2008 年股东大会 · 上午场

2008-05-03 · 原文约 24008 词
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电视剧肥皂剧明星苏珊·卢奇与巴菲特互换工作

TV soap star Susan Lucci trades jobs with Buffett

发言者新闻主播(CNBC 的贝基·奎克,录播带):各位,刚收到的消息。沃伦·巴菲特似乎达成了一项交易,要和日间肥皂剧天后苏珊·卢奇互换工作。据报道,巴菲特已经谈妥了在《我所有的孩子》剧组里的一个固定角色。而卢奇女士正在赶往奥马哈,出任伯克希尔的新任首席执行官。(掌声。)

SPEAKERNEWS ANCHOR (CNBC's Becky Quick, on tape): Folks, this just in. It appears that Warren Buffett has struck a deal to trade jobs with daytime soap opera diva Susan Lucci. Buffett has reportedly negotiated a permanent spot on the cast of All My Children. Apparently, Ms. Lucci is en route to Omaha as the new CEO of Berkshire. (Applause.)

查理·芒格他能去哪儿呢?(女演员苏珊·卢奇走上舞台,笑声和掌声)

CHARLIE MUNGERWhere could he be? (Laughter and applause as actress Susan Lucci comes on stage)

苏珊·卢奇你是说沃伦吗,查理?他给留在电视台摄影棚了。(笑声)

SUSAN LUCCIDo you mean Warren, Charlie? He's been detained at the TV studio. (Laughter)

查理·芒格当真?

CHARLIE MUNGERReally?

苏珊·卢奇嗨,查理。我是苏珊·卢奇。哦,你没听说我和沃伦那笔交易吗?他要去《我所有的孩子》里当大明星,而我要接手伯克希尔·哈撒韦。

SUSAN LUCCIHi, Charlie. I'm Susan Lucci. Oh, haven't you heard about the deal between Warren and me? He's going to be a big star in All My Children, and I'm going to be taking over Berkshire Hathaway.

查理·芒格嗯,你当然具备一些沃伦所没有的重要特质。(笑声)

CHARLIE MUNGERWell, you've certainly got some important qualities that Warren lacks. (Laughter)

苏珊·卢奇哦,谢谢你,查理。现在你可以放松了,真是个贴心的人。你就当在自己家一样好了,因为接下来由我接手,多谢。我想和我们的股东们聊聊,已经想了挺长一段时间了。我觉得我们这儿有些地方确实需要改改。首先得看看我们的股息政策。(笑声)我从来没听说过这么抠门、对我们这么可爱的股东这么不公平的事。我们得改。(掌声)

SUSAN LUCCIWell, thank you, Charlie. And you can relax now, you dear man. You just make yourself at home because I'll take it from here, thank you. I've been wanting to talk to our shareholders for quite some time now. There's some changes I really think we need to make around here. The first thing we need to look at is our dividend policy. (Laughter) I have never heard of anything so cheap and so unfair to our wonderful shareholders. We need to change it. (Applause)

查理·芒格我听着不错。(笑声)

CHARLIE MUNGERSounds good to me. (Laughter)

苏珊·卢奇第二,我们需要考虑提供盈利指引。而且每周都得发布一次。(笑声)

SUSAN LUCCIAnd, second, we need to look at giving guidance on earnings. And we need to do that every single week. (Laughter)

查理·芒格我听着不错。(笑声)

CHARLIE MUNGERSounds good to me. (Laughter)

苏珊·卢奇第三,我们给董事的报酬不能一年才 900 美元。(欢呼和掌声)

SUSAN LUCCIAnd, third, we need to pay our directors more than $900 a year. (Cheers and applause)

沃伦·巴菲特等一下。(掌声。)

WARREN BUFFETTJust one minute. (Applause.)

苏珊·卢奇嗨,沃伦。沃伦,我还以为你在《我所有的孩子》摄影棚呢。

SUSAN LUCCIHi, Warren. Warren, I thought you were at the All My Children studio.

沃伦·巴菲特我听到的分红是怎么回事?

WARREN BUFFETTWhat's that talk about dividends that I hear?

苏珊·卢奇哦,没什么要紧的,沃伦。你只管专心演好你在剧里的角色就行。

SUSAN LUCCIOh, nothing important, Warren. You just concentrate on your role on the show.

沃伦·巴菲特苏珊,我的节目就是伯克希尔·哈撒韦。我的角色就是经营它。(从夹克口袋里掏出纸,撕成两半)

WARREN BUFFETTSusan, my show is Berkshire Hathaway. And my role is to run it. (Takes paper out of jacket pocket and rips it up)

苏珊·卢奇沃伦,你不能这样。

SUSAN LUCCIWarren, you can't do that.

沃伦·巴菲特我已经这么做了。《我所有的孩子》离不开你,我也离不开伯克希尔。(掌声。)

WARREN BUFFETTI just did it. All My Children can't do without you, and I can't do without Berkshire. (Applause.)

苏珊·卢奇哦,沃伦。那你的意思是交易取消了?

SUSAN LUCCIOh, Warren. So you mean the deal is off?

沃伦·巴菲特交易取消了。我真的很感谢你。你让我清醒了过来。你可以回《我所有的孩子》去了。我留在伯克希尔。但我非常感激你,苏珊,我想让你去伯克希尔——不是伯克希尔——是去波仙珠宝,我想让你挑任何你喜欢的东西,记在查理的账上。(笑声)

WARREN BUFFETTThe deal is off. I really want to thank you. You've brought me to my senses. You can go back to All My Children. I'll stay here at Berkshire. But I am so grateful to you Susan, that I want you to go out to Berkshire — not to Berkshire — to Borsheims and I want you to pick out anything you would like, and charge it to Charlie. (Laughter)

苏珊·卢奇哦,沃伦,你太贴心了。谢谢你。(掌声。)苏珊·卢奇(对芒格说):你也很贴心。

SUSAN LUCCIOh, Warren, you are darling. Thank you. (Applause.) SUSAN LUCCI (to MUNGER): And you're a darling, too.

沃伦·巴菲特嘿,等一下。

WARREN BUFFETTNow, wait a second.

苏珊·卢奇谢谢。(掌声)

SUSAN LUCCIThank you. (Applause)

欢迎

Welcome

沃伦·巴菲特好了。查理,咱们开始吧。(笑声)她——她跟他待的时间比跟我还长,不过——(笑声)咱们按老规矩来。正式会议将在 3 点 15 分开始。但在此之前,中间有午餐休息时间,我们会回答大家的问题。我们不事先筛选问题,你们知道——就看谁先站到麦克风前面。我们会轮着从各个区域开始,然后到旁边的分会场。我了解了一下,我们最好的估计是今天大约有 31,000 人在这里。(掌声。)

WARREN BUFFETTOK. Charlie, let's get this show on the road. (Laughter) The — she spent more time with him than she did with me, but — (Laughter) The — we're going to follow the usual procedure. The business meeting will start at 3:15. But between now and then, with a break for lunch, we're going to answer your questions. We don't screen them ahead of time, as you know — based on who gets lined up at the microphone first. And we'll go around from sections to sections and then go to the overflow rooms. My understanding is that our best estimate is that we have about 31,000 people here today. (Applause.)

沃伦·巴菲特我这儿有张地图。马克,我们带了吗?什么?在这儿听不见。不管怎样——在黄色便签本上。好了。我们一边进行一边标记。我想——在我们开始之前——我听到罗恩·奥尔森在笑。我想他赶到了。很高兴听到这个。让我介绍一下我们的董事。在刚才他们为股息和涨报酬这种事报以热烈掌声之后,我真不确定要不要进行这部分——但我们这里有——我左边是查理·芒格。他是能听的那个;我是能看的那个。因为这个原因我们合作得很愉快。(掌声。)

WARREN BUFFETTSomewhere I have a map here. Marc, do we have that? Pardon me? Can't hear a thing up here. But in any event — on the yellow pad. OK. We'll just mark them off as we go along. The — I would like, before we start — I heard Ron Olson laughing there. I think he made it. I'm glad to hear it. Let me introduce our directors. I really wasn't sure whether to go through with this part of the show after they showed that rousing applause for things like dividends and raising their — but we have up here — we have Charlie Munger on my left. He's the one that can hear; I can see. We work together for that reason. (Applause.)

沃伦·巴菲特我念到名字的人请站起来。请大家把掌声留到结束——或者你们想鼓更久也行——(笑声)——我来介绍他们。他们是霍华德·巴菲特、苏珊·德克尔、比尔·盖茨、戴维·戈特斯曼、夏洛特·盖曼、唐·基奥、汤姆·墨菲、罗恩·奥尔森和沃尔特·斯科特。美国最好的董事们。(掌声。)

WARREN BUFFETTAnd if the rest of you will just stand as I give your name. And if you'll hold your applause to the end — or even longer if you would like — (laughter) — I will introduce them. It's Howard Buffett, Susan Decker, Bill Gates, David Gottesman, Charlotte Guyman, Don Keough, Tom Murphy, Ron Olson, and Walter Scott. The best directors in America. (Applause.)

沃伦·巴菲特我和查理会在中午休息一下,因为到那时候我们大概已经吃完了桌面上所有东西,得去吃午饭了。如果各位能把问题限制在一个问题内,我会很感激,也就是说不要夹带三个或四个部分的问题。也没必要做长篇的开场白,这样我们就能回答更多问题,而且我们也希望尽可能多地覆盖到各位。

WARREN BUFFETTCharlie and I will take a break at noon because we will probably, by that time, have finished all of the things we have up here to eat, and we'll need to have lunch. I'd appreciate it if you would limit your questions to one question, and that means not embodying a three-parter or a four-parter or something like that. And there's no need to make a long introductory statement because we'll get more questions answered that way, and we want to cover as many people as we can.

如何不做旅鼠

How NOT to be a lemming

沃伦·巴菲特那么,我们就直接开始,从 1 号提问位开始回答第一个问题。

WARREN BUFFETTSo with that, we'll go right over to post number 1 and start in with the first question.

现场股东巴菲特先生,芒格先生,早上好。我叫拉杰什·弗洛尔(音),来自印度孟买。我从你们的信中学到了很多。我从其他地方从未学到过如此深刻的投资哲学见解。做得太棒了。这是思想层面的。但在情感层面,最打动我的是你们这些年来完全靠百分之百的诚实取得的成就,我向你们致敬。谢谢。

AUDIENCE MEMBERVery good morning to Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Rajesh Furor (PH) from Bombay, India. I have been learning a lot from letters of yours. It's been a great insight into investment philosophy that I haven't learned from anywhere else. Great job. That's on the mind side. But on the heart side, what touches me the most is what you have achieved all these years is through a hundred percent honesty, and I salute to that. Thanks.

沃伦·巴菲特谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETTThank you.

现场股东我的问题是,您会推荐哪些关键步骤来纠正像我这样的典型投资者的思维定式,也就是您所说的那种旅鼠式的、随大流的思维?

AUDIENCE MEMBERNow, my question is on what key steps would you recommend to correct the mind set of typical investor like me, which is what you noted as lemmings-like, the crowd mindset?

沃伦·巴菲特我们推荐什么——问题在重复——关于投资者的思维定式?是那个吗——?

WARREN BUFFETTWhat would we recommend — we got the question being repeated here — about the mindset of an investor? Is that —?

查理·芒格他想让你给他建议,怎样才能不那么像旅鼠。(笑声)

CHARLIE MUNGERHe wants you to advise him as to how he can become less like a lemming. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特嗯,既然你重复了问题,我打算让你先回答这个问题,查理。(笑声)在他吃进大约一千卡路里之前,它——(笑声)

WARREN BUFFETTWell, since you repeated the question, I'm going to let you give the first answer to that, Charlie. (Laughter) Until he eats about a thousand calories, it — (Laughter)

查理·芒格他想投资时少像旅鼠一点。

CHARLIE MUNGERHe wants to invest less like a lemming.

沃伦·巴菲特哦,我明白了。我是让你先来。好吧,我来告诉你,是什么改变了我自己的投资人生。我 11 岁开始投资。我第一次读关于投资的书——我相信要读遍所有能看到的东西。我大概六七岁就开始读关于投资的书了。但大约有八年时间,我沉迷于技术分析和各种乱七八糟的东西,然后我读了一本书,叫《聪明的投资者》。那是在我 19 岁的时候,在内布拉斯加大学读的。我想说的是,如果你吸收了《聪明的投资者》的教训——主要是在——我写了序言,特别推荐第 8 章和第 20 章——你就不会表现得像旅鼠,而且与旅鼠相比,你可能做得非常好。我们书虫书店有《聪明的投资者》的拷贝,我认为这本书现在和我当初读它时一样伟大,我想是 1950 年。你永远不会——如果你遵循本·格雷厄姆在那本书里传授的教训,你不可能得到坏的结果。我还想提一下,还有一本书,我没想到现在就能完成。我的表亲,比尔·巴菲特,写了一本关于我们祖父杂货店的书,叫《你会享受的食物》。比尔会在那边。他在签名售书。我几天前刚拿到第一本。读了,非常喜欢。查理在同一家杂货店工作过——那是多少年前了?对查理来说大概是 70 年前了。我们两个干得都不怎么样。(笑声)但我祖父——他的股票建议你别太当真。他写了很多信,对股市非常悲观,强调在杂货店要努力工作。所以我们不听他的了。(笑声)相反,去读《聪明的投资者》。那本书给了我这套哲学,让我受用了很多年。书里有三个重要教训,与你对股票的总体态度有关:你把股票视为企业的一部分;你对市场的态度是,利用它来为你服务,而不是让它来指导你;还有安全边际的理念,总是留出一些额外的空间。但我想,在座的人已经学到了这重要的第一课。我的意思是,我认为大多数拥有伯克希尔的人,并不把自己看作是持有某个小股票代码、可能会出利好或利空的盈利惊喜之类的东西,而是更愿意把自己看作是拥有那边屋子里那一群企业的所有者。这就是看待股票的方式。如果你这样做,你永远不会成为旅鼠。

WARREN BUFFETTOh, I understand that. I was giving you the first shot at it. Well, I will tell you what changed my own life on investing. I started investing when I was 11. I first started reading about it — I believe in reading everything in sight. And I first started reading about it when I was probably six or seven years old. But for about eight years I wandered around with technical analysis and doing all kinds of things, and then I read a book called "The Intelligent Investor." And I did that when I was 19 down at the University of Nebraska. And I would say that if you absorb the lessons of "The Intelligent Investor", mainly in — I wrote a forward and I recommended particularly Chapters 8 and 20 — that you will not behave like a lemming and you may do very well compared to the lemmings. We have here in the Bookworm, copies of "The Intelligent Investor", and I think it's as great a book now as I did when I read it early, I guess, in 1950. You will never — you can't get a bad result if you follow the lessons of — Ben Graham taught in that book. I should mention that there's a book out there also that I did not know it would be completed by this time. My cousin, Bill Buffett, has written a book about our grandfather's grocery store called "Foods You Will Enjoy." And Bill will be out there. He's signing books. I just got my first copy a couple days ago. Read it, and I enjoyed it a lot. Charlie worked at the same grocery store — how many years ago? Probably a good 70 years ago in Charlie's case. Neither one of us was very good. (Laughter) But my grandfather — you don't want to pay much attention to his advice on stocks. He wrote a lot of letters, and he was very negative on the stock market and big on hard work at the grocery store. So we quit listening to him. (Laughter) Instead, read The Intelligent Investor. That's the book that gave me the philosophy that has taken me now for a lot of years. And there's three big lessons in there which relate to your attitude towards stocks generally, which is that you think of them as parts of a business; and your attitude toward the market, which is that you use it to serve you and not to instruct you; and then the idea of a margin of safety, of always leaving some extra room and things. But the people in this room, I think, have learned that important first lesson. I mean, I think most people that own Berkshire do not see themselves as owning something with a little ticker symbol or something that may have a favorable or unfavorable earnings surprise or something of the sort, but they'd rather think of themselves as owning a group of those businesses that are out there in the other room. And that's the way to look at stocks. You'll never be a lemming if you do that.

巴菲特将负责科隆再保险的投资组合

Buffett will handle Cologne Re's investment portfolio

沃伦·巴菲特让我们进入 2 号提问位。

WARREN BUFFETTLet's go to Number two.

现场股东早上好,沃伦。早上好,查理。我叫乔治·伊西斯(音),来自德国科隆。我的问题是:科隆再保险的业务整合进展如何?非常感谢。

AUDIENCE MEMBERGood morning, Warren. Good morning, Charlie. My name is George Iscis (PH) from Cologne, Germany. My question: how is the operational integration of the Cologne Re progressing? Thank you very much.

沃伦·巴菲特科隆再保险,对不熟悉它的各位来说,是通用再保险旗下 95% 控股的子公司,而伯克希尔·哈撒韦持有通用再保险 100% 的股权。我相信科隆再保险是全球历史最悠久的再保险公司。作为先属于通用再保险、后归伯克希尔·哈撒韦的一部分,它为我们做出了卓越的贡献。我们已经制定了一个流程,不久之后就能实现百分百控股科隆。到时候,经营上不会有任何差别——它现在的运营方式已经极为出色。不过,到那时——到现在为止,他们一直自行管理投资组合。这个组合和 GEICO 的股票投资组合,是仅有的两个不由我管理的组合。但当我们百分百控股科隆后,我将接手科隆投资组合的责任。除此之外,科隆的管理层已经做得无可挑剔。所以,除了我们会将科隆 100% 的利润并入报表(而非 95%)之外,你不会看到任何其他变化。

WARREN BUFFETTCologne Re, for those of you who are not familiar with it, is a 95 percent-owned subsidiary of General Re, of which Berkshire Hathaway owns 100 percent. And Cologne Re, I believe, is the oldest reinsurance company in the world. It's done a magnificent job for us as part of, first Gen Re, and then Berkshire Hathaway. And we have a process in place that will, before too long, result in us owning a hundred percent of Cologne. One difference, then — there won't be any difference in operation. It runs magnificently the way it's being run. But at that point — up until this point, they have run their own investment portfolio. That portfolio and the equity portfolio of GEICO are the only two that I don't run. But when we own a hundred percent of Cologne, then I will take the responsibility for Cologne's investment portfolio. Otherwise it would be hard to improve on the operation of the management of Cologne. So there will be — you will not see any other changes except we will consolidate in 100 percent of the earnings of Cologne rather than 95 percent.

“忘掉‘股票’这个词”

"Forget about the word 'stock'"

沃伦·巴菲特第三区。

WARREN BUFFETTArea 3.

现场股东巴菲特先生、芒格先生,早上好。我叫萨姆·赖纳(音),来自新泽西州李堡。我的问题有关您本周关于经济衰退的评论,以及 4 月份股市大幅上涨。您能就市场从这里走向何方展开谈谈吗?(笑声)

AUDIENCE MEMBERGood morning, Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger. My name is Sam Reiner (PH) from Fort Lee, New Jersey, and my question concerns your comment this week about the recession, and the stock market going up so significantly in April. Can you expand on where the market is going from here? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特哈,我可以展开,但我答不上来。(笑声)查理和我对股市下周、下个月或明年会怎么走,一点头绪都没有。我们从不谈论这个。你知道,这个话题从来不会出现。我们的董事可以告诉你,他们参加的董事会上,从没讨论过股市走向——我们不是干这行的。我们不知道该怎么干这行。显然,如果我们能在多数时候成功预测股市走向,那我们就只玩标普 500 指数期货好了,根本没必要研究企业和股票。所以,这不是我们的游戏。我们怎么看股市呢——我们看到每天有成千上万家公司被定价,99.9% 我们都忽略不计,尽管我们会扫一眼。然后偶尔,我们才会看到一些东西,从企业角度看价格对我们有吸引力。忘掉“股票”这个词。所以当我们买入一只股票时,就算有人告诉我们市场要关闭几年,我们也会乐意持有。我们关注的是企业本身。这跟你打算在奥马哈城外几英里的地方买一座农场,是一样的道理。你不会每天去问它的价格,也不会问今年的收成是不是比预期高一点或低一点。你会看农场随时间能产多少东西。你会看预期收成、预期价格、税费、肥料成本,然后根据农场的产出与你的买入价之间的关系,来评估你的购买是否明智。报价与此无关。这就是我们看待股票的方式。我们把它们看作企业。我们对这些企业的未来做出判断。如果我们的判断正确——股票自己会照顾好自己的。查理?

WARREN BUFFETTHah. Well, I can expand, but I couldn't answer. (Laughter) Charlie and I haven't the faintest idea where the stock market is going to go next week, next month, or next year. We never talk about it. You know, it never comes up. Our directors will tell you that they've never been to a directors meeting where the subject of the direction of the stock market is — we are not in that business. We don't know how to be in that business. Obviously, if we could guess successfully a high percentage of the time where the stock market was going to go, we would do nothing but play the S&P futures market. There wouldn't be any reason to look at businesses and stocks. So it's just not our game. We don't think — what we see when we look at the stock market is we see thousands and thousands and thousands of companies priced every day, and we ignore 99.9 percent of what we see, although we run our eyes over them. And then every now and then we see something that looks like it's attractively priced to us, as a business. Forget about the word "stock." So when we buy a stock, we would be happy with that stock if they told us the market was going to close for a couple years. We look to the business. It's exactly the same way as if you were going to buy a farm a few miles here outside of Omaha. You would not get a price on it every day, and you wouldn't ask, you know, whether the yield was a little above expectation this year or down a little bit. You'd look at what the farm was going to produce over time. You'd look at expected yields. You'd look at expected prices, the taxes, the cost of fertilizer, and you would evaluate the intelligence of your purchase based on what the farm produced relative to your purchase price. Quotes would have nothing to do with it. That's exactly the way we look at stocks. We look at them as businesses. We make judgments about what the future of those businesses will be. And if we're right about — in those judgments, the stocks will take care of themselves. Charlie?

查理·芒格没什么可补充的。(笑声)

CHARLIE MUNGERNothing to add. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特他练了好几个星期了。(笑声)

WARREN BUFFETTHe's been practicing for weeks. (Laughter)

我们不是培养优秀经理人,而是留住他们

We don't cultivate great managers, we keep them

WARREN BUFFETT我们去第四区吧。

WARREN BUFFETTLet's go to area 4.

现场股东巴菲特先生、芒格先生,早上好。我叫钱德·查夫拉(音),来自华盛顿州西雅图。伯克希尔·哈撒韦拥有世界上一些最优秀的经理人,而我在招聘好经理人方面非常差劲。有些——我做的某些决定,根本没有接到过杰米·李·柯蒂斯的电话,回想起来我就想,我当时在想什么。您有什么建议,关于如何在一小时内评估一个人能否成为好经理人?

AUDIENCE MEMBERGood morning, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Chander Chavla (PH), and I am from Seattle, Washington. Berkshire Hathaway has some of the best managers in the world, and I am very bad at hiring good managers. The — some of the decisions that I've made, which were without any phone calls from Jamie Lee Curtis, I look back and I see — you know, what was I thinking. What can you advise on, how in one hour you can assess the capability of a person to be a good manager?

WARREN BUFFETT嗯,你得明白我们作弊。(笑)我们买下那些已经有优秀经理人的企业。所以,如果你给我一百个 MBA——我经常有这些班级来奥马哈。今年大概有 30 所学校,通常每个班有 75 到 100 名男女学生。我根本不可能拿出几个小时,把那一百个人按他们未来当经理的成就从第一排到第一百,就像我无法挑出他们一样——这对我来说是不可能的。但我们做的是买下有优秀经理人坐镇的企业。在很多情况下,我们见过这些人在数十年间的表现。我们看过他们的业绩记录,他们是随着企业一起来的。现在,我们的工作与其说是挑选优秀经理人,不如说是留住他们。因为他们的业绩有据可查,是随企业附带的。而伯克希尔旗下许多经理人——绝大多数——已经财务自由了。我们给他们开支票,有时是数十亿美元,常常是数亿美元。所以很多情况下,他们没有经济上的理由必须工作。因此,我们的工作——我们依赖他们,顺便说一句。我是说,总部只有大约 19 个人,而伯克希尔在全球有 25 万名员工,我们不可能去经营他们的业务。我们的工作是确保在股权证书易手之后,他们对工作的热情、兴奋、激情,和之前一样。这需要我们对这些人究竟是热爱企业还是热爱金钱做出一些判断。他们都喜欢钱,但很多人——尤其是我们的经理人——热爱他们的企业。我是说,他们在企业上倾注心血——那对他们来说是一件艺术品,有时候已经在家族里传承了四代。所以,我们必须看到他们眼中的激情。如果我们看到了,那我们的行为就必须让这种激情持续下去。这不能靠合同来实现。我们没有合同。那行不通。但我们可以努力创造一个环境——坦率地说,伯克希尔就是理想的环境——它之所以理想,甚至是因为像今天这样的活动。我们的经理人感觉自己被赏识。他们确实被赏识。不仅是我和查理赏识他们,你们也赏识他们。我们想让你们有机会为他们鼓掌。(掌声。)

WARREN BUFFETTWell, you have to understand that we cheat. (Laughs) We buy businesses with good managers. So if you give me a hundred MBAs — and I have these classes come out all the time to Omaha. I've had about 30 schools this year, and usually there's 75 or a hundred men and women in the classes. I no more could take those hundred and spend a few hours and rank them from number one to a hundred in terms of their future achievements as managers, you know, than I could pick them — you know, it would be impossible for me. But what we do is we buy businesses with great managers in place. We've seen those people perform for, in many cases, decades. We've seen their record, and they come with the business. Now, our job is not so much to select great managers, because we do have this proven record that they come with. Our job is to retain them. And many of the managers — a majority of the managers that work at Berkshire — are independently wealthy. We hand them checks, sometimes, in the billions, often in the hundreds of millions. So they do not have a monetary reason to work, in many cases. So our job — we are dependent on them, incidentally. I mean, we have 19 or so people at headquarters, and we have 250,000 working for Berkshire around the world, and we can't run their businesses. And our job is to make sure that they have the same enthusiasm, excitement, passion, for their job after the stock certificate changes hands, than they had before. Now, that requires some judgment on our part as to whether these people love the business or love the money. They all like money, but many of them — well, our managers in particular — they love their businesses. I mean, they've worked at them — they're a work of art to them, and they've been in the family sometimes as many as four generations. So we have to see the passion in their eyes, and if we see that, then we have to behave in a way that that passion remains. Can't be done by contract. We don't have contracts. It won't — that doesn't work. But we can try to create an environment — and Berkshire, frankly, is the ideal environment — it's even an ideal environment because of events like this. Our managers feel appreciated. And they are appreciated. They're not just appreciated by me and Charlie; they're appreciated by you. And we want to give you a chance to applaud them. (Applause.)

