先锋——普林斯顿之子

2004 · 演讲 · 原文约 4511 词
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先锋——普林斯顿之子

约翰·博格在普林斯顿 1951 届毕业典礼上的主题演讲

先锋投资集团创始人

普林斯顿创业者网络第五届全国年会

新泽西州普林斯顿

2004 年 5 月 28 日

让我开门见山:没有普林斯顿,就没有先锋。正是得益于一系列幸运的巧合——始于我被这所最好的老校园录取,成为伟大的 1951 届一员——才最终促成了先锋的创立。如今我们管理着约 7200 亿美元的投资者资产,是全球规模最大的两家共同基金公司之一。和所有数字一样,这个数字本身并不特别重要。重要的是,我们创建了一种独特的公司架构,一种更高效、更经济的服务投资者的方式,以及一套全新的投资管理方法——这三者共同开始重塑金融界对投资的思考方式。

Vanguard—Child of Princeton Keynote Speech by John C. Bogle, Princeton 1951 Founder, The Vanguard Group of Investment Companies The Princeton Entrepreneurs’ Network 5th Annual National Conference Princeton, New Jersey May 28, 2004 Let me get right to the point: Were there no Princeton, there would be no Vanguard. For it was only a wonderful series of happy accidents—beginning with my admission to this best old place of all as a member of the great Class of 1951—that led to the creation of Vanguard. Today we manage some $720 billion of investor assets, one of the two largest mutual fund complexes in the world. Like all numbers, that number, in and of itself, is not particularly important. What is important is that we created a unique corporate structure, a more efficient and economical way to serve investors, and a new way of managing investments that together have begun to reshape the way the financial community thinks about investing.

先锋集团当然也是一个关于创业的故事。但这是另一种奇特的创业,涉及:(1)将现有企业转型为更高价值的用途;(2)一种几乎不需要资本资产的生意;(3)一种创新的公司结构,它不太可能被复制——甚至在 50 年后也尚未被复制;(4)一个原创想法——指数共同基金,简单来说就是“杀手级应用”——一种从经验上无法被改进的投资策略。如果这还不足以说明先锋集团的非典型性,我还要补充一点:(5)这家公司特意设计成不为其创始人提供股权或创业回报。(关于这点后面再详细说!)如果这五个奇特之处让我在创业这个话题上失去了权威发言的资格,那也无妨。但我还是会尽力一试。

Of course Vanguard is a story of entrepreneurship, too. But an odd kind of entrepreneurship, involving, (1) the conversion of an existing enterprise to a higher use. (2) A business that demands virtually no capital assets. (3) An innovative corporate structure that was unlikely to be—and even 50 years later has yet to be—copied. (4) An original idea, the index mutual fund, which, simply put is the “killer app”—an investment strategy that cannot be empirically improved upon. And if that’s not enough to make Vanguard atypical, I would add: (5) A firm specifically designed to provide neither equity nor entrepreneurial reward for its creators. (More about that later!) If those five peculiarities undermine my credentials to speak authoritatively on entrepreneurship, so be it. But I’ll try, anyway.

一切从这里开始。这个故事,要从我漫长人生中获得的第一个、也是近乎无尽机会中的第一个说起。它发生在布莱尔学院,靠着一份奖学金和一份工作,我在那里接受了极好的大学预科教育。这份无价的优势,随后又为我带来了另一个机会。靠着另一份全额奖学金以及在大学食堂打工,我在 1947 年夏末进入了普林斯顿大学。(那时入学可容易多了!)

Where It All Began The story begins with the first of the almost infinite number of breaks I’ve been given during my long life. It came at Blair Academy , where, thanks to a scholarship and a job, I received a splendid college preparatory education. That priceless advantage, in turn, presented me with another break. With the help of another full scholarship and a job waiting on tables in Commons, I entered Princeton University in the late summer of 1947. (It was easier to get admitted then!)

尽管我在布莱尔中学学业优异,但刚进入普林斯顿大学时还是觉得举步维艰。1948 年秋,当我吃力地啃着保罗·萨缪尔森《经济学:入门分析》第一版时,打击接踵而至。这本该是我主修专业的愉快入门,结果期中考试成绩却只得了 4+(相当于今天的 D+),毫不冤枉。其他科目的成绩也好不到哪儿去,我的奖学金——因而也就是我在普林斯顿的前途(我没有任何校外经济来源)——岌岌可危。但学期结束时,我的成绩总算有了不错的回升……达到了平淡无奇的 3 分(今天相当于 C)的平均绩点。

Despite my academic success at Blair, I found the early going at Princeton tough. The low point came in the autumn of 1948, when I struggled with the first edition of Paul Samuelson’s Economics: An Introductory Analysis. It was not a happy introduction to my major field of study, and I earned a well-deserved 4+ (D+ today) as my mid-term grade. With my other grades scarcely more worthy, my scholarship—and hence my Princeton career, for I had not a sou of outside financial support—was in dire jeopardy. But I ended the term with a nice upsurge . . . to a hardly distinguished 3 (today, C) average.

学术上的成就依然与我无缘,但一年后,命运再次向我微笑。我决心写一篇前人从未写过的毕业论文,亚当·斯密、卡尔·马克思和约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯显然不在我的考虑之列。但该选什么题目呢?1949 年 12 月,我在当时全新的 费尔斯通图书馆 阅览室翻阅《财富》杂志,翻到第 116 页时停下,读到了一篇关于我从未想象过的企业的文章。当“波士顿的大钱”将共同基金行业描述为“规模虽小却充满争议”时,这个稚嫩又不自信——但意志坚定——的年轻人决定,共同基金应该成为他论文的主题。我将其命名为“投资公司的经济角色”。因此,我今天要讲的第一个创业课是:#1. 撞大运。

Academic distinction continued to elude me, but a year later fate smiled down on me once again. Determined to write my senior thesis on a subject that no previous thesis had ever tackled, Adam Smith, Karl Marx, and John Maynard Keynes were hardly on my list. But what topic should I choose? Perusing Fortune magazine in the reading room of the then-brand-new Firestone library in December 1949, I paused on page 116 to read an article about a business which I had never even imagined. And when “Big Money in Boston” described the mutual fund industry as “tiny but contentious,” this callow and insecure—but determined—young kid decided that mutual funds should be the topic of his thesis. I entitled it, “The Economic Role of the Investment Company.” Thus, the first Entrepreneurial Lesson that I’ll present today: #1. Get lucky.

