Wesco金融2005年度股东大会——查理·芒格讲话纪要
2005 年西科金融股东大会纪要
2005 年 5 月 4 日
作者:惠特尼·蒂尔森
说明:本文并非逐字记录稿。会议现场不允许使用录音设备,因此本纪要基于数小时的快速打字记录和我的回忆整理而成。我按主题对发言内容进行了重组。方括号 [ ] 内的文字是我的评论或编辑。
如需查看我以前关于伯克希尔和西科会议的专栏文章和笔记,请点击此处。
查理·芒格的开场致辞
到了这把年纪,我觉得有义务多说几句,因为你们中很多人远道而来。所以,我想谈谈公司治理和投资界当前正在经历的变化,伯克希尔·哈撒韦和西科如何应对,以及你们可能如何面对这些挑战。
公司治理
首先说公司治理。我们正在经历一场温和的公司治理革命。国会通过了规则,要求董事会多数成员必须独立,这影响了各类公司,包括伯克希尔·哈撒韦和西科。在好事多,我们增加了老比尔·盖茨 [实际上,比尔·盖茨的父亲是小比尔·盖茨,微软的掌门人是比尔·盖茨三世(因此绰号“特里”),但大家都叫他们老比尔和小比尔] 和丹尼尔·埃文斯——我喜欢看到年轻人加入董事会。[笑声。盖茨和埃文斯都 79 岁了。]
我认为这对伯克希尔·哈撒韦是件好事。我们拥有一群非常能干、才华横溢的股东。我们给的报酬少得可怜,但我们邀请的每一位(加入董事会的人都)都同意加入:比尔·盖茨、桑迪·戈特斯曼、汤姆·墨菲、唐·基奥、夏洛特·盖曼——戈特斯曼家族就持有价值几十亿美元的伯克希尔·哈撒韦股票。
萨班斯-奥克斯利法案
后来他们又通过了萨班斯-奥克斯利法案,这带来了各种宣誓和合规程序。它造成的一个后果是成本急剧增加。审计师必须认证内部控制。在伯克希尔·哈撒韦,包括西科,过去这项费用是 20 万美元,现在则是几百万美元。不过,这些钱也不全是浪费——大约只有 80% 是浪费的。(笑声)
Notes from 2005 Wesco Financial Annual Meeting May 4, 2005 By Whitney Tilson Note: This is not a transcript. No recording devices were allowed at the meeting, so this is based on many hours of rapid typing, combined with my memory. I have reorganized comments by subject matter. Words in [brackets] are my comments or edits. For my columns and notes on previous Berkshire and Wesco meetings, click here. CHARLIE MUNGER’S OPENING REMARKS I feel a duty in these later years to talk a little bit because so many of you have come so far and therefore I’m going to talk a little about current change conditions in corporate governance, the investment world, how we’re adapting at Berkshire Hathaway and Wesco, and how you might face these challenges. Corporate Governance First, corporate governance. We’re having a mild revolution in corporate governance. Congress passed rules requiring that a majority of directors be independent, which has affected all kinds of companies, including Berkshire Hathaway and Wesco. At Costco, we added Bill Gates Sr. [actually, Bill Gates’s father is Jr. and Bill Gates, the head of Microsoft, is Bill Gates III (hence the nickname “Trey”), but everyone calls them Sr. and Jr.] and Daniel Evans – I like to see young people joining the board. [Laughter. Gates and Evans are both 79 years old.] I think it’s a plus at Berkshire Hathaway. We have a very able, brilliant group of shareholders. We pay a pittance but everyone we asked [to join our board] agreed to come aboard: Bill Gates, Sandy Gottesman, Tom Murphy, Don Keough, Charlotte Guyman – there’s a couple of billion dollars of Berkshire Hathaway stock in the Gottesman family. Sarbanes-Oxley Then they passed Sarbanes-Oxley, which creates all kinds of oaths and compliance procedures. One thing it caused was an enormous increase in costs. The auditors must certify the internal controls. At Berkshire Hathaway, including Wesco, this used to cost $200,000 but now it’s in the multiple millions. It’s not all wasted though – only about 80% is wasted. (Laughter)
也有一些积极的结果。但成为一家上市公司的成本已经大大增加。对小公司来说,上市已不再划算。许多小公司选择私有化,就是为了摆脱这些繁重的合规要求。
问题在于,你可以要求人们郑重宣誓自己的财务数据是准确的,但唯一能确认的方法就是信任一大堆其他人。他们以前就是这么做的,现在也还是这么做。我觉得国会里有人以为埃克森美孚的董事长会亲自跑遍油井去数石油桶数。好吧,那不可能发生。这需要的是应得的信任。
我认为目前的监管要求是好的。这让起诉坏人变得更容易了。但对于组织机构和普通人来说,我不认为《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》能带来多大的控制力。
丑闻与媒体曝光的影响
但另一个变化正在对公司治理和行为产生剧烈影响——那就是大规模的丑闻和媒体报道,它们带来了羞耻、耻辱、个人法律成本,以及毁掉了无数人的生活。这种局面已经改变了行为——甚至比过去更甚,当年价格操纵丑闻发生时,高管们是被直接抓进监狱的。那确实有效果[但当前的丑闻影响更大]。
这一波丑闻和铺天盖地的媒体报道对企业行为产生了难以置信的强大影响——这早就该来了。
想想安然、世通和泰科这些公司受到的舆论关注吧。还有共同基金行业——许多公司都沾上了丑闻的边。个人而言,我认为强生基金发生的事简直就是暴行。独立董事发现他在偷窃,但他们没有解雇他,也没有为基金另找一位管理人,反而允许他把公司卖掉。这说明一种文化可以变得多么放任和邪恶。
为斯皮策叫好
检察官们使用了媒体,而不是依赖安静的律师程序。我个人赞同这种做法。虽然有些人指责这是滥用职权,但我觉得 99% 的情况并非如此。
就我看来,埃利奥特·斯皮策表现得非常好,做了很多好事。他推动了许多监管改革,而这些改革证监会永远做不到。
有人说斯皮策针对的对象没有获得正当程序,但只有律师才喜欢没完没了的正当程序——他们是按小时收费的。这让我想到一个故事:有位律师下了地狱,他得到的全部东西就是无休止的正当程序,却永远等不到判决。
There are some results to the good. But the cost of being a publicly traded stock has gone way, way up. It doesn’t make sense for a little company to be public anymore. A lot of little companies are going private to be rid of these burdensome requirements. The problem is that you can require people to solemnly swear that their financials are accurate, but the only way to do it is to trust a lot of other people. That’s what they did before and that’s what they do now. I think someone in Congress thought that the President of Exxon would run around and count the barrels of oil. Well, it’s not going to happen. There needs to be deserved trust. I think the current requirements are good. It makes it easier to prosecute crooks. But for the organization and for ordinary people, I don’t think Sarbanes-Oxley will create a lot of control. Impact of Scandals and Press Coverage But another change is having a dramatic effect on corporate governance and behavior – that’s the widespread scandal and press coverage which has caused