2020 年股东大会 · 下半场
问答环节开始
Q&A begins
沃伦·巴菲特那么现在,我们准备开始回答贝基·奎克筛选出来的问题,这些问题是从直接转发给她的以及卡罗尔·卢米斯和安德鲁·罗斯·索金提交的问题中选出的。我和格雷格可以在这里——我们会花一些时间回答这些问题。贝基,你开始吧,希望所有技术——希望一切都运行正常。(笑)
WARREN BUFFETTSo now we're ready to have questions which Becky Quick has selected from those that's been forwarded to her directly and from Carol Loomis and Andrew Ross Sorkin, and Greg and I are available to be — we'll be answering them for some time. So, Becky, you're on and I hope all the tech — I hope everything works. (Laughs)
贝基·奎克沃伦,我得告诉你,自从你把那个地址放到屏幕上之后,我已经收到了超过 2500 封邮件。所以,股东们想进来提问的需求非常大。我会问一些我们之前整理好的问题,还有一些是刚刚收到的。
BECKY QUICKYeah, Warren, I should tell you that since you put that address up on the screen, I've gotten more than 2500 emails that have been coming in. So, there is a lot of demand from shareholders wanting to get in and ask questions. And I'll ask some that we've compiled before and some that are coming in right now.
巴菲特确认已卖出所有航空公司股票
Buffett confirms all airline shares were sold
贝基·奎克不过第一个问题,是根据你们刚刚的发言实时收到的。这个问题来自威廉·刘易斯。他问:“请问,我理解得对吗,巴菲特先生是说伯克希尔·哈撒韦卖掉了在四家不同航空公司的持股?如果确实如此,您能说出是哪些公司吗?可以明确说出是哪几家航空公司吗?”
BECKY QUICKThe first question, though, comes from one that just came in based on the comments that you were actually saying. This is a question that comes from William Lewis. He said, "Please, did I understand correctly Mr. Buffett to say that Berkshire Hathaway sold its interest in four different airlines, and if so, can you name them? Can the names of those airlines be identified?"
沃伦·巴菲特是的,我通常不会谈论这个。但我认为需要解释一下。这个解释的意思是,我们对这些企业当时的运营方式和管理层完全没有感到失望,但我们确实得出了不一样的看法。这四家大型——它们是美国最大的四家航空公司:美国航空、达美航空、西南航空和联合大陆航空。我认为,它们合计起来大概至少占美国境内飞行的收入客英里数的 80%。而且,除西南航空外,它们还拥有相当数量的国际航班业务。所以,我们喜欢这些航空公司。我们喜欢它们,但我们不喜欢的是——航空业的世界已经变了。我不知道它具体是怎么变的,我希望它能以合理迅速的方式自我修正。我不知道美国人现在是已经改变了习惯,还是会因为经济可能半停摆的状况持续较长时间(如果真的发生的话)而改变习惯。我不知道那些趋势——你知道,就是人们一直通过电话处理事务的趋势——会怎样。我是说,我已经——我已经七周没理发了,也有七周多——超过七周——没打过领带或系过任何类似的东西了。只是穿哪身运动服的问题。所以,谁知道我们会以怎样的方式走出这场危机,但我认为有些行业——不幸的是,我觉得航空业正是其中之一——确实因远超我们控制的事件而被迫实际上停摆,遭到了重创。格雷格,你有什么要补充的吗?
WARREN BUFFETTYeah, I wouldn't normally talk about it. But I think it requires an explanation. And it requires an explanation that means we were not disappointed at all in the businesses as they were being run, and the management, but we did come to a different opinion on it. The four large — there're the four largest U.S. airlines. It's American Airlines and Delta Air Lines and Southwest Airlines and United Continental. And I think collectively they probably are at least 80 percent of the revenue passenger miles in the — that is flown in the United States. And they have significant international flying, too, excluding Southwest. So, we like those airlines. We like them, but we do not like — the world was changed for the airlines. And I don't know how it's changed, and I hope it corrects itself in a reasonably prompt way. I don't know whether Americans will have now changed their habits, or will change their habits, because of an extended period, if it happens, that we're semi-shut down in the economy. I don't know whether the trends toward, you know, what people have been doing by phone. I mean I've been — it's been seven weeks since I've had a haircut. It's been seven weeks since— more than seven weeks — since I put on a tie or anything. It's just a question of which sweatsuit I wear. So, who knows how we come out of this, but I think that there are certain industries — and unfortunately, I think that the airline industry, among others — that are really hurt by a forced, in effect shutdown by events that are far beyond our control. Greg, would you like to add anything to that?
格雷格·阿贝尔实在没什么可补充的,沃伦。
GREG ABELReally nothing to add, Warren.
沃伦·巴菲特好了。(笑)我们这儿又出了个查理。(笑)
WARREN BUFFETTOK. (Laughs) We've got another Charlie here. (Laughs)
格雷格·阿贝尔我没——我没打算拿这个当一句惯用台词来说。但你看,你已经说得很到位了。
GREG ABELI didn't — I didn't intend to use that as a line. But you know, you've covered it well.
沃伦·巴菲特顺便说一下,我们本来也会买其他航空公司。但那四家是最大的,也是我们能投得进钱的。我们投进去了大概七八十亿美元,而拿回来的远没有七八十亿。这是我的错误。但问题是——发生概率较低的事情,有时候就是会发生。航空公司就摊上了这种事。而做出那个决定的人是我。
WARREN BUFFETTWe would have bought other airlines too, incidentally. But those were the four big ones. And those were the ones we could put some money into. And we put, whatever it was, 7 or 8 billion into it, and we did not take out anything like 7 or 8 billion. And that was my mistake. But it was — it's always a problem if — There are things on the lower levels of probabilities that happen sometimes. And it happened to the airlines. And I'm the one who made the decision.
贝基·奎克但是沃伦,我只是想确认一下他的问题,他问的是,你是不是把那四家公司的股票全卖了?
BECKY QUICKBut Warren, just to clarify on his question, he asked, did you sell your whole stake in all four of those?
沃伦·巴菲特是的,答案是肯定的。当我们卖出某样东西——当我们卖出某样东西时,通常会是整个持仓。我的意思是,我们不会削减仓位,或者——那不是我们的做法,就像如果我们买入一家企业 100% 的股份,我们不会把它减持到 90% 或 80%。我的意思是,如果我们喜欢一家企业,我们会尽可能多地买入,并尽可能长时间地持有。但当我们改变主意时——
WARREN BUFFETTYeah, the answer is yes. Yeah, when we — when we sell something — when we sell something, very often it's going to be our entire stake. I mean, we don't trim positions or — that just not the way we approach it, any more than if we buy a hundred percent of a business, we're going to sell it down to 90 percent or 80 percent. I mean, if we like a business, we're going to buy as much of it as we can and keep it as long as we can. But when we change our mind —
贝基·奎克好的。下一个问题——
BECKY QUICKAll right. The next question —
沃伦·巴菲特继续,抱歉。
WARREN BUFFETTGo ahead, I'm sorry.
贝基·奎克不,您继续说。您什么时候改变主意?
BECKY QUICKNo, go ahead. When you change your mind?
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,当我们改变主意时,绝不会半途而废或搞什么折中。所以,坦白说,我很惊讶——现在我们是远低于买入价的价格在卖出——但我惊讶的是成交量。航空股的成交量向来相对较大。我们已卖掉了全部持仓。
WARREN BUFFETTWell, when we change our mind, we don't take half measure or anything of the sort. So, I was amazed at how, frankly — now we were selling them at far lower prices than we paid — but I was amazed at the volume. The airlines always trade in large volume, relatively. But we have sold the entire positions.
贝基·奎克好的,谢谢。
BECKY QUICKOK, thank you.
买股票需要正确的心理
You need the right psychology to buy stocks
贝基·奎克下一个问题来自加拿大多伦多的罗伯特·托马斯。他问:“沃伦,你为什么会建议听众现在就买,可你自己现在却并不放心出手?你那庞大的现金仓位不就说明了这一点吗?”
BECKY QUICKThe next question comes from Robert Tomas, from Toronto, Canada, and he says, "Warren, why are you recommending listeners to buy now, yet you're not comfortable buying now, as evidenced by your huge cash position?"
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,第一,正如我解释过的,当我考虑最坏情况的可能性时,这个仓位并不算巨大。我想说,有些事情我认为相当不可能——可能性很低——我希望它们不会发生,但这不意味着它们不会发生。我的意思是,举个例子,在我们的保险业务中,我们可能遭遇世界上——或者说全国——有史以来最强的一次飓风,但这并不排除我们一个月后可能遭遇有史以来最大的一次地震。所以,我们不会只为单一问题做准备,我们为那些有时会自我强化的问题做准备。我是说,在 2008 年和 2009 年,你并不是第一天就看到所有的问题——真正点燃导火索的是,房利美和房地美这两个政府赞助企业在九月初进入政府接管状态。然后,当货币市场基金跌破面值(breaking the buck)时,有些事会引发其他事。我们考虑问题时,会采用一个最坏情况的场景,这个场景很可能比大多数人考虑的要糟糕得多。所以,我不认为那是巨大的。而且我没有推荐人们今天、明天、下周或下个月买入股票。我认为这完全取决于你自己的情况。但在我看来,除非你预期持有它们非常长的时间,并且你从财务和心理上都准备好了,像持有农场一样持有它们,从来不看报价,你不需要关注它们。我的意思是,最主要的事情是——你不可能抄到底,也没有其他人能帮你抄到底,或者诸如此类。当你买入一只股票时,你必须准备好它下跌 50% 甚至更多,并且对此感到泰然自若,只要你对持有它感到安心。我指出过——我想是一年还是两年前的股东信里,差不多就是最近那份之前的那份——我指出过,伯克希尔历史上,股价曾三次下跌 50%——三次不同的时间。如果你是用借来的钱持有,你可能已经被清仓了。这三次情况发生时,伯克希尔本身没有任何问题。但是,如果你要看着股价,认为你必须因为它的涨跌而行动,或者因为别人告诉你一句话,比如“你怎么还能拿着它”,当别的股票在上涨或诸如此类时——真的,你必须处于正确的心理状态。坦白说,有些人不够谨慎。有些人比其他人更容易受到恐惧的影响。就像病毒一样——它对某些人的攻击比对其他人凶猛得多。而恐惧是我本人从未在财务上感受过的东西——但我不认为查理感受过。有些人能在心理上应对它。如果你不能在心理上应对,那你真的不应该持有股票,因为你会在错误的时间买入和卖出。而且你不应该指望别人告诉你该怎么做。你应该做一些你自己理解的事情。如果你自己不理解,你就会被下一个和你谈话的人影响。所以,你应该处于能够持有的状态。我不知道今天是不是买入股票的好日子。我知道它在 20 或 30 年后会不错。我完全不知道它在两年内会不会不错。我完全不知道你周一早上买入的一只股票或整个市场,最终是赚钱还是亏钱。
WARREN BUFFETTWell, A, as I've explained, the position isn't that huge when I look at worst-case possibilities. I would say that there are things that I think are quite impossible — improbable — and I hope they don't happen, but that doesn't mean they won't happen. I mean, for example, in our insurance business, we can have the world's — or the country's — number one hurricane that it's ever had, but that doesn't preclude the fact we could have the biggest earthquake a month later. So, we — we are not — we don't prepare ourselves for a single problem, we prepare ourselves for problems that sometimes create their own momentum. I mean, in 2008 and '09, you didn't see all the problems the first day when really — what really kicked it off was when the Freddie and Fannie, the GSEs, went into conservatorship in early September. And then when money market funds broke the buck, I mean — there are things that trip other things. And we take a very much — a worst-case scenario into mind that probably is a considerably worse case than most people do. So, I don't look at it as huge. And I'm not — I'm not recommending that people buy stocks today or tomorrow or next week or next month. I think it all depends on your circumstances. But you shouldn't buy stocks unless you expect, in my view, you expect to hold them for a very extended period and you are prepared financially and psychologically to hold them the same way you would hold a farm, and never look at a quote, and never pay — you don't need to pay attention to them. I mean, the main thing to do — and you're not going to pick the bottom and you're not going — nobody else can pick it for you, or anything of the sort. You've got to be prepared, when you buy a stock, to have it go down 50 percent — or more — and be comfortable with it, as long as you're comfortable with the holding. And I pointed out — I think a year, maybe two years ago in the annual report — almost just the one before this most recent one — I pointed out that there have been three times in Berkshire's history when the price of Berkshire stock went down 50 percent — three different times. Now, if you hold it on borrowed money, you know, you could have been cleaned out. There wasn't anything wrong with Berkshire when those three times occurred. But if you're going to — if you're going to look at the price of the stock, and think that you have to act because it's doing this or that, or somebody else tells you a line, I mean, "How can you stay with that," when something else is going up or anything. Really, you've got to be in the right psychological position. And frankly, some people are not really careful. Some people are more subject to fear than others. It's like the virus — it strikes some people with much greater ferocity than others. And fear is — fear is something I've really never felt financially, but — I don't think Charlie's felt it, either. Some people can handle it psychologically. If you can't handle it psychologically, then you really shouldn't own stocks, because you're going to buy and sell them at the wrong time. And you should not count on somebody else telling you this. You should you should do something you understand yourself. If you don't understand it yourself, you're going to be affected by the next person you talk to. And so, you should — you should be in a position to hold. And I don't know whether today is a great day to buy stocks. I know it will work out over 20 or 30 years. I don't know whether it will work out over two years at all. I have no idea whether you'll be ahead or behind on a stock you buy on Monday morning — or the market.
四月 4.26 亿美元的股票买入毫无意义
April's $426M in stock buys was meaningless
贝基·奎克沃伦,下一个问题来自斯科特·凯利。他是根据你刚才公布的数字来信问的。他说:“你在四月份花 4.26 亿美元买了什么股票?是在增持现有仓位吗?还是开了新仓位?”
BECKY QUICKWarren, the next question comes from Scott Kelly. And he writes in based on the numbers you just put up. He said, "What did you spend the $426 million on equities in April? Was that adding to existing positions? Or was that initiating new positions?"
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,说实话,我不记得了。但有一点你得考虑在内——这些是伯克希尔·哈撒韦的总数字,里面包含了托德——托德·库姆斯和泰德·韦施勒各自管理的那一大笔钱。所以,很有可能是他们买的,也有可能是我买的。但 4.62 亿美元对伯克希尔来说不算多大点钱——(笑)——不过,就我们各自的组合规模而言,这对托德和泰德的意义,比对我要大。但我真的是一点都不记得了——显然,我们眼下没在做什么大动作。我们是非常愿意做大交易的。我的意思是,你可以在星期一早上来找我,说有一笔 300 亿、400 亿乃至 500 亿美元的交易,如果我们确实觉得这东西好,我们就会出手。总有一天会有这种事。如果是在二级市场上操作,我们不可能在一天、一周或一个月内把资金全部投进去。我们当时建立航空股仓位花了好几个月——很多个月。卖出的速度倒是比买入快,但都是在更低的价格卖出的。所以,这 4.62 亿基本没什么意义,而且甚至——大概都不是我操作的。
WARREN BUFFETTWell, I don't remember, to tell you the truth. But one thing you have to allow for — well, these are the figures for Berkshire Hathaway, and they include both Todd and — Todd Combs and Ted Weschler manage significant sums of money. So, it could well be something they bought. It could be something I bought. But I — 462 million is not much money — (laughs) — at Berkshire. It's more to Todd and Ted than it is to me, in terms of our positions. But I literally have no memory of — We're not doing anything big, obviously. We're willing to do something very big. I mean, you could come to me on Monday morning with something that involved 30 or 40 billion or $50 billion. And if we really liked what we were seeing, we would do it. And that will happen someday. If it happens in the market, we can't put it all in in one day or one week or one month. It took us months to build up our airline position — many months. We were able to sell them faster than we bought them, but we were selling them at lower prices. So, the 462 is essentially meaningless, and it may not have even — probably was not mine.
我们还没看到任何有吸引力的提供资本的机会
We haven't seen any attractive deals to provide capital
贝基·奎克好,下一个问题来自李彦达,他问:“在上次金融危机中,伯克希尔充当了八笔交易的资金支持方。虽然是通过优先股和认股权证注入了昂贵的资本,但这些公司实际上是在危机中为伯克希尔的信心信号买单。这价值无可估量。如今,我们有无限量宽松、低利率和饥渴的对冲基金,尽管过去几个月经济急剧恶化。为什么我们没有充当资金支持方?”
BECKY QUICKAll right, this next question comes from Lee Yan Dar, and his question is, "In the last financial crisis, Berkshire acted as a lender of support for eight different deals. Despite the injection of expensive capital through preferred stocks and securing warrants, these companies were, in fact, paying for the sign of confidence from Berkshire in the midst of a crisis. And that was invaluable. "Today we have QE infinity, low interest rates, and hungry hedge funds, even though the economy has deteriorated rapidly over the last few months. Why have we not acted as a lender of support?"
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,我们还没看到任何有吸引力的东西。而且,坦白说——这倒不是马后炮——美联储做了正确的事。他们行动非常迅速,本应如此。我为此向他们致敬。但这也意味着,很多需要资金的公司——它们或许本该早一点进行融资——但它们是相当不错的公司——在过去五周左右的时间里获得了大规模融资的机会。坦白说,这都创纪录了。有些公司甚至回来融了两轮——有好几家——一些非常大的公司,之前不着急拉长债务期限——都回来融了不止一次。伯克希尔实际上也借了些钱。我们并不需要。但我认为——长期来看,这么做仍然是个好主意。与此同时,还有一些相当勉强的公司也拿到了钱。所以,市场上资金完全不紧缺,只不过利率水平是我们不愿意去投的水平。因此,我们什么也没做——因为我们没看到任何特别有吸引力的机会。眼下这种情况,说不定很快就会变,也说不定不会变。可回到 2008 年和 2009 年,事实上,我们做那些交易,并不是要——要向外界传递什么信号。那些交易可能在某种程度上确实向外界传递了信号,如果真是这样,我也很欣慰。但我们之所以做,只是因为它们在商业上看起来很聪明。而且当时市场环境让我们几乎没有竞争。事后回头看,如果我们等上四五个月再做类似交易,收益会好得多。所以,我在 2008、2009 年的买入时机其实相当差,但——当时能拿到的条件实在太有吸引力了,哪怕我的时机奇差,我们到头来——结果依然不错,甚至比不错还要好一点。但这——我们当时的举措——并不是刻意要传递什么信号,而是为了充分利用我们认为极其优厚的条款。只是,当时没有其他人愿意提供这些条款,因为市场正处于恐慌之中。当疫情暴发——或者说蔓延到美国——并且形势变得明朗时,股票市场出现了一小段恐慌,债务市场也冻结了——或者说正在冻结。美联储出手后,局面发生了剧烈变化。但谁又知道下周、下个月或明年会发生什么呢?美联储不知道。我不知道。没有人知道。各种——各种不同的情景都可能上演。在某些情景下,我们会花出去很多钱;在其他情景下,我们不会。格雷格,你一直在观察伯克希尔周边所发生的情况吧。
WARREN BUFFETTWell, we haven't seen anything attractive. And, frankly — it wasn't predicated on this — but the Federal Reserve did the right thing. And they did it very promptly, which they should have. And I salute them for it. But that means that a lot of companies that needed money, and probably should have done their financing a little earlier — but they're perfectly decent companies — got the chance to finance in huge ways in the last five weeks or there abouts. I mean, it's set records. Some companies have come back twice — a number — very big companies that didn't bother to extend out their borrowings — came a couple times. Berkshire actually raised some more money. We don't need it. But we'll — I think it's still a good idea over time. And then there are some pretty marginal companies that have also had access to money. So, there is no shortage of funds at rates which we would not invest at. So, we have not — we have not done anything because we don't see anything that attractive to do. Now, that could change, you know, very quickly or it may not change. But in 2008 and '09, the truth is, we weren't — we weren't buying those things to make a statement to the world. They may have made a statement to the world to some extent, and I'm glad that they did, if they did. But we made them because they seemed intelligent things to do. And markets were such that we didn't really have much competition. Now it turned out that we would have been a lot better off if we'd waited four or five months to do similar things. So, my timing was actually terrible in 2008 or '09, but the — what was available was so attractive that even though my timing was terrible, we still — we still came out OK, or a little bit better than OK. But it was not — it was not designed — what we did was not designed to make a statement. It was designed to take advantage of what we thought were very attractive terms. But they were terms that nobody else was willing to offer at that time because the market was in a state of panic. And the market in equities was in a state of panic for a short period of time when the virus broke out — or spread to the United States — and it became apparent — and the debt market was frozen — or in the process of freezing. And that changed dramatically when the Fed acted. But who knows what happens next week or next month or next year? The Fed doesn't know. I don't know. And nobody knows. There's various — there's a lot of different scenarios that can play out. And under some scenarios, we'll spend a lot of money. In other scenarios we won't. Greg, you've been watching what's been happening around Berkshire.
格雷格·阿贝尔是的。是的。嗯,我认为你对美联储的评价,沃伦——因为你知道,有意思的是,最初发生时,我们接到了一些电话——不是我们感兴趣的交易规模,也不是我们倾向于行动的公司。但确实存在那种普遍的兴趣,因为人们当时处境困难,就是说,他们盯着自己的资产负债表,决定下一步该怎么办。但实际上,那些公司并不——并不吸引人。而在 3 月 23 日之后——基本上,实际上——从 3 月 23 日起,公司得以行动。沃伦提到了这一点。在伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源,美联储行动后,我们实际上发行了 40 亿美元的证券,与到期的债务或义务相关——我们有些短期债务,明显想展期。我们还为 PacifiCorp 的一个资本计划预先融资,认为这是获取资金的时机,这样我们就可以推进这个对 PacifiCorp、我们的客户以及最终对伯克希尔股东来说都是绝佳机会的项目。所以,我们在伯克希尔内部采取了行动,正如沃伦所说。
GREG ABELYeah. Yeah. Well, I think your comment on the Fed, Warren — because as you know, interestingly, when it was first occurring, there were calls coming in — not the size of transactions we're interested in nor companies we were inclined to act upon. But there were — there was that general interest out there as people were in a difficult point in time, i.e., looking at their balance sheet and deciding what they were going to do. But the reality is those companies were not — not of interest. And post — basically, effectively — March 23rd, the companies have been able to act. And Warren touched on it. At Berkshire Hathaway Energy, post the Fed action, we actually issued $4 billion of securities that was associated with debts or obligations we had maturing — some short-term obligations we wanted to clearly lengthen out. And we pre-funded one of our capital programs at PacifiCorp, with the thought this was the time to get the funds in place such that we could proceed with what is really an excellent opportunity both for PacifiCorp, our customers, and ultimately for the Berkshire shareholders. So, we've taken action within Berkshire, as Warren noted.
沃伦·巴菲特眼下是非常好的借钱时候,这也就意味着,眼下或许并不是非常好的放贷时候。不过——对国家来说,这很好——现在正是借钱的好时候。对伯克希尔倒不见得特别好,虽说我们也借了些钱——我们算是言行一致。
WARREN BUFFETTThis is a very good time to borrow money, which means it may not be such a great time to lend money. But the — it's good for the country that it's a good — it's a good time to borrow money. Not good for Berkshire, particularly, although we borrowed some money so we — we've put our money where our mouth is.
我们不会用股东的钱补贴旗下公司
We won't subsidize our companies with shareholder money
贝基·奎克这引出了伊利诺伊州芝加哥市马克·麦克尼科拉斯提出的另一个问题。他说,伯克希尔本身拥有诺克斯堡般的资产负债表,但一些运营公司可能在疫情期间现金紧张。伯克希尔是否会考虑向其运营公司提供现金,一是确保它们能度过疫情,二是能让它们在竞争对手挣扎时扩大市场份额?