企业的设计蓝图?

A Design for a Business?

我说不清,那篇论文是否就勾勒出了先锋集团未来的蓝图。但我毫不怀疑,50 年后,我当年确定的许多价值观,确实证明是我们非凡增长的核心所在。“共同基金的主要职责是其投资组合的管理。其他一切皆为附属……未来行业的增长,可以通过降低销售佣金和管理费来实现最大化”,并且,以一个华丽的修辞作结,基金应该“以最高效、最诚信、最经济的方式运营。”这是年少无知时的理想主义?还是为 25 年后才会崛起的企业绘制的蓝图?我把这个问题留给你来判断。但无论我当年脑子里真正想的是什么,那篇论文都明确提出了一个主张:共同基金股东应该得到公平的待遇。

I can’t tell you that my thesis laid out the design for what Vanguard would become. But there’s no question that many of the values I identified then would, 50 years later, prove to lie at the very core of our remarkable growth. “The principal function of mutual funds is the management of their investment portfolios. Everything else is incidental . . . Future industry growth can be maximized by a reduction of sales loads and management fees,” and, with a final rhetorical flourish, funds should operate “in the most efficient, honest, and economical way possible.” Sophomoric idealism? A design for the enterprise that would emerge a quarter-century later? I’ll leave it to you to decide. But whatever was truly in my mind all those years ago, the thesis clearly put forth the proposition that mutual fund shareholders ought to be given a fair shake.

无论如何,我在普林斯顿大学费尔斯通图书馆的研究室里,花费无数小时研究和分析这个行业,最终得到了 1+ 的成绩,并以优等拉丁文学位毕业——这对我来说,是普林斯顿学术生涯中一个令人愉悦、甚至完全出乎意料的结局。而且还有了一个美好的后续:半个世纪后,彼时已是诺贝尔经济学奖得主的萨缪尔森博士,为我的第一本书写了序言!(另一个反转是:1999 年,正是《财富》杂志让我接触这个行业 50 年之后,还是这本杂志,将我评为 20 世纪四大投资巨人之一。)创业教训第 2 条:把灾难变成胜利。

In any event, the countless hours I spent researching and analyzing the industry in my carrel at Firestone was rewarded with a 1+, and led to a magna cum laude diploma—a delightful, if totally unexpected, finale for my academic career at Princeton. And it came with a fine sequel: A half-century later, Dr. Samuelson, by then a Nobel Laureate in Economics, would write the foreword to my first book! (Another turnabout: In 1999, exactly 50 years after Fortune introduced me to the industry, that very magazine named me one of the four Investment Giants of the 20th century.) Entrepreneurial Lesson #2. Turn disaster into triumph.

命运再次对我露出了微笑,当年一位杰出的普林斯顿校友、1920 届毕业生、惠灵顿基金的创始人沃尔特·L·摩根读了我的毕业论文。用他自己的话说:“很大程度上是因为那篇论文,我们邀请博格尔加入了惠灵顿团队。”尽管我曾为踏入这个“规模虽小却充满争议”的行业而痛苦挣扎,但论文研究已让我确信,这个行业的未来将一片光明。于是,我把赌注押在这位伟人身上——他是我终生的挚友,直到 1998 年以 100 岁高龄辞世——从此义无反顾。他给了我一生难遇的机会。愿他的灵魂安息!创业教训之三:找个导师。

Fate smiled on me yet again when a great Princetonian named Walter L. Morgan, Class of 1920 and the founder of Wellington Fund, read my thesis. In his own words: “Largely as a result of his thesis, we have added Mr. Bogle to our Wellington organization.” While I agonized over the risks of going into that “tiny but contentious” business, my thesis research had persuaded me that the industry’s future would be bright. So I cast my lot with this great man, my good friend until his death at age 100 in 1998, and never looked back. He had given me the opportunity of a lifetime. Bless his soul! Entrepreneurial Lesson #3. Get a mentor.

先入行,后出局。到 1965 年,摩根先生已明确表示我将成为他的继任者。那时,公司落后于同行,他告诉我“不惜一切代价”去解决问题。年轻气盛(当时我年仅 36 岁),我策划了一次合并:与一群由四位“神童”组成的团队联手,他们在过去六年里取得了非凡的投资业绩记录。(这种做法——认为过往的基金业绩能预测未来表现——当然,与我今天所信奉的一切背道而驰。这是一个巨大的教训!)我们五位神童一起高飞了几年,然后便急转直下。20 世纪 60 年代中期“沸腾年代”投机热潮的股市泡沫“散了又散”。就像最近的“新经济”泡沫一样,它破裂了,随后在 1973-1974 年间市场下跌了 50%。曾经快乐的合伙人团队分崩离析。1974 年 1 月,我被赶下了我本以为属于自己的公司的领导职位。创业者教训第 4 条:被开除。

In the Business, then Out By 1965, Mr. Morgan had made it clear that I would be his successor. At that time, the Company was lagging its peers, and he told me to “do whatever it takes” to solve our problems. Young and headstrong (I was then but 36 years of age), I put together a merger with a high flying group of four “whiz kids” who had achieved an extraordinary record of investment performance over the preceding six years. (Such an approach—believing that past fund performance has the power to predict future performance— is, of course, antithetical to everything I believe today. It was a great lesson!) Together, we five whiz kids whizzed high for a few years. And then we whizzed low. The speculative fever in the stock market during the “Go-Go Era” of the mid-1960s “went-went.” Just like the recent “new economy” bubble, it burst, and was followed by a 50% market decline in 1973-1974. The once happy band of partners had a falling out, and in January 1974 I was deposed as the head of what I had considered my company. Entrepreneurial Lesson #4. Get fired.

