桥水基金关于普遍基本收入的入门指南

2018 · research · 原文约 2737 词

译文与英文原文逐段对齐可在本页展开英文，也可打开发布者原址核对上下文。

全民基本收入入门

什么是全民基本收入（UBI）？总体而言，UBI 是一种现金转移形式，其特点是：

Primer on Universal Basic Income What is Universal Basic Income (UBI)? In general, UBI is a type of cash transfer that is: o o o o

普遍性：每一位公民，无论就业状况或收入水平如何，都能获得这笔转移支付。

无条件：受益人如何使用这笔现金不受任何限制。

基础性：金额足以覆盖“基本生活需求”，构成一份“生活工资”。

长期性：现金转移将持续长期进行，例如，贯穿受益人的整个人生。

Universal: every citizen receives the transfer regardless of employment status or income. Unconditional: recipients have no restrictions on how they can spend the cash. Basic: the amount will cover “basic needs” and will constitute a “living wage.” Long-Term: the cash transfers will last for the long term, e.g. entirety of the receipt’s life.

全民基本收入（UBI）算不上什么新概念；连托马斯·潘恩都是它的拥护者。这一想法在 20 世纪 60 年代末（尤其是尼克松执政期间）引起了关注并引发讨论，但从未真正站稳脚跟。

UBI isn’t an especially new idea; even Thomas Paine was an advocate.i The idea gained traction and elicited debate in late 1960s (especially during the Nixon administration), but never really gained a foothold.ii Where is UBI Receiving Policy Interest? Cities in Canada, Finland, the Netherlands, and the US have announced pilot schemes to test the effects of the policy (generally, these are in very early stages). Governments in Germany, France, New Zealand, India, Scotland and Namibia have also expressed interest.iii GiveDirectly (a charity that distributes cash to the poor) has launched a comprehensive study on unconditional cash transfers in Kenya.iv Most notably, Switzerland held a referendum on UBI in 2016, proposing each citizen receive a monthly income of about $2700. The proposal was defeated (77% of voters opposed it).v Who are Prominent Supporters? Prominent supporters include Mark Zuckerberg, Elon Musk and Nobel winning economist Angus Deaton.vi Warren Buffet supports a related program, the negative income tax, originally popularized by Milton Friedman.vii What are the Chief Points of Contention? Proponents argue that UBI will reduce inequality, direct money to where it is needed most because the person with the need is the best decision maker, avoid the bad incentives created by traditional welfare programs, distribute more money because the administrative overhead costs are less, encourage dynamism and risk taking in the economy, and offer an additional safety net for those who are seeing downward wage pressure from automation/globalization. Critics claim that any meaningful basic income scheme will be prohibitively expensive, reduce incentives to work, redistribute money away from those who need it most to those who already have jobs, and/or redistribute it away from providing it where it is most needed (e.g. food stamps, social services) to bad or less good usage (e.g. “they will drink it away”) because of bad choices. (More Detail Below) viii What Does the Evidence Suggest? As UBI has never been implemented (unless you count the extremely generous payments Gulf States make to their citizens), we do not have a true case study to stress test the arguments for and against it. The pilot schemes that are/will be tried in Canada, the United States, Finland, Scotland, Kenya, and the Netherlands will take years to report their findings. We do, however, have the results from numerous experiments looking at the impact of unconditional direct cash transfers to poor households (i.e. no-strings transfers to cover basic needs for a period, but that weren’t universal or long term), both in the developed and developing world. These include five experiments in the US and Canada conducted in the 1970s, as well as over 50 experiments in the developing world.ix Findings from these studies are regularly employed in debates on UBI. These studies show an improvement in recipient economic conditions and wellbeing, a modest decrease in work effort, and a tendency for recipients to spend the transfers productively.x However, the usefulness of most of these studies is limited by the fact that the transfers ended after a short time period (2-3 years) and were only awarded to very poor households (not universal) – the studies were structured this way because they were more focused on testing unconditional cash transfers, rather than something closer to UBI. And the richest

数据来自发展中国家，因此不太清楚，之前每日收入不足 1.5 美元的转移支付受益者的行为，能在多大程度上推断到生活在更富裕经济体中的公民身上。之前关于无条件现金转移支付及其与理想化全民基本收入实验差异的研究表明：

data comes from the developing world, so it is not clear how much can be extrapolated from the behavior of transfer recipients previously earning less than $1.5 a day with citizens living in more prosperous economies. Previous studies conducted on unconditional cash transfers and their differences to an ideal universal basic income experiment:

*无条件现金转移项目试点完成*

是否全面推行？

Completed Pilots on Unconditional Cash Transfers* Universal?

