重建信任:新时代的金融服务
重建信任:新时代的金融服务——约翰·C·博格,先锋集团创始人兼前董事长主题演讲
2003 年 9 月 16 日,佛罗里达州奥兰多,SunGard World 2003 大会
感谢各位邀请我,让我有幸在这样一个非凡的聚会上发言——在场的人都关心、且深切关心金融机构的未来,以及我们为那些将辛苦赚来的资产托付给我们的投资者所提供的服务。我们相聚在一个充满特殊挑战的时刻,这已不是秘密。
Restoring Trust: Financial Services in the New Era Keynote Speech by John C. Bogle Founder and former Chairman, The Vanguard Group At SunGard World 2003 Orlando, FL September 16, 2003 Thank you for honoring me with your invitation to address this remarkable gathering of human beings who care—and care deeply—about the future of financial institutions and the services we provide to the investors who have entrusted us with their hard-earned assets. It is no secret that we gather at a time of special challenge.
挑战有多大?不妨想想影响金融服务业的关键因素变化有多快、多彻底。不到四年前,1999 年即将跨入 2000 年时,千年虫问题——如果你还能记得这个缩写代表什么!——是当时的头号挑战。我们克服了它,计算机跨入了一个被标榜为全球经济新时代的新世纪。在一篇题为“长期繁荣”——居然起这么个名字——的文章中,新经济最热门的刊物《连线》杂志打出了这样的头条:“我们正面临二十五年繁荣、自由和全球更美好环境。你对这有问题吗?”
How much of a challenge? Just think about how quickly and radically the crucial factors that affect the financial services field have changed. Less than four years ago, as 1999 was about to roll into 2000, the Y2K issue—if you can still remember what that acronym stood for!—was the major challenge of the day. We overcame it, and our computers moved into a new century that was billed as a new era of growth for our global economy. In an article entitled, of all things, “The Long Boom,” WIRED magazine, the hottest publication of the new economy, headlined its story, “We’re Facing Twenty-Five Years of Prosperity, Freedom, and a Better Environment for the Whole World. You Got a Problem with That?”
谁会对此有意见呢?的确,读者们在读到《连线》杂志所称的“前所未有规模的全球繁荣的开端……一段持续的增长期,最终可能每十二年就让世界经济翻一番,并为地球上数十亿人带来日益增长的繁荣……这种增长将在很大程度上解决诸如贫困等看似棘手的问题,缓解世界各地的紧张局势,且完全不会对环境造成破坏性影响”——当他们读到这些时,必定已经垂涎欲滴了。
Who could possibly have a problem with that? Indeed, readers must have salivated as they anticipated, in WIRED’s words, “the beginnings of a global boom on a scale never experienced before . . . a period of sustained growth that could eventually double the world’s economy every dozen years and bring increasing prosperity for billions of people on the planet . . . growth that will do much to solve seemingly intractable problems like poverty, and ease tensions throughout the world, all without blowing the lid off the environment.”
那个极度看多的论点建立在几个支柱之上:美国的胜利、重大战争的终结、一波又一波的新技术浪潮、生产率的飙升、一个名副其实的全球市场,以及企业重组——“一个由开放社会在融合世界中驱动的良性循环……”总的来说,这是一个“极其乐观的文化基因。”(这是个我得去查的词。1)《连线》杂志的预测有一部分确实说准了。我们正在进入一个新时代。但是,至少到目前为止,这个新时代与那些预测截然相反。股市的长期繁荣变成了短暂崩盘。美国卷入了三场战争(反恐战争、伊拉克战争和阿富汗战争)。信息技术的增长率大幅下滑。我们的经济只是断断续续地从衰退中复苏。而企业的不法行为动摇了投资者的信心,以至于现代资本主义的本质——非常恰当地——正在受到质疑。
That wildly bullish thesis was based on the triumph of the United States, the end of major wars, waves of new technology, soaring productivity, a truly global market, and corporate restructuring—“a virtuous circle . . . driven by an open society in an integrated world.” In all, “a radically optimistically meme.” (A word I had to look up.1) Part of WIRED’s forecast was right on the mark. We were moving into a new era. But, so far at least, the new era has been the diametrical opposite of those predictions. The long boom in the stock market has been a short bust. The U.S. is engaged in three wars (terrorism, Iraq, and Afghanistan). The growth rate in information technology has slumped. Our economy is recovering only fitfully from the recession. And corporate malfeasance has shaken the confidence of investors to the point that the very nature of modern-day capitalism is—quite properly—being challenged.