但若不是 1951 年的那次入职——让我有幸进入这个行业——和 1974 年的那次解雇——又让我突然离开这个行业——就不会有今天的先锋领航。被威灵顿管理公司免去职务后,我决定走一条前所未有的路。解雇我的那些公司董事在威灵顿基金董事会中只占少数,于是我向基金董事会提出了一项全新的方案:让该基金及其当时旗下的十只关联基金(如今已有一百只)宣布从管理人那里独立出来,并聘用我担任董事长兼首席执行官。

But without both the 1951 hiring, which providentially brought me into this industry, and the 1974 firing, which abruptly took me out of it, there would be no Vanguard today. Removed from my position at Wellington Management Company, I decided to pursue an unprecedented course of action. The company directors who fired me composed only a minority of the board of Wellington Fund itself, so I went to the fund board with a novel proposal: Have the Fund, and its then-ten associated funds (today there are 100), declare their independence from their manager, and retain me as their chairman and CEO.

这倒不完全是 1776 年北美殖民地让乔治三世国王滚蛋那种事。但基金独立——即基金有权在自身领导下为自己的股东利益运作,不受外部管理公司支配——才是我提案的核心。说来难以置信!经过长达七个月的激烈辩论,我们赢得了这场战役,得以在真正互助的基础上管理这些基金,由基金自己全资拥有的子公司以成本价运营。第五条企业家经验:敢于大胆行动!

It wasn’t exactly the Colonies telling King George III to get lost, as it were, in 1776. But fund independence—the right of a fund to operate with its own leadership, in the interest of its own shareholders, free of domination by the fund’s outside manager—was at the heart of my proposal. Mirabile dictu! After a contentious debate lasting seven months, we won the battle to administer the funds on a truly mutual basis, under which they would be operated, at cost, by their own wholly-owned subsidiary. Entrepreneurial Lesson #5. Dare to be bold!

距离公司注册仅有几周时间,我们还没给新公司取好名字。当然,命运再次眷顾了我们。1974 年夏末,一位古董版画商贩来到我的办公室,带来了一些拿破仑战争时期的小型铜版画,描绘的是威灵顿公爵的军事战役——46 年前,摩根先生正是以这位公爵的名字命名了他的第一只共同基金。我买下这些版画后,他又向我推荐了同一时期的英国海战系列版画。我素来迷恋大海及其永恒的神秘感,于是也一并买下。商贩喜出望外,把拆下这些版画的那本书也赠送给了我。就像 25 年前我在火石图书馆翻阅《财富》杂志一样,我又一次翻阅起书中的文字。

With only weeks to go before our incorporation, we still had no name for the new firm. Fate, of course, smiled again. In the late summer of 1974, a dealer in antique prints came by my office with some small engravings from the Napoleonic War era, illustrating the military battles of the Duke of Wellington, for whom Mr. Morgan had named his first mutual fund 46 years earlier. When I bought them, he offered me some companion prints of the British naval battles of the same era. Ever enticed by the sea and its timeless mystery, I bought them, too. Delighted, the dealer gave me the book from which they had been removed. Even as I had browsed through Fortune in Firestone Library 25 years earlier, I again browsed through the text.

凭着我一贯的好运气,我碰巧翻到了历史性的尼罗河战役的故事——在那场战役中,纳尔逊勋爵击沉了法国舰队,粉碎了拿破仑征服世界的梦想。纳尔逊从他的旗舰“先锋号”上发回了凯旋的战报,电文写道:“先锋号,尼罗河口外。”威灵顿领带的关联、皇家海军“先锋号”(HMS Vanguard)所承载的自豪海军传统,以及“先锋”(vanguard)这个名字所蕴含的前沿意味,加在一起让我难以抗拒。于是在 1974 年 9 月 24 日,将近 30 年前,先锋集团(The Vanguard Group)诞生了。请思考这个三段论:没有普林斯顿,就没有论文;没有论文,就没有摩根;没有摩根,就没有威灵顿;没有威灵顿,就没有合并;没有合并,就没有被解雇;没有被解雇,就没有先锋。没有普林斯顿这位“父辈”,先锋这个“孩子”就根本不会出生。创业教训第 6 条:多次走运,胜过一次走运。

With my usual luck, I happened to turn to the saga of the historic Battle of the Nile, where Lord Nelson sank the French fleet and ended Napoleon’s dreams of world conquest. There was Nelson’s triumphant dispatch from his flagship, “Vanguard, off the mouth of the Nile.” Together, the Wellington tie-in, the proud naval tradition embodied in HMS Vanguard, and the leading-edge implication of the name vanguard were more than I could resist. So on September 24, 1974, nearly 30 years ago, The Vanguard Group was born. Consider this syllogism: No Princeton, no thesis; no thesis, no Morgan; no Morgan, no Wellington; no Wellington, no merger; no merger, no firing; no firing, no Vanguard. Without Princeton the patriarch, Vanguard the child would never have been born. Entrepreneurial Lesson #6. Getting lucky multiple times beats getting lucky once.

