持续挖掘

1997 · 专栏 · 原文约 2538 词
译文与英文原文逐段对齐可在本页展开英文,也可打开发布者原址核对上下文。
打开来源正文

由彼得·林奇撰写

By Peter Lynch

所以你的克鲁格金币没赚到钱。不过,找到好的金矿公司还是有可能的。

So your Krugerrands haven't panned out. It's still possible to uncover good gold-mining companies.

我们再试一次。1995 年 6 月,我在《价值》杂志上为黄金造了一轮势。时机看上去恰到好处:通胀显出复苏迹象,全球黄金需求也在攀升。仅每年的加工需求——也就是用于实际用途(主要是首饰和电子工业)的黄金,而非投入金币和金条作为投资的部分——就已经超过了当年从地下挖出来的数量。单从供需基本面来看,这简直就是推动金价、进而带动黄金股票和基金上涨的完美配方。

Let's try this again. back in June 1995, I made my pitch for gold in the pages of Worth. It seemed like the right time: Inflation was showing signs of life, and world gold demand was on the rise. Annual fabrication demand alone--for gold destined for actual use, primarily in jewelry and the electronics industry, as opposed to gold to be held in coins and ingots as investments--exceeded the amount being taken out of the ground. Simply on a supply-and-demand basis, it all seemed like a promising recipe for gold prices and hence for gold stocks and funds.

嗯,我在需求端判断对了,但在供应端看错了。和大多数黄金分析师、黄金基金经理一样——更别提那些长期受苦的多头了——我没想到有些事情会发生。因此,我也没有预料到金价的走势:先横盘一阵,再漂亮地涨上一阵,最后像一位辛苦了一周的央行行长一样崩溃。1995 年中期,黄金现货价约 385 美元一盎司。1996 年涨到 416 美元。到了今年初夏,每盎司下跌近 100 美元,跌到 318 美元。而在我写这封信的时候,金价报 323 美元。

Well, I was right about the demand side of the equation but wrong about supply. Like most gold analysts and gold-fund managers, to say nothing of the long-suffering goldbugs, I didn't see some things coming. And therefore I didn't anticipate the way the price of gold would stagnate for a while, pop nicely higher for a while, and ultimately collapse like a central banker at the end of a long, hard week. In mid-1995, gold traded at a spot price of about $385 an ounce. It climbed in 1996 to $416. It dropped nearly $100 an ounce, to $318, by early this summer, and as I write, it's at $323.

我知道,金价走势一直很难看,但我认为黄金——以及对我们而言更重要的黄金开采公司——的情况可能开始好转。最好的消息是,如果你买对了公司,即便大宗商品价格不涨,这些股票也能给你带来不错的涨幅。

The trend has been ugly, I know, but I think things may begin looking up for gold--and, more important for our purposes, for gold-mining companies. The best news is that if you buy the right companies the commodity price doesn't have to jump for the stocks to show a nice increase.

从最广泛的意义上说,黄金面临的问题是它正在经历一次价值重估。许多国家的中央银行在思考,黄金的传统角色在现代全球经济中是否还有意义。几个世纪以来,一国的黄金储备一直是其财富的象征。货币贬值的定义,本身就是指没有黄金支撑的货币。但在某些地方,手握决策权的人信念正在动摇。他们或许认为,衡量经济实力的最佳标准是某种更无形的东西——可能是全球市场上的购买力。也许黄金只是一个比喻——一个既不派发股息也不升值的比喻。去它的吧。

In the broadest sense, the problem with gold is that it is undergoing a re-evaluation. The central banks of many countries are wondering if gold's traditional role has any meaning in the modern global economy. For centuries, a country's gold reserve has been the representation of its wealth. The very definition of a devalued currency has been one that isn't backed by gold. But in some places the men with their hands on the levers are weakening in their faith. Maybe the best measure of economic strength, they're saying, is something less physical--purchasing power in the world's markets, perhaps. Maybe gold is just a metaphor--a metaphor that doesn't pay dividends or go up in value. The heck with it.