WARREN BUFFETT所以我帮不了你太多。如果你面对一群 MBA,你知道,那不容易。我是说,他们到了那个阶段,多少已经学会了如何用你想听的答案之类的东西来糊弄你。我会找那些对工作充满激情的人。我是说,总是做超出自己份内事的人。你要找善于沟通之类的人。但我更喜欢我的方法。简单得多,就像在棒球场上找一个打击率 .400 的选手,然后说:“我觉得可以把他排进阵容。”我们这行的好处是,你知道,在棒球里,除非你是诺兰·瑞安之类的人物,否则到 40 岁左右就得退役了,但在我们这行,他们可以一直干下去。我是说,举个例——我们家具城有位著名的 B 夫人,她一直为我们工作到 103 岁,然后她离开,第二年去世了。这给我们的经理人上了一课——(笑声)查理?

WARREN BUFFETTSo I can't be of enormous help. And if you're looking at a group of MBAs, you know, it's not easy. I mean, they know — they sort of learn by that point in life how to fool you, in terms of what answers you want to hear and all of that sort of thing. I would look for the person with passion for the job. I mean, the person that is always doing more than their share. You look for people that are goods communicators and all of that sort of thing. But I like my way better. It's a lot easier just to take somebody that's been batting .400 in baseball and say, "I think I'll stick them in the lineup." And the nice thing about our game is that, you know, in baseball, unless you're Nolan Ryan or somebody, you have to hang up things at 40 or thereabouts, but in our game, they go on and on and on. I mean, I use as an example — we had a famous Mrs. B from the Furniture Mart, and she worked for us until she was 103, and then she left and she died the next year. And that is a lesson to our managers that — (Laughter) Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER嗯,这个建议非常有用。让我想起已故的霍华德·阿曼森。有一次,一个饥肠辘辘的商学院学生向他请教如何出人头地,霍华德说:“嗯,我手头总是放着几百万美元,以防好机会突然冒出来。”(笑声)

CHARLIE MUNGERWell, that was very useful advice. It reminds me very much of the late Howard Ahmanson. And a young and starving business student once asked him for advice as to how to get ahead, and Howard said, "Well, I always keep a few million dollars laying around in case a good opportunity suddenly turns up." (Laughter)

教授期权定价是“完全胡说八道”

Teaching option pricing is "totally nonsense"

WARREN BUFFETT好,我们进入第五个问题。(笑声)

WARREN BUFFETTWell, let's go to number 5. (Laughter)

现场股东早上好。我是乔·哈钦(音),来自印第安纳州卡尔弗的股东。您能评论一下,当您试图建仓或退出某家上市公司的头寸时,如何使用股票期权吗?

AUDIENCE MEMBERGood morning. I'm Joe Hutchin (PH), a shareholder from Culver, Indiana. Could you please comment on how you use stock options when trying to enter or exit a position in a public company?

WARREN BUFFETT是的。我们——我记得有一次,我们卖出了一份可口可乐的看跌期权,想法是,如果行权了,我们很乐意拥有更多可口可乐。结果它没有行权。如果我们当初直接买入股票,反而会更好。通常,如果你想买或卖一只股票,你就该直接买或卖那只股票。而用期权策略——买一个看涨期权来代替直接买入股票,指望这样能便宜一点,这意味着大约五次里有四次你会对,但第五次股票会提前上涨,你就会错过你想要的交易。所以我们几乎从未用期权作为建仓或退出的方式,我怀疑我们将来也不会。我们确实使用过——我们卖过那些股票——长期股票看跌期权,这些在昨天的新闻稿和年报里都有描述,但那是另一回事。如果我们想买什么,我们就直接开始买。如果想退出,我们就直接开始卖。我们不会搞什么花哨的技巧。查理?

WARREN BUFFETTYeah. We've — I think there's one time we sold a put on Coca-Cola with the idea that, if it got exercised, we were very happy to own more Coca-Cola. It didn't get exercised. We would have been better off if we had just bought the stock. Usually, if you want to buy or sell a stock, you should buy or sell the stock. And using an option technique to buy a call on a stock instead of buying the stock outright with the idea that you get it a little cheaper that way means that about four times out of five you'll be right and the fifth time the stock will have moved earlier and you'll have missed, you know, the transaction you wanted to have. And so we virtually have never used options as a way to enter a position or exit a position, and I would doubt very much if we do. We've used — we've sold these equity — long-term equity put options that were described in the press release yesterday and were described in the annual report, but that's a different sort of thing. If we want to buy something, we'll just start buying it. And if we want to get out of it, we'll start selling it. And we won't get involved in any fancy techniques. Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER嗯,如果我没记错的话,当年公共部门在决定是否要为股票设立期权交易所时,你写了一封信。当时沃伦是孤军奋战,他在信里说,他认为这样废除保证金规则对国家一点好处都没有。我一直觉得沃伦完全正确。我们——这事儿——把金融市场变成赌场,好让赌场老板赚更多钱,这个想法从来就没让我们觉得有什么吸引力。

CHARLIE MUNGERWell, if I remember right, you wrote a letter when the public authorities were deciding whether we should have option exchanges for stocks. And Warren was all alone at that time, and he wrote a letter saying that he didn't think it would do any good at all for the country to throw out the margin rules in this fashion. I've always thought that Warren was totally right. We — it's — the idea of turning financial markets into gambling parlors so the croupiers can make more money has never been very attractive to us.

沃伦·巴菲特是啊。(掌声)

WARREN BUFFETTYeah. (Applause.)

沃伦·巴菲特是啊。我跟那些 MBA 学生聊天时觉得特别有意思。几年前,芝加哥大学的一个学生问我的第一个问题就是:“我们学的东西里哪些是错的?”我就喜欢这种问题。以后我得事先安排好人来问。商学院花大量时间——现在可能少点了——教期权定价之类的东西,那完全就是瞎扯。我是说,商学院只需要两门课:一门是怎么给企业估值——从投资的角度看——怎么给企业估值,另一门是怎么看待股市波动。但那种把所有时间都花在公式上的想法——当然,问题是老师懂公式,学生不懂,所以他们就有的可讲,能填满时间给你们解释。你知道,这没什么意思——我是说,你要是教圣经研究,能把三四部最重要的宗教典籍倒背如流,精通五种语言,你肯定不愿意告诉别人,归根结底就是“十诫”那几条。哪个蠢货都能做到。所以金融界那些“祭司”们特别想教他们懂而你不懂的东西,那些他们花很长时间学来的、可能还需要不少数学功底的东西。但这跟投资成功一点关系都没有。投资成功取决于以合适的价格买入合适的企业。你得知道怎么给企业估值,还得有一种不被市场影响的心态。你希望市场存在,不是让它影响你,而是让它为你服务。这需要一种思维方式,回到之前那个问题,这种思维在《聪明的投资者》第 8 章里讲得很好。

WARREN BUFFETTYeah. It's very interesting to me when I talk to these MBA students. One of them from the University of Chicago, the very first question I got a few years ago, he says, "What are we being taught that's wrong?" I love questions like that. I have to plant them in the future. The amount of time spent at business schools — maybe it's a little less now — but teaching things like option pricing and that sort of thing, it's totally nonsense. I mean, you need two courses in a business school: one is how to value a business, and — from the standpoint of investments — how to value a business and how to think about stock market fluctuations. But the idea that you would spend all of this time with formulas — but the problem, of course, is that the instructors know the formulas, and you don't when they come, and so they've got something to fill the time explaining to you. And, you know, it is no fun if you — I mean, if you were teaching Biblical studies, you know, and you could read three or four of the most important religious tomes forward and backward in five different languages, you would hate to tell somebody that it comes down to the Ten Commandments. I mean, any damn fool can do that. So there's a great desire of the priesthood in finance to want to teach the things that they know and you don't know and that they spent a long time learning and that maybe requires a fair amount of mathematics. And it really has nothing to do with investment success. Investment success depends on buying into the right businesses at the right price. And you have to know how to value businesses, and you have to have an attitude that divorces you from being influenced by the market. You want the market there, not to influence you, you want it there to serve you. And that requires a mindset, which goes back to an earlier question, and it's a mindset that's described quite well in Chapter 8 of "The Intelligent Investor."

巴菲特称赞妹妹多丽丝的“零售式”慈善

Buffett praises sister Doris for her "retail" charity

沃伦·巴菲特咱们来第 6 个问题。

WARREN BUFFETTLet's go to number 6.

现场股东大家好。我叫艾琳,从德国波恩来。两位都是非常慷慨的人。你们捐款的乐趣是什么,捐款时又有什么潜在陷阱?抱歉。

AUDIENCE MEMBERHi. I'm Irene from Bonn, Germany. Both of you are very generous person. What is your joy of giving, and what are the potential pits when donating money — pitfalls when donating money? I'm sorry.

沃伦·巴菲特捐款的乐趣、给予以及其中的陷阱,是吧。就我个人而言,我这辈子从未捐出过任何对我生活有实质影响的东西。我是说,有些人这个周日去教堂,往捐款盘里放点钱,那点钱会决定他们带家人去哪儿吃饭,或是能不能带家人出去吃,要不要去看场电影,圣诞节是不是多买一件礼物,诸如此类。我是说,他们捐出的是能改变自己生活的钱。这种钱我一分都没捐过,也永远不会。我是说,生活中我想做的事都能做。但因为活得久——这在积累财富上是个巨大优势——而且我想要的大部分东西都不是靠花钱得来的。于是钱就攒下来了,我本质上是在捐出多余的部分。我捐的从来都不是从生活必需中挤出来的钱。所以我其实——这么说吧,我觉得用这些钱做点有用的事是好的,但我觉得这完全没法跟那些捐出对自己或子女生活有实质影响的善举相提并论。那些人,才是名副其实的慈善家。我想我妹妹多丽丝今天也在场。她捐出的钱,是会影响她自己生活的钱。她还捐出时间。她每天投入八到十个小时,去真切了解人们的实际需求,在金钱之外给予他们更多——为他们提供帮助、建议,还有能倾诉的对象。你明白吗,那才是真正的付出。我很钦佩她这一点。但我没有效仿她。我是说,她做的是零售式的捐赠;我更喜欢批发。至于其中的陷阱,你知道,任何领域都可能犯错。但如果你——你应该捐给自己真正感兴趣、自己相信的事情,这可以是任何事情。我不——我不打算给捐款用途排什么优先顺序。要找你自己亲身投入其中的事。找你既愿意捐钱也愿意投入时间的事。除此之外,我就让查理接着说。

WARREN BUFFETTThe joys and giving and the pitfalls of donating money, huh. The — I know personally I've never given up anything in my life that made a difference in my life. I mean, there are people that will go to church this Sunday and they will drop money in a collection plate, and it will make the difference about where they take their family, or whether they take their family, in terms of where they eat, whether they go to a movie, whether they get an extra present at Christmas, whatever it may be. I mean, they are giving some money that makes a difference in their lives. I've never given a penny that way, and I never will. I mean, I get to do everything I want to do in life. But because I've lived a long time — which gives you an enormous advantage in terms of accumulating money — and most of the things I want in life don't come from the expenditure of money. So it accumulates, and basically I'm giving away excess. I'm not giving away anything from necessity. So I really — you know, I think what I'm doing is useful with the money, but I don't think it's on a par at all with the actions of somebody that's giving money that really makes a difference in how they or their children live. Those are really charitable people. I think my sister Doris is here. She has given away money that made a difference in her life. She gives away time, too. She gives away eight or ten hours a day, in terms of actually looking into the real needs of people, and giving them things beyond the money — giving them help and advice and somebody to talk to. And, you know, that's real giving. And I admire her for it. I'm not emulating her. I mean, she is in the retail business of giving; I like wholesale much better. In terms of the pitfalls, you know, you can make mistakes in any area. But if you — you should give to things that you personally have an interest in and believe in, and that can be anything. I don't — I'm not going to prioritize what should be done with gifts. Something you're involved in. Something you want to give your time to as well as money. But beyond that, I'll let Charlie carry on.

查理·芒格是啊。说到陷阱,我预测,如果你持有极端政治意识形态,不管是左派还是右派,你很可能会做出很多愚蠢的慈善捐赠。(笑声和掌声)

CHARLIE MUNGERYeah. Regarding pitfalls, I would predict that, if you have an extreme political ideology, whether of the left or the right, you're very likely to make a lot of dumb charitable gifts. (Laughter and applause)

沃伦·巴菲特你要是像我一样跟查理待久了,就能体会到生活的阳光面。我是说——(笑声)我们应该放那首《阳光街》。

WARREN BUFFETTIf you hang around Charlie like I do, you get the sunny side of life. I mean — (laughter) We ought to have that playing, "The Sunny Side of the Street."

我们不会“告诉全世界怎么经营他们的生意”

We don't "tell the world how to run their business"

沃伦·巴菲特咱们来第 7 个问题。

WARREN BUFFETTLet's go to number 7.

现场股东早上好。我叫奥科什·瓦杰(音),来自印度。我因为巴菲特先生的慈善事业而非常崇拜他,也确实希望有一天能为盖茨基金会工作。我想问巴菲特先生的问题是,当您旗下公司面临道德困境时,您的参与程度有多深?比如,Fruit of the Loom 的竞争对手在中美洲设有血汗工厂。那么您会怎么做,才能确保自己不陷入同样的陷阱?

AUDIENCE MEMBERGood morning. My name is Okosh Vajay (PH), and I'm from India. I worship Mr. Buffett for his philanthropy, and I do hope to serve the Gates Foundation someday. My question to Mr. Buffett is, what's your level of involvement when one of your companies is faced with an ethical dilemma? For example, Fruit of the Loom's competitors have sweatshops in Central America. So what do you do to ensure that you don't fall into the same trap?

沃伦·巴菲特嗯。我们让经理人经营他们的企业。我们有一批非常出色的经理人,不仅能力出众,而且这些年来我们看到的道德水准,我认为也是极为出色的。这并不意味着没有——不会偶尔出点小差错。但总体来看,几十年下来,我很高兴能把钥匙交到他们手上,不只是企业的财务表现,还包括他们的行为方式。而且我想说,你对 Fruit of the Loom 的看法完全错了——它的运营标准绝对是一流的。约翰·霍兰德就在这儿。之后我很乐意让你跟他聊聊。但我们——我们为自己的企业以及它们的运营方式感到自豪。我们不会给他们下发详尽的指导手册。我大概每两年给他们写一封信,让他们回信告诉我,万一他们当晚出事,谁应该当接班人。这些信我一直留着。幸运的是,这些信很少派上用场。但我还告诉他们,我们需要的钱已经够了。钱多点当然好,但伯克希尔·哈撒韦不会缺钱。我们的声誉没有一点多余的余地,而且我们绝不想拿声誉去换钱。所以我给他们传递的信息,跟电影里所罗门事件中传达的一样:不仅要守法做事,还要做到即使第二天有个不友善但聪明的记者把这事写到当地报纸上,他们的邻居、家人看了也不会觉得有问题。我们每年都在电影里放这段,就是想让经理人不断听到这个信息。伯克希尔总部不会给他们任何压力,要求他们某个季度必须报出多少盈利。他们不给我预算报表,所以他们也——不会觉得必须完成某个数字,否则我在公开披露盈利时会下不来台。我们没有任何激励措施会让人违背良心、耍花招、偷工减料之类的。总体来看,我觉得效果还不错。不是完美无缺。一座城市如果住了 25 万人,难免会有事发生。我们确实有 25 万名员工。但我们的打击率,我没什么不满的。查理?

WARREN BUFFETTYeah. Well, we let our managers run their businesses. And we've got some terrific managers, not only in terms of ability, but I would say that what we have seen of the ethical standards of our managers has been extraordinary over the years. That doesn't mean there isn't — there aren't slip ups here or there. But taken as a group, over decades, I think that I'm very happy, in effect, turning over the keys, not only to the financial performance of the business, but in terms of how they behave. And I would say that I think you're quite wrong in terms of — Fruit of the Loom's operations are conducted in absolutely terrific standards. John Holland is here. I'd be glad to have you meet with him later. But we — we're proud of our businesses and how they operate. We do not give them elaborate guidelines. I write them a letter every two years, roughly, and I ask them to send me a letter telling who they think should be the successor if anything happened to them that night. I keep those letters around. Fortunately, they don't come into play very often. But I also tell them we've got all the money we need. It's nice to have more money, but we're not going to lack for money at Berkshire Hathaway. We don't have a shred of reputation more than we need, and we never want to trade away reputation for money. So we give them that same message that was given in the movie, in terms of the Salomon situation, which is that not only do they behave in a way that conforms with the laws, but that they behave in a way where, if a story were written by an unfriendly but intelligent reporter, the next morning, in their local paper, they would have no problem with their neighbors, their family reading it. And we run that in the movie every year, just because we like the managers to keep getting that message all of the time. There is no pressure from Berkshire's corporate office to report X dollars per — of earnings in any quarter. They don't give me budgets, so they don't — there's no feeling that they have to come through with given numbers or I'll be embarrassed in public in terms of publishing earnings or anything of the sort. We have no incentives to cause people to do anything that would go against their conscience or play games or cut corners or anything of the sort. And, overall, I think it's worked pretty well. It isn't perfect. You can't have 250,000 people in the city without having something going on at some point. And we do have 250,000 people working. But I'm not unhappy with our batting average. Charlie?

查理·芒格是啊。当然,Fruit of the Loom 也有海外工厂,我们对此完全没有禁令。我们现在有不少海外工厂。我们不偏爱海外工厂。只是根据实际情况做最合理的事。

CHARLIE MUNGERYeah. And, of course, Fruit of the Loom does have foreign plants, and we have no rule against that at all. We've got quite a few foreign plants now. We don't favor foreign plants. We just do whatever makes sense under the circumstances.

沃伦·巴菲特是的,我们有一家鞋业公司,我在年报里写过,在缅因州。那里的员工非常非常优秀,比世界各地的工人都更有效率。但 20 年前,美国每年生产大约 10 亿双鞋,我们这个国家简直就是一群“伊梅尔达·马科斯们”。我是说,那可真是疯狂。马萨诸塞州的布罗克顿,还有你能想到的各种城镇,都围绕着鞋业运转,缅因州德克斯特镇也是这样。我们买下了那家公司,努力参与竞争。我们有好品牌,有精湛的工艺。结果我们发现,跟中国生产的鞋竞争,根本行不通。现在,这个国家每年消费超过 10 亿双鞋,基本上全部来自境外。你们会看到这种情况的。中国的工厂、中美洲的工厂——它们的标准和我们这个国家不尽相同。你知道,这就是现实。我们不会对全世界指手画脚,告诉他们该怎么经营。显然,我们有一些必须满足的标准,但那些地方的情况,和美国本土并不完全一样。

WARREN BUFFETTYeah, we had a shoe business I've written about in Maine, and we had wonderful, wonderful workers there. They were more productive than workers around the world. But the United States was producing, 20 years ago, roughly a billion pairs of shoes a year, and we were a nation of Imelda Marcoses. I mean, it was wild. And Brockton, Massachusetts, and you name the towns, revolved around the shoe business, as did a town called Dexter, Maine. And we bought that business. And we tried to compete. We had a good brand name. We had great workmanship. And we found out that it just plain wouldn't work against — competing against — shoes produced in China. So now of the — it's over a billion pairs of shoes a year used in this country. Basically they all come from outside the borders. And you're going to see that. And factories in China, factories in Central America — they do not have exactly the norms that we have in this country. And, you know, that's going to be the situation. We are — we will not — we are not going to tell the world how to run their business in any great way. We — obviously we have some standards that have to be met, but we are not — they are not exactly the situation you are going to find in the United States.

巴菲特认为原材料成本上涨不足为虑

Buffett dismisses higher raw material costs

沃伦·巴菲特第 8 个。

WARREN BUFFETTNumber 8.

现场股东早上好。我叫迈克·麦高恩(音),来自加利福尼亚州帕萨迪纳。我同时是伯克希尔和西科金融的股东。我运营一个叫 FinancialFoghorn.com 的网站,写一些关于贵金属之类的内容。过去我曾向你问过白银的问题,并没有得到确切答复,所以这次我想问另一种大宗商品。我读到中国提高了钨的价格,于是联想到你去年收购伊斯卡(ISCAR)时所做的评论。像钨这类大宗商品价格上涨,是否会影响伊斯卡的盈利能力?这是否也是你们在中国选址建厂生产机床的原因之一?谢谢。

AUDIENCE MEMBERGood morning. My name is Mike McGowan (PH). I'm from Pasadena, California. I'm a shareholder in both Berkshire and Wesco. I run a website called FinancialFoghorn.com, and I write about precious metals and things. And I've asked you questions in the past about silver, and I didn't really get them answered. So I thought I'd ask about a different commodity this time. I read about the Chinese raising the price of tungsten, and I think about your comment last year in buying ISCAR. Will commodity price increases in things like tungsten affect the profitability of ISCAR? And would that be the reason you're locating a plant in China to build machine tools? Thanks.

沃伦·巴菲特是的。在中国建厂的原因是为了服务中国这个规模庞大且持续增长的市场。我们去年秋末在大连开设了工厂。靠近原材料固然更好,但这和钨价变化没有任何关系。一般来说,如果你像 ISCAR 那样用原材料制造更高附加值的产品,原材料价格变化可能需要三个月到六个月来适应。显然,某些大宗商品价格如果高到一定程度,就会出现替代品。但在切削刀具领域,钨是没有替代品的,将来也不会有——你知道,我们试过寻找原油的替代品来生产汽油或者——不太确切——取暖油,但之后天然气这样的替代品价格也会上涨。所以我认为,在我们的业务中,原材料成本大多能传导出去。现在,比如说,在地毯业务中,我们很难把以石油为基础的原材料的成本上涨传导给下游。但即便没有这个因素,由于住宅市场放缓,地毯业务可能也会遇到困难。这确实让事情变得更棘手。但长期来看,我们的业务会反映原材料成本。你看,我手上这块软糖,这块我很想马上吃进嘴里的软糖,它最终会反映糖和可可等成本。如果你经营一家航空公司,它也会反映燃料成本。所以,这里那里会有一些挤压,但这不是什么大问题,也肯定不是我们去中国设立 ISCAR 工厂的原因。那个工厂——顺便提一下 ISCAR——我们这里有几位来自 ISCAR 的人,有些还带着家人。我当时买下它时抱有很高期望,它在各方面都超出了预期。财务表现超出预期,我们与员工建立的人际关系也超出预期。我是说——几年前我就告诉过你们,这是一次极好的收购。它已经成为一个梦幻般的收购,我知道查理想补充这一点。(掌声)

WARREN BUFFETTYeah. The reason the plant was built in China was to serve the Chinese market, which is large and growing. And we opened in Dalian late last fall. It's nicer to be closer to the raw material, but it really had nothing to do with changes in the price of tungsten. Generally speaking, if you're creating a higher value-added product, as ISCAR is doing, from a raw material, there may be three months, six months, of adjustment to changes in raw material prices. And obviously, with some commodities, if it gets high enough you get into substitutes. But there isn't going to be any substitute for tungsten in the cutting tools, and there won't be — you know, we tried some substitutes for crude oil in terms of gasoline or — not so — heating oil but then the substitutes like natural gas go up in price, too. So I think largely, in our businesses, raw materials get passed through. Now, we're having a tough time, for example, in the carpet business in passing through the cost increases that we experience in oil-based raw materials. But we would be having trouble — we probably would be having trouble in the carpet business regardless now because of the slowdown in residential housing. It does make it tougher. But over a period of time, our businesses are going to reflect raw material costs. You know, the candy here I have, this fudge, which I can hardly wait to get into, you know, it's going to reflect sugar and cocoa and things like that over time. And if you're running an airline, it's going to reflect the cost of fuel. So you can have little squeezes here and there, but it's not a big deal, and it certainly isn't the reason that we went to China to locate the ISCAR facility. That facility — incidentally ISCAR — we have a number of people here from ISCAR, and families in some cases. That is — I had very high expectations for that when we bought it. It's exceeded it in every way. It's exceeded in terms of financial performance. It's exceeded in terms of the human relations we've developed with the people. I mean, it was — I told you it was a terrific acquisition a few years ago. It's been a dream acquisition, and I know Charlie wants to add to that. (Applause)

查理·芒格是的。简短的回答是,虽然我们不喜欢通胀,因为它对我们的国家和文明不利,但随着时间的推移,因为有通胀,我们可能会赚到更多的钱。

CHARLIE MUNGERYeah. I would say that the short answer is that, while we don't like inflation because it's bad for our country and our civilization, that we will probably make more money over time because there is inflation.