shame, disgrace, personal legal costs, and ruined many lives. That has changed behavior – even more so than in the past, during the price-fixing scandal when they carted executives off to jail. That had an effect [but the current scandals are having more of an effect]. This wave of scandal and widespread press coverage has had an unbelievably strong impact on corporation behavior – it’s overdue. Think of the publicity of Enron, WorldCom and Tyco. And the mutual fund industry – many firms had some whiff of scandal. Personally, I think what happened to the Strong funds was an outrage. The independent directors found him stealing, but instead of firing him and finding another manager for the funds, they instead allowed him to sell the firm. This shows how permissive and evil a culture can become. Kudos to Spitzer Prosecutors have used the press instead of relying on quiet lawyerly procedures. Personally, I’m in favor of this approach. While some have claimed that this is abusive, 99% of the time it’s not. As far I’m concerned Eliot Spitzer has behaved very well and has done a lot of good. He’s caused a lot of reforms the SEC wouldn’t have caused. Some claim that those targeted by Spitzer are not getting due process, but only lawyers like endless due process – they get paid by the hour. It reminds me of the story about the lawyer who goes to hell and all he gets is endless due process and no decision.
行为发生了巨大的转变。在保险行业,我要说,几乎是彻底改头换面。各种打着“财务再保险”名头的投机性保险产品——顺便说一句,“财务再保险”这个词本身根本没什么实际意义——现在根本卖不出去。
痴迷季度盈利
在很多企业里,管理层痴迷于达到季度盈利目标。为了达标,他们会稍微耍点花招:卖点股票获取资本利得、卖掉一栋两栋楼……如果还不够,他们还会搞渠道压货——如果你是通过中间商进行销售,就可以在季度末把产品塞给他们,让本季的业绩看起来更好看,但下一季度当然会更糟。这种事以前很普遍,而且处罚很轻。许多大型制药公司、消费品公司和软件公司,在季度末这么干是家常便饭。现在这种风气基本结束了。公开处决几个人,还真能改变行为。
我们的一位总统说过,如果允许他每年毫无理由地处决三个人,那治理国家会容易得多。当有人说不够时,他说:“哦,足够了,因为我会公布受审名单。”(笑声)
所以,这一切都是好事,而且这么做的成本其实非常低。“公开处决”的效果确实发挥了作用。现在人们都会去参加研讨会,学习如何避免这种情况。量刑标准表明,如果你试图避免这种情况(公司试图避免报告虚假或误导性盈利),你会得到更轻的处罚,因此企业纷纷制定政策来防范。
佣金的诱惑
保险和再保险行业的效果不错。但在那些直接依赖佣金的领域,效果就差一些了,因为销售团队全靠佣金吃饭。你永远会有一些靠佣金吃饭的经纪人、年金销售员之类的人做出越轨行为。在这些领域,你永远无法根除它。这是人性使然——人们会为了拿到报酬,为自己的各种行为找理由开脱。
如果你希望行为良好,就不要按佣金制付酬。我们的法官可不是按案件量拿钱的。我们让他们拿着固定薪水,与利益隔离得很好。在整个事件中,法官们的表现相当不错——丑闻相对很少。
所以,我们的文明社会还没有彻底完蛋。(笑声)
会计师事务所与投资银行
会计师事务所和投资银行已经跌到了谷底。正是它们的结合,才导致了安然公司这类烂摊子的发生。
There’s been a tremendous change in behavior. In the insurance business, I’d say it’s changed virtually overnight. All kinds of gamey insurance products which fall under financial reinsurance – a meaningless term, by the way – you couldn’t get written today. Obsession With Quarterly Earnings In many corporations, there’s an obsession with meeting quarterly earnings targets. To do so, they’d fudge a little, sell stock at a capital gain, sell a building or two... Then, if that wasn’t enough, they’d engage in channel stuffing – if you were selling through a middleman, you could unload your product at the end of the quarter and make the current quarter look better, but of course the next quarter would be worse. It went on a lot and the penalties were pretty light. For many major pharmaceutical, consumer products and software companies, at the end of quarter, this was very common. That’s pretty well over. A few public hangings will really change behavior. One of our Presidents said if he could execute three people each year for no cause, it would make it a lot easier to govern. When someone said that’s not enough, he said, “Oh yes it is, because I’d publish the list of people under consideration.” (Laughter) So this is all to the good and the cost of doing it has been really low. The public hanging aspect has really worked. People now go to seminars to learn how to avoid this. Sentencing shows that if you try to avoid this [companies trying to avoid reporting false or misleading earnings], you’ll get lower penalties, so corporations are putting in policies to prevent this. Temptation of Commissions This has worked in the insurance and reinsurance industries. It has worked less well where you have direct commissions because you have a sales force relying on commissions. You’ll always have brokers, annuity salesman and the like who go astray. You’ll never be able to stamp it out in these areas. It’s human nature – people will rationalize all sorts of things to get paid. If you want good behavior, don’t pay on a commission basis. Our judges aren’t paid so much a case. We keep them pretty well isolated with a fixed salary. Judges in this whole thing have come out pretty well – there have been relatively few scandals. So not everything has gone to hell in a bucket in our civilization. (Laugher) Accounting Firms and Investment Banks Accounting firms and investment banks had reached a near bottom. The combination helped messes like Enron to happen.
