依旧难以超越
有些人觉得这个投资机会好得不会长久。他们错了。这家本地储贷社（S&L）至今仍然是一个绝佳的存钱去处。
Some thought this investment opportunity was too good to last. They were wrong. The local S&L; is still a heck of a place to put your money.
由彼得·林奇撰写
By Peter Lynch
上次我们提到，投资一家刚上市的本地储贷机构，简直是股票猎手捡到的印钞机。1991 年至 1994 年间，约 300 家新储贷机构发行股票，上市首日平均上涨 30%，三个月内平均上涨 60%，随后翻倍、涨到三倍甚至四倍的也不在少数。（同样值得注意的是，这些股票中跌破发行价的屈指可数。）但到了 1994 年初，监管机构暂时叫停了这场盛宴。
When last we looked into it, investing in the local savings and loan when it went public was the closest thing to printing money that ever came a stock picker's way. Between 1991 and 1994, some 300 new S&Ls; issued shares that gained an average of 30 percent on the first day of trading and 60 percent within three months, on their way to doubles, triples, and even a few quadruples. (It's also remarkable that fewer than a handful of these are trading below their offering prices.) But in early 1994, regulators put a temporary stop to this bonanza.
最初造就这场盛宴的，是这类机构在成型过程中的一个奇特之处。几十年前（很多甚至是一百年前）成立的美国储蓄机构，是按照合作社模式组织的。它们为储户的利益而运营，但并不为任何特定个人所有。
What created the bonanza in the first place was a quirk in the way these institutions took shape. Founded many decades ago (and in many cases a hundred years ago), America's thrifts were organized along the lines of a co-op. They were run for the benefit of depositors, but they weren't owned by anyone in particular.
所以，当储贷机构（这个词涵盖储蓄与贷款协会、互助储蓄银行以及其他一些机构）开始上市时，并不像大多数公开发行那样，需要先偿付原来的所有者。原本会落入公司创始人腰包的一大笔资金，现在全都回到了公司的钱箱里。
So when the thrifts (the term covers S&Ls;, mutual savings banks, and some other creatures) began to go public, there were no previous owners to pay off, as happens in most public offerings. Instead of a big chunk of the proceeds ending up in the pockets of the company's founders, all the money was returned to the company till.
对于幸运的股票买家来说，结果就像用现金买了一辆新车，然后发现经销商把现金藏在手套箱里作为新车礼物。假设当地这家储贷机构的账面价值是 2000 万美元，这是公司几十年积累的盈利成果。然后它公开上市，在发行中卖出了 2000 万美元的股票。股东投资的这 2000 万美元，变成了他们送给自己的一份储贷机构乔迁礼；实际上，他们等于白捡了一家公司。而且，因为他们的 2000 万美元注入了这家储贷机构，账面价值一夜之间翻倍，从 2000 万美元变成了 4000 万美元。理论上，每股现在价值是投资者购买价格的两倍。
For the lucky buyers of the shares, the result was the same as buying a new car for cash, then discovering that the dealer has left the cash in the glove compartment as a car-warming present. Let's say the local S&L; had a book value of $20 million, the result of decades of earnings built up inside the company. Then it went public and sold $20 million worth of shares in the offering. That $20 million invested by the shareholders became their thrift-warming present to themselves; in effect, they were buying the business for nothing. And because their $20 million was injected into the S&L;, the book value doubled overnight, from $20 million to $40 million. Theoretically, each share was now worth twice as much as the investors had paid for it.
这就解释了新股上市首日开盘时的大幅“跳涨”——新股开始交易的那一刻，股价几乎总会跳空上涨，以追平公司价值在上市过程中翻倍的事实。没有前股东会跳出来喊冤，因为如果在传统发行中，公司以半价卖给那些潜在获利比前股东更大的公众买家，他们肯定会这么做。
This explains the big "pop" on opening day, when the newly issued shares began to trade on the stock exchanges. The price almost always took a jump to catch up to the fact that the value of the company had doubled in the act of going public. There were no former owners to cry foul, as they surely would have in a traditional offering had their company been sold for half price to public buyers who stood to make a greater profit than the previous owners.