要找到比伯克希尔更好的买入机会,工作量不小

Lots of work to find a better buy than Berkshire

沃伦·巴菲特第 9 个问题。

WARREN BUFFETTGo to number 9.

现场股东早上好。我叫马克·拉比诺夫,来自澳大利亚墨尔本。我的问题是,过去 12 个月伯克希尔买入了大量上市公司股票。您是否预计这些投资在未来多年的年化回报率在 7% 到 10% 之间?这一数字远低于伯克希尔过去的成绩。

AUDIENCE MEMBERGood morning. My name is Marc Rabinov from Melbourne, Australia. My question is, Berkshire has bought a lot of shares over the last 12 months in listed companies. Do you expect the return on these investments to be between 7 and 10 percent per annum over many years, which is, I would say, well below what Berkshire has achieved in the past?

沃伦·巴菲特答案是肯定的。(笑声)我们——如果我们能买入普通股,长期来看,税前来自股息和资本利得的预期回报——如果能有 10%,我们会非常高兴,而且我们大概会接受略低于这个数字的回报。毫无疑问——绝对没有疑问——将来持有伯克希尔所能获得的回报会低于过去。毫无疑问,我们在伯克希尔持有的普通股,未来表现不会像过去这差不多 40 年那样好。我们现在面对的可交易股票池,谈论的公司市值至少是 100 亿美元,但说实话,在大多数情况下,要想对伯克希尔产生有意义的影响,我们谈论的规模要大得多,也许是 500 亿美元甚至更高。好吧,在这个池子里操作,不像拥有全部成千上万家公司可挑选那样有利可图。所以,我们——举个例子。如果我们找到一家市值 100 亿美元的公司,可以买入 5% 的股份——通常这不会引起太大动静——我们就能拥有 5 亿美元的投资。假设它在一段时间后翻倍,那就是赚了 5 亿美元。交 35% 的税,剩下 3.25 亿美元。这对于伯克希尔的业绩来说,还不到 1% 的十分之二(0.2%)。所以我们的操作空间已经大幅缩小,而且在这个空间里,我们的表现——远远比不上——如果我们在一个广阔得多、什么都能做的空间里所能取得的水平。我们时不时找到一些小机会,赚了些钱。我稍后可能会提到其中一两项。它们不错,但对伯克希尔来说起不到多大作用。所以,任何期望我们接近复制过去表现的人,应该卖掉他们的股票。我是说,因为那不会——那不会发生。而且,你知道,我认为随着时间的推移,我们会取得不错的结果,但我们不会取得不像话的结果。在这个领域,我们更喜欢不像话的,但我们得不到。查理?

WARREN BUFFETTThe answer to that is yes. (Laughs) The — we would be very happy if we could buy common stocks where our expectation over a long period, pretax, from a combination of dividends and capital gains — we'd be very happy if we thought it was going to be 10 percent, and we would probably settle for a little less than that. And there's no question — absolutely no question — that returns from owning Berkshire will be less in the future than they have been in the past. There's no question that we will not do as well with the common stocks at Berkshire that we own in the future as we have over the last, really, 40 years or thereabouts. We operate now in a universe of marketable stocks that — where we're talking about companies with market caps of at least 10 billion but really, in most cases, to have a meaningful impact on Berkshire, we're talking much bigger than that, maybe 50 billion and up. Well, that universe is not as profitable a universe to operate in as if you have the entire universe of thousands and thousands of companies. So we — if we — just take an example. If we find a company with a market cap of 10 billion and we can buy 5 percent of it — and usually that's what we can buy without disturbing things — we can have a $500 million investment. Let's say it doubles over a period of time. That's 500 million. You pay a 35 percent tax. You have 325 million. That's less than two-tenths of 1 percent in terms of Berkshire performance. So our universe has shrunk enormously, and we will not do as well in that universe — remotely as well — as we would if we were the operating in a much wider universe and could do all kinds of things. We've found little things to do from time to time where we've made some money. I may refer to them a little later, a couple things. And they're nice, but they don't move the needle very much at Berkshire. So anyone that expects us to come close to replicating the past should sell their stock. I mean, because it isn't — it isn't going to happen. And, you know, I think we're going to get decent results over time, but we're not going to get indecent results. And in this field we prefer indecent, but we're not going to get them. Charlie?

查理·芒格我认为你可以把沃伦的承诺当成银行存款。我们非常满足于未来以远低于过去的赚钱速度赚钱。我建议你也采取同样的态度。(笑声)

CHARLIE MUNGERI think you can take Warren's promises to the bank. We are very happy making money at a rate in the future that is way less than the rate at which we made money in the past. And I suggest that you adopt the same attitude. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特嗯,我不会要求他们那样。我认为如果你操作的资金量小——我说过——

WARREN BUFFETTWell, I wouldn't condemn them to that. I think if you're working with small amounts of money — I've talked —

查理·芒格哦,是的。

CHARLIE MUNGEROh, yeah.

沃伦·巴菲特是的。那么,你可能找到比买入伯克希尔好得多的资金运用方式。我是说,如果你资金量小,愿意投入大量时间,去审视成千上万种证券,你会发现比买入伯克希尔更明智的选择。你知道,我们仍然认为长期来看伯克希尔是一项有吸引力的投资。我们认为,与其他非常大的公司相比,它相当不错。但我们不认为它是世界上最有吸引力的投资,如果你愿意花时间翻遍几千种可能性——就像我和查理很多年前做的那样——你会发现更好的。这对我们来说现在已经不可行,而且对伯克希尔也没影响。我们在伯克希尔喜欢做的,是买入规模不小甚至巨大的一流业务,配上优秀的一流管理层,然后一直持有。因为这样做的好处是,你不需要在花丛间跳来跳去。你只需坐等它们每年产出越来越多,给你提供资本,然后你可以买入更多业务。这是一个非常不错的公式。我认为这公式对我们有效。但它不会产生像过去那样的回报。

WARREN BUFFETTYeah. Then you may have something very much better to do with your money than to buy Berkshire. I mean, if you're working with small amounts of money, and you want to put in significant amounts of time, and examine thousands of securities, you will find things that are more intelligent to buy than Berkshire. You know, we still think Berkshire is an attractive investment over a long period of time. We think that it stacks up reasonably well with other very large companies. We don't think it's the most attractive investment in the world, in terms of what you can find if you're willing to go through those thousands of possibilities, which is what Charlie and I used to do many years ago. It's not feasible for us to do it now and wouldn't have any impact on Berkshire. What we really like at Berkshire is buying good-sized to very large first-class businesses with first-class management and just sitting there. Because the nice thing about that is you don't have go from flower to flower. You can just sit there and watch them produce more and more every year and give you capital and you can buy more businesses. That's a nice formula. It's a formula that will work, I think, for us. It won't produce returns like the past.

太平洋电力将遵循监管机构关于克拉马斯河水坝的决定

PacifiCorp will follow regulators on Klamath River dam

沃伦·巴菲特第 10 个问题。

WARREN BUFFETTNumber 10.

现场股东(听不清)我叫楚楚(听不清),我从克拉马斯河来到这儿,来的时候心情沉重。我知道这个场合本来挺轻松的,但去年我来的时候心情也很沉重。我开了十天车,一路禁食,就为了来跟您说句话。您知道,去年我们确实受到了不尊重,因为您的子公司太平洋电力公司在克拉马斯河上的水坝正在产生有毒藻华,还伴随着其他多种问题。我不细说了。但我今天来,是想跟您达成一个原则协议:您愿意坐下来,帮我们解决这事,让太平洋电力公司承担责任。作为美国原住民,而您作为欧裔美国人,是我家土地上的客人,我希望您今天当着所有股东的面,诚心诚意地这么做,让我看到您在乎。您是个慈善家,您关心帮助第三世界国家抗击贫困和疾病,可就在美国本土,您的公司却在制造这些问题。

AUDIENCE MEMBER(Inaudible). My name is Chu Chu (Inaudible), and I come here from the Klamath River, and I come here with a heavy heart. And I know this is a pretty light-hearted event, but I came here last year with a heavy heart, too. And I fasted for ten days driving over here to speak with you. And, you know, we really were disrespected last year, because one of your subsidiaries, PacifiCorp, has dams on the Klamath River that are creating toxic algae blooms, along with multiple other things. I won't go into it too far. But I just come here today with a principle agreement between you and I, that you will sit down at the table and help us figure this out, help us make PacifiCorp accountable. And being that I'm an indigenous American, and you're a guest in my home as a European American, that you would do that in front of all your shareholders today in good faith, that you care, you know, as a philanthropist and you care about, you know, helping, you know, third-world countries, you know, fight poverty, disease, when you're helping create it right here in the United States.

沃伦·巴菲特您可能不能——您可能不能——去年我们读过收购太平洋电力时签署的命令。实际上,您可能知道,我被禁止在太平洋电力那个领域做实际决策。那是我们收购时公共事业委员会裁决的一部分。但我们这里有戴夫·索科尔可以谈这个。我想第一座水坝是 1907 年建的,我们几年前才买下太平洋电力。但是戴维——如果戴夫能到话筒前,我想他——我想他能回应您提出的问题。我不认为我们去年有任何不尊重的意思。去年在座各位可能记得,我们在这件事上也许有不同意见,顺便说一句,据我所知,在您那个地区,对于该怎么做也存在激烈的分歧。嗯——我想我应该让戴夫来解释一下。戴夫?谁来打个光——

WARREN BUFFETTYou may not — you may not — last year we read the order under which we acquired PacifiCorp. And, actually, as you may know, I'm prohibited from actually making decisions in that — in the area of PacifiCorp. That was part of the public utility commission ruling when we bought it. But we have Dave Sokol here who can speak to that. I think the first dam was built in 1907, and we bought PacifiCorp a couple of years ago. But David — if Dave could go to a microphone, I think that — I think he could address the issues that you brought up. I don't think we meant in any way to be disrespectful last year. Those of you who were here last year, we may have a difference of opinion on this, and incidentally there are strong differences of opinion, as I understand it, in your area about what should be done. And — well, I think I should have Dave make the explanation on it. Dave? Somebody want to put a spotlight on the —

戴夫·索科尔谢谢,沃伦。正如您先说的,巴菲特先生不适合对这个问题做任何详细回应,因为这是 2006 年收购太平洋电力的一部分。他特别书面同意不干涉太平洋电力受监管资产的任何决策。所以话说回来,我们在克拉马斯河运营的四座水坝是过去 100 年里建的。在联邦能源监管委员会的重新许可过程中,有一系列关于该怎么做的问题。这些决策通过那个监管程序已经进行了八年,可能还要六年才能有结果。话说回来,有 28 个不同的当事方,包括联邦、州和地方政府机构、原住民、渔业相关人士、当地土地所有者,都在参与讨论这些资产应该或不应该怎样处理——我漏掉了灌溉者。在这 28 方中,除了太平洋电力之外,至少有四个不同的方向人们认为这个程序应该走。从我们的角度看,当这 28 方就解决方案该怎么推进、怎么出资等问题达成一致时,我们会很高兴地找到解决办法。从根本上说,这取决于联邦能源监管委员会、州和联邦监管机构,以及太平洋电力运营所在六个州的各自监管机构。所以,如果公共政策走向大坝拆除、鱼梯建设或维持现状,那就是我们要遵循的程序。我们正与各当事方建设性地合作。我们已经与四个部落分别会面多次。这是个复杂的情况,但愿随着时间的推移,能达成合作的解决方案。(掌声)

DAVE SOKOLThanks, Warren. As you stated first, it would be inappropriate for Mr. Buffett to respond in any detail on this issue, because it's part of the acquisition in 2006 of PacifiCorp. He specifically agreed in writing not to interfere with any decisions of our regulated assets within PacifiCorp. So having said that, these four dams that we operate on the Klamath River were built over the last 100 years. There are a whole series of issues in the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission relicensing process as to what should occur. These decisions, through that regulatory process, have been ongoing for eight years, and they won't culminate for probably another six. Having said that, there are 28 various parties from federal, state, and local agencies, Native Americans, fishery folks, local landowners, that are party to a discussion as to what should or should not happen with these assets — and I left out the irrigators. Of those 28 parties, other than PacifiCorp, there are at least four different directions in which people think this process should go. From our perspective, we will be pleased to find a resolution when the 28 parties agree as to how that resolution should go forward, how it would be funded, et cetera. Fundamentally, it's up to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, state and federal regulators, in addition to them, and then our specific regulators in each of the six states that PacifiCorp operates in. So if public policy moves in a direction of dam removal, fish ladders, or maintaining the existing status quo, that would be the process in which we would go forward. We are working constructively with each of the various parties. We've met numerous times with each of the four tribes. And it's a complicated situation and one that hopefully, over time, a cooperative resolution can be met. (Applause.)

想吃就吃,做你喜欢做的事

Eat what you want and love what you're doing

沃伦·巴菲特请 11 区。

WARREN BUFFETTArea 11, please.

现场股东早上好。我来自加州核桃溪(听不清)。我们从搞笑电影里学到了一些东西,但您能不能再多讲讲,您是怎么保持良好心理和身体健康的?(笑声)

AUDIENCE MEMBERGood morning. I'm (inaudible) from Walnut Creek, California. Well, we learned something from the comic movie, but could you please expand on how do you maintain your good mental and physical health? (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特嗯,你得从均衡饮食开始。(笑声)来点箭牌、玛氏、喜诗、可乐。基本上——如果查理和我的心态都不健康,那谁还能健康?我的意思是,我们每天都能做我们热爱的事。我们跟那些不仅心情愉快、喜欢我们,而且工作极其出色的人一起做——他们也喜欢自己的工作。我们几乎从不需要做任何不想做的事。我有个教练每周来三次。我觉得她大概就在这儿。她可能觉得我在那项活动上有点不情愿,但那只是每周三次、每次 45 分钟。其余时间我几乎都在做——嗯,我每天都在做我喜欢的事,一天又一天。而且我在空调办公室里做,有各种各样的帮助,我——我的意思是,有那么多福气,你怎么能对生活感到不满呢?更神奇的是,查理 84 岁,我 77 岁。我们在很多方面肯定慢下来了,但我们假装没慢,而且似乎也没什么影响。(笑)我们相处得很好。有好的搭档、好的经理、好的家庭。我——根本没有理由去看生活中的消极面并纠结于此。那太蠢了。所以我们确实数着我们的福气,因为很多,而且还在不断涌现,我们会尽可能长久地享受。仅此而已。查理?

WARREN BUFFETTWell, you start with a balanced diet. (Laughter) Some Wrigley's, some Mars, some See's, some Coke. Basically it — if Charlie and I can't have a decent mental attitude, who can? I mean, we get to do what we love doing every day. We do it with people that are not only cheerful about it and like us, but they do their jobs extraordinarily — they like their jobs too. We're forced to do virtually nothing we don't want to. I have a trainer that comes three times a week. She — I think she's probably here. And she may think I'm a little begrudging in that particular activity, but that's only 45 minutes, three times a week. The rest of the time I am doing almost — well, I'm doing whatever I love, you know, day by day by day by day. And I do it, you know, in air-conditioned offices and, you know, with all kinds of help and it — I mean, how could you be sour about life, you know, being blessed in so many ways? And then the amazing thing is that Charlie is 84; I'm 77. And we've slowed down, I'm sure, in a lot of ways, but we pretend we haven't, and it doesn't seem to bother us. (Laughs) We get along fine. Great partners, great managers, you know, great families. I — there's just no reason to look at any minuses in life and to focus on that. It would be crazy. So we really do count our blessings because they've been many and they continue to come forth, and we'll enjoy it as long as we can. There's not much more to it than that. Charlie?

查理·芒格嗯,我倒希望我们能成为跑马拉松和保持极瘦身材之类好处的活广告。可就我判断,我们俩都没怎么在意任何健康习惯或饮食规则——(笑声)——目前看来效果还不错。我不觉得这能推荐给所有人,但就我个人而言,我不打算改。(笑声和掌声)

CHARLIE MUNGERWell, I wish we were poster boys for the benefits of running marathons and maintaining a very slim bodily state and so forth. But as nearly as I can tell, neither of us pays much attention to any health habits or dietary rules — (laughter) — and it seems to have worked pretty well so far. I don't think we can recommend it to everybody, but I, for one, don't plan to change. (Laughter and applause)

沃伦·巴菲特说实话,从早上起床到晚上上床睡觉,我们都在做各种各样我们想做的事。我们能——跟优秀的人打交道,这差不多是最棒的事了。而且,你知道,我们生活在——我们显然有偏见——但我们认为我们生活在世界上最好的国家,拥有一切美好的东西。我的意思是,就想象一下——(掌声)

WARREN BUFFETTReally, from the moment we get up to when we go to bed at night, we get to do all kinds of things. We get to — associating with wonderful people is about as good as it gets. And, you know, we live — we're biased, obviously — but we think we live in the best country in the world and have all kinds of good things. I mean, just imagine — (Applause.)

沃伦·巴菲特我们当初要是留在我祖父的杂货店里,那简直就是人间地狱。(笑声)

WARREN BUFFETTWe could have stayed in my grandfather's grocery store, and it would have been hell. (Laughter)

查理·芒格顺便说一句,这跟公司薪酬这件事相关。你干的这份工作,假如倒贴钱是得到它的唯一途径,你也愿意倒贴钱去干,而你还被当成其他人——其他人的榜样。不给自己开太高的薪酬,其中深意,值得好好说说。(掌声)

CHARLIE MUNGERBy the way, this relates to the subject of corporate compensation. You're in a job which you would pay to have, if that were the only way to get it, and you're supposed to be an exemplar from other people — for other people. There's a lot to be said for not paying yourself very well. (Applause.)

沃伦·巴菲特他经常向我指出这一点。(笑)嗯,你想一想,你知道,那种认为 CEO 薪酬代表市场机制的观点,认为你得给某个人 1000 万美元留任奖金之类才能让他留在岗位上——而这份工作本来就是他拼了命想保住、把董事会安插得全是自己人、想方设法让自己留下来的。我的意思是,这——我不知道美国有哪个 CEO——我相信有少数几个例外——但我真不知道有哪个 CEO 不愿意在工资砍掉一半甚至四分之三的情况下还干这份工作。我见过一些拿着一千多万美元年薪离职的人,一年后、两年后,没有任何人给他们开出一丁点儿机会。我就纳闷了,那个据说有一大堆竞标者抢着买他们服务的奇妙市场机制到底在哪儿。我觉得这实在有点荒唐。(掌声)

WARREN BUFFETTHe points that out to me regularly. (Laughs) Well, if you think about it, you know, the idea that CEO compensation represents a market system and that you have to pay some guy a $10 million retention bonus or something to stay around in the job that, you know, he's been fighting to keep and stacking the board and everything so they keep him around. I mean, it's — I don't know of a CEO in America — I'm sure there are a few — but I don't know of any that wouldn't gladly do the job at half the price or a quarter of the price. And I've seen some that have left jobs paying them eight figures and nobody's offered them anything, you know, a year later or two years later. I wonder where that wonderful market system is that is supposed to have all these bidders for their services. It's really sort of ridiculous, I think. (Applause.)

追随你的激情,找对配偶

Follow your passion and marry the right spouse

沃伦·巴菲特我们换到 12 号。

WARREN BUFFETTLet's go onto 12.

现场股东嗨。我是来自德国波恩的理查德·伦特罗普。我现在还在上高中,想请教您的智慧:如何去面对“这辈子该做什么”这个问题。所以——(笑声)

AUDIENCE MEMBERHi. I'm Richard Rentrop from Bonn, Germany. At the moment I attend high school and would like your wisdom on how to approach the question of what to do with the rest of my life. So — (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特如果你手头还能有更难点的问题,我们会更喜欢——(笑声)

WARREN BUFFETTWe prefer things a little more difficult than that if you're got a — (Laughter)

现场股东那么,巴菲特先生和芒格先生,如果你们要重新开始,你们会选择什么职业?为什么?

AUDIENCE MEMBERSo, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, if you were about to start all over again, what profession would you choose and why?

沃伦·巴菲特嗯,我会选择做我现在做的事情,因为,第一,我乐在其中。第二,我在这方面还算擅长。你知道,通过它我能结识很多有意思的人。不用干重活儿。你知道,它——它就是——很适合我。但这——但那不是给你的建议。我的意思是,你得自己找到真正——你生命中的激情到底是什么?你知道,浑浑噩噩过一辈子是个可怕的错误,因为,你知道,除非雪莉·麦克雷恩那套转世理论是真的,否则你只有这一辈子。所以——我——我很幸运,很早就找到了自己的激情。我的意思是,我——这并不容易。你知道,这需要一些运气。刚好我父亲在一个很小的办公室做生意,那里放了一堆书。我周六或者是放学后去他那儿,就开始读那些书,这些书点燃了我的热情。那时《花花公子》还没创刊呢。(笑声)所以,你知道,这纯粹是运气。你知道,他要是个牧师,我就不太确定自己还会不会那么热衷于去他办公室了。(笑声)但路就是这么走的。我没法替你规划。但我可以告诉你,如果你只是在装模作样地过日子,那你就是在做一件——当然,如果你需要现在这份工作,没法改变,孩子还等着吃饭,诸如此类,那你得面对现实。但当你能够做出选择时,你知道,我总是对来拜访我的孩子们说,我告诉他们:“去为你钦佩的组织或你钦佩的个人工作。”这意味着他们很多人后来都自己干了,但他们——(笑声)这其中的要义——你知道,你不可能得到一个坏结果。我 24 岁时去为本·格雷厄姆工作。我只为他干了不到两年,但那段时间我每天早上都迫不及待地从床上跳起来。我对即将要做的事充满兴奋。我在学东西。我和一个我钦佩的人在一起。我接受那份工作时压根儿没问薪水。我搬到纽约,拿到支票才知道自己挣多少钱。所以,一定要确保你——还要确保你找对了配偶。这一点极其重要。你知道,就像查理说的,问题在于,你知道,我们常讲那个故事:有个家伙花了 20 年寻找完美的女人,终于找到了,可不幸的是,那个女人正在寻找完美的男人。所以这方面你可能会有麻烦。(笑声)但你和谁结婚,实在太太太重要了。我的意思是,这是一个极其、极其、极其重大的决定。而且,你知道,如果你在这类事情上运气好,你就能拥有幸福的一生。一路走下去,你的行为举止也会变得更好。我的意思是,当你事事顺遂、享受工作、喜欢你每天思考的东西——思考那些你天生就喜欢琢磨的事,这时候要保持良好的行为举止就容易多了。查理在这方面的建议比我好得多。你来吧。

WARREN BUFFETTWell, I would choose what I do because, A, I have fun at it. I'm reasonably good at it. You know, I meet a lot of interesting people through it. No heavy lifting. You know, it — it's — it fits me. It doesn't — but that — that's not advice for you. I mean, you have to find out what really — what's your passion in life? You know, it's a terrible mistake to kind of sleepwalk through your life, because unless Shirley MacLaine is right, you know, it's the only one you're going to have. And the — so I've — I was very lucky in that I found my passion early. I mean, I — that's not easy. You know, that takes some luck. It just so happened my dad was in a business at a very small office and he had a bunch of books down there. And when I would go down there on Saturday or after school, I would start reading those books, and it turned me on. And this was before Playboy actually existed. (Laughter) And so, you know, that was just plain lucky, you know. If he'd been a minister, I'm not so sure I would have been quite so enthused about visiting the office. (Laughter) But that's the way to go. And I can't prescribe that for you. But I can tell you that if you're going through the motions in life, you're doing something — now, obviously, if you need the job you have and you can't make a change and your kids have to eat and all of that, you deal with realities like that. But when you're in a position to make choices, you know, I always tell the kids that come visit me, I tell them, "Go to work for an organization you admire or an individual you admire." That means many of them become self-employed, but they — (Laughter) The idea — you know, you can't get a bad result. I went to work for Ben Graham when I was 24. I only worked for him for less than two years, but I jumped out of bed every day in the morning. I was excited about what I was going to do. I was learning things. I was with a man I admired. I never asked my salary when I took that job. I moved to New York City and found out what my salary was when I got the check. So just be sure you — and be sure and get the right spouse. That's enormously important. You know, as Charlie says, the problem, you know, is that we talk about that fellow that spent 20 years looking for the perfect woman, and then he found her, and unfortunately she was looking for the perfect man. So you may have a problem in that respect. (Laughter) But it's enormously important who you marry. I mean, it's a huge, huge, huge decision. And, you know, if you're lucky in a couple things like that, you're going to have a happy life. And you're going to behave better as you go along. I mean, it's a lot easier to behave well when things are going your way and you are enjoying your work and you like the — you're thinking about things every day that are the kind of things that you like to think about. And Charlie has a lot better advice than I have about it. Go to it.

查理·芒格嗯,当然,如果你对某件你有着相当天赋的事情产生了热情,你会做得更出色。我想,如果沃伦去跳芭蕾——(笑声)——那就没人会听说过他了。

CHARLIE MUNGERWell, of course, you'll do better if you develop a passion for something in which you have a considerable aptitude. I think if Warren had gone into the ballet — (laughter) - nobody would have ever heard of him.