Basic?

Long Term?

Reciepients

美国东部切罗基部落

Eastern Band of Cherokee, USA

Yes

15,000

印度中央邦

Madhya Pradesh, India

Yes

6,000

西雅图和丹佛，美国

Seattle and Denver, USA

Yes

4,800

美国印第安纳州加里市

Gary, Indiana, USA

Yes

1,799

Manitoba, Canada

Yes

1,300

美国新泽西州

New Jersey, USA

Yes

1,216

Namibia

Yes

930

美国北卡罗来纳州与艾奥瓦州农村地区

North Carolina & Rural Iowa, USA

Yes

809

飞行员培训中心位置

Location of Pilot

关于无条件现金转移的研究，目前尚无一项完成的研究能够完全符合全民基本收入（UBI）应有的形态标准。

No completed study on unconditional cash transfers meets all the criteria for what a UBI would look like.

*From GiveDirectlyxi

为了进一步充实这些研究 xii 的发现：

发达世界研究

To further flesh out what the studiesxii found: Developed World Studies o o

对经济和整体福祉的积极影响。获得帮扶的家庭身心健康状况更好，学业表现更佳，住房拥有率也更高。

劳动投入略有减少。主要收入来源者的工作时间减少了约 5% 至 10%，失业时间也更长。对于次要和第三位收入来源者而言，工作时间降幅更大（15% 至 30%），他们把更多时间投入到了育儿和教育上。

Positive effects on economic and general wellbeing. Treated households enjoyed better physical and mental health, educational performance, and homeownership rates. A modest reduction in work effort. Primary earners worked about 5-10% less and were unemployed for longer stretches of time. The reduction in working hours was much larger for secondary and tertiary earners (15-30%), who devoted more time to child care and education.

发展中国家研究

Developing World Studies o o o

工作时长没有下降，或者有所增加；就业参与率提高，就业结果得到改善。在少数工作时长减少的案例中，数据显示减少的部分主要集中在老年人和受抚养人口身上。

储蓄和投资增加，受助家庭将部分转移收入投入可创收的资产（牲畜、农业生产资料等）。部分研究还发现，转移支付停止后的收入水平高于启动前的水平。

在“诱惑性消费品”（如烟酒）上的支出没有明显增加，反而常常出现下降。

健康、教育、女性赋权等方面的指标普遍改善，童工现象明显减少。

No decline, or an increase, in hours worked, greater employment participation, and improved employment outcomes. In the cases where hours worked declined, the attribution showed the reduction to be mainly in the elderly and dependents. An increase in savings and investment, with recipient households investing a portion of the proceeds in income generating goods (livestock, agricultural productive assets etc.). Some studies also found that incomes after the transfers had ceased were higher than when they began. No noticeable increase, and frequently a decline, in consumption towards “temptation goods” (e.g. alcohol, tobacco). A general improvement in health, education, and female empowerment indicators, as well as a notable decline in child labor.xiii

如果在美国实施全民基本收入（UBI），成本是多少？

下面我们粗略估算一下在美国实施 UBI 需要多少资金。首先，我们看看向每位美国公民支付当前贫困线标准（每年 1.2 万美元——这还不到 2016 年瑞士提议金额的一半）的成本。这最终将耗资约 3.8 万亿美元（占 GDP 的 21%，占所有税收收入和政府社会保险缴款的 78%）。