狭隘的授权。鉴于先锋基金诞生于激烈争辩的熔炉之中,基金董事们决定——在基金自己拥有的新型共同结构下——只授予先锋基金最狭隘的授权。我们的唯一任务是处理基金的行政管理。当我们的长期航程开始时,仅有 28 名成员的团队只负责基金的运营、法律和财务事务。但行政管理仅仅是代表共同基金活动的三角形三边之一——而且可以说是最不重要的一边。

A Narrow Mandate Given the fiery crucible of contention out of which Vanguard was born, the Fund directors decided to allow Vanguard—owned, under its new mutual structure, by the funds themselves—only the narrowest of mandates. Our sole task was to handle the Fund’s administration. Our crew, numbering only 28 members when we began the long voyage, was responsible only for the Fund’s operating, legal, and financial affairs. But administration comprises but one of the three sides—and arguably the least important side—of the triangle that represents mutual fund activities.

三角形的另外两条边上——投资管理与份额发行——更为关键,将留给我的竞争对手威灵顿管理公司。然而,即使不是天才也能明白,我们的命运将由我们创造什么样的基金、这些基金能否取得卓越的投资回报、以及基金的份额如何营销及营销效果如何来共同决定。当我们被禁止主导这些活动时,我就知道前路坎坷。创业教训第 7 条:永远不要气馁。

The other two, more critical, sides of the triangle—investment management and share distribution—were to remain with my rivals at Wellington Management. Yet it didn’t take a genius to realize that our destiny would be determined by what kind of funds we created, by whether the funds could attain superior investment returns, and by how—and how effectively—the funds’ shares were marketed. When we were prohibited from presiding over these activities, I knew that a rough road lay ahead. Entrepreneurial Lesson #7. Never get discouraged.

投资管理不在先锋集团的授权范围内,这一事实促使我们在几个月内采取了一项前所未有的行动,这个行动在今天看来显而易见——这是我多年来一直酝酿的一个想法。基于我在普林斯顿论文中收集的证据,我曾写道,共同基金应“不声称超越市场平均水平”。这个想法是否预示了我后来对通过指数基金简单匹配市场的兴趣?老实说,我不知道。但早在 1951 年写下那些话时,那个时刻很可能就是埋下种子的时刻,这颗种子在 1975 年 9 月发芽,让我向基金董事会推荐:由先锋集团组织并运营历史上第一只市场指数共同基金。

The fact that investment management was outside of Vanguard’s mandate led us, within months, to an unprecedented action that today seems obvious—the fruition of an idea I had toyed with for years. Based on evidence that I had gathered in my Princeton thesis, I had written that mutual funds should “make no claim to superiority over the market averages.” Was this thought the precursor of my later interest in simply matching the market with an index fund? Honestly, I don’t know. But when I wrote those words way back in 1951, that moment may well have been when the seed was planted that germinated into my recommendation to the fund Board of Directors in September 1975: that Vanguard organize and operate the first market index mutual fund in history.

当董事会提醒我投资管理不在先锋集团的授权范围内时,我辩称指数基金并非“管理”而来的;它只是简单持有标普 500 指数中的所有 500 只股票。无论是否在狡辩,这个论点勉强获得了通过。我们在 1975 年末组织这只基金时,已经进入了基金三角形的第二条边——投资侧。第一指数投资信托(现名为先锋 500 指数基金)多年来被嘲笑为“博格的蠢行”,直到近十年后的 1984 年才被模仿。多么棒的想法!但如今,我们最初的指数基金已是全球最大的共同基金。创业教训第 8 条:爱默生说得对。造出更好的捕鼠器,全世界就会踏破门槛找上门。

When the board reminded me that investment management was not within Vanguard’s mandate, I argued that the index fund wasn’t “managed”; it would simply own all 500 stocks in the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index. Disingenuous or not, this argument narrowly carried the day. When we organized the fund in late 1975, we had made our entry into the second side—the investment side—of the fund triangle. First Index Investment Trust (now named Vanguard 500 Index Fund), derided for years as “Bogle’s Folly,” wasn’t even copied until 1984, after nearly a decade had passed. What a great idea! But our original index fund is now the world’s largest mutual fund. Entrepreneurial Lesson #8. Emerson was right. Build a better mousetrap and the world will beat a path to your door.

取消销售队伍。我们如何才能占据三角形的第三条也是最后一条边——份额发行?我们又一次设计了一个新颖的解决方案来应对看似不可逾越的挑战:我们将放弃半个世纪以来一直发行威灵顿份额的经纪人网络,直接取消发行的需求。我们将不依赖卖家去销售基金份额,而是依赖买家来购买它们。在又一次引发争议的董事会斗争之后,我们于 1977 年 2 月迈出了这一步,一夜之间从行业传统的经纪商-交易商供给推动销售体系转变为免收销售费用、免佣、需求拉动营销体系。从我们这个骨架企业带着狭窄的授权开始运营算起,仅仅 18 个月后,我们就成为了如今这样的成熟共同基金公司。创业教训第 9 条:永不放弃。永不。永不。永不。永不。永不。

Eliminating a Sales Force How could we take over the third and final side of the triangle—share distribution? Once again, we devised a novel solution to a seemingly insurmountable challenge: We would abandon the network of brokers that had distributed Wellington shares for the previous half-century, and simply eliminate the need for distribution. We would rely, not on sellers to sell fund shares, but on buyers to buy them. After another divisive board battle, we took that unprecedented step in February 1977, converting overnight from the industry’s traditional broker-dealer supply-push selling system to a sales-charge-free, no-load, demand-pull marketing system. In just 18 months from the day our skeleton enterprise began operations with its narrow mandate, we had become the full-fledged mutual fund firm we are today. Entrepreneurial Lesson #9. Never give up. Never. Never. Never. Never. Never.

