跌倒了爬不起来：均值回归与扭亏为盈
2004 年 2 月 10 日 第 3 卷 第 3 期
February 10, 2004 Volume 3, Issue 3
我摔倒了，爬不起来——均值回归与扭亏为盈这项研究的关键发现……在于，实现持续卓越经济表现的案例极为罕见，这意味着要做到这一点极其困难。一个相关的发现……是，即便在某段时期内取得了卓越表现并得以持续，从那个高位滑落的概率也相当高。
I’ve Fallen and I Can’t Get Up Mean Reversion and Turnarounds The key finding of this research . . . is that the demonstrated rarity of achieving sustained superior economic performance implies that it is extremely difficult to achieve. An associated finding . . . is that even if superior performance is achieved and sustained for a period of time, the probability of slipping from that lofty perch is relatively high.
罗伯特·R·威金斯和蒂莫西·W·鲁弗利《持续竞争优势》¹
Robert R. Wiggins and Timothy W. Ruefli Sustained Competitive Advantage 1
收益与增长
在《纽约时报》最近的一篇文章中，金融学教授约瑟夫·拉科尼肖克（Josef Lakonishok）认为，今天的股市存在许多“疯狂的口袋”。拉科尼肖克的论点基于增长与市盈率之间的关系，并暗示市场对一些市盈率倍数高企的公司隐含了不切实际的快速盈利增长率。他与两位同事进行的研究表明，极少数公司能够维持高增长率。
Returns and Growth In a recent New York Times article, finance professor Josef Lakonishok argues that 2 today’s stock market has many “pockets of craziness.” Lakonishok’s case is based on the relationship between growth and price-earnings ratios, and suggests that the market is implying unrealistically rapid earnings growth rates for some companies with lofty price-earnings multiples. Research he conducted with a pair of colleagues shows 3 that very few companies sustain high growth rates.
但真正决定市盈率的是什么？公司的价值，是市场对其增长率和经济回报预期的函数。这一基本概念解释了为什么孤立地看待增长会如此具有误导性。增长可能是好事（当公司赚取的回报超过资本成本时），也可能是坏事（当回报低于资本成本时），或者无关紧要（当回报等于资本成本时）。
But what really determines a price-earnings ratio? A company’s value is a function of the market’s expectations for its growth rate and its economic returns. This fundamental concept explains why looking at growth in isolation can be so misleading. Growth can be good (when a company earns returns in excess of the cost of capital), bad (when returns are below the cost of capital), or neutral (when returns equal the cost of capital).
你首先必须清楚一家公司是否能赚取合理的回报，然后才能判断增长的影响。公司可以——也确实会——一路增长到破产。同样，一些低增长、高回报的企业始终享有溢价估值。脱离经济回报孤立地研究增长，无异于自取灭亡。
You must first have a clear sense of whether or not a company is earning appropriate returns before you can judge the impact of growth. Companies can, and do, grow their 4 way to bankruptcy. Likewise, some low-growth, high-return businesses consistently carry premium valuations. Studying growth in isolation of economic returns is an Michael J. Mauboussin invitation to failure.
212-325-3108 要牢牢把握一家公司的经济回报前景，就需要透彻理解竞争策略。策略分析的目标是回答三个基本问题：克里斯汀·巴索德森 212-325-2788
212-325-3108 Gaining a firm grasp of a company’s prospects for economic returns requires a 5 thorough understanding of competitive strategy. The goal of strategic analysis is to Kristen Bartholdson 212-325-2788 address three fundamental questions:
1. 公司是否在创造高于资本成本的投资回报，或者是否有充分的理由相信它未来能赚取有吸引力的回报？
1. Is the company generating returns on investment above the cost of capital, or is there good reason to believe it will earn attractive returns in the future?
2. 如果回报确实超过资本成本，公司能将这 6 个百分点的超额回报维持多久？
2. If returns do exceed the cost of capital, for how long can the company sustain its 6 excess returns?
3. 一旦一家公司的回报率跌落到资本成本以下，它有多大可能实现持久复苏，重新达到要求的回报率之上呢？
3. Once a company’s returns dip below the cost of capital, what’s the probability it can stage a sustained recovery to above-required returns?
在这篇文章中，我们利用科技和零售行业的经验数据，对后面两个问题进行了更深入的探讨，以使这些观点更加生动具体。
In this piece we take a closer look at the latter two questions, drawing on empirical data from the technology and retail industries to bring the points to life.