BECKY QUICKThat gets kind of to another question that came in from Mark McNicholas in Chicago, Illinois. He says Berkshire itself has a Fort Knox-like balance sheet, but some of its operating companies may be tight on cash during the pandemic. Would Berkshire consider sending cash to its operating companies to, one, ensure that they can get through the pandemic and, two, allow them to increase market share while their competitors struggle?
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,我们给几家公司送去了钱——我们有能力这么做。但我们不会无限期地向任何看起来前景与一年前或六个月前相比发生了根本性变化的企业送钱。你知道,我们在航空业做出了那个决定。我们基本上把钱从企业里拿了出来,即使蒙受了重大亏损。我们不会资助一家我们认为未来会持续烧钱的公司。1965 年,我们从伯克希尔·哈撒韦的纺织业务开始就是这样一家公司。我们花了 20 年时间,试图解决一个本质上不可解决的问题。所以,我们不经营用股东的钱补贴任何公司的业务。如果有人想用自己的钱这么做——但我们不会代表他们这么做。不过,我们已经预付了资金——我们完全愿意预付资金。扩大市场份额之类的。那可能会发生,但需要资金的公司,可能市场份额不是它们的第一要务。我就这么说吧。格雷格,你会——?
WARREN BUFFETTWell, we've sent money to a few and — we're in a position to do that. We're not going to send money indefinitely to anything where it looks like their future is not — it's just changed dramatically from what it was a year ago or so, or even six months ago. You know, we made that decision in terms of the airline business. We took money out of the business, basically, even at a substantial loss. And we will not fund a company that — where we think that it's going to chew up money in the future. We started out with a company like that in our textile business at Berkshire Hathaway in 1965. And we went for 20 years, trying to think we could solve something that wasn't that solvable. So, we are not in the business of subsidizing any companies with shareholders' money. If people want to do that with their own money — but we're not going to do it on their behalf. But we have advanced money — we are perfectly ready to advance money. Gaining market share and all that. That may happen but the companies that need money, probably, market share is not their number one problem. I'll put it that way. Greg, would you —?
格雷格·阿贝尔是的,嗯,是的。有意思的是,当我们审视进入疫情的各家公司时,我们正在应对 COVID-19 危机。显然,我们的管理团队首先关注——而且理当如此——是我们的员工,确保他们在所处的商业环境中安全,能够继续运营。然后我们很快转向观察客户在周期中的位置,即业务中的潜在需求。值得赞扬的是,我们的经理们非常出色地根据客户的基本需求和诉求调整了业务。所以,他们实际上是与客户同步前进,这意味着我们很少有企业确实需要资金。有些需要,正如沃伦所说,我们已经向他们预付了资金。但企业真的以一种与市场状况——即对其产品的需求——相一致的方式做出了反应。
GREG ABELYeah, well, yeah. It's interesting when we look at our different companies as we went into the pandemic, where we're addressing the COVID-19 crisis. Obviously, the first focus by our management team — and appropriately — was our employees, and effectively making sure they're safe in that the business environment we're in that, that they could continue to operate. Then we quickly moved to looking at where our customers were in the cycle, i.e., what was the underlying demand within the business. And to great credit to our managers, they very much have adjusted their businesses consistent with the underlying needs and demands of customers. So effectively, they're moving with the customer, meaning very few of our businesses have actually required funds. Some have, and as Warren said, we've advanced the funds to them. But the businesses have really reacted in a way where they're managing consistent with the — with where the market's at, i.e., their — the demand for their products.
沃伦·巴菲特是的。伯克希尔几乎必然会持续产生现金。我是说,没有什么事是百分之百确定的——但正如格雷格提到的,伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源公司有一些短期融资。我们基本上没有任何短期融资。我们绝不会让自己陷入大量资金明天就要到期的处境。那些大量依赖商业票据融资、然后发现业务停滞的公司——你们已经看到了航空公司发生了什么。我是说,它们需要钱。邮轮公司需要钱。有些业务,你知道,这就是它们所处行业的本质。伯克希尔绝不会让自己陷入需要设法赚钱的窘境。我们把一些并非极端不可能发生的因素考虑在内——正如我所说——我们会把一些并非荒谬至极的可能性纳入考量。我不会详细列举具体情景,因为在某种程度上,你一旦开始——传播——列举具体情景,反而可能增加它们发生的可能性。所以,这不是我们真正想多谈的事,但——我们的立场会是——保持像诺克斯堡一样坚不可摧。但我们不需要——我们不需要一千三——目前这个数字比季度末略高一些——我们不需要 1300 亿或 350 亿美元,但我们需要大量随时可动用的资金。这意味着我们只持有国库券。我是说,我们不——我们从未持有——我们从不购买商业票据——我们不买——我们不依赖银行授信额度。我们的一两个子公司——少数几个子公司有银行授信额度,但——我们——基本上,我们想做到能够安然度过任何情况。我们当然希望那种情况不会发生,但你不能排除这种可能性,就像 1929 年时你不能排除你一直要等到 1955 年——或 1954 年底——才能回本的可能性一样。任何事情都可能发生,我们想为任何事情做好准备,但同时我们也想做大事。如果价格有吸引力——正如格雷格所说——就在美联储出手干预之前的那段时间——我们开始接到电话了。那些电话并不诱人。但我们确实接到了电话。那些打电话来的公司——在美联储出手之后——坦率地说,其中不少都能够从公开市场筹集到资金,而且条件是我们不会提供给它们的。
WARREN BUFFETTYeah. Berkshire is almost certain to generate cash. I mean nothing's 100 percent certain but — and we're, as Greg mentioned, at Berkshire Hathaway Energy we had some short-term financing. We don't have short-term financing to any degree. We'll never get ourselves in a position where we have a lot of money that can come due tomorrow. And people that were financing heavily with commercial paper and then found their business stopped — well, you've seen what's happened to the airlines. I mean, they need money. Cruise lines need money. There's some businesses that, you know, it's just the nature of what they're in. Berkshire will never get in a position where it makes money. And we factor in — like I say — we factor in some things that are not ridiculously unlikely. And I'm not going to spell out scenarios because I, to some extent, you start — spreading — spelling out scenarios, you may increase the chance of them happening. So, it's not something that we really want to talk about a lot, but — Our position will be to be — to stay a Fort Knox. But we don't need — we don't need a hundred and — it's a little higher now than it was at quarter end — we don't need 130 or 35 billion, but we need a lot of money that's always available. And that means we own nothing but Treasury bills. I mean, we do not — we've never owned — we never buy commercial paper — we don't buy — we don't count on bank lines. One or two of our subsidiaries — a few of our subsidiaries have them but the — we've — we basically want to be in a position to get through anything. And we hope that doesn't happen, but you can't rule out the possibility any more than in 1929 you could rule out the possibility that, you know, you would be waiting until 1955 — or the end of 1954 — to get even. Anything can happen, and we want to be prepared for anything, but we also want to do big things. If the prices are attractive — as Greg said — there was a period right before the Fed acted — we were starting to get calls. They weren't attractive calls. But we were getting calls. And the companies we were getting calls from — after the Fed acted — a number of them were able to get money in the public market, frankly, at terms we wouldn't have given it to them.
伯克希尔可能短期裁员,但预期长期增加就业
Berkshire may have short-term layoffs but expects long-term job gains
贝基·奎克好的,下一个问题来自格雷格,你实际上在某种程度上已经触及了答案,但也许你们两个可以展开谈谈。这个问题来自亚利桑那州图森市的理查德·瑟瑟。他问:“伯克希尔的年报显示,截至 2019 年底,伯克希尔有 391,539 名员工。我们业务中的哪些领域已经受到或将要受到新冠疫情的严重冲击?这对这些人的持续就业有什么影响?”
BECKY QUICKAll right, this next question is one that Greg, you actually touched on the answer to this to some extent, but maybe the two of you could expand on it. It comes from Richard Sercer from Tucson, Arizona. He says, "Berkshire's annual report indicated that Berkshire had 391,539 employees at the end of 2019. Which areas of our operations have already been hardest hit, or will be, by the coronavirus pandemic? And what are the implications for the continued employment of those people?
沃伦·巴菲特这些人在几十个不同的行业工作。有一些行业,我们的就业人数很可能会减少,但规模不大。我边想边说。我是说,这不像——这不像我们在——你知道——在某些行业——你知道——我们不在酒店业,也不在旅行、娱乐等各个可能发生重大变化的领域。所以,我不认为我们的就业——我这么说吧。五年后,我认为伯克希尔将会雇佣相当多的人。我不认为——我不认为我们会大幅下滑。但病毒可能会以某些方式爆发,导致我们的一些制造企业,例如,需求可能大幅下降。在这种情况下,我们会在某些时候进行裁员。格雷格?
WARREN BUFFETTThose people are employed in dozens and dozens of different industries. And there's — there are a few industries that there's a fair likelihood that our employment could be reduced but they're not large. I'm just thinking as I'm talking. I mean, it's not like — it's not like we're — you know — in the — some of the businesses that are — you know — we're not in the hotel business, or various aspects of travel and entertainment and all of that that could really be changed in a very major way. So, I don't see our employment — I'll put it this way. Five years from now, I think Berkshire will be employing considerably more people. And I don't — I don't see where we'll have large dips. But the virus could take off in certain ways that in some of our manufacturing businesses, for example, the demand could be dramatically reduced. And in those cases, we would have — we would have layoffs at some point. Greg?
格雷格·阿贝尔我想补充一点,沃伦,那就是当我们处在疫情的关键时刻,我们仍在应对它,所以我们的业务已经进行了调整。有些业务需要调整更多。如果你看看伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源公司,例如,你会发现美国电力消耗下降了 4%。实际上,这并不会对该业务产生重大影响,长期来看我们会继续发展该业务。所以即使在危机期间,对业务的影响也相对较小。但正如沃伦所知,我们确实有一些零售商——他们的门店目前关闭了。比如我们的喜诗糖果,我们的一些珠宝店。那时,我们确实会根据环境进行调整和适应,也就是说,我们调整劳动力。但同样,我们也看到,例如,喜诗——某个时候,我们的门店会重新开张。那时,我们会重新雇佣员工。总的来说,对于整个伯克希尔,正如沃伦所说,五年后,我们看到我们的员工数量将远远、远远、远远高于今天,因为我们看到整个运营业务中有很好的前景。
GREG ABELWhat I would add, Warren, is that as we are in the, you know, sort of crux of the pandemic, we're still dealing with it, so our businesses have adjusted. Some have had to adjust more. We have — if you look at Berkshire Hathaway Energy, for example, you can see U.S. electricity consumption's down 4 percent. That, realistically, doesn't impact that business in a significant way, and longer term we'll continue to grow that business. So even in — even during the crisis, a relatively small impact to the business. But, as Warren knows, we do have retailers that — their doors are shut right now. Be it our See's Candy, the — some of our jewelers. And at that point in time, we do adjust and adapt to the environment, i.e., we adjust our workforce. But equally, we do see, for example, See's — at a point, our stores will reopen. And at that point, we reemploy the folks. And overall, for Berkshire as a whole, as Warren said, five years from now, we see our employment numbers being far, far, far greater than they we are today, in that we see great prospects within the operating businesses as a whole.
沃伦·巴菲特是的。喜诗——喜诗是个有趣的例子,因为我们从 1972 年就拥有了它。那是很长的时间。我们喜欢它,而且一直喜欢。我这里有一盒我们的花生脆糖,还有一盒软糖,我可能会全带回家,不给格雷格分享。(笑声)但是,我们当时正值复活节销售季。复活节是喜诗的一个大销售期。我不知道我们是不是过了半程,但在销量方面我们还没过一半,因为高峰在季末。基本上,我们被关闭了,而且仍然关闭着。那些商场——我们有大约 220 家零售店,还有很多——你知道——内布拉斯加家具城卖我们的糖果,但家具城也关门了。所以——
WARREN BUFFETTYeah. See's — See's is an interesting example, because we've owned that since 1972. That's a long time. And we love it. And we continue to love it. And I have a box here of our peanut brittle, and I've got another box of fudge right here, and I'll probably take them all home and not share with Greg. (Laughs) But, we were in the midst of our Easter season. And Easter is a big sales period for See's. And I don't know whether we were halfway through, but we weren't halfway through in terms of the volume that was going to be delivered, because it comes toward the end. And essentially, we were shut down and we remain shut down. The malls that — we've got 220 or so retail stores and we've got a lot of — you know, (Nebraska) Furniture Mart sells our candy, but the Furniture Mart's closed down. And so —
格雷格·阿贝尔对。
GREG ABELYep.
沃伦·巴菲特——喜诗的业务停了。而且它本身就是一个季节性很强的业务。所以,我们也有很多季节性工人,特别是在圣诞节期间。但我们有很多复活节糖果——(笑)——复活节糖果也有点特殊,所以我们卖不掉它,我们还生产了不少。我们无法发货——我们无法——我们无法把它放到店里——而且——有些情况正在发生。当然,我——格雷格负责所有这类情况的工作——我们的经理们当然也很出色,在处理这件事——但这是一个非常、非常不寻常的时期。就像我说的,几年后,我认为伯克希尔雇佣的员工会超过 395,000 人。多年来,我们从一家纺织企业开始,只有 2000 人,现在我们还是同样的套路——
WARREN BUFFETT— See's business stopped. And it's a very seasonal business to start with. So, we have a lot of seasonal workers, too, that come in, particularly for the Christmas season. But we have — we have a lot of Easter candy — (laughs) — and Easter candy is kind of specialized, too, so we won't sell it, and we produced a good bit of it. We couldn't ship it — we couldn't— we couldn't put it in stores and — and there's — some of that's going on. And, of course, I — Greg does all the work on those sort of situations — and our managers are terrific, of course, and dealing with it — but this is a very, very unusual period. And like I say, a few years from now, I think Berkshire will be employing more people than 395,000. Over the years, we've — we started with 2000 at a textile business, and we still got the same playbook — is —
只有非常小的伯克希尔子公司可能不会重新开业
Only very small Berkshire subsidiaries may not reopen
贝基·奎克下一个问题来自德鲁·约翰逊,他说自己是长期股东,参加过几次股东大会。他说在 4 月 17 日的一次采访中,查理提到,伯克希尔旗下的一些小企业在疫情缓解后不会重新开业。你能谈谈可能受影响的业务是哪些吗?
BECKY QUICKThis next question comes from Drew Johnson, who says that he's a longtime shareholder who has attended a couple of meetings. He says in an interview on April 17th, Charlie mentioned that some small businesses owned by Berkshire would not reopen after the pandemic eases. Can you elaborate on which businesses might be impacted?
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,甚至——我们内部还有业务。在玛蒙集团,我们不是有 97 家不同的业务吗,例如?
WARREN BUFFETTWell, even — we have businesses within businesses. At Marmon, don't we have 97 different businesses, for example?
格雷格·阿贝尔没错。是的。
GREG ABELExactly. Yeah.
沃伦·巴菲特是的。有些业务在疫情之前就做得不太好——我不是特指马蒙集团——但确实有几家是这样的,还有几家——事实上,过去几个月发生的事可能加速了这些业务的衰退,或者它们的客户正在养成不同的习惯。我是说,人们在零售方面的习惯正在改变,这一点毫无疑问。这并不意味着我们没有一大批好的零售业务。但有些业务之前就有问题,现在问题更大了。我们不再直接拥有报纸,但我们为拥有这些报纸的公司提供融资。通过把报纸卖给李氏企业(Lee),再为其债务提供再融资,我们实际上增加了在报纸业务上的投入。而报纸业务在病毒来临之前,就在发行量和广告方面麻烦不断。现在,各地的广告收入下滑都在加速,幅度相当大。你知道,当汽车行业停摆时,汽车经销商就不会再打那么多广告。这让某些原本就很艰难的行业现在更加艰难了。你向我们提醒的,至少有一家子公司的管理层会继续留任。所以,有些小业务的状况会有些变化,但它们都是非常小的业务。我们的大型业务,以及中等规模的业务,我想不出有哪一家重要到不会重新开业的。但对于那些世道已经发生实质性改变的行业,接下来的日子不会好过。你正在看到很多变化。如果你拥有一家购物中心,会有一批租户现在不想付你租金——我们不——而且,你知道,零售空间的供需状况可能发生相当重大的变化。办公空间的供需状况也可能发生重大变化。很多人发现在家也能工作,或者有其他方式开展业务,这在几年前他们从自己的行事方式里是想不到的。当这个世界发生变化时,你就得去适应它。
WARREN BUFFETTYeah. And there are some that weren't doing that well before — and I'm not talking about Marmon specifically — but they got a couple of them and there's a couple of — and — and it may be that in effect, the — you know, what's happened in the last couple months has accelerated the decline in — of those businesses, or their customers are developing different habits. I mean, people are developing different habits in retail. There's no question about that. Now, that doesn't mean we haven't got a bunch of good retail businesses. But there are businesses that were — that were having problems before, and that have even greater problems. Now, we don't own our newspapers anymore, but we're financing the enterprise which does have them. We've actually increased our investment in the newspaper business by selling the papers to Lee and then refinancing their debt. And the newspaper business was having plenty of problems with both circulation and advertising before the virus came along. But advertising declines everyplace have accelerated, fairly dramatically. You know, when the automobile industry stops, the auto dealers don't advertise as much. It's — it's made certain businesses that were tough before, even tougher now. And there will be management of at least one of the subsidiaries that you suggested to us. And so, there'll be — but there'll be — there'll be some changes in a few businesses, but they're very small businesses. Our major businesses, and our businesses of intermediate size, I can't think of anything that's of significance that won't reopen. But it won't be any fun with the businesses where the world has really changed. You're seeing a lot of change. If you own a shopping center, you've got a bunch of tenants who don't want to pay you right now — we don't — and, you know, the supply and demand for retail space may change fairly significantly. The supply and demand for office space may change significantly. A lot of people learned that they can work at home or that there's other methods of conducting their business, and they might have thought that — from what they were doing a couple of years ago. When — when change happens in the world, you adjust to it.
格雷格·阿贝尔是的,我觉得——你先说。
GREG ABELYeah, I think the — go ahead.
贝基·奎克下一个问题是——
BECKY QUICKThe next question is —
沃伦·巴菲特贝基,我想让格雷格——
WARREN BUFFETTBecky, I think that Greg —
格雷格·阿贝尔嗯,我正想就马蒙集团的例子补充一点:那里有 97 家公司。举个例子,我们有一个餐饮服务集团,向各类餐厅销售设备。我们有一些业务,即便在行业整体表现相当好的时候,也面临着切实的挑战。而当我们走出这场危机后,它们的经济前景并不会变得更好。公平地说,那里的团队和员工也理解这一点,他们正在努力应对,今后在马蒙集团内部或别的什么地方,也许会有其他机会。不过,你提出的那个问题,确实有一个非常具体的答案——或者说例子。
GREG ABELWell, I was just going to add on the Marmon example, there are 97 companies there. For example, we have a food service group, which sells equipment to a variety of the restaurants. We have a few businesses that realistically were challenged when the industry was performing really well. And as we come out of the, you know, crisis, their economic prospects aren't going to be better. And in fairness to the teams and the employees in there, they understand that, and they're working through it, and there'll be other opportunities, potentially within the company, within Marmon, and things like that. But you know, there's a very specific answer — or example — relative to the question.
出售或关闭业绩不佳的子公司,对伯克希尔来说并不是新政策
Selling or closing underperforming subsidiaries is not a new policy for Berkshire
贝基·奎克下一个问题是关于这个话题的追问,来自费城的克里斯·弗里德(Chris Fried)。他说:“伯克希尔长期以来有一条政策,只要子公司的业务前景不是个‘烧钱窟窿’,就不会出售或关闭正在经营的子公司。”他指出,“过去一年里,先是伯克希尔哈撒韦媒体被出售,接着查理在采访中又提到,新冠疫情封锁解除后,伯克希尔几家小型子公司将不会重新开业。那么,股东是否应该认为,伯克希尔在保留业绩不佳子公司方面的长期政策已经改变了?”
BECKY QUICKThis next question is a follow up on that. It comes from Chris Fried of Philadelphia. And he says, "It's been a long-term policy at Berkshire to not sell or close any ongoing subsidiaries as long as their business prospects weren't a money hole. "Over the last year," he points out, "The sale of Berkshire Hathaway Media, and then Charlie's comments from that interview, saying that several small Berkshire subsidiaries will not be opening when the coronavirus lockdown is lifted. "So, should shareholders assume that Berkshire has now changed its long-term policy in regards to keeping underperforming subsidiaries?"
沃伦·巴菲特不,我认为那条政策在大约 30 年前就已经在年报的附录里明确写出来了。我们说过,如果一家公司——或者说一个业务——我们认为它的前景是未来会持续亏损,那我们肯定会——会试着把它卖给其他人——但无论如何,我们不会继续持有它。这不是什么新政策,也从未改变过。实际上,你可以说,我们在航空业某种程度上就是这么做的。如果我们现在完全拥有一家航空公司,那将是一个艰难的决定:要不要持续承受数十亿美元的运营亏损,因为,第一,你不知道这种情况会持续多久;第二,你知道很可能会有太多飞机闲置,而当客座率下降、飞机座位供过于求时,航空业的定价会发生什么,我们心里清楚。所以,我们并不需要在自身运营层面做出那个决定。但我们确实做出了一个决定——那是一个非常艰难的管理决策。当然,政府愿意为航空公司提供第一轮融资,但值得称赞的是,航空公司自己也在非常积极地筹资。我是说,他们做得有多好,这让我感到惊讶。而且,以其中三家为例——不,是两家——但可能还会有更多——他们也筹集了股权资金。我的意思是,他们是在对债权人和投资者说,你们知道,如果我们想继续下去,你们还得往这个业务里投入更多钱。政府这么做了,私人资本也这么做了——这正是管理层应该做的事。但是,至于这么做是否合理,那就要看投资者最终会怎么样了。
WARREN BUFFETTNo, I think that policy was spelled out for, maybe, 30 years or so in an addendum to the annual report, that we have said that if a company — or if an operation — we think its prospects are that it will continually lose money in the future, that we will certainly — we'll try to sell it to somebody else — but one way or another, we will not continue to hold it. That is not a new policy and it's not been changed. You can say, in effect, we did that with the airline industry, to some extent. If we owned all of an airline now, it would be a tough decision to decide whether to sustain billions of dollars in operating losses, when you know, A, you don't know how long it's going to happen — or occur — and secondly, you know that it's very likely that there'll be too many planes around, and we know what happens in airline pricing when load factors go down, and there's an oversupply of airline seats. So, you know, we didn't have to make that decision in terms of our own operation on it. But we did make a decision that — that's a very tough management decision to make. And the government, of course, is willing that the first wave of financing for the airlines, but to the airlines' credit, they have very aggressively raised money. I mean, it's amazing to me how — what a good job they've done of that. And, in the case of — I think, in the case of three of them — no, two of them — but there may be more coming — that they've raised equity money, too. I mean, they are saying to the debt holders and investors, you know, you got to put more money into this business if we're going to be able to continue. And the government's done it, and private sources have done it, and it's going to — it's exactly the right thing for the managements to be doing. But, you know, whether it's — whether it makes sense, we'll find out, for the investors.
精密铸件公司的未来取决于波音的不确定性
Precision Castpart's future is tied to uncertainty for Boeing
贝基·奎克下一个问题来自埃里克·勒范特(Eric LeFante),指定由格雷格回答。他问:“精密铸件公司(Precision Castparts)如何应对航空航天业的严重放缓?”
BECKY QUICKThis next question comes from Eric LeFante, and it's directed to Greg. He asks, "How is Precision Castparts handling the severe slowdown in the aerospace industry?"
