挖掘思维:神经科学与投资
2003 年 11 月 4 日 第 2 卷 第 20 期
November 4, 2003 Volume 2, Issue 20
挖掘你的思维:神经科学与投资之道
有一种全新且极为有效的方法,能让你成为更聪明的投资者。
Mine Your Mind Neuroscience and Investing There is a totally new and profoundly effective way to become a smarter investor.
突然间,令人惊叹的投资洞见,竟然来自你可能最想不到的领域前沿:神经科学。在世界各地的大学和医院实验室里,研究人员正运用最新的技术突破,追踪你作为投资者做决策时大脑所使用的精确回路。
Suddenly, stunning investment insights are coming from the frontiers of one of the least likely fields you can imagine: neuroscience. In university and hospital laboratories around the world, researchers are using the latest breakthroughs in technology to trace the exact circuitry your brain uses to make the kinds of decisions you rely on as an investor.
Jason Zweig 你天生适合致富吗?1 尽管意识对情绪的控制很薄弱,但情绪却能淹没意识。
Jason Zweig Are You Wired for Wealth? 1 While conscious control over emotions is weak, emotions can flood consciousness.
之所以如此,是因为在我们进化历程的现阶段,大脑的连接方式决定了——从情绪系统到认知系统的连接,要强于从认知系统到情绪系统的连接。
This is so because the wiring of the brain at this point in our evolutionary history is such that connections from the emotional systems to the cognitive systems are stronger than connections from the cognitive systems to the emotional systems.
约瑟夫·勒杜《情绪脑》:我们现代的头骨里,装着一副石器时代的心智。
Joseph LeDoux The Emotional Brain 2 Our modern skulls house a Stone Age mind.
莱达·科斯米德斯和约翰·图比《进化心理学入门》第 3 章 火车与大脑 来看这个问题:你看到一辆失控的火车,如果继续沿当前轨道行驶,会撞死五个人。不过,你可以通过扳动道岔,让火车转到一条侧轨上,那样会撞死一个人。你会扳动道岔,用一个人的牺牲来救下五个人吗?
Leda Cosmides and John Tooby Evolutionary Psychology: A Primer 3 The Train and the Brain Consider the following problem: You observe a runaway train that will kill five people if it continues on its current course. You can save the five people, though, by hitting a switch that will divert the train to a side track where it will kill one person. Do you hit the switch, sparing the five people but at the expense of one?
迈克尔·J·莫布森 现在来思考一个类似的问题:同一辆失控的火车正威胁着那五个人。但这次,你站在轨道上方的一座桥上,旁边有一个身材高大的陌生人。把这个陌生人推到轨道上,那五个人就能得救,但陌生人会死。
Michael J. Mauboussin Now ponder a related problem: You have the same runaway train threatening the five 212-325-3108 people. But now, you are on a bridge over the tracks next to a large stranger. Push the stranger onto the tracks, and the five people are saved but the stranger dies.
克里斯汀·巴索尔森:你会推吗?
Kristen Bartholdson Would you push?
212-325-2788 [email protected] 如果你和大多数人一样,你对第一个问题回答“是”,对第二个回答“否”。当然,从客观上看,两者取舍是一样的:五条命对一条命。
212-325-2788 [email protected] If you are like most people, you answered yes to the first question and no to the second. Objectively, of course, the trade-off is the same: five lives versus one life.
为什么我们在第一种情况下愿意以一换五,在第二种情况下却不愿意?普林斯顿大学的研究人员发现,第一种情境——即“非个人困境”——激活了大脑中与记忆相关的区域。相比之下,第二种更具个人色彩的情境则触发了与情感相关的区域。即使是那些在第二种困境中回答“是”的人,回答问题所花的时间也要长一倍。情感大脑在尖叫着“不”,要压制这种反应需要费些力气。
Why are we willing to trade one for five in the first instance, but not in the second? Princeton researchers found that the first scenario—the “impersonal dilemma”— activated brain areas related to memory. In contrast, the second, more personal scenario triggered areas associated with emotion. Even those who answer yes in the second dilemma take twice as long to answer the question. The emotional brain is 4 screaming “no,” and it takes some effort to override that response.
尽管投资领域存在大量未解之谜,但或许没有哪个问题比人类认知的运作方式更引人入胜、更切中核心。科学家已经证实,我们大脑的不同区域负责处理不同问题,而我们——
While there are lots of unresolved questions in the investing world, perhaps none is as fascinating and relevant as the workings of human cognition. Scientists have established that distinct parts of our brains handle various problems, and that we
无法有效地将情绪与决策过程分离开来。证据还表明,由于遗传和环境的差异,我们每个人都拥有不同的神经生物学构造。
cannot effectively separate emotion from the decision-making process. The evidence also shows that we all have diverse neurobiological make-ups because of hereditary and environmental differences.
我们都知道有些人比普通人更情绪化,或更理性,这些认知差异无疑塑造了各自的投资气质与技能。
We all know people that are more emotional, or rational, than average and these cognitive differences 5 undoubtedly shape investing temperaments and skills.
