终局——索恩投资会议主题演讲(文字实录)

2016 · 演讲 · 原文约 1827 词
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第 21 届索恩投资年会 2016 年 5 月 4 日,星期三 终局

1981 年 2 月我创立杜肯资本时,无风险回报率——五年期国债——是 15%。实际利率接近 5%。那正是金融史上最伟大牛市之一的酝酿期,资产价格低到令人难以置信,足以与无风险利率竞争,而沃尔克残酷的货币紧缩政策,在宏观和微观层面都催生了亟需的结构性改革。不久之后,政见不一的蒂普·奥尼尔和罗纳德·里根联手推动社保和税收领域最后重大改革,这绝非巧合。此外,15% 的回报率门槛迫使公司将资本投向明智之处,并主动进行内部结构改革。如果说这造就了史上最伟大的投资环境之一,那么它的镜像——也就是我们今天所处的位置——又怎么可能同样是一个伟大的投资环境呢?每周都有人因为“利率为零,别无选择”而大谈股票市场的优点。这种观点流传甚广,甚至有了自己的缩写“TINA”。

21st Annual Sohn Investment Conference Wednesday, May 4, 2016 The Endgame When I started Duquesne in February of 1981, the risk free rate of return, 5 year treasuries, was 15%. Real rates were close to 5%. We were setting up for one of the greatest bull markets in financial history as assets were priced incredibly cheaply to compete with risk free rates and Volcker’s brutal monetary squeeze forced much needed restructuring at the macro and micro level. It is not a coincidence that strange bedfellows Tip O’Neill and Ronald Reagan produced the last major reforms in social security and taxes shortly thereafter. Moreover, the 15% hurdle rate forced corporations to invest their capital wisely and engage in their own structural reform. If this led to one of the greatest investment environments ever, how can the mirror of it, which is where we are today, also be a great investment environment? Not a week goes by without someone extolling the virtues of the equity market because “there is no alternative” with rates at zero. The view has become so widely held it has its own acronym, “TINA”.

{切换到第 3 张幻灯片}不仅 1981 年估值很低,而且财务杠杆率还不到今天的一半。信贷驱动增长的能力仍在前方。对全球危机的政策回应,当年如此,更重要的是,至今依然如此强力,以至于它阻止了任何真正的去杠杆化发生。杠杆实际上在全球范围内增加了。讽刺的是,从我所在的位置看,这正是如今大多数政策制定者有意追求的目标。

{Switch to slide 3} Not only valuations were low back in 1981 but financial leverage was less than half of what it is today. The capacity of credit inspired growth was still ahead of us. The policy response to the global crisis was, and more importantly, remains so forceful that it has prevented any real deleveraging from happening. Leverage has actually 5/5/2016 4:20 PM Page | increased globally. Ironically from where I stand, that has been the intended goal of most policymakers today.

{第 4 页} 让我重点谈谈两个主要政策,它们不仅未能清理发达市场的过往过度行为,还导致了新兴市场杠杆的爆炸式增长。第一个政策由美国的联邦储备银行主导。以大多数客观指标衡量,我们正处于有史以来持续时间最长的过度宽松货币政策期。在大衰退期间,利率被设定为零,美联储资产负债表扩张了 1.4 万亿美元。更关键的是,大衰退结束后,美联储继续将资产负债表再扩张 2.2 万亿美元。如今,失业率低于 5%,通胀接近 2%,美联储的极端鸽派立场仍在持续。如果美联储采用沃尔克和格林斯潘对数据响应的平均值,即标准泰勒规则所暗示的水平,那么今天的联邦基金利率应接近 3%。换句话说,相当讽刺的是,这是我们有史以来最不“依赖数据”的美联储。简而言之,这是我在职业生涯中见过的与历史常态最大的、持续时间最长的鸽派背离。美联储比以往任何时候都更多地预支了未来的消费。尽管美国在全球表现优异,但当前我们在七国集团中实际利率最低。在 2005 年的 Ira Sohn 会议上,面对一个较为缓和但类似的偏离,我曾指出,格林斯潘领导的美联储正在播下历史性住房泡沫的种子,这个泡沫由鲁莽的次级贷款助长,结局会很糟糕。而今天的政策过度,与那时相比,在持续时间和程度上都更加极端。