格雷格·阿贝尔嗯,这与我们刚才讨论的完全一脉相承。显然,航空航天业占其业务的很大一部分。正如我们在 10-Q 报告中所做的,这块业务大致可以分成三个领域,其中两个正受到冲击。精密铸件公司内部的国防合同业务仍然非常稳健、强劲。但如果你看大型宽体飞机和支线喷气机所用的飞机,那块业务将直接跟随相关需求以及长期飞机的订单来走。因此,就在我们说话的此刻,精密铸件公司正在根据来自波音的需求持续调整其业务。他们每周都会与波音召开电话会议,了解波音的生产订单情况,并相应调整业务。
GREG ABELSo, very consistent with everything we've just discussed, which is, obviously, a large part of their businesses, is the aerospace industry. And it can really be broken into three areas as we do in our (10-)Q, but two are being impacted. The defense contract business remains very sound and strong within Precision Castparts. But if you look at the large-body aircraft, the aircraft that they use within the regional jets, that business will move directly with the demand there, and the jets that are ordered longer term. So, Precision Castparts is, literally as we speak, continuing to adjust their business relative to the demand that would come out of Boeing. They would be having weekly calls with Boeing, recognizing what are their production orders there and adjusting the business accordingly.
沃伦·巴菲特波音就在一两天前又筹了 250 亿美元,这之前还筹过 140 亿美元。一年前,他们还觉得现金状况良好,我能理解这一切的来龙去脉。空客也面临同样的情况。最近一周他们发表了一些评论,大意是他们确实不知道自己的未来会怎样。我也不知道他们的未来会怎样。美国肯定还会有飞机,我们一定会继续飞行。但真正的问题是,你是否需要很多新飞机,以及你什么时候可能需要。这会影响到很多人。当然也会影响精密铸件公司,影响通用电气,显然也影响波音。这实质上是一次需求的骤然枯竭,是一记重击。而且这种冲击会向上游传导。飞机厂商不是自己招来的麻烦,航空公司也不是自己招来的,精密铸件公司不是,通用电气也不是。根本上,是我们国家停摆了航空旅行。而这会对人们的习惯产生什么影响,他们未来会怎么做,实在很难评估。我不知道答案。但我们的确知道,这会对精密铸件公司产生影响。影响有多严重,取决于那些同样在冲击波音的变量。你随便在航空业点出一家公司——航空业是个大产业。顺便说一句,这个国家很擅长这个。想想波音,那真是一家极其出色的公司,举足轻重。它是一个庞大的出口商,影响大量就业。其中一些岗位就在我们这里。我们当然希望一切顺利,也祝愿所有人顺利。显而易见,也衷心希望我们自己顺利。但这里面有一部分确实不在——显然超出我们的掌控范围。
WARREN BUFFETTBoeing raised 25 billion just a day or two ago, and they raised 14 billion before that. And a year ago, they felt they were in a fine cash position, and I understand how all that happened. Airbus has had the same situation. They've made some comments recently, within the last week, you know, the fact that they — they really don't know what their future is. And I don't know what their future is. We're going to — we're going to have aircraft in this country. We're going to be flying. But the real question is, whether you need a lot of new planes or not, and when you'll — when you're likely to need them. And it affects a lot of people. And it certainly affects Precision Castparts. It affects General Electric. It, obviously, affects Boeing. And it's — it is a blow to, essentially, have your demand dry up. And it goes up in the chain. And, you know, the aircraft manufacturers didn't — they didn't bring it on themselves. The airlines didn't bring it on themselves. Precision Castparts didn't bring it on itself. General Electric didn't — It's, basically, that we shut off air travel in this country. And what that does to people's habits, how they behave in the future, it's just hard to evaluate. I don't know the answer. But we do know that it will have an effect on Precision Castparts. And how severe it will be depends on the same sort of variables that are hitting Boeing. You name the company in aircrafts — and aircraft's a big business. And this country's good at it, incidentally, too. I mean, if you think about Boeing, you know, it is one hell of a company and it's important. It's a huge exporter and it affects a lot of jobs. And some of them are with us. And, you know, we hope for the best and we wish everybody the best. Obviously, we wish ourselves the best in it. But part of it is out of our — certainly out of our control.
新冠疫情对 GEICO 的影响
COVID-19's effect on GEICO
贝基·奎克下一个问题提给沃伦。“您是否认为,即便向客户返还了 15% 的保费,GEICO 在 2020 年也会因驾驶量减少而实现异常高的盈利?”
BECKY QUICKThis next question is for Warren. "Do you think GEICO will experience unusually high profitability in 2020 due to the reduced amount of driving, even after giving customers a 15 percent credit?"
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,我们已经承诺回馈我们的客户——在 GEICO,我们是第二大汽车保险公司,不同的汽车保险公司正在以不同的方式,与保单持有人分享经营状况改善带来的好处。我们的方案是,考虑到这段时期事故频率下降,我们将返还大约 25 亿美元。我们不知道这种情况会持续多久。人们当然还是想开车,但目前的状况显然大大减少了驾驶量。我们现已启动了一个为期六个月的方案,帮大家省钱。到目前为止,其他公司大多只推出了两个月的措施,不过有些公司在这两个月里每月给的比例比我们高。我们的返还总额是最大的,达到 25 亿美元。除此之外,我们和业内其他所有公司——不仅仅是 GEICO——我还在很多情况下相信是保险监管机构要求的——都在人们不按时缴费时,给予更宽裕的付款时间。而如果他们取消了保单,或者到头来没有付钱给我们,实际上等于我们在这段时间里免费为他们提供了保障。付款延迟的现象显然加剧——就像你有一家购物中心,租户不付租——这种时期就会出现付款延迟。这会构成我们一笔相当可观的成本,我们不清楚具体会有多大。路上无保险的司机将会增多,而他们引发事故的比例会高得不成比例——所以,变量非常多。我们根据当前事故减少的情况,对接下来一年里我们实际收取的保费做出了我们自认为最合理的估计。这项政策适用于六个月的续保,但我们在 10 月份续保的保单,其影响会一直延伸到明年 4 月。所以,我们只是做了一个猜测,然后看结果如何。
WARREN BUFFETTWell, we have promised to give our customers — at GEICO, we're the second-largest auto insurance company and — and different auto insurers are handling a sharing of the better experience with their policyholders in different ways. We — our plan — we'll deliver back 2 1/2 billion, roughly or so, in recognizing the reduced frequency of accidents during this period. What we don't know is how long this will continue. I mean, people want to drive their cars still. But conditions have reduced that driving dramatically, obviously. Now, we have instituted a program that runs — saving people money — for six months. And so far, other people have largely been two months, but some of them have given a little more for those two months than we give per month. Our total is the greatest at 2 1/2 billion, and — In addition to that, we and all the others in the industry — it's not just GEICO — we've also — and insurance commissioners, in many cases, I believe have required it — but we have — we give people more time to pay, if they aren't paying. And if they cancel their policy, or if they don't end up paying us, we've, in effect, given them free insurance during that period. And the delay in payments is, obviously — increased delay of payments — if you've got a shopping center getting rent, it — delay in payments is what happens during a period like this. And that will be a significant cost to us. We don't know how significant it will be. There will be more uninsured motorists driving, and they cause a disproportionate amount of accidents, and that — so there's a lot of variables. We made our best guess as to what we're going to do to reflect the current reduced accidents in our — in our premiums that we receive, really, over the next year. It applies for six months on renewals, but that — we'll be renewing policies in October that will extend it into next April. And so, we've made a guess on it , and we'll see how it works out.
伯克希尔的保险子公司没有巨大的新冠风险
Berkshire insurance subsidiaries don't have big COVID-19 risk
贝基·奎克下一个问题来自史蒂芬·泰德(Stephen Tedder),他是佐治亚州亚特兰大的一位股东。他问:“能否帮我们理解新冠疫情对我们保险业务的影响?其他保险公司报告出现了亏损,因为它们为未来预计因新冠病毒而需要支付的理赔增加了准备金。但在伯克希尔今天上午发布的 10-Q 报告中,我们似乎没有报告太多这类未来预期亏损。您能告诉我们为什么会这样吗?伯克希尔承保了什么样的风险,使得我们不受疫情的影响?或者反过来说,我们承保的哪些业务可能会受影响?”
BECKY QUICKThis next question comes from Stephen Tedder. He's a shareholder in Atlanta, Georgia, and he says, "Would you please help us understand the effects of COVID-19 on our insurance businesses. Other insurance companies have reported losses from boosting reserves for future insurance claims that they expect to be paying as a result of coronavirus. "Yet in Berkshire's 10-Q released this morning, we do not appear to have reported much of these future expected losses. Can you tell us why this is the case? What kind of risks Berkshire is underwriting that allows us not to be affected by the pandemic? Or conversely, what we are writing that might be?"
沃伦·巴菲特这个嘛,已经发生的事将引发的诉讼量——更不用说将来可能发生的事了——会非常庞大。要知道,光是诉讼辩护的费用,就是一笔巨大的开支,具体取决于案量。在汽车保险领域,这是按保费规模算我们最大的业务领域,而且领先幅度不小,这方面更容易界定。但谁知道在诉讼方面会冒出什么来?不过,在他们称为“商业多重险”的险种里,涉及财产损失,而有些人会选择购买营业中断保险。很多保单的合同措辞写得很清楚,如果你在商业多重险下选择了营业中断险,按条款你不会获得营业中断理赔。但另一些保单却会。我知道——我想我知道有一家公司——细节我不清楚——它承保了不少业务,保障范围包括——或者说——至少很有理由认为它们保障——可能由大流行病引发的营业中断。那么,它们的处境就与标准条款大不相同了,标准条款说的是,只有当涉及财产的实体损坏时,你才能就营业中断获得赔付。你可以买各种不同的保单。我们在商业多重险业务上规模不大。所以,我的意思是,这不像我们的汽车险业务或类似的东西。但我们会有——我们会有索赔。我们会有诉讼费用。不过,按比例来说,我们和其他一些公司不一样,那些公司在承保商业多重险时,营业中断险的比重高得多。但并不是说你有了营业中断就自动获得保障。我的意思是,举个例子,我觉得如果通用汽车发生了罢工——它们确实发生过——而它们的营业中断险能覆盖罢工,这种情况会很罕见。说起来,我们大概写了一份——可能是全美国唯一一份——关于营业中断险的年报——(笑)——因为我们在法国遇到过,当时我们的一处物业挨着另一处物业——一处小得多的物业——发生了火灾,然后火势蔓延到我们的工厂,造成了大量实体损坏。而我们购买了——我们购买了与之挂钩的营业中断险。但是,如果我们有某家供应汽车零部件的公司客户发生了罢工,我们的业务也会中断,但那不在承保范围内。我的意思是,那不属于保障范围,除非你特意去买了那种保险。所以,就眼下这种情况,有些索赔会完全有效。还会有大量有待诉讼的索赔是无效的。毫无疑问,一些保险公司——我知道有一家尤为突出——将根据它们已签发的保单,支付相对于自身规模而言数额巨大的钱。而我认为我们已提取了准备金——我们的历史也显示,我们一般提取得比较保守、至少是充分的。这当然也是我们的意图。我们不会告诉旗下任何保险子公司的管理层,我们期望他们交出什么数字,也不会做任何诸如此类的事。他们自己评估损失。他们会把社会通胀的因素考虑进去。他们会把各种因素都考虑进去。总体而言,伯克希尔在其准备金计提上一直相当准确,我没有理由认为现在会有所不同。
WARREN BUFFETTWell, the amount of litigation that is going to be generated out of what's already happened, let alone what may happen, is going to be huge. You know, just the cost of defending litigation is a huge, enormous expense, depending on how much there. Now, in the auto insurance field, which is our number one field in terms of premium volume, by some margin, that's more definable. But who knows what comes out of it in terms of litigation? But in what they call "commercial multiple peril," which involves property losses, and where some people elect to buy business interruption coverage, many policies, quite clearly in the contract language, would not have a claim for business interruption under a commercial multiple peril policy, where you've elected that. But other policies do. I know of — I think I know of one company — I don't know the details — that's written a fair amount where they cover — or they — certainly there's a good argument perhaps that they cover — business interruption that might arise from a pandemic. Well, they're in a very different position than the standard language, which says that you recover for business interruption only if there's — involves physical damage to the property. And you can buy all kinds of different policies. We are not big in the commercial multiple peril business. So, I mean, this is not like our auto business or anything of the sort. But we will have — we will have claims. We'll have litigation costs. But proportionally, it's not the same with us as with some other companies, which have been much heavier in writing business interruption as part of a commercial multiple peril. But you don't automatically get coverage if you have business interruption. I mean, for example, I think it would be unusual if, say, General Motors had a strike, which they did, and that they have business interruption that covers a strike. Now, we actually wrote about — probably the only annual report in the United States — we wrote about business interruption insurance — (laughs) — because we had it over in France, when one of our properties was adjacent to a property that's — much smaller property — that had a fire, and then it spread to our plant, and it caused a lot of physical damage. And we had bought — we have business interruption that ties in with that. But, if we had some company we were selling auto parts to, and they had a strike, our business would be interrupted, but it's not covered by that. I mean, that is not part of the coverage, unless you specifically really buy it. So, there's some claims that are going to be very valid related to this, the present situation. There'll be an awful lot that there'll be litigation on that won't be valid. There's no question that some insurance companies — I know one in particular — that will pay a lot of money, relative to their size, in terms of policies that they've written. And I think we have reserved — and our history shows we generally have reserved — on the conservative side, adequately, at least. And that's certainly our intent. And we tell no managers of any of our insurance operations what numbers we expect from them, or do any of that. They evaluate their losses. And they build in something for social inflation. They build in things for — all kinds of things. And generally speaking, Berkshire has been pretty accurate in its reserving, and I have no reason to think that we're otherwise than that currently.
只要“价格合适”,我们会承保流行病保险
We would sell pandemic insurance "at the right price"
贝基·奎克来自亚特兰大的史蒂文·斯托勒(Steven Stoller),他说自己持有伯克希尔股票十年了,他来信问:“您认为伯克希尔未来会在保单中提供流行病保障吗?”
BECKY QUICKSteven Stoller from Atlanta, who says he's a 10-year Berkshire shareholder, writes in and he says, "Do you see Berkshire offering pandemic coverage in future insurance policies?"
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,答案是,我们承保很多种东西。当然。我不——前几天有人来找我们,想为一件非常不寻常的事情投保 100 亿美元的保障。我们不太可能做那笔交易——事实上,我会说已经没戏了——但如果有人来找我们,出价我们认为合理,我们本来是会承保流行病保险的。我们可能会错——(笑)——如果真做了的话。但我们——对于非常不寻常、限额非常高的事情,我们并不排斥报价。我们以此闻名。在某些时期我们做得不多,因为价格不合适。但如果你想为几乎任何东西投保——当然,如果你是个众所周知的纵火犯,我们不会想保你的火险——但如果你带着任何不寻常的保障需求来找我们,无论是在规模还是保障性质上,伯克希尔都是一个非常好的终点站。所以,如果有人想买——他们可以设想出一种保障,然后告诉我们他们愿意付的价格,我们——我们会考虑承保。例如,在 9/11 事件之后,我们承保了大量业务,当时世界上真的只有少数几家公司愿意承保。伯克希尔和 AIG 承保了很多业务,我们当时以为我们清楚自己在做什么。但我们也可能被意外情况打脸。我是说,9/11 之后可能发生一些我们当时不知道的后续事件,你知道,你无法百分百确定答案。这就是人们为什么要买保险。但我们会——我们愿意在合适的价格下承保流行病保险。
WARREN BUFFETTWell, the answer is, we insure a lot of things. Sure. I don't — We had somebody come to us the other day wanting insurance involving a $10 billion protection on something very unusual. We're not going to make that deal, in all probability — in fact, I would say it's dead — but we would have written — we would have written pandemic insurance if people had come to us and offered us what we thought was the right price. We would have been wrong — (laughs) — probably, in doing it. But we — we have no reluctance to quote on very unusual things and very big limits. We're famous for it. We haven't done that much of it in certain periods because the prices aren't right. But if you want to come and insure almost anything — and we don't want you to insure against fire if you happen to be a known arsonist or something — but if you come to us with any unusual coverages, either in the size or in the nature of what's covered, Berkshire is a very good place to stop. And so, if somebody wants to buy — they can dream up the coverage, and they can tell us the price they'll pay, and — we will — we'll consider writing it. We wrote a lot of business after 9/11, for example, when there were really only a couple companies in the world that were willing to write the business. And Berkshire and AIG wrote a lot of business, and we thought we knew what we were doing. But we could have been surprised. I mean, there could have been some follow-on incidents from 9/11 that we wouldn't have known about, and, you know, you don't know for sure the answer. That's why people are buying insurance. But we would — we would be willing to write pandemic coverage at the right price.
巴菲特和芒格之后,伯克希尔仍会做得出色
Berkshire will still do great deals after Buffett and Munger
贝基·奎克下一个问题是问格雷格的,来自一位名叫托德·弗拉斯卡(Todd Flaska)的股东。他说:“我不指望伯克希尔在好年景里跑赢标普 500 指数。但我仍然是一个长期投资者,因为伯克希尔拥有庞大的资金储备,可以像我们现在看到的这样,在市场低迷时进行部署。”“沃伦在这些低迷时期,与那些有一定迫切资金需求的公司谈判、达成互利交易方面,做得极为出色。这些机会可能十年才出现一次。这些交易的机会窗口很短。它们会集中出现,而且当交易开始出现时,你并不确定是否已经到了市场底部。”“当沃伦和查理不再掌舵时,伯克希尔还能继续这种打法吗?”
BECKY QUICKThis next question is for Greg and it comes from a shareholder named Todd Flaska. He says, "I don't expect Berkshire to outperform the S&P 500 during good times. However, I remain a long-term investor because of the huge war chest that can be deployed during the downturns in the market like we're seeing right now. "Warren has been brilliant at negotiating mutually favorable deals with companies that have somewhat urgent capital needs during these downtimes. These opportunities may only come about once a decade. There's a small window of time for these deals. They all come at once, and you don't really know if you're at the bottom of the market when the deals start coming. "Will Berkshire be able to continue this approach when Warren and Charlie are no longer at the helm?"
格雷格·阿贝尔从根本上说,即使沃伦和查理不再掌舵,我也不认为伯克希尔的文化会改变。我不认为我们配置资本的能力会改变,这在很大程度上需要具备理解交易、评估经济前景的商业头脑,以及快速行动的能力。我真的不认为那会改变。正如我们都听到的那样,没有人比沃伦和查理做得更好,但同样,伯克希尔拥有一支才华横溢的团队,无论是在伯克希尔层面还是在我们旗下的管理层中,他们显然也能非常迅速地审视机会。但你知道,现实是,这是我们目前拥有的巨大优势,我们显然希望能保持这一优势地位。沃伦?
GREG ABELI fundamentally, without Warren and Charlie at the helm, I don't see the culture of Berkshire changing. I don't see our billet, which a large part of that is having the business acumen to understand the transaction, the economic prospects, and then the ability — the ability to act quickly. I really don't see that changing. As we've all listened, you know, there's no one better than Warren and Charlie, but equally, we've got a talented team in Berkshire, both at the Berkshire level and within our managers, that can, obviously, look at opportunities, too, very quickly. But you know, the reality is, it's a huge advantage we have right now, and we would clearly want to be in a position to maintain that — that position of strength. Warren?
沃伦·巴菲特是的,我们会保持的。我们不仅在旗下经理身上拥有这种能力——在某些情况下,远非所有情况——但在某些情况下,我们的经理会偶尔提出一些相当有吸引力的东西。而在格雷格、托德·库姆斯(Todd Combs)和泰德·韦施勒(Ted Weschler)三人之间,我们在资本配置方面拥有三位极其出色的(听不清)。而且——你知道,我——查理可能会——我们可能偶尔会接听到一个电话,因为某个我们 20 年前认识的人之类的——但他们认识的人要多得多,精力也更充沛。而且他们的思维方式和我们过去是一样的。所以,我认为当这三个人考虑资本配置时,情况很可能会比现在查理和我在做时有显著的提升——尤其是现在他已学会了用 Zoom。(笑声)
WARREN BUFFETTYeah, we will maintain it. And we not only have it with the managers of the — in some cases — not all cases by a longshot — but in some cases, we have managers that will occasionally come up with something that can be quite attractive. But between Greg and Todd (Combs), and Ted (Weschler), we've got three extraordinarily good (inaudible), in terms of allocating capital. And — you know, I — Charlie may get — we may get an occasional call, because of someone we knew 20 years ago or something — but they know a lot more people, they've got a lot more energy. And their minds work the same way as ours have in the past. So, I think it could very well be a significant improvement when the three of them are thinking about capital allocation than when Charlie and I are now — particularly now that he's found Zoom. (Laughter)
没有伯克希尔旗下企业获得政府“救助”资金
No Berkshire businesses have received government "bailout" money
贝基·奎克好的,下一个问题来自内布拉斯加州奥马哈的马克斯·鲁道夫(Max Rudolph)。他问,伯克希尔或其任何全资子公司是否参与了美联储或财政部的任何救助?
BECKY QUICKAll right, this next question comes from Max Rudolph in Omaha, Nebraska. And he asks if Berkshire or any of its fully-owned businesses have participated in any of the bailouts from the Fed or the Treasury?
沃伦·巴菲特我肯定不知道有这种事。我想你可以说,在我们持有航空公司的时候——嗯,你知道,问题问的是全资控股的企业。如果有人参与过其中任何一个,我不可能不知情。格雷格?
WARREN BUFFETTI certainly don't know of any. I guess you could say while we owned the airlines — well, you know, the question is about fully-owned businesses. And there's no way that I wouldn't know about anybody that did any of that. Greg?
格雷格·阿贝尔没有。实际上,我们对旗下企业交代得非常清楚。而我们的企业也理解——理解伯克希尔的运作方式。同样,我们非常明确地表示,我们不会参与任何这类项目或所谓的“救助”。
GREG ABELNo. In fact, we've been very clear with the businesses. But we — our businesses understood our — how Berkshire operates. And equally, we're very clear that we would not be participating in any of those programs or quote, "bailouts."
面对 COVID-19,未来是个“巨大的未知数”
With COVID-19, the future is a "huge unknown"
贝基·奎克这是一个与之相关的问题,来自赛斯·弗雷登(Seth Freiden),他问:“作为伯克希尔 B 股的长期股东,我想知道沃伦对一些规模较小的持股公司的看法,特别是总部设在您家乡奥马哈的东方贸易公司(Oriental Trading Company)和内布拉斯加家具城(Nebraska Furniture Mart)。”他猜想这些较小的业务单元受到了新冠居家令的不利影响。所以他想知道,东方贸易公司或其他小型业务单元,是否申请了 PPP(小企业管理局薪资保护计划)贷款或参与了那些法案?如果它们没有资格获得贷款或没有参与,那么伯克希尔将如何支持这些较小企业,以确保它们能够继续雇佣它们的员工?
BECKY QUICKThis is a similarly related question. It comes From Seth Freiden, who says, "As a long-term shareholder of Berkshire B shares, I'd like to know Warren's viewpoint around smaller holdings, specifically Oriental Trading Company and Nebraska Furniture Mart, that are based in your hometown of Omaha." He imagines that those smaller business units have been adversely impacted by COVID shelter-in-place mandates. So he would like to know if Oriental Trading, or other small business units, applied for PPP (Small Business Administration Paycheck Protection Program) loans or participated in those acts? And if they didn't qualify for a loan or didn't participate, then how will Berkshire support those smaller businesses to make sure that they can continue to employ their employees?