同样关键的一点是,我们的大脑是在一个与当今环境截然不同的环境中进化而来的。因此,一些能引发我们反应和情绪的当代刺激,与过去触发行动的因素已大不相同。虽然短期财务损失对你的影响可能和看到一条蛇差不多,但你绝不想用同样的方式来应对这两种情况。
Also critical is that our brains evolved in an environment that was very different from the one in which we find ourselves today. So some of the contemporary stimuli that trigger reactions and emotions are much different than what triggered actions in the past. While a short-term financial loss may have the same effect on you as seeing a snake, you don’t want to deal with the two situations the same way.
随着我们对大脑的了解不断深入,我们或许能够各自调整自己的投资行为,从而改善投资业绩。正如神经科学家安东尼奥·达马西奥所说,“如果你意识到自己有多失控,你反而会更有掌控力。”
As we learn more about our brains, we may be able to alter our investment behavior individually so as to improve our results. As neuroscientist Antonio Damasio says, “You will be much more in control if 6 you realize how much you are not in control.”
火车与大脑:第二部(菲尼亚斯·盖奇的故事)
The Train and the Brain: Part II (The Story of Phineas Gage)
1848 年,一位名叫菲尼亚斯·盖奇的 25 岁铁路工人负责用炸药炸开岩石,为铁路扩建扫清道路。工人们先钻好炮眼,填入炸药粉,装上引信,再往炸药粉上覆一层沙土。盖奇的部分工作就是拿一根铁棒把沙土夯实,确保炸药能顺利引爆。
In 1848, a 25-year-old railway worker named Phineas Gage was in charge of blasting rock to clear the way for track expansion. The workers drilled a hole, filled it with explosive powder, added a fuse, and topped the powder with sand. Part of Gage’s job was to tamp the sand with an iron rod to make sure that the powder properly detonated.
一个宿命的下午,盖奇往洞里填满火药,正等着工友往上面加沙子。
One fateful afternoon, Gage filled a hole with powder and was waiting for a co-worker to add the sand.
就在这时,身后有人喊他,盖奇向右肩后方看了一眼。这一分神,他在同事还没来得及加沙子之前就开始捣实,溅起的火星引燃了火药,铁钎从岩石中朝他射来。
Just then someone behind him called, and Gage looked over his right shoulder. Thus distracted, Gage started to tamp before his co-worker had added the sand. He sparked a fire, causing the rod to fire out of the rock toward him.
铁棍从盖奇的左脸颊穿入,以高速击穿他的前脑,从头顶飞出。(见图表 1。)这根铁棍重 13.5 磅,长 3 英尺 7 英寸,宽 1.25 英寸,落在了 100 多英尺外。冲击力将盖奇掀翻在地,但没过几分钟他就能开口说话了。随后他乘坐牛车走了将近一英里来到镇上,并在几乎没有帮助的情况下自己起身走到医生办公室。
The rod entered Gage’s left cheek, blasted through the front of his brain, and exited the top of his skull at high speed. (See Exhibit 1.) The rod—thirteen-and-half pounds, three-feet seven inches long, and one and a quarter inches wide—landed more than a hundred feet away. The impact threw Gage on his back but within a few moments he was speaking. He then rode nearly a mile to town in an ox cart and managed to get up and walk to the doctor’s office with little assistance.
附录一:菲尼亚斯·盖奇的脑损伤
Exhibit 1: Phineas Gage’s Injury
来源:http://soma.npa.uiuc.edu/courses/bio303/Ch1.html
Source: http://soma.npa.uiuc.edu/courses/bio303/Ch1.html.
令人惊讶的是,盖奇不仅活了下来,而且大部分官能都完好无损:他能触摸、能听、能看,也没有瘫痪。真正改变的是盖奇的性格。他原本以沉稳、勤勉、敬业著称,却变得“喜怒无常、毫无敬意”,还染上了“极其粗鄙的脏话——这在他过去绝非习惯。”盖奇还失去了规划未来的能力。朋友们总结道:“盖奇不再是盖奇了。”
Amazingly, Gage not only survived but maintained most of his faculties: he could touch, hear, see, and suffered no paralysis. What did change was Gage’s personality. Known as a measured, diligent, hard-working man, he became “fitful, irreverent” and indulged in “the grossest profanity which was not previously his custom.” Gage also lost an ability to plan for the future. Friends summed it up by saying, 7 “Gage was no longer Gage.”
盖奇的非凡故事生动展示了大脑功能的模块化。他失去了右额皮层的一大部分——这块大脑区域(在其他功能之外)负责阻止我们说出脑子里想的每一句话,并帮助我们为未来做规划。我们用来解决问题的那个大脑部位,很可能会影响我们最终得出的解决方案。
The Mind of the Investor Gage’s remarkable story is a vivid illustration of the modularization of brain function. He lost a significant part of his right frontal cortex, a part of the brain that (among other things) keeps us from saying everything we think and helps us plan for the future. The part of the brain we use to solve a problem is likely to influence the solution we come up with.