{Slide 4} Let me focus on two of the main policies that have not only prevented a clean-up of past excesses in developed markets but also led to an explosion in leverage in Emerging markets. The first of these policies has been spearheaded by the Federal Reserve Bank in the US. By most objective measures, we are deep into the longest period ever of excessively easy monetary policies. During the great recession, rates were set at zero and they expanded their balance sheet by $1.4T. More to the point, after the great recession ended, the Fed continued to expand their balance sheet another $2.2T. Today, with unemployment below 5% and inflation close to 2%, the Fed’s radical dovishness continues. If the Fed was using an average of Volcker and Greenspan’s response to data as implied by standard Taylor rules, Fed Funds would be close to 3% today. In other words, and quite ironically, this is the least “data dependent” Fed we have had in history. Simply put, this is the biggest and longest dovish deviation from historical norms I have seen in my career. The Fed has borrowed more from future consumption than ever before. And despite the US global outperformance, we currently have the most negative real rates in the G-7. At the 2005 Ira Sohn Conference, looking at a more muted but similar deviation, I argued that the Greenspan Fed was sowing the seeds of an historical housing bubble fed by reckless sub-prime borrowing that would end very badly. Those 5/5/2016 4:20 PM Page | policy excesses pale in comparison to the duration and extent of today’s monetary experiment.

对短期刺激的痴迷,与 80 年代初那种结构性改革的思维形成鲜明对比。当年沃尔克宁愿承受短期阵痛,也要让经济摆脱通胀,推动改革。他制造的那场动荡,带来了生产率繁荣、实际增长飙升,以及长达 25 年的牛市。如今央行官员的短视,正导向相反的结果 —— 在政府和企业层面催生鲁莽行为。五年前,你或许还能辩称这是为了寻求“逃逸速度”。但这项激进货币实验进行到第八年时我们经历的低迷增长,以及日本二十多年来的停滞,已经彻底击溃了那个理论。而且,平滑周期波动,绝不应该和持续向未来借消费混为一谈。美联储没有终局计划。它的目标似乎就是再撑过六个月,避免标普 500 指数下跌 20%,同时尽量不让美国在短期内陷入衰退。这样做,它们实际上是在助长与必要改革背道而驰的行为,反而提高了(而不是降低了)它们试图避免的经济尾部风险的概率。在政府层面,市场信号被压制,使得政客们得以继续无视早已迫在眉睫的福利和税制改革。

The obsession with short-term stimuli contrasts with the structural reform mindset back in the early 80s. Volcker was willing to sacrifice near term pain to rid the economy of inflation and drive reform. The turbulence he engineered led to a productivity boom, a surge in real growth, and a 25 year bull market. The myopia of today’s central bankers is leading to the opposite, reckless behavior at the government and corporate level. Five years ago, one could have argued it was in search of “escape velocity.” But the sub-par economic growth we are experiencing in the 8th year of a radical monetary experiment and in Japan after more than 20 years has blown that theory out of the water. And smoothing growth over a cycle should not be confused with consistently attempting to borrow consumption from the future. The Fed has no end game. The Fed’s objective seems to be getting by another 6 months without a 20% decline in the S and P and avoiding a recession over the near term. In doing so, they are enabling the opposite of needed reform and increasing, not lowering, the odds of the economic tail risk they are trying to avoid. At the government level, the impeding of market signals has allowed politicians to continue to ignore badly needed entitlement and tax reform.

看我身后的幻灯片。鸽派们一直在问:“过度投资的证据在哪里?” 如你们所见,经营现金流在 5 年前见顶,近期同比转为负值,而净债务却仍在以极其惊人的速度增长。二战后从未出现过这种情况。在大衰退之前的周期里,这两个指标的峰值基本是同步的。即使在那轮周期中,它们也只背离了 2 年,而当 EBITDA 像今天这样同比转负时,净债务增长已经连续下降超过 2 年了。再说一遍,当前这 5 年的背离在金融史上是史无前例的!

Look at the slide behind me. The doves keep asking where is the evidence of mal-investment? As you can see, the growth in operating 5/5/2016 4:20 PM Page | cash flow peaked 5 years ago and turned negative year over year recently even as net debt continues to grow at an incredibly high pace. Never in the post-World War II period has this happened. Until the cycle preceding the great recession, the peaks had been pretty much coincident. Even during that cycle, they only diverged for 2 years, and by the time EBITDA turned negative year over year, as it has today, growth in net debt had been declining for over 2 years. Again, the current 5-year divergence is unprecedented in financial history!