在这数百起所谓的储贷机构“改制上市”中（即储贷机构公开发行股票时），每家机构的储蓄账户持有人都有资格以最初的低价购买股票！过去四年里，我曾两次（一次在专栏文章，另一次在《价值》杂志封面故事中）试图描述投资于正在上市的储贷机构的优势，或者，就此而言，投资于那些已经上市、价格似乎仍处于折价水平的储贷机构。本页列出了我在去年和 1992 年建议研究的上市储贷机构名单。
In these hundreds of thrift "conversions," as it's known when a thrift goes public, every person with a savings account in the institution was invited to buy shares at the initial low price! Twice in the past four years (in a column and a Worth cover story), I attempted to describe the merits of investing in S&Ls; as they went public or, for that matter, investing in S&Ls; that had already gone public and were still selling at what seemed to be bargain rates. Reviews of the publicly traded thrifts I suggested researching last year and in 1992 are shown on this page.
遗憾的是，全国各地的储户中，只有极小一部分抓住了机会，认购了自己所在社区发行的新股。绝大多数股票（据某些统计高达 98%）被职业投资者席卷一空——这些人穿梭全国开设储蓄账户，目的就是为了尽可能多地参与各地机构的改制发行。而那些在当地储蓄和贷款机构存了数十年钱的老客户，却对这些认购机会视若无睹，眼睁睁看着外来的投机者把战利品搬回了家。
Sadly, only a small percentage of depositors nationwide took advantage of the opportunity to buy shares in the public offerings in their own neighborhoods. The vast majority of the shares (98 percent by some accounts) were scooped up by professional investors who roamed the country opening savings accounts so they would get the right to participate in as many conversions as possible. The loyal customers who had maintained savings accounts at the local S&L; for decades turned their backs on these deals while the outsiders took home the spoils.
有几个臭名昭著的案例，当地储蓄机构的经理和董事在转制过程中给自己发放了大量免费股票或股票期权。为了制止这种牟利行为，储蓄机构监管办公室在 1994 年初暂停了转制。暂停令一宣布，一群行业观察者就齐声宣称游戏结束了，但四个月后暂停令就被解除了。
There were a few notorious cases where the managers and directors of the local thrift gave themselves an ample supply of free stock or stock options going into a conversion. To stop this profiteering, the Office of Thrift Supervision slapped a moratorium on conversions in early 1994. As soon as the moratorium was announced, a chorus of industry watchers proclaimed that the game was over, but four months later the moratorium was lifted.
又一次，监管机构允许了转换，但要附加新的限制。内部人士不能再给自己塞满免费股票和期权作为奖励，而那些把这些公司推向上市的承销商也被迫提高发行价，以挤出这些股票中的一些泡沫。
Once again, the regulators would allow conversions, subject to new restrictions. Insiders could no longer reward themselves with bushelfuls of free shares and options, and the underwriters who took these companies public were pressured to raise the offering prices to take some of the pop out of these stocks
尽管游戏尚未结束，但玩法确实变了。1994 年，有 100 家储蓄机构上市。在纳斯达克交易的 68 家，首日股价平均上涨 17%，但到年底，涨幅只剩下 16%。
Though the game wasn't over, it had definitely changed. In 1994, 100 thrifts went public. The stock prices of the 68 that traded on Nasdaq gained 17 percent on average on the first day, but by the end of the year, they were up only 16 percent.
1994 年的业绩令人失望，原因有两个：其一是 1994 年末股市表现平平，其二是新法规引发了困惑。如今困惑已经消除，1994 年转换发行的储蓄机构股票，从初始发行价算起已上涨 48%。第 页的表格列出了截至 1995 年年中，1994 年上市中表现最佳的储蓄机构。[表格与图表未收入《价值》在线版档案。]
There were two reasons for this disappointing performance: a lackluster stock market in late 1994 and the confusion surrounding the new regulations. Since that confusion has now been resolved, the 1994 conversion class is up 48 percent from the initial offering prices. The table on page shows the top- performing thrifts that went public in 1994, as of mid-1995. [Tables and graphs are not included in the Worth OnLine archives.]