死亡、税收与均值回归
有一条在实证中得到充分证明的微观经济学理论，认为一家公司的投资回报率会随时间回归到资本成本的水平。这个理论及其直觉都很直白。
Death, Taxes, and Reversion to the Mean One microeconomic theory that is well documented empirically is the notion that a company’s return on 7 investment reverts to the cost of capital over time. The theory, and intuition, is straightforward.
能产生高回报的公司会引来竞争和资本，从而将回报率拉低至机会成本水平。同样，资本会逃离回报率低的行业——通过破产、撤资或整合——使回报率回升至资本成本水平。
Companies that generate high returns attract competition and capital, which drive returns toward opportunity-cost levels. Similarly, capital flees poor return industries—through bankruptcy, disinvestment, or consolidation—lifting returns back to the cost of capital.
图表 1 展示了 1979 年至 1996 年间超过 450 家科技公司的这一过程。（我们在 1996 年截止，以避开泡沫相关的问题。）我们根据投资现金流回报率（CFROI）将公司分为四个四分位，并跟踪其回报模式。由于 CFROI 是一项实际税后指标，其时间序列不受利率和通胀潜在扭曲变动的影响。
Exhibit 1 shows this process for a sample of over 450 technology companies from 1979 to 1996. (We 8 stopped at 1996 to avoid issues related to the bubble.) We ranked companies in quartiles based on their ® cash flow return on investment (CFROI ), and followed the return patterns. Because CFROI is a real, after-tax measure, the time series is unaffected by the potentially distorting shifts in interest rates and inflation.
下表 1：美国科技行业 CFROI 衰减率
Exhibit 1: U.S. Technology CFROI Fade
15 12 9 6
15 12 9 6
CFROI (%)
CFROI (%)
原件此处是表格，PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失，下面只剩按列读出的数字，行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。
3 0 （3） （6） （9） （12） （15） 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
3 0 (3) (6) (9) (12) (15) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
根据四分位排名后的多年数 4 3 2 1
Years Forward after Quartile Ranking 4 3 2 1
资料来源：CSFB HOLT。
Source: CSFB HOLT.
最优秀组在初始阶段的平均投资现金流回报率为 15%，但仅五年后就降至 6%。最差组则从 15% 的负回报，在五年内回归到零（仍远低于资本成本）。中间两个四分位组的表现相对稳定，始终围绕资本成本水平波动。最高组与最低组之间的回报差距，从首个测量期的 3000 个基点，十年后收窄至仅 300 个基点。虽然十年不足以完成均值回归的全过程，但其中大部分演进趋势在这一时间段内已清晰可见。
The top group earned an average CFROI of 15% during the initial period and declined to 6% after only five years. The worst group went from 15% negative returns to zero (still well below the cost of capital) within five years. The middle two quartiles showed relative stability around cost-of-capital levels. The return gap between the highest and lowest quartiles went from 3,000 basis points at the first measurement period to just 300 basis points after ten years. While ten years in insufficient to complete the reversion-to-the-mean process, much of the progression is evident within that timeframe.
与理论一致的是，淘汰在最低四分位收益率的改善中扮演了核心角色。五年后，最低四分位的公司仅有 60% 仍存续，许多表现不佳的企业要么破产，要么被收购。这种淘汰造成了生存者偏差，使得十年期间的收益率得以提升。相比之下，最高收益四分位中有 85% 的公司五年后仍存续。所有四分位数的淘汰率在五年后往往趋于平均。
Consistent with theory, attrition plays a central role in the improvement of lowest-quartile returns. Just 60% of the lowest-quartile companies were active after five years, as many of the poor performers went bankrupt or were acquired. This attrition creates a survivorship bias, allowing returns to rise during the decade. In contrast, 85% of the firms in the highest-return quartile were active after five years. Attrition rates across all quartiles tend to average out after five years.
多个均值回归研究中有一个共同特征：一些公司（虽然数量不多）能够且确实持续获得高回报。在我们对 1950 年至 2001 年间近 700 家零售企业的研究中，有 14% 的公司从未低于其资本成本线。而在 1960 年至 1996 年样本中，1700 家科技公司里有 11% 保持了超额回报为正的完美纪录。
One consistent feature across the many mean-reversion studies is that some companies (albeit not many) can and do earn persistently high returns. In our study of nearly 700 retailers from 1950 to 2001, 14% of 9 the companies never earned below their cost of capital. Of the 1,700 technology companies in our sample from 1960 to 1996, 11% sustained an unblemished record of positive excess returns.