如果这还不够让人警惕,再看看这个周期中债务的使用情况。20 世纪 90 年代的债务用于建设互联网,而今天大部分债务却用于金融工程,而非生产性投资。这一点在这张幻灯片中非常清楚。图表中紫色部分代表回购和并购,绿色部分代表资本支出。请注意,在 90 年代绿色部分占据主导,而在当前周期中紫色部分完全占据了主导。想想看。去年,回购和并购总额达 2 万亿美元。所有研发与办公设备支出为 1.8 万亿美元。在 8 年免费资金之后,这种鲁莽行为以非线性方式增长。2012 年,回购和并购总额为 1.25 万亿美元,而所有研发与办公设备支出为 1.55 万亿美元。自那时起,随着估值上升,研发与办公设备支出仅增长了 2500 亿美元,但金融工程却增长了 7500 亿美元,是其 3 倍!你只能靠吃老本撑那么久。尽管在净借款增加 1.7 万亿美元的同时利息成本没有上升,但企业部门的利润份额在 2012 年达到了顶峰。如今,企业部门陷入了一个盈利管理、资本配置可疑、低生产率、利润率下滑和债务不断增长的恶性循环。而我们正在为这类资产支付 18 倍的市盈率。

And if this wasn’t disturbing enough, take a look at the use of that debt in this cycle. While the debt in the 1990’s financed the construction of the internet, most of the debt today has been used for financial engineering, not productive investments. This is very clear in this slide. The purple in the graph represents buybacks and M/A vs. the green which represents capital expenditure. Notice how the green dominates in the 1990’s and is totally dominated by the purple in the current cycle. Think about this. Last year, buybacks and M&A were $2T. All R&D and office equipment spending was $1.8T. And the reckless behavior has grown in a non-linear fashion after 8 years of free money. In 2012, buybacks and M&A were $1.25T while all R&D and office equipment spending was $1.55T. As valuations rose since then, R&D and office equipment grew by only $250b, but financial engineering grew $750b, or 3x this! You can only live on your seed corn so long. Despite no increase in their interest costs while growing 5/5/2016 4:20 PM Page | their net borrowing by $1.7T, the profit share of the corporate sector peaked in 2012. The corporate sector today is stuck in a vicious cycle of earnings management, questionable allocation of capital, low productivity, declining margins, and growing indebtedness. And we are paying 18X for the asset class.

{第 7 页} 短视政策的第二个来源现在来自中国。为应对全球金融危机,中国启动了一项 4 万亿美元的刺激计划。但由于他们在过去 10 年已经进行了大规模基础设施投资,而这又是他们选择的主要刺激渠道,这只会加剧其经济投资侧的产能过剩。不出所料,这只是在名义增长上带来了短暂的刺激。当我们 2012 年担心银行资产与 GDP 之比时,令人难以置信的是,此后的 4 年里信贷增长已达到 GDP 的 70%。换个角度看,这意味着自 2012 年以来,中国银行业每年放出的信贷量相当于整个巴西的 GDP!想象一下整个巴西在新房和基础设施上的产出。令人难以置信的是,所有这些信贷增长都伴随着名义 GDP 增长率从 15% 下降到 5%。对于那些以 10% 利率借款、预期 15% 销售增长的公司来说,这无异于剧毒鸡尾酒。因此,我们强烈怀疑,这种增长中的很大一部分只是信贷流向了原本资不抵债的借款人。否则,如何解释在遭受价格和销售增长打击的重工业领域,不良贷款问题却没有出现?

{Slide 7} A second source of myopic policies is now coming from China. In response to the global financial crisis, China embarked on a $4 trillion stimulus program. However, because they had engaged in massive infrastructure investment the previous 10 years, and that was the primary stimulus pipe they chose; this only aggravated the overcapacity in the investment side of their economy. Not surprisingly, this only provided a short term pop in nominal growth. While we were worried about bank assets to GDP in 2012, incredibly, credit has increased by 70% of GDP in the 4 years since then. Just to put this in perspective, this means that since 2012 the Chinese banking sector has allowed credit to grow by the amount of the entire Brazilian GDP per year! Picture the entire Brazilian production in new houses and infrastructure. Incredibly, all this credit growth has been accompanied by a fall in nominal GDP growth from 15% to 5%. This is an extremely toxic cocktail for companies that have borrowed at 10% expecting 15% sales growth. Our strong suspicion therefore is that a large part of this growth is just credit flowing to otherwise insolvent borrowers. How else to explain the 5/5/2016 4:20 PM Page | lack of NPL problem in heavy industries hit by lower prices and sales growth?