在会计行业,发生了一个变化——审计业务从咨询业务中分离出来了。
还有另一种诱惑:盖楼。少浇混凝土能省下很多钱,这就是为什么拉丁美洲的楼房经常倒塌。如果不仔细检查,人们就会屈服于诱惑,所以我们有法规,浇混凝土时建筑专员必须到场。总体而言,美国的建筑记录相当不错。
建筑检查员和许可证发放员就像法官一样——他们拿的是固定工资。
在会计领域,我们不会像对待建筑许可证发放员那样对待他们——只让他们做检查工作。我们允许他们做税务筹划之类的咨询业务。我一直是支持的,因为大多数情况下他们能做这些事,而且行为也相当规范。但四五年前,情况变了,几乎每家大型会计师事务所都在销售欺诈性的税务筹划方案,并且参与了——至少有一位合伙人在参与——会计欺诈。他们已经开除了那些合伙人,有些情况下是勉强的,但无论如何,他们走了,会计行业好多了。
我们是否应该彻底只让会计师事务所做审计,这是一个有趣的问题。我喜欢会计师事务所——我们得到过很好的服务。但考虑到所有诱惑,我不知道让他们只做审计是不是最好的选择。
如果再来一波丑闻,注册会计师将被迫在审计上市公司账目和其他业务之间做出选择。他们讨厌这个——查账非常无聊;其他工作更有趣,所以他们无法吸引优秀人才进入这个行业。
投资银行简直令人难以置信。如果你们真想感到恶心,那些还没读过《金融衍生品灾难》(FIASCO,弗兰克·帕特诺伊著,副标题“一个华尔街交易员的内部故事”)的人,里面关于摩根士丹利衍生品交易台的描述,会让你们反胃。
我推荐库尔特·艾兴瓦尔德的新书《愚人的阴谋》(关于安然丑闻)。他做了一些发挥,比如那家伙进电梯时在想什么,但我认为要点没错。书名起得好:《愚人的阴谋》。这里面很多都是妄想。
但让人作呕的是投资银行家——不过律师和会计师的行为也很糟糕。
把鼻子凑上去闻闻是好事。如果你受不了一次性看完,那就分几次看。如果中间吐了,那也没关系。(笑声)
有些过失应该像在教堂里一样被判定——是重罪还是轻罪。平滑利润这种罪过被太多人广泛使用,以至于我们不得不把它当作轻罪。但现在我们在改变分类,也应该改变。我认为在平滑业绩记录之前,应该深思熟虑。
我认为很多聪明人已经决定:“我离这个能把人吸下去、打碎再吐出来的漩涡十英里之内都不去。”有些只犯了小错的人会受到重创。但总体而言,检方的裁量权没有被滥用。
然而,一旦某人名誉扫地、交了罚款等等,再痛打一个半死不活的人有什么意义?他既然已经身败名裂,还需要再踩他一脚吗?