在先锋集团核心理念的演变中,实际上只剩下进一步的一步。在我们做出免佣决定后的六个月内,我们创建了一系列市政债券基金,采用了前所未有的结构。正如我逐渐相信很少有股票经理能比股市更聪明一样,我也逐渐相信很少有债券经理能通过准确预测利率的方向和水平来比债市更聪明。然而,我们的同行在提供“管理型”免税债券基金时,实际上是在暗示他们能做到这一点——一个无法兑现的承诺。那么,为什么不与众人背道而驰,不仅成立一只免税债券基金,而是成立一个三层级债券基金:提供一只长期投资组合;一只短期投资组合;还有——你猜到了——一只中期投资组合?说实话,很难想象一个更平淡无奇的主意。但这从未被做过。它几乎在一夜之间改变了投资者对债券基金投资的看法,并且行业迅速采纳了这个概念。

There was really only one further step in the evolution of Vanguard’s central concept. Within six months of our no-load decision we created a series of municipal bond funds with an unprecedented structure. Even as I had come to believe that precious few stock managers could outguess the stock market, so I had come to believe that precious few bond managers could outguess the bond market by accurately forecasting the direction and level of interest rates. Yet our peers, offering “managed” tax-exempt bond funds were implicitly promising they could do exactly that—a promise that could not be fulfilled. So why not depart from the crowd and form not a single tax-exempt bond fund, but a three-tier bond fund offering a long-term portfolio; a short-term portfolio; and—you guessed it—an intermediate-term portfolio? It’s difficult, in truth, to imagine a more banally simple idea. But it had never been done before. It changed, almost overnight, the way investors thought about bond fund investing, and the industry quickly adopted the concept.

战略服从结构。我刚才列举的所有变化可能看起来复杂甚至神秘,所以让我们花点时间思考一下我们在先锋集团结构设计和战略确定方面所做的事情。我们创造了一个独特的互助结构,使成本可以降低到最低限度,并制定了一个强调共同基金的策略,在该策略中,我们的成本与投资者回报之间的联系将是显而易见的,甚至几乎是因果关系。战略服从结构。投资中一个伟大且基本未被认识到的理念就是:成本至关重要。

Strategy Follows Structure All of the changed I’ve just cataloged may seem convoluted and even arcane, so let’s think for a moment about what we had done in the design of Vanguard’s structure and the determination of Vanguard’s strategy. We had created a unique mutual structure in which costs could be reduced to the bare-bones minimum, and a strategy that emphasized mutual funds in which the linkage between our costs and our investors’ returns would be obvious, indeed almost causal. Strategy follows structure. The one great—and largely unrecognized—idea of investing is this: Costs matter.

为什么成本如此重要?考虑一下将股市比作赌场的类比,投资者兼赌徒之间互相交换股票,在这个赌场里,所有投资者作为一个群体不可避免地共同享有股市的回报,不多也不少。但只有当庄家的抽水出现时,情况才会改变。然后,本应是零和博弈——投资者在计入成本前战胜市场的徒劳努力——在减去投资成本后变成了负和博弈。从定义上看,战胜市场就变成了一场输家的游戏。总市场回报减去中介成本等于投资者净回报——显然,这是一个非常复杂的算术公式。创业教训第 10 条:成为数学天才。(只是开个玩笑!)

Why do costs matter? Consider the analogy of the stock market as a casino, in which the investor-gamblers swap stocks with one another, a casino in which, inevitably, all investors as a group share the stock market’s returns, no more, no less. But only until the rakes of the croupiers descend. Then, what was inevitably a zero-sum game—a fruitless search by investors to beat the market before costs—becomes a negative-sum game after the costs of investing are deducted. Beating the market, by definition, is then a loser’s game. Gross market return, minus intermediation costs, equals net investor return—clearly, a highly complex arithmetic formula. Entrepreneurial Lesson #10. Be a mathematical genius. (Only kidding!)

由于玩共同基金游戏成本高昂且涉及许多庄家,每个都挥舞着宽大的抽水耙子,输家输得很多。大多数基金购买时产生的销售佣金。基金管理费和运营成本。营销成本,包括你看到的那些昂贵的广告。基金经理在基金投资组合中反复买卖股票时支付给股票经纪人和做市商的交易成本。基金因不断、往往无脑的换手而不必要地让其股东承担的过高税务成本。这些成本加起来,每年约占基金资产的 3.5% 到 4%,年复一年的复利效应,使得应税共同基金投资者在过去十年中仅获得市场回报的大约一半,而在过去四分之一世纪中——我很高兴你坐着!——仅略高于三分之一。平均基金投资者,投入了 100% 的资本并承担了 100% 的风险,却只获得了市场税后回报大约 33% 的部分。是的,成本至关重要。创业教训第 11 条:永远不要低估显而易见的力量。

Since playing the mutual fund game carries heavy costs and entails lots of croupiers, each wielding a wide rake, the losers lose lots. Sales commissions when most funds are purchased. Fund management fees and operating costs. Marketing costs, including all those expensive advertisements you see. Transaction costs paid to stock brokers and market-makers when fund managers buy and sell the stocks in fund portfolios over and over again. The excessive tax costs to which funds unnecessarily subject their shareholders as the result of their incessant, often mindless, turnover. Taken together, these costs, roughly 3½% to 4% of fund assets each year, compounded year after year, have given taxable mutual fund investors but about one-half of the market’s return during the past decade and—I’m glad you’re sitting down!—only a little more than one-third in the past quarter century. The average fund investor, who put up 100% of the capital and assumed 100% of the risk, garnered something like 33% of the market’s after-tax return. Yes, costs matter. Entrepreneurial Lesson #11. Never underestimate the power of the obvious.

