当经济失去潜在能量时的投资考量
October 28, 2019
October 28, 2019
鲍勃·普林斯
By Bob Prince
物理定律给出了势能和动能的概念。例如,当球被高高举过地面时,它具有很大的势能;当球被释放并运动起来时,这转化为动能;而当球静止在地面上时,它既没有势能也没有动能。经济具有类似的动力学。当失业率和利率很高而债务水平很低时,就具备了强劲经济增长时期的潜力,这种潜力可以通过降息来释放。但一旦失业率降至低水平,利率已降至接近零,且债务高企,经济的势能就变低了。这就是大多数发达经济体现在所处的位置。不利的人口结构和缓慢的生产率增长使情况更加糟糕。
The laws of physics give us the concepts of potential energy and kinetic energy. For example, when a ball is held high above the ground, it has a lot of potential energy; when the ball is released and in motion, this turns into kinetic energy; and when the ball is on the ground at rest, it has neither. Economies have analogous dynamics. When unemployment and interest rates are high and debts are low, you have the potential for a period of strong economic growth, which can be released by a cut in interest rates. But once unemployment has fallen to low levels, interest rates have been lowered to near zero, and debts are high, the potential energy of the economy is low. That is where most developed economies now find themselves. This is made worse by unfavorable demographics and slow productivity growth.
然而,缓慢的增长有助于维持低而稳定的通胀,这使央行得以通过低利率/零利率/负利率和充足的流动性来实施支持性货币政策。目前,他们正在尽其所能维持经济运行,直到他们看到通胀持续高于设定目标的明确警告信号。
However, slow growth contributes to low and stable inflation, which frees up central bankers to run supportive monetary policies via low/zero/negative interest rates and plenty of liquidity. At the present time, they’re doing what they can to keep things going until they confront clear warning signals of inflation moving sustainably above set targets.
从投资角度看,这样的环境意味着增长的上升空间较小,但经济急剧下行的概率也较低,因为急剧下行通常是由货币政策收紧和过度借贷的回落引起的,而这两者目前都不太可能发生,至少在短期内如此。
From an investment standpoint, an environment like this implies less upside from growth, though also a lower probability of a sharp economic downturn, because sharp downturns are generally caused by a tightening of monetary policy and a pulling back of an excessive rate of borrowing, both of which are now unlikely, at least in the near term.
这种情况具有挑战性,但更具挑战性的将是停滞或衰退。系统缺乏势能也意味着央行将难以扭转衰退。他们最不愿意做的事情就是自己引发衰退,因此先发制人地防止衰退并维持扩张是合乎逻辑的,也是他们现在正在尝试做的。
This scenario is challenging, but what would be even more challenging is a stall or downturn. The lack of potential energy in the system also means that it will be difficult for central banks to reverse a downturn. The last thing they want to do is cause a downturn themselves, so pre-empting a downturn and sustaining the expansion is logical and what they are now trying to do.
这净效果是一个增长缓慢、通胀低迷的环境,即名义增长率非常低,由接近零/负利率和充足的流动性维持。
This nets to an environment of slow growth and low inflation, i.e., very low nominal growth rates, sustained by near-zero/negative interest rates and plenty of liquidity.
在这样的世界里如何进行投资?从逻辑上讲,某些类型的长期收益型策略相对于短期价格型或增长型策略的重要性可能会上升。可能性包括……
How to approach investing in such a world? Logically, certain types of longer-term income-based strategies can rise in importance relative to shorter-term price- or growth-based strategies. Possibilities include...
即使在一个名义增长为零或负增长的世界里,也会有一个收入水平(例如,20 万亿美元的名义 GDP/收入)像分层蛋糕一样按层级分配:工资、税收、利润、股息等等。而央行设定的利率水平接近或低于零,旨在维持当前的收入水平,或许还有一点增长。这为相对于接近零或负的融资成本,对特别可靠的收入层级进行利差布局留下了空间。例如,正如 9 月 23 日的《观察》中“重新审视股息”所讨论的,在美国,无论名义 GDP 是在增长还是下降,股息支付总能从收入分层蛋糕中获得一份。当然,需要考虑按市值计价和投资期限的问题。但从收入和融资成本的水平角度思考,是在这种环境中值得考虑的一条路径。
Even in a world of low or no nominal growth, there will be a level of income (e.g., $20 trillion of nominal GDP/income) that is distributed like a layer cake in tiers: wages, taxes, profits, dividends, and so forth. And central banks have set a level of interest rates near or below zero in an effort to sustain current levels of income with perhaps a bit of growth. That leaves room to position for a spread on particularly reliable layers of income relative to the near-zero or negative cost of funds to finance them. For example, as discussed in the September 23 Observations , “Taking a Fresh Look at Dividends,” in the US, dividend payments have always gotten a share of the income layer cake, whether nominal GDP was growing or falling. There will of course be mark-to-market and investment horizon considerations to assess. But thinking in level terms with respect to income and funding cost is a path to consider in this environment.