举一个近期的例子,基于百事挑战。在 1970 年代和 80 年代的一项营销策略中,百事公司进行了消费者口味测试,让自己的饮料与竞争对手可口可乐正面对决。在大多数情况下,人们更喜欢百事的口味。但可口可乐仍然是第一位的可乐品牌。这是怎么回事?
Take a recent example based on the Pepsi Challenge. In a 1970s and 1980s marketing tactic, Pepsi conducted consumer taste tests pitting its drink versus rival Coca-Cola. A majority of the time, people preferred Pepsi’s taste. But Coke continues to be the top cola brand. What gives?
神经科学家瑞德·蒙塔古最近试图用核磁共振成像技术回答这个问题。他先复制了百事挑战实验,并证实了过去的营销说法——百事在大脑中与奖赏相关的区域引发了更强的反应。但这实在古怪:如果喝饮料的乐趣在于味道,为什么味道最好的品牌却没有赢?
Neuroscientist Read Montague recently set out to answer the question using magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) technology. Montague first restaged the Pepsi Challenge and corroborated the past marketing claims by showing that Pepsi generates a stronger response in a brain region associated with reward. Now this is downright weird: if enjoying a soft drink is about taste, why isn’t the best-tasting brand winning?
但蒙塔古的研究并未止步于此。他重复了测试,但换了一种方式——这次不再提供匿名样本,而是告诉品尝者哪一杯是可口可乐。突然之间,大多数饮用者都偏爱可口可乐。而且,值得注意的是,蒙塔古发现大脑中与高级认知能力相关的区域出现了活动。可口可乐取胜的原因并不仅仅是口味,而是口味与其他某种(大概是正面的)联想共同作用的结果。
But Montague’s investigation didn’t stop there. He repeated the test with a twist—instead of presenting unidentified samples, he told the tasters which one was Coke. All of a sudden, a majority of the drinkers preferred Coke. And, remarkably, Montague found activity in the part of the brain linked to high-level cognitive powers. Coke wasn’t winning on taste alone, but on a combination of taste and other 8 (presumably positive) associations.
从可口可乐如何击败百事可乐,到理解我们为何可能偏爱某笔投资而非另一笔——即使理性事实并不支持这种偏好——这个跳跃并不太难。许多投资者对股票怀有正面或负面的历史记忆,而他们的情绪在引导决策时确实扮演着重要角色。以下是我们大脑运作方式的另外一些例子,以及对投资者的启示:
It’s not too hard to make the leap from seeing how Coke beats Pepsi to seeing why we might prefer one investment to another—even when the rational facts don’t justify that preference. Many investors have positive or negative histories with stocks, and their emotions play a real role in guiding their decisions. Here are some other examples of how our brains work, and the implications for investors:
• 模式识别。人类天生就是模式搜寻者。事实上,我们太习惯于寻找模式,以至于在根本没有模式时也会“看出”模式来。例子包括篮球中的“手热”现象和股票走势图。模式识别对我们祖先的生存至关重要,因此被深深烙在大脑里。
• Pattern recognition. Humans are natural pattern seekers. In fact, we’re so used to finding patterns that we see them when they aren’t really there. Examples include the “hot hand” in basketball and stock charts. Pattern recognition was extremely important to the survival of our ancestors, and is hard 9 wired in our brains.
功能磁共振成像(fMRI)追踪脑部活动的实验发现,前额叶皮层的某些区域专门负责模式识别,尤其是对重复与交替模式的识别。
Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to track activity, neuroscientists found that parts of the prefrontal cortex specialize in pattern recognition, especially in repetition and alternation.
令人惊叹的是,研究人员发现,在 10 号刺激物连续出现仅两次后,大脑就开始预判下一次重复。
Amazingly, the researchers discovered that the brain starts to anticipate another repetition after a 10 stimulus occurs only twice in a row.
看一下附件 2,想想接下来两个数据点该落在哪里。现在再看附件 3,它揭示了背后的系统:1998 年初到 2002 年初思科每个季度的销售额增长率。我们骨子里就爱把趋势往外推。一旦模式断裂,大脑里引发恐惧和焦虑的那部分就活跃起来。
Take a look at Exhibit 2 and consider where you think the next two data points should appear. Now look at Exhibit 3, which reveals the underlying system: Cisco’s quarterly sales growth from early 1998 through early 2002. Our strong inclination is to extrapolate a trend. When a pattern breaks, parts of the brain that cause fear and anxiety become active.
附件 2:模式识别与外推
Exhibit 2: Pattern Recognition and Extrapolation
100% 估计接下来的几个数据点。
100% Estimate the next few data points.
80%
80%
Growth Rate 60%
Growth Rate 60%
40%
40%
20%
20%
源:公司数据。
Source: Company data.
