《美国新闻》访谈

2012 · 访谈 · 原文约 1247 词
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美国新闻 - 迈克尔·莫布森访谈

US News - Michael Mauboussin Interview

资产管理不过是一种被美化了的彩票?

Is Asset Management Just a Glorified Lottery?

Nov 1, 2012

Nov 1, 2012

投资本不该是赌博,但当你把钱交给一位基金经理时,你就在承受某种技能与运气的组合。即便对被动指数基金来说也是如此,更别提主动管理型基金了。可你怎么知道——技能还是运气——将最左右最终结果?有没有办法确保技能至少与运气扮演同等重要的角色?如果做不到,资产管理难道只是一场精心设计的彩票游戏吗?

INVESTING IS NOT supposed to be gambling, but when you give your money to a fund manager you're exposing yourself to some combination of skill and luck. That's true even for passive index funds, to say nothing of actively managed funds. But how do you know which—skill or luck—will most determine the outcome? And is there a way to ensure that skill plays at least as large a role as luck? If not, is asset management just an elaborate lottery?

莱格·梅森分析师迈克尔·莫布森在他的第四本书《成功方程式》中探讨了一个古老的问题:

It's an age-old question that Legg Mason analyst Michael Mauboussin tackles in his fourth book, The Success Equation:

在商业、体育和投资中厘清技巧与运气。他先提出一个简单的测试来判断哪些领域技巧比运气更重要:如果你能够故意输掉某件事,那么这件事涉及技巧;如果你做不到,那它就是一场运气游戏。

Untangling Skill and Luck in Business, Sports and Investing. He starts with a simple test for discerning where skill matters more than luck: If it's possible to lose at something on purpose, that something involves skill. If it's not possible, the something is a game of luck.

既然你的基金经理通常不会故意亏钱,你也许会忍不住下结论:他实际上是在拿你的养老金赌博。没错,在运气与技能的坐标轴上,莫布辛把投资定位得更接近轮盘赌,而不是国际象棋。但沃伦·巴菲特是个相当有力的证据,表明投资结果并不纯粹是运气的产物——哪怕巴菲特也不能完全靠故意来亏钱。

Since your fund manager can't normally lose on purpose, you might be tempted to conclude that he's effectively gambling with your retirement. Indeed, on the luck-versus-skill continuum, Mauboussin places investing closer to roulette than to chess. But Warren Buffett is pretty good evidence that investing outcomes are not purely functions of luck, even if Buffett can't lose entirely on purpose.

投资者怎样才能找到那些有充分理由被认为具备技能的基金经理?莫布森说,有两个办法。你可以考察经理的业绩记录,但可靠的业绩记录需要多年积累。莫布森认为,更好的办法是考察他的投资流程。如果流程是稳健的——比如挑选被低估的股票——那么无论市场短期如何风云变幻,长期来看都应该成功。

How does an investor go about finding fund managers who can be reasonably credited with skill? Two ways, says Mauboussin. You can look at the manager's track record, but reliable track records take years to amass. Better, says Mauboussin, to look at his process. If it's a sound process—picking undervalued stocks, for instance—it should succeed in the long run whatever the short-term vicissitudes of the market.

当然,普通股东完全没有能力评估基金经理的投资流程,这也是莫布森和许多其他人向大多数散户投资者推荐指数基金的原因。不过,对于那些不介意钻研一些技术细节的投资者,莫布森提供了一些具体工具。

Of course, the typical shareholder is wholly unequipped to size up a fund manager's process, which is why Mauboussin and many others recommend index funds for most retail investors. For investors who don't mind wading into some technical weeds, though, Mauboussin suggests some concrete tools.

一个方法是将“主动份额”和“跟踪误差”结合起来看。主动份额是指投资组合偏离基准指数的部分,以百分比表示(0 代表完全复制基准,100 代表与基准毫无相似之处)。跟踪误差则衡量投资组合复制基准指数的精确度。

One is to look at "active share" and "tracking error" together. Active share is the portion of a portfolio that departs from the benchmark, expressed as a percentage (zero represents exact replication of the benchmark and 100 no resemblance at all). Tracking error is the precision with which the portfolio mimics a benchmark index.