维持高回报率是财富的巨大潜在来源。假设两家公司在初始回报率和未来增长率上完全相同，那么能够更长时间保持高于资本成本的回报率的那一家，价值会高出 10 倍，因此其交易估值倍数也会高得多。
Sustaining high returns is a huge potential source of wealth. Given two companies with the same initial returns and future growth rates, the business that can sustain above-cost-of-capital returns longer will be 10 significantly more valuable, and hence will trade at a much higher valuation multiple.
对一家高回报企业的战略评估，应当揭示超额收益的来源——通常是消费者优势或生产优势——并提供某种框架来考量这一优势的持久性。此外，某些企业（尤其是网络型和知识型）在成长过程中享受递增回报。仅仅聚焦增长，基本上会忽略一家公司的战略优势及其带来的经济成果。
A strategic assessment of a business earning high returns should reveal the source of the excess spread—typically either a consumer or production advantage—and provide some framework to consider the longevity of that advantage. Further, some businesses (especially those in network and knowledge 11 businesses) enjoy increasing returns as they grow. A company’s strategic strengths, and the economics that result, are essentially overlooked by a singular focus on growth.
我摔倒了，爬不起来
股价反映的是预期，而获得卓越长期回报的关键在于成功预判预期的修正。一个重要的推论是：无论是好生意（即高回报）还是坏生意（低回报），其本身并没有固有的吸引力或排斥力。投资者需要对所有公司股票与预期的关系进行评估。
I’ve Fallen and I Can’t Get up Stock prices reflect expectations, and the key to generating superior long-term returns is to successfully anticipate expectation revisions. An important corollary is that neither a good (i.e., high-return) business nor a bad (low-return) business is inherently attractive or unattractive. Investors need to assess the stocks 12 of all companies versus expectations.
本着这一精神，我们审视了一类特定的公司——那些已经经历了衰退的公司。
In this spirit, we took a look at a particular class of companies—those that have realized a downturn.
此处，我们将“下行”定义为：在连续两年的资本现金流收益率（CFROI）高于资本成本之后，又出现连续两年的 CFROI 低于资本成本。
Here, we define a downturn as two consecutive years of CFROI below the cost of capital following two years of returns above the cost of capital.
这项分析对价值投资者尤为重要——他们常常买入那些从数据上看估值偏低、寄望于经济回报能够改善的公司。经典的价值陷阱是买下一家原本就该因为经济回报糟糕而价格低廉的公司。但若一家公司因暂时性低迷而变得便宜，且市场并未预料到其将发生扭转，那么此时买入就极具吸引力。
This analysis is particularly important for value investors, who often buy companies that are statistically inexpensive in the hope that economic returns improve. The classic value trap is buying a cheap company that deserves to be cheap based on poor economic returns. But buying a company that is cheap because of a temporary downturn is potentially very attractive if the market does not anticipate the turnaround.
表 2 展示了那些经历业绩下滑的公司会发生什么。我们的样本涵盖来自科技和零售行业的近 1200 家公司。这两个行业的数据惊人地相似，而且都不太令人鼓舞：样本公司中只有大约 30% 能够实现持续性复苏。（我们将持续性复苏定义为：在连续两年低于资本成本的表现之后，实现连续三年高于平均水平的回报。）大约四分之一的公司实现了非持续性复苏。其余公司——略低于样本总数的一半——要么没有出现好转，要么就消失了。公司可以体面地消失（被收购），也可以不体面地消失（破产）。
Exhibit 2 shows what happens to companies that realize a downturn. Our sample includes almost 1,200 companies from the technology and retail sectors. The data for the two industries are strikingly similar, and not particularly encouraging: Only about 30% of the sample companies were able to engineer a sustained recovery. (We define a sustained recovery as three years of above-average returns following two years of below-cost-of-capital results.) Roughly one-quarter of the companies produced a non-sustained recovery. The balance—just under half the population—either saw no turnaround or disappeared. Companies can disappear gracefully (get acquired) or disgracefully (go bankrupt).