这些挑战,恰巧都在金融服务领域的方方面面产生连锁反应,像分子一样与参与者相互作用。今天上午,我想讨论这些“迷因”:一种具有传染性的想法,像病毒一样复制,从一个大脑传到另一个大脑。迷因的作用方式和病毒一样,通过传播网络和人与人之间的面对面接触来扩散……它是文化演进的基本单位。
Each of these challenges, as it happens, reverberates across every single aspect of the financial services field, interacting like molecules on its participants. This morning I’d like to discuss these “Meme”: A contagious idea that replicates like a virus, passed on from mind to mind. Memes function the same way viruses do, propagating through communication networks and face-to-face contact between people . . . the basic unit of cultural evolution.
四个主要领域的回响,每个领域都各具其类的新时代面貌:金融市场、共同基金、信息技术,以及我们的资本主义体系。
reverberations in four major areas, each in its own kind of new era: the financial markets, mutual funds, information technology, and our capitalistic system.
股票市场进入新时代 让我们从金融市场的新时代说起。此前的时代里,20 世纪 90 年代的股市繁荣规模空前。在科技股、网络股以及纳斯达克指数中其他“新经济”股票的引领下,股票实际(经通胀调整)年化收益率飙升至惊人的 15%,这是美国股市两个世纪历史中第二好的十年表现,比美国历史常态的 6.7% 高出一倍多。
A New Era in the Stock Market Let’s begin with the new era in the financial markets. In the previous era, the stock market boom of the 1990s was unprecedented in its magnitude. Led by technology, dotcoms, and the other “new economy” stocks of the NASDAQ Index, the return on stocks soared to an astonishing real (inflation-adjusted) annual rate of 15%, the second best decade in the two-century history of our market, and more than double the historic U.S. norm of 6.7%.
然而,就在旧十年结束后短短几个月,市场突然逆转。美国上市公司的总市值伴随一声令人作呕的闷响暴跌,从 2000 年 3 月的 17 万亿美元峰值,一路跌至去年 10 月初的 9 万亿美元低点(或者说可能的低点)。(目前市值已回升至 11 万亿美元。)以纳斯达克指数下跌 78% (!) 为首的这场暴跌,使整个市场下挫了 50%。这种均值回归本不应让任何人感到意外,因为涨跌交替的周期历来是股票市场的特征。但它从根本上——而且理所应当地——动摇了过去那种认为普通股持股不会带来极端风险的传统智慧。
But only a few short months after the old decade ended, the market abruptly reversed course. The capitalized market value of U.S. corporations fell with a sickening thud, tumbling from its $17 trillion peak in March 2000, to a low—or probable low—of $9 trillion early last October. (The value has now recovered to $11 trillion.) Led by the 78%(!) decline in the NASDAQ Index, the total market fell by 50%. This reversion to the mean should have surprised no one, for the boom and bust cycle has characterized stock markets all through their history. But it has fundamentally, and properly, undermined the once-conventional wisdom that common stock ownership doesn’t entail extreme risks.
那些风险在本世纪头三年集中爆发了。股市提供的实际年化回报率为 –17%,除 1930–1933 年外,这是过去两个世纪里任何一个十年的最差开局。但随着这一轮下跌已成为过去,股市很可能在未来十年里提供正回报,虽然回报水平会比之前那个十年更温和——比如说,年化 6% 到 9% 的区间。我这么说,并非作为市场预言家(我远远算不上!),而是基于我半个世纪的观察:长期来看,推动股价的是股息收益率和盈利增长——投资回报——这一现实,而不是投资者为每一美元盈利愿意支付的瞬时价格(市盈率)所反映的估值感知——投机回报。
Those risks came home to roost in the first three years of this decade. Stocks have provided a real annual rate of return of –17%, with the exception of 1930-1933, the worst start for any decade in the past two centuries. But with that tumble now behind us, the stock market is likely to provide positive returns in the decade ahead, albeit at levels that are more modest than in the prior decade—say, in the range of 6% to 9% annually. I say that, not as a market seer (I’m hardly that!), but rather based on my half-century of observation that in the long run, it is the reality of dividend yields and earnings growth—investment return—that drive stock prices, not the perception of valuations—speculative return—reflected in the momentary prices that investors are willing to pay for a dollar of earnings (the price-earnings ratio).