沃伦·巴菲特哦,查理,我想他们会听说过我的,只不过是以另一种形式。(笑声)嗯,是这样,如果你发现了让你兴奋的事情,你很可能在这方面确实有一些天赋。我的意思是,这——我从来都——我不认为我会因为芭蕾而兴奋。(笑)

WARREN BUFFETTOh, I think they'd have heard of me, just in a different way, Charlie. (Laughter) Well, the chances are, if you find something that turns you on, you probably do have some talent for it. I mean, it — I never — I don't think I could have gotten turned on by ballet. (Laughs)

巴菲特如何克服当众演讲的恐惧

How Buffett overcame his fear of public speaking

沃伦·巴菲特我们接下去——我们现在去 13 号厅,就在旁边那个宴会厅。我们有好几个溢出厅,这就是我们容纳 3.1 万人的办法。但只有大宴会厅里装了麦克风。我们换到 13 号厅。那边有人吗?

WARREN BUFFETTLet's go — we're going to go now to 13, which is in an adjacent ballroom. We have multiple overflow rooms, which is how we're handling the 31,000. The grand ballroom is the only one we've got a microphone in. So let's go to number 13. Somebody there?

现场股东我叫南希·安科维茨,来自纽约市,在纽约大学教书。巴菲特先生,我想请教您一个有点偏离投资路径、但需要用到您商业经验和智慧的问题。我正在写一本书,旨在帮助性格偏内向的人获得他们应得的认可。对于人群中这些比较安静的半数人,您有什么建议,可以帮助他们在职业生涯中提升知名度?

AUDIENCE MEMBERI'm Nancy Ancowitz. I'm from New York City, and I teach at New York University. Mr. Buffett, I'd love to get your advice on something that's a little off the investing path but that taps into your business experience and wisdom. I'm writing a book to help people of a more introverted nature get the recognition they deserve. What advice would you give to the quieter half of the population to help them raise their visibility in their careers?

沃伦·巴菲特嗯,这个问题很好。我自己也一度面临类似的情况。整个高中和大学期间,我都对公开演讲怕得要死。只要是要求演讲的课,我一概不选。光是想到要当众讲话,我就会浑身难受,更别说真的去讲了。我上过戴尔——是这样,我最先——我在哥伦比亚大学的时候,跑去找了戴尔·卡耐基的课程,报了名,开了一张 100 美元的支票,回到宿舍就把支票止付了。(笑声)台上这位,可真是个勇气可嘉的人。(笑声)后来,我回到奥马哈,又看到了类似的广告。地点在罗马酒店,奥马哈的老居民都知道,就在第 16 街上。这次我去了,带了 100 美元现金,交给了沃利·基南,你们当中可能有人认识他。他几年前去世了。那是我第一次见到他。我上了那个课程,课程一结束,我就直奔奥马哈大学,自愿去当老师,因为我知道自己必须站到人前。我认为沟通能力,无论是书面还是口头,都极其重要,而我们的教育在这方面严重不足。大多数商学院研究生院都找不到愿意教这门课的讲师,因为教这种看似简单的东西,在他们看来有点掉价。但如果你擅长沟通,你就拥有了巨大的优势。对于你,正在和一群性格内向的人对话——相信我,我在某些方面就相当内向——你知道,重要的是趁年轻赶紧去练。等到 50 岁可能就太晚了。趁年轻去练,强迫自己进入那些必须培养这些能力的场景。我认为最好的办法,就是和一大群有同样问题的人在一起,因为这样你就会发现不是只有你一个人这样,就不会觉得自己那么傻。当然,戴尔·卡耐基的课程就是这么做的。我的意思是,我们会站到 30 个连自己名字都差点念不出来的人面前,过了一阵子,我们发现自己居然真的能在众人面前说出自己的名字了。我们还会站到桌子上,做各种傻事,就为了突破自己。你可能觉得——事到如今,你可能觉得在我身上做得有点过头了,但那是另一码事了。(笑)但如果你正在帮助内向的人走出自我,那你做的是一件非常有价值的事。让他们在群体中一起练习,看到别人也有同样的问题,自己就没那么难堪了,我想——当你帮他们做到这一点时,你真的为很多人做了件大好事。查理?

WARREN BUFFETTWell, that's a very good question. And I sort of faced that at one time. I was absolutely, throughout high school and college, terrified of public speaking. And I would have — I avoided any classes, signing up for them, that would require it. I would get physically ill if I even thought about having to do it, let alone doing it. And I took a Dale — well, I've — first of all, I signed up — I went down to a Dale Carnegie course when I was at Columbia, and signed up for it, gave him a check for a hundred dollars, went back to my room and stopped payment on the check. (Laughter) This is a real man of courage you're looking at up here. (Laughter) And then I came out to Omaha, and I saw a similar ad. It was at the Rome Hotel, for you old-timers in Omaha, on 16th Street. And I went down there, and this time I took a hundred dollars in cash and gave it to Wally Keenan, who some of you may know. He died some years ago. First time I'd met him. And I took that course, and when I finished that course, I went right out to the University of Omaha and volunteered to start teaching, knowing that I had to get up in front of people. I think the ability to communicate, both in writing and orally, is of enormous importance, under taught. Most graduate business schools, they wouldn't find an instructor to do it because it would sort of be beneath them to do something so supposedly simple. But if you can communicate well, you have an enormous advantage. And to you, who are talking to the group of introverted people — and, believe me, I was in certain ways quite introverted — it — you know, it's important to get out there and do it while you're young. If you wait until you're 50 it's probably too late. But if you do it while you're young, just force yourself into situations where you have to develop those abilities. And I think the best way to do that is to get in with a whole bunch of other people who are having equal problems, because then you find you're not alone, and you don't feel quite as silly. And, of course, that's what they did at the Dale Carnegie course. I mean, we would get up in front of 30 other people who could hardly give their own name, and after a while we'd find that we could actually pronounce our own name in front of a group. But we would stand on tables and do all kinds of silly things, just to get outside of ourselves. You may have thought — by this point you may think it went too far in my particular case, but that's another problem. (Laughs) But you're doing something very worthwhile if you're helping introverted people get outside of themselves. And working with them in groups, where they see other people have the same problem and they don't feel quite as silly themselves, I think is — I think you're doing a lot for some human beings when you help them do that. Charlie?

查理·芒格是的。一位教育工作者来到这里,致力于做一件简单而重要的事,而不是一件愚蠢而无谓的事,这确实令人高兴。(掌声)

CHARLIE MUNGERYeah. It's a real pleasure to have an educator come who is working to do something simple and important instead of something foolish and unimportant. (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特我希望他别点名道姓。(笑声)

WARREN BUFFETTI hope he's not going to name names. (Laughter)

克拉马斯河水坝的经济账

Klamath River dam economics

沃伦·巴菲特好。我们回到 1 号区。

WARREN BUFFETTOK. Let's go back to number 1.

现场股东您好,巴菲特先生。我叫雷吉娜·奇奇佐拉,是克拉马斯河守护者。今天,我和许多从克拉马斯河地区来的人一起到场,感谢您接待我们,也感谢各位股东今年对我们的态度比去年友善了许多。我的问题是,我相信您一定了解克拉马斯河严重的污染问题,比如说,有毒藻类污染浓度高达允许娱乐水平的 4000 倍,而且由于克拉马斯河水坝,河里的鱼现在也带毒了。我想知道,您是否了解克拉马斯河水坝背后的经济账?多项经济研究表明,拆除克拉马斯河水坝比重新申请运营许可证能节省高达数亿美元。所以我的问题是,如果太平洋电力公司决定保留这些水坝,即使这意味着您的股东从长远来看会亏钱,太平洋电力公司的用户也会亏钱,您会怎么做?

AUDIENCE MEMBERHi, Mr. Buffett. My name is Regina Chichizola, and I'm the Klamath Riverkeeper. I came here today with many of the other people from the Klamath that came here, and I thank you for having us, and I thank the shareholders for being a lot nicer to us this year than they were last year. So my question is, I'm sure you're familiar with the severe pollution issues in the Klamath River, such as the toxic algae problem that is 4,000 times allowable recreation levels, and that the fish are also now toxic due to the Klamath dams. I was wondering if you were familiar with the finances behind the Klamath dams? Many economic studies have shown that removing the Klamath dams would be up to hundreds of millions of dollars cheaper than relicensing them. So my question is, what would you do if PacifiCorp decided to keep these dams, even though it would mean that your shareholders would lose money in the long run and that PacifiCorp's ratepayers would also be losing money?

沃伦·巴菲特嗯,我想关于用户的问题会由各州的公用事业委员会来处理。我的意思是,他们的职责就是代表俄勒冈州的公民,权衡一系列不同的考量因素——比如,清洁能源。您希望用——按您的说法——用向大气排放二氧化碳的煤电,来取代水电吗?这中间存在巨大的取舍。任何时候政府介入土地征用领域——比如我们在爱荷华州的风电场项目——总有人对我们用土地建风电场感到不满。但另一方面,这样一来你们又获得了清洁能源。政府政策本身就涉及各种取舍。你提到土地征用权,还有诸如此类的问题,都会牵涉到这些。不过,我想让戴夫来接你后面那些更偏技术性的问题。但总的来说,我想说的是,你会面对利益彼此大相径庭的各方。显然,一个重大的利益点是电力成本。在某种程度上,每一个公用事业委员会在做关于天然气、煤炭、风能、太阳能的决策时,部分依据是对于用户的经济性,部分依据是他们自己对于什么对社会最有利的看法,而这些委员会正是各州委任来做这些决策的。此外,在这个具体案例中,还有一家叫 FERC 的机构,也就是联邦能源监管委员会,也必须对此作出裁决。他们会听取所有人的意见。他们会听你的意见。他们会听戴夫提到的另外 28 方的意见。最终,他们怎么说我们就怎么做。我的意思是,作为一家公用事业公司,如果他们告诉我们建——不建煤电,我们就不建煤电。如果他们告诉我们建风电,假定有地方有风,我们就会建风电。我们服从监管机构的指令,他们告诉我们要做什么。归根结底,他们会让我们的投入资产获得合理回报,无论资产是什么,我们都会得到那份回报。如果他们让我们投建煤电资产,我们也能从中获得回报。所以从我们的角度看,从盈利能力的角度看,这是中性的。从社会的角度看,去权衡所有这些不同因素,那是社会要做的决定。不过,戴夫,我们——你想谈谈那个藻类问题吗?

WARREN BUFFETTWell, I think the question about the ratepayers will be addressed by the public utility commissions. I mean, it is their job to represent the citizens of Oregon, and weigh a number of different considerations — for example, clean energy. Do you want to replace hydro energy with a — what you're talking about — with coal, which emits carbons into the atmosphere? There are enormous tradeoffs. Anytime the government gets involved in eminent domain — we have that with wind farms, for example, in Iowa — there's some people that are unhappy with us using the land for wind farms. But, on the other hand, you get clean energy that way. There are tradeoffs involved in government policy. You get into that with the question of eminent domain, all of that sort of thing. But I think I'm going to let Dave talk to the more technical questions you get into. But I would say, overall, you have people with widely different interests. Obviously, a big interest is the cost of electricity. And to some extent, every public utility commission that makes a decision on gas versus coal versus wind versus solar is making a decision based partly on the economics to their ratepayers, partly on their feelings about what is the best for society, and those commissions are appointed state by state to make those decisions. Now, in addition, in this case we have the FERC as it's called, the Federal Energy Regulation Commission, that will also have to rule on it. They will listen to everybody. They'll listen to you. They'll listen to the 28 others that Dave mentioned. In the end we will do exactly what they say. I mean, as a public utility, if they tell us to put up — not put up coal, we will not put up coal. If they tell us to put up wind, assuming that there is a place where there is wind, we will put up wind. We follow the dictates of the regulatory bodies that tell us what to do. And in the end they give us a fair return on the assets employed, and we will get that return whatever the assets may be. If they tell us to put in coal assets, we'll get a return out of that. So from our standpoint, from the standpoint of profitability, it's neutral. From the standpoint of society, weighing all these different things, that's a decision society will make. But, Dave, let's — do you want to talk to the algae question?

戴夫·索科尔好的。首先,很重要的一点是,卡鲁克部落确实进行了一项研究,他们在克拉马斯河的鲈鱼和淡水贻贝体内发现了微囊藻毒素(即蓝绿藻毒素)的生物累积。需要明白的一点是——顺便说一句,我们当时立刻将这份报告分送给了州和联邦卫生机构,因为他们有知情必要。微囊藻毒素并非克拉马斯河所独有。俄勒冈州还有另外 27 个湖泊存在蓝绿藻问题,全球有 70 个不同的国家、加拿大的每个省份,以及美国的 27 个州,都有湖泊存在蓝绿藻。它产生于那些富含营养物质并自然形成藻类的湖泊。而克拉马斯河的源头是一个叫上克拉马斯湖的湖泊,它实际上是垦务局的一个水库——是一个又浅又大的水库,以高度富营养化著称,意味着存在大量的藻类和各种各样的营养物质。这些营养物质随后顺流而下,确实会流过垦务局关联水坝下游的四个水库,或者在某些情况下,被它们拦截。问题的关键在于,联邦能源监管委员会确实把这些因素都纳入了考量。他们去年 11 月发布了环境影响报告书,报告中认可了在水坝上采用多种鱼道方案,但并未要求拆除水坝。但是,话说回来,这些决定,所有州、联邦机构以及各相关方,要么必须达成一致,要么就让它们走完 FERC 的流程。

DAVE SOKOLSure. First, it's important, the Karuk tribe did do a study and found bioaccumulation of microcystins, or blue-green algae, in the perch and the fresh water mussels in the Klamath River. What's important to understand about that — and by the way, we disseminated that report immediately to state and federal health agencies because they should know about it. Microcystin is not unique to the Klamath River. There are 27 other lakes in the state of Oregon that have blue-green algae, 70 different countries, every province in Canada, and 27 of the U.S. states have lakes that have blue-green algae. It is created from lakes that have a high abundance of nutrients and naturally-forming algae. And at the head of the Klamath River is a lake known as Upper Klamath Lake, which is actually a Bureau of Reclamation reservoir — it's a shallow, large reservoir, that is known as being hypereutrophic, which means a great abundance of algaes and various nutrients. Those nutrients then flow down the river and do pass through or, in cases, get backed up by the four reservoirs down below the Bureau of Reclamation-linked dam. The important issue is those things are, in fact, taken into account by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. They issued their environmental impact statement last November, which endorsed various fish passage methods on the dams but do not call for removal of the dams. But, again, those are decisions that all the state, federal, agencies, and the various involved parties will either have to come to agreement with or let them run their course through the FERC process.

多空策略并非赚钱大头

Long-short strategy wasn't a big money maker

沃伦·巴菲特谢谢。2 号区。

WARREN BUFFETTThank you. Number 2.

现场股东你好。我叫亨利·帕特纳(音)。最近从新加坡来。在你早年的一封信里——你 1964 年的老合伙信里——你引入了第四种投资方法,叫“相对低估类——相对低估”。你会描述道:“我们最近开始实施一种方法,这种方法有希望大幅降低因整体估值标准变化带来的风险:我们以 12 倍市盈率买入某些股票,而与之可比或质地更差的公司,市盈率是 20 倍,但随后市场发生了重大重估,后者的市盈率跌到了只有 10 倍。”这种方法是配对交易吗?如果是,你是如何看待并计算多空头寸比例的呢?

AUDIENCE MEMBERHi. My name is Henry Pattener (PH). I'm hailing from Singapore, most recently. In one of your older letters, you — your older partnership letters in 1964 — you introduced a fourth investment method called "Generals — Relatively Undervalued." In your description you say, "We have recently begun to implement a technique which gives promise of very substantially reducing the risk from an overall change in valuation standards. "We buy something at 12 times earnings when comparables or poor-quality companies sell at 20 times earnings, but then a major revaluation takes place so that the latter only sell at ten times." Is this technique pair trading and, if so, how did you think about and calculate the ratio of longs to shorts?

沃伦·巴菲特是的。我不记得我们早在 1964 年就开始做这个了,但肯定在 60 年代,我们做过一些现在从广义上会被称为配对交易的操作。这是许多对冲基金可能还有其他机构采用的一种手法,做多一只证券的同时做空另一只,而且他们通常会尽量让这两只证券属于同一行业或类似的东西。他们会说英国石油相对雪佛龙更有吸引力,或者反过来,于是做多一只、做空另一只。实际上,这种手法最早是本杰明·格雷厄姆在 20 年代中期使用的,当时他经营着一只对冲基金,经常——我总看到文章说 A.W. 琼斯在 40 年代末首创了对冲基金概念,但本杰明·格雷厄姆在 20 年代中期就有了——他确实做过配对交易。他发现这有点效果——非常微小的效果——因为他五次里对四次,但那错的一次往往能把前四次赚的都赔进去。我们做的是——在我们的合伙公司里,我们曾大体上做空整个市场大约五年。我们直接从一些主要大学借入股票。我们在这方面可能相当早。我们去了哥伦比亚、哈佛、芝加哥等不同地方,实际安排直接借入股票。那时候不像现在这么容易操作。我们会拿到他们的投资组合,然后说:“你们想让我们借走哪些股票都行,过一段时间我们会还给你们,再付一点费用。”然后我们去做多我们认为有吸引力的东西。我们并不做空我们认为没有吸引力的东西;我们只是总体上做空市场。对我来说,有件事一直挺有趣:我去拜访哥伦比亚大学财务主管之类的人时说:“我们想借你们的股票来做空。”你知道,那时候他觉得自己的股票相当不错。他会问:“你想要哪些?”我说:“随便给我几只就行——(笑)——我很乐意做空你整该死的投资组合。”(笑声)我那时候得靠戴尔·卡内基课程才能撑过这种场面,你懂的。我们没有想过具体的比例。我们总是被愿意借出股票给我们做空的机构数量所限制。所以那不是什么大事,但我们在 60 年代可能靠这个多赚了一点钱。这完全不是我们现在——我们如今完全不做这类事。而且,一般来说,我认为如果你对某些被低估的企业有很好的想法,根本没必要去做任何市场做空。对于那些在金融领域的人来说——我的意思是——有一个——相当流行的提议——基金经理总是有一些流行的提议在向潜在投资者推销——现在有一种叫 130-30 的东西,你做多 130%,做空 30%。那堆东西基本上就是一堆没用的玩意儿,目的只是向你推销当天的点子。它在统计上真没什么了不起的优点。但鱼儿会上钩,就像查理说的。查理可以详细说说这个。

WARREN BUFFETTYeah. I didn't remember we started as early as '64, but certainly in the '60s we did some of what, in a very general way, would be called pair trading now, which is a technique that's used by a number of hedge funds, and perhaps others, that go long one security and short another, and often they try to keep them in the same industry or something. They say that British Petroleum is relatively attractive compared to Chevron or vice versa, so they long one and short the other. And actually that technique was employed first by Ben Graham in the mid-1920s when he had a hedge fund, oftentimes — I read articles all the time that credit A.W. Jones with originating the hedge fund concept in the late '40s, but Ben Graham had one in the mid-1920s — and he actually engaged in pairs trading. And he found out it worked modestly — very modestly — well because he was right about four times out of five but the time he was wrong tended to kill him on the other four. We did — we shorted out the general market for about five years in the partnership, to a degree. We borrowed stocks directly from some major universities. I think we were probably quite early in that. We went to Columbia and Harvard and Chicago and different places and actually arranged for direct borrowing. They weren't — it wasn't as easy to facilitate in those days as it is now. And so we would take their portfolios and we would just say, "Give us any of the stocks you want, and then we'll return them to you after a while and we'll pay you a little fee." And then we went long things that we thought were attractive. We did not go short things that we thought were unattractive; we just shorted out the market generally. It was always kind of interesting to me, when I would visit the treasurer of Columbia or something like and I'd say, "We'd like to borrow your stocks to short," and, you know, he thought his stocks were pretty good at that point. And he'd say, "Which ones do you want?" And I said, "Just give me any of them — (laughs) — I'm happy to short your whole damn portfolio." (Laughter) I needed the Dale Carnegie course to get me through that kind of thing, you know. We didn't have any specific ratios in mind. We were always limited by the number of institutions that would give us the stocks to short. So it was not a big deal, but we probably made some extra money on it in the '60s. It's not something that would fit our — what we do these days at all. And, generally speaking, I think if you've got some very good ideas on businesses that are undervalued, it's really unnecessary to do any shorting out of the market. There's a — for those of you who are in the field — I mean, there's a — kind of a popular proposal — money managers always have some popular proposal that's being sold to the potential investors — and now there's something called 130-30, where you're long 130 percent long, short 30 percent. That stuff is all basically a bunch of stuff just to try and sell you the idea of the day. It doesn't really have any great statistical merit. But the fish bite, as Charlie says. Charlie can elaborate on that.

查理·芒格对。我们赚钱是靠做多优秀的企业。我们不是靠多空策略赚的钱。

CHARLIE MUNGERYeah. We made our money by being long some wonderful businesses. We didn't make it by a long-short strategy.

大机会往往不会持续太久

Big opportunities often don't last long

沃伦·巴菲特第 3 个问题。

WARREN BUFFETTNumber 3.

现场股东尊敬的巴菲特先生,尊敬的芒格先生。我叫奥利弗·克劳沙伊德,来自德国法兰克福。次贷危机导致了资本市场定价不一致。信贷资产在以很大的折价交易,同时,股票却没有反映出这一点。我的问题是,这种情况什么时候会结束,你们如何利用市场的错位?

AUDIENCE MEMBERDear Mr. Buffett, dear Mr. Munger. My name is Oliver Krautscheid from Frankfurt in Germany. The subprime crisis has led to inconsistent pricing in capital markets. Credits are trading at large discounts, and at the same time, the equities do not reflect this. My question is, when will this be over, and how do you take advantage of market dislocations?

沃伦·巴菲特嗯,当市场出现错位时,总有办法从中获利,但我们会把寻找这些机会的乐趣留给你们。不过,确实出现过一些相当重要的错位。我带了一些数据,纯粹是为了逗你们开心,讲讲我们最近做的一件事。但这件事对伯克希尔来说没什么重大意义。我是说,伯克希尔会从中多赚点钱。它根本不花什么时间去琢磨。不过,它确实说明了当时的变化有多么剧烈。我带的这些数据跟免税货币市场基金有关。当时这类基金有 3300 亿。那是很大一笔钱——3300 亿。这些基金几乎全都依赖——说真的,几乎所有情况下——都是一级市政债券的重新定价来运作的。每七天它们就搞一次拍卖,整个机制设计得非常精巧,让人们觉得自己手里的钱基本上可以随时取用,还能免税,所以它们被广泛推销。我随身带了一份——比如说,这里有一份跟——它们是由各种市政债券支持的。这一份碰巧是洛杉矶县艺术博物馆的,我随便抽出来的。1 月 24 日,它的市场利率是 3.15%;1 月 31 日是 4.0%;2 月 7 日是 3.5%;2 月 14 日是 8%。现在,一只短期的免税债券,怎么会在一个星期前还是 3.5% 的利率,一个星期后的情人节就变成 8%,再过一个星期又涨到 10%?现在它又回到了 4.2%。这些都是市场中的巨大错位。这太疯狂了。如果只是一些没人注意的小东西也就罢了,但这种事发生在价值数百亿、甚至数千亿美元的证券上。这种事甚至发生在——我们每天都会收到这些投标单,我手头这张碰巧是花旗的,我觉得。它们每七天重新定价一次。你会在这上面发现——你会看到涉及大量债券——同一只债券会出现在好几页上,因为它代表了不同的拍卖,尽管是由同一家经纪商同时操作的。在一页上,你会找到一只债券——我们当时对所有债券都报了价——我们碰巧以 11.3% 的利率买到了。在另一页上,同一只债券,我们报了 11.3%,但别人报了 6%。所以,同一只债券,通过同一家经纪商,同时以 11.3% 和 6% 的利率成交。这些都是极端错位的标志,你偶尔会遇到这种情况。你在 1998 年长期资本管理公司危机之后遇到过。你在 1974 年的股票市场里也见过类似的情况。那些都是赚取超额收益的绝佳时机。如果你——有些事情我们搞不明白。我在《华尔街日报》上看到——最近看到一些广告,在拍卖某些稀奇古怪的抵押贷款证券。如果你有足够的时间,你也许能找出其中一些严重定价错误的。但我们不会去碰那些东西。我们就是没那个时间。我们能做四笔——我们现在在这上面大约有 40 亿美元。等全部做完,我们几个月内能多赚点钱。相对于伯克希尔的规模,这不算什么,但这件事实在是很容易做。你也许能找到——通过在一些较小的问题上非常非常努力地工作——你也许能在这堆乱七八糟的抵押贷款里面找到机会——而且这已经超出了次贷的范围。已经蔓延到了 Alt-A 贷款,还蔓延到了可选择浮动利率抵押贷款(Option ARM)之类的东西。外面很可能有一些很好的机会,但查理和我已经不会再发现了,因为我们实在没精力看那么多东西。查理?