表 2：我跌倒了，起不来
Exhibit 2: I’ve Fallen and I Can’t Get Up
| 行业分类 | 科技 1 | 零售 2 |
|---|---|---|
| 未反转 | 45% | 48% |
| 非持续反转 | 26% | 23% |
| 持续反转 | 29% | 29% |
1
Technology 1 Retail 2 No turnaround 45% 48% Non-sustained turnaround 26% 23% Sustained turnaround 29% 29% 1
712 家公司样本，1960–1996 年。
Sample of 712 companies, 1960-1996.
2 家样本公司，445 家，1950-2001 年。
2 Sample of 445 companies, 1950-2001.
来源：瑞信霍尔特（CSFB HOLT）
Source: CSFB HOLT.
在这一分析中，我们同样能够看到企业经历低迷期的时长分布。对于零售商和科技公司而言，大约 27% 的低迷期仅持续两年，而这两个行业中超过 60% 的低迷期持续时间不足五年。换言之，大多数经历低迷期的企业，其命运会在相当短的时间内被决定。
Within this analysis, we were also able to see how long companies experienced downturns. For both retailers and technology companies, roughly 27% of downturns lasted only two years, and for both sectors over 60% of downturns lasted for less than five years. In other words, the destiny of most firms that live through a downturn is determined rather quickly.
这些均值回归与扭亏为盈的数据，突显了竞争力量有多么强大且持续。
These mean reversion and turnaround data underscore how strong and consistent competitive forces are.
大多数便宜的股票之所以便宜，自有其道理——一家回报率糟糕的企业，想要恢复长期、高于资本成本的盈利轨迹，希望非常渺茫。
Most stocks that are cheap are cheap for a reason, and the likelihood that a business earning poor returns resumes a long-term, above-cost-of-capital profile is slim.
然而，高回报持续性确实存在（以及市场可能错误定价这种持续性）的证据表明，那些对竞争动态有深刻理解、且有足够投资期限的投资者，有机会实现超额回报。
Yet the evidence that high-return persistence does occur (and the likelihood that markets misprice this persistence) suggests that investors with a strong grasp of competitive dynamics and a sufficient investment horizon have an opportunity to realize superior returns.
罗伯特·R·威金斯（Robert R. Wiggins）与蒂莫西·W·鲁埃弗利（Timothy W. Ruefli），《持续竞争优势：时间动态与卓越经济绩效的发生频率及持久性》
Robert R. Wiggins and Timothy W. Ruefli, “Sustained Competitive Advantage: Temporal Dynamics and the Incidence and Persistence of Superior Economic Performance,”
《组织科学》杂志，第 13 卷，第 1 期，2002 年 1–2 月号，第 100 页。
Organizational Science, Vol. 13, 1, January-February 2002, 100.
2 马克·休伯特，“五年预测看起来很棒，还是并非如此？”《纽约时报》，2004 年 1 月 25 日。
2 Mark Hulbert, “The Five-Year Forecast Looks Great, or Does It?” New York Times, January 25, 2004.
3 Louis K. C. Chan、Jason J. Karceski 和 Josef Lakonishok，《增长率的水平和持续性》，《金融学刊》，第 58 卷，第 2 期，2003 年 4 月，第 644–684 页。另见 Michael J. Mauboussin 和 Kristen Bartholdson，《数字金字塔：公司规模、增长率与估值》，《协同学观察》，第 2 卷，第 17 期，2003 年 9 月 17 日。
3 Louis K. C. Chan, Jason J. Karceski, and Josef Lakonishok, “The Level and Persistence of Growth Rates,” The Journal of Finance, Vol. 58, 2, April 2003, 644-684. See also Michael J. Mauboussin and Kristen Bartholdson, “The Pyramid of Numbers: Firm Size, Growth Rates, and Valuation,” The Consilient Observer, Vol. 2, 17, September 17, 2003.
4 迈克尔·J·莫布森与克里斯滕·巴托尔森，《安然何去何从——或安然何以枯萎》，
4 Michael J. Mauboussin and Kristen Bartholdson, “Whither Enron: Or—Why Enron Withered,”
《一致性观察者》，第 1 卷，第 1 期，2002 年 1 月 15 日。
The Consilient Observer, Vol. 1, 1, January 15, 2002.