想一想:1990 年代那 18% 的名义年化回报率,很大程度上是由 8% 的投机回报推动的——市盈率从 15 倍飙升到了 30 倍。起初 3% 的股息率加上 7% 的利润增长,带来了 10% 的投资回报。如今股息率只有大约 2%,而且——我猜测——未来利润增长会在 5% 或 6%,那么未来十年的投资回报大约会是 7.5%。但市盈率现在大约在 20 倍,这算不上便宜,而且我无法想象投机回报还能为这个总数增添多少。(当然,它也可能削减回报。)这样一个权益回报更温和的新时代,不可避免地会影响到金融服务业以及聚焦于此的科技公司。
Consider that the 18% nominal annual return of the 1990s was driven largely by a speculative return of 8%, as the price/earnings ratio rose from 15 times to 30 times. The 3% initial dividend yield plus a 7% earnings growth produced a 10% investment return. With today’s dividend yield only about 2%, and—I’m guessing—future earnings growth of 5% or 6%, the coming decade’s investment return would come to about 7½%. But the price/earnings ratio, now at about 20 times, is hardly cheap, and I can’t imagine that speculative return will add much to that total. (It could, of course, reduce it.) Such a new era of more subdued equity returns cannot help but affect both the financial services field and the technology firms that focus on it.
共同基金的新纪元 投资行业对市场尤其敏感,股市的繁荣引发资产管理领域的更猛烈的繁荣。事实上,共同基金公司的收入在 1990 年代以每年 20% 的实际速度增长,是国内生产总值增长速度的 6.5 倍。我们从未如此风光!
A New Era for Mutual Funds The investment business is especially market-sensitive, and the stock market boom led to an even more powerful boom in the asset management field. Indeed, revenues of mutual fund companies grew at a real rate of 20% a year during the 1990s, six and one-half times the GDP growth rate. We never had it so good!
但当熊市来临,同样的市场敏感性让整个行业的增长戛然而止。共同基金资产在 1990 年代从不到 1 万亿美元增长到近 7 万亿美元,如今虽有所回落,但仍处于健康的 6 万亿美元水平——这一稳定性得益于我们稳健的债券和货币市场基金资产。然而,股票基金资产已从 4 万亿美元暴跌至 2.3 万亿美元,且截至 2000 年 9 月的十二个月内 310 亿美元的现金流入,在过去一年已逆转为 45 亿美元的流出。
But when the bear market arrived, that same market sensitivity brought our industry’s growth to a screeching halt. While mutual fund assets grew from less than $1 trillion to nearly $7 trillion during the 1990s, they now stand at a smaller, but still healthy, $6 trillion, a stability engendered by our healthy bond and money market fund assets. Equity fund assets, however, have tumbled from $4 trillion to $2.3 trillion, with a cash inflow of $310 billion in the twelve months ended September 2000 reversing to an outflow of $45 billion during the past year.