不过,我不想暗示所有的吹嘘和愚蠢行为都结束了。
现在他们穿着量身定制的西装,但这些西装里还保留着不少老马克·吐温式的文化。
部分原因是有些人回避做不愉快的事。谁没有过呢?解雇人是极其不愉快的。或者你怎么告诉一个人不要进入一个能赚大钱但味道不对的领域?或者如果他们的收入下降,就有巨大的压力去发明一些产品来维持他们的收入。
这就是为什么当我们的本土保险公司业务量下降时,沃伦不会裁员。
在年金销售领域存在骇人听闻的行为。为了赚佣金,把一位老太太从一个年金产品转到另一个——你们觉得好笑,但这确实发生了。麻烦总是伴随着我们。
尽管被所有这些丑闻弄得很恶心,但我认为行为正在变好。
对冲基金
我不知道对冲基金会发生什么。它们现在有 1 万亿美元,而且全部都在用保证金交易。历史表明,如果他们有丝毫的自由裁量权,一定比例的人会谎报业绩,并会尽可能掩盖市场错误。我可以自信地预测会有丑闻。永远都会这样。
公司薪酬
公司治理问题,在它影响薪酬的方面,我认为没有得到改善。他们(CEO)会在聪明律师的帮助下,达成同样老一套的事情。人们只是会做得更巧妙。
也许像纽交所这样半公开的场所会表现更好,但普通公司将继续推高薪酬。关键高管任命董事,然后董事决定高管拿多少钱。然后高管增加董事的薪酬,等等。你环顾会议桌,没有其他人反对。存在心理压力,导致严重的滥用。
这并不是说所有 CEO 的薪酬都过高。在我看来,杰克·韦尔奇在通用电气做的事,他拿的薪酬低了。
但如果你在公司或生活中爬到了高位,你有责任成为榜样——你有责任拿得少于应得的,以身作则。这可以追溯到雅典时代。雅典人就像今天的联合犹太呼吁组织一样。公共职责不是可选的。文明人有责任成为榜样——这不是小责任;这是人生的一项主要责任。薪酬顾问可不会提这个。(笑声)
有损官员体面的行为
这一点应该改变。当我还是军队军官时,我们有一条规则叫“有损官员体面的行为”。它并不具体,但规定了一些作为他人榜样的行为方式。我不明白为什么我们不能对公司高管也这样。我认为波音的 CEO 被解职就是因为“有损官员体面的行为”。用色情露骨的邮件搞乱公司电子邮件系统就是“有损官员体面的行为”。我很想看到 SEC 明确宣布:“我们特此行使权力,声明上市公司高管将有一个新的标准,叫‘有损官员体面的行为’。”不过律师们会尖叫——这不够具体。
但如果我们可以要求冒着生命和致残风险的军官遵守这个标准,那为什么我们不能要求一个年薪 200 万美元的家伙也这样做呢?(掌声)
嗯,这就是公司治理。看着这些乱七八糟的故事展开,确实很有趣。
更多关于坏会计的讨论
哦,我想说:如果你们读了艾兴瓦尔德关于安然的书,要重点强调一个问题的话,那就是安达信和 SEC 允许他们用华尔街会计方式来核算长期合同。这是最糟糕的事情之一。一个训练有素的红毛猩猩都能看出这会导向什么后果,但 SEC 和会计师们却屈服了。这占了问题的 90%。
当会计师们屈服时,他们是在以一种真正重要的方式让文明失效。没有理由那些如此稳固的人——只剩下四家事务所,而且它们都一样,所以解雇它们也没什么用——不能做得更好。他们很稳固,而且宣传效果很糟糕,所以没有理由会计工作不能做得更好。
In the accounting business, you’ve had a change – it’s been separated from the consulting business. There’s another temptation: building buildings. You can save a lot of money by pouring less concrete, which is why buildings in Latin America often fall down. People will yield to temptation if they’re not carefully checked, so we have regulations and the building commissioners actually have to be present when the concrete is poured. By and large, [the result is that] the building record is pretty good in the U.S. Building inspectors and permitters are like judges – they are paid a salary. In accounting, we’re not going to treat them like building permit issuers – limit them to just checking things. We let them do consulting for tax shelters, etc. I was for it all the way along because for the most part they could do these things and the behavior was pretty good. But four or five years ago, this changed and pretty much every major accounting firm was selling fraudulent tax shelters and were participating – at least one partner was – in accounting fraud. They have thrown out those partners, in some cases reluctantly, but in any case they’re gone and the accounting is way better. Whether we should have gone all the way and only let accounting firms do audits is an interesting question. I like accounting firms – we’ve had good service. But given all the temptations, I don’t know if it wouldn’t be best to make them do only audits. If we have another wave of scandals, CPAs will be asked to choose between certifying the accounts of publicly traded corporations vs. other activities. They hate it – checking the accounts is very boring; other work is more interesting, so they won’t be able to attract good people [to the profession]. The investment banks were just unbelievable. If you want to be really horrified, those of you who haven’t already read FIASCO [The Inside Story of a Wall Street Trader, by Frank Partnoy], the account of the derivatives trading desk at Morgan Stanley, it will turn your stomach. I recommend the new book by Kurt Eichenwald, Conspiracy of Fools [about the Enron scandal]. He takes some liberties, like what the guy was thinking as he got on the elevator, but I don’t think the gist is wrong. The title is right: Conspiracy of Fools. A lot of this was delusion. But the thing that is sickening is the investment bankers – but lawyers and accountants behave badly too. It’s good to rub your nose in it. If you can’t stand it all at once, then do it in bursts. If you throw up in between episodes, that’s OK too. (Laughter) Some of these faults ought to be judged as they are in the church – as mortal vs. venial. The sin of smoothing of earnings was so widely done by so many people that we have to accept it as a venial sin. But now we’re changing the category, and we should. I think we should think long and hard before we smooth the achievement record. I think a lot of smart people have decided “I’m not going within 10 miles of this whirlpool that can suck you down, break you up and spit you out.” Some people who only had small sins are going to get clobbered. But overall the prosecutorial discretion has not been