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,据我所知,没有一家伯克希尔旗下的公司去申请政府贷款——你提到的这两家——我不喜欢具体说公司名字——但我可以向你保证,内布拉斯加家具城和东方贸易在我看来有很好的前景。但是我不——我不想逐一谈论每一家公司,因为有些我也说不上来。你知道,我们其实有一阵子就决定,如果我们拥有的报纸交给 Lee 报业集团来经营,它们的存活几率会比我们自己经营高得多。而且像我之前说的,我们实际上投入了更多的钱——过去六个月里,我们在报纸业务上投的钱可能比美国几乎任何其他人都多,因为我们接手了一笔贷款——那笔贷款本来会在某个时间点(大概是,一年半前)出问题——我们让他们只需要和一个贷款方打交道,而不是一堆。他们管理报纸比我们做得好。这一直是我们的偏好。如果我们有一项业务——它看起来——如果在我们手里无法长久维持下去,而我们可以找到一个我们认为能做得更好的人,我们很乐意让他们接手。所以,如果我们有个麻烦业务,我们更愿意找一个觉得自己能做得更好、而且可能确实能做得更好的人来打理。但有些业务就是会消失。我们——我们最早起步于纺织业务。我们创办了一家公司叫 Diversified Retailing,它后来并入了伯克希尔——成了伯克希尔的一部分——它最早是从巴尔的摩的一家百货店开始的。1966 年时百货店看起来不错,但时代抛弃了它们。我们曾经也做过印花票生意,我们撑得比谁都久,但世界还是把印花票甩在了后面。有些业务就会这样。这就是资本主义。未来 10 年、未来 50 年,有些伯克希尔旗下的业务也会这样。我们觉得我们会找到更多能增长的业务,整体上伯克希尔会增长,但我们不认为如果你拥有一大堆公司,每一家都会注定成功。这也是为什么我建议人们买指数基金。我不——除了伯克希尔——我不会把所有钱投到任何一家公司上,尽管有几家公司我挺愿意接近这个数。但是——我不认为——你知道——这个世界总有意外。有些我们觉得很好的业务结果会没那么好。有些业务会比我们想的更好。最终由这个世界来评判我们的长期打击率。格雷格?
WARREN BUFFETTWell, to my knowledge, none of them have gone in for government money and — The two that are mentioned — I don't like to get into specific companies — but I can assure you that the Nebraska Furniture Mart and Oriental Trading, in my view, have a fine future. But I — I don't want to talk about — go down the list, obviously, of every single company, because some of them I don't know the answer to. You know, we actually decided some time ago that our newspapers would have a much better chance of surviving if they were run as part of Lee, than if we ran them independently. And, as I said earlier, we actually put considerably more money — we probably put more money in the newspaper business than virtually anybody in the country in the last six months, because we took over a loan that would have been a problem in the year — whatever it might have been, maybe, a year and a half — and we enable them to just deal with one lender rather than a group. And they are doing a better job with the newspapers then we would do. And that's always our preference. If we've got a business that's — that does not have — looks like it is not going to sustain itself over time in our hands, if we can find somebody else that we think will do a better job, we'd love to have them run it. So, if we have a problem business, we would prefer to find somebody that thinks they can do a better job, and probably can do a better job, of running it than we can. But some businesses just disappear. We — we started with a textile business. We started a company called Diversified Retailing, which merged into Berkshire — became part of Berkshire — and it started with a department store in Baltimore. And department stores looked good in 1966, but the world has gone against them. And we had a trading stamp business at one time, and we stayed longer than anybody else, but the world left trading stamps behind. And that's going to happen with some businesses. That's capitalism. And it will happen to some Berkshire businesses over the next 10 years, in the next 50 years. We think we'll find more of them that will grow and, net, that Berkshire will grow, but we do not think if you own a great many businesses, that everyone is destined for success. That's why I suggest to people they buy an index fund. I do not — with the exception of Berkshire — I would not want to put all my money in any one company, although there's a few I wouldn't mind being very close to that. But — I don't think — you know — you get surprises in this world. And there will be businesses that we think are very good that turn out not to be so good. And there will be other businesses that turn out better than we think. And It's up to the world to judge our batting average over time. Greg?
格雷格·阿贝尔我就补充一点,再重申一下,关于 PPP 贷款,我们没有发现旗下任何一家公司去申请过。而且,你知道,就像我说的,我们鼓励它们,如果它们想过要和我们讨论,但我们没发现有任何一家公司在申请。我还想补充一点,当你回顾我们进入危机时的业务表现,它们应对得非常好。所以,当我们审视我们的业务——沃伦也提到了这一点——我们的大型业务、中型业务,甚至再往下看,它们在疫情中处境相当稳健,现在真的在准备重新崛起。所以,它们正在评估,在倾听。它们会面对不一样的客户。会有不一样的消费行为——我们的员工怎么工作,比如说,很多人现在在家办公——这合理吗?我们运营所在的社区全都变了。但我们现在真的在从“我们挺过了危机”这个节点,转向认真规划如何重新崛起。我想说,我们的业务处在一个极其稳固的位置。
GREG ABELWell, I would just add, and echo again, that when it comes to the PPP loans, we're not aware of any of our businesses taking them. And, you know, as I said, we encouraged them, if they were ever thinking that there is going to be a dialog, and we're not aware of any businesses pursuing them. I would also just add that when you look at our businesses as we went into the crisis, they responded very well. So, as we look at our businesses — and Warren touched on this — our large businesses, our mid-sized businesses, and even as you go down from there, they're in very sound shape as we go through the pandemic, and are really preparing to emerge now. So, they're evaluating, they listen. They're going to have a different customer. There's going to be different consumer behaviors — how our employees work, i.e., a lot of them work at home now — does that make sense? And the communities we're operating in have all changed. But we're literally moving from the point of — OK, we're making it through the crisis, and really planning to reemerge now. And I would say our businesses are in an extremely sound place.
沃伦·巴菲特我们不知道这个——
WARREN BUFFETTWe don't know when the —
贝基·奎克下一个问题——
BECKY QUICKThis next question —
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,我只是——我们不知道的事——我们不知道——我们不知道这个阶段会持续多久。没人知道。你知道,我们不知道——大部分人认为——他们比我知道得多——病毒在夏季几个月扩散程度会有所下降。我会说——但很多人认为它在某个时间点会卷土重来。而美国公众会如何反应——如果他们因为某些重新开放、因为夏季疫情减弱而抱有希望——他们面对病毒第二轮攻击时会如何反应——就像福奇博士说的——你知道,病毒将决定我们的行为。你知道,我们——我们做了很多明智的事,我们有很多非常聪明的人,但还有未知因素。这些健康层面的未知因素给经济带来了未知。我们——我们得在过程中不断评估。我当然疯狂希望——病毒一旦被压制就不会再回来,我们能够重新调整。但事情并不总是完美发展。那并不意味着有更好的行动方案——我不会到处批评任何人做了什么或者类似的事情。我只是觉得我们在面对一个巨大的未知。而且我认为,过去几个月里它扰乱世界、改变习惯、危及企业的程度表明——你最好——别太确信它会在未来六个月或一年或随便多久里干什么。
WARREN BUFFETTWell, I just — what we don't know — we don't — we don't know how long this period lasts. And nobody knows. You know, we don't know whether the — most people think — and they know more about it than I do — that the virus will, you know, to some extent, decline in its spread during summer months. And I would say — but many think that it will come back at some later date. And how the American public reacts, if they get their hopes up through some reopening — some through — through some summer diminution — and how they would react to a second attack, in effect, by the virus — it's like Dr. Fauci — you know, the virus is going to determine our behavior. You know, we — and we're doing a lot of smart things, and we've got a lot of very smart people, but there are unknowns. And the unknowns that apply to the health aspect create unknowns in the economy. And we will — we'll have to keep evaluating things as we go along. I hope, like crazy, obviously, that — that once suppressed, it doesn't come back and that we readjust. But things don't always work perfectly. That doesn't mean there was a better course of action that would not — I would not go around criticizing people at all for what they've done, or anything of the sort. I just think you're dealing with a huge unknown. And I think that the degree to which it's disturbed the world, and changed habits, and endangered businesses, in the last couple of months, indicates that you'd better be — not be too sure of yourself about what will — what it'll do in the next six months or year or whatever.
指数基金仍然比给华尔街支付高额费用好
Index funds are still better than paying big fees to Wall Street
贝基·奎克沃伦,刚才你提到你仍然建议人们投资于标普 500 指数基金。让我来问一下凯文提出的这个问题。他说:“过去几周,我们一直听到主动型基金经理在说,被动投资的时代已经结束了,长期投资指数基金的传统安全性已经消失了。能否请你谈谈对这个问题的看法?特别是关于 10 年的投资时间跨度?”
BECKY QUICKWarren, a moment ago, you mentioned that you still are recommending that people invest in an S&P 500 index fund. Let me ask this question that came in from Kevin. He says, "The last few weeks, we've been hearing from active money managers that the day of passing — passive investing is over, the historical safety of investing in an index fund long-term is gone. "Would you please provide your thoughts on this topic? Particularly in regards to an investment time span of 10 years?"
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,我可以告诉你,我的遗嘱还没改。(笑)它指示我的遗孀将 90% 的资金放在指数基金里。我认为——这个建议比人们通常从那些收了很多钱给出其他建议的人那里得到的建议更好。靠推荐标普 500 指数基金赚不到多少钱,我的意思是——你怎么能说指数基金时代结束了?我的意思是,你——如果你说投资美国的时代结束了,我会非常强烈地反对。那么,指数基金是一种糟糕的投资方式,有什么特殊之处吗?我就是不觉得——确实——很难找到证据。我的意思是,指数基金反映市场。一边是收费高——他们认为自己能挑中股票。另一边是收费低。我知道哪一边会长期获胜——而且——你必须认识到,有太多人出于自身利益想说服你,他们能做他们可能自己也相信能做到的事。其中一定比例的人会靠运气做到,极少数人靠技能。这就是为什么它如此诱人——你能找到吉姆·西蒙斯之类的人,能产生非凡的回报。吉姆和他的团队(文艺复兴科技)是靠脑力做到的,但这非常罕见。顺便说一句,他们会收你很多钱,而且如果真做到了,他们可能还会关闭基金,因为相比他们过去创下业绩记录时的规模,他们无法再用极其巨量的资金来做到这一点——所以——你只需要承认,你在和一个销售本领能赚大钱的行业打交道。而且如果你是一个很牛的销售,还能确实产出点什么,那赚得更多。但钱是在销售上。如果你看到投资管理的本质,做销售赚的钱比做管理多得多,实际上。
WARREN BUFFETTWell, I can tell you, I haven't changed by will. (Laughs) It directs that my widow would have 90 percent of the funds in index funds. And it's — I think it's better advice than people are generally getting from people that are getting paid a lot to give other advice. You don't make a lot of money advising an S&P 500 index fund, I mean and — How you can say the day of index funds is over? I mean, you're — if you say the day of investing in America is over, I would disagree quite violently. And then, is there something special about index funds being a terrible way to invest? I just don't think — it really — it's very hard to have evidence of that. I mean, the index funds reflect the market. And one side has high fees, that — they think they can pick out stocks. And the other side has low fees. I know which side is going to win over time, and — It's — you have to recognize that it's in a great many people's interest to convince you that they can do something that they may well even believe they can. And a certain percentage of them will do it from luck, and a few people will do it from skill. And that's what makes it so enticing, that you can find the Jim Simons, or somebody, that is going to produce extraordinary returns. And Jim and his group (Renaissance Technologies) have done it by brainpower, but it's very unusual. And incidentally, they are going to charge you a lot of money, and they're going to actually maybe close up their fund, if they do it, because they can't do it with really huge amounts of money compared to what they've — how the record's been established in the past, so — It's — you just have to recognize you're dealing with an industry where it pays to be a great salesperson. And it pays even better if you're a great salesperson, and you can actually produce something. But the money is in selling. There's a lot more money in selling than in managing, actually, if you look to the essence of investment management.
伯克希尔不会总跑赢标普指数,但它是一家强大的公司
Berkshire won't always beat the S&P, but it's a strong company
贝基·奎克我收到了好几个人从不同角度提的下一个问题,有的更客气一些。这个算中规中矩。来自俄克拉荷马州塔尔萨的马克·布莱克利。他说:“像很多人一样,我是一名骄傲的伯克希尔·哈撒韦股东。然而,将伯克希尔与标普 500 指数过去 5 年、10 年或 15 年的表现相比,我对伯克希尔的落后感到失望。即使是今年迄今为止,伯克希尔也比标普 500 指数落后 8%。你认为伯克希尔表现不佳的原因是什么?虽然我无法想象自己会卖掉伯克希尔的股票,但说到底,钱就是钱。”
BECKY QUICKI got a number of variations on this next question, some more polite than others. This one's right down the middle. This is from Mark Blakely, who writes in from Tulsa, Oklahoma. And he says, "Like many, I'm a proud Berkshire Hathaway shareholder. However, in comparing the performance of Berkshire with the S&P 500 over the last five, 10, or 15 years, I've been disappointed in Berkshire's underperformance. "Even year-to-date, Berkshire is trailing the S&P 500 by 8 percent. To what would you attribute Berkshire's underperformance? While I can't imagine ever selling my Berkshire stock, at some point, money is money."
沃伦·巴菲特不,我完全同意刚才那位——我忘了他名字——说的每句话。事实是——我推荐标普 500 指数给人。我也碰巧相信,在长期获得合理回报方面,伯克希尔和任何单一投资一样稳健。但我不会拿命去赌未来十年我们能否战胜标普 500 指数。我觉得,你知道,我显然认为有机会做到,但——我们有过一些时期——我不清楚过去这 50 到 55 年里有多少年——我们跑赢了还是没跑赢。我之前提到,1954 年是我表现最好的一年,但那时我操作的是——可惜,绝对是小打小闹。我认为,如果你操作小资金,有那么一些机会——一点机会——让少数确实有本事的人有所作为。但我觉得,要识别出这些人非常、非常难。而且,当他们操作大资金时,难度会更大。对我们来说,资金规模大了以后,确实更难了。我不会向任何人保证我们会跑赢标普 500 指数。但我可以保证的是,我 99% 的钱都在伯克希尔,我家大部分成员——可能没那么极端,但也差不多。我对伯克希尔的长期前景,关心程度不亚于任何人。但你知道,关心不能保证结果。它只能保证我会用心。格雷格?
WARREN BUFFETTNo, I agree with everything that — I forget his name, but — just said. I mean the truth is that — that's — I recommend the S&P 500 to people. And I happen to believe that Berkshire is about a sound as any single investment can be in, in terms of earning reasonable returns over time. But I would not want to bet my life on whether we beat the S&P 500 over the next 10 years. I think there's, you know, I obviously think there's a reasonable chance of doing it, but — and we've had periods — I don't know how many out of the 50-55 years that we've been doing it or — I don't know how many we've beaten or not. I mentioned earlier that 1954 was my best year, but I was working with — absolutely with peanuts, unfortunately. And, I think if you work with small sums of money, I think there is some chances — some chance — of a few people that really do bring something to the game. But I think it's very, very hard for anybody to identify them. And I think that when they work with large funds, it gets tougher. And it's certainly gotten tougher with — for us with larger funds. And I would make no promise to anybody that we will do better than the S&P 500. But I will promise them is that I've got 99 percent of my money in Berkshire, and most members of my family are — may not be quite that extreme, but they're close to it. And I do care about what happens to Berkshire over the long period about as much as anybody could care about it. But, you know, caring doesn't guarantee results. It does guarantee attention. Greg?
格雷格·阿贝尔我同意,沃伦,从来没有保证。但看看我们现有的资产和团队——你本人对伯克希尔投入,我们还有同样投入的团队,他们每天都在全力以赴。当我看到这些资产和人才时,我认为——如你所说,你不能保证,但我们有很大的机会去努力跑赢。
GREG ABELWell, I would agree, Warren, that there's never guarantees, but when I look at the assets we have in place, and the teams that are in place, i.e., you're committed to Berkshire, but we have dedicated teams that equally are dedicated to Berkshire, and they're sure going to give it their best effort every day. And I — when I look at the assets and the people, I think we have, as you said, you can't guarantee it, but we have a great chance of sure giving it a good effort to outperform it.
沃伦·巴菲特很难想象伯克希尔会得到糟糕的结果,但你知道,什么事都可能发生。我确实知道的是,管理 500 万美元比——伯克希尔季度末的账面净资产,我记得大概是 3700 多亿美元,虽然有所下降,但仍然比美国任何一家公司的账面净资产都高。没错,我是说,也许有些联邦机构更高,但就——它可能是全球最高的。我不确定。
WARREN BUFFETTIt's hard to imagine getting a terrible result with Berkshire, but, you know, anything can happen. And what I do know is it would be easier to be running 5 million than — our book net worth at Berkshire at the quarter-end, I think, was 370-some billion, which is down, but it's still greater than the book net worth of any corporation in the United States. That's right, I mean, maybe there's some federal corporation that has more, but in terms of — and it may be the greatest in the world. I'm not sure.
格雷格·阿贝尔沃伦,我会——
GREG ABELWarren, I would —
沃伦·巴菲特这在某些方面也让事情变得困难。(笑)
WARREN BUFFETTThat makes that makes life difficult in some ways, too. (Laughs)
格雷格·阿贝尔没错,我们旗下运营业务的潜力相当可观。你想想——我们谈过能源领域,你也提到了——基础设施投资持续(听不清),我们已准备好在那里面临 1000 亿美元的投资机会。只需看看未来 10 年的业务需求、所需的基础设施以及其变化趋势——那里有极为庞大的投资机会——这本身就告诉我们前景非常好,而且我们处于有利位置去把握这些机会。这对我来说又意味着——当你审视我们的核心业务时——你也提到了——伯灵顿、保险和能源——我们的下行风险得到了很好的保护。我们拥有三项堪称卓越的核心业务。
GREG ABELRight, and the potential of our operating businesses are substantial. When you think — we've talked about energy, you touched on it — that infrastructure is continuing to (inaudible), and we're ready for a hundred billion dollars of investment opportunities there. If we just look at the business over the next 10 years and the infrastructure that's required and how it's changing — substantial, substantial investments there — that just tell me we have very good prospects, and we're well positioned to pursue them. Which again, to me — when you look at our core businesses — you touched on them — Burlington, the insurance, and energy — our downside is very nicely protected. We have three really core great businesses.
沃伦·巴菲特对。在能源业务上,我们比任何一家公司都更有优势,因为我们没有股息要求。过去 20 年我们留存了 280 亿美元的收益——一般的上市公司做不到。我们胃口很大,国家需要,世界也需要。我们是一家非常、非常合理、结构良好、管理出色的——我敢说,这不涉及我——公司,能参与全球巨大的需求。但你知道,这些事进展缓慢,涉及政府,我是说州政府。有很多——这不是一朝一夕的事。但趋势会实现,伯克希尔应该大举参与。我们在保险领域能做到别人做不到的事。多数时候这没什么意义,但偶尔可能很重要。所以,规模和实力有一些优势,但规模也有劣势。如果我们找到一个绝好机会——投 10 亿美元——能翻倍,那税前赚 10 亿,税后 7.9 亿,对 4500 亿左右的市场价值来说,可惜,不算什么。我们还是会尽力去做。(笑)
WARREN BUFFETTYeah. And we're better positioned than anybody in the energy business, just because we don't have dividend requirements. We've retained 28 billion of earnings over 20 years that — you can't do it if you run a normal public company. And we've got a huge appetite and the country needs it. The world needs it. And we are a very, very logical, well structured, well managed —I would say because it doesn't involve me — company to participate in just huge requirements around the world. Now, you know, they're slow and they involve governments and, I mean, you know, state governments. And there's a lot of — it's not anything that happens dramatically. It will happen and Berkshire should participate in a huge way. We can do things in insurance nobody else can do. That doesn't mean much, many times, but occasionally, it may be important. So, there are — there are some advantages to size and strength, but there are disadvantages to size, too. If we find some great opportunity that — for a billion dollars — to double our money, that's a billion pre-tax, and that's 790 million after tax, and on a market value of 450 billion or whatever it may be, it doesn't amount to much, unfortunately. We'll still try and do it if we can. (Laughs)
格雷格·阿贝尔对。(笑声)
GREG ABELYeah. (Laughter)
阿吉特·贾恩在保险领域很出色,但不做资本配置
Ajit Jain is great at insurance, but doesn't do capital allocation
贝基·奎克我想问一个收到的提问,因为我觉得有些人可能误解了你几分钟前说的话。这就是能实时收到问题的好处。但刚才,你在谈论你和我离开后负责资本配置的人。你提到托德·康布斯、泰德·韦斯勒和格雷格都在做这个。但我收到一些类似的问题。这个是纽约的爱德华·普普拉提问,他说:“亲爱的沃伦,我注意到你列出未来管理层名单时没有提到阿吉特·贾恩。他不在考虑范围内了吗?”
BECKY QUICKI want to ask this question that came in, because I think some people may have had a misinterpretation about something you said a few minutes ago. This is the benefit of being able to get these questions real-time. But a few moments ago, you were talking about the people at the company who will be allocating capital after you and Charlie are no longer doing it. And you mentioned that you've got Todd (Combs), Ted (Weschler), and Greg all doing that. But I've gotten a few questions that read similar to this. This one's from Edward Popoola in New York City, who says, "Dear Warren, I noticed you didn't mention Ajit Jain when you reeled off your list of future management. Is he out of the picture?"
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,阿吉特不做资本配置。他是最好的——他有世界上最好的头脑之一。他为我们工作几年后,我给他父亲写过信——前几天我又写了一封——但 20 年前我写信给他说:“如果你还有这样一个儿子,把他从印度送过来,我们就能统治世界。”不,阿吉特是独一无二的。任何和他接触过的人,特别是保险行业了解他的人,都会告诉你,他绝对是独一无二的。但他的工作不是资本配置,而是评估保险风险。这是一种罕见的——他拥有罕见的天赋,并且有庞大的资本支持他做这件事。所以,他是个不可思议的资产。但格雷格、托德和泰德在资产配置领域做了很久,规模也很大。那是他们的游戏,阿吉特的游戏是保险。所以我提了那三个人。顺便说一句,我和查理还在的时候,我们自己也挺喜欢资本配置的。(笑)我们不会主动离开,但大概过不了多久,我们可能被迫离开。(笑声)顺便说一句,查理身体很好。我身体也不错。(笑)
WARREN BUFFETTWell, Ajit is not in the capital allocation business. He is the best — well, he's got one of the best minds in the world. I mean, I wrote his father after he worked for us for a few years — I wrote him again the other day — but 20 years ago, I wrote him and I said, "If you've got another son like this, send him — send him over from India, because we'll own the world." No, Ajit is one of a kind. Anybody will tell you, that's had any contact with him, and particularly anybody in the insurance business where they know him well, he is absolutely one of a kind. But his job is not capital allocation. It's evaluating insurance risk. And that is a rare — he possesses a rare talent and he has a huge capital backing to do it. So, he's an incredible asset. But Greg, and Todd, and Ted have been in the asset allocation business in a big way, for a long time. That's their game, and Ajit's game is insurance. So that's why I mentioned those three. And incidentally, while Charlie and I are around, we kind of like capital allocation ourselves. (Laughs) We're not going anyplace voluntarily, but we probably will go someplace involuntarily before that long. (Laughter) Charlie is in good health, incidentally. I'm in good health. (Laughs)
伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源资产的折旧
Depreciation of assets at Berkshire Hathaway Energy
贝基·奎克格雷格,我来问你一个关于资本配置的问题。这个问题来自马特·莱贝尔,他问:“伯克希尔在 2019 年将 46% 的资本支出投入了伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源公司。你能用整数给我们讲一下,你是如何看待资本支出与经济折旧、GAAP 折旧之间的差异的,并帮助我们理解,作为股东,我们在伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源公司进行这些大规模投资时,应该按怎样的时间框架来确认这些大额投资的合同净资产收益率。”
BECKY QUICKGreg, let me ask you one of these capital allocation questions. This one comes from Matt Libel, and he says, "Berkshire directed 46 percent of capital expenditure in 2019 to Berkshire Hathaway Energy. Can you walk us through, with round numbers, how you think differences in capex spending versus economic depreciation versus GAAP depreciation, and help explain the timeframe over which we should recognize the contract — the contractive return on equity from these large investments, as we are shareholders in — as we, as shareholders, are making in Berkshire Hathaway Energy."