5 迈克尔·J·莫布森与克里斯汀·巴索尔森，《衡量护城河：评估价值创造的规模与可持续性》，瑞士信贷第一波士顿股票研究，2002 年 12 月 16 日。
5 Michael J. Mauboussin and Kristen Bartholdson, “Measuring the Moat; Assessing the Magnitude and Sustainability of Value Creation,” Credit Suisse First Boston Equity Research, December 16, 2002.
6 迈克尔·J·莫布森、亚历山大·谢伊和帕特里克·J·麦卡锡，《竞争优势期：财务与竞争战略的交汇点》，瑞士信贷第一波士顿股权研究，2001 年 10 月 4 日。
6 Michael J. Mauboussin, Alexander Schay, and Patrick J. McCarthy, “Competitive Advantage Period (CAP): At the Intersection of Finance and Competitive Strategy,” Credit Suisse First Boston Equity Research, October 4, 2001.
7 Ibid., 7-9.
7 Ibid., 7-9.
8 Todd Erickson、Carin Cooney 和 Craig Sterling，“美国科技行业：均值回归分析”，CSFB HOLT 研究，2004 年 2 月 2 日。本报告可应要求提供。
8 Todd Erickson, Carin Cooney, and Craig Sterling, “US Technology Sector: Mean Reversion Analysis,” CSFB HOLT Research, February 2, 2004. This presentation is available upon request.
9 名瑞士信贷第一波士顿（CSFB）HOLT 分析师克里斯托弗·卡塔帕诺、凯蒂·邓恩和克雷格·斯特林执行了零售行业分析。
9 CSFB HOLT analysts Christopher Catapano, Katie Dunne, and Craig Sterling performed the retail industry analysis.
为了说明这一点，我们创建了一个模型：两家公司经营利润增长率均为 8%，增量投入资本初始回报率均为 100%，资本成本也完全相同。我们让第一家公司回报率在 10 年内逐渐降至零，第二家公司回报率在 20 年内逐渐降至零。结果，第二家公司——尽管增长率完全相同——价值比第一家高出 33%，折算成市盈率就是超过 6 个点。
10 To illustrate, we created a model with two companies that had 8% operating income growth rates, initial returns on incremental invested capital of 100%, and identical costs of capital. We faded the first company’s returns to zero over 10 years, and the second company’s returns to zero over 20 years. The second company—again, with identical growth—was 33% more valuable than the first, representing over 6 price-earnings points.
11\. W. Brian Arthur 所著“递增收益与新商业世界”，《哈佛商业评论》，1996 年 7-8 月号。
11 W. Brian Arthur, “Increasing Returns and the New World of Business,” Harvard Business Review, July-August 1996.
12 迈克尔·J·莫布森和克里斯汀·巴托尔森合著，“做庄家：投资中的过程与结果”，《协同学观察家》，第 2 卷，第 18 期，2003 年 10 月 7 日。
12 Michael J. Mauboussin and Kristen Bartholdson, “Be the House: Process and Outcome in Investing,” The Consilient Observer, Vol. 2, 18, October 7, 2003.
CFROI 是瑞士信贷第一波士顿银行或其子公司、关联公司在美国注册的商标。
® CFROI is a registered trademark in the United States of Credit Suisse First Boston or its subsidiaries or affiliates.
附加披露
本报告并非针对或意图分发给任何位于或居住于任何地区、州、国家或其他司法管辖区的个人或实体，若在该司法管辖区进行分发、发布、提供或使用本报告违反相关法律或法规，或会使瑞士信贷第一波士顿银行及其子公司或关联公司（合称“CSFB”）承担该司法管辖区的任何注册或许可要求。本报告中所有材料，除非另有明确说明，版权均归 CSFB 所有。未经 CSFB 事先书面许可，不得以任何方式修改、传输、复制或分发本报告的任何材料、内容或其任何副本。本报告中使用的所有商标、服务标志和标识均为 CSFB 的商标、服务标志或注册商标、服务标志。
Additional Disclosures This report is not directed to, or intended for distribution to or use by, any person or entity who is a citizen or resident of or located in any locality, state, country or other jurisdiction where such distribution, publication, availability or use would be contrary to law or regulation or which would subject Credit Suisse First Boston or its subsidiaries or affiliates (collectively "CSFB") to any registration or licensing requirement within such jurisdiction. All material presented in this report, unless specifically indicated otherwise, is under copyright to CSFB. None of the material, nor its content, nor any copy of it, may be altered in any way, transmitted to, copied or distributed to any other party, without the prior express written permission of CSFB. All trademarks, service marks and logos used in this report are trademarks or service marks or registered trademarks or service marks of CSFB.