图例 3:思科季度销售增长
思科季度同比增长率(1998 财年第二季度 - 2002 财年第二季度)
Exhibit 3: Cisco’s Quarterly Sales Growth Quarterly Cisco Year/Year Growth Rates (FQ2 '98 - FQ2 '02)
80%
80%
60%
60%
40%
40%
Growth Rate 20% 0% 1/98 4/98 7/98 10/98 1/99 4/99 7/99 10/99 1/00 4/00 7/00 10/00 1/01 4/01 7/01 10/01 1/02 -20% -40%
Growth Rate 20% 0% 1/98 4/98 7/98 10/98 1/99 4/99 7/99 10/99 1/00 4/00 7/00 10/00 1/01 4/01 7/01 10/01 1/02 -20% -40%
来源:公司数据。
Source: Company data.
• 直觉。一个小测试:一根球棒和一个球总共 1.10 美元。球棒比球贵 1 美元。球多少钱?
• Intuition. A quick quiz: A bat and ball together cost $1.10. The bat costs $1 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?
人们脑海中首先冒出的答案——即便没说出口——是“10 美分”。当然,这个答案是错的。研究表明,我们做许多判断时非常迅速,往往未经核对。关于偏见与刻板印象的研究显示,人们在毫秒之间就会对他人进行分类。证据也表明,投资者在做决策时同样常常依赖直觉。
The first answer that pops into people minds, if not out of their mouths, is ten cents. Of course, that answer is wrong. Research shows that we make many judgments very quickly, often without 11 checking. Studies of prejudice and stereotyping show that people categorize others in milliseconds. 12 Evidence suggests that investors, too, often rely on intuition in their decision-making.
记者杰森·茨威格描述了一个实验:一台核磁共振仪追踪他的神经活动热点,他需要通过选择两个盒子来最大化自己的收益(一个能增加价值,另一个会扣减价值——他完全不知道哪个是哪个)。更复杂的是,研究人员在茨威格嘴里塞了一个安抚奶嘴,这个奶嘴会不时喷出酷爱牌饮料或白水。同样,研究人员没有告诉他任何关于他何时、如何或为何会得到酷爱饮料或白水的信息。
Journalist Jason Zweig describes an experiment where an MRI machine tracked his neural hot spots as he tried to maximize his earnings by selecting between two boxes (one added value, the other detracted—he had no idea which was which). To complicate matters, the researchers inserted a pacifier in Zweig’s mouth that periodically squirted either Kool-Aid or plain water. Again, the researchers told him nothing about how, when, or why he would get the Kool-Aid versus the water.
在挣扎了一段时间、试图提高自己的收益后,茨威格发现,在他反复敲击左下角的过程中,收益竟然在膨胀。他解释说,原因是,在他还没能清醒意识到发生了什么之前,他的大脑就已无意识地识别出了酷爱(Kool-Aid)饮品与附加值之间的关联。13 茨威格的经历,似乎是一个运用直觉的例证。
After struggling a while to improve his earnings, Zweig found his earnings swelling as he repeatedly hit the left bottom. The reason, he explains, is that his brain unconsciously recognized association between the Kool-Aid and the added value before he had any conscious idea of what was going on. 13 Zweig’s experience appears to be a case for using intuition.
直觉很棒,但面对不平稳(即统计特征在变化)且非线性(因果关系不清晰)的系统时,往往失灵。鉴于市场本身就存在不平稳和非线性的成分,投资者应当小心,不要过度依赖直觉。
Intuition is wonderful, but tends to fail in systems that are nonstationary (i.e., the statistical properties change) and nonlinear (cause and effect are not clear). Given that markets have elements of nonstationarity and nonlinearity, investors should be careful about relying too heavily on intuition.
• 心智模型。心理学家、哲学家和经济学家长期持有一种观点,认为人类遵循基本的逻辑规则。(“如果 a,则 b”且“a”,你就可以得出结论“则 b”。)
• Mental models. Psychologists, philosophers, and economists have long held the view that humans follow basic rules of logic. (“If a, then, b” and “a”, you can conclude, “then b”.)
但心理学家菲利普·约翰逊-莱尔德的研究表明,人们实际上是用心智模型来运作的。其核心观点是:“你正在推理的内容,会影响你得出的结论。”具体来说,[你]会设想与[你]正在推理的前提相一致的可能性。
But research by psychologist Philip Johnson-Laird shows that people instead operate with mental models. The key idea is that “the content you’re reasoning about can affect the conclusions you draw.” Specifically, [you] think about possibilities that are compatible with the premises [you’re] reasoning from.”
因此,“人们往往只关注给定前提下的真实或可能情况;他们常常不去考虑那些他们认为必定为假的事情。” 14
As a result, “people focus on what is true or possible from a given set of premises; they often fail to consider what they believe must be false.” 14
• 从众。精神病学家格雷格·伯恩斯的研究表明,“从众群体可能带来某种奖励或快感。”伯恩斯让受试者比较抽象图案,并提供了另外四个人的答案。在许多情况下,受试者选择了多数人的观点。伯恩斯随后比较了负责处理空间图像的区域与决策相关的 15 前额皮质的活动。皮质区域的活跃度倾向表明,人们在依赖他人进行决策。
• Follow the crowd. Research by psychiatrist Greg Berns shows that, “there is probably some reward or kick in conforming to a group.” Berns asked subjects to compare abstract images, and provided the answers of four other people. In many cases, the subjects went with the majority view. Berns then compared activity between the area that deals with integrating spatial images and the decision- 15 making prefrontal cortex. A tilt in favor of the cortex shows how people rely on others to decide.