abused. However, once people are disgraced, pay a fine, etc., what’s the point of beating up a guy who’s half dead? Once he’s disgraced, do you need to stomp on him? I don’t want to suggest that all of the puffery and folly is over, however. Now they wear tailored suits, but there’s a good bit of the old Mark Twain culture in those suits. Part of it is from people who shrink from doing unpleasant things. Who hasn’t? It’s terribly unpleasant to fire someone. Or how do you tell someone not to go into a field [of business] with lots of money to be made because it smells? Or if their incomes are going down, there’s huge pressure to invent some products to keep their income up. That’s why Warren doesn’t lay people off when our home-grown insurance company volume goes down. There’s been ghastly behavior in the sale of annuities. The idea of shifting an old lady from one annuity to another to make a commission – you laugh, but it happens. The trouble is always with us. At the cost of being sickened by all the scandal, I think the behavior is getting better. Hedge Funds I don’t know what will happen with hedge funds. They now have $1 trillion and all of them are on margin. History would indicate a certain percentage will lie about their results if they have any discretion whatsoever, and will try to cover up market errors if they can. I can confidently predict scandals. It will always be thus. Corporate Compensation The corporate governance thing, as it affects compensation, I do not think is getting improved. They [CEOs] will accomplish the same old thing, helped by clever lawyers. People will just get more sophisticated in the way they do it. Perhaps a semi-public place like the NYSE will behave better, but the ordinary corporation will continue to escalate compensation. The key officers appoint the directors and then the directors decide how much the officers make. And then the officers increase the compensation of the directors, etc. You look around the table and nobody else is objecting. There are psychological pressures tending to gross abuse. That’s not to say that all CEOs are overpaid. In my opinion, Jack Welch was underpaid for what he did at GE. But if you rise high in a corporation or elsewhere in life, you have a duty to be an exemplar – you have a duty to take less than you deserve, to set an example. This goes all the way back to Athens. The Athenians were like today’s United Jewish Appeal. Public duty was not optional. Civilized man had a duty to act as an exemplar – and this was not a minor duty; it was a major duty of life. This is not mentioned by compensation consultants. (Laughter) Conduct Unbecoming an Officer This should change. When I was an officer in the military, we had a rule called Conduct Unbecoming an Officer. It was not specific, but it said there were certain ways to behave as an example for others. I don’t see why we shouldn’t have this for our corporate executives. I would argue the CEO of Boeing was removed for Conduct Unbecoming an Officer. Messing up the email system of a corporation with hot and dirty email is Conduct Unbecoming an Officer. I would love to see the SEC make it explicit: “We hereby exercise our authority and say that there will be a new standard for officers of public companies called Conduct Unbecoming an Officer.” The lawyers would scream though – it’s not specific enough. But if we ask our military officers, who risk their lives and risk being maimed [to adhere to this standard], then why can’t we ask this of some guy making $2 million per year? (Applause) Well that’s corporate governance. It’s certainly been interesting to watch as these messy stories unfurl. More on Bad Accounting Oh, I’d say this: if you read the Eichenwald book on Enron, if there’s one issue to highlight, it’s that Arthur Andersen and the SEC allowed them to use Wall Street accounting to account for long-term contracts. It’s one of the worst things. A welltrained orangutan could see what it would lead to, but the SEC and the accountants lay down. This was 90% of the problem. When accountants lie down, they are failing civilization in a truly important way. There’s no reason that people so secure – there are only four firms and they’re all the same, so it doesn’t do any good to fire them – can’t do better than they do. They’re secure and it’s terrible publicity, so there’s no reason the accounting can’t be better.
投资回报