本报告中提供的信息、工具和材料仅供您参考，不得视为或用作出售或购买或认购证券或其他金融工具的要约或要约邀请。CSFB 可能未采取任何措施确保本报告中提及的证券适合任何特定投资者。CSFB 不会因接收方收到本报告而将其视为客户。本报告中包含或提及的投资或服务可能不适合您，建议您在对此类投资或投资服务有疑问时咨询独立投资顾问。本报告中的任何内容均不构成投资、法律、会计或税务建议，也不构成任何投资或策略适合或适用于您个人情况的陈述，或属于对您的个人推荐。CSFB 不提供投资税务后果的建议，建议您咨询独立税务顾问。请特别留意，税收的基础和水平可能发生变化。
The information, tools and material presented in this report are provided to you for information purposes only and are not to be used or considered as an offer or the solicitation of an offer to sell or to buy or subscribe for securities or other financial instruments. CSFB may not have taken any steps to ensure that the securities referred to in this report are suitable for any particular investor. CSFB will not treat recipients as its customers by virtue of their receiving the report. The investments or services contained or referred to in this report may not be suitable for you and it is recommended that you consult an independent investment advisor if you are in doubt about such investments or investment services. Nothing in this report constitutes investment, legal, accounting or tax advice or a representation that any investment or strategy is suitable or appropriate to your individual circumstances or otherwise constitutes a personal recommendation to you. CSFB does not offer advice on the tax consequences of investment and you are advised to contact an independent tax adviser. Please note in particular that the bases and levels of taxation may change.
CSFB 认为本报告披露部分中的信息和意见准确完整。报告其他部分呈现的信息和意见来自 CSFB 认为可靠的来源，但 CSFB 对其准确性或完整性不作任何陈述。如需更多信息，可应要求提供。CSFB 不对因使用本报告中材料而产生的损失承担责任，但此责任排除不适用于根据适用于 CSFB 的特定法规或法规产生的责任情形。本报告不可替代独立判断的运用。CSFB 可能已经发布，并可能在将来发布关于本证券的交易提示。交易提示是基于市场事件和催化因素的短期交易机会，而股票评级则反映基于相对于相关覆盖范围的预期总回报（12 个月期间）的投资建议。由于交易提示和股票评级反映不同的假设和分析方法，交易提示的方向可能与股票评级不同。此外，CSFB 可能已经发布，并可能在将来发布与本报告信息不一致且得出不同结论的其他报告。这些报告反映了编写这些报告的分析师不同的假设、观点和分析方法，CSFB 无义务确保此类其他报告引起本报告任何接收方的注意。CSFB 及其关联公司参与许多与本报告中提及公司相关的业务。这些业务包括专业交易、风险套利、做市及其他自营交易。CSFB 可在法律允许的范围内，在材料发布之前根据或使用本报告中呈现的信息或意见，或其依据的研究或分析。
CSFB believes the information and opinions in the Disclosure Section of this report are accurate and complete. Information and opinions presented in the other sections of the report were obtained or derived from sources CSFB believes are reliable, but CSFB makes no representations as to their accuracy or completeness. Additional information is available upon request. CSFB accepts no liability for loss arising from the use of the material presented in this report, except that this exclusion of liability does not apply to the extent that liability arises under specific statutes or regulations applicable to CSFB. This report is not to be relied upon in substitution for the exercise of independent judgment. CSFB may have issued, and may in the future issue, a trading call regarding this security. Trading calls are short term trading opportunities based on market events and catalysts, while stock ratings reflect investment recommendations based on expected total return over a 12-month period relative to the relevant coverage universe. Because trading calls and stock ratings reflect different assumptions and analytical methods, trading calls may differ directionally from the stock rating. In addition, CSFB may have issued, and may in the future issue, other reports that are inconsistent with, and reach different conclusions from, the information presented in this report. Those reports reflect the different assumptions, views and analytical methods of the analysts who prepared them and CSFB is under no obligation to ensure that such other reports are brought to the attention of any recipient of this report. CSFB and its affiliate companies are involved in many businesses that relate to companies mentioned in this report. These businesses include specialized trading, risk arbitrage, market making, and other proprietary trading. CSFB may, to the extent permitted by law, act upon or use the information or opinions presented herein, or the research or analysis on which they are based, before the material is published.