格雷格·阿贝尔当我们审视伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源及其资本计划时,我们试图从几个不同的角度去看。第一,未来 10 到 20 到 30 年,维持现有资产实际需要多少资本?也就是说,这不是增量投资,而是维持资产本身,反映折旧。我们的目标一直是清楚地了解,在整个业务中,我们哪项业务需要超过折旧的资本、刚好等于折旧、还是少于折旧。很高兴地说,鉴于我们现有的资产以及我们维护能源资产的方式,通常我们认为折旧是足够充裕的,如果将其重新投入资本用于维护资产的话。不过,在我们绝大多数受监管的能源业务中——这超过 85%——实际上是 83%——我们仍然可以从重新投入该业务的资本中获得收益。所以,这不同于传统模式——你投入资金只是为了维持现有的收益流。所以差别不大,但我们确实能从中赚取收益。但我们在大量思考的是——这也是沃伦和我在考虑巨大机会时关注的——那是用于新机会的增量资本。所以,这是为了建设增量风电、增量输电线路——服务风电或其他可再生能源和太阳能——而投入的资本。这对业务来说是增量,并推动业务的增量增长。它确实需要资本,但确实能推动能源业务的增长。所以,实际上有两个类别。我认为我们会用一个略低于折旧的数字,我们觉得业务可以在那个水平上得到维护。当我们投入超过那个数字的部分时,我们确实将其视为所谓增量或增长性资本支出。
GREG ABELSo, when we look at Berkshire Hathaway Energy and their capital programs, we try to really look at — look at it as it was highlighted, really, in a couple different packages. One, what does it actually require to maintain the existing assets for the next 10-20-30 years? I.e., it's not incremental, it's effectively maintaining the asset, the reflection of depreciation. And our goal is always to clearly understand, across our businesses, do we have businesses that require more than our depreciation, or equal, or less. And, happy to say, with the assets we have in place and how we've maintained the energy assets, we generally look at our depreciation as being more than adequate, if we deploy it back into capital to maintain the asset. Now, the unique thing in the lion's share of our energy businesses that are regulated — and that exceeds 85 percent of them — 83 percent of them — we still earn on that capital we deploy back into that business. So, it's not a traditional model where you're putting it in, but you're effectively putting it in to maintain your existing earnings stream. So, it's not drastically different, but we do earn on that capital. But what we do spend a lot of time, and that's what, when Warren and I think about the substantial amounts of opportunities, that's incremental capital that is truly needed within new opportunities. So, it's built — it's to build incremental wind, incremental transmission, that services the wind or other types of renewable solar. That's all incremental to the business and drives incremental growth in the business. It does require capital, but it does drive growth within the energy business. So, there's really the two buckets. I think we would use a number a little bit lower than the depreciation we're comfortable the business can be maintained at that level. And as we deploy amounts above that, we really do view that as, quote, incremental or growth capex.
沃伦·巴菲特对,我们在进行中的项目大概有 400 亿左右吧?
WARREN BUFFETTYeah, we have what — what — 40 billion or something of — what do we have in, sort of, kind of, in the works?
格雷格·阿贝尔哦,对。所以,就像沃伦刚才强调的,我们目前有 400 亿美元的资本投入在运作中,这基本上是未来九年、十年的项目。其中大约一半,我们认为是为了维持现有资产。实际上,略超过一半是实实在在的增量投入,但这些是已知的——是我们已知要推进的项目。我乐意告诉大家,我们可能还有另外 300 亿美元——离成为那个领域的机会也不远了。现在,就像沃伦说的,这需要很多时间,工作量大。比如输电项目,我们在 2020 年完成的项目,是在 2008 年收购 PacifiCorp 时就启动的。我记得当时在制定那个输电计划,想着六到八年之后就能投入使用。结果十二年后才建成,而在那段时间里,我们已经在投入的资本上获得了收益,等项目投运后,整个投资额都开始产生回报。所以我们对这个机会非常满意,但——这么说吧,我们播下了很多种子。
GREG ABELOh, yeah. So, we have basically, as Warren's highlighting, 40 billion in the works of capital, that's over the next, effectively, nine years, 10-year period. A little — approximately half of that, we would view as maintaining our assets. More — a little more than half of it is truly incremental, but — and that are known — those are known projects we're going to move forward with. And I would be happy to report, we probably have another 30 million — 30 billion — that aren't far off of becoming real opportunities in that business. Now, as Warren said, that takes a lot of time. It's a lot of work. The transmission projects, for example, we're finishing in 2020 were initiated in 2008 when we bought PacifiCorp. I remember working on that transmission plan, putting it together, thinking six to eight years from now, we'll have them in operation. Twelve years later, and over that period of time, we earned on that capital we have invested, and then when it comes into service, we earn on the whole amount. So, we're very pleased with the opportunity, but it — we plant a lot of seeds, put it that way.
沃伦·巴菲特是的。这些并不是——不是说它们回报率超高。但长期来看,回报还算不错。而我们几乎是唯一有条件配置这些资本的公司,相比之下——我是说,政府实体也能做这种事——但从私营企业的角度来说——而且这些项目周期很长。它们能赚到不错的回报。关于能源业务,我一直这么说:它不是暴富的途径,却能守住财富。我们会配置大量资金,赚取不错的回报——不是超级回报,这类业务本就不该赚超级回报。我是说——你得到了政府授权来做某些事。政府应该保护消费者,同时也应该保护那些拿出资本的人。你看,过去 20 年一直运作良好,未来还有很长的跑道。
WARREN BUFFETTYeah. And these are not — it's not like they're super-high return thing. But they're decent returns over time. And we're almost uniquely situated to deploy the capital, as opposed — I mean, you could have government entities do it too —but in terms of a private enterprise — and they take a long time. They earn decent returns. I've always said about the energy business, it's not a way to get real rich, but it's a way to stay real rich, and — We will deploy a lot — a lot of money at decent returns — not super returns, you shouldn't earn super returns on that sort of thing, I mean — it does — you are getting rights to do certain things that governmental authorities are authorizing. And they should protect consumers and — but they also should protect people that put up the capital. And — You know, it's worked now for 20 years, and it's got a long runway ahead.
西方石油交易因油价意外暴跌遭受重创
Occidental deal hurt by unexpected oil price plunge
贝基·奎克好。下一个问题来自新泽西的杰森(普劳纳)。“作为伯克希尔和西方石油两家公司的股东,看到您投资西方石油,我起初备受鼓舞。但随着时间过去几周,事情变得很明显——您的投资帮助西方石油管理层得以避免就阿纳达科收购案举行股东投票,这是一个对股东极为不利的结果。从西方石油的角度看,这笔交易最终证明既不负责又代价高昂,对西方石油股东的价值造成了巨大破坏。在我看来,这件事也永久性地损害了伯克希尔在市场上的声誉。请评论这个不幸的结果,并告诉我,为什么西方石油股东和其他市场观察者不应该这么看。”
BECKY QUICKAll right, this next question comes from Jason (Plawner) in New Jersey. "As both a Berkshire and Occidental shareholder I was encouraged to see your investment in the company, but with passing weeks, it became evident that your investment facilitated Occidental management's ability to avoid a shareholder vote on the Anadarko acquisition, a very shareholder unfriendly outcome. "This deal proved to be irresponsible and expensive from an OXY perspective, and ultimately, very value destructive for OXY shareholders. In my view, it also permanently hurt Berkshire's reputation in the marketplace. "Please comment on this unfortunate outcome and tell me why OXY shareholders and other market observers shouldn't feel this way."
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,是的。我们从一开始就说过——虽然我们确实没想到会发展到这个程度——我们基本上说过,当你投资一家石油公司——一家大型石油生产公司——你知道,最终结果会在很大程度上取决于油价。它不会是你在勘探上的全垒打或重大失误之类的事。这是一项取决于油价的投资。而且,你知道,我——当油价跌到负 37 美元时——(笑)——前几天确实发生了,我想是五月合约。你知道,这完全超出了常规。如果你持有石油,你只应该在预期油价会大幅上涨时持有。我不知道油价会不会大幅上涨。我们正在交易中。我们的承诺是在一个周日做出的,当时阿纳达科的管理层偏向雪佛龙。雪佛龙有 10 亿美元的违约金,而西方石油公司的人已经为此努力了好几年。在当时油价水平下,这笔交易是有吸引力的。但显然,它行不通——在 20 美元一桶时行不通——在负 37 美元一桶时当然也不行——但在 20 美元时就是行不通的。而所有石油公司一直在做的事,无论是埃克森还是西方石油或其他公司,在当前油价下都是行不通的。这就是为什么未来几年石油产量会大幅下降,因为现在钻井根本不划算。过去其他时候也发生过这种情况。但情况是,你知道,你不知道该把多出来的那桶油存在哪里,石油需求急剧下降,而有一段时间俄罗斯和沙特还在互相较劲,看谁能生产更多石油。当储存设施都装满时,库存消化起来可没那么快。现在,美国的石油产量会大幅下降。在许多之前有利润的油层钻井都不划算了,而且——以一两年前地下石油的交易价格来购买储量也不划算了。从这个意义上说,如果你持有西方石油的股票,你知道你已经——或者任何石油生产公司的股东——到目前为止,在油价走势方面,你们跟我一样都犯了错。谁知道未来油价会怎样呢。
WARREN BUFFETTWell, yeah. We said right from the beginning — although we didn't certainly expect the degree of what's happened — we said, essentially, when you buy into an oil — a huge oil production company — you know, how it works out is going to depend on the price of oil to a great extent. It's not going to be your geological home runs or super mistakes or anything like that. It is a — it is a investment that depends on the price of oil. And, you know, I — when oil goes to minus $37 — (laughs) — it happened the other day for, I guess, it was the May contract. You know, that's off the chart, and — If you own oil, you should only own oil, if you expect these prices to go up significantly. I don't know whether they'll go up significantly or not. We're in the transaction. Our commitment was made on a Sunday when the management of Anadarko favored Chevron. And Chevron had a breakup fee of a billion dollars and the Occidental people had been working on it for several years. And it was attractive at oil prices that then prevailed. And it doesn't work, obviously — it doesn't work at $20 a barrel — it certainly doesn't work at minus $37 a barrel — but it doesn't work at $20 a barrel. And everything the oil companies have been doing, whether it's Exxon or Occidental or anybody else, it doesn't work at these oil prices. That's why oil production is going to go down a lot in the next few years, because it does not pay to drill now. That's happened at other times in the past. But the situation is, you know, you don't know where you're going to store the incremental barrel of oil, and oil demand is down dramatically, and for a while the Russians and the Saudis were trying to outdo each other in how much oil they could produce. And when you've got too much in storage, it doesn't work its way off that very fast. Now, you will have production of oil go down in the United States significantly. It does not pay to drill in all kinds of formations that paid before, and it doesn't pay — it doesn't pay to have paid the price that oil was trading at in the ground a year or two ago. And to that extent, if you're an OXY shareholder, you know you've — or any shareholder in any oil producing company — you'll join me in having made a mistake, so far, in terms of where oil prices went. And who knows where they go in the future.
低价对石油股权投资构成风险
Low prices pose a risk to oil equity investments
贝基·奎克我再追问一下。这个问题来自莫尼什·巴尔,他问道:“投资石油股,是否存在本金永久损失的风险?”
BECKY QUICKLet me follow up with this one, and this one comes in from Mohnish Bahl, who says, "Is there a risk of permanent loss of capital in the oil equity investments?"
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,确实有,你知道——毫无疑问,如果油价维持在当前水平,会有大量资金——非常多的资金——困在中期扩展银行贷款里,一定程度会影响到银行业,不会摧毁银行或怎样,但有很多投资进去的钱,并不是基于 WTI(西得克萨斯中质原油)17 美元、20 美元或 25 美元的价格做决策的。不过铜也是一样。我们制造的一些产品也一样——我是说——但大宗商品的情况尤其显著。而且,你知道,农民一直在承受糟糕的价格,不过某种程度上政府补贴了他们。其实我完全支持这个做法。但如果你是石油生产商,就要承担未来价格波动的风险,除非你想大量卖出远期合约。实际上,西方石油公司(OXY)每天卖出了 30 万桶的看跌期权——或者说他们买了看跌期权——同时卖出看涨期权来对冲。他们在每天 30 万桶的规模上,保护了 10 美元——每桶 10 美元的价差。但你买入石油的时候,本质上是在押注长期的油价走势。而油价是有风险的。此刻,石油生产商正在切身感受这种风险。如果当前价格持续下去,能源贷款中会出现大量坏账——或者能源贷款变成坏账。如果能源贷款变成坏账,你可以想象股权持有者会遭遇什么。所以没错,确实存在风险。
WARREN BUFFETTWell, there certainly is, you know — there's no question if — if oil stays at these prices, there's going to be a lot of money — a whole lot of money — in middle extended bank loans, and it'll affect the banking industry, to some degree, not — it doesn't destroy them or anything, but there's a lot of money that's been invested that was not invested based on a $17 or $20 or $25 price for WTI, West Texas Intermediate oil, and — But you can do the same thing in copper. You can do the same thing in some of the things we manufacture — I mean it — but with commodities, it's particularly dramatic. And, you know, farmers have been getting lousy prices, but to some extent, the government subsidized them. I'm all for it, actually. But if you're an oil producer, you take your chances on future prices, unless you want to sell a lot of futures forward. OXY, actually, did sell 300,000 barrels a day of puts, in effect, that — or they bought puts — and sold calls, in effect, to match it. And they were protected on $10 — for a layer of $10 a barrel on 300,000 barrels a day. But you're really buying — when you buy oil, you're betting on oil prices over time, and over a long time. And oil prices — there's risk. And the risk is being realized by oil producers as we speak. There will be— if these prices prevail — there will be a lot of bad loans in energy loans and or— bad debts in energy loans. And if there are bad debts in energy loans, you can imagine what happens to the equity holders. So yes, there's a risk.
伯克希尔股票衍生品合约中不存在“意外”负债
No "surprise" liabilities in Berkshire's stock derivatives contracts
贝基·奎克好,这个问题来自鲍勃(科尔曼)。他说:“沃伦,你能跟我们讲讲你那批股权卖出期权的现状吗?从 2019 年——”
BECKY QUICKAll right, this question comes from Bob (Coleman). He says, "Warren, could you bring us up to date with the status of your equity put contracts? Sourcing the 2019 — "
沃伦·巴菲特是的。
WARREN BUFFETTYeah.
贝基·奎克“——年报第 60 页显示,2019 年底,这一负债的公允价值略低于 10 亿美元。如果指数下跌 30%,负债义务会膨胀到 27 亿美元。那么,如果指数下跌 60%,伯克希尔的义务是否会接近 55 亿美元?这个数字算得合理吗?以及,与此相关的有没有任何悬而未决的尾巴或敞口——”
BECKY QUICK" — annual report, found on page 60, it appears at 2019 year-end, the fair value liability was just under a billion dollars. And if the indexes decline 30 percent, the liability obligations balloon to $2.7 billion. "So, if the indexes are down 60 percent, would Berkshire's obligation be close to 5 1/2 billion dollars? Does that math seem reasonable? And are there any loose ends or open exposures associated with — "
沃伦·巴菲特不,它们——我们——在 2004 年到 2006 年之间,我记得我们签了 48 份——也许是 50 份合同——差不多那样。最短的 15 年,最长的 20 年。我们收到了,我记得,大概 48 亿美元,我们可以随意支配这笔钱。我们同意在到期时,根据四个指数中一个或多个的收盘点位来支付。它们是所谓的欧式看跌期权,只在某个特定日期可执行。除了极少数例外,我们不需要提供抵押品,这是交易的一部分。我们拿着那 48 亿美元——最初的名义价值大概超过 300 亿,也许 350 亿——那是假设一切归零的情况。我的意思是,如果道琼斯指数跌到零,富时指数跌到零,日经指数等等。其中一些已经到期了。所以我们现在名义上还有大约 140 亿。剩下的不到一半。我们还没支付过什么大钱。我们回购了一些。如果一切都归零,我们得付 140 亿。如果所有指数都按 3 月 31 日的价格收盘,我想那个数字——大概比我们资产负债表上列为负债的金额要少一些,那个数字是 20 多亿。到目前为止,一切顺利。我的意思是,我们一直能利用一大笔钱,而它们潜在的义务是,如果市场大幅上涨,我们什么都不用付;如果市场再跌一些,我们得付超过几十亿,但我们已经为此计提了负债。不过到目前为止,这方面还不错。这不会给我们带来任何问题。它们到期——最后一份——我想是 2023 年某个时候到期。我记得——大概有 20% 或 25% 在今年晚些时候到期。所以——没什么——提问者其实不太了解这些,从问题就能看出来——这没什么意外。不可能有什么负债突然翻倍,除非——除非跟那些指数在各类不同看跌期权到期时的收盘价有关,而就像我说的,这些期权已经削减了一半以上。我们在这上面做得很好。关键——
WARREN BUFFETTNo, they — we — between 2004, I think, and 2006, I think we wrote 48 — maybe 50 contracts — something like that. The shortest was 15 years. The longest was 20 years. And we received, as I remember, roughly $4.8 billion, which we were free to do with what we wanted. And we agreed to pay based on where one or more of four indices were selling for, at the time of expiration. They were so-called European style puts, where they're only payable based on one date. And we did not have — with a small exception — we did not have to put up collateral, which was part of the deal. And we've had that $4.8 billion — we probably had an original nominal value of something over 30 billion, maybe 35 billion — that's if everything went to zero. I mean, if the Dow Jones went to zero, the FTSE went to zero, and the Nikkei and so on. A number of those have run off. So, we now have about 14 billion, nominal. We have something less than half left. We haven't paid out anything significant. We bought back a few of them. If everything went to zero, we would owe 14 billion. If everything were to sell at the same price it was selling for on March 31st, I think the number is some — I think it's somewhat less than we carry as a liability on the balance sheet, which is two-and-a-fraction billion. So far, so good. I mean, we've, had the use of a lot of money, and the outstanding potential of them is, if the market went up a lot, we wouldn't have to pay anything, and if it goes down some more, we have to pay more than a couple of billion, but we've had the liability set up for that. But so far, so good, on that. And it is not anything that causes us any problem. They come due — the final one — I think comes due sometime in 2023. I think there's — I think maybe 20 or 25 percent of them come due late this year. And so, it's — there's nothing — the questioner doesn't really understand about them, I can tell by the question — and there's no surprises there. There's — there's no way that some liability could double up on us, except based on — except relating to where those indices close at the expiration of a group of different puts, which, like I said, have been more than cut in half. And we've done very well on it. Key to that —
贝基·奎克沃伦,你刚才提到你——
BECKY QUICKWarren, you mentioned a few minutes ago that you —
沃伦·巴菲特我只是想说,关键之处在于——除了极少数小例外——我们没有同意提供抵押品。我们绝不会让自己陷入那种处境。我们做交易的时候,就是不会让自己陷入那种处境。我们永远不会,永远不会,在某个特定日期,冒出一笔我们没预料到的巨额负债等着我们去付。我说完了,贝基。
WARREN BUFFETTWell, I was just going to say, key to that was — with just a couple of tiny exceptions — we did not — we did not agree to put up collateral. We never would have gotten ourselves in that position, and — That was — when we made the deals, we would just would not get ourselves in that position. And we never, never, will, where on a given date, we could have some tremendous obligation that would come due that we weren't counting on getting — having come due. I'm done, then, Becky, yeah.
伯克希尔在巴菲特之后将保持完整
Berkshire will stay intact after Buffett
贝基·奎克好的,谢谢。你刚才提到你非常关注伯克希尔的长期健康。这个问题来自佐治亚州亚特兰大的德鲁·埃斯蒂斯,他说:“已经有关于后巴菲特时代伯克希尔分拆的猜测,考虑到现代激进投资者的影响力,这种猜测应该被认真对待。”许多长期股东认为这种看法很愚蠢。250 亿美元的附属收益流在投资保险浮存金时提供了很大的灵活性。“为了我们和您的遗产,您能否更有力地论证维持伯克希尔现有架构的理由?如果您不这样做,这个责任将落在一些信誉远不如您的未知人士肩上。”
BECKY QUICKOK, thanks. And you mentioned a few minutes ago that you're very concerned about Berkshire's long-term health, too. This question came in from Drew Estes in Atlanta, Georgia, who says, "There's already speculation of a post-Buffett breakup of Berkshire, and given the sway carried by modern activists, the speculation should be taken seriously. "Many long-term owners see the folly in this view. A $25 billion auxiliary earnings stream provides a lot of flexibility when investing insurance float. "On our, and your estate's, behalf, could you more forcefully make the case of maintaining Berkshire's current architecture? If you don't, that responsibility will fall on an unknown set of shoulders with far less credibility>'
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,如果你要——如果你要卖掉伯克希尔的各个子公司,在向股东分配任何收益之前,公司层面就得缴纳一笔非常可观的税款。你可以剥离某个子公司,或者做类似的事情。但是,在没有税务影响的情况下拆分一家多元化公司——有一种东西叫“通用公用事业原则”,在 1986 年之前以各种方式通行。很多人发表评论时似乎基于这样一个事实:1986 年后这个原则就不存在了。(笑)人们会想出各种有创意的方式来避税,在某些情况下、对某些类型的交易确实能做到。如果要拆分伯克希尔,那会是一个因素。但能够调动资本——也就是说,能在保险业务上做一些事情,而如果没有其他实体创造的利润和投入的资本作为后盾,我们根本做不了这些——这在公司内部的资本配置上有着巨大的优势,所以我——伯克希尔股价中体现的拆解价值折价并不大。实际情况是,尽管我所有的伯克希尔股票——每一股——都将按照我 14 年前制定并一直遵循的计划捐给慈善机构,今年 7 月也会继续——我会捐出价值大约 30 亿美元的股票——但这一切——这依然涉及很大的投票权占比——即使除了巴菲特家族之外,还有其他人的股份仍在其中——拆分是不会发生的。现在,我可以告诉你,全世界的人都会跑过来提出各种建议,说这对股东多么有利,顺便说一句,这里面涉及巨额的费用。我是说——(笑)你不可能——你不可能从华尔街得到公正的建议——(笑)当一种行动可能带来巨额费用,而另一种行动则没有费用时。但你可以放心,我已经考虑过这个问题了。我会说,你可以指望伯克希尔目前的状况会长期持续下去。我没法告诉你一百年后会发生什么。我也没办法准确告诉你,比如,如果某些关于财富税或基金会税收的想法改变了,会发生什么。我是说,它们可能会——但我的计划是经过深思熟虑并长期实施的。它不仅确保伯克希尔赚来的钱——全部会随着时间的推移分批流向各种慈善机构——它还能——让那些“豺狼”无从下手。格雷格,你有什么想法吗?(笑)
WARREN BUFFETTWell, if you were to — if you were to sell Berkshire's various subsidiaries, you would incur a very significant amount of tax at the corporate level before anything was distributed to the shareholders. You can spin off a given one, or something of the sort. But the ability to break up a diverse company without tax implications — there was there was something called the General Utilities Doctrine that prevailed in various ways up until 1986. And a lot of people seem to comment based on the fact that that didn't happen in 1986. (Laughs) And there's imaginative ways where people try to avoid taxes, and can do it in some cases, on certain types of transactions. If you were to break up Berkshire, that would be one factor. But the interaction of being able to move capital around, in terms of being able to do things in insurance that we couldn't do unless there were the backup earnings, and capital employed in the other entities — there's enormous advantages in capital deployment within the place, so I — There is not a big discount to breakup value embodied in Berkshire's price. And the situation actually is that although all my Berkshire shares — every share — will be given to charities pursuant to a plan I developed back 14 years ago and followed ever since, and will continue following this July — I'll be giving away 3 billion or so worth of the stock and — but it's all — it still involves a big voting percentage that — including other people's that still remain in the picture, aside even from the Buffett family — it isn't going to happen. Now, I will tell you everybody in the world will come around and propose something, and say it's wonderful for shareholders, and by the way, it involves huge fees. I mean— (laughs) — you do not — you do not get impartial advice from Wall Street — (laughs) — when there's (an) enormous amount of fees possible from one action, and no fees applicable from another action. But you can be sure I've thought about it. And I would say that you can you can count on Berkshire's present posture being continued for a long time. I can't tell you what's going to happen a hundred years from now. And I can't tell you exactly what would happen, for example, if certain ideas, in terms of wealth taxes, changed, or taxes on foundations change. I mean, they could — But my plan has been thought out and in place for a long time. And it not only ensures that the money that's been made off Berkshire — all of it ends up going to various philanthropies staggered over time — but it also — it will keep the wolves away. Greg, do you have any thoughts on that? (Laughs)
格雷格·阿贝尔嗯,我觉得关于资本配置的那段评论是关键,我们拥有在各个实体之间——无论是在各个经营企业之间,还是向上流向保险板块或向下游配置——自由调配资本的能力,而且几乎不给股东带来任何额外成本。这正是伯克希尔独特结构的价值驱动因素,创造了巨大价值,所以——我要补充的,或者说再次确认的,就是这些。
GREG ABELWell, I think the comment on the capital allocation is critical, that we have the ability to move the capital amongst the — be it the operating businesses or up to the insurance or down — with really no consequences to our shareholders. That's the value driver, the unique structure of Berkshire, and it creates immense value, so — That's all I would add, or second, I guess.