结果就是,与刺激前每 1 美元 GDP 需要 1.50 美元债务相比,现在需要 7 美元。这种情况极为罕见且危险。最近一次类似的历史案例是 2000 年代中期的美国——次贷狂热期间,每产生 1 美元 GDP 所需的债务从 1.50 美元攀升至 6 美元。两年前,我们曾希望中国愿意接受增速放缓以换取改革。不幸的是,在七国集团的鼓励下,他们选择了另一轮以投资为主的财政刺激——这或许能争取一些时间,但会加剧问题。他们不需要更多债务和更多房子。

As a result, unlike the pre-stimulus period, when it took $1.50 to generate a $1.00 of GDP, it now takes $7. This is extremely rare and dangerous. The most recent historical analogue was the U.S. in the mid-2000’s when the debt needed to generate a $ of GDP increased from $1.50 to $6 during the subprime mania. Two years ago, we had hope the Chinese were ready to accept a slowdown in exchange for reform. Unfortunately, with the encouragement of the G-7, they have opted for another investment focused fiscal stimulus which may buy them some time but will exacerbate their problem. They do not need more debt and more houses.

如图表所示,这将移除世界增长引擎的一个主要气缸。

As the chart shows, this will remove a major cylinder from the engine of world growth.

{切换到第 8 张幻灯片 我曾指出,目光短浅的政策制定者没有终局计划,他们从一个短期财政或货币刺激方案跌跌撞撞地走向下一个,尽管压倒性的证据表明,这些刺激只会产生短暂的糖分式兴奋,并积累起拖累长期增长的无生产力债务。此外,过去十年尽管刺激力度前所未有,全球增长却持续下滑,这表明我们从未来借取了过多、过久,如今因果报应正在显现。三年前,就在这个台上,我曾批评美联储政策的逻辑,但得出了一个看好的中期结论,因为证据的天平显示,全球央行的货币浪潮仍将推高金融资产。现在,我感觉证据的天平已经转向另一边;更高的估值、又三年无生产力的企业行为、进一步宽松的极限以及过度向未来借贷,都表明这轮牛市正在耗尽自身。

{Switch to Slide 8 I have argued that myopic policy makers have no end game, they stumble from one short term fiscal or monetary stimulus to the next, despite overwhelming evidence that they only produce an ephemeral sugar high and grow unproductive debt that impedes long term growth. Moreover, the continued decline of global growth despite unprecedented stimulus the past decade suggests we have borrowed so 5/5/2016 4:20 PM Page | much from our future for so long the chickens are coming home to roost. Three years ago on this stage I criticized the rationale of fed policy but drew a bullish intermediate conclusion as the weight of the evidence suggested the tidal wave of central bank money worldwide would still propel financial assets higher. I now feel the weight of the evidence has shifted the other way; higher valuations, three more years of unproductive corporate behavior, limits to further easing and excessive borrowing from the future suggest that the bull market is exhausting itself.

如果我们比历史上任何时候都更多地预支未来,而市场又对未来定价,那我们的市场就应该折价交易,而不是相比历史估值溢价。这很难让人不联想到 1982 年——当时市场仅以 7 倍的低迷盈利交易,伴随着数十次降息和生产率上升——而现在是 18 倍的膨胀盈利、生产率下降,利率方面也弹尽粮绝。

If we have borrowed more from our future than any time in history and markets value the future, we should be selling at a discount, not a premium to historic valuations. It is hard to avoid the comparison with 1982 when the market sold for 7x depressed earnings with dozens of rate cuts and productivity rising going forward vs. 18x inflated earnings, productivity declining and no further ammo on interest rates.

全球股市过去一年缺乏进展,波动加剧——这通常是大趋势转变的前兆——表明在价格没有大幅下跌和/或结构性改革之前,其风险/回报比是负面的。别指望后者能很快到来。政策制定者没有终局方案,但市场有。最后提一句:1981 年我刚创办杜肯资本时,你最不想持有的资产是什么?提示……它已经交易了 5000 年,如今在全球许多地区首次出现了正利差,而银行家们正在试验负利率这种荒谬概念。有人把它当作金属,我们则视其为一种货币,它仍是我们最大的货币配置。

The lack of progress and volatility in global equity markets the past year, which often precedes a major trend change, suggests that their risk/reward is negative without substantially lower prices and/or structural reform. Don’t hold your breath for the latter. While policymakers have no end game, markets do. On a final note, what was the one asset you did not want to own when I started Duquesne in 1981? Hint…it has traded for 5000 years and for the first time has a positive carry in many parts of the globe as bankers are now experimenting with 5/5/2016 4:20 PM Page | the absurd notion of negative interest rates. Some regard it as a metal, we regard it as a currency and it remains our largest currency allocation.

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