股市的繁荣与崩盘,以及信息技术催生的日益丰富的投资者服务,在共同基金行业扮演了至关重要的角色——而结果并不完全令人愉快。我们利用了科技引领“新经济”这一理念,推广了我们表现最激进的基金,并创设了约 500 只(!)新型、高风险、激进成长型和行业型基金,其核心正是科技股和电信股。此外,我们将我们所提供服务的每一个潜在科技进步都变成了现实,加快了我们的活动节奏。基金投资组合的年换手率飙升,平均超过 100%,而我们的基金投资者资本的换手率达到每年 40%,这意味着典型的平均持有期仅为 2.5 年,对于这一在我看来始终是人类心智设计出的长期投资最佳载体而言,其短视程度令人震惊。
The stock market boom and bust, as well as the burgeoning panoply of investor services that information technology has engendered, have played a vital role in the mutual fund industry—and the outcome has not been entirely happy. We exploited the idea of a tech-led “new economy,” promoted our highest-flying funds, and created some 500(!) new, and risky, aggressive growth and sector funds with technology and telecommunications stocks at their very core. Further, we turned each new potential tech advance in the services we provide into a reality, speeding up our activity levels. Fund portfolio turnover soared to an average of more than 100% per year, and the turnover of our fund investors’ capital reached an annual rate of 40%, suggesting a typical average holding period of but 2½ years, stunningly short-term for what I’ve always thought of as the finest medium for long-term investing ever designed by the mind of man.
与直觉相悖的是,尽管我们在这个蓬勃发展的行业中坐享惊人的规模经济,股票基金的费用率却持续攀升。算上高昂的换手成本、销售费用和其他支出,基金的综合年成本已接近 3%。这 3% 的成本带来的结果毫不意外:在 1984 年至 2002 年期间,股票市场本身(标普 500 指数)的年回报率为 12%,而普通共同基金的年回报率仅略高于 9%。更糟的是,大部分基金投资者直到股价创下历史新高时才入场,而且他们一进门就把资金投向了行业内最具投机性的基金。结果:普通基金持有人每年仅获得约 2.6% 的回报,还不如把钱存在银行赚得多。基金行业欠下了巨额账,我们的新时代则预示着巨大的挑战。
Counterintuitively, despite the staggering economies of scale we enjoy in this burgeoning industry, equity fund expense ratios kept rising. With high turnover costs, sales charges, and other expenses, fund all-in costs now approach 3% per year. The unsurprising result of this 3% cost: During the 1984-2002 period, when the stock market itself (the Standard & Poor’s 500 Stock Index) delivered an annual return of 12%, the average mutual fund delivered a return of only slightly over 9%. To make matters worse, most fund investors didn’t come to the party until stock prices were hitting all-time highs, and when they arrived, they invested their resources in the industry’s most speculative funds. Result: The average fund shareholder earned only about 2.6% per year, less than they would have earned had they left their money in the bank. The fund industry has a lot to answer for, and our new era portends huge challenges.
技术行业的新纪元随着共同基金行业及其姊妹金融机构在 IT 应用上领跑,20 世纪 90 年代成了信息技术的黄金年代。科技收入的增长速度达到了美国国内生产总值(GDP)增长率的五倍。但伴随经济放缓,以及基金和其他 IT 领域的金融用户承受熊市压力,增长大幅减缓。如今,科技收入增速与 GDP 增速已基本同步。即便未来 IT 行业有望恢复到,比方说,GDP 增速两倍的水平,对已然庞大的科技产业而言,实现这一目标也绝非易事。
A New Era for Technology With the burgeoning mutual fund industry and its sister financial institutions leading the way in using IT, the 1990s were a golden era for information technology. Tech revenues grew at five times the rate of our nation’s gross domestic product. But as our economy slowed and funds and other financial users of IT faced the pressure of the bear market, growth slowed dramatically. Today, technology revenues are growing at a rate that is tracking GDP one-for-one. And while future IT may return to a level of, say, twice GDP growth, achieving that goal would be no small achievement for the now-giant technology industry.
同样重要的是技术环境内部正在发生的变化。虽然早先那个令人惊叹的创新时代围绕着“杀手级应用”、数据系统和个人电脑的崛起展开,但我们如今正迅速走向技术融入日常商业主流的阶段,这一趋势在金融服务公司中最为明显。然而,尽管这些公司早先从信息技术投资中获得了高额回报,如今降低成本似乎成了当务之急。重点转向了改进系统集成,并且,信不信由你(正如《伦敦经济学人》所言),“传统分行网络的复兴”。
Equally important is what’s happening within the technology environment. While the earlier era of incredible innovation revolved around “killer apps,” data systems, and the rise of the personal computer, we are now rapidly moving toward the integration of technology into the mainstream of day-to-day business, a trend most obvious among financial services firms. But while such firms garnered high returns on their earlier information technology investments, cost-cutting now seems to be the order of the day. The focus is on improved systems integration and, believe it or not (as the London Economist put it), “the revival of old-fashioned branch networks.”