接下来，我们看看这笔支出中有多少可以通过废除现有社会项目并以 UBI 取而代之来筹集资金（正如一些支持者所主张的那样）。我们首先设想一种极不可能出现的情况：所有社会支出（不包括基础设施支出和教育，但包括几乎其他所有对家庭的政府转移支付，如医疗保健）全部被废除。这将释放出实施 UBI 所需资金的约 92%。随后，我们设想只砍掉收入支持项目（伤残、退休及社会保障、福利和失业救济金）。这将提供所需资金的约 37%。最后，如果从可替换项目清单中排除社会保障、退休和伤残项目，那么 1.2 万美元的 UBI 成本中，只有 11% 能通过替换现有福利国家组成部分来覆盖。

最后，我们设想两种方案，即根据受助者的收入水平调低 UBI 的发放金额。例如，在第一种方案中，每赚取 1 美元收入，UBI 就减少 10 美分，这意味着如果你挣到 12 万美元，就领不到基本收入；如果你挣 6 万美元，只能领到一半（即 6000 美元）。虽然严格来说这不算全民基本收入，但它或许能在实现 UBI 的根本目标与围绕其融资的制约和担忧之间提供一种折中方案。如下所示，这大幅降低了实施 UBI 的成本。然而，即便采用陡峭的递减斜率，现有收入支持项目仍不足以完全覆盖 UBI 的资金需求——很可能还需要额外增加收入来源。

美国全民基本收入

实施全民基本收入的成本

向所有美国公民支付贫困线标准工资的 UBI 实施成本非常高昂。即使砍掉所有现有社会支出，也难以全额买单。

What would UBI cost if implemented in the US? Below we take a rough cut at estimating how much it would cost to implement UBI in the United States. We first look at what it would cost to pay every American citizen the current poverty threshold ($12,000 a year – an amount less than half what the Swiss proposed implementing in 2016). This would end up costing ~ $3.8 trillion (or 21% of GDP and 78% of all tax revenues and contributions for government social insurance). We next look at how much of this expenditure could be funded through scrapping existing social programs and replacing them with a UBI (as some proponents argue). We first imagine the highly unlikely scenario in which all social spending (excluding infrastructure spending and education, but includes almost all other government transfers to households including healthcare) is scrapped. This would free up about ~ 92% of the funds needed to implement UBI. We subsequently imagine that only income support programs (disability, retirement & social security, welfare, and unemployment benefits) are axed. This would yield ~ 37% of the required funding. Finally, excluding social security, retirement and disability from the list of replaceable programs leaves only 11% of the costs for a UBI of $12,000 covered through replacing existing components of the welfare state. Finally, we imagine two scenarios in which the payouts of UBI are reduced depending on the income level of the receipt. For instance, in the first scenario, every $ of income earned will reduce UBI by 10 cents, meaning that if you make $120,000 you will not receive a basic income, and if you make $60,000 you will receive only half (i.e. $6000). While this is technically not a Universal Basic Income, it may offer a compromise solution between securing the underlying goals of UBI and the constraints/concerns surrounding financing it. As you can see below, this reduces the cost of implementing UBI significantly. However, even using a steep slope, existing income support programs will fall short of fully financing UBI - and additional revenues will likely need to be raised. Universal Basic Income for the United States Cost of Implementing Universal Basic Income Implementing UBI paying the poverty wage to all American citizens would be very expensive. Even axing all current social spending would struggle to foot the bill.

全民基本收入的各种变体

% 税收收入

Variants of Universal Basic Income % Tax Revenue

% 全民基本收入（UBI）可通过替换现有项目来提供资金

所有社会支出*

% UBI Could Be Funded Through Replacing Existing Programs All Social Spending*

所有收入保障（IS）

All Income Support (IS)

（是）以前靠社会保障。

(IS) ex Social Security

USD, Billions

% GDP

每位公民承担 1.2 万美元（贫困线）

Every Citizen Paid $12,000 (Poverty Line)

3,866

21%

78%

92%

37%

11%

每赚 1 美元，全民基本收入就减少 0.10 美元。

Every $ you earn reduces UBI by $0.10

2,431

13%

49%

147%

59%

17%

每多赚 1 美元，全民基本收入（UBI）就减少 0.15 美元。

Every $ your earn reduced UBI by $0.15

1,912

10%

38%

186%

76%

22%

第一种变体意味着，若年收入 12 万美元则无 UBI，收入 6 万美元可获半数，而收入 1 万美元可得九成。

In the first variant, this means that if you make $120,000 you get no UBI, if you make $60,000 you get half, and if you make $10,000 you get 90%

*社会总支出数字基于经合组织对总社会支出的估算，涵盖医疗保健、医疗服务、养老金、福利金及食品券等项目，但不包括基础设施支出等一般性服务。

*The All Social Spending Number is based on OECD estimates of total social spending. It includes things like healthcare, medical services, pensions, welfare payments, and food stamps, but excludes general services like infrastructure spending.