我和一些人聊过,他们认为对黄金的重新评估是明智且早该进行的;另一些人则认为这很愚蠢,甚至可能是灾难性的。在这里站队并不重要。重要的是,过去两年里,不少央行行长决定不再在乎金库里是否还存着黄金,于是他们卖掉了(有些情况是为了筹现金)。两年前我说过,搞错了黄金供需局面中的供给端。这正是问题的主要所在:央行以更快的速度抛售黄金。

I've talked with people who think this reassessment of gold is savvy and long overdue and with people who think it's foolish, perhaps catastrophic. It's not important to take a position here. What's important is that in the past two years a number of central bankers have decided they didn't particularly care whether their vaults held gold anymore, and they sold (in some cases because they needed to raise cash). I said I had messed up the supply side of the scenario two years ago. That's a large part of what went wrong: Central banks unloaded gold at an accelerated pace.

各国央行抛售的黄金量并不大——他们目前持有的黄金仍相当于 1994 年底持有量的 97.6%。但这不是重点。黄金比任何其他大宗商品都更关乎情绪和心态。人们感觉到,央行不再按老规矩行事了。

The amount of gold dumped by the central banks wasn't enormous--they still hold 97.6 percent of the gold they held at the end of 1994. But that's not the point. Gold, much more so than any other commodity, is about sentiment and psychology. There's a sense that central banks aren't playing by the old rules.

例如,澳大利亚今年夏天卖掉了三分之二的黄金储备——政府表示,他们宁愿购买至少能付点利息的外国债券。投资者看到了这一剧变,问了一个相当合理的问题:如果银行不要黄金,那到底谁会要?黄金传统上被视为抗通胀工具,但这同样建立在同一套隐喻和假设之上。(且不说通胀在世界各地已基本趋于平静。)对一些人来说,正如吉姆·罗杰斯今年早些时候在《价值》杂志上所说,黄金似乎已经不再管用了。

Australia, for example, sold two-thirds of its reserves this summer--the government said it would rather buy foreign bonds, which at least pay some interest. Investors have seen this sea change and have asked a pretty fair question: If banks don't want gold, who the heck does? Gold has traditionally been regarded as an inflation hedge, but that is dependent on the same metaphor, the same set of assumptions. (Not to mention that inflation has been quiescent more or less worldwide.) To some people it has begun to appear that, as Jim Rogers said in Worth earlier this year, gold just doesn't work anymore.

我该谈谈那个臭名昭著的 Bre-X 矿业丑闻。你们还记得那件事:这家公司宣布,它在印度尼西亚的丛林里发现了一个巨大的矿藏。然后它又宣布,之前出现了……一个……错误。根本没有黄金。随之而来的是相互指责,更别提那些律师了。公司的一名地质学家从直升机上跳了下来。公司本身也消失了。

I should touch on the infamous Bre-X Minerals scandal. You remember that: The company announced that it had found an enormous reserve in the jungles of Indonesia. And then it announced that there had been...a...mistake. There was no gold. Recriminations followed, to say nothing of lawyers. A company geologist leaped from a helicopter. The company itself has disappeared.

从实际角度看,这本来不该有太大影响。甚至可以把坏消息看成好消息:没有巨大的新储量,意味着不会新增供应来稀释需求。但投资者是在一个已经变得怪异和不可预测的市场背景下看待这桩丑闻的。他们把它看作又一个不喜欢黄金的理由。Bre-X 并没有导致金价和金矿股暴跌,但它让本来就已悲观的市场气氛更加阴沉。

In real terms, this shouldn't have mattered very much. It was even possible to see the bad news as good news: No huge new reserve meant less new supply to dilute demand. But investors saw the scandal in the context of a market that had become odd and unpredictable. They saw it as just another thing not to like about gold. Bre-X didn't cause the collapse of gold prices and gold stocks, but it darkened an already negative atmosphere.

那我凭什么敢建议你们投资黄金股?不妨谦逊地指出,两年前在黄金需求面这件事上,我的判断没错。事实上,自 1991 年以来,每年需求都超过了所谓的矿产和回收供应量。去年,供需缺口约为 840 万盎司,是 1994 年缺口的 2.3 倍。需求大部分来自亚洲——尤其是印度和中国。这些国家的经济快速增长,中产阶级日益壮大。这些人会拿财富做什么?他们住的地方离电子卖场远得很。对其中许多人来说,汽车仍遥不可及。如果印度人和中国人不能像美国人那样拼命把钱换成实物,他们就会储蓄——而他们仍然喜欢通过购买高纯度金首饰来储蓄,至少部分如此。很多人认为,这种需求虽然已被证明对价格敏感,却为市场提供了底部支撑。