• 冷门。多巴胺是一种与天然快感相关的大脑化学物质。当你获得冷门奖励时,多巴胺神经元变得极度活跃,让你感觉非常好。毫不奇怪,16 研究表明,在赛马场上,赌客们总是对冷门马下注过多。
• Long shots. Dopamine is a brain chemical associated with natural highs. When you receive a long shot reward, dopamine neurons become extremely active, making you feel very good. Not surprising, 16 research shows that handicappers consistently bet too much on long shots at the track.
那种间歇性奖励还会让你欲罢不能。科学家证明,一旦你将某种获得与特定线索关联起来,你的大脑只需要那个线索就能释放多巴胺。最后,一旦清楚获得不会紧随线索而来,多巴胺会瞬间消退,让你从高峰极快 17 跌入低谷。
That periodic reward also keeps you coming back. Scientists show that once you associate a gain with a specific cue, your brain only needs the cue to release dopamine. Finally, once it becomes clear that the gain will not follow the cue, dopamine fades instantly, taking you from a high to a low 17 very quickly.
投资者启示 那么,投资者能从神经科学中学到什么教训?首先是,你应该意识到直觉的局限性。直觉在众多场合非常有用,包括人际交往和某些专业场景。但我们往往能改进直觉所暗示的判断和决策过程。特别地,我们应该谨慎地识别所有备选方案。
Investor Implications So what lessons can investors learn from neuroscience? The first is that you should be aware of the limits of intuition. Intuition can be very useful in a host of circumstances, including interpersonal dealings and certain professional settings. But we can often improve on the judgments and decision courses that intuition suggests. In particular, we should be careful to identify all alternatives.
其次,我们必须意识到心智模型固有的盲点。通常,我们在决策过程中认识不到自己的偏见。
Next, we must be aware of the blind spots inherent in mental models. Often, we don’t recognize our own biases in our decision-making.
最后,我们必须谨慎地解读模式。我们的大脑渴望看到模式,并且能快速找到它们。
Finally, we must be careful about interpreting patterns. Our mind wants to see patterns, and is quick to find them.
Jason Zweig,“你天生适合赚钱吗?” 《金钱》杂志,2002 年 10 月,75-83 页。
Jason Zweig, “Are You Wired for Wealth?” Money, October 2002, 75-83.
参见 http://money.cnn.com/2002/09/25/pf/investing/agenda_brain_short/。
See http://money.cnn.com/2002/09/25/pf/investing/agenda_brain_short/.
2 Joseph E. LeDoux,《情绪大脑:情绪生活的神秘基础》(纽约:Simon and Schuster,1996 年),19 页。
2 Joseph E. LeDoux, The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 19.
3 http://cogweb.ucla.edu/ep/EP-primer_contents.html。
3 http://cogweb.ucla.edu/ep/EP-primer_contents.html.
4 Billy Goodman,“思考思考”,《普林斯顿校友周刊》,2003 年 1 月 29 日,26-27 页;Greene 等人,“道德判断中情绪参与的 fMRI 研究”,《科学》,第 293 卷,2001 年 9 月 14 日,2105-2108 页。
4 Billy Goodman, “Thinking about thinking,” Princeton Alumni Weekly, January 29, 2003, 26-27; Greene et al., “An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment,” Science, Vol. 293, September 14, 2001, 2105-2108.
5 Dale Purves 等人编,《神经科学》第二版(桑德兰,马萨诸塞州:Sinauer Associates, Inc.,2001 年),519 页;Colin Camerer,George Loewenstein,Drazen Prelec,“神经经济学:神经科学如何为经济学提供信息”,手稿,2003 年 2 月。
5 Dale Purves, et al. , eds., Neuroscience, 2nd ed. (Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates, Inc. , 2001), 519; Colin Camerer, George Loewenstein, and Drazen Prelec, “Neuroeconomics: How neuroscience can inform economics,” Mimeo, February 2003.
参见 http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~camerer/neurojepsubmitted.pdf。
See http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~camerer/neurojepsubmitted.pdf.
6 Zweig, 82-83.
6 Zweig, 82-83.
7 Antonio R. Damasio,《笛卡尔的错误:情绪、理性与人脑》(纽约:Avon Books,1994 年),3-10 页。
7 Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain (New York: Avon Books, 1994), 3-10.
8 Clive Thompson,“每个内侧前额叶皮质里都有一个傻瓜诞生”,《纽约时报杂志》,2003 年 10 月 26 日,54-57 页。
8 Clive Thompson, “There’s a Sucker Born in Every Medial Prefrontal Cortex,” The New York Times Magazine, October 26, 2003, 54-57.
9 Michael J. Mauboussin 和 Kristen Bartholdson,“论连胜:感知、概率与技能”,《协和观察者》,第 2 期,第 8 篇,2003 年 4 月 22 日。
9 Michael J. Mauboussin and Kristen Bartholdson, “On Streaks: Perception, Probability, and Skill,” The Consilient Observer, Issue 2, 8, April 22, 2003.