在收入分层蛋糕内部,会发生转变。一些公司将相对于其他公司获得更大的份额。在经济各部门之间,企业、劳动力和政府之间的收入分配也会发生变化。在增长较低、波动率较低的宏观环境中,利率稳定、流动性充足,收入相对份额的转变对投资的影响比例,将相对于增长、通胀和利率变化的影响而上升。
Within the income layer cake, there will be shifts. Some companies will gain share relative to others. And across sectors of the economy, you will get changes in the distribution of income between business, labor, and government. In a lower-growth, lower-volatility macro environment with stable interest rates and plenty of liquidity, the proportionate influence of shifts in the relative share of income would rise in relation to the impact of changes in growth, inflation, and interest rates.
上述低势能的宏观环境主要涉及发达国家。一些新兴经济体,特别是东方国家,其生产率增长可能会在 4% 到 6% 的范围内,并且信贷扩张的潜力持续存在。对其中一些国家来说,未来十年名义 GDP/收入可能每年增长 5% 到 10%,而本币利率/融资成本低于这一水平,且与发达国家的利率相去不远。长期名义 GDP 增长与利率之间的显著差距,有可能成为长期投资回报的驱动因素。
The low-potential macro environment described above pertains mainly to the developed world. A number of emerging economies, particularly in the East, are likely to experience productivity growth in the 4% to 6% range, with ongoing potential for credit expansion. For some, nominal GDP/income are likely to grow by 5% to 10% per year over the coming decade, with local currency interest rates/funding below that and not far above interest rates in the developed world. A significant spread between long-term nominal GDP growth and interest rates has the potential to be a driver of longer-term investment returns.
这些仅仅是一些例子,说明如何从 a) 收入水平,b) 随时间推移,相对于 c) 与该收入相关的融资成本水平来思考,可以在一个减少其他投资机会的世界里创造投资可能性。
These are just a few examples of how thinking in terms of a) levels of income, b) over time, in relation to c) levels of funding costs associated with that income can create investment possibilities in a world that would reduce others.
我们认为这些条件和可能性构成了我们所说的范式转变的要素。范式转变并不是新现象;它们在历史上定期发生,我们已描述过其中的许多。重要的是,范式转变并不代表经济机器的全面改变,只是该机器要素的重新配置。从投资角度看,重要的是察觉范式转变,然后通过机器的视角处理这种条件配置,以得出新的概率结果集和应对方法。每个投资者都会以自己的方式做到这一点,如您所知,我们通过系统化的研究和投资流程来应对这一挑战。
We see these conditions and possibilities as elements of what we’ve described as a paradigm shift. Paradigm shifts are not a new phenomenon; they have happened regularly throughout history, and we’ve described a number of them. Importantly, a paradigm shift does not represent a wholesale change in the economic machine, just a new configuration of the elements of that machine. From an investment standpoint, the important thing is to perceive paradigm shifts and then to process that configuration of conditions through the lens of the machine in order to derive new sets of probabilistic outcomes and approaches for dealing with them. Each investor will do that in their own way, and as you know, we approach that challenge through our systematic research and investment processes.
在接下来的篇幅中,我们附上了一组图表和摘要说明,以展示正在演变的环境。
In the pages that follow, we’ve included a set of charts and summary descriptions to illustrate the unfolding environment.
我们理解正在发生之事的模板
Our Template for Understanding What Is Going On
作为对我们模板的提醒,我们认为经济面临三大力量:生产率增长、长期债务周期和短期债务周期。生产率增长是实际长期人均收入增长的稳定影响因素。它对长期增长率有重要影响,但对经济周期没有影响。长期债务周期反映了债务相对于收入的水平,并影响未来信贷增长的潜力。短期债务周期塑造了商业周期,由货币政策和财政政策驱动。在大多数发达世界,我们正处于长期和短期债务周期的后期阶段,长期生产率增长前景渺茫,劳动力增长缓慢或负增长。
As a reminder of our template, we see three big forces on economies: productivity growth, a long-term debt cycle, and a short-term debt cycle. Productivity growth is a steady influence on real long-term per capita income growth. It’s an important influence on longer-term growth rates but not economic cycles. The long-term debt cycle reflects the level of debt in relation to income and influences the potential for future credit growth. The short-term debt cycle shapes the business cycle and is driven by monetary policy and fiscal policy. Across most of the developed world, we are in the latter stages of both the long-term and short-term debt cycles, with meager prospects for long-term productivity growth and slow or negative growth in labor forces.