WARREN BUFFETTWell, when there are market dislocations, there are always ways to take advantage of it, but we'll leave for you the joy of searching for those. But there have been some really important dislocations. And I brought along, just for your amusement, a few figures on something that we've done recently. But it doesn't have any big significance for Berkshire. I mean, Berkshire will make some extra money out of this. It doesn't take any time to think about. But it does illustrate just how dramatic the changes were. And the ones I brought along relate to the tax-exempt money market funds. There were 330 billion of these. That's a lot of money — 330 billion. And they relied on repricing of — really, in almost all cases — first-grade municipal bonds. Every seven days they have these auctions, and it was all set up very elaborately so that people could have their money, more or less, in their minds, instantly available and something that was tax exempt, and they were marketed extensively. And I brought along — for example, here's one that related to the — they were backed by various municipal issues. This one happens to be one by the LA County Museum of Art. Just pulled that out. And on January 24, it was marketed at 3.15 percent; January 31, 4.0; February 7, 3.5; February 14, 8 percent. Now, how can a tax-exempt bond of short-term nature be selling at a 3 1/2 percent rate one week, and one week later on Valentine's Day be at 8 percent, and one week after that be at 10 percent? It's now back to 4.2 percent. Now, those are huge dislocations in markets. That's crazy. It would be one thing to be some little obscure item, but this happened with billions and billions and billions of dollars of securities. It even happened — we get these bid sheets every day, and this happens to be a bid sheet, I think, from Citigroup. And they were repricing these every seven days. And what you would find on these — you'll see there's lots of issues involved — the same issue would appear on several different pages, because it would represent some different auction, although handled by the same broker at the same time. On one page you would find an issue — we would bid all these — we happened to bid these at 11.3 percent. On one page, we bought them at 11.3 percent. On another page, the same issue, we bid the 11.3 percent and somebody else bid 6 percent. So you have the same issue with the same broker at the same time being sold at 11.3 percent and 6 percent. Those are marks of extreme dislocation, and you find those occasionally. You found that after the Long-Term Capital Management crisis is 1998. You found the equivalent of it in the stock market in 1974, and so on. And those are great times to make unusual amounts of money. And if you — there's certain things we can't figure out. I see — in the Wall Street Journal — I see advertisements these days of auctions taking place in some esoteric mortgage securities. If you had enough time, you could probably figure out some of those that were very mispriced. We don't fool around with that. We just don't have the time. We were able to do four — we have about 4 billion in this right now. When we get all through, we'll have made some extra money for a couple of months. It won't be significant, in relation to Berkshire's size, but it's something that's very easy to do. You may be able to find — by working very, very hard on some smaller issues — you might be able to find in this mess in mortgages — and it's gone beyond subprime. It's gone into Alt-As and it's gone into Option ARMs and that sort of thing. There very well could be some great opportunities out there that Charlie and I will no longer spot because we just can't be looking at that many things. Charlie?

查理·芒格对。有趣的是——这些利用错位的机会,往往稍纵即逝。有些愚蠢的对冲基金,以不可思议的杠杆倍数买入了无限的市政债券。我想他们买了超过自身资金能力 20 倍的市政债券,其余全是借来的。当这些东西因为追加保证金而被抛售时,美国的市政债券突然就被错误定价了。但这次错位非常短暂。所以你们——

CHARLIE MUNGERYeah. What is interesting is that — how brief these opportunities to take advantage of dislocations frequently are. Some idiot hedge fund bought unlimited municipal bonds at, you know, incredible margins. I think they bought 20 times more municipal bonds than they could afford with their own money, borrowing all the rest. And when those things were dumped on margin calls, municipal bonds suddenly got mispriced in America. But the dislocation was very brief. So you —

沃伦·巴菲特但非常极端。

WARREN BUFFETTBut very extreme.

查理·芒格但非常极端。

CHARLIE MUNGERBut very extreme.

沃伦·巴菲特对。

WARREN BUFFETTYeah.

查理·芒格所以,如果你不能快速思考并果断行动,那对你来说就没用。你就好比一个人站在溪边想叉鱼,而鱼每周、每月,甚至每十年才游过来一次。你必须在那儿,在鱼游走之前迅速把叉子投出去。如果你真要这么干,这可是个相当苛刻的行当。

CHARLIE MUNGERSo if you can't think fast and act resolutely, it does you no good. So you're like a man standing by a stream trying to spear a fish and the fish just comes by once a week or once a month or once every ten years. And you've got to be there to throw that spear fast before the fish swims on. It's a pretty demanding business if you do it right.

沃伦·巴菲特但确实有过这样的时机。我是说,在垃圾债券市场,2002 年有大约三四个月的时间,发生了一些极其不可思议的事情,而且规模很大。所以——

WARREN BUFFETTBut there have been times. I mean, in the junk bond market, there was a three- or four-month period in 2002 where some really incredible things happened and they happened on a large scale. So —

查理·芒格对。这种事大概一个世纪才发生两次。

CHARLIE MUNGERYeah. It happens about twice a century.

沃伦·巴菲特是啊。(笑声)这意味着他和我这辈子大概也就碰到过四五次能这么干的机会。(笑声)

WARREN BUFFETTYeah. (Laughter) Which means he and I have only had four or five times when we could do it. (Laughter)

“出人头地的自动公式”

"Automatic formula for getting ahead"

沃伦·巴菲特我们来看第 4 个问题。

WARREN BUFFETTLet's go to number 4.

现场股东您好,巴菲特先生,芒格先生。我叫斯维内瓦兹·卡纳迪瓦尔(音),来自佛罗里达州劳德代尔堡。我把你们所有的信和年报都读了很多遍,每次读都有不同的启发。所以,谢谢你们。我的问题是,如何把一家成功的小企业变成大企业。过去几年,我经营着一家不错且成功的小企业,但一直无法将它提升到下一个层次。感觉好像缺少了一些关键的要素,所以想听听你们的建议。

AUDIENCE MEMBERHello, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger. My name is Svinneyvaz Canadival (PH). I'm from Fort Lauderdale, Florida. I read all your letters and annual reports multiple times, and every time I get a different insight. So thanks for doing it. My question is about converting the successful small businesses into large enterprise. I have a good and successful small business from the last few years, and I'm unable to grow it to the next level. It seems like there are some components are missing, so I wanted to take your advice on it.

沃伦·巴菲特嗯,伯克希尔曾经也是一家小企业。我是说,这需要时间。这就是复利的本质。你知道,你不可能在一天或一周内就建成它。所以查理和我——我们从未试图靠什么神来之笔——把伯克希尔的规模一下子变成原来的四倍。商界确实有人那样做过。但我们一直觉得,如果我们坚持做自己理解的事情,持之以恒,并在做的过程中乐在其中,那么有朝一日,它自然会变得相当大。但这没什么神奇的——如果能吸引一大笔资金投入到一个绝妙的主意上,然后在几周内就翻上很多倍,诸如此类的,那当然很好。但这确实不是我们的做法。我们只是——在总体方向上,我们一直在做同样的事。现在,我们会对它做些小的调整,但多年以来我们一直坚持做同样的事,并且会继续这样做。你知道,几年之后,我们拥有的企业会比现在更多。而且我们现在拥有的企业,我们仍会全部保留。它们中的大多数会做得更好,有些则不会。我们还会再增加一些。这是一个会自动前进的公式,但不是一个会自动飞速前进的公式。但我们并不真的觉得——我们不会因为没在飞速前进就不开心。如果我们完全停滞不前,我们当然也不会开心。但你知道,我们拥有大约 76 家,在绝大多数情况下,都相当出色的企业。而且,就像我说的,随着我们不断前行,我们还会拥有更多。所以,这是一个非常简单的公式。吉普赛·罗丝·李有一次说过——她说:“我五年前拥有的一切,现在依然拥有。只是所有东西都下垂了两英寸。”你知道。嗯,我们希望在五年后拥有的是:一大堆我们以前就有的企业,它们都又长高了两英寸,再加上一些新的企业。这就是我们的公式。查理?

WARREN BUFFETTWell, Berkshire was a small business at one time. I mean, it just takes time. I mean, it's the nature of compound interest. You know, you can't build it in one day or one week. So Charlie and I — you know, we've never tried to do in some master stroke — convert Berkshire into something four times as large. People have done that sometimes in business. But we've sort of felt that if we kept doing what we understood, and did it consistently, and had fun while we were doing it, that it would be something quite large at some point. But there's nothing magic — it would be nice to attract a whole bunch of money into some great idea and have it — you know, multiply it manyfold in a few weeks or something of the sort. But that has really not been our approach. We have just — we have done — in a general way, we've done the same thing. Now, we do little variations of it, but we kept doing the same thing for years and we'll keep doing it. You know, we will have more businesses a few years from now than we have now. And we'll have all the ones we have presently. Most of them will do better. Some won't. And we will have added something. And that's an automatic formula for getting ahead, but it's not an automatic formula for galloping ahead. But we don't really feel — we're not unhappy because we're not galloping. We're not happy if we're not moving at all. But, you know, we've got 76 or so, in most cases, pretty darn wonderful businesses. And, like I say, we'll have more as we go along. So it's a very simple formula. Gypsy Rose Lee said once — she said, "I have everything I had five years ago. It's all that it's 2-inches lower," you know. Well, what we want to have five years from now is a whole bunch of businesses we had before that are 2-inches higher, plus some more businesses. And that's the formula. Charlie?

查理·芒格是的。你必须记住,大多数小企业永远不会成为大企业,这是事物的本质。同样,大多数大企业最终都会沦为平庸,甚至更糟,这也是事物的本质。所以,外面的游戏是很残酷的。此外,游戏的参与者都终究会死,这就是游戏的规则,你得习惯它。我能想到的,我们从零开始创建、并发展成一项大业务的小企业,只有一家,就是我们的再保险部门。在那里,沃伦、阿吉特和其他人,凭空创建了一个极为重要且有价值的企业。但你能想到,在过去的这几十年里,我们还做成过其他什么称得上“大”的事吗?

CHARLIE MUNGERYeah. You've got to remember that it's the nature of things that most small businesses will never be big businesses. It's also in the nature of things that most small — most big businesses — eventually fall into mediocrity or worse. So it's a tough game out there. In addition, the players of the game all have to die, and that is — those are just the rule of the game, and you have to get used to it. We've only created from scratch one small business that became a huge business that I can think of, and that's the reinsurance department. And there, Warren and Ajit and others have created a great and valuable business out of air. But can you think of anything other that's large that we've done in all these decades?

沃伦·巴菲特没有。没有。

WARREN BUFFETTNo. No.

查理·芒格我们只做成了这么一次,所以我们就是匹只会一招的小马驹。

CHARLIE MUNGERWe've only done it once, so we're a one-trick pony.

沃伦·巴菲特是啊。那一次我们也是运气好。(笑声)对,而且顺便提一句,没有阿吉特,我们根本就不可能做成。

WARREN BUFFETTYeah. We were lucky on that one, too. (Laughter) Yeah, and incidentally, without Ajit we wouldn't have done it at all.

查理·芒格没错,没错。

CHARLIE MUNGERRight, right.

沃伦·巴菲特不是我们做成的,是阿吉特做成的。我们只是坐在那里当啦啦队。

WARREN BUFFETTIt isn't that we did it. Ajit did it. We just sat there cheering.

查理·芒格曾有人问我们做过的最好的一笔投资是什么,我回答说,是我们付给猎头公司,让他们去找阿吉特·贾恩的那笔中介费。(掌声。)

CHARLIE MUNGERSomebody asked us once what was the best investment we ever made, and I answered the fee we paid to the executive recruiter to find Ajit Jain. (Applause.)

债券保险业务开局强劲

Bond insurance business off to strong start

沃伦·巴菲特说到这个,我想简单汇报一下。几个月前我们进入了市政债券保险业务,自然,这事交给了阿吉特。他帮我们的公司组建起来,拿到牌照,开始运营。2008 年第一季度——我没有其他公司的数据——但我们的保费收入超过 4 亿美元。而且我认为——现在,这绝大部分是在二级市场承保的——但我觉得我们的保费收入不仅比美国任何一家市政债券保险公司都大,而且就算它等于其他所有公司的总和,我也不会惊讶。这是阿吉特从零起步做到的。我这里有一份清单,大概 300 多笔——这是季度末的数据——278 笔,我相信这个数字,是交易数量。所有这些,都出自一个只有 29 或 30 人的办公室,他们同时还在做大量其他事情。我是说,这地方极为出色。其中一件有趣的事是,几乎所有业务——虽然不是全部保费收入——几乎所有业务——都来自那些拿着市政债券来找我们要求承保的人,而且除了两三个案例外,这些债券原本都已经由其他债券保险公司承保,其中大多数评级为 AAA。所以他们付给我们更高的费用来购买保险,这笔保险只在市政当局不付款、而且原债券保险公司也不付款的情况下才赔付。所以我们在本季度以平均 2% 多一点的费率承保业务,而原保险公司可能平均收了 1% 的保费。而他们必须先赔付——实际上,我们唯一需要赔付的情况是他们破产。这告诉你在 2008 年第一季度,AAA 评级在再保险——债券保险——领域的实际意义。阿吉特在这个领域干得非常出色。伯克希尔还为底特律下水道区和底特律水务区承保了几笔直保保单,金额分别在 3.7 亿或 3.8 亿左右——人们发现我们承保的债券在二级市场交易时,为发行人带来了更有吸引力的收益率。换句话说,收益率比任何其他债券保险公司都要低。所以整个公司,就是在短短几个月里,由阿吉特在康涅狄格州他那间小办公室里建立起来的。这相当了不起,我向他表示祝贺。(掌声。)

WARREN BUFFETTIn that connection, I'd like to give you a little report. We went into the municipal bond insurance business a few months ago, and naturally, we did it through Ajit. And he got our companies up, licensed, and running. And in the first quarter of 2008 — I don't have the figures for all the other people — but our premium volume came to over $400 million. And I think — now, that was overwhelmingly written in the secondary market, but I think our premium volume was not only larger than any other municipal bond insurer in the United States, I wouldn't be surprised if it's as large as all of the rest of them combined. And this was from a standing start that Ajit accomplished this. And I have here a list of, what, 300 and — this is the end of the quarter — 278, I believe it is, transactions. Now, that's all done out of an office with 29 or 30 people who are doing a lot of other things, too. I mean, it's a remarkable, remarkable place. One of the interesting things about this is that almost all of this business — although not all the premium volume — all of — almost all of this business was — came from people who came to us with municipal bonds asking us to insure them, and in every case, except two or three, they already had insurance from the other bond insurance, most of whom are rated triple-A. So they were paying us a fee which was higher to write insurance which would only be paid, not only if the municipality didn't pay, but the original bond insurer didn't pay. So we were writing business at an average rate of two and a fraction percent for the quarter, and the original insurer had charged, perhaps, an average of 1 percent. And they had to pay and they — in fact, the only way we're going to pay is if they went broke. So it tells you something about the meaning of triple-A in the reinsurance — in the bond insurance — field in the first quarter of 2008. Ajit has done a remarkable job in this arena. And Berkshire wrote a couple of primary policies for the Detroit Sewer District and the Detroit Water District that — each about 370 or 380 million — and people have found our insured bonds trading in the secondary market at a more attractive yield to the issuer. In other words, at lower yields than from any other bond insurer. So this whole company has been built, just in a matter of a couple of months, by Ajit in his small office in Connecticut. It's pretty remarkable, and I congratulate him for it. (Applause.)

我们偏爱“被现金淹没”的企业

We prefer "the business which drowns in cash"

沃伦·巴菲特请到第五区。

WARREN BUFFETTLet's go to area 5, please.

现场股东你好。我叫斯图尔特·凯耶,来自纽约市。我想知道,如果你不能和管理层交流,不能阅读公司年报,也不知道公司的股价,只允许你看一家公司的财务报表,你会关注什么指标来帮助你决定是否应该买入这家公司?

AUDIENCE MEMBERHello. My name is Stuart Kaye, and I'm from New York City. I wanted to know, if you could not talk with management, could not read an annual report, and did not know the stock price of a company, but were only allowed to look at the financial statements of a company, what metric would you look at to help you determine whether you should buy the company?

沃伦·巴菲特嗯,我们在投资中所做的,也是每个人在投资中所做的,就是现在投入资金,以期在未来收回更多的钱。现在,让我们先把资产的市场价格因素放在一边。我的意思是,当你买下一座农场时,你真的不会去考虑它明天、下周或下个月的市场行情会怎样。你会考虑的是,每英亩能产出多少蒲式耳的大豆,或者多少蒲式耳的玉米,以及这些作物的价格可能会是多少。你关注的是资产本身。在你设定的这种情况下,你首先要问自己的是:我对这家企业是否有足够的了解,以至于财务报表能告诉我一些有用的信息,来帮助我判断未来的财务报表会是什么样子。而在很多情况下,答案是否定的。很可能在绝大多数情况下,答案都是否定的。但我也确实多次按照你所描述的方式买过股票,它们所在的企业是我认为自己能够理解的,如果我对它们过去的财务状况有足够的了解,这些信息就足以告诉我关于它们未来财务状况的足够信息,让我可以做出买入的决定。然而,我无法说这只股票价值是 X,或是 X 的 105%,或是 X 的 95%,但如果我能够以 X 的 40% 的价格买入它,我会感觉我拥有了格雷厄姆所谈论的那种安全边际,那我就能做出决定。但大多数时候,我做不到这一点。如果你递给我一堆财务报表,却不告诉我这是做什么生意的,我根本无法判断未来会发生什么。这家公司可能是个呼啦圈公司;也可能是个宠物石公司。你知道,但另一方面,它也可能是早期的微软。所以,除非我了解企业的性质,否则财务报表本身不会告诉我太多东西,你知道的。如果我知道企业的性质,同时又看到了财务报表——你知道,如果我看到箭牌的财务报表,我对这家企业就有了一定的了解。那么在这之前,我需要先了解它的产品,才能做出判断。但我们买过许许多多的证券。查理和我买过的大多数证券,我们都未曾见过其管理层,也从未跟他们交谈过,但我们主要是依据财务报表、我们对于企业的一般理解,以及对我们所购买的这家公司所在行业的一些特定理解来做出决策的。查理?

WARREN BUFFETTWell, what we're doing in investment, and what everybody is doing in investment, is they're laying out money now to get more money back later on. Now, let's leave the market aspect of the asset out. I mean, when you buy a farm, you really aren't thinking about what the market on it's going to be tomorrow or next week or next month. You're thinking about how many — what the — how many bushels of beans per acre can you get or corn per acre and what the price is likely to be. You're looking to the asset itself. In the case you lay out, the first question you'd have to make is do I understand enough about this business so that the financial statements will tell me the information that's useful to me in making a judgment about what the future financial statements are going to look like. And in many cases, the answer would be no. Probably in a great majority of the cases it would be no. But I've actually bought stocks the way you're describing many times, and they were in businesses that I thought I understood where, if I knew enough about the financial past, it would tell me enough about the financial future that I could buy. Now, I couldn't say the stock was worth X or 105 percent of X or 95 percent of X, but if I could buy it at 40 percent of X, I would feel that I had this margin of safety that Graham would talk about, and I could make a decision. Most times I wouldn't be able to make it. I wouldn't know — if you hand me a bunch of financial statements and you don't tell me what the business is, there's no way I could make a judgment as to what's going to happen. It could have been a hula hoop business; it could have been a pet rock business. You know, on the other hand it could have been Microsoft early on. So unless I know the nature of the business, the financial statements aren't going to tell me much, you know. If I know the nature of the business and I see the financial statements, you know, if I see the financial statements on Wrigley, I know something about the business. Now I have to know something about the product before I can make that judgment. But we've bought lots and lots of securities. The majority of the securities Charlie and I bought, we've never met the management and never talked to them, but we have primarily worked off financial statements, our general understanding of business, and some specific understanding of the industry in the business we're buying. Charlie?

查理·芒格是的。我想有一个指标会让很多人栽跟头。我们倾向于偏爱那种“被现金淹没”的生意。这种生意实在是太赚钱了,以至于拥有它的一个主要原则就是,你会有大量的现金源源不断地流入。而其他一些生意,比如我老朋友约翰·安德森的建筑设备生意,他过去常常这样形容自己的生意:“你辛苦干了一整年,到了年底,你的利润就堆在院子里。”从来见不到现金,有的只是更多的二手建筑设备。我们往往很讨厌这样的生意。

CHARLIE MUNGERYeah. I think there's one metric that catches a lot of people. We tend to prefer the business which drowns in cash. It just makes so much money that the main — one of the main — principles of owning it is you have all this cash coming in. There are other businesses, like the construction equipment business of my old friend John Anderson. And he used to say about his business "You work hard all year, and at the end of the year there's your profit sitting in the yard." There was never any cash. Just more used construction equipment. We tend to hate businesses like that.

沃伦·巴菲特是的。理解一家每个月都给你寄支票的企业要容易得多。一栋公寓楼就是这样——你知道,如果你拥有一栋公寓楼,并且你对它所在的城市有所了解,你很可能能相当准确地评估它的价值。如果你有财务报表,你也能合理推测它未来的收益大概会是多少。但这正是因为它是一门给你带来现金的生意。当然,这个领域也可能出现意外。我确实通过财务报表买过很多东西。也有大量企业我不会买,你知道,即便我知道——实际上,有很多企业,哪怕我认为管理层是世界上最优秀的,我也不会买,因为如果它们身处一个错误的行业,管理层再优秀也真的无济于事。

WARREN BUFFETTYeah. It's a lot easier to understand a business that's mailing you a check every month. But that's what an apartment house — you know, if you own — you can probably value an apartment property pretty well if you know anything about, you know, the city in which it's in. And if you have the financial statements, you could make a reasonable guess as to what the future earnings are likely to be. But that's because it is a business that gives you cash. Now, you can — there can be surprises in that arena as well. But I've bought a lot of things off financial statements. There are a lot of things that I wouldn't buy, you know, if I knew the — actually, there are a lot of businesses I wouldn't buy if I thought the management was the most wonderful in the world because, if they were in the wrong business, it really doesn't make much difference.

克拉马斯河的污染问题

Pollution in Klamath River

沃伦·巴菲特第六个问题?

WARREN BUFFETTNumber six?

现场股东早上好。我叫迈克·帕尔马蒂尔,是卡鲁克部落渔业局的渔业主管。巴菲特先生,您在密苏里河畔长大,至今仍住在那里。我也住在一条河边,这条河叫克拉马斯河。我的家族自远古时代起就居住在那里。2002 年,克拉马斯河河口有 68,000 条鱼因疾病和水质恶化而死亡。这些鱼也是我的亲人。如果另一家公司污染了您的河流,杀死了所有的鱼,让河流变得无法游泳和钓鱼,您会怎么处理这个问题?谢谢。

AUDIENCE MEMBERGood morning. My name is Mike Palmateer (PH), fisheries supervisor for Karuk Fisheries. Mr. Buffett, you grew up and still live in the banks of the Missouri River. I, too, live on a river called the Klamath. My family has lived there since time immemorial. In 2002, 68,000 fish died at the mouth of the Klamath River due to disease and bad water quality. These fish are also my relations. If another company polluted your river and killed all the fish and made the river unswimable and unfishable, how would you approach this problem? Thank you.

沃伦·巴菲特嗯,我认为社会——作为一个整体——处理这个问题的方式应该是,考察当前这种情况所带来的净收益、电力成本,以及如果农民转向另一种水资源分配方式他们的处境会如何。我想说的是,在一个庞大的社会里,有许许多多相互冲突的想法和诉求,这基本上要由政府来协调解决。我们正在协调解决——就在当下,我们在国内建造燃煤电厂,建造燃气电厂,做着各种不同的事情。人们对于要做出什么样的取舍得出不同的结论,这些通常是在州一级做出的,尽管你也可以制定一项凌驾于各州决定之上的全国性能源政策。我们服从国家在这方面的政策,也服从地方政策。我确信,俄勒冈州公用事业委员会完全了解您所描述的情况,他们必须考虑这一点,但他们在决定为俄勒冈州居民提供所需电力的最佳方式时,还必须考虑许多其他因素。戴夫,你有什么要补充的吗?

WARREN BUFFETTWell, I think society would — as a whole — should approach that problem by looking at the net benefits from whatever is taking place in that situation and what the costs of electricity would be and what the farmer's situation would be if he went to a different form of water distribution. I mean, there are a lot of competing ideas and desires in a large society, and it's up to government, basically, to sort out those. We're sorting it out — right now, we're building coal plants in the country. We're building gas plants. We're doing various things. People are coming to different conclusions about what kind of tradeoffs they want to make, and generally these are being made at the state level, although you could have a national energy policy that would override individual states' decisions. We're responsive to national policy on that. We're responsive to local policy. The Oregon Public Utility Commission, I'm sure, is aware of exactly what you've discussed and they have to consider that, but they have to consider a lot of other things in determining what is the best way to generate the electricity required for the citizens of Oregon. And, Dave, would you want to add anything to that?

戴夫·索科尔沃伦,我只补充一点。这绝无对渔民不敬之意,但有一点需要明确——我们并没有污染那条河。我们没有向水中添加任何——没有添加任何不是从克拉马斯河上游流下来的东西。我们承认,对于灌溉是好事还是坏事,对于像水电这样的可再生能源是否比让河流恢复到 1907 年之前的状态更好,各方存在不同看法。但有一点需要澄清——太平洋电力公司没有添加任何东西。水通过压力水管流动,产生电力,然后从尾部流出,根据联邦能源管理委员会颁发的 50 年许可证,一直就是这么运行的。同样,我们理解这些不同的担忧,并希望在未来六年里,能找到一个平衡所有这些关切的社会解决方案。

DAVE SOKOLWarren, just one comment. And not in any way to be disrespectful of the fishermen, but it — we are not polluting the river. We're not doing — adding — anything to the water that isn't coming out of Upper Klamath River, and we do recognize the different views as to whether the irrigation is a good thing or a bad thing, whether renewable power such as hydro is better than returning the river to its prior 1907 date. But the one thing that — just to be clear — is that PacifiCorp is not adding anything. The water is flowing through penstocks, creating electricity, and coming out the rear end, and it did so under a 50-year FERC license. Again, we understand the varying concerns, and hopefully, over the next six years a societal answer that balances all those concerns will be reached.

沃伦·巴菲特谢谢。(掌声。)

WARREN BUFFETTThank you. (Applause.)