10 Scott A. Huettel 等人,“随机序列中的模式感知:前额叶皮质的序列动态处理”,《自然神经科学》,第 5 卷,第 5 期,2002 年 5 月。
10 Scott A. Huettel, et al., “Perceiving patterns in random series: dynamic processing of sequence in prefrontal cortex,” Nature Neuroscience, Vol. 5, 5, May 2002.
11 Goodman, 31.
11 Goodman, 31.
12 Robert A. Olsen,“专业投资者作为自然决策者:证据与市场启示”,《心理学与金融市场杂志》,第 3 卷,第 3 期,2002 年,161-167 页。13 Zweig,80 页。
12 Robert A. Olsen, “Professional Investors as Naturalistic Decision Makers: Evidence and Market Implications,” The Journal of Psychology and Financial Markets, Vol. 3,3, 2002, 161-167. 13 Zweig, 80.
14 Goodman, 30.
14 Goodman, 30.
15 Melanie Wells,“寻找购买按钮”,《福布斯》,2003 年 9 月 1 日,65-66 页。16 Wayne W. Snyder,“赛马:检验有效市场模型”,《金融学杂志》,第 33 卷,第 4 期,1978 年 9 月,1109-1118 页。
15 Melanie Wells, “In Search of the Buy Button,” Forbes, September 1, 2003, 65-66. 16 Wayne W. Snyder, “Horse Racing: Testing the Efficient Markets Model,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 33, 4, September 1978, 1109-1118.
17 Zweig, 81.
17 Zweig, 81.
附加披露 本报告不针对、也不拟分发给或由任何位于任何地区、州、国家或其他司法管辖区的公民、居民或实体使用,若在其境内分发、发布、提供或使用本报告违反当地法律或法规,或会使 Credit Suisse First Boston 或其子公司或关联公司(统称“CSFB”)受制于该司法管辖区内的任何注册或许可要求。除非另有明确说明,本报告中所有材料均归 CSFB 版权所有。未经 CSFB 事先明确书面许可,不得以任何方式修改、传输、复制或分发给任何其他方任何材料、其内容或其副本。本报告中使用的所有商标、服务商标和标识均为 CSFB 的商标、服务商标或注册商标、服务商标。
Additional Disclosures This report is not directed to, or intended for distribution to or use by, any person or entity who is a citizen or resident of or located in any locality, state, country or other jurisdiction where such distribution, publication, availability or use would be contrary to law or regulation or which would subject Credit Suisse First Boston or its subsidiaries or affiliates (collectively "CSFB") to any registration or licensing requirement within such jurisdiction. All material presented in this report, unless specifically indicated otherwise, is under copyright to CSFB. None of the material, nor its content, nor any copy of it, may be altered in any way, transmitted to, copied or distributed to any other party, without the prior express written permission of CSFB. All trademarks, service marks and logos used in this report are trademarks or service marks or registered trademarks or service marks of CSFB.
本报告中提供的信息、工具和材料仅供您参考,不得视为或用作出售、购买或认购证券或其他金融工具的要约或要约邀请。CSFB 可能未采取任何步骤以确保本报告中提及的证券适合任何特定投资者。CSFB 不会因接收者收到本报告而将其视为客户。本报告中包含或提及的投资或服务可能不适合您,建议您在对此类投资或投资服务有疑问时咨询独立投资顾问。本报告中的任何内容均不构成投资、法律、会计或税务建议,也不构成任何投资或策略适合或适用于您的个人情况或构成对您的个人推荐。CSFB 不提供投资税务后果方面的建议,建议您联系独立税务顾问。请特别注意,税收的基础和水平可能发生变化。
The information, tools and material presented in this report are provided to you for information purposes only and are not to be used or considered as an offer or the solicitation of an offer to sell or to buy or subscribe for securities or other financial instruments. CSFB may not have taken any steps to ensure that the securities referred to in this report are suitable for any particular investor. CSFB will not treat recipients as its customers by virtue of their receiving the report. The investments or services contained or referred to in this report may not be suitable for you and it is recommended that you consult an independent investment advisor if you are in doubt about such investments or investment services. Nothing in this report constitutes investment, legal, accounting or tax advice or a representation that any investment or strategy is suitable or appropriate to your individual circumstances or otherwise constitutes a personal recommendation to you. CSFB does not offer advice on the tax consequences of investment and you are advised to contact an independent tax adviser. Please note in particular that the bases and levels of taxation may change.