莫布森指出,在主动份额较高(比如超过 60%)的基金中,业绩表现差异极大。但那些同时具备高主动份额和适度跟踪误差的基金,往往能比高主动份额但跟踪误差也高的基金,获得更高的风险调整后收益。

There is wide variation in performance among funds with high active share (say, above 60 percent), but those with both a high active share and moderate tracking error tend to generate higher risk-adjusted returns than those with high active share and high tracking error, notes Mauboussin.

当然,即使从杂草丛中看出去,也无法告诉你一切。关于技能与随机性之间的相互作用,有无数种观察方式。近年来,这个话题催生了一个小型出版产业,以纳西姆·塔勒布的《黑天鹅》和詹姆斯·索罗维基的《群体的智慧》等畅销书为代表。

Even the view from the weeds doesn't tell you everything, of course. There are lots of ways to look at the interplay of skill and randomness, a subject that has produced a minor publishing industry in recent years exemplified by such popular books as Nassim Taleb's The Black Swan and James Surowieki's The Wisdom of Crowds.

我们最近与莫布森聊了聊那些书以及他的一些核心概念——均值回归、“技能悖论”(集体技能水平的提升如何使运气变得更相关、而非更不相关)、什么才算是有用的统计数字,以及其他问题。以下是经过编辑的访谈记录:

We chatted with Mauboussin recently about some of the concepts central to those books and his—mean reversion, the "paradox of skill" (how a rise in collective skill levels makes luck more, not less, relevant), what makes for a useful statistic, and other questions. An edited transcript:

即便我们承认投资技巧确实存在,典型投资者也很难找到它。那么,除了指数基金之外,一般投资者还有必要考虑其他选择吗?

Even if we agree there is such a thing as investment skill, a typical investor would be hard-pressed to find it. So does it make sense for an average investor to be anywhere other than index funds?

如果投资者不愿意花些功夫去尝试判断哪些基金经理可能具备超越常人的技能,那么对大多数人来说,指数基金是非常合理的选择。不过,我想补充两点:第一,经济学中有一项测试叫宏观一致性测试,它本质上问的是这样一个问题:“如果所有人同时做同一件事,会发生什么?”不幸的是,指数化投资或者说被动投资,通常通不过这项测试。换句话说,不是所有人都能同时这样做。

If an investor is not interested in putting some effort into trying to figure out which managers potentially have differential skill, index funds make an enormous amount of sense for most people. Two things I would add, though: First, there is a test in economics called the macro-consistency test, which basically asks the question, "What would happen if everybody does something at once?" Unfortunately, index or passive investing generally fails that test. In other words, not everyone can do it at the same time.

《美国新闻》——迈克尔·莫布森访谈

US News - Michael Mauboussin Interview

投资在技能-运气连续谱上更偏向运气一侧,并非因为投资者缺乏技能,而是因为他们的技能在有效价格的作用下相互抵消了。经典的随机游走理论大致是这样的:关于股票的所有相关信息都已体现在当前价格中,因此只有新信息才能改变股价,而新信息,就其本质而言,是随机的。

Investing sits toward the luck side of the continuum not because investors are not skillful but because, in effect, their skills offset one another through efficient prices. The classic random-walk argument goes roughly as follows: All relevant information about stocks is reflected in the price today, therefore only new information should change stock prices, and new information, by definition, is random.

这在实际世界中并不完全准确,但作为对当前状况的一个粗略描述,它倒也算是个不错的出发点。为了让信息能够反映在价格中,总得有一些主动管理行为存在。

That's not perfectly accurate in the real world, but as a rough sketch of what's going on, it's not a bad place to start. There has to be some active management in order to ensure that information is reflected in prices.

