《每日电讯报》|为何为优质股多付钱是安全的

2013 · 文章 · 原文约 857 词
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沃伦·巴菲特,这位传奇投资人,曾将复利称为世界第八大奇迹。理解其威力对于投资成功至关重要,然而对许多人来说,它依然是个谜。

Warren Buffett, the legendary investor, has described compound interest as the eighth wonder of the world. Understanding its effects is essential to success in investment. Yet it remains a mystery for many people.

最简单的例证就是问:以每年 10% 的复利回报,需要多长时间能让本金翻倍?

The simplest illustration of this is to ask how long it takes to double your capital at 10pc a year compound return.

关键在于我们谈论的是复利回报,即收益被加入本金,而每一期的回报率都基于这不断增加的本金计算。因此,答案是七年。实际上,每年仅需 7% 的复利回报,就能让本金在 10 年内翻倍。

The whole point is that we are talking about compound returns in which the gains are added to the capital sum to which each successive period's rate of return is applied. Consequently, the answer is seven years. It only takes a compound return of 7pc per annum to double your money in 10 years.

再看这个例子:从 1000 英镑起步,投资 30 年,每年 10% 的复利回报与每年 12.5% 的复利回报,最终资本会差多少?我问这个问题,是因为这可能代表了一个人投资生涯中较为合理的回报区间——先储蓄 30 年,然后退休靠投资收益生活。结果相当出人意料:额外 2.5% 的复利回报竟会让最终金额翻倍——1000 英镑的投资按 12.5% 复利会变成 34243 英镑,而按 10% 复利则是 17449 英镑。

How about this example: starting with £1,000, what is the difference in final capital from 30 years of investment at 10pc a year compound versus 30 years at 12.5pc a year? I ask this because it may represent a reasonable range of outcomes from an investment lifetime in which a person saves for 30 years before retiring then trying to live on the income from investments. The answer, rather surprisingly, is that the extra 2.5pc of compound return would double the final sum – so £1,000 invested would become £34,243 at 12.5pc as opposed to £17,449 at 10pc.

在 Fundsmith,我们只投资于那些投入资本回报率高的公司;能将大部分或全部利润转化为现金;拥有高利润率;并且几十年来被证明能抵御经济周期的公司。

At Fundsmith, we only invest in companies which make high returns on capital employed; convert most or all of their profits into cash; have high profit margins; and which have proved resilient to economic cycles over many decades.

但这些公司的估值已成为投资者担忧的问题。它们的估值在金融危机及随后的“大衰退”期间不断攀升。这是因为它们通过提供日常必需品和奢侈品带来了稳定的业绩,并且在一个几乎没有经济增长的世界里具备增长能力,这与市场上大多数其他板块形成鲜明对比。

But the valuation of such companies has become a subject of concern to investors. Their valuations have risen through the financial crisis and the "Great Recession" which has followed. This is because they produce consistent performance from the provision of our everyday necessities and luxuries, and have an ability to grow in a world in which there has been little or no economic growth in contrast to most other sectors of the market.

近年来,这些公司股价的涨幅超过了公司利润或现金流的增长,因此它们的估值无疑比以前更高,但这并不等同于被高估。我承认它们的估值不如这轮上涨之前那么有吸引力,但我建议,对复利的研究或许能让人在匆忙得出结论、认为应该卖出甚至避开这些股票之前,稍作停顿。

Since the rise in their share prices has outpaced the rise in the companies' profits or cash flows in recent years, they are certainly more highly rated than they were, but that is not the same as being overvalued. While I accept that they are not as attractively valued as they were before this recent rise, I would suggest a study of compounding should perhaps give reason to pause before moving swiftly on to the presumption that as a result they should be sold or even avoided.