对冲基金里有 1 万亿美元,私募股权基金的规模还要大 3 到 4 倍。私立大学设有固定收益部门、从事中段投资的私募股权基金,还有大量复杂的数学模型来追踪每类资产的风险,以及如何判断每类资产等等。到目前为止,哈佛和耶鲁做得相当漂亮——它们投中了一些好项目。但说到哈佛和耶鲁,我的感觉和我对自己职业生涯的感觉一样:我觉得,以我那种方式致富,我自己的榜样反而伤害了我的国家。我认为,哈佛和耶鲁的做法导致所有慈善基金会都效仿同样的模式。我觉得这对文明有有害的影响。
太多脑力流向了资金管理
我猜,大约有 5% 的 GDP 流向了资金管理及其伴随的摩擦成本。我的定义很宽泛——包括年金、激励薪酬、所有交易等等。没有其他人用过这么高的数字,但这是我的猜测。最糟糕的是,从事这些工作的人都是最优秀、最聪明的人。成千上万的工程师等等,都涌向了对冲基金和投资银行。这根本不是对文明脑力的明智配置。
在我们做这些事的时候,在韩国的三星,他们每天晚上 11 点开会,回顾当天的进展。好吧,如果我们的脑力都投向了对冲基金,而他们的脑力在晚上 11 点开会,谁会赢?但没人谈论这个问题。这些人还备受尊敬。如果在乡村俱乐部聊天,有人可能会说:“哎呀,我女儿要嫁给一个对冲基金经理了。” 他们被奉为英雄。
我女儿是艺术品经销商,她说她的大部分生意就是卖给对冲基金经理。如果你赚了 1 亿美元,为什么不弄一套豪华公寓,挂两幅夏加尔的画呢?你在别处赚不到这种钱,所以就这么继续下去了。
信贷过度
交易、投机、信贷规模…… 而要获得好的回报,对冲基金需要更多地使用信贷。
当然,提供信贷的机构是投资银行。如果出现任何大规模出逃的浪潮,那些家伙会迅速撤离。除非美联储决定保护对冲基金,否则你可能会陷入真正的混乱。
艰难的环境
所以,这就是我们现在的处境。同时,这就像一场复活节彩蛋寻宝,猎人太多,彩蛋却不够。所以,你们这些价值投资者,环顾一下四周。这里有很多猎人。所以,如果你遇到困难,请加入俱乐部。
Investment returns There’s $1 trillion in hedge funds and private equity is 3-4 times larger. Private universities have fixed-income departments, private equity for mid-stage investments, masses of complicated math to track risk in each class and how to judge each class, etc. So far, it’s worked beautifully for Harvard and Yale – they got into some good things. But I feel about Harvard and Yale the way I feel about my own career: I feel that by getting rich in the way I did, I think my own example has hurt my own country. I think that Harvard and Yale have caused every charitable foundation to act in the same way. I think it has pernicious effects on civilization. Too Much Brainpower Going Into Money Management It’s my guess that something like 5% of GDP goes to money management and its attendant friction. I define it broadly – annuities, incentive pay, all trading, etc. Nobody else has used figures that high, but that’s my guess. Worst of all, the people doing this are among the best and the brightest. Hundreds and thousands of engineers, etc. are going into hedge funds and investment banking. That is not an intelligent allocation of the brainpower of the civilization. While we’re doing this, in Korea at Samsung, they have a meeting every day at 11 pm to review the day. Well, who is going to win if our brainpower is going into hedge funds and theirs is having a meeting at 11 pm? But nobody is talking about this. These people are honored. If people talk at the country club, one person might say, “Boy, my daughter is getting married to a hedge fund manager.” They’re making heroes. My daughter is an art dealer and she says that most of her business is selling to hedge fund managers. If you make $100 million, why not have a fancy apartment and two Chagalls? You can’t get this [kind of money] elsewhere, so it goes on. Too Much Credit The action, the trading, the amount of credit... And to get good returns, the hedge funds need more use of credit. Of course, the firms that are extending the credit are the investment banks. If there’s any great wave of running for the exits, those people will get out fast. Unless the Federal Reserve decides to protect hedge funds, you could have a real mess. Tough Environment So that’s where we’re at. Meanwhile, it’s like an Easter egg hunt with too many hunters and not enough eggs. So you value investors, look around the room. There are a lot of hunters. So if you’re having trouble, please join the club.
我认为这是一个非常有趣的发展。我一生中从未见过——它同时冲击了所有资产类别。房地产按照过去的标准定价极高,股票按照过去的标准定价极高,固定收益按照过去的标准定价极高。所有这些资产类别都受到了冲击。而这些占 GDP 绝大部分的人都想致富,他们很可能会推动市场继续上涨。
这可能会以两种方式收场:要么继续上涨,要么出现像日本曾经经历的那种典型崩盘。
收购公司的竞争正在升温。私募股权公司几乎能为任何价格找到理由。我的一位朋友收购仓库,几个月来他什么都没买到。他说:“我能做的就是不断提高付给仓库主的价钱。”于是我的朋友停止试图收购仓库。
东方的崛起
看看东方状况的巨大改善——那真是了不起。在伯克希尔·哈撒韦,我们不喜欢和中国制造商竞争。他们学东西很快,而且善于把产品送到你手上。他们正在迅速崛起。
亚洲人口中的才华令人惊叹。他们曾被荒谬的制度压制——先是独裁者统治,然后是共产主义——但现在在资本主义制度下,他们的潜力极其惊人。
我的测试方法是看交响乐团。在最难的乐器上,需要最专注训练的那些位置上,80% 的演奏者是亚洲人。这在几年前并非如此。他们是一个非常优秀、非常有动力的族群。美国的好处是他们会来这里。看看这个房间——看看这里有多少亚洲人。20 年前的西科股东大会上,情况并非如此。
去加州大学伯克利分校的工程系看看——你会觉得自己身在亚洲。
我的孙辈们可能会被亚洲人取代。如果是这样,那对芒格家来说就太糟了。我完全赞成精英制度。
当你有如此庞大的人口基数、如此天赋异禀、家庭观念又如此强大时,经济影响是巨大的。我没见过一个亚洲家庭不为教育拼命的。在韩国,最大的生意之一是家教。孩子们整天上学,然后家教上门——而孩子才三岁!(笑声)
我们正在尝到精英制度的滋味。但这并不意味着你可以直接去中国投资。先动者可能会被杀掉。印度尼西亚有句谚语:“你所谓的腐败,是亚洲的家庭价值观。”(笑声)