在早期时代,投资经理们用海量信息淹没投资者;开发程序化交易;创造复杂、奇特的投资策略;并提供服务让投资者能以最低成本进行无止境的交易。只要我们能提供的服务,我们就提供,信息技术是我们的主宰。在新的时代,我们必须让信息成为我们的仆人,批判性地审视:我们向投资者客户提供的加速交易服务与泛滥信息,由于聚焦于当下而非长远,是否反而适得其反。
In the earlier era, investment managers surfeited investors with cascading information; developed program trading; created complex, exotic investment strategies; and provided services that enabled investors to trade endlessly at minimum costs. If we could provide the service, we did provide it, and information technology was our master. In the new era, we must make information our servant, critically examining whether the speeded-up trading services and plethora of information we give to our investor clients have, by focusing on the here and now rather than the long pull, been counterproductive.
这些挑战出现之际,其他信息技术挑战也同样层出不穷——个人隐私、数据安全、无用垃圾邮件和骚扰信息、以及计算机病毒。在我们这个新的网络社会里,各种相互关联的复杂性使得技术一旦失效,就会造成巨大损失,比如哥伦比亚号航天飞机失事,以及最近让整个美国东北部陷入黑暗的大停电。在当今世界,系统失灵的影响可能是毁灭性的。因此,技术的新时代预示着增长放缓、风险上升。
These challenges come at a time when other information technology challenges abound—in personal privacy, in data security, in useless spam and unsolicited information, and in computer viruses. Given the interlinked complexities of our existence in our new wired society, when technology fails us, it fails us greatly, as in the Columbia space shuttle disaster and the recent power failure that left the entire northeastern United States in the dark. In today’s world, the effects of system failure can be devastating. The new era for technology, then, promises lower growth and higher risks.
公司治理的新时代 股市更加低迷、共同基金行业辜负了投资者的信任、IT 增长相应放缓——这些挑战加在一起,已经让我们的环境变得很不容易。但还不止这些。随之而来的美国企业界的信任缺失——而企业界正是驱动我国大部分增长的巨大引擎——用一句反讽的话来说,简直是雪上加霜。
A New Era for Corporate Governance The combined challenges of a more subdued stock market, a mutual fund industry that has failed to measure up to the trust of investors, and a commensurate slowing of IT growth have hardly made our environment an easy one. But there is more. The accompanying breach of trust by corporate America, the giant engine that drives much of our nation’s growth, was, perversely speaking, the icing on the cake.
这种信任缺失的根本原因,是传统的所有者资本主义逐渐蜕变成为一种新的管理者资本主义。资本主义自 19 世纪初诞生之日起,就建立在信任之上。它必须如此。当商品和服务的制造者与买卖双方在市场中面对面相遇时,一种良性的信任循环就形成了:“给我做好产品,以公平价格卖给我,我还会再来买。”企业的所有者——也就是投入资本的人——为了寻求合理的投资回报,会小心翼翼地看管自己的企业。
The root cause of that breach of trust was the gradual metamorphosis of traditional owners’ capitalism to a new system of managers’ capitalism. From its earliest days at the start of the nineteenth century, capitalism was based on trust. It had to be. As makers of goods and services and buyers and sellers met face-to-face in the marketplace, a virtuous circle of trust developed: “Make me a good product, sell it to me at a fair price, and I’ll be back for more.” Seeking a reasonable return on their investment, the owners of the business—those who put up the capital—watched over it with care.