查理·芒格我想——我想指出,看到有人谈论一个与燃烧碳无关的污染问题,真是令人耳目一新。(掌声。)

CHARLIE MUNGERI'd like to — I'd like to point out how refreshing it is to have people addressing a pollution problem which has nothing to do with burning carbon. (Applause.)

巴菲特给一位 12 岁孩子的建议

Buffett's advice to a 12-year-old

沃伦·巴菲特第七个问题。

WARREN BUFFETTNumber 7.

现场股东嗨,我叫杰克·兰奇,来自费城,今年上七年级,12 岁。我想问问,在我这个年纪应该读些什么?因为我知道学校里有很多东西是不教的,但你应该去了解,那么我该看哪些方面的内容呢?(掌声。)

AUDIENCE MEMBERHey. I'm Jack Range (PH). I'm from Philadelphia. I'm in seventh grade, and I'm 12-years-old. I just wanted to ask, what kind of things should I be reading, like, in my grade? 'Cause I know there are a lot of things that they don't teach you in school that you should know, but what things should I be looking into? (Applause.)

沃伦·巴菲特嗯,如果你还没有这个习惯——不过听你说话,很可能已经有了——我建议你养成每天读一份日报的习惯,这在当今的年轻人中并不十分流行。但你要尽可能多地了解你周围的世界。我想,比尔·盖茨在读到《世界百科全书》里以 P 开头的内容时就停下来了,但那似乎并没能对他造成什么伤害。你可以拥有一套《世界百科全书》,可以阅读报纸,你应该像海绵吸水一样去吸收。然后你会发现什么最让你感兴趣。我是说,要知道,有一段时间体育版最吸引我,之后才是财经版。我恰好也是个政治迷。但你在人生中学到的永远不嫌多,而且我认为——你会发现,你学到的越多,就越想学。我是说,这很有意思。不过在我看来,你是个会自己去大量做这些事的年轻人。查理,你有什么建议吗?你多半会建议读本杰明·富兰克林吧。

WARREN BUFFETTWell, I would get in the habit, if you don't have it already — but you sound like you very well may — of reading a daily newspaper, which is not the most popular thing in the world among younger people these days. But you want to learn as much as you can about the world around you. And Bill Gates, I think, quit at the letter P in the World Book. Doesn't seem to have hurt him too much to quit there. But you can have a set of World Books. You can read the newspapers. You should just sop it up. And you'll find out what's the most interesting to you. I mean, you know, there's a certain point where the sports pages were most interesting to me, then the finance pages. I happen to be a political junkie. But you just can't learn enough in life. And I think the fact — what you'll find is the more you learn, the more you want to learn. I mean, it is fun, and — but you sound to me like a young person that's going to do a lot of that on their own. Do you have any suggestions, Charlie? You'd probably suggest reading Ben Franklin.

查理·芒格我的建议是,刚才发言的这位年轻人已经领悟了如何在生活中取得成功。你已经成功了。(掌声)

CHARLIE MUNGERMy suggestion would be that the young person that just spoke has already figured out how to succeed in life. You've got it made. (Applause)

“我们从不催促人们卖掉好生意”

"We never urge people to sell good businesses"

沃伦·巴菲特第八个问题。

WARREN BUFFETTNumber 8.

现场股东来自欧洲中部、莱茵河畔、德国波恩的各位,向你们致以问候。我是诺曼·伦特罗普,伯克希尔、西科金融和科隆再保险的股东。我要感谢您和艾坦·韦特海默主动抽出宝贵时间走访欧洲四座城市,并可能走遍全球,去向家族企业的所有者说明,将企业卖给伯克希尔·哈撒韦是比卖给收购基金好得多的选择。现在,我的问题有关巧克力行业。我遇到个难题,因为我在家乡德国波恩买不到喜诗糖果。您举过那个非常精彩的例子,关于好生意、普通生意和糟糕生意。您提到,喜诗糖果已经向奥马哈输送了大约 13 亿美元的现金利润。还有一家公司叫瑞士莲史宾利。虽然喜诗糖果取得了超过 20% 的销售利润率,您形容它的增长“还行”。而瑞士莲史宾利的销售利润率只有 14%,但它们差不多做到全球化经营了。

AUDIENCE MEMBERGreetings to all of you from the Midwest of Europe, from Bonn, Germany, on the Rhine River. I'm Norman Rentrop. I'm a shareholder in Berkshire, Wesco, and Cologne Re. I want to thank you and Eitan Wertheimer to take the initiative and the time to come to four cities in Europe, and potentially throughout the world, to tell owners of family businesses what great alternative Berkshire Hathaway is to selling their businesses to buyout funds. Now, my question regarding the chocolate industry. I'm challenged since I cannot buy See's Candy in my hometown, Bonn, Germany. You gave that great example of the great business, the good business, and the gruesome business. See's Candy, you cited, having sent, like, $1.3 billion in cash profits to Omaha. There's another company called Lindt and Sprungli. Now, while See's Candy achieves more than 20 percent profit on sales, you describe that their growth has been "OK." Lindt and Sprungli does only 14 percent on sales, but they did go almost global.

沃伦·巴菲特嗯,你能直接进入问题吗?(笑)

WARREN BUFFETTYeah. Could you get to the question, please, on this? (Laughs)

现场股东好的。问题是——你是想要一个高利润但增长一般的公司,还是一个全球扩张但利润较低的公司?你的考虑是什么?

AUDIENCE MEMBERYeah. The question is in — whether you want to have a company with high profitability but OK growth versus a company going global but lower profits? What are your considerations?

沃伦·巴菲特这对我们来说其实没区别。我们评估各种生意。我们想要的是拥有持久竞争优势的生意,你提到的那两家公司都有。我们想要我们能理解的东西。我们想要我们喜欢并信任的管理层。然后我们想要一个合理的价格。我们试着去看——我们大概看了每家在 20 年间公开上市的糖果公司,只要能拿到数据。有时我们能找到可以采取行动的东西,大多数时候我们没有。当它们是私人企业时,我们不会决定——一个相当好的私人企业——我总是告诉管理者,如果你有一家很棒的私人企业,最好的做法就是留着它。它明年和以后会更值钱。所以,除了一些外在因素外,没有理由卖掉一家好企业。可能是家庭情况,可能是税收,可能是没有其他潜在继承人,或者其他什么。但没必要——如果你有一家价值 10 亿美元的生意,你不需要那 10 亿美元——你已经有一家价值 10 亿美元的生意了——就像你有一块价值 100 万美元的农场一样。你已经拥有了那 100 万美元。你只是恰好把它放在了农场里。如果你喜欢农业,你就留着它。所以我们从不催促人们卖掉好生意。我们鼓励他们留着。但有时,他们会因为这样或那样的原因想要卖——可能每 20 或 50 年一次——我们确实认为,如果他们有一家他们极为自豪的生意——一家确实出色的生意——他们可以通过卖给伯克希尔,比卖给其他任何人,保留更多他们所热爱的这家生意的特质。因此,我们是合乎逻辑的买家。正如你提到的,我要去欧洲——艾坦,他在安排这件事上非常出色——我们会去做展示,不是为了现在就让任何人把生意卖给我们,因为大多数人现在不应该卖给我们。但我们确实希望他们在时机到来,当有事件促使他们考虑出售时,能想到我们。我们希望出现在他们的雷达屏幕上。我们在美国的雷达屏幕上比在欧洲更显眼,我们正试图纠正这一点。但如果你拿你提到的公司,比如瑞士莲,你知道,有一个价格我们会买入瑞士莲的股票。有一个价格我们会买入整个生意。但它不太可能在这个价位出售。你知道,如果你想想成百上千的出色公司——我接触到所有这些经理——昨天刚有一个 CEO 打给我——他们想告诉我他们的生意,他们暗示他们的生意——或者他们认为——他们的生意是世界上最吸引人的投资。这并非世界上最吸引人的投资。有成千上万种可能的投资。你知道,所有这些经理都说“我们的股票是世界上最棒的”这种想法很疯狂。但我们的工作是看几百种东西,对于可流通证券,买入我们认为最吸引人的那些,在我们理解并喜欢它们的生意的范围内。然后偶尔我们有机会买下整个生意。我们从不以低价位做这种事。这根本不会发生。人们不会那样做。股票市场给你低价;个体拥有者不会。但当我们有机会以公平价格这么做时,我们喜欢这样做。我们喜欢用一批具有长期有利经济特征的生意来构建伯克希尔。但其中任何一家——你知道,我们不会去找某家特定的糖果公司说,“不管价格如何,我们都要做这个”,因为一旦句子中出现“不管价格如何”这个短语,我们什么都不会做。查理?

WARREN BUFFETTIt really makes no difference to us. We evaluate all kinds of businesses. And what we do want is we want a business with a durable competitive advantage, which both of the companies you named do. And we want something we understand. And we want a management that we like and trust. And then we want a price that makes sense. And we try to look at — we probably looked at every confectionary business, you know, for 20 years that was publicly owned where we got the figures. And sometimes we find something where we can take action, and most of the time we don't. When they're private businesses, we don't determine — a really good private business — I always tell the manager, the best thing to do if you've got a wonderful private business is just keep it. It's going to be worth more next year and the year after. So there's no reason to sell a wonderful business except for kind of extraneous factors. It may be family situations. It may be taxes. It may be that there isn't another potential heir or whatever it may be. But there's no need — if you've got a business worth a billion dollars, you don't need the billion dollars — you've got a business that's worth a billion dollars — any more than if you've got a farm that's worth a million dollars. You've already got the million dollars. You just happen to have it in the farm. And if you like farming, you keep it. So we never urge people to sell good businesses. We urge them to keep them. But there comes times when they do want to sell for one reason or another — maybe once every 20 or 50 years — and we do think if they have a business that they're enormously proud of — it's a really fine business — that they can keep more of the attributes that they love in that business by selling it to Berkshire than they can, by far, selling it to anyone else. So we are the logical buyer. As you mention, I'm going to Europe — Eitan, who's been wonderful about setting this up — and we're going to make presentations, not to try to get anybody to sell us their business now, because most people shouldn't sell us their business now. But we do want them to think of us when the time comes when an event occurs that does cause them to think about selling. And we want to be on their radar screen. And we're more on the radar screen in the United States than we are in Europe, and we're going to try to correct that. But if you take a firm like you name, a Lindt, you know, there's a price at which we would buy stock in Lindt. There's a price at which we'd buy the whole business. But it's unlikely to be selling there. You know, the — if you think about hundreds and hundreds of wonderful companies — I get all these managers that — just got a CEO yesterday who called me — and they want to tell me about their business, and they imply their businesses — or they think — their business is the most attractive investment in the world. It isn't the most attractive investment in the world. There are thousands of possible investments. And, you know, the idea that all these managers are saying "Our stock is the most wonderful in the world" is crazy. But it's our job to look at hundreds of things and, in terms of marketable securities, buy what we think are the most attractive ones, among the ones we understand and like as a businesses. And then occasionally we get the chance to buy an entire business. We never do that at a bargain price. It just doesn't happen. People don't do that. The stock market gives you bargain prices; individual owners won't. But when we get a chance to do that at a fair price, we like doing it. We love building Berkshire with a bunch of businesses with favorable long-term economic characteristics. But the chance that any one of them — you know, we aren't going to look for a given confectionary company and say, "Regardless of price, we're going to do this," because we don't do anything when the phrase "regardless of price" enters into the sentence. Charlie?

查理·芒格是的。我见过一个人在加州南部建立了一家生意,那是一家很棒的生意。到了该卖的时候——他把自己一生都奉献给了创造它——他把它卖给了一个众所周知的骗子,这人显然会毁掉那生意,只因为他能多拿到一点钱。如果你拥有一家繁荣的生意,我认为那样生活是疯狂的。我认为更好的做法是卖给你知道会是你所创造之物的好管家的人。(掌声)

CHARLIE MUNGERYeah. I watched a man build up a business in southern California, which was a wonderful business. And the time came to sell it — and he devoted his whole life to creating it — he sold it to a known crook who was obviously going to ruin the business just because he could get a slightly higher price. I think that's an insane way to live a life if you own a prosperous business. I think the better course is to sell to somebody you know is going to be a good steward of what you've created. (Applause.)

美元长期可能走弱

Dollar will probably weaken over time

沃伦·巴菲特我们请第九个问题。

WARREN BUFFETTLet's go to number 9, please.

现场股东嗨,我叫约翰·弗罗伊登伯格,来自德国。作为一个投资美国股票的欧洲投资者,你如何对冲美元风险?谢谢。

AUDIENCE MEMBERHi. My name is Johann Freudenberg (Ph) from Germany. How would you, as a European investor that invests in U.S. equities, hedge the U.S. dollar risk? Thank you.

沃伦·巴菲特我怎么什么?

WARREN BUFFETTHow would I what?

查理·芒格你如何对冲美元?

CHARLIE MUNGERHow do you hedge the U.S. dollar?

沃伦·巴菲特哦。嗯,无论你是考虑从德国出发,对冲在这里投资带来的美元风险,还是反过来,我们都很乐意投资在德国赚取欧元、在法国、意大利或其他地方赚取欧元、或在英国赚取英镑的企业,因为我们不认为——至少我不认为——这些货币对美元会大幅贬值。那才是我们可能会受伤的情形。我们可以通过在那些国家借钱、用当地货币借款完成收购来对冲。但总体而言,我认为美国会继续奉行某些近年来导致美元走弱的政策。所以,如果让我押上身家在往后十年做一个方向性判断,我大概会押美元兑其他主要货币走弱。因此,我觉得没必要——如果我们收购的企业盈利主要来自其他主要国家——我就觉得没必要去对冲这些收购。这么说吧,假如我今天从火星降落,带着十亿火星币,管火星人怎么称呼它,我正在考虑钱往哪投。然后我去了当地——不管我的 UFO 降落在哪——走进银行说:“我有这十亿火星币”,对方说:“嗯,您想兑换成什么?”我不认为我会把这十亿全换成美元。所以,在全球各地收购企业,不在货币上做对冲,让相当一部分盈利来自其他币种,并在将来某个时候按当时汇率换成美元——这并不让我烦心。拿可口可乐来说——我们持有 2 亿股可口可乐。如果他们的每股盈利大约是 3 美元,那么我们享有的可口可乐年盈利就是 6 亿美元。在这 6 亿盈利里,可能有将近 5 亿来自全球各地——涉及各种货币。本质上我喜欢这一点。我认为随时间推移,这对我们来说会是净增益,实际上近年来它也确实是净增益。所以,我们基本上不靠对冲货币赚钱。我们没有大规模的对冲仓位。查理?

<<<END P 10>>>

WARREN BUFFETTOh. Well, whether you're thinking about starting in Germany and hedging the dollar risk of investing here or vice versa, we are happy to invest in businesses that earn their money in euros in Germany, or whether it's there, or France, or Italy, or earn their money in sterling in the UK, because we do not have a feeling — at least I don't have a feeling — that those currencies are likely to depreciate in a big way against the U.S. dollar. That would be how we would get hurt. We could offset that by borrowing the money in those countries and borrowing in their currency to make the purchases. But, overall, I think that the U.S. is going to continue to follow some policies that have made the dollar weaker in recent years. So if I had to bet my life one way or another over 10 years, I would probably bet that the dollar would weaken against other major currencies, and, therefore, I feel no need — if we buy companies whose earnings primarily arise elsewhere in major countries — I feel no need to try and hedge those purchases. I mean, if I landed from Mars today with a billion of Mars dollars or whatever they call them on Mars, and I was thinking about where to put my money, you know, I went to the local — wherever my UFO landed — and went to the bank and said, "I've got this billion of Mars currency," and they said, "Well, what would you like to exchange here?" I don't think I'd put all the billion in U.S. dollars. So it doesn't bother me to buy businesses around the world, unhedged in terms of their currency, and have a fair amount of our earnings coming from earnings that originate in other currencies and which I will convert at current rates to dollars at some time in the future. If you take Coca-Cola — we own 200 million shares of Coca-Cola. And if their earnings are roughly $3 a share, that means our share of the earnings of Coca-Cola are $600 million a year. And of those earnings of 600 million, you know, maybe close to 500 million will be from around the world — all different kinds of currencies. Basically I like that. I think that that will be a net plus to us over time, and it certainly has been a net plus to us in recent years. So we are not in the business of hedging currencies, basically. We do not have a lot of hedges set up. Charlie?

查理·芒格没什么补充的。

CHARLIE MUNGERNothing to add.

小盘股和错误定价的债券带来机会

Small stocks and mispriced bonds offer opportunities

沃伦·巴菲特第 10 个问题。

WARREN BUFFETTNumber 10.

现场股东嘿。你好吗?我叫埃里克·施莱恩,来自纽约拉奇蒙特。这其实是去年我在股东大会上问过的问题的后续。我当时问你们,嗯,你们会用小额资金做什么,因为——嗯,我管理一个小型投资组合,不到 100 万美元。我问你们会不会做一些事情,嗯,比如本杰明·格雷厄姆以前讲过的净营运资本股票,嗯,还有清算套利。嗯,很多你在巴菲特合伙公司时期做过的事。你当时承认你不会只是一个买入并持有的投资者,就像你今天这样——而是会做很多这类交易。而且,巴菲特先生,你还谈到很多你用 100 万美元以下资金做的投资跟股票无关,而是其他类型的证券,但你并没有详细说明——你们俩都没有再多讲。所以我想知道你们能不能再详细说说,嗯,你当年的投资策略,嗯,就非股票投资而言,跟你今天的买入并持有策略有什么不同?你大概会做什么样的事?也许你可以给我举个你在 1950 年代和 1960 年代做过的过去例子。那就太棒了。谢谢。很感激。

AUDIENCE MEMBERHey. How you doing? I'm Eric Schleien from Larchmont, New York. This is actually a follow-up question from a question that I asked last year at the meeting. I'd asked you guys, you know, what you would do with small sums of money since — you know, I run a small portfolio, under a million dollars. And I asked you if you'd be doing things, you know, like the net-nets that Benjamin Graham used to talk about and, you know, liquidation arbitrage. You know, a lot of things you used to do at the Buffett Partnership. And you acknowledged that you wouldn't be just a buy-and-hold investor, that you — as you are today — but we would be doing a lot of those transactions. And, Mr. Buffett, you also talked about how a lot of the investments you would do with under a million dollars would have nothing to do with stocks and would be with other types of securities, and you really don't elaborate — neither of you really elaborated any more than that. So I guess I was wondering if you could elaborate a little bit more on how your investment strategy, you know, back then, you know, in reference to non-stock investments, would be different than your buy- and-hold strategy today? So what kind of stuff would you be doing? Maybe you could give me a past example that you did in the '50s and the '60s. That would be great. Thank you. Appreciate it.

沃伦·巴菲特嗯,如果我用小额资金操作——我很乐意这样做——那就会给我打开成千上万的可能性。你很可能会——我们确实找到过错误定价严重的债券,在伯克希尔的体量下根本买不到足够多的仓位来产生影响,但如果用 100 万美元操作,那就能产生影响。但那是债券。也会是美国和世界其他地方的股票。几年前我们在韩国发现了一些股票,便宜得荒谬。你知道,基本上你必须获得非常显著的回报,但你没法投入大钱。所以它可以是股票。可以是债券。不会是小额资金去做货币。嗯,你知道吗,我有个朋友以前买税务留置权——嗯,汤姆·纳普,他有些亲戚在这儿。一个进取的人能找到很多不同的赚钱方式。你会发现大多数方式都在小盘股里。如果你用小额资金操作,它们会是小盘股,或者是一些特殊的债券机会。你不这么认为吗,查理?

WARREN BUFFETTWell, if I work with small sums of money — and I'd be happy doing that — it would just open up thousands of possibilities to me. And you might very well — certainly we found very mispriced bonds, where we could come nowhere near buying a position of enough size in Berkshire to make a difference, but where it would have made a difference if you were working with a million dollars. But it would be bonds. It would be stocks of both in the United States and elsewhere. We found them in Korea a few years ago that were ridiculously cheap. You know, you basically had to make very significant returns, but you couldn't put big money on it. So it could be in stocks. It could be in bonds. It wouldn't be in currencies with small amounts. But, you know, I had a friend who used to buy tax liens — you know, Tom Knapp, he's got some relatives here. An enterprising person can find a lot of different ways to make money. You'll find most of them will be in small stocks. If you're working with small money, they'll be in small stocks or in some specialized bond situations. Wouldn't you say that, Charlie?

查理·芒格当然。(笑声)

CHARLIE MUNGERSure. (Laughter)

迎合选民的政客在任上表现更好

Pandering politicians behave better in office

沃伦·巴菲特请提第 11 个问题。

WARREN BUFFETTNumber 11, please.

现场股东嗨。我是来自圣路易斯不孕症中心的西尔伯医生。我们觉得通过制造很多很多婴儿,我们在尽最大努力帮助挽救社会保障体系的偿付能力。(笑声)

AUDIENCE MEMBERHi. I'm Dr. Silber from the Infertility Center of St. Louis. And we feel that by making many, many babies, we're doing the best we can to help salvage the solvency of Social Security. (Laughs)

沃伦·巴菲特我们不会把这套逻辑推得太远。(笑声)

WARREN BUFFETTWe won't pursue the logic of that too far. (Laughter)

现场股东我们需要有人为这个体系交钱,而面对我们正在面临的人口结构崩溃以及当前的反移民情绪,这才是社会保障困境的根源。这在大多数发达国家都是事实。但我的问题是,每个人都在非常仔细地关注你和查理在这次股东大会上要说什么,因为自从信贷危机以来,存在巨大的困惑,我想你已经经历过很多很多年、几十年的困惑。但大家确实想知道你的看法,因为我们有三位候选人,其中有一位我挺喜欢,我就不说是谁了,但三个人似乎都在迎合选民,并没有展示出对经济的深刻理解。我们要降低利率来帮助信贷危机,我们要向经济注入 1800 亿美元作为免费礼物,而我们的美元却贬值了 50%,我们当然不想要衰退以及随之而来的所有痛苦。但美国最终不会出现巨大的通货膨胀吗?而中国,作为我们在这方面的主要合作伙伴,股市下跌了,人们在亏钱,因为他们担心美国。所以我想知道你是否能分享一些明智之言,如果你是总统候选人——我很想看到这种情况发生——你的立场或政策会是什么?

AUDIENCE MEMBERWe need someone to pay into the system, and with the demographic implosion that we're facing and the current anti-immigration feeling, that this is the real cause of the Social Security dilemma that we're facing. And it's true in most of the developed world. But my question is, everybody is looking very closely at what you and Charlie are going to say at this meeting because there's just a huge amount of confusion since the credit crisis, and I guess you've been through many, many years and decades of confusion. But everybody really wants to know what you think, because we have three candidates, one of whom I like, which I won't mention, but all three of whom seem to be pandering to voters and not really demonstrating a profound understanding of economics. And we're going to decrease interest rates to help the credit crisis, and we're going to inject $180 billion as free gifts into the economy, and yet our dollar is down 50 percent, and we certainly don't want a recession and all the misery that would bring. But aren't we going to eventually have a gigantic inflation here in the U.S.? And so — in China, which is our major partner in this, the stock market has gone down and people are losing money because they're worried about the U.S. So I'm wondering if you could just shed some words of wisdom on, if you were the presidential candidate — which I would like to see happen — what would be your position or your policy?

沃伦·巴菲特嗯,我想是比尔·巴克利竞选纽约市长,大约 40 年前或者类似的时候,有人问他如果当选第一件事会做什么。他说,“我会要求重新计票。”(笑声)这不是一个好玩的游戏。我觉得我们——仅个人看法——我觉得这次我们有三位相当不错的候选人——相当不错。但我认为你关于迎合选民之类的评论,恐怕这只是——如果你的政治进程非常漫长,而人们基本上只愿意听相当简短的观点,你又试图用某种方式让其他候选人看起来不好——我认为事实是,在提出的政策中确实有很多迎合选民的东西。我认为这几位候选人对经济都相当聪明。我碰巧认为三人中有两位可能比第三位在经济上稍微更聪明一点,但第三位可能也一样聪明。他们可能只是被迫站到了不同的立场上。你知道,政治进程本身并不适合像道格拉斯-林肯那样辩论政策细节,这是一个艰难的游戏。我不——我觉得有一点是,我认为他们在任上的表现会比在竞选时更好。我认为这对三个人都适用,而且我认为——但我觉得这本身就是体制造成的。我们——嗯,你知道吗,我们有一个运作得非常棒的国家。无论是沃伦·哈丁在位,还是富兰克林·皮尔斯,或者多年来随便什么人。这又回到了我常说的一句话:你想买入一家好到连傻瓜都能经营的企业,因为迟早会有傻瓜来经营。(笑声)坦率地说,我们生活在一个如此美好的国家,你的子孙后代生活会比你好得多,即使偶尔会有一两个傻瓜在中间管理。但我们遇到的远不止是傻瓜在管理。相信我。我认为我们有三位非常好的候选人,我希望——无论他们中的哪一个获胜,我都祝他们好运。你知道,那是世界上最艰难的工作,也是世界上最重要的工作,我认为那些竞选者的动机有时比他们在政治进程中发表的宣言要好得多。我认为在爱荷华州不拥护乙醇就很难竞选。你知道吗,也许——你最终可能会赢得某种勇气的勋章,但你赢不了总统大选。查理?