过往业绩不应被视为未来业绩的指标或保证，且不对未来业绩作出任何明示或暗示的陈述或保证。本报告中包含的信息、意见和估计反映了 CSFB 在原发布日期的判断，并可能随时更改，恕不另行通知。本报告中提及的任何证券或金融工具的价格、价值及收入可能下跌也可能上涨。证券和金融工具的价值受汇率波动影响，可能对该等证券或金融工具的价格或收入产生正面或负面影响。投资于价值受货币波动影响的证券（如美国存托凭证）的投资者将实际承担此风险。
Past performance should not be taken as an indication or guarantee of future performance, and no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made regarding future performance. Information, opinions and estimates contained in this report reflect a judgement at its original date of publication by CSFB and are subject to change without notice. The price, value of and income from any of the securities or financial instruments mentioned in this report can fall as well as rise. The value of securities and financial instruments is subject to exchange rate fluctuation that may have a positive or adverse effect on the price or income of such securities or financial instruments. Investors in securities such as ADR’s, the values of which are influenced by currency volatility, effectively assume this risk.
结构性证券为复杂工具，通常涉及高风险，仅向能够理解并承担相关风险的成熟投资者发售。任何结构性证券的市场价值可能受经济、金融和政治因素（包括但不限于现货及远期利率和汇率）、到期时间、市场条件和波动性，以及任何发行人或参考发行人的信用质量变化的影响。任何有意购买结构性产品的投资者应对该产品进行自己的调查和分析，并就购买该产品所涉风险咨询自己的专业顾问。
Structured securities are complex instruments, typically involve a high degree of risk and are intended for sale only to sophisticated investors who are capable of understanding and assuming the risks involved. The market value of any structured security may be affected by changes in economic, financial and political factors (including, but not limited to, spot and forward interest and exchange rates), time to maturity, market conditions and volatility, and the credit quality of any issuer or reference issuer. Any investor interested in purchasing a structured product should conduct their own investigation and analysis of the product and consult with their own professional advisers as to the risks involved in making such a purchase.
本报告中讨论的某些投资具有高波动性。高波动性投资可能会经历价值突然大幅下跌，导致在实现该投资时产生损失。这些损失可能等于您的原始投资。实际上，对于某些投资，潜在损失可能超过初始投资金额，在此情况下，您可能需要支付更多资金来弥补这些损失。投资的收入收益可能波动，因此，用于投资的初始资本可能被用作该收入收益的一部分。某些投资可能不易变现，出售或变现这些投资可能困难，同样，您可能难以获得有关该投资价值或风险的可靠信息。
Some investments discussed in this report have a high level of volatility. High volatility investments may experience sudden and large falls in their value causing losses when that investment is realised. Those losses may equal your original investment. Indeed, in the case of some investments the potential losses may exceed the amount of initial investment, in such circumstances you may be required to pay more money to support those losses. Income yields from investments may fluctuate and, in consequence, initial capital paid to make the investment may be used as part of that income yield. Some investments may not be readily realisable and it may be difficult to sell or realise those investments, similarly it may prove difficult for you to obtain reliable information about the value, or risks, to which such an investment is exposed.
本报告可能提供网站地址或包含网站超链接。除非本报告引用的是 CSFB 自己的网站材料，CSFB 未审查链接网站，对其内容不承担任何责任。此类地址或超链接（包括指向 CSFB 自己网站材料的地址或超链接）仅为您的便利和信息提供，链接网站的内容绝不构成本文件的一部分。通过本报告或 CSFB 网站访问此类网站或点击此类链接，风险由您自行承担。
This report may provide the addresses of, or contain hyperlinks to, websites. Except to the extent to which the report refers to CSFB’s own website material, CSFB has not reviewed the linked site and takes no responsibility for the content contained therein. Such address or hyperlink (including addresses or hyperlinks to CSFB’s own website material) is provided solely for your convenience and information and the content of the linked site does not in any way form part of this document. Accessing such website or following such link through this report or CSFB’s website shall be at your own risk.