本报告中呈现的信息和意见源自 CSFB 认为可靠的来源,但 CSFB 对其准确性或完整性不作任何陈述。可根据要求提供更多信息。CSFB 不承担因使用本报告所述材料而产生的损失的责任,但若根据适用于 CSFB 的特定法规或法规而产生责任,则不适用此责任排除。本报告不应替代独立判断。CSFB 可能已发布、并可能在将来发布与本报告信息不一致且得出不同结论的其他报告。这些报告反映了编制这些报告的不同的分析师的不同假设、观点和分析方法,CSFB 没有义务确保此类其他报告被本报告的任何接收者知悉。CSFB 及其关联公司参与许多可能与本节中提及的公司相关的业务。这些业务包括专门交易、风险套利、做市和其他自营交易。CSFB 可在法律允许的范围内,在材料发布之前依据或使用本报告中呈现的信息或意见,或其依据的研究或分析。
Information and opinions presented in this report have been obtained or derived from sources believed by CSFB to be reliable, but CSFB makes no representation as to their accuracy or completeness. Additional information is available upon request. CSFB accepts no liability for loss arising from the use of the material presented in this report, except that this exclusion of liability does not apply to the extent that liability arises under specific statutes or regulations applicable to CSFB. This report is not to be relied upon in substitution for the exercise of independent judgment. CSFB may have issued, and may in the future issue, other reports that are inconsistent with, and reach different conclusions from, the information presented in this report. Those reports reflect the different assumptions, views and analytical methods of the analysts who prepared them and CSFB is under no obligation to ensure that such other reports are brought to the attention of any recipient of this report. CSFB and its affiliate companies are involved in many businesses that may relate to companies mentioned in this report. These businesses include specialized trading, risk arbitrage, market making, and other proprietary trading. CSFB may, to the extent permitted by law, act upon or use the information or opinions presented herein, or the research or analysis on which they are based, before the material is published.
过往业绩不应作为未来业绩的指标或保证,并且不对未来业绩作出任何明示或暗示的陈述或保证。本报告中包含的信息、意见和估计反映了 CSFB 在其原始发布日期时的判断,如有变更,恕不另行通知。本报告中提及的任何证券或金融工具的价格、价值和收益可能下跌也可能上涨。证券和金融工具的价值受汇率波动影响,可能对此类证券或金融工具的价格或收益产生积极或消极影响。投资于价值受货币波动影响的证券(如 ADR)的投资者实际上承担了这种风险。
Past performance should not be taken as an indication or guarantee of future performance, and no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made regarding future performance. Information, opinions and estimates contained in this report reflect a judgement at its original date of publication by CSFB and are subject to change without notice. The price, value of and income from any of the securities or financial instruments mentioned in this report can fall as well as rise. The value of securities and financial instruments is subject to exchange rate fluctuation that may have a positive or adverse effect on the price or income of such securities or financial instruments. Investors in securities such as ADR’s, the values of which are influenced by currency volatility, effectively assume this risk.
结构性证券是复杂的工具,通常涉及高风险,仅面向能够理解并承担相关风险的成熟投资者销售。任何结构性证券的市场价值可能受到经济、金融和政治因素(包括但不限于即期和远期利率与汇率)、剩余期限、市场条件和波动性以及任何发行人或参考发行人的信用质量的影响。任何有兴趣购买结构性产品的投资者都应自行对该产品进行调查和分析,并咨询自己的专业顾问关于进行此类购买所涉及的风险。
Structured securities are complex instruments, typically involve a high degree of risk and are intended for sale only to sophisticated investors who are capable of understanding and assuming the risks involved. The market value of any structured security may be affected by changes in economic, financial and political factors (including, but not limited to, spot and forward interest and exchange rates), time to maturity, market conditions and volatility, and the credit quality of any issuer or reference issuer. Any investor interested in purchasing a structured product should conduct their own investigation and analysis of the product and consult with their own professional advisers as to the risks involved in making such a purchase.
本报告中讨论的一些投资具有较高的波动性。高波动性投资可能经历价值突然大幅下跌,导致在变现该投资时发生损失。这些损失可能等于您的原始投资。实际上,对于某些投资,潜在损失可能超过初始投资金额,在这种情况下,您可能需要支付更多资金来弥补这些损失。
Some investments discussed in this report have a high level of volatility. High volatility investments may experience sudden and large falls in their value causing losses when that investment is realised. Those losses may equal your original investment. Indeed, in the case of some investments the potential losses may exceed the amount of initial investment, in such circumstances you may be required to pay more money to support those losses.
投资的收益可能会波动,因此,用于投资的初始资本可能被用作该收益的一部分。某些投资可能不易变现,出售或变现这些投资可能很困难,同样,您可能难以获得有关此类投资的价值或风险的可靠信息。
Income yields from investments may fluctuate and, in consequence, initial capital paid to make the investment may be used as part of that income yield. Some investments may not be readily realisable and it may be difficult to sell or realise those investments, similarly it may prove difficult for you to obtain reliable information about the value, or risks, to which such an investment is exposed.
本报告可能提供网址或包含超链接。除非本报告涉及 CSFB 自己的网站材料,CSFB 未审查链接网站,并且对其内容不承担任何责任。此类地址或超链接(包括指向 CSFB 自己网站材料的地址或超链接)仅为了方便您和提供信息而提供,链接网站的内容绝不构成本文件的一部分。通过本报告或 CSFB 网站访问此类网站或遵循此类链接的风险由您自行承担。
This report may provide the addresses of, or contain hyperlinks to, websites. Except to the extent to which the report refers to CSFB’s own website material, CSFB has not reviewed the linked site and takes no responsibility for the content contained therein. Such address or hyperlink (including addresses or hyperlinks to CSFB’s own website material) is provided solely for your convenience and information and the content of the linked site does not in any way form part of this document. Accessing such website or following such link through this report or CSFB’s website shall be at your own risk.