I regard that as a very interesting development. I don’t think I’ve ever seen in my whole life – it’s hit all asset classes together. Real estate is priced very high by past standards. Stocks are priced very high by past standards. Fixed income is priced very high by past standards. All of these asset classes have been hit. And all of these people accounting for a vast part of GDP want to get rich, and they will likely push. This could end up in two ways: keep going up or there could be a classic bust, as occurred in Japan. The competition to buy companies is heating up. The private equity firms will rationalize almost any price. My friend buys warehouses and for months he’s been unable to buy anything. He says, “All I do is raise the price paid to the owner of the warehouse.” So my friend stopped trying to buy warehouses. The Rise of the Orient Take the vast improvement of conditions in the Orient – that is really something. At Berkshire Hathaway we do not like to compete against Chinese manufacturers. They learn fast and are good at getting things to you. They’re coming up fast. The amount of talent in the Asian populations is amazing. They were held down by ridiculous systems -- first ruled by autocrats and then by communists – but now under capitalism, the potential is awesome. My test is I look at symphony orchestras. For the hardest instruments, that require the most dedicated training, 80% of the faces are Asian. This was not true years ago. They are a very talented, driven ethnic group. A good thing about the U.S. is that they come here. Look around this room – look how many Asians are here. 20 years ago at the Wesco meeting, this was not true. Go to the UC Berkeley engineering department – you’d think you were in Asia. My grandchildren may be displaced [by Asians]. If so, that’s too damn bad for the Mungers. I’m all for meritocracy. The economic implications are huge when you have a population base so large, so intrinsically talented, with family values so good. I don’t know an Asian family that doesn’t kill itself for education. In Korea, one of the biggest businesses is tutors. Kids go to school all day and then the tutor comes – and the kid is three! (Laughter) We’re getting a taste of meritocracy. It does not mean you can just go invest in China, however. The first movers can get killed. There’s a saying in Indonesia: “What you’re calling corrupt is Asian family values.” (Laughter)
未来展望
其他人也可能面临同样的问题。一些离奇的坏事可能发生,所以要做好准备。或者,我们可能进入一个没有灾难、但回报糟糕的时期。这种情况曾长期存在——最近一次是截止 1981 年的 15 年。但现在,每个人都习惯了预期高回报。读一读哈佛和耶鲁的委员会报告——他们看不到任何理由不做到高于平均水平。毕竟,他们历史上就是这么做的。
我认为规模会拖累回报。看看伯克希尔·哈撒韦——沃伦最近做的五笔交易,按历史标准衡量,回报相当出色,但如果你给他 1000 亿美元资产,再来衡量整体业绩,就没那么好看了。我们只能买大仓位,而能买到大量仓位的机会,只有在市场惨烈下跌或停滞的时期才会出现。这种机会确实不常有。你们很幸运,没有那么多钱。我们钱很多,只能承受。(笑声)
嗯,这就是投资环境。
Future Outlook There may be implications for the rest of you. Something weirdly bad can happen, so prepare for it. Or we could be in for a period with no calamity, but lousy returns. There have been long periods when this was the case – most recently, the 15 years ending in 1981. But now everyone is conditioned to expect high returns. Read the committee reports from Harvard and Yale – they see no reason not to do better than average. After all, they have done so historically. I think size will hurt returns. Look at Berkshire Hathaway – the last five things Warren has done have generated returns that are splendid by historical standards, but now give him $100 billion in assets and measure outcomes across all of it, it doesn’t look so good. We can only buy big positions, and the only time we can get big positions is during a horrible period of decline or stasis. That really doesn’t happen very often. You people are lucky to not have a lot of money. We have a lot of money and we’ll endure. (Laugher) Well, that’s the investment climate.
查理·芒格在问答环节的发言
伯克希尔以无缝的应得信任网络运营
每个人都喜欢被欣赏、被公平对待,而那种有能力经营企业的强势人物,喜欢被信任。一个被信任可以拿电脑室钥匙的孩子说:“被信任的感觉真好。”
我们经营伯克希尔的方式就是这样——一个无缝的应得信任网络。我们摒弃那些疯狂的行为,摒弃那些派人去检查以确保事情做对了的做法。当你拥有一个无缝的应得信任网络时,你会获得巨大的效率。这正是日本人当年在制造业上把我们打得落花流水的原因:供应商、雇主、采购公司、管理层——全都构建了一个无缝的应得信任网络。这就是为什么我们会有公司——它们构建了一个无缝的应得信任网络。好的橄榄球队也是一样。
伯克希尔·哈撒韦一直在努力构建一个无缝的应得信任网络。偶尔会失效,不是因为有人邪恶,而是因为有人滑向了不当行为,然后自我合理化。我们的基本态度是构建一个无缝的应得信任网络。
伯克希尔·哈撒韦怎么能在总部只有 15 个人的情况下运营?没人能这样干。但我们做到了。
拿西科金融来说。我们偶尔会被某件事惊到——大概十年一次吧。这就是我们想要的。谁他妈的会不想生活在一个没有无缝应得信任的家庭里?我们在商场上也追求同样的事。这不是什么火箭科学;这是基础常识。为什么那么多人不这么做,我不知道。也许就因为它太基础了。我们之前没学日本人的做法,直到他们把我们都打趴下了——而他们又是从我们这里学去的!
伯克希尔·哈撒韦的投资标准降低了
在伯克希尔·哈撒韦,我们稍微降低了一点标准——我们愿意以比过去更低的标准投资。我们不是在等 1974 年,甚至也不是等 1984 年。如果你手里有钱,你就得找个地方投出去。很可能,你就得接受一些明显回报率比你过去习惯的要低的东西。
我认为那些说“我需要更多”,然后试图去获取超过自己需要的人,很可能陷入巨大的麻烦。我认识一个人,他拥有的房子没有任何抵押贷款,还有 500 万美元的证券,靠这些证券的收入生活。但这点收入离他想要的还差一点,于是他对自己说:“我去做点小工作,把回报率提上来”,然后他卖出了看跌期权,用他的全部账户做担保。当时,最高价格的是互联网股票的裸看跌期权,最后他亏光了所有钱,现在在一家餐厅打工。
我们带着降低的预期买入
沃伦在股东大会上说过,对于我们目前持有的大部分头寸,我们既不买入也不卖出。而当我们确实买入时,不会说:“哇!大牛股!”我们是带着降低的预期买入。还能怎么干?难道有人希望我们把伯克希尔·哈撒韦的资产全部换成现金,然后干坐着等一场灾难,好让伯克希尔把现金投出去?
我们绝没有放弃将现金投入运作
沃伦在伯克希尔股东大会上回答过这个问题。我们绝没有放弃将现金投入运作。而如果我们没有投出去,钱也不会消失。
你们预测到伯克希尔的成功了吗?