WARREN BUFFETTWell, I think it was Bill Buckley that ran for mayor of New York, you know, 40 years ago or something like that, and they asked him what the first thing he would do if he were elected. He said, "I'd ask for a recount." (Laughter) It's not an easy game. I think we have — just personally— I think we have three pretty good candidates this time — quite good candidates. But I think that your comments about the pandering and all that, I'm afraid that's just part of — if you have a very long political process, and you have people only generally willing to listen to ideas in fairly short form, and you're trying to make the other candidates look bad one way or another — I think that the truth is you do get a lot of pandering in the policies that are proposed. I think you have candidates that are pretty smart about economics. I happen to think two of the three are maybe a little smarter about economics than the third, but the third may be just as smart, too. They may just be forced into a different position. You know, a political process is something that doesn't lend itself to Douglas-Lincoln debates on the fine points of policy, and it's a tough game. And I don't — the one thing I think is I think they will behave better in office than on the stump. I think that's true of all three of them, and I think — but I think that's just built into the system. We — you know, we have a country that works awfully well. You know, whether Warren Harding is in office or Franklin Pierce, or whatever it may be over the years. And it gets back to that saying I've said many times that you want to buy stock in a business that's so good that an idiot can run it because sooner or later one will. (Laughter) And we live in a country, frankly, that is so good that your children and grandchildren will live a lot better than you live, even though an idiot or two runs it from time to time in between. But we've got a lot better than idiots running. Believe me. I think we've got three very good candidates, and I wish — whichever one of them wins, I wish them well. You know, it's the toughest job in the world, the most important job in the world, and I think the motivations of the people running it are a lot better sometimes than their proclamations as they go along in the political process. I think it's very hard to run in Iowa without being for ethanol. You know, it may be — you may win some badge for courage or something in the end, but you won't win the presidency. Charlie?

查理·芒格我想谈谈最近的动荡及其与政治的关系。安然公司以极其严重的愚蠢和不当行为震惊全国之后,我们的政客们通过了《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》,结果现在发现他们拿的是豌豆枪在打大象。接着,我们迎来了一场让安然显得像茶话会的动荡。(笑声)我很有信心地预测,我们将迎来监管改革,而这些改革不会完美地起作用。(笑声)人性中总是存在那些找理由、行为不当的激励因素,而受过良好教育的专业阶层往往在履行其基本职责——即保持专业素养——方面失败。在你所能看到的未来,这种动荡会一直持续。

CHARLIE MUNGERWell, I'd like to address the recent turmoil and its relation to politics. After Enron totally shocked the nation with the gross amount of folly and misbehavior, our politicians passed Sarbanes-Oxley, and it has now turned out that they were shooting at an elephant with a pea shooter. And low and behold, we have a convulsion that makes Enron look like a tea party. And I confidently predict that we will have changes in regulation and that they won't work perfectly. (Laughter) Human nature always has these incentives to rationalize and misbehave, and the learned professions very often fail in their basic responsibility to be learned. And we're going to have this turmoil as far ahead as you can see.

沃伦·巴菲特不过,你可以这样看:我有一份自己热爱的工作。说真的,我宁愿花钱来做这份工作。现在,我持有的股票足够多,所以基本上能确保我保住这份工作,但让我们暂时假设还有另外三个候选人,我们谁都没有持股,都在这里向你们推销自己。我的回答也许今天会有点不同,你知道,就伯克希尔在我领导下的前景以及未来之类的事情而言。这是一个会腐蚀人的过程。现在,你知道,这个过程效果还不错,但过程本身必然有腐蚀性。就拿我们经历的大宗商品价格繁荣来说吧。油价上涨了,但玉米和大豆的价格也涨了。我还没听到哪个政界候选人说,玉米和大豆价格出现了如此巨大的上涨。这意味着全国所有的穷人,他们要花更多钱买食物,所以我们该对农民征收暴利税。这不是你会听到的话。另一方面,当同样的事情发生在石油上,而且碰巧是埃克森美孚时,你知道,人们偶尔会提议,我们应该对埃克森美孚征收重税,因为油价涨了。这里面有很多情景伦理,或者说情景式政策制定,这取决于任何给定类别里有多少选民,你碰巧在哪个州,以及诸如此类的事情。但我不认为自己会表现得更好。如果我的目标是成为美国总统,你知道,我肯定会——我确信这会影响到——我谈论的内容和我的行为。你知道,我们都是人。所以我不因为某些人在一天工作 18 个小时,对手对他们开炮,他们就开始有点夸大其词而谴责他们;我只是觉得你不应该对人期望过高——而且我认为他们会倾向于——我认为这三位候选人中的任何一位——都会在白宫表现得相当好。他们会屈服于总统们为了某些帮助他们上台的群体以及诸如此类事情而必须做的一切。但我认为,总体来说,他们最终会做他们认为对国家最有利的事,而且我认为他们都是聪明人。

WARREN BUFFETTBut look at it this way: I have a job here I love. You know, I'd gladly pay to have this job. Now, I have enough stock so that I'm reasonably assured of keeping the job, but let's just assume for the moment that there are three other candidates out there, and none of us had any stock, and we were all up here making a pitch to you. My answers might have been a little different today, you know, in terms of what Berkshire's prospects would be under me and all that sort of thing going forward. It's a corrupting process. Now, you know, it works pretty well, but the process itself has to be corrupting. Just take the boom in commodity prices we've had. We've had a boom in the price of oil, but we've had a boom in the price of corn and soybeans. Now, I've heard no political candidate say you've had this huge increase in the price of corn and soybeans. That means all these poor people throughout the country, they'll be paying more for food, so we ought to put an excess profits tax on farmers. That is not something you're going to hear. On the other hand, when it happens in oil and it happens to be Exxon, you know, people will propose occasionally we ought to put a terrible tax on Exxon because the price of oil has gone up. There's a lot of situational ethics, or situational policymaking, that depends on how many voters there are in any given category and what state you happen to be in and all that. But I don't think I'd behave any better. If my ambition were to be President of the United States, you know, I would — I'm sure it would affect my — what I talked about and my behavior. You know, we're all human beings. So I don't condemn the people for the fact that when they, you know, are working 18 hours a day and the other guy is shooting at them and they start exaggerating things a little, I just don't think you should expect more of human beings than — and I think that they will tend — I think any one of the three candidates — will tend to behave quite well in the White House. They'll succumb to all the things that presidents do in terms of having to — certain groups that helped them get there and all that sort of thing. But I think, on balance, they will end up doing what they think is best for the country, and I think they're all smart people.

“我去世后不会有真空期”

"There will be no gap after my death"

沃伦·巴菲特第 12 个问题?

WARREN BUFFETTNumber 12?

现场股东我叫约翰·埃伯特(音),来自华盛顿州布雷默顿。看到你和查理气色这么好,我非常高兴;我也很高兴知道你计划至少工作到 102 岁才退休。我想你的秘诀一定是樱桃可乐和喜诗巧克力,从你屏幕上正在做的事情来看。我的问题显然与接班有关。在去年的股东大会上,你谈到了你的首席财务官计划。你能告诉我们接班计划的进展情况吗?

AUDIENCE MEMBERMy name is John Ebert (PH). I'm from Bremerton, Washington. I'm very pleased to see that both you and Charlie look so healthy, and I'm also glad to know that your goal is to work to at least 102 before you retire. I think your secret must be the Cherry Coke and the See's Candy by evidence of what you're doing on the screen there. My question, obviously, deals with succession. At last year's meeting, you spoke about your plan for your chief financial officer. Could you please update us on where you stand on succession?

沃伦·巴菲特好的。我们在首席执行官人选方面,已经说过有三个候选人,他们中的任何一个在不同方面都能胜任,而且能比我做得更好。我相信董事会也一致知道,如果明天早上就需要确定人选会是哪一个,但这在几年后可能就不一样了。我认为无论如何,到时候他们会想选一个相对年轻的人,因为总的来说,在这份工作上有个较长的任期是个好主意,这也有助于收购,以及能够向人们承诺他们的业务会受到怎样的对待等等。在投资主管方面,董事会目前有四个候选人。我们商讨过这四个人的情况。他们中的任何一个或全部都能很好地胜任我的工作,在某些方面可能还做得更好,而且——他们现在都有不错的工作。他们对现在的处境很满意。他们——我想如果今晚我去世了,而董事会向他们中的一个提供这个职位,他明天就会到位。他们相对都比较年轻。他们都相当富有或非常有钱,薪酬对他们来说不是主要因素。我认为他们中的任何一个都会愿意以比现在更少的薪水接受这份工作,但他们现在没有理由过来。如果我现在还在这儿做决策,他们可能对于不能自己拍板会感到不自在。其实我当年为本·格雷厄姆工作过几年。我非常敬重他。我从他身上学到了很多。我给我大儿子取名,中间名就用他的名字。但最终,我想自己做决定,而且我——如果本·格雷厄姆做出了不同的决定,你知道——我实际上更愿意自己来做决定。任何一个管理资金有方的人都会有这种感觉。所以在这种情况下,这更好。这事儿可能明天就发生。也可能五年后发生。但不管什么时候我不在这儿做决策了,董事会都会决定是安排他们中的一个、两个、三个还是四个人来做这件事。他们会决定——你知道,他们可能决定安排四个人,任务分成四份。他们也可能决定只用一个人。他们的决定很可能在很大程度上会受新上任的首席执行官想法的影响,他究竟想如何与一个团队还是一个人共事。而他们会到位。所以在我去世之后,在资金管理方面不会有——不会有——不会有真空期,而且他们可能会比我现在更有干劲。他们可能——他们很可能创造比我现在好得多的业绩。他们中有几个近期的业绩比我好得多。查理?

WARREN BUFFETTYeah. And we've said, on the CEO front, we have three that any one of which could step in and do a better job than I do in many respects. And the board is unanimous, I believe, in terms of knowing which one it would be if it were tomorrow morning, but that might be different two or three years from now. I think in any event, when the time comes, they'll want to pick somebody reasonably young, because I think, on balance, it's good idea to have a long run at this job, and I think it aids in acquisition and being able to make promises to people about how their businesses will be treated and so on. In terms of the investment officer, the board has four names. We've discussed the four. Any one or all of the four would be good at doing my job, probably better in some ways, and — but they all have good jobs now. They're happy where they are now. They would — I think any one of the four would be here tomorrow if I died tonight and they were offered the job by the board. They're all reasonably young. They're all very well to do or rich, and compensation would not be a major factor with them. I think any of the four would take the job at less money than they're making now, but there's no reason for them to come now. I would still end up making the decisions, and they would probably chafe at the idea of not being able to make the decisions. I actually worked for Ben Graham for a few years. And I loved the man enormously. I learned an amount from him. I named my older son, middle name, is after him. But in the end, I wanted to make decisions, and I — if Ben Graham made them differently — you know, I actually prefer to make my own decisions. And anybody that manages money well is going to feel that way. So it's just better in this case. It can happen tomorrow. It could happen five years from now. But whenever I'm not around to make the decisions, the board will decide whether to have one, two, three, or four of these people. They'll decide — you know, they may decide to have four and divide it up four ways. They may decide to have only one. They will probably be heavily influenced by how the incoming CEO feels about exactly how he wants to work with a group or with one. And they'll come. So there will not — there will be no — there will be no gap after my death in terms of having somebody managing the money, and they'll probably be a lot more energetic than I am now. And they'll — they could very easily have a much better record. Some of them have a much better recent record than I do. Charlie?

查理·芒格嗯,你知道,我们这里还有一个叫沃伦·巴菲特的冉冉升起的年轻人。(掌声)

CHARLIE MUNGERWell, you know, we still have a rising young man here named Warren Buffett. And having — (Applause)

沃伦·巴菲特这就是跟一个 84 岁的人共事的好处。你永远显得年轻。(笑声)

WARREN BUFFETTThat's the advantage of working with a guy 84. You always look young. (Laughter)

查理·芒格而且我认为,我们应该鼓励这位冉冉上升的年轻人,让他充分发挥潜力。(笑声与掌声)

CHARLIE MUNGERAnd I think we want to encourage this rising young man to reach his full potential. (Laughter and applause)

沃伦·巴菲特有一点我应该指出,我们的平均年龄是 80 岁,大家老是说管理层高龄化。我们还没见过不高龄化的管理层。要是哪天让我们找到了,我们真想开始吃他们吃的东西。而关于你们的管理层,我可以指出的是,既然我们平均年龄 80 岁,我们每年的高龄化速度只有 1.25%,这据我所知是全美公司中最低的。我是说,有些公司里有 50 岁的人,他们每年的高龄化速度是 2%,你们想想看那风险得多大。(笑声)

WARREN BUFFETTOne thing I should point out, with our average age being 80, people talk about aging managements. We haven't found a management that isn't aging. If we ever find them, we want to start eating what they eat. And what I can point out about your management, since our average age is 80, we're only aging at the age of 1 1/4 percent a year, and that is the lowest rate of aging that I know of in corporate America. I mean, some of these companies have 50-year-olds, and they're aging at 2 percent a year, and just think how much riskier that is. (Laughter)

"分散化是给一无所知的投资者准备的"

"Diversification is for the know-nothing investor"

沃伦·巴菲特我们来听第 13 个问题。

WARREN BUFFETTLet's go to 13.

现场股东我是艾萨克·迪米特罗夫斯基(音),来自纽约。巴菲特先生,能来到这里真是太好了。我读到过,在你的投资生涯中,有几次你对某一个想法有足够信心,愿意把大量资金投入进去——比如,25% 或更多。我相信其中几次是 70 年代的美国运通和《华盛顿邮报》。我听过你讨论对这些投资的思考。但你能不能谈谈其他那些你有足够信心做出如此重大投资的时刻,以及那时你的想法是怎样的?

AUDIENCE MEMBERI'm Isaac Dimitrovski (PH) from New York City. Mr. Buffett, it's great to be here. I've read that there were several times in your investing career when you were confident enough in one idea to put a lot of your money into it — say, 25 percent or more. I believe a couple of those cases were American Express and the Washington Post in the '70s. And I've heard you discuss your thinking on those. But could you talk about any of the other times you've been confident enough to make such a big investment and what your thinking was in those cases?

沃伦·巴菲特查理和我一直有足够的信心——如果我们只是管理自己的净资产的话——我敢肯定,回头看这 50 年,有相当多次,在很多时点上你都会把至少 75% 的净资产投入到一个想法里。不是吗,查理?

WARREN BUFFETTCharlie and I have been confident enough — if we were only running our own net worth — I'm certain a very significant number of times, if you go over 50 years, there have been a lot of times when you would have put at least 75 percent of your net worth into an idea. Wouldn't there, Charlie?

查理·芒格嗯,可是,你在伯克希尔之外的资产,它的 75% 从来就不是一笔多大的钱。

CHARLIE MUNGERWell, but 75 percent of your worth outside Berkshire has never been a very significant amount.

沃伦·巴菲特不是。好吧,那我这样往回推——我们就假设它是笔大钱吧。(笑声)我们暂且假设伯克希尔没在画面上。曾经有一些时候——我是说,我们见到过各种各样的想法,会把我们 75% 的净资产投进去。

WARREN BUFFETTNo. Well, I'm going back — let's just assume it was. (Laughter) Let's just assume you didn't have Berkshire in the picture. There have been times — I mean, we've seen all kinds of ideas we would have put 75 percent of our net worth in.

查理·芒格沃伦,我一生中有不少时候,会把自己超过 100% 的净资产投入某些东西里去。

CHARLIE MUNGERWarren, there have been times in my life when I've had more than a hundred percent of my net worth invested in things.

沃伦·巴菲特那是因为你认识好说话的银行家;我没有。(笑声)这——确实曾有一些时候——嗯,最早的时候,我投入 70%——有几次我把 75% 的净资产集中在一个机会上。你在足够长的时间跨度里会看到一些情形。我是说,你会看到一些事情,如果你运作的资金规模比较小——不把一半净资产放进去会是一个错误。我是说,你确实——有的时候在证券市场上你确实会看到一些十拿九稳的机会。你不会经常看见它们,电视上或类似的地方也不会有人谈论这些机会,但在人的一生中确实会出现一些非同寻常的事情,让你可以把 75% 的净资产或类似比例投入某个特定的机会。问题出在那些把 500% 净资产投进去的家伙身上。你知道,我是说,你看看——就拿长期资本管理公司(LTCM)来说吧。极其聪明的人。极其正派的人。其中有我的一些朋友。素质一流。深谙自己的业务。可他们把,你知道,大概净资产 25 倍的资金投进了那些本来是十拿九稳的东西里,如果他们没有押得那么重的话。我是说,他们持有的那些东西本来必然收敛,但他们没能把那手牌打完。可如果他们投入的资金只是净资产的 100%,事情就会顺利完成。如果他们投入的是净资产的 200%,也会顺利完成。可他们的做法却是下到了,大概是净资产的 2500% 吧。所以说,有些股票——实际上,这个房间里相当多的人把将近 100% 的净资产放在伯克希尔上,有些人持有它已经 40 年甚至更久了。伯克希尔一向不属于十拿九稳那一类。我认为它属于高概率一类。但我在 2002 年的垃圾债领域看到过一些东西。我在股票市场里也看到过一些东西。如果你能在早期——1974 年时买入汤姆·墨菲经营的大都会,它的售价只有资产价值的三分之一或四分之一,管理这家公司的是全世界最出色的经理人,而且你拥有的这门生意,即便没有那位经理人也相当不错。那时候你可以把你 100% 的净资产投进去而不必担心。你也可以把 100% 的净资产投入可口可乐,时间比我们买入稍早一些,但肯定也在我们买入前后,那也不算一个危险的头寸。远远更危险的是去做经纪人给人们推荐的一大堆其他事情。查理,你想不想——?

WARREN BUFFETTThat's because you had a friendly banker; I didn't. (Laughter) That — there have been times — well, initially, I had 70 — several times I had 75 percent of my net worth in one situation. There are situations you will see over a long period of time. I mean, you will see things that it would be a mistake — if you're working with smaller sums — it would be a mistake not to have half your net worth in. I mean, there — you really do, sometimes in securities, see things that are lead-pipe cinches. And you're not going to see them often and they're not going to be talking about them on television or anything of the sort, but there will be some extraordinary things happen in a lifetime where you can put 75 percent of your net worth or something like that in a given situation. The problem has been the guys that have put 500 percent of their net worth in. You know, I mean, if you look at — just take LTCM. Very smart guys. Very decent guys. Some friends of mine. High grade. Knew their business. But they put, you know, maybe 25 times their net worth into things that were a cinch, if they hadn't have gone in that heavily. I mean, they were in things that had to converge, but they didn't get to play out the hand. But if they'd have had a hundred percent of their net worth in them, it would have worked out fine. If they would have had 200 percent of their net worth in it, it would have worked out fine. But they instead went to, you know, maybe 2500 percent or something like that. So there are stocks — I mean, actually, there's quite a few people in this room that have close to a hundred percent of their net worth in Berkshire, and some of them have had it for 40 or more years. Berkshire was not in a cinch category. It was in the strong probability category, I think. But I saw things in 2002 in the junk bond field. I saw things in the equity markets. If you could have bought Cap Cities with Tom Murphy running it in the early — in 1974, it was selling at a third or a fourth what the properties were worth and you had the best manager in the world running the place and you had a business that was pretty damn good even if the manager wasn't. You could have put a hundred percent of your net worth in there and not worry. You could put a hundred percent of your net worth in Coca-Cola, earlier than when we bought it, but certainly around the time we bought it, and that would not have been a dangerous position. It would be far more dangerous to do a whole bunch of other things that brokers were recommending to people. Charlie, do you want to —?

查理·芒格对。如果你们——美国的学子们去读那些精英商学院和法学院,学现在所教授的那套公司理财和投资管理。这些人中有一些会在报纸和其他地方写文章,说,“嗯,投资的所有秘诀就在于分散化。”这就是他们的金科玉律。他们把话说得完全本末倒置。投资的所有秘诀在于找到那些既安全又明智、不必分散化投入的地方。就这么简单。分散化是给一无所知的投资者准备的;不是给专业人士准备的。

CHARLIE MUNGERYeah. If you — students of America go to these elite business schools and law schools and they learn corporate finance the way it's now taught and investment management the way it's now taught. And some of these people write articles in the newspaper and other places and they say, "Well, the whole secret of investment is diversification." That's the mantra. They've got it exactly back-ass-ward. The whole secret of investment is to find places where it's safe and wise to non-diversify. It's just that simple. Diversification is for the know-nothing investor; it's not for the professional.

沃伦·巴菲特而一无所知的投资者去实践它,并没有错。那正是他们应该做的。那也正是优秀的专业投资者不应该做的。不过,你知道,这两者并无矛盾。一个一无所知的投资者,只要他意识到自己是一无所知的投资者,在买入股票的时间点上分散,在买入的股票品种上分散,就能取得不错的成绩。但对确实知道自己正在做什么的人来说,这样做就是疯了。而且你会遇到一些机会,在这些机会上如果你只投入 20% 的净资产,那你就浪费了一生中难得的机遇,我说的是没有下重注。我们在过去,很早很早以前,在以小额资金运作的时候,曾经得到过那样的机会。以伯克希尔运作的这类资金规模,我们永远也不会再有那样的机会了。我们尽可能在好东西上集中持仓。我们不时会在某些市场里得到一些机会,但很少能就任何一个好主意买到我们想买的那么多。

WARREN BUFFETTAnd there's nothing wrong with the know-nothing investor practicing it. It's exactly what they should practice. It's exactly what a good professional investor should not practice. But that's — you know, there's no contradiction in that. It — a know-nothing investor will get decent results as long as they know they're a know-nothing investor, diversify as to time they purchase their equities, and as to the equities they purchase. That's crazy for somebody that really knows what they're doing. And you will find opportunities that, if you put 20 percent of your net worth in it, you'll have wasted the opportunity of a lifetime, you know, in terms of not really loading up. And we've had the chance to do that, way, way in our past, when we were working with small sums of money. We'll never get a chance to do that working with the kinds of money that Berkshire does. We try to load up on things. And there will be markets when we get a chance to from time to time, but very seldom do we get to buy as much of any good idea as we would like to.

家长电视委员会与合适的广告

Parents Television Council and appropriate ads

沃伦·巴菲特请 1 号提问。

WARREN BUFFETTGo to number 1.

现场股东早上好,董事长先生,查理。我是瓦尔·彼得神父。我曾有幸做了 25 年“男孩镇”的负责人,业务扩展到了全美各地。沃伦多年来一直对我非常友善,给了我很多帮助。今天,我代表家长电视委员会,这个组织在全美有 120 万人,我们关切的是帮助减少电视节目中的有害内容——例如过度的暴力等等。我非常惊讶,身为家长电视委员会的一名董事,当我读到一份报告时——我希望这不是真的,但有可能是真的——报告说,在最好和最麻烦的广告商排行榜上,伯克希尔·哈撒韦在 452 家中排名第 444 位,接近垫底。我希望那不是真的。但我的意思是这样的:当我还是“男孩镇”的负责人时,如果有人告诉我类似的事情,我会说,“去查清楚。有错就改。”我的问题是,您是否愿意说一句,“去查清楚”,如果有必要的话,“有错就改”。谢谢。

AUDIENCE MEMBERGood morning, Mr. Chairman and Charlie. I'm Father Val Peter. For 25 years I was lucky to be head of Boys Town. Expanded across the whole country. Warren was very kind to me, very helpful, over long periods of time. What I represent today is Parents Television Council, where 1.2 million folks across the country, and our concern is to help keep toxicity off television programs — excessive violence, et cetera. And I was very surprised, being on a parents television council board, when I read a report — I hope it's not true, but it might be — that says that of the best and most troublesome advertisers, Berkshire Hathaway, is near the bottom at 444 out of 452. I hope that's not true. But my point is this: when I was head of Boys Town and somebody said something like that, I'd say, "Go find out. Correct it." My question is would you be kind enough to say, "Go find out," if it's necessary, "Correct it." Thank you.

沃伦·巴菲特嗯。我会这么说:我不知道这个排名从哪儿来的。我是说,我看到——我们最大的广告商肯定是 GEICO。我们每年在广告上投入超过 7 亿美元。我看到他们的广告到处都是,你知道,我不觉得它们有冒犯性,或者会诱发反社会行为之类的。但我很乐意您联系托尼·奈斯利,因为我想不出伯克希尔还有哪家公司能做如此规模的广告。托尼是个随和的人——实际上他现在就在这里,但你可以给他往 GEICO 写信,或者今天晚些时候去 GEICO 的展位找他,直接跟他聊这件事。我很乐意您这么做,彼得神父。

WARREN BUFFETTYeah. I would say this: I don't know where the rankings come from. I mean, I see the — certainly by far our biggest advertiser would be GEICO. We spend over $700 million a year on advertising. I see their ads all over the place, and, you know, I don't regard them as offensive or inducing antisocial behavior or anything like that. But I would be glad for you to contact Tony Nicely because I can't think of any other company at Berkshire that does, remotely, the amount of advertising. And Tony is an easy fellow — he's here now, actually, but you could write him at GEICO or you could find him at the GEICO booth, probably, later in the day and just talk to him about that. I'd be glad to have you do that, Father Peter.

分散化、个人退休账户和证券账户

Diversification, IRAs, and brokerage accounts

沃伦·巴菲特2 号。

WARREN BUFFETTNumber 2.

现场股东早上好,巴菲特先生,芒格先生。我叫黛布·卡维罗(音译),来自新泽西州温莎市。我 45 岁,已经实现了财务独立,可以全职管理自己和配偶的钱。这有一部分归功于嫁得好。我当时——

AUDIENCE MEMBERGood morning Mr. Buffett, Mr. Munger. My name is Deb Caviello, (PH) and I'm from Windsor, New Jersey. I'm 45-years-old and have achieved financial independence in that I'm able to manage the money of my spouse and myself full time. And that goes to marrying well, part of that. I was —

沃伦·巴菲特那可以是很重要的一部分。(笑声)

WARREN BUFFETTThat can be a big part of it. (Laughter)

现场股东嫁得好是指我得到了鼓励和信心去追求这个。

AUDIENCE MEMBERMarrying well in the sense that I received the encouragement and the confidence to pursue that.