在去年那篇文章（《押注吧》，1994 年 4 月）中，弗吉尼亚州夏洛茨维尔市的研究公司 SNL 证券的工作人员——这家公司是我们在这个话题上最信赖的权威机构——向我们提供了 100 家尚未上市但最终可能发生转换的储贷机构的名单。其中 8 家迄今已完成转换，首日平均涨幅为 18%，截至本文撰写时平均涨幅为 34%。该名单上还有 7 家储贷机构正在等待转换。
For last year's article ("Bank on It," April 1994), the staff at SNL Securities, a Charlottesville, Virginia, research firm that is our favorite authority on the subject, gave us the names of 100 thrifts that were not yet public but were likely candidates for eventual conversion. Eight of those have converted thus far, with an average one-day pop of 18 percent and an average gain of 34 percent as of this writing. Seven more thrifts on that list have conversions pending
1995 年，有 53 家储蓄机构上市，首日交易平均涨幅 14.7%，三个月后涨幅 27%。这些数字虽然比不上往年的暴利，但 90 天内赚 27%，比你把钱存五年储蓄账户的回报还高。
In 1995, we've seen 53 thrifts go public, with an average gain of 14.7 percent on the first day of trading and 27 percent after three months. These results don't quite measure up to the bonanza of years past, but a 27 percent gainin just 90 days is a better return than you'd get from a savings account in five years.
近期新股发行中，收益暴涨幅度更大的一个原因是，这些股票的定价平均仅为账面价值的 64%，而 1994 年时这一比例为 73%，当时联邦政府正施压承销商（负责定价）降低储蓄机构转制带来的暴利。
One reason for the return of the bigger pops is that shares in the recent offerings have been priced at an average of 64 percent of book value, as opposed to the 73 percent in 1994, when the Feds were leaning on underwriters (who price the shares) to make the thrift conversions less lucrative.
一年前我在这份刊物上提过一个建议，现在依然管用：在你生活或工作的区域，找找那些还没上市的信储机构，每家都开一个储蓄账户。大多数情况下，只要你保持账户满六个月，一旦发生转制，你就能买到股票。如果转制迟迟不来，你也没损失什么，这段时间还能赚点利息。
It still makes sense to do what I suggested a year ago in these pages: Scout the area where you live or work for thrifts that haven't yet gone public, and open a savings account in each. In most cases, if you maintain an account for six months, you'll be able to buy shares if a conversion occurs. If the conversion never happens, you haven't lost anything, and you'll collect interest along the way.
未转换机构的数量已经从十年前的 2524 家降到了今天的 1036 家，按它们上市的速度，到 2005 年可能全部都会变成上市公司。虽然剩下的储蓄机构大多规模很小（很多只有一家分行），但我在 SNL 证券的消息人士估计，它们手头有 15 亿到 20 亿美元的“隐藏收益”，迟早会落到那些先驱投资者口袋里。
The number of unconverted institutions has dropped from 2,524 ten years ago to 1,036 today, and at the rate they've been going public, they may all be public by 2005. Although many of the remaining thrifts are small (many have only one branch), my sources at SNL Securities estimate they represent between $1.5 billion and $2 billion in "embedded gains" that could end up in the pockets of the pioneer investors.
左边展示了 SNL 对一些可能转换目标的更新列表。我们特别感谢保罗·多尔蒂（Paul Doherty）和比尔·克卡姆（Bill Kerkam）为我们提供了这些数据。
SNL's update on likely conversion candidates is shown at left. We offer our special thanks to Paul Doherty and Bill Kerkam for providing us with this data.