So where do I get the nerve to suggest that you look into gold stocks? I'd like to humbly point out that I was correct two years ago about the demand side of the gold equation. Every year since 1991, in fact, demand has outstripped what is known as the mine and scrap supply. Last year, the gap was about 8.4 million ounces, about 2.3 times the gap in 1994. Much of the demand comes from Asia--in particular India and China. The economies in those countries are increasing rapidly and producing a growing middle class. What are these people going to do with their wealth? They tend to live a long way from a Circuit City. Cars are still out of the question for many of them. If Indians and Chinese can't convert their money to stuff, as Americans so vigorously do, they're going to save it--and they still like to do that, in part, by buying high-karat gold jewelry. A lot of people think this demand, though it has proved price- sensitive, provides a bottom for the market.

供给问题现在可能也控制得更好了。1980 年,当黄金价格飙升至 850 美元一盎司时,矿业公司的反应不出所料:它们疯狂勘探、开掘新矿、重启旧矿。它们不惜血本,又何必吝啬呢?如果一盎司能卖 850 美元,几乎任何生产成本下都能赚钱。

The supply issue is probably better under control now, too. Beginning in 1980, when the price of gold shot up to $850, mining companies reacted as you might expect: They explored frantically, sunk new mines, re- opened old mines. They spared no expense, and why should they have? If you can get $850 an ounce, you can make a profit at almost any production cost.

这些金矿现在有些已快开采殆尽,它们已经产了八到十年。另一些在每盎司 330 美元的金价下,运营成本太高。据伦敦研究公司黄金矿业服务公司(Gold Fields Mineral Services)的数据,整个行业从地下开采一盎司黄金的平均总成本已升至 317 美元——仅比近期现货价格低 1 美元。

Some of those mines are playing out now; they've had their eight or ten years of production. Others are too expensive to operate in a $330-an- ounce market. According to Gold Fields Mineral Services, a London-based research firm, the industry-wide total cost of getting an ounce of gold out of the ground has risen to an average of $317--a dollar less than the recent low spot price.

就连南非那些了不起的金矿,最终也在走向枯竭。它们已经辉煌了上百年甚至更久——但现在,黄金开采不再那么容易了,成本也没那么低了:劳动力成本与金价走势相反。南非作为黄金产地的地位今非昔比。至于央行抛售,未来可能不会那么频繁,影响也不会那么大。投资者如今明白,银行确实可以卖金。他们也知道,银行能卖的量是有限的。澳大利亚几个月前的抛售在象征意义上是戏剧性的,但相对而言,该国本来就没有多少黄金可卖。在抛售三分之二储备的过程中,澳大利亚只向市场投放了 590 万盎司黄金。作为对比,美国储备的黄金总量是澳大利亚的 44 倍,达 2.62 亿盎司,而且法律规定我们……

Even the great mines of South Africa are finally winding down. They've had amazing runs--100 years and more--but now the gold isn't coming as easily. Or as cheaply: Labor costs have gone in the opposite direction as gold prices. South Africa is not what it used to be as a gold producer. As for central-bank sell-offs, they probably won't be as numerous or have the same kind of impact in the future. Investors now understand that banks can sell. They also know there's a limit to how much they can sell. Australia's sale a few months ago was dramatic symbolically, but in relative terms the country never had much gold to sell. In dumping two-thirds of its reserves, Australia put just 5.9 million ounces of gold into circulation. The U.S., by comparison, has 44 times that much gold in reserve, 262 million ounces, and law requires us

持有它。德国、瑞士和法国是仅次于美国的黄金持有国(分别持有 9500 万、8300 万和 8200 万盎司),它们也不可能通过清空金库来破坏世界经济稳定。

to hold on to it. Germany, Switzerland, and France, the next-largest holders of gold (95 million, 83 million, and 82 million ounces, respectively), aren't likely to destabilize the world economy by emptying their vaults either.

我所描述的是一种相当微妙的平衡。需求健康但对价格敏感,供给有限(即便在理论上并非如此,现实中也是如此),但也没有限到能推动价格上涨的程度。

What I'm describing is a fairly delicate balance. Demand is healthy but price-sensitive. Supply is limited (if not in theory, then in practice) but not so limited as to drive prices up.