沃伦·巴菲特那太棒了。

WARREN BUFFETTThat's terrific.

现场股东我本来想问一个关于分散化的问题,但我想换个方式。我稍微调整一下。我们每人有一个传统个人退休账户、一个罗斯个人退休账户,我们共同还有一个证券账户。这些账户里的资产应该分开管理,还是作为一个整体来更好地管理?换句话说,是在每个账户里配置相同的证券,还是把不同类型的证券分别放在特定账户里?

AUDIENCE MEMBERI was going to ask you a question more along the lines of diversification, but I think I will put it this way. I'll skew it a little differently. Each of us has a traditional IRA, a Roth IRA, and together we have a brokerage account. Should the assets in those accounts be separated or better managed as a whole pile? In other words, have overlapping securities in each account or different types of securities relegated to a specific account?

沃伦·巴菲特嗯。我会说,你们的婚姻听起来会持久,所以我认为你应该把自己和丈夫看作一个整体。你会——你应该——在我看来,你应该审视自己的整体财务状况,而不是操心资产放在哪个地方。所以,如果你的净资产是 X,其中 20% 在 401(k) 账户里,30% 是直接持有的,等等,你就只看整体情况,决定你想要什么样的资产组合、什么样的资产类型,不要把每笔钱当作独立的罐子。我是说,在伯克希尔,你知道,我们在很多不同实体里持有股票——我们的保险公司在不同的投资组合里持有股票,之前也提到我们甚至在科隆还有一个投资组合。我根本不去想具体哪个实体持有哪只股票。你知道,它们都在为伯克希尔工作,我觉得你也应该——考虑自己情况的方式,就是把它当作都在为你的家庭工作。现在,如果你——你给我的印象是婚姻非常稳固,我觉得你丈夫要是离开你那他就疯了。但——如果你刚开始一段关系,你可能想把钱分开一段时间,看看发展如何,因为有相当比例的人最后都离婚了。听着,我不怎么做婚姻咨询。(笑声)但我感觉脚下有点站不住了。所以,我把它交给我们的婚姻专家,查理·芒格。(笑声)

WARREN BUFFETTYeah. Well, I would say your marriage sounds like it's going to last, so I think you should think of yourself and your husband as a unit. And I would — you should — in my view, you should look at your overall financial condition and not worry about where the location of the assets will be. So if you have a net worth of X and you have 20 percent of it in a 401(k) and 30 percent outright and so on like that, just look at the whole picture and decide what mix of assets, what type of assets you want, and don't treat them as being in separate pots. I mean, at Berkshire, you know, we own stocks in a whole bunch of different — our insurance companies own stocks in separate portfolios and we even have a portfolio in Cologne as mentioned earlier. I don't even think about what entity anything is in. You know, it's all working for Berkshire, and I think you should — the way to think about your situation is to think about it all working for your family. Now, if you're — you strike me as having a very solid marriage, and I think your husband would be crazy if he split with you. But the — if you're just starting out, you may want to keep your money separate for a while until you see how it plays out, because a significant percentage do end up in divorce. Listen, I don't get into marriage counseling very often. (Laughter) But I can feel the ground sort of disappearing between my feet here. But I will turn it over, therefore, to our marital expert, Charlie Munger. (Laughter)

查理·芒格是的。偶尔你会遇到一个会产生大量应税收入的投资。比如一只需要缴税的高收益垃圾债之类的。所以有些东西更适合放在那些有税收递延优惠的退休账户里。但除此之外,它就是一个整体,没错。

CHARLIE MUNGERYeah. Occasionally, you'll find an investment that is going to produce a huge amount of taxable income. It's a junk bond paying a high yield that's taxable or something. So some items are more suitable for those retirement accounts that get tax-deferral benefits. But apart from that, it's all one pot. Sure.

最终动力将不得不来自太阳

Eventually power will have to come from the sun

沃伦·巴菲特3 号。

WARREN BUFFETTNumber 3.

现场股东嗨,沃伦。我是道格·希克斯(音译),来自俄亥俄州阿克伦。最近新闻里很多人说石油在本世纪内会用完。考虑到美国的政策是拖到最后一秒才行动,你觉得石油的终结会如何上演?比如,你是否认为这不幸地会导致第三次世界大战?还是说你觉得石油用尽的那一天,替代能源就能顶上?还有,你觉得这些石油公司的价值在石油用尽时会归零吗?

AUDIENCE MEMBERHi, Warren. I'm Doug Hicks (PH) from Akron, Ohio. And you hear on the news lately a lot of people say that oil will run out during this century. Considering the U.S. policy is to do nothing until the very last second, how do you think the end of oil will play out? For example, do you think that this would, unfortunately, result in World War III? Or do you think alternative energy will be available, the day that oil runs out, to take its place? And maybe, do you think these oil companies' value will go to zero when oil runs out?

沃伦·巴菲特是的。石油不会用完。事情不是那样的。石油会在某个时候——谁知道什么时候——人们预测很多事情——石油在某个时候,全球每日生产能力会先趋于平稳,然后开始非常缓慢地下降。石油开采的特性决定了油井不会——除了极少数例外——不会在某个点每天产 100 桶,然后突然就停了或怎样。所以你会遇到这种枯竭问题,进入递减曲线之类的东西。所以我们不会——全球现在每天生产 8600 万或 8700 万桶石油,比以往任何时候都多。我们更接近——至少按我的计算——比以往任何时候都更接近在现有油田开发阶段下的全球产能极限。我的意思是,我们的剩余产能,我觉得,比我能记起的任何时期都少。而且比大多数时期要少得多。所以我们没有能力在短期内把每日 8600 万或 8700 万桶提到 1 亿桶。但不管那个峰值是多少,不管我们是 5 年后还是 50 年后达到,之后都只会逐渐下降,世界会适应它,希望我们在它发生之前就想到它,世界会做出各种调整,导致需求随着可用供应而逐渐下降。但我们会在这个世纪之后继续生产石油。只不过——问题是我们是每天生产 5000 万桶,还是 7500 万桶,还是 2500 万桶。我不知道答案。世界上有大量石油资源。我们搞砸了很多石油的采收。我的意思是,我们从来没有完全回收油田的全部潜在储量。有些油田我们工程设计失误,导致采收率会非常低。现在,未来可能会有更好的工程技术,三次采油之类的东西。但就世界生产石油或适应产能下降之类的事情而言,这绝不像拨动开关那么简单。你仍可能面临巨大的政治考量——去获取可用的石油——因为它在很长一段时间内对我们社会都太重要了。我们在任何短期内都无法让世界摆脱石油。你知道,这是生活中的现实。查理?

WARREN BUFFETTYeah. Oil won't run out. It doesn't work that way. What oil will do at some point — who knows when — people predict a lot of different things — oil at some point, daily productive capacity throughout the world will first level off and then start declining very gradually. The nature of oil extraction is such that wells don't — with rare exceptions — they don't go to a given point producing a hundred barrels a day and then all of a sudden quit or anything like that. So you run into this depletion aspect and get into decline curves and that sort of thing. So we won't — we're producing in the world, 86 or 87 million barrels a day of oil, which is more than we've ever produced before. We are closer — by at least my calculations — we are very much closer to producing almost as much as our productive ability is in the world, with fields in their current stage of development, than we've ever been. I mean, our surplus capacity, I think, is less than, well, any time I can remember. And it's quite a bit less than most periods. So we don't have the ability to crank up, in any short period of time, the 86 or 7 to a hundred million barrels a day. But whatever that peak will be, and whether we hit it five years from now or 50 years from now, and then it will just gradually taper down, and the world will adjust to it, and hopefully we'll be thinking about it, you know, well before it happens, and various adjustments will be made in the world that will cause the demand to somewhat taper down as the available supply. But we will be producing oil far beyond this century. It's just — the question is whether we're producing 50 million barrels a day, or 75 million, or 25 million barrels a day. I don't know the answer to that. There's a lot of oil in place in the world. We've messed up the recovery of a lot of the oil. I mean, we never recovered the, you know, the total potential of fields. And some fields we've mis-engineered in ways so that we will recover a very small percentage. Now, maybe there will be better engineering, tertiary recovery, and that sort of thing in the future. It's nothing like an on and off switch, though, in terms of the world producing oil or adjusting to reduced capacity or anything like that. You may still have enormous political considerations to — access to the available oil — because it's going to be so darn important to our society for so long. There's nothing we can do, in any short period of time, that will wean the world off of oil. You know, that is a fact of life. Charlie?

查理·芒格嗯,如果我们能再有 200 年经济增长,并在世界各地相当均匀地分配,同时世界人口也在增加,那么世界上所有的石油、煤炭、天然气和铀储备都微不足道。所以最终,当然,你不得不利用太阳。没有其他选择。而且我认为我们可以有把握地预测,在适应一个完全不同世界的这个过程中,会有一些痛苦。就我个人而言,我认为像我们这样快速地消耗掉世界的碳氢化合物储备是极其愚蠢的。我认为对于这些作为化工原料的东西,我们没有任何好的替代品,而且把如此珍贵、又没有确定替代品的东西消耗掉,完全是疯了。如果你回头看,我们本该怎么做?见鬼,我们本该在 30 年代买下中东的所有石油,用油轮运过来,存到我们自己地下。我的意思是,过去该做什么显而易见。即使这是显而易见的,我们现在在做类似的事吗?答案基本上是,没有。所以我认为政府政策在理性方面往往大大落后。我认为我们只能硬撑过去。但最终——如果我们要拥有一个繁荣的文明——除了太阳,我们没有别的选择。

CHARLIE MUNGERWell, if we get another 200 years of economic growth pretty well disbursed over the world, while the population of the world also goes up, all of the oil, coal, natural gas, and uranium reserves of the world are like nothing. So eventually, of course, you have to use the sun. There is no other alternative. And I think we can confidently predict that there will be some pain in this process of adjusting to a different world. Personally, I think it's extremely stupid to use up the hydrocarbon reserves of the world as fast as we are. I don't think we've got any good substitutes for those things as chemical feed stocks, and I think it's perfectly crazy to use up something so precious for which you have no alternative that's sure to be available. And if you look at it backwards, what should we have done? Hell, we should have bought all the oil in the '30s in the Middle East and take it over here by tankers and put it in our own ground. I mean, it's obvious to see what should have been done in the past. Even though that's obvious, are we doing the equivalent of that now? And the answer is, basically, no. So I think the governmental policy tends to be way behind in terms of rationality. And I think we'll just have to soldier through. But eventually the — if we're going to have a prosperous civilization — we have no other alternative than the sun.

沃伦·巴菲特你觉得 25 年后全球每日石油产量会是多少?

WARREN BUFFETTWhat's your over-under figure for 25 years from now, world production oil per day?

查理·芒格低于。

CHARLIE MUNGERDown.

沃伦·巴菲特是的。(笑声)这不是一个无关紧要的预测。我的意思是,它——相信我。如果 25 年后石油产量下降,那将是一个不一样的世界。我的意思是,中国今年将销售超过 1000 万辆汽车。我的意思是,需求会继续——即使在这样的价格下——我很难想象需求会大幅下降。所以如果产量下降,你会遇到一些有趣的后果。

WARREN BUFFETTYeah. (Laughter) That's not an insignificant prediction. I mean, it — believe me. If oil production is down 25 years from now, it will be a different world. I mean, you — China's going to sell over 10 million cars this year. I mean, the demand is going to keep — even at these prices — it's hard for me to imagine demand falling off a lot. So if production falls off, you'll have some interesting consequences.

巴菲特总统对超级富豪加税

Higher taxes for the superrich under Pres. Buffett

沃伦·巴菲特第 4 个问题。

<<<END P 4>>>

WARREN BUFFETTNumber 4.

现场股东巴菲特先生和芒格先生,我叫 Guy Pope,来自俄勒冈州波特兰。我很喜欢今天早上的那幅漫画,我想引申一下。我也喜欢你们俩各自当一届美国总统的想法。假设,巴菲特先生,你当第一任;芒格先生,你当第二任。

AUDIENCE MEMBERMr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, my name is Guy Pope, and I'm from Portland, Oregon. I enjoyed the cartoon this morning, and I'd like to expand on that. I, too, like the idea of both of you serving as a single term as the President of the United States. During — hypothetically, let's say, Mr. Buffett, you served the first term; Mr. Munger, you served a second term.

沃伦·巴菲特我觉得反过来更好,但请继续。(笑声)

WARREN BUFFETTI think the other way around is better, but go ahead. (Laughter)

现场股东请你们各自说出三项在任期内会实施的艰难政策,以便让国家变得更好。

AUDIENCE MEMBEREach of you please name three difficult policy decisions you would implement during your term to better the country.

沃伦·巴菲特嗯,查理会当第一任,所以我让他先说三项。

WARREN BUFFETTWell, Charlie is going to serve the first term, so I'm going to let him name his three.

查理·芒格我觉得这个问题太偏了,要求太高了。让我们俩在几分钟内给出针对人类重大问题的三个完美解决方案?我们这辈子能勉强熬过来就不错了,我觉得我们应付不了这个。(笑声)

CHARLIE MUNGERI think that one takes us so far afield that I think it's asking too much. Three perfect solutions to the major problem of mankind from each of us in a few minutes? We've just barely managed to stagger through life as well as we have, and I don't think we're quite up to it. (Laughter)

沃伦·巴菲特我们可能实际上会搞一个大规模的联邦养老院计划。(笑声)我可能会在税收制度上做点什么,改变现状,让超级富豪多交点,中产阶级少交点,但是——(掌声)

WARREN BUFFETTWe'd probably have a massive federal program for retirement homes, actually. (Laughter) I would probably do something about the tax system that would change things so that the superrich paid a little more and the middle class paid a little less, but — (Applause.)

沃伦·巴菲特这也许就是你们为什么更希望查理先当总统的原因。

WARREN BUFFETTThat might be why you'd prefer to have Charlie serve first.

芒格:乙醇“蠢得离谱”

Munger: Ethanol is "monstrously dumb"

沃伦·巴菲特第 5 个问题。

WARREN BUFFETTNumber 5.

现场股东嗨。我是来自亚利桑那州的 Ryan Johnson,我想问问你们对世界粮食短缺的看法,以及你们认为未来一二十年的趋势是什么?

AUDIENCE MEMBERHi. I'm Ryan Johnson (PH) from Arizona, and I wanted to ask what you think about the food shortages in the world and what trends you see in the next decade or two?

沃伦·巴菲特嗯,这我又不是专家。查理?

WARREN BUFFETTWell, again, I'm no expert on that. Charlie?

查理·芒格嗯,我去年说过,我认为把美国玉米变成汽车燃料的政策,就世界的未来而言,是我见过的最愚蠢的主意之一——(掌声)。我跟一个学术机构的负责人一起来这里,他说这个主意蠢得惊人。现在,我在内布拉斯加,我喜欢内布拉斯加人发财。但这个主意蠢得离谱,我觉得它可能快要被淘汰了。

CHARLIE MUNGERWell, I said last year that I thought that the policy of turning American corn into motor fuel was one of the dumbest ideas, in terms of the future of the world — (applause) — that I'd ever seen. I came out here with the head of an academic institution, and he called the idea stunningly stupid. Now, I'm here in Nebraska where I like Nebraskans to prosper. But this idea was so monstrously dumb that I think it's probably on its way out.

业余投资者应坚持低成本的指数基金

Amateurs should stick with low-cost index funds

沃伦·巴菲特我们现在已经——哦,不对。我们还有时间再回答几个。来,第 6 个问题。

WARREN BUFFETTWe've now — oh, no. We've got time for a couple more. Let's go to number 6.

现场股东嗨,我叫 Timothy Ferriss,每年在普林斯顿大学担任两次客座讲师。我想接续之前一个关于小额投资的问题。我想请问两位,如果你们又回到 30 岁,银行里有第一个 100 万美元,你们会怎么投资,假设你们不是全职投资者,有另一份全职工作,可以用其他储蓄支付大约 18 个月的生活开销,没有家属,如果你们能尽可能具体地谈谈资产类别、配置比例之类的,不管你们愿意分享多少都可以,这对我的学生、对我自己、对在座各位都会非常有帮助。(观众席嘈杂声)

AUDIENCE MEMBERHi. My name is Timothy Ferriss. I am a guest lecturer at Princeton University twice a year. And I'd like to touch on an earlier question about investing with small sums of money. I'd like to ask both of you, if you were 30-years-old again and had your first million in the bank, how would you invest it, assuming you're not a full-time investor, you have another full-time job, you can cover your expenses with other savings for about 18 months, no dependents, and it would be really helpful for my students, for myself and others here, if you could be as specific as possible about asset classes, percentages, whatever you're willing to offer. (Crowd noises)

沃伦·巴菲特嗯,我会非常简单:根据你设定的条件,我可能会全部投到一个成本极低的指数基金里,可能——你也知道,或许是 Vanguard——某个我信得过、费率低的基金。因为你假设自己不会成为职业投资者,我会承认我是业余投资者这一事实,并且我会认为——除非是在大涨的牛市中买入,而现在显然不是——我会认为,在长期内,以当前条件来看,它能跑赢债券到一定程度,然后我就不管了,回去工作。查理?

WARREN BUFFETTWell, I'll be very simple: I — under the conditions you name, I'd probably have it all in a very low-cost index fund, and it would probably be — you know might be Vanguard — somebody I knew was reliable, somebody where the cost was low. And because you postulated that you're not going to become a professional investor, I would recognize the fact that I'm an amateur investor, and I would feel that a — unless bought during a strong bull market, which this hasn't been — I would feel that that was going to outperform, to a degree, bonds, under current conditions over a long period of time, and then I'd forget it and go back to work. Charlie?

查理·芒格是的。在事情的本质里,你本来也不会遇上很多极为成功的职业投资者。你面对的是大批的专业人士,像庄家一样从系统中抽水,其中大多数人是在假装自己是职业投资者,而这同样也是事情的本质。但如果你确实没有可能成为非常出色的职业投资者,那你当然就应该接受现实,选择指数基金这样简单的东西。

CHARLIE MUNGERYeah. It's in the nature of things that you aren't going to have a whole lot of screamingly successful professional investors. You've got a great horde of professionals taking croupiers profits out of the system, most of them by pretending to be professional investors, and that is in the nature of things, too. But if you don't have any rational prospects of being a very skilled professional investor, of course you should compromise on some simple thing like an index fund.

沃伦·巴菲特没错。而且这一点——你不会从任何人那里得到这种建议,因为没人靠给你这种建议赚钱。所以会有形形色色的人告诉你,他们能替你做得比这好得多,只要你给他们一笔打包费,或者给他们佣金,不论是哪种名目,他们都能做得更好,但他们做不到。平均而言,如果其他一千个跟你情况相同的人也这么做,那这一千个人如果听了那些向他们推销的人的话,结果反而会更差。说到底,你凭什么指望——我的意思是,按我建议的做法,你在 30 年或 40 年里能获得相当不错的回报。你自己没什么特别的东西带到牌桌上,凭什么指望得到更多呢?推销员会告诉你你能得到,但你得不到。

WARREN BUFFETTYeah. And that — you will not get that advice from anybody because nobody gets paid to give you that advice. So you will have all kinds of people telling you how much better they can do for you than that, and how if you just give them a wrap fee, or give them commissions, or whatever it may be, that they will do better, but they won't do better. On average, you know, if a thousand other people like you do the same thing, that group of a thousand will do worse if they listen to the people that make pitches at them. And in the end, why should you expect — I mean, you've got a very perfectly decent return over a 30- or 40-year period by doing what I suggest. And why should you expect more than that when you don't bring anything to the party? The salesman will tell you that you'll get it, but you won't.

查理·芒格我再给你们一句提醒:不要用在这次大会上见到的股票经纪人来衡量整个行业。我们吸引来的是全世界最正直、最聪明的一些股票经纪人。他们代表不了这个群体的普遍水平。

CHARLIE MUNGERI would give you another word of warning: do not judge stockbrokers generally by the ones you meet at this meeting. We attract some of the most honorable, intelligent stockbrokers in the world. They are not representative of the class.

沃伦·巴菲特(笑)他骨子里政治家的那一面露出来了。

WARREN BUFFETT(Laughs) The politician in him just came out

不必“极端节俭”,但不要入不敷出

No "extreme frugality" but don't spend more than you make

沃伦·巴菲特好。我们再回答一个问题,然后休会吃午饭。第 7 个。

WARREN BUFFETTOK. We'll do one more, and then we'll break for lunch. Number 7.

现场股东早上好。我叫 Tim Fam,来自得克萨斯州奥斯汀。为了我的孩子们,我想听听两位对攀比诱惑这个问题的看法。你们能否给他们一些可以奉行一生的建议,有关节俭、债务和职业操守方面的?

AUDIENCE MEMBERGood morning. My name is Tim Fam (PH). I'm from Austin, Texas. For my children, I would like to hear from both of you as far as the temptation to keeping up with the Joneses. And can you give them advice that they can live by with respect to frugality, debt, and work ethic?

沃伦·巴菲特好。就告诉他们跟巴菲特家攀比吧。(笑声)嗯,查理和我一直都倡导量入为出,如果你能做到,未来的收入会多得多。而且,我认为——在很大程度上,虽然不是绝对,但孩子们会效仿父母的榜样。我的意思是,如果父母对邻居的每样东西都眼红,或者总想办法增加生活开支,却并未提升生活品质,那么孩子们很可能会学样。不过也可能有相反的效果。如果你对孩子管得太死,他们以后会走极端。(笑)但——这是——这是每个人自己的选择。顺便说一句,有些人——有很多人我是不劝他们攒钱的。我的意思是,说真的——如果你日子过得紧巴巴,收入还算合理,有雇主帮你往 401(k) 里存钱,又有社保,那谁能断言,把家里省下来的一块钱花在带孩子去迪士尼乐园,让他们开心得不得了,就一定不如等你 75 岁时把 20 英尺的船换成 30 英尺的船?我的意思是,这其中有许多选择,在家人还年轻的时候,把钱花在各种形式的享受、教育或别的用途上,是有好处的。所以,我不——我不提倡——我自己或许这样做——但我不提倡极端节俭。我也不说存下收入的 10% 就一定比存下 5% 更好。我觉得花掉收入的 105% 是发疯,那会带来各种各样的麻烦,我每天都收到遭受过这些麻烦的人写来的信。但是,说到底,你希望拥有的是自己的内心记分牌。我的意思是,你不会因为与邻居过着不同的生活,就成为一个更好或更差的人。去过忠于自己的人生吧。查理?

WARREN BUFFETTYeah. Just tell them to keep up with the Buffetts. (Laughter) Well, Charlie and I have always been big fans of living within your income, and if you do that, you'll have a whole lot more income later on. And, you know, it — I think they will, to a considerable extent, not a perfect extent, they will follow the example of their parents. I mean, if their parents are coveting, you know, every possession of their neighbor, you know, or trying to figure out ways to increase their cost of living without necessarily their standard of living, the kids are likely to pick up on it. But now you can get the reverse effect. If you get too tough with them, they go crazy later on. (Laughs) But the — it's — people make that election. Incidentally, there are people — there are plenty of people that I don't advise to save. I mean, the real — if you're struggling along and making a reasonable income and you have a job with a 401(k) being put aside for you, and you have Social Security, who's to say whether it's better to defer a dollar of expenditure on your family on a trip to Disneyland or something that they'll get enormous enjoyment out of so that when you're 75 you can have a, you know, 30-foot boat instead of a 20-foot boat? I mean, there are choices and there are advantages to spending money in various forms for your family when it's young, and giving them various forms of enjoyment or education or whatever it may be. So I don't — I don't advocate — I may practice — but I don't advocate extreme frugality. The — and I don't say that it's always better to be saving 10 percent of your income instead of 5 percent of your income. I think it's crazy to be spending 105 percent of your income, and I think that leads to all kinds of problems, and I get letters from people every day that have experienced those problems. But, you know, in the end you want to have an internal score card. I mean, you are not a better person or a worse person because you live a different kind of life than your neighbor. Live a life that, you know, is true to yourself. Charlie?

查理·芒格是啊。教育孩子最好的方法,显然是给他们树立正确的榜样。(台下有人在大喊大叫)

CHARLIE MUNGERYeah. It's obviously the best method to train your children to provide the proper example. (A person in the audience is shouting)

沃伦·巴菲特看来我们听到的,正是一个没得到那种建议的孩子。(笑声)

WARREN BUFFETTI think we're hearing a child that didn't get that advice. (Laughter)

查理·芒格但当然了,即使你树立了正确的榜样,也很可能不管用——

CHARLIE MUNGERBut of course, even if you do provide the proper example, it's likely not to work —

沃伦·巴菲特中午了。

WARREN BUFFETTIt's noon.

查理·芒格——至少有些时候是这样。

CHARLIE MUNGER— some of the time anyway.

沃伦·巴菲特现在已经是中午了。我们休息约 30 到 40 分钟,之后再回来。另一个房间的部分股东——午饭之后,主会场通常会有一些空位,你们或许可以换到主会场来。我们暂定 12:45 重新开始,一直开到下午 3 点。

WARREN BUFFETTIt's noon now. We'll take about a 30 to 40-minute break. We'll come back. Some of those who are in the other room — we always have some openings here after lunch so you might be able to move into the main room. We'll reconvene, we'll say, at 12:45. We'll go to 3 o'clock.