在您购买任何一家上市储蓄机构的股票之前，作为储户，您会收到一份招股说明书，里面详细说明了您将要购买的东西——这份天上掉下来的馅饼，您还真得仔细看看它的馅料。这里有几个关键点：* 最起码，这家储蓄机构得是盈利的。虽然您不花一分钱就能拿到股份，但如果它不盈利、不健康，那可能连零都不值。* 您希望它资产负债表扎实，不被问题贷款拖累。您希望它的市盈率相对较低（去年我建议 10 倍或更低），股本资产率相对较高（5% 或以上），不良资产占比在下降。* 您希望看到内部人士也买入股份，而且和您支付同样的价格。内部人士的买入行为必须在招股说明书中充分披露，所以您很容易就能查清管理层和董事是否在用自己的钱押注这家储蓄机构的未来。如果他们对这笔交易和您一样有信心，那就是个好迹象。* 您还希望这次发行募集的资金总额，大致对应发行前公司的账面价值。如果一家地方储蓄机构的每股账面价值为 10 美元，却计划在 IPO 中每股募集 100 美元，那买家就要花 100 美元去买 110 美元的资产——这几乎谈不上划算。但如果同一家账面价值 10 美元的储蓄机构，计划在 IPO 中每股只募集 10 美元，那么买家只花 10 美元就能买到 20 美元的资产，这种有利的数学关系会让股价一飞冲天。* 如果您不喜欢招股说明书中的内容，您完全不必参与这次发行。没人强迫您投资。特别提醒一下所谓的“互助控股公司”。少数储蓄机构采用这种组织形式，是因为这能让它们只出售少数股权，内部人则能永久掌握控制权，并防止潜在收购。这类交易对投资者吸引力较差。银行的真实盈利能力和真实账面价值都被低估了，股票也涨不起来。
Before you purchase a single share in a thrift going public, you'll receive (as an account holder) a prospectus with all the details about what you may be buying__this is one gift horse whose mouth ought to be looked into. Here are some of the important points: * At minimum, you want the thrift to be profitable. You're getting it for nothing, but unless it's a profitable and healthy enterprise, it may be worth less than zero. * You want it to have a solid balance sheet and not be saddled with problem loans. You want the price-to-earnings ratio to be relatively low (last year I suggested p/e's of 10 or below), the equity-to-assets ratio to be relatively high (5 or above), and the percentage of nonperforming assets to be on the decline. * You want to see insiders buying the shares and paying the same price as you. Insider buying must be fully reported in the prospectus, so you can easily find out whether the managers and directors are risking their own money on the future success of the thrift. If they believe in the deal as much as you do, it's a good sign. * You also want the amount of money raised in the offering to roughly correspond to the book value of the company before the offering. If a local thrift with a book value of $10 a share plans to raise $100 a share in the IPO, the buyers will be paying $100 to get $110 in assets__hardly a bargain. But if that same thrift with a $10 book value plans to raise $10 a share in the IPO, the buyers will be paying $10 to get $20 in assets, the kind of favorable math that produces a nice pop. * If you don't like what you see in the prospectus, you don't have to participate in the offering. Nobody is forcing you to invest. A special note about so-called "mutual holding companies." A small number of thrifts have adopted this form of organization because it allows them to sell a minority interest in the business, with the insiders keeping permanent control and preventing a potential takeover. These deals are less attractive for investors. The real earnings power and real book value of the banks are understated, and the stocks don't have much lift.
过去几年，即使你从未买入过任何一家转制公司的股票，仅靠买入那些近期转制、盈利丰厚、市盈率适中且低于账面价值的储蓄贷款机构（S&Ls）股票，也能过上不错的日子。但如今的机会比一年前少多了。正如下表所示（表格和图表未收录于《Worth》在线存档），我当前研究列表中的储蓄贷款机构，与我早期研究列表中的相比，价格已相当昂贵。在这份列表中的储蓄机构里，我持有阿斯托利亚金融（Astoria Financial）、卡梅伦金融（Cameron Financial）、卡弗联邦储蓄银行（Carver Federal Savings）、GP 金融（GP Financial）和贵格城（Quaker City）。
In years past, even if you never bought shares in a single conversion, you could make a good living buying shares in recently converted, profitable S&Ls; that were selling at modest p/e ratios and below book value. But the pickings are much slimmer than they were a year ago. As you can see in the table below, [Tables and graphs are not included in the Worth OnLine archives.] the S&Ls; I've put on the current research list are quite expensive compared with those on my earlier research list. Of the thrifts on this list, I own Astoria Financial, Cameron Financial, Carver Federal Savings, GP Financial, and Quaker City.
1994 年，我名单上 15 家上市储蓄机构中有 13 家的市盈率在 10 倍或更低，而新名单上 15 家中却有 7 家市盈率超过 10 倍。在 1994 年的名单中，15 家中有 14 家股价低于账面价值，但在最新这份名单上，15 家中有 9 家股价高于账面价值。在如今这个价格更高的市场上，很难找到真正的便宜货。
In 1994, 13 of the 15 publicly traded thrifts on my list had p/e ratios of 10 or below, whereas 7 of the 15 on my new list have p/e ratios above 10. On the 1994 list, 14 of the 15 were trading below book value, but on this latest list, nine are trading above book. It's hard to find real bargains in today's higher-priced market.