UBI 随收入下降的坡度越陡，其成本承受力就越强。然而，即便采用激进的坡度设计，实施 UBI 所需的增收幅度，仍将超出通过取代现有收入支持计划所能筹措的资金规模。

The sharper the slope at which UBI falls with income, the more affordable it becomes. However, even with an aggressive slope, implementing UBI would require raising more revenues than can be acquired through replacing existing Income Support Programs.

作为参考，下图展示了经济合作与发展组织（OECD）的估计：如果发达经济体将除医疗以外的所有社会支出替换为全民基本收入，每人可获得的资金有多少（按购买力调整）。即使是最慷慨的福利国家，也难以覆盖贫困线基本收入的成本。这并不是说不可能实现——只是仅靠社会与税收体系的渐进式改革，无法达到这一目标。

As perspective, the chart below shows OECD estimates for how much money would be made available per person if developed economies replaced all social spending ex-health care with a Universal Basic Income (purchasing power adjusted). Even the most generous welfare states would struggle to cover the cost of a poverty-line basic income. Not to say it isn’t possible – just that incremental change in our social/taxation systems wouldn’t get you there.

社会支出*（按购买力平价调整后的人均水平）

12000 美元

10000 美元

8000 美元

6000 美元

4000 美元

2000 美元

0 美元

丹麦挪威瑞典芬兰法国德国

Social Spending* Per Person (PPP adjusted) $12,000 $10,000 $8,000 $6,000 $4,000 $2,000 $0 Denmark Norway Sweden Finland France Germany

Italy

USA

即便将所有除医疗外的社会支出全部取消，用以资助全民基本收入（UBI）计划，即便是那些拥有最全面、最慷慨福利制度的国家，其公民也难以获得足以维持贫困线水平的收入。

Even if all social spending ex healthcare was scrapped to fund a UBI program, citizens would struggle to receive a poverty level wage even in countries with the most extensive, and generous, welfare states

日本澳大利亚加拿大

Japan Australia Canada

*ex-healthcare

关于全民基本收入（UBI）利弊的更多细节

除了为经济体中每位公民提供满足基本需求的收入，并作为个人财务急剧下滑时的缓冲之外，支持者还认为，UBI 将有助于：

More Details on the Pros and Cons for UBI Other than to provide every citizen in an economy with an income to meet basic needs, and a buffer against sharp personal financial downturns, supporters argue that UBI will help in: o

减少不平等：全民基本收入被视为缩小贫富差距的一种手段，而贫富差距在发达国家已日益扩大。支持者认为，它有助于弥补长达 30 年的低工资增长，增强劳动力相对于资本的议价能力，并作为一种不具侵入性、政治阻力可能更小的再分配形式。

将资金导向最需要之处：传统福利转移通常对资金用途附带限制（例如食品券）。这意味着管理者和政策制定者最终不得不替个人做出选择，决定收入支持在其生活中哪个方面最有效，并将这种指令一刀切地适用，难以根据个人情况进行调整。相比之下，全民基本收入赋予个人权力，让他们根据自身具体情况和需求，决定如何最好地使用这笔收入转移。

减少不良激励：全民基本收入比传统福利政策提供了更好的激励机制。与失业救济或收入补助不同，它不会抑制人们寻求更高薪酬的工作（因为随着收入增加，全民基本收入不会被削减——见附录一示例）。与最低工资不同，全民基本收入不会让部分工人对雇主而言成本过高。

支持经济活力：全民基本收入可以通过鼓励人们承担更多风险、降低创业或获取提升生产力技能的入门成本，以及鼓励劳动者花时间寻找更契合自身兴趣、才能和成就感的工作来支持经济活力和创新。