鉴于这些基本的市场算术,引入低成本结构和以指数为导向、结构化投资组合策略的洞察不仅显而易见,而且令人震惊地显而易见。这对于我们行业中的其他公司来说不可能是秘密。我们所有的竞争对手都有与先锋集团相同的机会来创建这样的结构,但就像谋杀悬疑案中的主要嫌疑人一样,我们只有我们有动机去行动。由于我们的互助结构,罪责的手指,可以说是直接指向先锋集团。我们追求低成本以最大化基金股东的回报;而我们的竞争对手则渴望最大化其管理公司股东的回报,寻求市场所能承受的最高回报。创业教训第 12 条:如果你的竞争对手不愿且无法在成本上竞争,竞争就会更容易。

Given those elementary mathematics of the market, the insight that led into a low-cost structure and an index-oriented, structured-portfolio strategy is not only obvious, but startlingly obvious. It can’t have been a mystery to the other firms in our industry. All of our rivals had the same opportunity as Vanguard to create such a structure, but, just like the prime suspect in a murder mystery, we alone had the motive to act. Because of our mutual structure, the finger of guilt, as it were, pointed directly at Vanguard. We sought low costs to maximize the returns for our fund shareholders; our rivals, eager, to maximize the returns for their management company shareholders, sought the highest returns that traffic would bear. Entrepreneurial Lesson #12. Competition is easier if your competitors won’t—and can’t—compete on costs.

来自强大对手的反对。尽管我们长期以来努力将先锋集团建立在坚实的基础之上,但我们的企业仍然建立在沙土之上。因为我们仅根据一项临时 SEC 命令运营,该命令允许我们在独特的共同基金结构下运营。尽管在今天看来可能令人震惊,但在 1980 年,即给予我们临时批准近三年后,SEC 推翻了其裁决,将我们置于我从未考虑过的无人区。我惊恐万分,因为我知道我们正在为股东做正确的事情,于是我们发起了激烈的上诉。最终,在 1981 年,经过长达四年的斗争,SEC 来了个 180 度大转弯,用以下有力的话语批准了我们的计划:先锋集团计划实际上推进了[1940 年投资公司法]的目标,确保了基金的董事……能够更好地评估向基金提供的服务质量。该计划促进了对股东的信息披露改善……促进了规模经济带来的节约……明显增强了基金的独立性……为基金提供了无利益冲突的发行控制……并促进了一个健康且可行的基金综合体,在此综合体内每个基金都能更好地繁荣发展。

Opposition from a Formidable Source While we had struggled long and hard to establish Vanguard on a firm foundation, however, our enterprise was still built on sand. For we were operating only under a temporary SEC order that allowed us to operate under our unique mutual fund structure. Astonishing as it may seem today, in 1980, nearly three years after giving us that temporary approval, the SEC reversed its ruling, leaving us in a no-man’s-land that I never contemplated. Aghast, for I knew we were doing what was right for our shareholders, we mounted a vigorous appeal. Finally, in 1981, after a struggle that had lasted four long years, the SEC did an about-face, approving our plan with these powerful words: The Vanguard plan actually furthers the objectives [of the Investment Company Act of 1940] by ensuring that the Funds’ directors . . . are better able to evaluate the quality of services rendered to the funds. The plan fosters improved disclosure to shareholders . . . promotes savings from economies of scale. . . clearly enhances the Funds’ independence . . . provides them with conflict-free control over distribution. . . and promotes a healthy and viable fund complex within which each fund can better prosper.

哇!委员会的支持——实际上是为我们做了一则商业广告——让这场斗争变得值得。终于,我们的基础变成了坚如磐石的岩石,稳稳地扎根。创业教训第 13 条:“我来自政府,我是来帮助你们的。”有时。

Wow! The Commission’s endorsement—virtually a commercial message on our behalf—made the struggle worthwhile. At last, our foundation was a rock, firmly in place. Entrepreneurial Lesson #13. “I’m from the government and I’m here to help you.” Sometimes.

资产每三年翻一番。我们的结构悬在达摩克利斯之剑下的那些年充满挑战。但当 SEC 终于在 1981 年给我们开绿灯时,股市已经开始复苏,我们的资产翻了一番,从 14 亿美元增至 30 亿美元。到 1983 年,它们再次翻番至 60 亿美元;到 1985 年,再次到 120 亿美元;到 1986 年,再次到 240 亿美元;到 1990 年,再次到 480 亿美元。资产在 1993 年再次翻番,几乎达到 1000 亿美元,然后在 1996 年又翻番至 2000 亿美元,在 1998 年再次翻番至 4000 亿美元。没有人认为这一非凡的记录能够持续。它确实没有。尽管如此,尽管自 2000-2002 年泡沫破裂以来股市严峻,我们的资产目前总计达 7200 亿美元。

Assets Double Every Three Years The years in which our structure was hanging by a Damoclean thread were a challenge. But when the SEC finally gave us the green light in 1981, the stock market had begun to recover, and our assets had doubled, from $1.4 billion to $3 billion. By 1983, they’d doubled again to $6 billion; by 1985, again to $12 billion; by 1986, again to $24 billion; by 1990, again, to $48 billion. Assets doubled yet again to nearly $100 billion in 1993, then again to $200 billion in 1996, and again to $400 billion in 1998. No one thought that remarkable record could continue. It didn’t. Nonetheless, despite the tough stock market since the bubble burst in 2000-2002, our assets now total $720 billion.

我们简单的指数基金、结构化债券基金和货币市场基金组合——每一只都提供了低成本与高回报之间近乎因果关系——构成了推动这一惊人增长的强大引擎。这些基金目前的资产总计 5200 亿美元,占我们总资产基础的 75%。更重要的是,我们还将它们所基于的原则——强调极低的运营成本、最小的投资组合换手、无销售费用、多元化、高质量的投资组合、以及明确界定的目标和策略——应用于我们剩余的大部分资产,主要是主动管理型股票基金。在我们选择为之服务的明智长期投资者市场——包括个人和机构——中,我们的策略是相互强化的。创业教训第 14 条:内部一致的策略是商业成功的关键之一。

Our simple group of index funds, structured bond funds, and money market funds—each providing a near causal relationship between low costs and high returns—constitute the powerful engine that has driven that amazing growth. The assets of these funds now total $520 billion, fully 75% of our asset base. What is more, we have also applied the principles on which they are based—an emphasis on rock-bottom operating costs, minimal portfolio turnover, no sales charges, diversified, investment-quality portfolios, and clearly-defined objectives and strategies—to substantially all of the remainder of our assets, largely actively-managed equity funds. In the marketplace of intelligent long-term investors— individual and institutional alike—whom we have chosen to serve, our strategies are mutually reinforcing. Enterpreneurial Lesson #14. An internally-consistent strategy is one of the keys to business success.