大问题:美国可以无代价地持续发钞吗?
Big question: Can U.S. keep issuing money without consequences?
贝基·奎克好的,这个问题来自华盛顿特区的罗布·格兰迪什。他问道:“欧洲大部分地区以及日本已是负利率。沃伦多次撰文指出,伯克希尔旗下保险公司的价值源于投保人预付保费,由此形成保险浮存金,伯克希尔可借此赚取利息。‘如果利率为负,那么提前收取资金就会形成成本而非利润。如果利率为负,保险浮存金就不再是一项优势,而变成一项负担。能否请您谈谈,假如美国利率也进入负值区间,伯克希尔的保险公司将如何应对?’”
BECKY QUICKAll right, this question comes from Robb Grandish in Washington, D.C. He says, "Interest rates are negative in much of Europe, also in Japan. Warren has written many times that the value of Berkshire's insurance companies is derived from the fact that policyholders pay up front creating insurance float, on which Berkshire gets to earn interest. "If interest rates are negative, then collecting money up front will be costly rather than profitable. If interest rates are negative, then the insurance float is no longer a benefit but a liability. "Can you please discuss how Berkshire's insurance companies would respond if interest rates became negative in the United States?"
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,如果它们长期为负,你最好——你最好持有股票。或者你最好持有其他东西,而不是债券。我的意思是,过去 10 年发生的事情太不寻常了。我原本以为在通胀不抬头的情况下不可能有这些发展,我错了。但我们有 1200 多亿——嗯,我们有——很大比例是短期国库券——还有一些其他投资——还有一些只是现金——但这些短期国库券几乎不给我们付什么利息。从长期来看,它们是糟糕的投资。但当机会来临时——它会在某个时刻来临——也许你唯一可以用来支付这些机会的就是你手里的短期国库券。我的意思是,世界上其他地方可能已经停摆了。我们也需要它们来保护——确保我们能够随时间支付对投保人的负债,我们非常认真地对待这一点。所以,如果世界变成一个你可以不断印更多钱,并且利率长期为负的世界,我得亲眼看到才相信,但我已经看到了一点。我很惊讶。所以到目前为止我是错的。我不认为——我不明白你怎么能创造——我会这样说,如果你能有负利率,并且不断印钱,相对于生产能力积累越来越多的债务,你会想世界早在最初几千年就该发现这一点,而不是现在才出现,但我们走着瞧。这是最——这大概是我在经济学中见过的最有趣的问题——你能不能继续做我们现在做的事情——我们一直能做到——或者说世界一直能做到——到现在大概十几年了——但我们可能面临——可能面临一个时期,我们会用比以前大得多的力度来检验这个假设,即你能继续这样做。格雷格,你有什么想法吗?我多希望我知道答案。也许你知道?(笑声)
WARREN BUFFETTWell, if they were going to be negative for a long time, you better — you better own equities. Or you better own something other than — than debt. I mean, it's remarkable what's happened in the last 10 years. I've been wrong in thinking that you could really have the developments you've had without inflation taking hold. But we have 120-odd billion — well, we have some — almost — very high percentage in Treasury bills — some in other — and some just in cash, but we — but those Treasury bills are paying us virtually nothing. Now, they're a terrible investment over time. But they are the one thing that when opportunity arises — it will arise at a time — and maybe the only thing you can look to pay for those opportunities is the Treasury bills you have. I mean, the rest of the world may have stopped. And we also need them to protect— be sure that we can pay the liabilities we have, in terms of policyholders over time, and we take that very seriously. So, if the world turns into a world where you can issue more and more money and have negative interest rates over time, I'd have to see it to believe it, but I've seen a little bit of it. I've been surprised. So, I've been wrong so far. I do not think that— I don't see how you can create — I would say this, if you can have negative interest rates, and pour out money and incur more and more debt, relative to productive capacity, you think the world would have discovered it in the first couple thousand years rather than just coming on it now, but we will see. It's one of the most — it's probably the most interesting question I've ever seen in economics — is can you keep doing what we're doing now, and — We've been able to do it — or the world's been able to do it — for now, a dozen years or so and — But we're — we may be facing a — we may be facing a period where we're testing that hypothesis that you can continue it with a lot more force than we've tested it before. Greg, do you have any thoughts on that. I wish I knew the answer. Maybe, you do? (Laughter)
格雷格·阿贝尔没有,我想,正如您所阐述的——我记得年报里也写了——我的意思是,我们并不知道答案。但正如您所说,考虑了负利率再来反观当前的一些基本面,确实十分有意思。但我清楚——虽然不想这么说,但我确实没什么可补充的。(笑声)
GREG ABELNo, I think, as you articulated — I think it was in the annual report, too — I mean, we don't know the answer. But, as you said, some of the fundamentals right now are very interesting relative to having a negative interest rate. But I know — I hate to say it, but I don't have anything to add. (Laughter)
沃伦·巴菲特我倒是很乐意当财政部长,要是知道能一直以负利率借钱不愁,日子可就太好过了。我们目前做的事,确实不知道最终结果会怎样。我认为——而且我整体认为,这些事做得是对的,但我不认为没有后果。同时我也认为,如果推得太过极端,后果可能相当极端。可如果不这样做,后果同样极端。因此,总要有人——你懂的——去权衡这些——这些问题。
WARREN BUFFETTI'd love to be secretary of the Treasury, if I knew I could just keep raising money at negative interest rates, that makes life pretty simple. We're doing things that we really don't know the ultimate outcome. I think — and I think, in general, they are the right things, but I don't think they're without consequences. And I think they could be, kind of, extreme consequences if pushed far enough. But there would be, kind of, extreme consequences if we didn't do it as well. So, somebody has to — you know, balance those — those questions.
不需要太多资本投入的企业,更胜一筹
Businesses that don't need a lot of capital are better
贝基·奎克好的,这个问题来自佛罗里达州迈阿密的亚当·施瓦茨。他说,伯克希尔是他合伙基金里的第一大持仓,而这个合伙基金又承载了他家的大部分净资产。他问道:“伯克希尔多年来投资了不少资本密集型业务,比如铁路。您如何看待所有这些资本密集型业务面临的通胀乃至通缩风险?这对有些企业而言会不会成为生存危机?”“我多少是承接您刚才谈到的观点,即总有一天发行债务的账单会到期。最终,是否会由所有企业来买单,比如通过提高企业所得税、提高中低阶层工资等一系列组合措施?”
BECKY QUICKAll right, this question comes from Adam Schwartz in Miami, Florida. And he says Berkshire is the largest holding in his partnership, which also houses most of their net worth. He says, "Berkshire's invested in many capital-intensive businesses through the years, railroads as an example. How do you think about the inflationary, or even deflationary, risks for all of the capital-intensive businesses? And could this prove to be an existential problem for businesses?" "I'm kind of referencing what you were just talking about, that eventually the bill for the debts being issued comes due. Will it eventually come from all businesses through some combination of higher tax rates on corporations, increased wages for the lower-middle classes?"
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,我当然认为,调高企业所得税的概率远高于调低企业所得税。所以,我——我认为,几年前我们作为一家公司,从政府手里接过了一大块原本归属于政府的利润。这在一定程度上取决于哪个政党当选,以及他们是否同时掌控参众两院和总统职位,至于其他变数就说不准了。但我们很有可能在某个时点面临更高的企业所得税,甚至可能高很多。而说到资本密集型企业,如果你能找到一家同样优秀——我指的是经营上同样优秀——而且不需要资本投入的企业,那么资本密集型企业相对就没那么好了。我是说——它们——你知道——喜诗(糖果)从来不需要追加资本。它几乎没有增长,但它就是——扩张不需要资金,却向我们贡献了巨额资金。而且正因为我们是在伯克希尔内部持有它,把资金重新配置到其他地方时,无论公司层面还是个人层面,都不需要承担太高的税务成本。所以说,你想要的——也是所有人都想要的——是一门几乎不需要任何资本就能持续增长——而且在增长过程中也不需要追加更多资本的生意。而我们的公用事业业务(话音不清)能源业务,随着业务增长需要更多资本投入。我们的铁路业务,在一定程度上,即便没有增长也需要追加资本。所以资本密集型业务,就其本质而言,就是不如那些客户提前付款、你无需垫付大笔资本的业务好。我是说,你看看——你放眼一个 30 万亿美元市值的市场里,那些位居市值最顶端的企业,你知道——排名前四五家的公司,加总起来大概占了这 30 万亿里的 3 到 4 万亿美元,它们基本上不需要多少资本。这就是它们值大钱的原因,因为它们赚取巨额利润,却不必把大量资金沉淀在企业经营里。我们也拥有一些类似的生意。但这一点在铁路上肯定不成立。在——在能源业务上也不成立。它们是很好的生意,我们很喜欢。但如果它们不需要资本投入,那就好得难以想象了。而这——这正是我们经营企业五六十年下来学到的一件事:如果你能找到一家增长时不需要资本投入的杰出企业,那你就挖到宝了。在某种程度上,正因为保险业务配置的资产本来就是我们愿意长期持有的,我们的保险业务实际上并不消耗资本。它要求必须有可动用的资本。但我们可以把这些资金绝大部分投到我们本来就乐意拥有的东西上。因此,我们尤其适合经营保险。而且多年来,保险确实是我们增长最重要的驱动因素,尽管很多其他业务也各有贡献。格雷格,你就在资本密集型行业里耕耘过。(笑)你来给我们说说吧。(笑声)
WARREN BUFFETTWell, I certainly think that increased corporate taxes are a much higher probability than having lower corporate taxes. So, I — I think that we got handed, as a corporation, a big chunk of what used to be the government's profits from our business a couple of years ago. And it would depend on, to some extent, which party is elected and — and whether they have control of both houses as well as the presidency, and who knows what else. But we could very easily have higher corporate income taxes, and perhaps much higher corporate income taxes, at some point. And in terms of capital-intensive businesses, they're just not as good, if you can find an equally good business — I mean, in terms of operations — that doesn't require capital. I mean — they're — you know, the — See's never — See's (Candies) never really required. It didn't grow, but it's — it just doesn't — it didn't take money to expand it and it's delivered enormous sums to us. And because we own it within Berkshire, to redeploy it elsewhere didn't require a lot of tax expense either at the corporate level or at the personal level. So, you really want a business — and everybody wants a business — that doesn't take any capital to speak off — and keeps growing — that doesn't take more capital as it grows. Now, our utility business (inaudible) the energy business requires more capital as it grows. Our railroad business, to some extent, requires more capital if it doesn't grow, even. So capital-intensive businesses, by their nature, you know, are not as good as something where people pay in advance and you don't need the capital. I mean, if you look at — if you look at where the top market value is in a $30 trillion market, you know — if you take the top four or five companies that account for, you know, maybe 3 — 4 trillion or so of that 30 trillion, basically, they don't take much capital. And that's why they're worth a lot of money, because they make a lot of money and they don't require the money, to any great extent, in the business. We own some businesses like that. But it's certainly not the railroad. And it's not — it's not the energy business. They're good businesses. We love them. But if they didn't take any capital, they'd be unbelievable. But that's just — that's what we've learned from 50 or 60 years of operating businesses, that if you can find a great business that doesn't require capital when it grows, you've really got something. And to a certain extent, because insurance uses the kind of assets we would like to own anyway, our insurance business doesn't really take capital. It requires having capital available. But, we're able to invest that money, largely, in things we'd like to own anyway. So, we're particularly well suited for the insurance business. And it's really been the most important factor in our growth over the years, although a lot of other things contribute. Greg, you're in a capital — you were in a capital-intensive business. (Laughs) Tell us about it. (Laughter)
格雷格·阿贝尔嗯,毫无疑问,我们当然更希望身处资本密集度较低的行业,但那个领域也有独特的机遇。说到通胀,我想提一点——甚至可能,随着我们经历这场危机,也许是一场旷日持久的危机——或者取决于复苏需要多长时间——我的意思是,我们处于一个独特的位置——当我们审视能源或铁路业务时——我们确实拥有一定的定价权。这来自我们的监管公式,或者我们与客户的合同安排。因此,如果我们之后进入通缩时期,这算不上完美的保护,但那些业务通常能收回很大一部分成本,即使在通胀环境下,也仍能赚取合理的回报。它们不会带来极高的回报,正如您所指出的,沃伦。但它们仍然能赚取——
GREG ABELWell, I think there's no question, obviously, we'd prefer to be in a less capital-intensive business, but there are unique opportunities there. The one I would touch on when I think of inflation — or even potentially, as we go through this crisis, and maybe a prolonged one — or depending on how long it takes to recover — I mean, we are in a unique — when we're looking at energy or rail — we do have a certain amount of pricing power. And it's through our regulatory formulas or how our arrangements are with our customers. So, if we then were to move into a deflationary period, it's not perfect protection, but those businesses, generally, can recover a significant portion of their costs, even in an inflationary environment, and still earn a reasonable return. They're not going to be great returns, as you highlight, Warren. But they're still going to earn a —
沃伦·巴菲特哦,是的。
WARREN BUFFETTOh yeah.
格雷格·阿贝尔——合理的资本回报,即使在通胀时期。可能会有一些滞后之类的问题,但它们仍将是非常稳健的投资。
GREG ABEL— reasonable return on their capital, even in an inflationary period. There may be some lag and some things like that, but they're still going to be very sound investments.
沃伦·巴菲特哦,是的。如果发生 10 比 1 的通胀——往极端了说——是的,我们会很高兴拥有铁路——非常高兴。当然,我们会往里面投入大量资本,但在我看来,铁路这个行业在未来很多很多很多很多年,都是一项非常非常扎实的生意。我最初说过,我们买入时考虑的是百年投资期限,现在我已经把这个期限延长了,所以——如果通胀严重,它会赚更多的美元。按实际购买力算,谁知道呢?但它确实会赚取更多的美元。很多能源项目也一样——但没通胀更好。如果我们能找到同样优质但不那么资本密集的生意,那也更好。我们——我们有资本。我的意思是,我们——我们处于理想的位置,可以投资那些别人难以筹集资本的资本密集型业务,但它们还是必须保证能提供合理的回报。
WARREN BUFFETTOh, yeah. If there was 10- for-1 inflation — make it extreme — yeah, we'd be happy we own the railroad — very happy. Well, we'd be investing a lot of capital in it, but that businesses, in my view, is a very, very solid business for many, many, many, many decades to come. I said originally, we bought it with a hundred-year time horizon, and I've extended that, so — It will earn more dollars if there's a lot of inflation. In real terms, who knows? But it would earn a lot more dollars. And a lot of the energy projects would in the — But it's better if we don't have inflation. And it's better if we don't have capital — (laughs) — if we can find the same sort of businesses that aren't as capital intensive. We — we've got capital. I mean, we — we're ideally positioned for capital-intensive businesses that other people have trouble raising capital for, but they've still got to promise decent returns.
美国不会对自己本币债务违约,但通胀是风险
U.S. can't default on its debt, but inflation is a risk
贝基·奎克好的,这个问题来自旧金山的股东查理·王。他说:“鉴于当前经济和债务水平都处于前所未有的时期,美国政府债券违约可能存在哪些风险和后果?”
BECKY QUICKAll right, this question comes from Charlie Wang. He's a shareholder in San Francisco. He says, "Given the unprecedented time of the economy and the debt level, could there be any risks and consequences of the U.S. government defaulting on its bonds?"
沃伦·巴菲特没有风险。如果——如果你用自己国家的货币发行债券,那这种货币会怎么样——可能是个问题,但你不会违约。美国足够聪明,人们也对我们足够信任,一直用本币发行债务。阿根廷现在遇到了问题,就是因为债务不是用本币发行的。很多国家都遇到过这个问题,未来还会有很多国家遇到。欠别人货币的债是非常痛苦的。但如果你——听我说,如果我能发行一种货币——巴菲特币——而且我有台印钞机,你知道,我就能借钱——我就能以它为基础借钱——我永远不会违约。(笑)所以,你最终能拿到多少购买力,这值得怀疑。但就美国政府而言——当年标普下调美国政府评级的时候——我想是标普,几年前——对我来说,那毫无道理。我的意思是,你怎么能把任何一家公司看得比一个能印钱还你钱的人更强大,我就是想不通。所以,别担心政府会违约。顺便说一句,我觉得有点荒唐——这话应该说出来——搞这些债务上限之类的东西,然后政府又为此争论不休。我们肯定会提高债务上限的。债务不会被还清,只会被展期。谁要是觉得能降低国家债务,我的意思是——那——你知道——曾经有过短暂的时期——我记得是在 90 年代末左右——债务确实下降了一点。这个国家还会印更多钱——顺便说一句,这个国家的偿债能力也会增长。但——诀窍在于,要一直用本币借钱。
WARREN BUFFETTNo. The — if you — if you print bonds in your own currency, what happens to the currency is — it can be a question, but you don't default. The United States has been smart enough, and people have trusted us enough, to issue its debt in its own currency. And Argentina is now having a problem because the debt isn't in their own currency. And lots of countries have had that problem, and lots of countries will have that problem in the future. It is very painful to owe money in somebody else's currency. But if you — listen, if I could issue a currency — Buffett Bucks — and I had a printing press, you know, I could borrow money — and I could borrow money on that — I would never default. (Laughs) So, what you end up getting, in terms of purchasing power, can be in doubt. But in terms of the U.S. government — when Standard and Poor's downgraded the United States government — I think it was Standard and Poor's, some years back — that, to me, did not make sense. I mean, in the end, how you can regard any corporation as stronger than a person who can print the money to pay you, I just don't understand. So, don't worry about the government defaulting. I think it's kind of crazy, incidentally — this should be said — to have these limits on the debt and all of that sort of thing, and then stopped government arguing about whether it's going to increase the limits. We're going to increase the limits on the debt. The debt isn't going to be paid, it's going to be refunded. And anybody that thinks they're going to bring down the national debt, I mean — that — you know — there's been brief periods — I think in the late '90s or thereabouts — when the debt has come down a little bit. The country is going to print more — incidentally, the country is going to grow, in terms of its debt paying capacity. And — but the trick is to keep borrowing in your own currency.
股票回购并非不道德,但可能很愚蠢
Stock buybacks aren't immoral, but they can be stupid
贝基·奎克重点是“诀窍”。这个问题来自大卫·卡斯,他是马里兰大学的金融学临床教授。他问:“伯克希尔投资了许多有股票回购计划的公司。最近,回购遭到了强烈的反对。您对此怎么看?”
BECKY QUICKEmphasis on trick. This question comes from David Kass. He is a clinical professor of finance at the University of Maryland. And he says, "Berkshire has invested in many companies with stock buyback programs. Recently there's been a backlash against buybacks. What are your views on this subject?"
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,现在反对回购在政治上是极其正确的,你知道,他们还要把它纳入贷款计划的条款里。关于回购,有很多疯狂的说法。回购其实非常简单。我的意思是,这是一种向股东分配现金的方式。我们就假设你、我和格雷格——我们三个——决定买下一家汽车经销店,或者一家麦当劳特许经营店,或者别的什么。我们每人投入 100 万美元,你知道,或者任何数目。我们彼此相处融洽,生意也在增长,诸如此类。我们其中有一个人真的想花掉属于自己那份收益。另外两个则想把钱留在公司里继续增长。如果我们三个人就这么做,而且我们是仅有的股东,我们不会为所有人制定一个 100% 的股息支付率。我们也不会把那个想退出的人晾在一边。合乎逻辑的做法是,公司买回那个人每年想从收益中花掉的那部分——对应的部分股票,而另外两个人会发现自己在这家公司里的权益比例上升了。至于第三个人,他留在公司里的那部分钱也让他的权益增加了一点,但他同时也能从公司里取出一些钱。无论用哪种方式,你都是在从公司拿钱出来。一种叫做股息,你把它发给每一个人,不管他们想不想要。而通过回购,你把钱给那些想要的人。我从 2006 年开始,就一直遵循赠送股票的策略。我会赠送很多股票。但是那些收到这些股票——这些捐赠——的慈善机构,必须很迅速地花掉这些钱,你知道,差不多要在当期花掉。所以,他们拿到价值 30 亿美元的股票,或者别的什么数目。而我,实际上是在减少我在伯克希尔的权益比例。但我仍然是——伯克希尔留存的资本比我送出去的要多,所以我投入的美元总额在增加,但我的权益比例在下降,而那些需要现金来开展慈善事业的人,他们则把股票套现。我不强迫——我不强迫我的妹妹,或者任何人,去接受一堆她不想要的钱。她希望把钱全——全部——再投资回公司里。而那些不这么想的人,可以卖掉一部分股票。公司的最终财务状况是一样的。我们已经分配了一些我们增长所不需要的资本。至于公司是否应该回购,这取决于几个因素。一是它们应该保留那些用于明智增长机会的资金,这没问题。第二点——这一点从来没人提过——它们应该在股价低于它们自己所认为的内在价值时进行回购。当然,它们会在这方面犯错,但你在各种生意上都会犯错。但总的来说——这应该是指导原则。据我所知——摩根大通的(CEO)杰米·戴蒙这么说过一次,我们也说过很多次,你知道——我们会保留资金——只有当回购对继续持股的股东有利时,我们才会进行回购。但你读到的所有这些关于回购的问题,说什么我们要花 50 亿回购,或是 100 亿。这就像是说,我今年要花 50 亿去买下某个生意,却不知道这笔钱能换来什么。显然,它应该对价格敏感。显然,它应该对资金需求敏感。但当条件合适时,回购股票也应该是显而易见的选择,而且它不应该比股息背负更多污点。那些现在开始大声疾呼,说公司回购股票有多么糟糕的人——我要说,他们当时派发股息也同样糟糕——(笑)——他们现在手里本可以有更多钱,但他们当时做的是符合当时情况的明智之举,我希望他们未来能继续做明智的事。格雷格?