通过降低行政和间接成本，分配更多资金：全民基本收入也被视为一种手段，用以简化或取代庞大、官僚化且低效的福利国家，代之以更简洁、更高效、政治争议更小的安全网。这将降低行政和间接成本，意味着福利预算中更大比例的资金能真正分配给需要帮助的人。

抵御技术和经济冲击：随着自动化、人工智能和全球化对工资形成下行压力，全民基本收入可以为许多人保障一份维持生计的收入。

Reducing Inequality: UBI is seen as a means to reduce inequality, which has risen in developed countries. Proponents argue that it will help compensate for 3 decades of low wage growth, increase the bargaining power of labor relative to capital, and act as a non-intrusive, and potentially less politically toxic, form of redistribution. Directing Money to Where it is Needed Most: Traditional welfare transfers typically come with restrictions as to how the money can be spent (e.g. foods stamps). This means that administrators and policy makers end up having to make choices for individuals as to where income support would be most impactful in their lives and apply such direction across the board, with limited ability to tailor to individual circumstances. In contrast, UBI empowers the individual to decide how best to use the income transfer given their particular circumstances and needs. Minimizing Bad Incentives: UBI offers better incentives than more traditional welfare policies. Unlike unemployment benefits or income support, there is no disincentive against seeking better paying employment (as UBI will not be cut off as income rises – see appendix 1 for an illustration). Unlike the minimum wage, UBI should not make a set of workers prohibitively expensive for employers. Supporting Economic Dynamism: UBI could support economic dynamism and innovation through encouraging people to take more risks, lowering the entry costs for entrepreneurship/accessing productivity enhancing skills, and encouraging workers to take the time to seek work better suited to their interests, aptitudes, and sense of fulfillment. Distribute More Money By Reducing Administrative & Overhead Costs: UBI is also seen as a means to reduce/replace the large, bureaucratic, and inefficient welfare state with a simpler, more efficient, and less politically controversial safety net. This will reduce administrative and overhead costs, meaning that more money is actually distributed to those who need it as a percent of the welfare budget. Protecting against Technological and Economic Disruption: UBI can assure many people a living wage as automation, artificial intelligence, and globalization puts downward pressure on wages. UBI would

o o

还能为失业者提供更大的经济自由，让他们得以投资于学习新技能，而不必急于寻找立即（且很可能薪酬更低）的工作。

相关地……

应对反建制与民粹主义政治抬头：反建制政治带来的威胁，促使一些人主张以全民基本收入作为更新资本主义、更公平分享其成果的手段。

补偿无偿劳动：许多具有社会价值的角色在市场体系中并未获得正式报酬（例如养育子女），且这些工作主要由女性承担。全民基本收入被视为以货币形式开始认可这类角色、并纠正由此产生的权力失衡的一种方式，尤其是在第三世界。

提供更有效的国际援助：目前有 7 亿人生活在全球贫困线（每日 1.9 美元）以下。世界银行和布鲁金斯学会的估算显示，需要 800 亿美元的直接现金转移，才能将这些人口提升至全球贫困线以上。xiv 这一数额接近我们目前国际援助支出的一半（仅经合组织的预算就超过 1300 亿美元，尚不包括私人捐赠）。xv

also provide greater economic freedom for dislocated workers, allowing them to invest in building new skills, rather than having to seek immediate (and likely lower paying) employment. Relatedly… Combatting the Rise of Anti-Establishment and Populist Politics: The threat of anti-establishment politics has led some to advocate for UBI as a means of updating capitalism and sharing its spoils more equitably. Compensating for Unpaid Work: Many socially valuable roles are not formally compensated in a market economy (e.g. raising a child) and are predominantly performed by women. UBI is seen as a means to begin to recognize, in monetary form, such roles, and rectify resulting imbalances in power, especially in the third world. Providing More Effective International Aid: Currently 700 million people live below the global poverty line ($1.9/day). Calculations from the World Bank and Brookings Institute approximate that it would take $80 billion in direct cash transfers to lift these individuals above the global poverty line.xiv This is almost half of what we currently spend on international aid (OECD’s budget alone is over $130 billion, not including private donations).xv