在暂停收购之前，典型的储蓄机构股票通常经历三个阶段：上市初期的冲高、逐渐上涨至账面价值、以及当该机构被更大机构以高于账面价值的溢价收购时出现的二次冲高。近年来，这些二次冲高相当惊人，股价升至账面价值的 150% 到 170%。被收购的可能性给了我们另一个投资储蓄机构的理由，尽管在近期内，我们可能不会看到像过去那么多收购案例。
Before the moratorium, the typical thrift stock would advance in three phases: the original pop, the gradual rise to book value, and a secondary pop when the thrift was acquired by a larger institution at a premium to its book value. In recent years, these secondary pops have been quite spectacular, taking the stock prices to new heights__150 to 170 percent of book value. The possibility of a takeover gives us another reason for investing in thrifts, although in the near future, we may not see as many takeovers as we've seen in the recent past.
1995 年银行并购势头强劲，成为标志性的一年——这一趋势预计将持续下去——但银行收购储蓄机构的数量却在下降。在 1991 至 1994 年的活跃收购方中（包括 AmSouth、Fifth Third、波士顿银行、First Fidelity、First Interstate、Fleet、PNC 和 Shawmut），只有 First Union 一家仍在收购储蓄机构。按被收购资产规模衡量，1995 年上半年的收购率比 1994 年低了 60%。SNL Securities 的专家告诉我们，这是因为储蓄机构目前价格过高。
While 1995 has been a banner year for bank mergers__a trend that is expected to continue__the number of thrifts acquired by banks has been declining. Of the active buyers from 1991 to 1994 (including AmSouth, < wam-co NASD:FITB>Fifth Third, Bank of Boston, First Fidelity, First Interstate, Fleet, PNC, and Shawmut), only First Union has continued to buy thrifts. Measured by assets sold, the takeover rate in the first half of 1995 is 60 percent behind the 1994 rate. The experts at SNL Securities tell us this is because thrifts are currently too expensive.
我们经历了一段银行业的“极乐期”——连续几年利率稳定，经济表现不错，银行利用这些有利条件清除了问题贷款、强化了资产负债表。如果这种状况持续下去，那就再好不过；但万一情况有变，迟早我们会看到储蓄银行股遭遇抛售，那又会再次创造出新的机会。
还有两个因素，一个短期、一个长期，让储蓄银行业具有吸引力。短期来看，监管机构即将达成一项协议，降低存款保险的保费。覆盖储蓄银行的银行保险基金（Bank Insurance Fund）已经出现盈余。而覆盖储贷协会（S&L;）的储蓄协会保险基金（Savings Association Insurance Fund）则资本不足，政府正考虑向 SAIF 承保的机构一次性收取 60 亿美元来充实准备金。这笔资金注入后，储贷协会的存款保险保费也会随之降低。
We've gone through a period of bankers' nirvana, several years of steady interest rates and a decent economy, and banks have used these good conditions to eliminate problem loans and strengthen their balance sheets. If these conditions continue, so much the better, but if they don't, sooner or later we may see a sell-off in the thrift-banking stocks, which would create new opportunities all over again. There are two additional factors, one short-term and one long-term, that make thrifts attractive. In the short term, regulators are nearing an agreement that would lower the premiums on deposit insurance. There is already a surplus in the Bank Insurance Fund, which covers savings banks. The Savings Association Insurance Fund, which covers S&Ls;, is undercapitalized, and the government is considering hitting SAIF-insured institutions with a one-time charge of $6 billion to bolster the reserves. Following that infusion of money, the premiums on S&L; deposit insurance would be reduced as well.
对于 BIF 覆盖的储蓄机构，保费的下降可能使收益增加 10% 或更多。而 SAIF 覆盖的机构则必须承担那 60 亿美元中的相应份额，这相当于每 100 美元存款要付出 85 美分。这笔一次性冲击会导致它们的账面价值立即下降，但之后更低的保险费将在未来多年提振它们的收益。
For thrifts covered by the BIF, the drop in premiums could increase earnings by 10 percent or more. Those covered by SAIF will have to pay their share of the $6 billion, which might cost them 85 cents on every $100 of deposits. This one-time hit would cause them to suffer an immediate drop in book value, but the lower insurance premiums would boost their earnings for years thereafter.