但在接下来的两个世纪里,资本的需求增长到了惊人的规模。企业的所有权不可避免地从私人企业家转移到了公众投资者手中。随着股权分散在数百万投资者之间,没有任何一方占据主导地位,公司的控制权便从所有者转移到了管理者手中。然而,旨在确保管理层服务于所有者的制度结构,却未能胜任这一任务。董事会的权力逐渐被侵蚀,由此产生的真空被新的帝王式首席执行官所填补,他不仅被视为企业的老板,也被视为董事会的老板。公共会计师——曾经是公司财务报表的独立专业评估者——变成了管理层的业务顾问和合伙人,财务报告标准也随之滑坡。
But over the next two centuries, the need for capital grew to staggering proportions. The ownership of business inevitably moved from private entrepreneurs to public investors. And as shareholdings became diffused among millions of investors, none with a dominant position, the control of firms shifted from owner to manager. But the institutional structure that developed to assure that management would serve the owners was not up to the task. The power of the board of directors gradually eroded, creating a vacuum that was filled by the newly-imperial chief executive, who came to be seen not only as boss of the business, but boss of the board. Public accountants, once independent professional evaluators of a firm’s financial statements, became management’s business consultant and partner, and financial reporting standards eroded.
与此同时,股东们的关注点从长期——在一个充满竞争、创新和资本主义经济中,日复一日艰难地构建公司的内在价值——转向了短期——通过炒作报告的营业利润来推高公司股价这一远为容易的任务。最终结果是:糟糕的商业决策;愚蠢的资本支出;不明智的并购;以及极其过分的过高薪酬。巨量的股票期权被随意赠予,其虚假理由是:转瞬即逝的股价是衡量商业成功的有效标准。总而言之,对资本主义来说,这是一个黑暗的时代。
Simultaneously, stockholders turned their focus from the long-term—the eternally tough job of building the intrinsic value of the corporation in a competitive, innovative, capitalistic economy—to the short-term—the far easier task of building the momentary price of the corporation’s stock by hyping reported operating earnings. Net result: Bad business decisions; foolish capital expenditures; unwise mergers; and grotesquely excessive executive compensation. Mega-grants of stock options were given away, on the false rationale that transitory stock prices were a valid measure of business success. In all, it was a dark era for capitalism.
怎么办?
What’s to be Done?
然而,如果黎明前总是最黑暗——像我这样的乐观主义者相信这一点——那么眼下正是投身于我们这个虽受挑战但依然充满活力的经济领域的绝佳时机。毕竟,我们经历了一场近乎“完美风暴”的事件——熊市、陷入困境的基金行业、科技增长放缓、以及投资者信任缺失同时相互作用——但我们仍然齐聚一堂,共同思考如何建设一个更美好的世界。如果你在挑战中茁壮成长,你会热爱未来十年。
Yet if it’s always darkest before the dawn, as the optimist in me believes, then this is a great moment to be part of this challenged but nonetheless vibrant sector of our economy. After all, we’ve been through something akin to “a perfect storm”—the simultaneous interaction of a bear market, a beleaguered fund industry, a slowdown in tech growth, and a breach of investor confidence—yet we’re all here together to consider ways to build a better world. If you thrive on challenge, you’ll love the coming decade.
最后,我想谈谈我认为我们应该推进的一些方向:1. 在一个股市更为低迷的新时代,我们最好清醒地认识到:现有水平的金融中介成本将消耗投资者所获得的回报中一个过高的、不可接受的比例。虽然 3% 的成本在股市回报率为 15% 时只消耗了(?)20% 的回报,但在回报率为 7½% 时,它却消耗了 40%(!)的回报。如果要让共同基金投资者得到公平的待遇,将成本从系统中剔除至关重要。降低管理费是第一步;降低营销成本是第二步;降低投资组合周转成本则是第三步。
Let me close with my views as to some directions in which we should move: 1. In the new era with a more subdued stock market, we’d best wake up to the fact that the existing level of financial intermediation costs will consume an unacceptably large proportion of the returns earned by investors. While a 3% cost consumes only(?) 20% of a 15% stock market return, it consumes 40%(!) of a 7½% return. If we are to give mutual fund investors a fair shake, taking costs out of the system is essential. Reduced management fees are one step; reduced marketing costs another; and reduced portfolio turnover costs yet another.