这是一个对投资者友好的环境吗?是的,我认为可能是。原因有两个:第一,就算金价不上涨,最优秀的矿业公司也能创造可观的利润。第二,如果金价目前正处于底部,而最终真的上涨了,这些公司就会赚得盆满钵满。

This is a welcoming environment for investors? Yes, I think it might be. That's because, first, the price of gold doesn't have to rise for the best mining companies to produce respectable profits. And second, if the price of gold is currently at a bottom and does eventually rise, these companies will make huge profits.

我提到过,现在普通公司开采每盎司黄金的成本是 317 美元。假设你在考察一家比平均水平稍好的公司,原因可能是规模经济、劳动力更便宜,或者仅仅是它的矿每吨岩石能产出更多黄金。这家公司生产黄金的成本也许比平均水平低 10%,也就是每盎司大约 285 美元。即便金价在 330 美元的低位徘徊,这家公司也能赚到可观的利润。

I mentioned that the average company is now spending $317 to get an ounce of gold out of the ground. Let's say you're investigating a company that's a little better than average, because of economies of scale or cheaper labor or simply because its mines yield more gold per ton of rock. Perhaps this company produces gold for 10 percent less than the average, or about $285 an ounce. Even with the price of gold limping along at $330, the company can earn good money.

有充分证据表明,即便黄金本身是一项糟糕的投资,好公司也能为投资者带来良好回报。我请理柏分析公司(Lipper Analytical Services)列出了一份存续满 17 年的黄金共同基金名单。17 年前,黄金当然正处于价格顶峰。如果当时你把 850 美元一盎司的克鲁格金币塞满梳妆台抽屉,现在已经亏掉了 60% 的本金。但这 7 只存续时间同样长的黄金基金中,有 5 只取得了正回报。表现最好的富兰克林黄金 I 号基金(Franklin Gold Fund I)上涨了 257%。紧随其后的范埃克国际投资者黄金基金(Van Eck International Investors Gold Fund)上涨了 166%。在黄金的这段黑暗岁月里,还有三只基金成功保持了盈利,就连其中表现最差的那只,也比黄金本身强。

There's ample proof that good companies can do well for investors even when gold itself is a bad investment. I asked Lipper Analytical Services to give me a list of all the gold mutual funds that have been around for 17 years. Seventeen years ago, of course, gold was at a peak. If you filled your dresser drawer with Krugerrands then, at $850 an ounce, you have lost 60 percent of your money. But of the seven gold funds that have been around that long, five show positive returns. The best, Franklin Gold Fund I, has gained 257 percent. The next best, Van Eck International Investors Gold Fund, is up 166 percent. Three more funds managed to stay in the black during these dark days for gold, and even the worst of them has done better than gold itself.

那么,如果黄金的现货价格真的上涨了呢?同样显而易见的是,拥有黄金的最佳方式不是囤积克鲁格金币,而是持有最好的金矿公司股票或投资这些公司的黄金基金。假设现货价格上涨 25%:达到 412.50 美元,略低于 1996 年中的水平。你的克鲁格金币升值了 25%。不错。但公司的利润几乎翻了三倍。之前每盎司赚 45 美元,现在每盎司赚 127.50 美元。当公司利润如此飙升时,你可以想象股价会发生什么——而黄金股票一直支付适度的股息。金条显然不会有任何收益。

And what if the spot price of gold actually rises? Again it becomes clear that the best way to own gold is not to hoard Krugerrands but to own shares in the best mining companies or in the gold funds that invest in them. Let's say the spot price manages a 25 percent rally: It rises to $412.50, a little below where it was in mid-1996. Your Krugerrands are worth 25 percent more. Not bad. But the company's profits have almost tripled. Where once it cleared $45 an ounce, it now clears $127.50. When a company's profits jump like that, you can imagine what happens to the stock price--and gold stocks consistently pay modest dividends. Gold bars, obviously, don't pay anything.