本报告在欧洲（瑞士除外）由 Credit Suisse First Boston (Europe) Limited 发布和分发，地址为 One Cabot Square, London E14 4QJ, England，该公司在英国受金融服务管理局（“FSA”）监管。本报告在美国由 Credit Suisse First Boston LLC 分发；在瑞士由 Credit Suisse First Boston 分发；在加拿大由 Credit Suisse First Boston Canada Inc. 分发；在巴西由 Banco de Investimentos Credit Suisse Boston S.A. 分发；在日本由 Credit Suisse First Boston Securities (Japan) Limited 分发；在亚太其他地区由以下在相关司法管辖区获适当授权的实体分发：Credit Suisse First Boston (Hong Kong) Limited、Credit Suisse First Boston Australia Equities Limited、Credit Suisse First Boston (Thailand) Limited、CSFB Research (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd、Credit Suisse First Boston Singapore Branch，以及在世界其他地区由上述实体的相关授权关联公司分发。关于台湾证券的研究由 Credit Suisse First Boston, Taipei Branch 制作，由注册资深业务人员编写。有关 Credit Suisse First Boston Canada Inc. 关于股权研究报告传播的政策和程序，请访问 http://www.csfb.com/legal_terms/canada_research_policy.shtml。
This report is issued and distributed in Europe (except Switzerland) by Credit Suisse First Boston (Europe) Limited, One Cabot Square, London E14 4QJ, England, which is regulated in the United Kingdom by The Financial Services Authority (“FSA”). This report is being distributed in the United States by Credit Suisse First Boston LLC; in Switzerland by Credit Suisse First Boston; in Canada by Credit Suisse First Boston Canada Inc.; in Brazil by Banco de Investimentos Credit Suisse Boston S.A.; in Japan by Credit Suisse First Boston Securities (Japan) Limited; elsewhere in Asia/Pacific by whichever of the following is the appropriately authorised entity in the relevant jurisdiction: Credit Suisse First Boston (Hong Kong) Limited, Credit Suisse First Boston Australia Equities Limited, Credit Suisse First Boston (Thailand) Limited, CSFB Research (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd, Credit Suisse First Boston Singapore Branch and elsewhere in the world by the relevant authorised affiliate of the above. Research on Taiwanese securities produced by Credit Suisse First Boston, Taipei Branch has been prepared by a registered Senior Business Person. For Credit Suisse First Boston Canada Inc.'s policies and procedures regarding the dissemination of equity research, please visit http://www.csfb.com/legal_terms/canada_research_policy.shtml.
在 CSFB 尚未注册或获得证券交易许可的司法管辖区，交易将仅根据适用的证券法规进行，各司法管辖区的法规可能不同，并可能要求交易须符合注册或许可要求的适用豁免条件。非美国客户如需进行交易，应联系当地司法管辖区的 CSFB 实体，除非适用法律另有规定。美国客户如需进行交易，应仅通过联系 Credit Suisse First Boston LLC 在美国的代表进行。
In jurisdictions where CSFB is not already registered or licensed to trade in securities, transactions will only be effected in accordance with applicable securities legislation, which will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and may require that the trade be made in accordance with applicable exemptions from registration or licensing requirements. Non-U.S. customers wishing to effect a transaction should contact a CSFB entity in their local jurisdiction unless governing law permits otherwise. U.S. customers wishing to effect a transaction should do so only by contacting a representative at Credit Suisse First Boston LLC in the U.S.
请注意，本报告最初由 CSFB 编制并发布，分发给其市场专业及机构投资者客户。
Please note that this report was originally prepared and issued by CSFB for distribution to their market professional and institutional investor customers.
非 CSFB 市场专业或机构投资者客户的接收方，在根据本报告作出任何投资决策或需要对其内容进行任何解释之前，应寻求其独立财务顾问的建议。本研究可能涉及英国境外个人或实体提供的投资或服务，或涉及 FSA 未监管的事项，或可能无法获得 FSA 对私人客户的保护及/或英国补偿计划，有关本报告中可能属于此类情况的具体详情可应要求提供。
Recipients who are not market professional or institutional investor customers of CSFB should seek the advice of their independent financial advisor prior to taking any investment decision based on this report or for any necessary explanation of its contents. This research may relate to investments or services of a person outside of the UK or to other matters which are not regulated by the FSA or in respect of which the protections of the FSA for private customers and/or the UK compensation scheme may not be available, and further details as to where this may be the case are available upon request in respect of this report.
版权所有：瑞士信贷第一波士顿银行及其子公司和关联公司，2004 年。保留所有权利。
Copyright Credit Suisse First Boston, and its subsidiaries and affiliates, 2004. All rights reserved.
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