在 Fundsmith,我们不常看市盈率这一传统的价值衡量指标,更倾向于看现金流,但由于几乎其他所有人都在用市盈率,这是表达我们投资组合相对估值最简单的方式。目前我们的投资组合市盈率比市场高出约两个点——Fundsmith 的股票约为预期盈利的 21 倍,而 MSCI 世界指数约为 19 倍。

We don't often look at price to earnings (p/e) ratios, the traditional measure of value, at Fundsmith as we prefer to look at cash flows, but since almost everybody else uses them it is the simplest way of expressing the relative valuation of our portfolio, which currently has a p/e about two points higher than the market – the Fundsmith stocks are on about 21 times forecast earnings and the MSCI World Index is on about 19 times.

在判断这意味着什么时,有几件事你也应该了解,即并非所有盈利(该比率中的“盈”)都具有同等价值。Fundsmith 投资组合中的股票产生盈利所需的资本密集度远低于市场整体水平(因此其资本回报率更高),并且它们将更多的盈利以现金形式交付,这更有价值。它们的盈利也更具可预测性,这又让我回到了复利的话题。

In judging what this implies there are a number of things which you should also be aware of, namely that not all earnings (the "e" in that ratio) are of equal value. The shares in the Fundsmith portfolio produce their earnings with significantly less capital intensity (hence their higher return on capital) than the market in general, and they deliver more of their earnings in cash, which is more valuable. Their earnings are also more predictable, which brings me back to compounding.

我研究过在 1979 年至 2009 年的 30 年间,你本可以为这些公司中的一些支付多高的价格。具体来说,我看了可口可乐和高露洁棕榄。1979 年,它们的估值与市场大致相当——市盈率为 10 倍。但在当时,你能以多高的市盈率买入,并且在接下来的 30 年里仍能获得与市场相同的表现?答案相当出人意料,大约是盈利的 40 倍。为什么?因为在此期间,这些公司的总回报增长率比市场每年高出约 5 个百分点,就像前面提到的 2.5% 复利增长差异一样,这 5 个百分点的差异使得代表其股价的最终资本金额以比市场快四倍的速度增长。

I have taken a look at how much you could have paid for some of these companies over the 30-year period between 1979 and 2009. In particular, I looked at Coca-Cola and Colgate Palmolive. In 1979 they had about the same rating as the market – 10 times earnings. But what could you have paid for them at that time in terms of p/e and still equalled the performance of the market over the next 30 years? The answer rather surprisingly is about 40 times earnings. Why? Because these companies' total returns grew at about 5pc a year faster than the market over this period, and rather like the earlier illustration of a 2.5pc differential in compound growth, this 5pc differential multiplied the final capital sum represented by their share prices four times faster than the market rose.

当然,未来 30 年可能会有所不同。然而,如果我必须猜测这将如何影响这一计算,那就是像可口可乐和高露洁这样的公司,鉴于周期性股票不太可能再现信贷泡沫所刺激的那种增长,它们在增长方面表现会更好。同样可以公平地指出,优质股票相对于市场其他部分可能确实并不昂贵,但两者最终可能都会被证明是昂贵的,尤其是在利率上升时。但即便如此,我建议你想想,如果在 1979 年有人建议你以市场市盈率两倍的价格投资可口可乐或高露洁,你当时会作何反应。如果你当时拒绝了这个想法,你就会错过在那段时期获得相当于市场指数投资两倍收益的机会。

Of course, the next 30 years may be different. However, if I had to guess how it would affect this calculation it would be that companies like Coke and Colgate will fare even better in terms of growth given that cyclical stocks are unlikely to get a repetition of the growth that was stimulated by the credit bubble. It is also fair to point out that quality stocks may indeed not be expensive relative to the rest of the market but that both will prove to be expensive, particularly when interest rates rise. But even so, I suggest you consider how you might have reacted if someone had suggested you invest in Coca-Cola or Colgate at, say, twice the market p/e in 1979. In rejecting that idea you would have missed the chance to make twice as much money as an investment in the market indices over that period.

Terry Smith

Terry Smith

《每日电讯报》

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