我要逆着普遍的悲观情绪再来做个练习:假设黄金涨到每盎司 500 美元。在投资这件事上,尤其是黄金投资,我倾向于认为没有什么是不可能的,特别是如果这种事以前发生过。那么黄金涨到每盎司 500 美元。如果你在 330 美元时买了克鲁格金币,你已经赚了 52%。你是个天才;也许你应该办个投资通讯。然而,我们那家虚构的公司,现在每盎司净赚 215 美元。利润几乎翻了五倍。(顺便说一句,这种杠杆效应解释了你在报纸上查看黄金股时会注意到的一个现象:它们的市盈率极高。在目前的黄金价格下,一家经营良好的金矿公司市盈率达到 50 倍并不被视为不合理。)

I'm going to run contrary to the general pessimism and do one more exercise: Let's imagine that gold hits $500 an ounce. When it comes to investing, and especially when it comes to gold, I tend to believe that nothing is impossible, especially if it has happened before. So gold goes to $500 an ounce. If you bought your Krugerrands at $330, you've cleared 52 percent. You're a genius; maybe you should start a newsletter. Our imaginary company, however, is now clearing $215 an ounce. Profits have nearly quintupled. (This bit of leverage, by the way, explains something you'll notice when you look up gold stocks in the newspaper: They trade at extraordinarily high price-to-earnings ratios. A p/e of 50 is not considered out of line for a well-run gold- mining company at today's gold prices.)

莱曼兄弟公司(Lehman Brothers)的黄金及贵金属分析师彼得·沃德(Peter Ward)认为,黄金正逐渐沦为另一种普通商品,更多央行只要条件允许就会选择出售。

Peter Ward, gold-mining and precious-metals analyst at Lehman Brothers, is among those people who think that gold is becoming just another commodity, that more central banks would sell if they could

只能找到一个合理的价格,而且除非出现短暂的暴跌,否则在未来 12 个月内,现货价格不太可能有太大变动。

only find a decent price, and that, with the possible exception of brief spikes downward, the spot price isn't likely to go much of anywhere in the next 12 months.

不过,他对几家在当前环境下具备生存优势的矿业公司还是充满期待。他最喜欢的是巴里克黄金(Barrick Gold,纽交所代码:ABX,最新股价 21.69 美元),这家加拿大公司是全球第三大黄金生产商。核心事实是这样的:巴里克每开采一盎司黄金的现金成本(实际开采成本)是 200 美元,总成本是 265 美元。巴里克还是对冲领域的行业领头羊:它签订的合同确保未来三年内的大部分黄金产量能以每盎司 420 美元的价格出售。

Nevertheless, he's excited about a couple of mining companies that have the right qualities to thrive in the current environment. His favorite is Barrick Gold (NYSE: ABX; recent price, $21.69), a Canadian firm that is the world's third-largest producer. The central fact is this: Barrick gets gold out of the ground for a cash cost (the actual cost of extraction) of $200 an ounce and a total cost of $265 an ounce. Barrick is also the industry leader in hedging: It has contracts that guarantee it a price of $420 an ounce for much of the gold it produces over the next three years.

沃德还看好普莱斯多姆(Placer Dome,纽约证券交易所代码:PDG,股价 16.13 美元),因为它具备与巴里克公司类似的一些特质。该公司的黄金开采成本低廉(现金成本每盎司 215 美元,总成本 280 美元),拥有一套良好的套期保值方案,且资产负债表干净整洁。多伦多马尔洛·勒米尔证券公司(Marleau, Lemire Securities)的高级矿业分析师维克托·弗洛雷斯(Victor Flores)认为,黄金的长期平均现货价格将徘徊在 350 美元至 385 美元之间。他也认为巴里克黄金公司前景不错。

Ward also likes Placer Dome (NYSE: PDG, $16.13), because it has some of the same qualities as Barrick. It gets gold out of the ground cheaply (a cash cost of $215 an ounce and a total cost of $280), it has a good hedging program, and it has a clean balance sheet. Victor Flores, senior mining analyst at Marleau, Lemire Securities of Toronto, thinks the long-term average spot price of gold is going to linger in a range of $350 to $385. He, too, sees good things for Barrick Gold.

弗洛雷斯也看好几家中型公司。其中之一是 美利坚黄金公司(Meridian Gold,纳斯达克代码:MDG,股价 4.25 美元),原名 FMG 黄金。另一家是 皇冠资源公司(Crown Resources,纳斯达克代码:CRRS,股价 6.50 美元),这是一家总部位于丹佛的勘探公司,与 巴特尔山黄金公司(Battle Mountain Gold)在华盛顿州有一个合资项目。最后,弗洛雷斯提到了一家我持股的公司:总部位于波士顿的 先锋集团(Pioneer Group,纳斯达克代码:PIOG,股价 30.50 美元)。先锋实际上是一家资产管理公司——你很可能听说过“先锋家族基金”——但它也有采矿业务,其中包括 加纳特贝雷比黄金有限公司(Teberebie Goldfields Limited)90% 的股权。在弗洛雷斯看来,即使不算特贝雷比这块资产,先锋的估值也已合理。所以当你买入先锋股票时,相当于几乎白捡了一家价值 5 亿美元的黄金公司。