WARREN BUFFETTWell, it's very politically correct to be against buybacks now, you know, and they're going to incorporate it in the loan program. The — there's a lot of crazy things said on buybacks. Buybacks are so simple. I mean, it's a way of distributing cash to shareholders. And let's just say that you and I and Greg — the three of us — decide to buy an auto dealership, or a McDonald's franchise, or something. We each put a million dollars in, you know, or whatever the number may be. And we get along with each other and the business grows and all of that. And one of us really wants to spend our share of the earnings. And the other two want to leave the money in the business to grow. Now if the three of us did that, and we’re the only shareholders, we would not establish a 100 percent dividend payout for everybody. And we wouldn't freeze the one that wanted to get out, either. The logical thing to do is to buy a portion — whatever that person wants to spend annually from the earnings — buy a portion of their stock, and the other two find their interest in the company goes up. And the third person still has a little more of an interest by what they leave in, but they also can take some money out of the business. You're taking money out of the business in either case. And one you call dividends and you send it to everybody whether they want it or not. And with buybacks, you give it to the ones who want the money. And I have been following a policy of giving away stock, now, since 2006. And I'll give away a lot of stock. But the people — the philanthropies — that that receive it — the gifts — have to spend the money very promptly, within, you know — on a current basis, more or less. So, they are getting $3 billion worth of stock, or whatever it may be. And I'm, in effect, reducing my interest in Berkshire. But I'm still — Berkshire is still retaining more capital than I'm giving away, so I have more dollars invested, but my interest goes down, and the people that need the cash to carry out the philanthropic efforts, they cash out the stock. And I don't force — I don't force my sister, or whoever it may be, to take a bunch of money she doesn't want. She wants it reinvested — all of it — reinvested in the business. And people that don't want to, can sell some of their stock. And the company ends up in the same position. We've distributed some of the capital that we don't need for growth. Now, whether the company should buy it depends on a couple of things. One is they ought to retain the money they need for intelligent growth prospects, that's fine. And secondly — and this is a point that's never mentioned — they should be buying it back below what they think it's worth. Now, they'll make mistakes in that, but you make mistakes in a lot of businesses. But over — that should be the guiding principle. And to my knowledge — JPMorgan — (CEO) Jamie Dimon said it once, and we've said it various times, you know — we retained — we will repurchase shares when it's to the advantage of the continuing shareholder to have us do so. But you read about all these buyback problems that we're going to spend 5 billion buying it back, or 10 billion. Well, that's like saying, I'm going to go out and buy some business this year for 5 billion without knowing what you're going to get for the money. It should be price sensitive, obviously. It should be needs sensitive, obviously. But when the conditions are right, it should also be obvious to repurchase shares, and there shouldn't be the slightest taint to it any more than there is to dividends. And people that have now, sort of, taken up the cries about how terrible it was that companies bought back stock — I will say it was terrible for them to pay dividends, too — (laughs) — and they'd have more money now, but they were doing what was intelligent at the time, and I hope they continue to do what's intelligent as they go forth. Greg?
格雷格·阿贝尔不,我——我唯一记得你过去评论过的一点,沃伦,是——我想我们正在看到的一个现象是,显然,我们支持回购——但有些公司运用——可能它们的财务工程玩得有点——
GREG ABELNo, I — the only thing I know you've commented on in the past, Warren, is that — I think the one thing we are seeing, and obviously, we're supportive of buybacks — but there are companies that used — probably their financial engineering was just a little —
沃伦·巴菲特极端。
WARREN BUFFETTExtreme.
格雷格·阿贝尔——极端而且过于取巧,实际上,你在用尽资产负债表上的每一分余地来回购股票,而此时你根本没有为你的公司应对任何意外事件或发展中的坎坷保留任何缓冲,我——你知道,我们会看到这种情况,我认为这对它们来说是一个非常不幸的结果,也因此招来了一些反对的声音。但仍有公司,就像你强调的,很多公司都做得对。
GREG ABEL— extreme and too cute, that effectively you're using every ounce of your balance sheet to buy back stock at a time where you're really creating no cushion for your business for any type of event or bump in the road, and I — you know, we're going to see that, and I think that's a very unfortunate outcome of them, and hence you get some of the backlash. But there's still companies, as you highlighted, many that do it right.
沃伦·巴菲特是的。不,如果他们回购是因为这很时髦,因为他们确实喜欢这个想法——采取一项能提高剩余股份价值的行动,这本身没有问题,但如果他们做得非常——顺便说一句,我亲眼见过一些回购计划,那真是愚蠢。但我不认为那是不道德的。我只是觉得那很蠢——(笑)——你知道,基本上就是这样。而且——另一方面,我——我们欣赏那些公司,它们会首先满足自身增长所需的一切,并且像格雷格说的,保持稳健的资产负债表等等,为那些可能让你措手不及的事情留出容错余地,如果在此之后它们发现自己的股价低于——低于生意的内在价值,我认为它们如果不回购自己的股票,那就犯了一个大错。这将会成为一个政治皮球,就像我说的,当某件事在这个国家变得政治上正确时——如果你是个政客,最好的做法就是随大流。但伯克希尔会做它认为对股东有意义的事。而我们——我们也喜欢投资那些同样这样思考的公司。显然,并不是所有公司都这么做。
WARREN BUFFETTYeah. No, if they're buying it back because it's fashionable, because they really do like the idea that —there's nothing wrong with doing — taking an action that increases the value of the remaining shares, but if they're doing it very — and incidentally, I've been witness to some programs, where it really is stupid. But I don't think it's immoral. I just think it's stupid — (laughs) — you know, basically. And — on the other hand, I — we favor companies that take care of all their requirements for growth and, as Greg says, maintain sound balance sheets and all of that, leave a margin of error for things that you can get surprised with, and if they find their stock selling below the — what the business is intrinsically worth, I think that they're making a big mistake if they don't buy in their stock, and — It's going to be a political football, and like I say, that when it becomes politically correct to do something in this country — if you're a politician, the best thing to do is get on board. But Berkshire is going to do what it thinks makes sense for shareholders. And we — and we like investing in companies that think that way, too. And not all companies, obviously, do.
如果想在减持变现时降低税负,可以将 A 股转换为 B 股
Convert A shares to B shares if you want a smaller tax liability when cashing out
贝基·奎克好的,这是来自佛罗里达州博卡拉顿的卢·博加特的问题。他说:“我是一名长期股东,随着年龄增长即将退休,我有一个担忧。我明白拆股对股票价值没有影响的理论。然而,由于 A 股价格极高,当我想在退休后从投资组合中提取部分资金时,会面临很大的税务冲击。”“假设今年的均价大约是 30 万美元,我每股承担 20 万美元的资本利得税义务。如果在退休期间我需要额外 6 万美元现金,我就得卖掉一整股,并面临 20 万美元的税负。”“如果你把股票按 10 比 1 分拆,我就可以卖掉两股 3 万美元的股票,把税负控制在更易于管理的 4 万美元。我也能保留更多在伯克希尔的投资。”他问:“你考虑过这件事吗?回过头看,我本该买 B 股,但当时没想那么多。”
BECKY QUICKAll right, here's a question from Lou — Lou Bogart in Boca Raton, Florida. He says, "I'm a longtime shareholder with a concern as I head into retirement. I understand the theory that splitting shares does nothing for the value of shares. However, with the extremely high price on A shares, when I wish to draw down some money on my portfolio in retirement, I'm facing a large tax hit. "Say the average price has been about $300,000 this year, and I'm sitting on a $200,000 capital gains liability for each share. If I need $60,000 in additional cash during my retirement, I need to sell a full share and get hit with $200,000 tax liability. "If you would split the stock 10-for-1, I could sell two $30,000 shares and keep my tax liability at a more manageable 40,000. I could also maintain more of my investment in Berkshire." He said, "Have you thought about this? In retrospect, I should have bought B shares but didn't think about it the time."
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,你可以把 A 股转换成 B 股,这正是我 7 月份向五家基金会捐赠时做的。实际上,我在捐赠前即刻转换,我的意思是,这样做他们拿到的就是 B 股。事实上,B 股对那些想捐出一小部分持有份额,或者花掉,或者做别的什么的人非常有用。所以,你可以把 A 股转换成 B 股,这正是我 14 年来捐赠时一直在做的,这样做就解决了那个问题。而且我们——我们拆分过 B 股,我记得,从某个时点开始,就是为了让操作更加容易,这样大家就能用更小的单位进行交易。B 股——A 股有不同的投票权——但是,我们一段时间前通过了某项决议,我想——情况也必定如此——无论如何,我们永远不会让 A 股获得优于 B 股的待遇。在之前我们曾设立的一项股东指定捐款计划中,A 股确实有过优势,我们在发起时把它放在里面,但那是很早以前了,现在那个计划已经不存在了,所以随着时间的推移,B 股和 A 股会得到完全一致的对待。确实,A 股有更多的投票权,不过——它们的交易价格一直非常接近平价。所以,我要说的是,如果你想做任何套现操作,而且你有很多 A 股,你知道,你拿出一两股 A 股——我知道很多人就这么做过——直接换成现金,把它转为 B 股,然后就可以给自己取出你想要的任意金额现金了。
WARREN BUFFETTWell, you can convert A to B shares, which is exactly what takes place when I give away the money in July to the five foundations. I actually convert it immediately before the gift, I mean, and so they get B shares. And the truth is, the B shares are very useful to people that want to, either, give away a small portion of what they have, or spend it, or whatever it may be. So, you can convert the A to B shares, which is exactly what I've been doing now for 14 years as I give it away, and — and solve that problem, and we — We split the B shares, as I remember it, from one point, you know, just to make it even more manageable, so that people could deal with smaller denominations. The B shares — the A shares have a different voting power — but, we passed some resolution some time ago, I think — and it certainly would be the case — in any event, we're never going to give the A shares an advantage over the B. They used to have an advantage in a shareholder-designated contribution program that we had, and we put that in there when we started but that's in — that goes way back in time, and that doesn't exist anymore, so that the B and the A are going to get treated exactly the same over time. It's true the A have more votes, but — and they sell — they sell very close to parity all the time. So, I would say that if you want to do anything, in terms of raising cash, and you've got a lot of A shares, you know, you take one or two shares of A — and plenty of people I know have done this — and just cash in, and turn it into B, and give yourself whatever amount of cash you want to get.
“银行业目前不存在特殊问题”
No "special problems in the banking industry now"
贝基·奎克这个问题来自台湾的托马斯·林。他说:“沃伦曾经说过,如果你不在资产端做蠢事,银行业就是个好生意。考虑到疫情可能会给贷款带来很大压力,过去几年做过的蠢事很可能爆发。”“通过阅读年报、10-Q 报告和其他公开信息,你在寻找哪些线索,来判断一家银行是否由一位不做蠢事的地道银行家在运营?”
BECKY QUICKThis is one that comes from Thomas Lin in Taiwan. He says, "Warren once said that banking is a good business if you don't do dumb things on the asset side. Given that the pandemic might put a lot of pressure on the loans, dumb things that got done in the past few years are likely to explode. "Through reading annual reports, 10-Qs, and other public information, what clues are you looking for to decide whether a bank is run by a true banker who avoids doing dumb things?"
沃伦·巴菲特这个问题很好。但我要说的是,这次让(美联储)主席(杰罗姆)鲍威尔的工作比 2008、2009 年时稍微好做一点的地方在于,银行的状况要好得多。所以——在考虑怎样对经济有利时,他不需要同时担心要怎么处理银行 A 或银行 B,要不要把它们和别人合并,或者给体系增添压力什么的。银行——银行在 2008、2009 年的危机中深陷其中。它们——它们做过一些不该做的事——其中一些银行。而且它们当时的财务状况和现在实在差得太远了,所以——这一次的经济停摆,银行业不是问题所在。政府——我们作为一个国家,决定让经济的一部分大规模停摆。它发生并不是任何人的错。世上总会发生这种事。你知道,会有地震。会有巨大的飓风。这次虽然性质不同,但——银行需要监管。我的意思是,你知道,它们受惠于联邦存款保险公司,但政府为你的存款背书,部分前提条件是你得行为端正,而我认为银行一直表现得很好,而且我认为它们现在的状况非常出色。我的意思是,这就是为什么联邦存款保险公司积累了我提过的一千亿美元。我是说,近几年它们在某些时期以加速的额度向银行收取保费,它们甚至区别对待大银行。所以,它们在那方面建立了庞大的准备金。而且它们也强化了自身的资产负债表,眼下它们并不是鲍威尔主席要面对的问题,而在 2008、2009 年,它们很大程度上是伯南克主席要应对的问题。怎样发现那些正在做蠢事的人并不简单,因为——嗯,有时候倒很简单。不过——(笑)——我并没有看到太多让我忧虑的事。但银行说到底,是靠大量别人的钱来运营的机构,一旦经济问题严重到一定程度,即使是稳健的银行也会承受巨大压力,而那时我们会非常庆幸有联邦储备体系在它们身后支撑。我目前没有看到银行业存在什么特殊问题。我可以想象一些潜在风险。杰米·戴蒙在摩根大通报告里也稍微提到了这一点。你可以设想一些会给银行带来严重压力的情景,这些情景也并非完全不可能。这就是为什么我们有(听不清)。我认为——总的来说,银行业不会成为问题。但我不会说百分之百肯定,因为在这个世界上,确实存在某些可能性会让银行出现问题。它们在能源贷款上会遇到麻烦。它们在——你知道,它们在消费信贷上也会遇到更多麻烦。它们还——你知道,它们对此心知肚明。而且它们为此计提了充足的准备金。嗯,它们为此配置了充足的资本。它们在第一季度就在积累准备金,而且可能还需要计提更多。但它们完全不是我最主要的担忧。我们持有大量银行股票。格雷格,你有什么看法?
WARREN BUFFETTThat's a very good question. But I would say that the one thing that made (Federal Reserve) Chairman (Jerome) Powell's job a little easier this time than it was in 2008 and '09, is that the banks are in far better shape, so — In terms of thinking about what was good for the economy, he wasn't at the same time worrying about what he was going to do with bank A or bank B, to merge them with somebody else, or put strain — added strains on the system or anything. The banks — the banks were very involved with the problem in 2008 and '09. They had — they had done some things they shouldn't have done in —some of them. And they were certainly in far different financial condition than now, so that — the banking system is not the problem in this particular shutdown. The government — we decided, as a people, to shut down part of the economy in a big way. And it was not the fault of anyone that it happened. Things do happen in this world. Earthquakes happen, you know. Huge hurricanes happen. This was something different, but — The banks — banks need regulation. I mean, you know, they benefit from the FDIC, but part of having the government standing behind your deposits is to behave well, and I think that the banks have behaved very well, and I think they're in very good shape. I mean, that's why the FDIC has built up a hundred billion dollars that I've talked about. I mean, they've assessed the banks, in recent years, at accelerated amounts in certain periods, and they even differentiated against the big banks. So, they built up great reserves there. And they built their own balance sheets, and they are not, presently, part of Chairman Powell's problem, whereas they were very much a part of Chairman Bernanke's problem back in 2008 and '09. How you spot the people that are doing the dumb things is not easy because — well, sometimes it's easy. But — (laughs) — I don't see a lot that bothers me. But banks are, in the end, institutions that operate with significant amounts of other people's money, and if problems become severe enough in an economy, even strong banks can be under a lot of stress, and we'll be very glad we've got the Federal Reserve System standing behind them. I don't see special problems in the banking industry now. I could think of possibilities. And (CEO) Jamie Dimon referred to this a little bit in the Morgan — JPMorgan report. You can dream of scenarios that puts a lot of strain on banks, and they're not totally impossible. And that's why we have a (inaudible). And I think that — I think overall, the banking system is not going to be the problem. But I'm not — I wouldn't say that with a hundred percent certainty because there are certain possibilities that exist in this world where banks can have problems. They're going to have problems with energy loans. They're going to have problems some — you know, they're going to have extra problems with consumer credit. They're going to have — you know, they're in — but they know it. And they're well reserved. Well, they're well capitalized for it. They were reserve building in the first quarter, and they may need to build more reserves. But they are not a primary worry of mine at all. We own a lot of banks. We own a lot of bank stocks. Greg, do you have any thoughts on it?
格雷格·阿贝尔没有,我其实——你前面也点到了,总的来说,我们不知道这轮疫情会持续多久,我们不知道会不会有第二波,这些都是目前确实无法预测的风险,而银行将不得不在这种环境中继续经营,就像所有企业一样。但你已经把这一点说的很清楚了。
GREG ABELNo, I really — you touched on it earlier, too, just in general, which is we don't know how long this pandemic will go, we don't know if there's going to be a second event, which are just risks that are really unknown at this time, and the banks will have to continue to manage through that, as businesses do. But you've already highlighted that, obviously.
沃伦·巴菲特对。
WARREN BUFFETTYeah.
尽管股价下跌,伯克希尔仍未觉得回购条件足够吸引
Despite its drop, Berkshire's stock price hasn't made buybacks compelling
沃伦·巴菲特贝基?
WARREN BUFFETTBecky?
贝基·奎克好的。这个问题——我刚才就一直在找一个像这样的问题,因为我收到了好几个类似的问题——我刚才就在找。这个是安德鲁·温克问的。他说:“你能问问沃伦,为什么他三月份没有买进——是回购——伯克希尔的股票,当时股价跌到比他一二月份回购时的价格还要低 30%?”
BECKY QUICKAll right. So, this question — I was looking for one of these, because I got several questions that came in similar to this — I was looking for one of these a moment ago. This one's from Andrew Wenke. He says, "Can you ask Warren why he didn't purchase — repurchase — Berkshire shares in March when they dropped to a price that was 30 percent lower than the price that he had repurchased shares for in January and February?"
沃伦·巴菲特是的。价格低 30% 的那个时段非常、非常、非常短,但——我们——我认为,与内在价值相比,伯克希尔股票目前的价格折扣和我们当时以略高的价格回购时相比,并没有显著差异。你知道,就像凯恩斯说的,或者不管是谁说的:“事实变了,我就改变想法。先生,你怎么办呢?”所以——我们一直都在考虑这件事。但我并不觉得现在买进伯克希尔的股票,比我在三个月、六个月或九个月前感觉到的吸引力大多少。它始终是一个选项。我们拭目以待。格雷格,你——你一直在考虑回购的事。(笑)
WARREN BUFFETTYeah. It was very, very, very short period where they were 30 percent less, but — We — I don't think Berkshire shares, relative to present value, are at a significantly different discount than they were when we were paying somewhat higher prices. You know, it's like (economist John Maynard) Keynes said, or whoever it was, "If the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?" So — it's — we always think about it. But I don't feel that it's more — far more compelling to buy Berkshire shares now than I would have felt three months, or six months, or nine months ago. It's always — it's always a possibility. And we'll see what happens. Greg, you've — you think about repurchasing shares. (Laughs)
格雷格·阿贝尔没有,我——我认为我们的做法,沃伦,是正确的做法。我的意思是,你一直——我确实没法补充什么,只能说这个做法就是正确的做法。当我们认为回购对我们股东而言是正确之举时,我们就会去做。这并不意味着我们一直在回购,也不代表观点不会改变。
GREG ABELNo, I — I think our approach, Warren, is the right approach. I mean, you're always — I can't really add anything other than the approach is the right approach. We approach it when we see it's the right thing for our shareholders to be repurchasing. And that doesn't mean we're repurchasing all the time, or the view doesn't change.
沃伦·巴菲特相对于当时的内在价值,可能存在一个价格,我说的不是相对于一年前值多少钱。我的意思是,某些东西的价值已经下降了。我们的航空股仓位是个错误。正因持有那个仓位,伯克希尔今天比我没持有它时更不值钱。还有其他类似的决策。它们并不是,你知道——现在买进股票并不比我们当时买入时更有吸引力。也并没有更不吸引人。我的意思是,就这么扯平了。但我们没有做任何——我们——价格并没有达到一个水平——或者说并未处在一个水平——让我们确实感觉它比其他选择(包括持有现金的期权价值)要好得多,好到需要我们大规模出手。
WARREN BUFFETTThere could be a price, relative to value at the time, not relative to what it was worth a year ago, I mean. The value of certain things have decreased. Our airline position was a mistake. Berkshire is worth less today because I took that position than if I hadn't. And there are other decisions like that. And they're not, you know — it is not more compelling to buy the shares now than it was when we were buying them. It's not less compelling. I mean, it's a wash. But we didn't do any — we — It's not gotten — the price has not gotten to a level — or not been at a level — where it really feels way better to us than other things, including the option value of money, to step up in a big, big way.
不要欠信用卡债
Don't owe money on your credit card
贝基·奎克这个问题来自三位以色列投资者:利多尔·兹洛夫、约西·兹洛夫和丹·戈凡格。他们想了解信用卡行业。问题是:“你怎么解释近年来信用卡平均利率相对于联邦基金利率的上升?你认为哪些力量可能会将它维持在目前价位或附近,而哪些力量未来又可能将其压低?”
BECKY QUICKThis question comes from three investors in Israel, Lidor Zloof, Yossi Zloof, and Dan Gorfung. They want to know about the credit card industry. It says, "How do you explain the rise in the average credit card interest rate in recent years compared to the federal funds rate? What are the forces that you think might keep it at or around current levels, and what are the forces that might drive it lower in the future?"
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,这个话题我——你知道——显然它在一定程度上影响到美国运通,也影响到我们持有的银行。信用卡利率显然会受到竞争和潜在损失的影响——过去几个月潜在损失明显增加了——尽管从其他历史时期看可能下降了——但这个问题我真的没什么高见。我们不——哦,这么说不对。我们的家具公司,有两家,有自己的信用卡,虽然它们也用别家的信用卡做很多生意。我给人们的总体建议是——你知道——我们在信用卡上有利益,但人们——我不认为——我觉得人们不应该把信用卡当存钱罐来乱花。前不久有位女士来找我,她(听不清)有点钱——数额不大,但对她来说不少——她是我朋友——她说:“我该怎么处理?”我说:“你信用卡上欠多少?”她说:“我欠 X 块。”我说:“那你应该”——我不知道她付的利率是多少,但我想——或许——我问了她,她知道,大概是 18% 左右。我说:“我不知道怎么赚到 18%。”你知道,我的意思是——如果我有任何欠款利息是 18%,我手里有的钱第一件事就是把它还掉。这比我任何投资主意都好得多。这不是你想听的话。后来在谈话里,她提到她女儿,她女儿有一千美元或两千美元之类的。她说:“那我该拿(女孩的名字)的钱做什么?”我说:“让她借给你啊。”(笑)“如果你愿意付 18%”——(笑声)——“或者不管多少,她找不到更好的买卖了。我借给你钱。”这根本说不通。你一辈子靠借那么高利息的钱过日子,不可能过得更好。所以我鼓励所有人——这跟我自己或者伯克希尔在某些情况下的利益相悖——但整个世界都爱信用卡——我建议所有人,人生第一件事就是不要欠——我不认为——你可以以后再考虑别的——但别付——别付任何人 12% 的利息,哪怕 12% 也别付。先把那笔债还掉——如果他们信用真的很好又不想还,就来找我,我私人按那个利率借钱给你——(笑)。格雷格,你怎么跟你孩子说的?(笑)
WARREN BUFFETTWell, that is not a subject that I'm — you know — obviously, it affects American Express to some degree, it affects the banks we own. But interest rates on credit cards respond to competition, obviously, to loss potential, which, obviously, has gone up significantly in the last few months — although it's gone down, perhaps from some other periods you can pick in the past — but I don't really have much I can bring to the party on that question. We are not in the — well, that isn't true. Our furniture companies, a couple of them, have their own credit card, although they do a lot of business on other people's credit cards. My general advice to people — I mean, you know — we have an interest in credit cards, but people — I don't — I think people should avoid using credit cards as a piggy bank to be raided. I had a woman come to see me here not long ago, and she'd (inaudible) some money — and not very much, but it was a lot to her — she's a friend of mine — and she said, "What should I do with it?" And I said, "Well, what do you owe on your credit card?" And she's, "Well, I owe X." And I said, "Well, what you should do" — I don't know what interest rate she was paying, but I think, you know — maybe — I think I asked her, and she knew, and something like 18 percent or something. I said, "I don't know how to make 18 percent." You know, I mean — if I owed any money at 18 percent, the first thing I'd do with any money I had, would be to pay it off. It's going to be way better than any investment idea I've got. And that wasn't what you wanted to hear. And then later on in the conversation, she talked about her daughter, and her daughter had a thousand dollars or two thousand dollars, or something. And she said, "Well, what should I do with …" — and she named the girls — "… money?" And I said, "Have her lend it to you." (Laughs) "I mean, if you're willing to pay 18 percent —(laughter) — or whatever, I mean, she's not going to find a better deal. I'll lend you money." It just doesn't — it doesn't make sense. You can't go through life, you know, borrowing money at those rates and be better off (inaudible). So, I encourage everybody — it's contrary to my own — or Berkshire's interests in certain cases — but the world is in love with credit cards — but I would suggest to anybody that the first thing they do in life is not owe — I don't think — you can get to something else later on — but don't be paying — don't be paying, even 12 percent, to anybody. I mean it's — Pay that off and then — and if they're really a good credit and they don't want to do it, come and see me personally, I'll lend you the money — (laughs) — at that rate. Greg, what do you tell your children? (Laughs)
格雷格·阿贝尔我也是同一个建议——非常好的建议。(笑)不会,我有三个孩子,他们用信用卡都很谨慎,而且我想更多是因为——不是说——不过,显然随着大家进入数字世界和电商世界,信用卡用得比以前多多了,但目标必须是还清欠款。这不等于说你——因为不得不用信用卡做这类交易,就任由余额越滚越大,但现在这里面又多了一层风险。
GREG ABELThe same advice — excellent advice. (Laughs) No, I have three that carefully use their credit card, and more I would say for — not the — but, obviously, people use it a lot more as they go into the digital world and e-commerce world, but then the goal has to be to repay it. It doesn't mean you — because you have to use it for those type of transactions, you run up the balance, but there's an incremental risk there now.