着眼于长期力量,在发达世界,生产率增长呈下降趋势,而人口结构恶化。因此,潜在 GDP 增长最近已降至过去一个世纪的最低水平,接近 1%。
Looking to the longer-term forces, in the developed world productivity growth has been trending lower while demographics have deteriorated. As a result, potential GDP growth has recently fallen to the lowest level of the past century, near 1%.
从周期角度看,失业率处于低水平,这限制了相对于潜在增长的增长。这也增加了需求激增引发通胀的可能性。如果发生这种情况,将重新引入货币紧缩政策,这将对增长激增施加上限。
From a cyclical standpoint, you’ve got low unemployment rates, which limits growth relative to potential. It also raises the odds that a surge in demand will produce inflation. Should that occur, it would bring monetary tightening back into play, which would put a cap on that surge in growth.
债务水平也很高,这降低了未来信贷增长的潜力。过去十年的去杠杆过程使债务有所下降,但幅度不大,因为去杠杆过程很快被激进的再通胀货币政策所阻止并平滑。
You’ve also got high debt levels, which reduces potential future credit growth. The deleveraging process over the past decade brought them down some, but not by a lot, because the deleveraging process was quickly arrested and smoothed out by aggressive reflationary monetary policies.
历史上,当国家的债务/GDP 比率持平或下降时,其增长率比债务/GDP 比率上升时低约三分之一,如下所示。
Historically, when countries’ debt/GDP ratio was flat or falling, their growth rates were about one-third lower than when their debt/GDP ratio was rising, as shown below.
而利率接近零,这进一步抑制了刺激信贷扩张的能力。
And you’ve got near-zero interest rates, which further inhibits the ability to stimulate a credit expansion.
另一方面,资产收益率仍处于一个水平,只要你能容忍持有这些资产的价格波动,就可以在零或负利率下为这些资产融资。即使增长不多,你也可以获得相对于低融资成本的一些利差,并随时间累积。
On the other hand, you’ve still got a level of yields on assets that can be financed at those zero or negative interest rates, so long as you can tolerate the price volatility of holding those assets. Even if you don’t get much growth, you can get some spread against a low financing cost that can accumulate over time.
例如,下面您可以看到全球股息收益率与债券收益率之间的利差,以及美国 REITs 股息与债券收益率之间的利差。
As an example, below you can see the spread between the dividend yield and the bond yield globally, and the same for the dividends on REITs and the bond yield in the US.
这就是发达世界的图景。当转向新兴世界时,由于更高的生产率和更大的信贷扩张空间,名义增长率有可能更高。下图显示了我们对新兴和发达经济体未来 10 年的生产率增长和债务融资增长的预测。
That is the picture in the developed world. As you move to the emerging world, you have the potential for higher nominal growth rates from both higher productivity and more room for a credit expansion. The following charts show our 10-year projections of productivity growth and debt-financed growth for emerging and developed economies.
部分由于新兴经济体的利率受到发达国家利率水平的影响,这些名义增长率产生的现金流可以以显著低于名义增长率的利率进行融资。
Partly because emerging economies’ interest rates are impacted by the level of interest rates in the developed world, the cash flows from these nominal growth rates can be financed at interest rates that are significantly below the nominal growth rates.
低而稳定的通胀将是央行能否维持宽松货币政策的关键因素。如果 a) 商品货币需求超过商品供应量,或 b) 汇率变动产生货币通胀,通胀将上升。这两点都应加以关注,但迄今为止,技术、全球化和增长乏力的长期力量抑制了前者,而货币政策的激进程度以及其他动态因素(如债务的计价货币等)尚未产生后者。
Low and stable inflation will be a key factor in whether central banks can sustain accommodative monetary policies. Inflation will rise if either a) the money demand for goods exceeds the quantity of goods supplied, or b) exchange rate movements produce monetary inflation. These should both be watched for, but so far the secular forces of technology, globalization, and sluggish growth have held down the first of these, and the aggressiveness of monetary actions, as well as other dynamics such as the currency denomination of the debt and so forth, has not yet produced the second.