2. 信息技术公司必须在提高金融服务效率和投资者服务方面做出重要贡献。我们需要向股东提供的不仅仅是更多的信息,而是更相关的信息——关于可能的回报、潜在的风险、成本的影响、冲动投资的危险,以及坚持到底的必要性。我们还必须从运营中挤出每一分钱浪费。信息技术可以在完成这项任务中发挥不可估量的作用,但正如本次会议的主题所暗示的,存在着“盈利的新规则”。其中一条新规则必须是利用技术的效率,来降低基金管理者承担的成本,以及基金股东承担的成本。
2. Information technology firms must make a vital contribution to improving financial service efficiency and investor services. We need to provide to our shareholders, not just more information, but more relevant information, about likely returns, potential risks, the impact of costs, the perils of hair-trigger investing, and the need to stay the course. We also must drag every penny of waste out of our operations. IT can help immeasurably in this task, but as the theme of this conference suggests, there are “new rules for profitability.” One new rule must be to capture the efficiency of technology to reduce, not only the costs borne by fund managers, but the costs borne by fund shareholders.
3. 在大牛市期间,共同基金公司在一个推销时代里繁荣发展——它们组织、提供和推销高风险基金,选择的是对销售商来说最佳、而对投资者来说最差的时机进行销售。新时代迫切要求我们回归信托责任的根源——将股东放在第一位。这将需要韧性,但我们必须反弹,走向一个新的、更好的方向。
3. During the great bull market, mutual fund firms have prospered in an era of salesmanship, organizing, offering, and promoting risky funds at the best time for distributors to sell them and the worst time for investors to buy them. The new era cries out for a return to our roots of stewardship—putting the shareholder first. That will require resilience, but we must bounce back in a new and better direction.
4. 在投机性高、周转率高的牛市时代,共同基金管理人忘记了他们作为负责任的企业公民的职责。当所有者自己都不关心公司治理时,还有谁应该关心呢?当我们最终回归作为长期投资者的本源——指数基金必须在这一趋势中处于,嗯,先锋地位——我们不仅将很好地服务于我们的基金股东,也将很好地服务于我们的社会。
4. In the speculative, high turnover era of the bull market, mutual funds managers forgot their duty to act as responsible corporate citizens. And when owners don’t care about corporate governance, who on earth should? When we at last return to our roots as long-term investors— and index funds must be in the, well, vanguard of this trend—we will serve, not only our fund shareholders, but our society well.
5. 我们的任务,并非像人们常说的那样,是“恢复投资者对我们金融体系诚信的信心”。而是要恢复体系的诚信本身。股票所有者需要有效的治理、对高管薪酬设置上限、以及诚实的会计制度。如果我们得不到这些,我们就需要有权获取公司的委托投票说明书,以便提名董事并要求实施正当的公司行为。当我们再次开始以所有者的身份行事并实施这些改革时,投资者的信心就会回来,如同黎明必然跟随黑暗一样确定。
5. Our task is not, as it is so often said, “restoring the confidence of investors in the integrity of our financial system.” It is restoring the integrity of the system. Stock owners need effective governance, a lid on executive compensation, and honest accounting. And if we don’t get it, we need the right to gain access to corporate proxy statements in order to nominate directors and demand proper corporate practices. When we again begin to act as owners and implement those reforms, the confidence of investors will return, as surely as the dawn follows the darkness.
因此,使命是清晰的。剩下的只是极其、极其艰巨的执行工作。虽然在金融服务领域,可能有一些只会阳光草地上爱国的纸上爱国者和夏季战士,会畏缩于我们今天所面对的激动人心的挑战,但我们大多数人宁愿坚持下去,因为我们知道,用托马斯·潘恩的话来说,“冲突越艰难,胜利越光荣。”我很高兴能为这一服务于美国投资者的关键使命尽我所能,并恳请你们加入我。
So the mission is clear. All that remains is the tough, tough job of implementation. While there may be some sunshine patriots and summer soldiers in the financial services field who would shrink from the exciting challenges we face today, most of us would rater persevere, knowing that in Thomas Paine’s words, “the harder the conflict, the more glorious the triumph.” I’m delighted to contribute whatever I can to this vital mission in the service of America’s investors, and I urge you to join me.
注:本演讲中表达的观点不一定代表先锋集团现任管理层的看法。© 版权所有 2005,约翰·C·博格尔
Note: The opinions expressed in this speech do not necessarily represent the views of Vanguard’s present management. © Copyright 2005 by John C. Bogle