本报告由 Credit Suisse First Boston (Europe) Limited(地址:One Cabot Square, London E14 4QJ, England)在欧洲(瑞士除外)发行和分发,该公司在英国受金融服务管理局(“FSA”)监管。本报告在美国由 Credit Suisse First Boston LLC 分发;在瑞士由 Credit Suisse First Boston 分发;在加拿大由 Credit Suisse First Boston Canada Inc. 分发;在巴西由 Banco de Investimentos Credit Suisse Boston S.A. 分发;在日本由 Credit Suisse First Boston Securities (Japan) Limited 分发;在亚太其他地区,由以下在相关司法管辖区获得适当授权的实体分发:Credit Suisse First Boston (Hong Kong) Limited、Credit Suisse First Boston Australia Equities Limited、Credit Suisse First Boston (Thailand) Limited、CSFB Research (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd、Credit Suisse First Boston Singapore Branch;在世界其他地区,由上述实体的相关授权关联方分发。关于台湾证券的研究由 Credit Suisse First Boston 台北分公司编制和/或审核,并由注册高级业务人员完成。
This report is issued and distributed in Europe (except Switzerland) by Credit Suisse First Boston (Europe) Limited, One Cabot Square, London E14 4QJ, England, which is regulated in the United Kingdom by The Financial Services Authority (“FSA”). This report is being distributed in the United States by Credit Suisse First Boston LLC; in Switzerland by Credit Suisse First Boston; in Canada by Credit Suisse First Boston Canada Inc.; in Brazil by Banco de Investimentos Credit Suisse Boston S.A.; in Japan by Credit Suisse First Boston Securities (Japan) Limited; elsewhere in Asia/Pacific by whichever of the following is the appropriately authorised entity in the relevant jurisdiction: Credit Suisse First Boston (Hong Kong) Limited, Credit Suisse First Boston Australia Equities Limited, Credit Suisse First Boston (Thailand) Limited, CSFB Research (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd, Credit Suisse First Boston Singapore Branch and elsewhere in the world by the relevant authorised affiliate of the above. Research on Taiwanese securities produced by Credit Suisse First Boston, Taipei Branch has been prepared and/or reviewed by a registered Senior Business Person.
在瑞士信贷第一波士顿(CSFB)未注册或未获证券交易许可的司法管辖区内,交易将仅根据适用的证券法规执行,各司法管辖区的法规可能有所不同,且可能要求交易依据相关注册或许可要求的豁免条款进行。非美国客户若欲进行交易,应联系其所在司法管辖区的 CSFB 实体,除非管辖法律另有规定。美国客户若欲进行交易,仅应通过联系美国 Credit Suisse First Boston LLC 的代表进行。
In jurisdictions where CSFB is not already registered or licensed to trade in securities, transactions will only be effected in accordance with applicable securities legislation, which will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and may require that the trade be made in accordance with applicable exemptions from registration or licensing requirements. Non-U.S. customers wishing to effect a transaction should contact a CSFB entity in their local jurisdiction unless governing law permits otherwise. U.S. customers wishing to effect a transaction should do so only by contacting a representative at Credit Suisse First Boston LLC in the U.S.
请注意,本报告最初由 CSFB 编制并发布,供其市场专业和机构投资者客户使用。非 CSFB 市场专业或机构投资者客户的接收者,在依据本报告作出任何投资决策或需要对其内容进行任何必要解释前,应寻求其独立财务顾问的建议。本研究可能涉及英国境外人士提供的投资或服务,或涉及不受 FSA 监管的其他事项,或者可能无法享受 FSA 为私人客户提供的保护和/或英国赔偿计划,关于此类情况的更多细节可应要求就本报告提供。
Please note that this report was originally prepared and issued by CSFB for distribution to their market professional and institutional investor customers. Recipients who are not market professional or institutional investor customers of CSFB should seek the advice of their independent financial advisor prior to taking any investment decision based on this report or for any necessary explanation of its contents. This research may relate to investments or services of a person outside of the UK or to other matters which are not regulated by the FSA or in respect of which the protections of the FSA for private customers and/or the UK compensation scheme may not be available, and further details as to where this may be the case are available upon request in respect of this report.
版权所有 瑞士信贷第一波士顿及其子公司与关联公司,2003。保留所有权利。
Copyright Credit Suisse First Boston, and its subsidiaries and affiliates, 2003. All rights reserved.
亚太地区:+852 2101-6000 欧洲:+44 (20) 7888-8888 美利坚合众国:+1 (212) 325-2000
ASIA/PACIFIC: +852 2101-6000 EUROPE: +44 (20) 7888-8888 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: +1 (212) 325-2000