当然,我意识到,在现有公司的框架内创建一家新公司,可能不太算得上是创业。但我希望,你能将我今天谈到的这些举措视为创业行为:(1)在共同基金行业创立了一种新型治理结构——一种共同结构,让基金投资者的利益优先于基金经理和销售商的利益。(2)成立了全球第一只指数基金——一个被动的投资组合,其设计目标仅仅是提供股票市场的回报,而长久以来,能超越这一挑战的基金经理少之又少。(3)一种债券基金管理的新范式。(4)放弃已有的成熟销售体系,转而采用一种全新且未经检验的体系。(5)面对董事会意见分歧,以及联邦监管机构最初的反对,完成这一切所需要的巨大精力。我们按自己独特的节奏前行,结果证明这行得通。创业第 15 课:走那条少有人走的路。它能带来天壤之别。

Now, I recognize that creating a new company out of the framework of an existing company may not quite qualify as entrepreneurship. But I hope you’ll consider as entrepreneurial the initiatives I’ve discussed today: (1) The creation of a new form of governance in the mutual fund industry, a mutual structure in which the interests of fund investors take precedence over the interests of fund managers and distributors. (2) Forming the world’s first index fund, a passive portfolio designed simply to provide the returns provided by the stock market, a challenge that precious few portfolio managers have bettered over time. (3) A new paradigm for bond fund management. (4) Abandoning a proven distribution system in favor of a new and untried one. (5) The sheer energy required to get it all done, in the face of a divided board of directors and the initial opposition of a Federal regulatory agency. We marched to our own, different, drummer, and it worked. Entrepreneurial Lesson #15. Take the road less traveled by. It can make all the difference.

成功的果实……还是为了成功本身?

The Fruits of Success . . . or Success for Its Own Sake?

最后,我想借用企业家的经典定义——“承担企业的人”——来作结,并追问:一个人为何要承担企业?在《经济发展理论》一书中,经济学家约瑟夫·熊彼特否定了物质和金钱收益是企业家的首要动机,他认为以下两种动机要强大得多:

■ “创造的喜悦、完成事情的乐趣、纯粹发挥自己精力与才智的快感,以及

■ “征服的意志、战斗的冲动……为了成功本身而追求成功,而非为了成功的果实。”

Let me close by considering the classic definition of the entrepreneur, “one who undertakes an enterprise,” and ask why does a person undertake an enterprise? In his Theory of Economic Development, economist Joseph A. Schumpeter dismissed material and monetary gain as the prime motivation of the entrepreneur, concluding that these motives are far more powerful:  “The joy of creating, of getting things done, of simply exercising one’s energy and ingenuity, and  “The will to conquer, the impulse to fight . . . to succeed for the sake, not of the fruits of success, but of success itself.”

熊彼特将企业家精神视为人类经济进步中至关重要的推动力时,将其归因于这些动机的组合。值得注意的是,他弱化了成功果实作为首要动机的作用。他告诉我们,企业家精神实际上关乎成功本身、成就、创造力、喜悦、活力,以及为自身理念而战的意志。事实正是如此!

When Schumpeter identified entrepreneurship as a vital moving force in human economic progress, he ascribed it as a combination of those motives. Note that he downplayed the fruits of success as a primary motivator. Entrepreneurship, he tells us, is really about success itself, accomplishment, creativity, joy, energy, and the will to fight for one’s ideas. And so it is!

早在熊彼特(Schumpeter)之前,一位常被称作“美国第一位企业家”的人也同样摒弃个人利益。与许多企业家一样,本杰明·富兰克林(Benjamin Franklin)也是一位发明家,他发明了避雷针和富兰克林炉等装置。他并未试图为避雷针申请专利以谋取私利,而且拒绝了宾夕法尼亚州州长对他发明的富兰克林炉——“宾夕法尼亚壁炉”——授予专利的提议,该炉具是他为了提升家庭取暖效率、惠及公众而设计的。富兰克林认为,“知识并非发现者的私人财产,而是所有人的共同财富。既然我们享受着他人发明带来的巨大好处,”他写道,“我们就应该乐于借助自己的任何发明为他人服务,而且应当慷慨无私地这样做。”

Long before Schumpeter, a man often described as “America’s first entrepreneur” also eschewed personal gain. Like many entrepreneurs, Benjamin Franklin was also an inventor, creating, among other devices, the lightning rod and the Franklin stove. He made no attempt to patent the lightning rod for his own profit, and declined an offer by the governor of the Commonwealth for a patent on his Franklin stove, the “Pennsylvania fireplace” he designed to improve the efficiency of home heating and benefit the public at large. Franklin believed that, “knowledge was not the personal property of its discoverer, but the common property of all. As we enjoy great advantages from the inventions of others,” he wrote, “we should be glad of an opportunity to serve others by any invention of ours, and this we should do freely and generously.”