长期来看，让我对银行和储蓄机构业务一直感兴趣的原因是未来收购和兼并的可能性。随着政府放宽对跨州银行业的禁令，我们必然会看到更多的整合。这个国家的银行和炸鸡店都已经太多了。我以前就说过，英国有 5800 万人口，却只有 7 家不同的银行；而我们的人口几乎是英国的 5 倍，却有超过 2 万家银行——如果把信用合作社、储蓄机构、全国性银行、地区性银行等等都算上的话。
In the long run, what keeps me interested in the banking and thrift business is the likelihood of future takeovers and mergers. As the government relaxes the prohibitions against interstate banking, we're bound to see more consolidation. There are too many banks and too many chicken restaurants in this country already. I've said this before, but Great Britain has a population of 58 million and only seven different banks, while we've got almost five times the crowd and more than 20,000 banks__if you count the credit unions, thrifts, national banks, regional banks, and so on.
我们不需要这么多独立的大楼、软件系统、董事会会议室和高薪的管理人员。每当一家储蓄机构被收购，收购方银行就能削减上层成本、提升下层效率。收购方银行可以将储蓄机构的存款借给更广泛的借款人，覆盖更大的地理区域，并利用自身丰富的经验和专长发放多种类型的贷款，从而更好地利用这些存款。整个行业将变得更高效——就像电话公司、制药公司以及众多其他行业已经实现的那样。
We don't need all these separate buildings, software systems, boardrooms, and highly paid administrators. Every time a thrift is taken over, the acquiring bank can cut costs upstairs and increase productivity downstairs. The acquiring bank can make better use of the thrift's deposits by lending them to a wider range of borrowers over a larger geographical area and by making numerous types of loans where they have a lot of experience and expertise. The entire industry will become more efficient__just like the phone companies, drug companies, and a whole gamut of other companies already have.
本文由约翰·罗思柴尔德执笔。彼得·林奇是富达管理与研究公司（Fidelity Management and Research）的副主席，与罗思柴尔德合著过两本投资书籍。最新一本《战胜华尔街》（Beating the Street）由西蒙与舒斯特出版社出版。
Written with John Rothchild. Peter Lynch is vice-chairman of Fidelity Management and Research and the coauthor, with Rothchild, of two books on investing. Beating the Street, the latest, is published by Simon and Schuster.
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1992 年研究清单更新
1992 RESEARCH LIST UPDATED
贝尔银行（BELL） 16.94 美元 30.75 美元 82% 查特 FSB 银行¹ 15.18 美元 33.57 美元 121% 自由银行（LBCI） 15.75 美元 26.25 美元 67% 日耳曼敦储蓄² 21.50 美元 62.00 美元 188% 人民储蓄金融（PBNB） 13.25 美元 19.50 美元 47% 银行家公司（BKCO） 9.47 美元 17.38 美元 83% NS 银行（NSBI） 22.13 美元 33.00 美元 49% UF 银行³ 16.75 美元 38.70 美元 131% 阿梅里亚纳银行（ASBI） 12.33 美元 16.25 美元 32% 鹰金融（EGFC） 13.12 美元 22.00 美元 68%
Bell Bancorp (BELL) $16.94 $30.75 82% Charter FSB Bancorp1 15.18 33.57 121 Liberty Bancorp (LBCI) 15.75 26.25 67 Germantown Savings2 21.50 62.00 188 People's Savings Finan (PBNB) 13.25 19.50 47 Bankers Corp (BKCO) 9.47 17.38 83 NS Bancorp (NSBI) 22.13 33.00 49 UF Bancorp3 16.75 38.70 131 Ameriana Bancorp (ASBI) 12.33 16.25 32 Eagle Financial (EGFC) 13.12 22.00 68
数据来源：SNL Securities, L.P. 推荐价格为 1992 年 7 月 21 日数据，近期价格为 1995 年 8 月 15 日数据。1) Charter FSB Bancorp 于 1994 年 11 月 1 日被 Sovereign Bancorp 收购，近期价格反映的是 Charter 股票换股后的价格。2) Germantown Savings Bank 于 1994 年 12 月 2 日被 CoreStates Financial Corp 以每股 62 美元现金收购。3) UF Bancorp 于 1995 年 8 月 4 日被 Citizens Bancshares Inc. 收购，近期价格反映的是 UF Bancorp 股票换股后的价格。
Source: SNL Securities, L.P. Recommended prices as of 7/21/92. Recent prices as of 8/15/95. 1) Charter FSB Bancorp was acquired by Sovereign Bancorp 11/1/94. Recent price reflects the exchange of Charter's stock. 2) Germantown Savings Savings Bank was acquired by CoreStates Financial Corp for $62 cash per share on 12/2/94. 3) UF Bancorp was acquired by Citizens Bancshares Inc. 8/4/95. Recent price reflects the exchange of UF Bancorp's stock.