沃伦·巴菲特对一些人来说,这不过是图个方便。
WARREN BUFFETTIt's a matter of convenience for some people.
格雷格·阿贝尔对,对。
GREG ABELYeah, yeah.
沃伦·巴菲特但——要是让我付 12% 去借钱,或者不管多少,我真的会很难受——那可不是什么好事。(笑)你不会看到伯克希尔付这种利率的。(笑声)
WARREN BUFFETTBut — I would have trouble — if I were paying 12 percent for money, or whatever it might be, it would not be a good thing. (Laughs) You won't see Berkshire paying that. (Laughter)
“我百分之百支持照顾” 那些因新冠疫情封锁而遭受经济伤害的人
"I'm 100% for taking care of people" hurt economically by COVID-19 shutdowns
沃伦·巴菲特贝基。
WARREN BUFFETTBeck.
贝基·奎克沃伦,这个问题来自林赛·舒马赫。
BECKY QUICKWarren, this question is from Lindsay Schumacher.
沃伦·巴菲特嗯——
WARREN BUFFETTWell —
贝基·奎克你刚才是不是有话要说?
BECKY QUICKDid you have something you were saying?
沃伦·巴菲特我们也许该在 15 分钟左右收尾。你能挑几个最好的问题吗?(笑)
WARREN BUFFETTWe probably ought to wind this up, maybe, in 15 minutes. Can you select the best ones? (Laughs)
贝基·奎克好。没问题。嗯,我还有几个问题要问你。这个问题来自林赛·舒马赫。她问:“沃伦,你对(新冠)薪资保护计划有什么看法?”
BECKY QUICKOK. Absolutely. Yeah. Well, I've got a couple more questions for you. This one's from Lindsay Schumacher. She says, "Warren, what's your opinion regarding the (COVID-19) Payroll Protection plan?"
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,我一般不想谈政治。但我认为,去照顾那些在这样一段时期里自己实在撑不下去的人,是个很好的主意。我的意思是,如果政府——环境条件和各种情况不管是什么——你实际上是在告诉很多企业,你知道,在相当长一段时间里关门歇业——这样的事搁在我身上是一回事,可你要告诉那些靠一张张薪水单过日子的人——你知道——我——我完全赞成。但实施起来肯定极其头疼。我的意思是——你知道——任何一个庞大的计划都是这样。我不想——我绝不会去批评人们怎么执行这个或那个,因为我自己在管几件大事的时候也遇到过问题。要启动一个极其庞大的计划,做起来没那么容易。一定会有一定数量的欺诈。一定会——你知道,不可能事事都做得完美。但我百分之百支持去照顾那些,因为一件跟他们完全无关的事而确实受到伤害的人,这事——你知道——谁知道会持续多久。你有千千万万人,在担心几个月前他们压根不担心的事。而他们什么也没做错。他们按时上班,他们让打交道的人满意,不管做什么。现在他们没了工作,或者被停职停薪,诸如此类。所以,我——我完全赞成这个基本理念。而且我也认为这事非常难。我们不可能执行得完美无缺。你只能尽力而为,而且动作要快。我——我真的要称赞国会,他们针对问题反应迅速。我想他们从 2008 年和 09 年的经历中吸取了教训。我也要称赞他们努力去做我认为非常正确的事,我不会闲坐着想我怎么才能做得更好。格雷格?
WARREN BUFFETTWell, I don't want to get into politics generally. But I think that's a very good idea to take care of the people who are having terrible trouble taking care of themselves in a period like this. I mean, if the government — and surrounding conditions and whatever it may be — if you're telling a lot of businesses, essentially, you know, quit doing business for a long time — and it's one thing to tell me, but to tell somebody that is living from paycheck to paycheck that way — you know — I'm — I'm all for it. It must be hell to administer. I mean it — you know — any huge program. I don't want to — I'll never get into criticizing on how people do this or that, because I've had problems myself in running a few big things. It just isn't that easy to inaugurate incredibly large problems (programs). There's going to be a certain amount of fraud. There's going to be — you know, everything doesn't go perfectly. But I am a hundred percent for taking care of the people that really get hurt by something that they've got nothing to do with, and where it's — you know — who knows how long it lasts. You've got millions and millions of people that are worrying about something that they weren't worried about a few months ago. And they didn't do anything. They showed up for work on time, and they pleased the people they dealt with, and whatever it may have been. And now they don't have a job, or they've been furloughed, or whatever. So, I — I'm totally for the basic idea. And I think it's very difficult. We can't carry it out perfectly. You do your best and you do it promptly. And I give — I give real credit to both Congress for acting promptly on what the problem is. They've sort of caught on from what they learned in 2008 and '09, I think. And I give credit to trying to do what I think is very much the right thing, and I don't sit around and think about how I could do it better. Greg?
格雷格·阿贝尔我同意这些看法。
GREG ABELI agree with the comments.
作为一个繁荣的国家,我们需要更好地照顾那些抗击新冠的人
As a prosperous nation, we need to take better care of people fighting COVID-19
贝基·奎克沃伦,这个问题来自演员比尔·默瑞,他也是伯克希尔的股东。他问:“这场大流行将造就新一代退伍军人:医护、食品供应、配送、社区服务。那么多人欠这几个人那么多。这个伟大的国家怎样才能轮到我们来照顾他们所有人?”
BECKY QUICKWarren, this question comes from Bill Murray, the actor, who's also a shareholder in Berkshire. He says, "This pandemic will graduate a new class of war veterans, health care, food supply, deliveries, community services. So many owe so much to these few. How might this great country take our turn and care for all of them?"
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,我们实际上无法回报——你知道——就像登陆诺曼底的人一样。我的意思是,穷人、弱势群体,他们受苦了。有难以想象的苦难,与此同时,他们做所有这些事情——你知道——他们一天工作 24 小时,我们甚至不知道他们的名字。所以,我们应该——如果我们对某件事做得过分,我们应该做那些能帮助那些人的事。这个国家——我以前说过很多次——但它的历史,我的意思是——我们是一个极其富裕的国家。而比尔提到的那种工作的人,你知道,他们贡献的比那些出生在幸运子宫里的人多得多,或者走运了,觉得自己——知道如何套利债券,或者别的什么。而我在很大程度上就是那些人之一。所以,你要努力创造一个社会,在正常情况下,人均 GDP 超过 6 万美元,任何每周工作 40 小时的人,不需要第二份工作也能过上像样的生活,有一两个孩子,你知道——他们不能像国王那样生活。我不是那个意思。但是——没有人应该被落下。这就像一个富裕家庭。你知道,你会发现富裕家庭,如果有五个继承人或六个继承人,他们知道他们会试图挑选出最有能力的一个来经营企业。但他们不会忘记——你知道——那个可能在某种程度上比最擅长商业的人更好的公民,但他只是碰巧没有那种市场价值——技能。所以,我不认为一个非常富有的公司应该完全服从——完全服从市场分配的结果,你知道,像 18 世纪那种风格。所以,我欢迎朝那个方向的想法——我们已经朝那个方向走了——你知道,我们在 30 年代推出了社保。我们——我们取得了一些进步,但我们应该。我们作为一个国家已经变得极其富裕。而且我们一直——底层 20% 人的情况改善了。我的意思是,你可以看到各种统计数据。但我更愿意——我更愿意现在在底层 20%,而不是 100 年前或 50 年前的底层 20%。但改善最明显的——(笑)——是顶层 1%。我希望我们作为一个国家,能朝着比尔谈到的那种人得到更好对待的方向前进。这不会损害——这不会损害国家的增长,而且——这早就该做了,但很多事都早就该做了。我们——我仍然会说我们比一百年前的社会更好。但你会觉得,以我们的繁荣程度,我们应该——我们会——对自己有更高的标准来照顾同胞,尤其是当你看到像今天这样的局面时,那些名字你不知道的人,在看着病人进来、尸体出去。格雷格?
WARREN BUFFETTWell, we won't be able to pay, actually — you know, it's like people that landed in Normandy or something. I mean, the poor, the disadvantaged, they suffer. There's an unimaginable suffering, and at the same time, they're doing all these things that — you know, they're working 24-hour days, and we don't even know their names. So, we ought to a — If we go overboard on something, we ought to do things that can help those people. And this country — I've said it a lot of times before — but the history of it, I mean — we are a rich, rich, rich country. And the people that are doing the kind of work that Bill talks about, you know, they are they're contributing a whole lot more than some of the people that came out of the right womb, you know, or got lucky and thinks they're — know how to arbitrage bonds, or whatever it may be. And I'm, you know, in large part, I'm one of those guys. So, you really try to create a society that under normal conditions, with more than $60,000 of GDP per capita, that anybody that worked 40 hours a week can have a decent life without a second job, and with a couple of kids, and have, you know — They can't live like kings. I don't mean that. But that — nobody should be left behind. It's like a rich family. You know, you find rich families, and if they have five heirs, or six heirs, they know they try and pick, maybe, the most able one to run the business. But they don't forget about — you know — the kid that actually may be a better citizen in some ways even than the one that does the best at business, but he just doesn't happen to have that market value — skill. So, I do not think that a very rich company ought to totally abide by — totally abide by what the market dishes out, you know, in 18th century style or something of the sort. So, I welcome ideas that go in that direction I — we've gone in that direction — you know, we did come up with Social Security in the '30s. We — we've made some progress, but we ought to. We have become very, very, very rich as a country. And we've been — things have improved for the bottom 20 percent. I mean, you can see various statistics on that. But I'd rather be in the — I'd rather be in the bottom 20 percent now than be in the bottom 20 percent a hundred years ago, or 50 years ago. But it's — what's really improved — (laughs) — is the top 1 percent. And I hope we, as a country, move in a direction where the people Bill's talking about get treated better. And it isn't going to hurt — it isn't going to hurt the country's growth, and — It's overdue, but a lot of things are overdue. We are — I will still say we're a better society than we were a hundred years ago. But you would think with our prosperity, we could — we would — hold ourselves to even higher standards of taking care of our fellow man, particularly when you see a situation like you've got today, where it's the people that — whose names you don't know, that are watching the people come in and watching the bodies go out. Greg?
格雷格·阿贝尔是的,我——我唯一想强调的另一个群体,而且我认为会非常有趣的是——随着很多在家上学和孩子们待在家里——我认为有一种——我们一直非常尊重老师,但我们总说我们不好好照顾他们。你知道,听到多少人评论说,显然我们不认可或者——你知道,我家里有一个 8 岁的孩子——贝克特——你知道,对妈妈来说有很多挑战。但突然之间,你尊重了这个机构、学校、老师以及一切相关的东西。所以,有——然后当我想到我们的公司和配送员工时,他们所做的绝对令人惊叹,他们确实处于前线。你知道,那是我们面临让他们保持健康安全的挑战的地方。然后你可以一直走到铁路。从我们公司看到的最好的视频是,我们有员工积极参与运输物资、食品、医疗产品,他们对此非常自豪,他们意识到自己在做出改变。所以,在很大程度上,我们欠他们一句感谢。而且,沃伦,你提到了。我们可以——以某种方式——也许,希望是长期补偿他们,但有很多感谢,我可能认为对各种各样的人有巨大的新的感激之情。
GREG ABELYeah, I — the only other group that I would highlight, and I think it's — it'll be very interesting how it plays out — is with the number of homeschooling and the children that are home — I think there's a — we've always had so much respect for teachers, but we all talk about how we don't take care of them. And, you know, it is remarkable to hear how many people comment that, clearly, we don't recognize or — you know, I have a little 8-year-old — Beckett — at home and, you know, plenty of challenges for Mom. But all of a sudden, you respect the institution, the school, the teachers, and everything around it. So, there's — and then when I think of our companies and the delivery employees we have, it's absolutely amazing what they're doing, and they're truly on the front line. You know, that's where we have our challenges around keeping them health and safety. And then you go all the way to the rail. The best videos you see out of our companies are when we have folks that are actively engaged in moving supplies, food, medical products, and they're so proud of it, and they recognize they're making a difference. So, a lot of it is, we just owe them a great thanks. And, Warren, you touched on it. We can — some way — maybe, hopefully, longer term compensate them, but there's a great deal of thanks, and I probably just think an immense amount — new appreciation for a variety of folks.
沃伦·巴菲特我们国家(听不清)正朝着正确的方向前进,但速度实在是太慢了。
WARREN BUFFETTWe're going the right direction (inaudible) the country, but it's been awfully slow.
格雷格·阿贝尔是的。
GREG ABELYeah.
资本主义需要政府来确保人人共享繁荣
Capitalism needs government to make sure everyone participates in prosperity
贝基·奎克先生们,我把这个问题作为最后一个。提问者是菲尔·金。他问道:“新闻界和政治界的许多人在质疑资本主义的有效性。你们能对他们说些什么,能促使他们更正面地看待资本主义?”
BECKY QUICKGentlemen, I'll make this the last question. It comes from Phil King. He says, "Many people in the press and politics are questioning the validity of capitalism. What can you say to them that might prompt them to take a look at capitalism more favorably?"
沃伦·巴菲特嗯,市场体系能创造奇迹。但如果完全放任自流,它也很残酷。如果没有让市场体系发挥作用,我们国家也不会是今天这个样子。而且从某种程度上说,世界上其他那些大幅改善了生活水平的国家,也在一定程度上模仿了我们。所以,市场体系在很多方面都很出色,但它需要政府——你知道——它叫做创造性破坏,但对于那些被摧毁的人来说,这可能是一个非常残酷的游戏,对于那些在相关行业工作的人们等等而言也是如此。所以,我并不想提出什么不同于资本主义的东西,但我当然不想要不受约束的资本主义。而且我不认为我们会背离它,但我认为我们这些资本家——我也是其中之一——你知道,我觉得我们应该多想想,如果我们再抽一次签——根据市场所看重的技能来决定命运——会发生什么。你知道的——很久以前,有人发明了电视。我不知道是谁。然后他们发明了有线电视。然后又发明了付费系统等等这些。所以,那个在 1941 年能打出 0.406 打击率的家伙,一年只值 2 万美元,而现在一个勉强够格的大联盟球员,你知道,能赚多得多的钱,因为实际上,球场容量从 3 万、4 万或 5 万人扩大到了全国范围,而市场体系——资本主义——接管了一切。这是非常不均匀的。顺便说一句,我觉得泰德·威廉姆斯——(笑)——比我应该赚的任何钱都值得多得多。但市场体系可能会导致赢家通吃的局面,我们不想打击人们努力工作和深入思考的积极性,但仅靠这些是不够的。资本主义体系中有很多随机性——包括继承的财富——我认为我们可以保留市场体系和资本主义最好的部分,而且我们可以做得更好,确保每个人都能分享由此产生的繁荣。格雷格?
WARREN BUFFETTWell, the market system works wonders. And it's also brutal, if left entirely to itself. And we wouldn't be the country we are, if the market system hadn't been allowed to function. And to some extent, you can say that other countries around the world that have improved their way of life dramatically, to some extent, have copied us. So, the market system is marvelous in many respects, but it needs government and it — you know — it is creative destruction, but for the ones who are destroyed It can be a very brutal game, and for the people who work in the industries and all of that sort of thing, so I — I do not want to come up with anything different than capitalism, but I certainly do not want unfettered capitalism. And it's — I don't think we'll move away from it, but I think we capitalists — and I'm one of them — you know, I think there's a lot of thought that should be given to what would happen if we all drew straws — again — for particular market-based skills. You know, it's — Somewhere way back, somebody invented television. I don't know who it was. And then they invented cable. Then they invented pay systems and all of that. And so, the fellow that could bat .406 in 1941 was worth $20,000 a year, and now a marginal big leaguer, you know, will make vastly greater sums because, in effect, the stadium size was increased from 30 or 40 or 50,000 people to the country, and the market system — capitalism — took over. And it's very uneven. And incidentally, I think that Ted Williams — (laughs) — was worth a whole lot more money than I ever should make. But the market system can work toward a winner takes all-type situation, and we don't want to discourage people from working hard and thinking hard, but that alone doesn't do it. There's a lot of randomness in the capitalist system — including inherited wealth — and I think we can — I think we can keep the best parts of a market system and capitalism, and we can do a better job of making sure that everybody participates in the prosperity that that produces. Greg?
格雷格·阿贝尔是的。不,我认为关键是要一直保留它最好的部分。我甚至觉得,看看我们现在所处的环境,也就是疫情期间,我们必须在可以妥善地重新开放的时候才能行动,但从某种角度看,对人们来说最大的机会显然是当我们恢复工作、系统再次运转起来的时候。但那是明摆着的,此外,正如沃伦你所指出的,这个体系有很多不完善之处,但它仍然是——这绝对是现存最好的模式,只是需要一些微调。
GREG ABELYeah. No, I think it's always keeping the best parts of it. And I even think if we look at the current environment we're in, i.e., in the pandemic, and we have to do it only when we can do it properly and reemerge, but in some ways the best opportunity for people is when we're back working, clearly, and that the systems function again, but that — that's the obvious and then there's, as Warren, you've highlighted, there's, you know, there's a lot of imperfections but it's still — it's definitely the best model out there, that just needs some fine tuning.
“聪明并不必然等同于智慧”
"Smartness does not necessarily equate to wisdom"
沃伦·巴菲特贝基,在最后,我只想说——
WARREN BUFFETTAnd Becky, at the end, I would just —
贝基·奎克沃伦——
BECKY QUICKHey Warren —
沃伦·巴菲特我只想说,你知道——哦,当然,你先说。
WARREN BUFFETTI would just say that, you know — oh sure, go ahead.
贝基·奎克可以吗?我就——
BECKY QUICKCan I? Can I just —
沃伦·巴菲特当然。
WARREN BUFFETTSure.
贝基·奎克——再看一个简短的问题。我把这个给忘了。有人早些时候发来的。谢谢。安德森·哈克斯顿(Anderson Haxton)发来问题。他说:“沃伦提到本·格雷厄姆是他见过的最聪明的三个人之一。”(巴菲特笑)“我想请教他另外两个人的名字。”
BECKY QUICK— look at one more quick question. I forgot this one. Someone sent it in earlier. Thanks. Anderson Haxton wrote in. He said, "Warren mentioned that Ben Graham is one of the three smartest he's ever met." (Buffett laughs) "I'd like to ask him the names of the other two."
沃伦·巴菲特这个嘛,我可能不是最聪明的人之一,但我足够聪明,不会点出另外两个人的名字。我会让两个人感到高兴。但是——(笑声)但我要——这不是一个——本·格雷厄姆是最聪明的三个人之一,我确实认识一些绝顶聪明的人。聪明并不必然——并不必然等同于智慧。本·格雷厄姆,他喜欢说的一件事是,每天他都想做一件有创意的事、一件慷慨的事和一件蠢事。他说他对最后一件事相当在行。(笑)不过他确实很在行——实际上,他在创造方面是很了不起的。但有趣的是,智商并不总能转化为理性和行为上的成功或智慧。所以——我认识一些人,他们极富智慧,但在智商测试中可能排不进前三名。但如果我想就某件事征求他们的判断,甚至想让他们去某个地方承担一份责任,我可能会选择他们——而不是我们说的那三人中的某一个。这样另外那两个人会感觉很好——(笑)——三人中的另外两个。(笑)格雷格,你有什么想法吗?(笑声)
WARREN BUFFETTWell, I may not be one of the smartest, but I'm smart enough not to name the other two. I'd make two people happy. But — (Laughter) But I would — it isn't a — Ben Graham is one of the three smartest people, and I've known some really smart people. Smartness is not necessarily — does not necessarily equate to wisdom, either. And Ben Graham, one of the things he said he liked to do, every day, was he wanted to do something creative, something generous, and something foolish. And he said he was pretty good at the latter. (Laughs) But he was pretty good — he was amazing, actually, creating. But it's interesting that IQ does not always translate into rationality and behavioral success or wisdom, and so — I know some people that are extraordinarily wise that would not be in the top three on an IQ test. But if I wanted their judgment on some matter, even if I want to put them in a position of responsibility someplace, I might prefer them to — we'll say one of the three. That'll leave the other two feeling fine — (laughs) — of the three. (Laughs) Greg, you have any thoughts on that? (Laughter)
格雷格·阿贝尔没有。我同意你提到的那个人的观点。
GREG ABELNope. I agree with the person you named.
沃伦·巴菲特嗯。
WARREN BUFFETTYeah.
结语:永远不要做空美国
Conclusion: Never bet against America
沃伦·巴菲特贝基,我只想——我只想再说一遍,我们可能会有——我希望不会——但我们可能会有一些不愉快的意外,你知道。我们正在应对一种病毒——它以某种方式传播,你知道,以非常不可预测的方式,而所有美国人对它的反应如何,你知道,有各种各样的可能性。但我在权衡了所有这些事情之后,得出的结论是:永远不要做空美国。所以,谢谢。
WARREN BUFFETTAnd Becky, I would just — I would just say, again, that we may have — I hope we don't — but we may get some unpleasant surprises, you know. We're dealing with a virus that — that spreads its wings in a certain way, you know, in very unpredictable ways, and how the — how all Americans react to it, you know, there's all kinds of possibilities. But I definitely come to the conclusion, after weighing all that sort of stuff, never bet against America. So, thanks.
贝基·奎克谢谢。
BECKY QUICKThank you.
沃伦·巴菲特好的。
WARREN BUFFETTOK.
贝基·奎克感谢您今晚的时间。
BECKY QUICKI appreciate your time tonight.
沃伦·巴菲特我们明年见。我们会——我们会把这里坐满。好的。(笑)
WARREN BUFFETTAnd we'll see you next year. We'll have — we'll fill this place. OK. (Laughs)
贝基·奎克好了,各位晚安。
BECKY QUICKOK, good night, everybody.