创业还有另一个我们不应忽视的方面。好点子虽然俯拾皆是,但即便最出色的想法,也需要落地执行才能开花结果。所以,让我们所有人都放低姿态,收起那份创业者的自我膨胀,意识到:对那些加入我们、共同把想法变为现实的人给予关怀和照顾,是成功不可或缺的前提。海伦·凯勒说得太美了:“我渴望成就一项伟大而崇高的事业,但我首要的本分是,把卑微的琐事当成伟大而崇高的事业来完成。推动世界前进的,不仅是英雄们强有力的推动,更是每一位诚实劳动者微小力量的汇聚。”创业第十六课(借约翰·多恩的话):“没有人是一座孤岛,可以自全。”

And there is yet another aspect of entrepreneurship that we should not ignore. While ideas are a dime a dozen, even the best of them require implementation to bring them to fruition. So let’s all be humble enough to suppress our entrepreneurial egos and realize that the care and handling of those human beings who join us in the mission to turn an idea into a reality require is an essential prerequisite of success. Helen Keller said it beautifully. “I long to accomplish a great and noble task, but it is my chief duty to accomplish humble tasks as though they were great and noble. The world is moved along, not only by the mighty shoves of its heroes, but also by the aggregate of the tiny pushes of each honest worker.” Entrepreneurial Lesson #16 (after John Donne) “No man is an island, entire of itself.”

纵身一跃,然后变现 本次会议的主题是“创业的基石——从纵身一跃到成功变现”。我尽己所能,为大家总结了 17 条心得(其中一条尚未讲到),希望这些能成为你们创业时可以参照的基石。我试图呼应副标题的前半部分,不仅讲述那“纵身一跃”,更讲述我漫长职业生涯中经历过的多次跳跃——最初那次以失败告终(早期那场并购让我丢了饭碗),而后来的几次,大概算得上成功——互助基金结构、指数基金、三级债券基金,以及在新营销体系上的豪赌。

Taking the Plunge, and Cashing In The theme of this conference is “The Building Blocks of Entrepreneurship—From Taking the Plunge to Cashing In,” and I’ve done my best to give you 17 lessons (one of which is still to come) that I hope will serve as building blocks that you can use as a frame of reference for your own entrepreneurship. I’ve tried to honor the first half of the subtitle by describing not only the plunge, but the many plunges, I’ve taken during my long career, at first with failure (that early merger that cost me my job), and later with what I guess passes for success—the mutual structure, the index fund, the three-tier bond fund; the gamble on a new marketing system.

可惜,对于副标题的后半段“兑现”,我无话可说。先锋领航以共同所有制结构为基石,这一概念本身就不允许创始人或任何其他人从中“兑现”。若真如此,便违背了我们存在的根本——我们的共同基金股东才是公司真正的所有者,他们每年节省的成本——估计约为 60 亿美元——实际上就是基金投资带来的额外现金流。

Alas, I have nothing to say about the second half of the subtitle, “cashing in.” The concept of a mutual structure that is the rock foundation of Vanguard simply doesn’t entail cashing in for the founder, or for any one else. To do so would belie the very core of our existence—that our mutual fund shareholders are the actual owners of our firm, and their annual cost savings—estimated at something like $6 billion per year—in effect, extra cash flow on their fund investments.

然而,我远未到痛苦自责的地步,原因主要有四点:(1)我的薪酬和奖金激励一直非常丰厚;(2)我更喜欢储蓄而非消费;(3)我坚持了 53 年的长期定投——部分通过我们的税收递延储蓄计划完成——我可以向你保证,这个方法行之有效;(4)我足够明智,始终遵循自己审慎的投资建议:青壮年时期大量配置股票,晚年大量配置债券,几乎全部投资于我们低成本的先锋基金,这些基金采用指数或指数化策略。这个方法也同样奏效!

Yet I’m a long way from sackcloth and ashes, for four major reasons: (1) I’ve been very well paid in salary and bonus incentives; (2) I prefer to save money rather than spend it; (3) I’ve been dollar-averaging—in part, in our tax-deferred savings plan—for 53 long years, and I can assure you that it works; and (4) I’ve been wise enough to follow my own prudent investment advice: lots of stocks in youth and middle age, lots of bonds in my later years, nearly all in our low-cost Vanguard funds with index or index-like strategies. That works too!

远比为金钱口袋带来的回报(更多的东西、更多的物质财富、更多无用的奢侈)更重要的是,来自努力为他人而非为自己服务的灵魂与精神的回报。无论我在创业方面取得了怎样的成就,我相信它们都帮助了那些实实在在、脚踏实地的普通人——他们之所以投资先锋集团,正是为了避开通往投资成功这条漫长道路上那些众多且往往很深的路坑,从而公平地分享我们的金融市场回馈给我们的那部分收益,并能像塞缪尔森博士在为我第一本书所写的前言中提到的那样,享受到比大多数邻居更舒适的退休生活。我对这样的结果感到无比欣喜。因此,我以……创业者第 17 课作为结尾。我们最大的回报,来自促进经济进步、并帮助建设一个更美好的世界。

Far more important than the rewards of the pocketbook—more things, more material possessions, more useless extravagance—are the rewards of the soul and spirit that come from trying to serve others rather than oneself. Whatever my entrepreneurial achievements may have been, I believe they have helped those honest-to-God, down-to-earth human beings who have invested with Vanguard in order to avoid the many, often deep, potholes on the long road to investment success, and thus capture their fair share of the returns with which our financial markets have rewarded us, and to enjoy a more comfortable retirement than most of their neighbors, just as Dr. Samuelson wrote in his foreword to my first book. I revel in that outcome. So I conclude with . . . Entrepreneurial Lesson #17. Our greatest rewards come when we foster economic progress, and help to build a better world.

这就是我的故事。有时候我会想,如果 57 年前普林斯顿没有为我打开那扇天堂之门、让我走进校门,我的人生又会是怎样一番光景。

So that’s my story. Sometimes I wonder what my life would have been like had Princeton, 57 long years ago, not opened its heavenly gate and let me in.

注:本次讲话中所表达的观点,未必代表先锋集团现任管理层的看法。

_______________ Note: The opinions expressed in this speech do not necessarily represent the views of Vanguard’s present management.