除了反对再分配或质疑固定收入固有权利的哲学争论外，反对者还指出全民基本收入将带来以下弊端：

Aside from philosophical arguments opposing redistribution or contesting any inherent right to a fixed income, opponents argue that UBI will hurt in: o

o o

成本高得惊人：反对者认为，实施任何有意义的全民基本收入都将成本高得惊人，难以持续。例如，瑞士提出每月向每位公民发放约 2700 美元，这大约会耗费国内生产总值的 25%。批评者进一步指出，为充分资助全民基本收入所需的增税措施，很可能对经济增长造成显著拖累。我们上文已列举了美国的一些数据。

削弱工作动力：保守派批评者认为，全民基本收入将大幅降低工作激励，促使人们减少工作时间，并延长失业期。

重新分配资金，远离最需要的人：取决于实施方式，全民基本收入可能成为一种净转移，将资金从目前领取福利的人手中，转向已有工作的人。虽然为支付全民基本收入而提高税收，很可能导致资金从最富有者手中净流出，但同时也可能减少对最需要者的支持。

将资金从最急需的用途转移到不良或低效用途：无条件现金转移意味着政策制定者无法确保所提供的资金被用于满足基本需求（如食品券、社会支出），而非用于影响较小甚至有害的用途（例如人们将转移资金花在“诱惑品”上，如烟酒）。

分散对完善现有福利制度的注意力：一些自由派批评者认为，全民基本收入分散了人们对完善现有福利制度这一更紧迫问题的注意力。批评者担心，全民基本收入可能削弱对改进那些历时数十年建立、经过验证的项目的资金和支持。

Being Prohibitively Expensive: Opponents argue that implementing any meaningful universal basic income will be prohibitively expensive and unsustainable. For instance, the Swiss proposal of awarding each citizen about $2700 a month would cost about 25% of GDP.xvi Critics further argue that the tax hikes necessary to adequately fund UBI will likely be a significant drag on growth. We go through some numbers for the US above. Reducing Work Ethic: Conservative critics argue that UBI will significantly reduce incentives to work and encourage people to work fewer hours and have longer stints in unemployment. Redistributing Money Away From Those Who Need It Most: Depending on how it’s done, UBI might act as a net transfer away from people currently on welfare receipts to those who already have jobs. While raising taxes to pay for UBI will likely lead to a net transfer away from the wealthiest, it might simultaneously reduce support to those who need it most. Redistributing Money Away from Providing What is Most Needed to Bad or Less Good Usage: Unconditional cash transfers would mean that policy makers cannot try to ensure that the money provided is spent towards providing essentials (e.g. food stamps, social spending) versus less impactful or even harmful uses (e.g. people spending the transfers on “temptation goods” such as alcohol and tobacco). Distracting From Improving The Existing Welfare State: Some liberal critics have argued that UBI is a distraction from the more pressing issue of improving the existing welfare state. Critics are concerned that UBI might undermine funding and support for improving tried and tested programs that took decades to set up.

附录一：现有收入支持计划中激励失当的例证

下图展示了税前及转移支付前收入最高达 7 万美元的美国人的实际税后及转移支付后收入情况。图中存在数个“断崖”：在这些节点上，多赚一点反而会让你实际受损，因为你会因此失去某项社会救助计划的资格。xvii

Appendix 1: An Illustration of Bad Incentives in Existing Income Support Programs The chart below shows the effective after tax and transfer income of Americans earning up to 70k. There are several ‘cliffs’: points at which earning a bit more actually hurts you because you lose eligibility for a social program.xvii

2012 年单亲家庭抚养一个孩子的可支配收入

6 万美元

医疗补助计划

家长收入限制

Disposable Income for Single Parent with One Child, in 2012 $60,000 Medicaid income limit for parent

CHIP

免费覆盖的

收入上限

CHIP income limit for free coverage

5 万美元

4 万美元

芯片收入

享受费用减免

保险的

收入上限

$50,000 $40,000 CHIP income limit for reduced-cost coverage

$30,000

$20,000

$10,000

$30,000 $20,000 $10,000 $0

$10,000

$20,000

$30,000

$40,000

税前利润

Pre-tax Earnings

$50,000

$60,000

Disposable Income

TANF

收入

限制

TANF income limit