Flores also likes some medium-size companies. One is Meridian Gold (NYSE: MDG, $4.25), formerly known as FMG Gold. Another is Crown Resources (Nasdaq: CRRS, $6.50), a Denver-based exploration company that is involved in a joint venture in Washington State with Battle Mountain Gold. Finally, Flores mentions a company in which I own shares, Boston-based Pioneer Group (Nasdaq: PIOG, $30.50). Pioneer is actually a money-management firm--you've probably heard of the Pioneer Family of Funds-- but it also has mining interests. Among these is a 90 percent stake in Teberebie Goldfields Limited in Ghana. In Flores's opinion, Pioneer is fairly valued even without Teberebie figured in. So when you purchase Pioneer, it's like getting a $500 million gold company for almost nothing.

我们暂且回到巴里克黄金公司。1985 年春天,你可以用大约每股 50 美分的价格买入这家公司的股票(已按拆股调整)。当时黄金的价格与现在几乎完全相同。到 1996 年春天,尽管其行业环境惨淡,巴里克股价已涨至每股 32 美元——涨幅达到 64 倍。就算你直到 1990 年才买入,并且经历了近期的下跌后仍继续持有,你的本金也已经翻了三倍,而且这些年还每年收到一些小额股息作为补偿。

Let's return for a moment to Barrick Gold. In the spring of 1985, you could have picked up shares in this company for about 50 cents apiece, adjusted back for splits. Gold stood at almost exactly the same price then that it does now. By the spring of 1996, despite a miserable environment for its industry, Barrick traded at $32 a share--it had become a 64-bagger. Even if you didn't buy until 1990, and you're still holding on through a recent drop, you've tripled your money and been paid a small annual dividend for your pains.

巴里克就是那种如今很少有投资者会寻找的公司。它做的是老式生意,谁都能看懂。它不是什么“下一个大东西”。它每年就是稳定地赚上几亿美元。

Barrick is the kind of company that too few investors are looking for today. It has an old-fashioned business that anyone can understand. It's not the next big anything. All it does is consistently make a couple hundred million dollars a year.

当然,没有哪家公司,包括巴里克,是稳赚不赔的。假设黄金价格开始上涨,那些让巴里克眼下赚得盆满钵满的对冲合约,短期内就可能变成它的沉重负担。如果现货价格涨过了对冲价,巴里克的利润就会撞上天花板,一下子让它在某些竞争对手面前黯然失色。但别忽略了更重要的一点:几乎每个行业里都有优秀公司。你不必了解什么前沿趋势就能识别出它们,不必凭内幕消息在首次公开发行时买入,甚至不需要判断全球心理负担最重的大宗商品的价格走向。你只需要睁大眼睛、竖起耳朵,弄明白什么样的公司值得持有。

No company, including Barrick, is a sure thing, of course. Say the price of gold begins to rise. The hedging contracts that are now making Barrick so profitable could become, in the short term, an albatross. If the spot price rose above the hedging price, Barrick's profits would hit a ceiling, which would suddenly make it less attractive than some rivals. But don't miss the larger point: There are great companies in just about every industry. You don't have to understand cutting-edge trends to identify these companies. You don't have to have an inside position and buy at the initial public offering. You don't even have to peg the direction of the world's most psychologically freighted commodity. You just need to keep your eyes and ears open and understand what makes a company worth owning.

彼得·林奇担任富达管理与研究公司(Fidelity Management and Research)的副董事长。他的第三本投资著作《学会赚钱》(Learn to Earn)去年由西蒙与舒斯特出版社(Simon & Schuster)出版。他与丹·费拉拉(Dan Ferrara)共同撰写“投资者优势”(Investor's Edge)专栏。约翰·弗里德(John Fried)为本专栏提供研究协助。

Peter Lynch is vice-chairman of Fidelity Management and Research. His third investing book, Learn to Earn, was published last year by Simon & Schuster. He writes "Investor's Edge" with Dan Ferrara. Research assistance is provided by John Fried.