稳定通胀的逐渐显现和确认,促使短期利率波动率稳步下降。作为反思,25 个基点的决策受到很多关注。然而,改变借贷和支出的经济状况以对经济方向产生显著影响,往往需要大约 500 个基点的变动,而过去 50 年短期利率的正常年度变化为每年 ±200 个基点(即一个标准差)。
The gradual unfolding and acknowledgement of stable inflation rates has contributed to the steadily reduced volatility of short-term interest rates. As a point of reflection, 25 basis point decisions get a lot of attention. Whereas it’s taken more like 500 basis points to change the economics of borrowing and spending by enough to have a significant impact on the direction of the economy, and a normal annual change in short-term interest rates over the past 50 years has been +/-200 basis points per year (i.e., one standard deviation).
本研究论文由桥水基金有限合伙企业编写并为其财产,仅供信息和教育目的分发。未考虑任何接收者的具体投资需求、目标或风险承受能力。此外,桥水基金的实际投资头寸可能且通常会因其种种因素(如客户投资限制、投资组合再平衡和交易成本等)而与其在此讨论的结论有所不同。接收者在做出任何投资决定前应咨询自己的顾问,包括税务顾问。本报告并非出售要约或招揽购买所述证券或其他工具的要约。
This research paper is prepared by and is the property of Bridgewater Associates, LP and is circulated for informational and educational purposes only. There is no consideration given to the specific investment needs, objectives or tolerances of any of the recipients. Additionally, Bridgewater’s actual investment positions may, and often will, vary from its conclusions discussed herein based on any number of factors, such as client investment restrictions, portfolio rebalancing and transactions costs, among others. Recipients should consult their own advisors, including tax advisors, before making any investment decision. This report is not an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy the securities or other instruments mentioned.
桥水研究公司使用来自公开、私人和内部渠道的数据与信息,包括桥水自身交易的实际数据。数据来源包括澳大利亚统计局、巴克莱资本公司、彭博金融有限合伙、世邦魏理仕公司、中经数据有限公司、共识经济公司、科洛逻辑公司、高纬环球房地产信息公司、CreditSights 公司、信贷市场分析公司、迪罗基有限责任公司、美国存托信托与结算公司数据存储(美国)有限责任公司、经济分析公司、EPFR Global、欧亚集团、欧洲货币市场研究所(EMMI)、FactSet 研究系统公司、英国《金融时报》有限公司、加夫卡尔研究有限公司、全球金融数据公司、哈弗分析公司、加拿大投资基金协会、洲际交易所(ICE)、国际能源署、伦巴德街研究公司、Markit 经济有限公司、默根公司、金属焦点有限公司、穆迪分析公司、MSCI 公司、美国全国经济研究所、经济合作与发展组织、养老金与投资研究中心、Renwood Realtytrac 有限责任公司、RP Data 有限公司、睿思丹能源公司、标普全球市场情报公司、Sentix 有限公司、斯皮尔斯联合公司、道富银行与信托公司、新鸿基金融(英国)、Refinitiv、东京证券交易所、联合国、美国商务部、上海万得信息技术股份有限公司、伍德麦肯兹有限公司、世界金属统计局和世界经济论坛。尽管我们认为外部信息来源可靠,但不对其准确性承担责任。
Bridgewater research utilizes data and information from public, private and internal sources, including data from actual Bridgewater trades. Sources include the Australian Bureau of Statistics, Barclays Capital Inc., Bloomberg Finance L.P., CBRE, Inc., CEIC Data Company Ltd., Consensus Economics Inc., Corelogic, Inc., CoStar Realty Information, Inc., CreditSights, Inc., Credit Market Analysis Ltd., Dealogic LLC, DTCC Data Repository (U.S.), LLC, Ecoanalitica, EPFR Global, Eurasia Group Ltd., European Money Markets Institute – EMMI, Factset Research Systems, Inc., The Financial Times Limited, GaveKal Research Ltd., Global Financial Data, Inc., Haver Analytics, Inc., The Investment Funds Institute of Canada, Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), International Energy Agency, Lombard Street Research, Markit Economics Limited, Mergent, Inc., Metals Focus Ltd, Moody’s Analytics, Inc., MSCI, Inc., National Bureau of Economic Research, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Pensions & Investments Research Center, Renwood Realtytrac, LLC RP Data Ltd, Rystad Energy, Inc., S&P Global Market Intelligence Inc., Sentix Gmbh, Spears & Associates, Inc., State Street Bank and Trust Company, Sun Hung Kai Financial (UK), Refinitiv, Tokyo Stock Exchange, United Nations, US Department of Commerce, Wind Information (Shanghai) Co Ltd, Wood Mackenzie Limited, World Bureau of Metal Statistics, and World Economic Forum. While we consider information from external sources to be reliable, we do not assume responsibility for its accuracy.
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