第二点是,我认为证据表明,虽然投资中有大量随机性存在,但确实存在不同的技能水平。而且有一些方法可以去思考如何事先识别这种不同的技能。对于那些不感兴趣涉足其中的人来说,指数化投资非常合理;而对于那些有动力的人而言,可能有一些途径可以尝试理性地去做这件事。

The second thing is, I think the evidence shows that while there's a lot of randomness in investing, there is indeed differential skill. And there are ways to think about trying to identify a priori that differential skill. For people who are not interested in getting into that, indexing makes a lot of sense; for those that are motivated, there may be some paths to trying to do that intelligently.

一个投资组合经理能否足够靠近技能这一边,让股东确信其中至少是技能和运气各占一半?

Can a portfolio manager move close enough to the skill side that shareholders can be confident there's at least as much skill as luck at play?

这是一个非常有趣的问题。我认为像巴菲特这样的人,可以相当肯定地说,他非常有技巧。我猜他这一路走来也沾了点好运气,但这没关系。这就引出了一个核心问题:“你到底是怎么得出这个结论的?”对此有两种基本方法。第一种是看结果。像巴菲特这样的人,他的业绩记录就足以说明一切。

It's a super-interesting question. I think that someone like Buffett you could say quite confidently is very skillful. I think he's enjoyed a bit of good luck along the way, but that's fine. This gets to an essential question, which is, "How might you come to that conclusion?" There are two fundamental approaches to this. This first is to look at outcomes. With someone like Buffett, the track record tells you all you need to know.

但对于大多数投资组合经理来说,他们的业绩记录实在太短了。

But for most portfolio managers, their track records are simply too short.

所以我提倡的第二种方法,是关注他们的过程。对我来说,这才是看清技能的关键。打个比方,我给你 1000 美元,看你是否懂得玩二十一点。你去玩一整晚,回来时把赚到的钱给我。我们都知道结果很大程度上受运气影响。另一种做法是给你 1000 美元,然后站在你身后,观察你的决策过程,看你是否采用基本策略。如果你确实用了,我就知道长期来看你表现不会差,因为你的过程是正确的。

So the second approach, which I advocate for, is to focus on their process. That, to me, is the key to illuminating skill. For instance, I might give you $1,000 to see if you know how to play blackjack. You go off and play for the evening, then return and give me whatever you have made. We know the results are going to be largely influenced by luck. The alternative is to give you $1,000, then look over your shoulder and watch your decision-making to see if you're playing basic strategy. If you are, I know that you're going to do as well as you can over time because your process is a good process.

在判断能力与运气的区别时,你是否建议需要一个最低年限?

Do you suggest a minimum tenure needed to discern skill from luck?

我一直倾向于回避这种思路,因为它假设了一个纯随机过程。我不会给出具体数字。

I've always tended to balk at this kind of approach because it assumes a purely random process. I wouldn't give a number on that.

确实有些投资者流程很糟糕,但过往业绩相当不错,我可不想再给他们多投一分钱。也有一些投资者业绩记录相对较短,但看起来流程不错,把钱交给他们我会更放心。

There can be investors who have a poor process but a pretty good track record, and I wouldn't want to incrementally give them any of my dollars. And there can be people with relatively short track records who do seem to have a good process, and I'd be more comfortable giving them money.

如果你认为管理费过高,业绩报酬会是答案吗?基金行业能按这种方式运作吗?

If you think fees are too high, would performance fees be the answer? Could the fund industry run on that basis?

我认为这对零售业来说不太适用,但在机构资金管理领域,已经有不少这样的情况——业绩报酬。你真正想要奖励的是那些每天都在以合理、深思熟虑的方式运作的人。长远来看,最好的流程会胜出,但短期内可能不会。每当薪酬与运气(无论好坏)挂钩过紧时,我都会有点警惕。

I think it's less true for retail, but in the institutional money-management world, there is already a fair bit of that—performance fees. What you really want to reward are people who are operating with a proper and thoughtful process every single day. Over the long haul the best processes win, but in the short term they may not. Whenever compensation gets too linked to luck, good or bad, it makes me a little bit leery.