1994 年研究清单更新
1994 RESEARCH LIST UPDATED
阿斯托利亚金融公司（ASFC） 29.13 美元 37.25 美元 28% 阿美瑞银行投资集团（Ameribanc Investors Group1） 1.44 3.00 108 湾景资本公司（BVFS） 20.50 25.00 22 加利福尼亚金融公司（CFHC） 15.75 16.50 5 CENFED 金融公司（CENF） 17.50 20.13 15 布鲁克林联邦公司（BRKB）2 34.00 37.25 10 FFY 金融公司（FFYF） 14.62 21.31 46 信实纽约联邦储蓄银行（Fidelity New York, FSB）3 16.63 29.00 74 GP 金融公司（GNPT） 19.87 24.75 25 莱克维尤储蓄银行（LVSB） 11.04 17.38 57 中艾奥瓦金融公司（MIFC） 7.18 10.50 46 北侧储蓄银行（NSBK） 16.78 27.25 62 潘拉普银行公司（PBCI） 14.00 22.88 63 皇后区银行公司（QCSB） 24.83 33.25 34 日出联邦储蓄银行（SUNY） 21.00 30.13 43
Astoria Financial (ASFC) $29.13 $37.25 28% Ameribanc Investors Group1 1.44 3.00 108 Bay View Capital (BVFS) 20.50 25.00 22 California Financial (CFHC) 15.75 16.50 5 CENFED Financial Corp (CENF) 17.50 20.13 15 Brooklyn Federal (BRKB)2 34.00 37.25 10 FFY < wam-co NASD:FFYF>Financial Corp (FFYF) 14.62 21.31 46 Fidelity New York, FSB 3 16.63 29.00 74 GP Financial (GNPT) 19.87 24.75 25 < wam-co NASD:LVSB>Lakeview Savings Bank (LVSB) 11.04 17.38 57 < wam-co NASD:MIFC>Mid-Iowa Financial (MIFC) 7.18 10.50 46 North Side Savings Bank (NSBK) 16.78 27.25 62 Pamrapo Bancorp Inc. (PBCI) 14.00 22.88 63 Queens County Bancorp (QCSB) 24.83 33.25 34 Sunrise Federal (SUNY) 21.00 30.13 43
来源：SNL Securities, L.P. 推荐价格为 1994 年 3 月 1 日数据，近期价格为 1995 年 8 月 15 日数据。 1) Ameribanc Investors Group 在 1995 年 4 月 1 日被北卡罗来纳州夏洛特的第一联合银行以每股 3 美元现金收购。 2) Crossland Savings 更名为 Brooklyn Federal。 3) Fidelity New York 在 1995 年 1 月 31 日被 Astoria Financial 以每股 29 美元现金收购。
Source: SNL Securities, L.P. Recommended prices as of 3/1/94. Recent prices as of 8/15/95. 1) Ameribanc Investors Group was bought out by First Union of Charlotte, NC for $3 per share in cash on 4/1/95. 2)Crossland Savings changed its name to Brooklyn Federal. 3)Fidelity New York was bought out by Astoria Financial for $29 per share in cash on 1/ 31/95.
1994 年的成功故事
SUCCESS STORIES OF 1994
IPO 近期占比 储蓄机构 日期 价格 价格涨幅
IPO recent percent Thrift DATE Price price gain
（去年储蓄机构最成功的五宗首次公开发行）
(The five most successful initial public offerings of thrifts last year)
哈伯联邦储蓄银行（HARB） 1994 年 1 月 6 日 10 美元 23.00 美元 130% 证券资本公司（SECP） 1994 年 1 月 3 日 25 52.63 111 第一肯特金融公司（FKFC） 1994 年 6 月 27 日 10 21.00 美元 110 湾脊银行股份公司（BRBC） 1994 年 4 月 6 日 10 20.88 美元 109 金融公司（GTFN） 1994 年 3 月 31 日 10 20.38 美元 104
Harbor Federal Savings Bank (HARB) 1/6/94 $10 $23.00 130% Security Capital Corp (SECP) 1/3/94 25 52.63 111 First Kent Financial Corp (FKFC) 6/27/94 10 21.00 110 Bay Ridge Bancorp, Inc. (BRBC) 4/6/94 10 20.88 109 Financial Corporation (GTFN) 3/31/94 10 20.38 104
资料来源：SNL Securities, L.P., 弗吉尼亚州夏洛茨维尔市。最新价格截至 1995 年 8 月 1 日。
Source: SNL Securities, L.P., Charlottesville, VA. Recent price as of 8/ 1/95.
1995 年值得研究的储蓄机构 公开交易的储蓄银行和储蓄贷款机构值得更仔细地审视
THRIFTS TO RESEARCH FOR 1995 Publicly traded savings banks and S&Ls; deserving of a closer look
第一段译文：
THRIFT STATE Equity Price P/E Assets to Assets to Book ($ billions)
Albank Financial Corp (Nasdaq: ALBK) 纽约州 28.75 美元 11% 114% 12 3.0 Astoria Financial (Nasdaq: ASFC) 纽约州 37.25 美元 9% 96% 8 6.4 Cameron Financial (Nasdaq: CMRN) 密苏里州 13.00 美元 28% 79% 12 0.2 Carver Federal Savings (Nasdaq: CARV) 纽约州 7.00 美元 10% 47% 12 0.4 Charter One Financial (Nasdaq: COFI) 俄亥俄州 26.75 美元 6% 155% 8 6.3 First Federal Financial Corp (NYSE: FED) 加利福尼亚州 15.00 美元 4% 86% 9 4.2 GP Financial (Nasdaq: GNPT) 纽约州 25.25 美元 11% 128% 9 14.4 Home Financial Corp (Nasdaq: HOFL) 佛罗里达州 15.00 美元 26% 115% 15 1.2 ISB Financial (Nasdaq: ISBF) 路易斯安那州 15.00 美元 21% 90% 13 0.6 Leader Financial (Nasdaq: LFCT) 田纳西州 32.75 美元 8% 154% 9 2.7 Portsmouth Bank (Nasdaq: POBS) 新罕布什尔州 12.25 美元 25% 107% 11 0.3 Quaker City (Nasdaq: QCBC) 加利福尼亚州 12.75 美元 10% 78% 12 0.6 Queens County (Nasdaq: QCSB) 纽约州 34.00 美元 18% 105% 9 1.2 Standard Federal Bank (NYSE: SFB) 密歇根州 34.50 美元 7% 152% 8 13.0 Washington Mutual (Nasdaq: WAMU) 华盛顿州 23.25 美元 6% 141% 9 20.3
Albank Financial Corp (Nasdaq: ALBK) NY $28.75 11% 114% 12 $3.0 Astoria Financial (Nasdaq: ASFC) NY 37.25 9 96 8 6.4 Cameron Financial (Nasdaq: CMRN) MO 13.00 28 79 12 0.2 Carver Federal Savings (Nasdaq: CARV) NY 7.00 10 47 12 0.4 Charter One Financial (Nasdaq: COFI) OH 26.75 6 155 8 6.3 First Federal Financial Corp (NYSE: FED) CA 15.00 4 86 9 4.2 GP Financial (Nasdaq: GNPT)1 NY 25.25 11 128 9 14.4 Home Financial Corp (Nasdaq: HOFL) FL 15.00 26 115 15 1.2 ISB Financial (Nasdaq: ISBF) LA 15.00 21 90 13 0.6 Leader Financial (Nasdaq: LFCT) TN 32.75 8 154 9 2.7 Portsmouth Bank (Nasdaq: POBS) NH 12.25 25 107 11 0.3 Quaker City (Nasdaq: QCBC) CA 12.75 10 78 12 0.6 Queens County (Nasdaq: QCSB) NY 34.00 18 105 9 1.2 Standard Federal Bank (NYSE: SFB) MI 34.50 7 152 8 13.0 Washington Mutual (Nasdaq: WAMU) WA 23.25 6 141 9 20.3
截至 1995 年 8 月 17 日的价格。1）所有数据均包含从 H.F. Ahmanson & Co. 收购分支机构的待定交易。
Source: Prices as of 8/17/95. 1) All data incorporates the pending branch purchase from H.F. Ahmanson & Co.
关键词银行业，股票投资策略
KEYWORDSBanking Industry, Stock Investing Strategies