嗯,我们的成功有一部分是预测到的,有一部分是碰巧。不管怎样,和大多数人类一样,我们接受了掌声。(笑声)
伯克希尔史上最佳投资的共同点
有些结果最终成真了。那 15 笔最佳交易的共同点是:它们全都成功了。模式各不相同——喜诗糖果和 Shaw 地毯就不同。但两者都是好生意,能为在座各位的后代带来持久的回报。我之所以不断提起剔除了那 15 笔最佳交易的数据,是为了说明你一生中需要的好交易其实很少。那些每个月都需要一笔交易的人,绝大多数最后都崩了。你需要的是耐心和激进的机会主义——这是个奇怪的组合,但最管用。
伯克希尔和西科金融回购股票?
巴菲特在伯克希尔股东大会上回答了这个问题。在某个价位,我们会回购伯克希尔的股票,但那个价位比当前的市场价格低得多。我们并不寻求以远低于内在价值的价格,兴高采烈地把股东买断。我们喜欢的行为方式是让这种事不会发生。
至于西科金融,因为你们这群人创造了一种崇拜氛围,它的股价总是高于清算价值。
看好伯克希尔
尽管我说了那些话,但我看好伯克希尔·哈撒韦。可能需要耐心等上一段时间,但我认为好日子还在前面。
我们正在买入的股票
[我错过了句子剩余部分,但在某个时刻芒格说:“……我们正在买入的那些股票(复数)……”]
巴菲特基金会最终不得不出售伯克希尔股票的问题
我认为这太好解决了,我根本不会花两秒钟去想它。如果基金会必须每年出售 5% 的股票(以遵守法律规定基金会必须每年捐出 5% 资产的要求),那么伯克希尔可以派发股息或回购股票。这不会让我烦恼——我们现金多到泛滥。任何一位股东的需求,在我们当前的环境下都容易处理。如果你为这种事操心,那你的日子过得真是太优越了。
对伯克希尔·哈撒韦旗下业务的评论
伯克希尔 AAA 级信用评级在保险领域的优势
定价上有一点分层——保险公司之间基于信用状况存在差异。但差异够大吗?答案是不够。我是否预期会有大量业务涌向伯克希尔·哈撒韦?不。但会有一点点、越来越大的涓涓细流。人们对信用的警惕性远没有达到应有的程度。
巨灾再保险保单的定价
我们非常独特。我们没有那种信任员工可以独立完成决策的部门。所有决策必须经阿吉特·贾恩和沃伦批准,而他们两个都不使用标准的精算表。换句话说,在很长一段没有飓风的时间之后,精算表会告诉你飓风风险降低了——伯克希尔·哈撒韦的人可不是那么想的。他们非常理性。我们不使用标准的精算表,就像我们以公司的报告财务数据为起点,然后从那里深入分析。你不需要几十个人来写巨灾再保险保单。所以我们的计划是:找来阿吉特·贾恩,加上沃伦·巴菲特免费干活,然后因为人们信任你,你就能筹集到几百亿美元,然后就行了。(笑声)
我们有简单的薪酬体系
只买对的企业还不够。你还需要有一套能让经营这些企业的人满意的薪酬体系。在伯克希尔·哈撒韦,我们没有统一的体系;我们有不同的体系。它们非常简单,而且我们通常不经常去重新审视。令人惊讶的是,它运作得多么好。我们在收购喜诗糖果时和查克·哈金斯签了一页纸的协议,此后从未改动过。我们从未聘请过薪酬顾问。
克莱顿住宅与活动房屋行业的灾难
移动房屋——实际上,现在叫“制造房屋”;它们不是为移动而制造的——近年来的历史经验是,有一堆糟糕的疯子,加上一大波受佣金驱动的不幸销售活动。任何时候,你让拿销售佣金的人来为使用杠杆(例如借款买房)的人设定信用标准,你就是在制造灾难。这就像把氧气和氢气混在一起,然后划火柴。
房屋质量下降…… 这绝对是一场灾难。如果不是这样,我们也不可能买下克莱顿住宅。行业困境如此之大,以至于它们失去了证券化能力。克莱顿是最好的,但连它们也面临风险,所以把公司卖给了我们。
你对在活动房屋停车场里没收一套房子了解多少?然后你拿它怎么办?我们现在是全国最大的。我认为这对伯克希尔和克莱顿来说会运作得相当好。如果克莱顿是一家独立公司,它们会有麻烦。那些声称我们付的钱太少了的人真是疯了。令人惊讶的是,竟然有那么多自认为比卖家知道得更多的人。
Cort 长远来看会成功
Cort 受益于风险资本支持的新公司繁荣。你可以说我们犯了一个宏观错误。这些公司消失了一段时间,Cort 受到了影响。但从第一季度的盈利可以看出,它正在恢复。
有一类人只想租,不想拥有。他们试图成为家具租赁领域的 Enterprise 租车公司。这不是一座金矿,但我们认为它长远来看会成功。
CHARLIE MUNGER RESPONSES DURING Q&A SESSION Berkshire Operates With a Seamless Web of Deserved Trust Everybody likes being appreciated and treated fairly, and dominant personalities who are capable of running a business like being trusted. A kid trusted with the key to the computer room said, “It’s wonderful to be trusted.” That’s how we operate Berkshire – a seamless web of deserved trust. We get rid of the craziness, of people checking to make sure it’s done right. When you get a seamless web of deserved trust, you get enormous efficiencies. It’s what the Japanese did to beat our brains out in manufacturing: suppliers, employers, the purchasing company, management – all created a seamless web of deserved trust. That’s why we have firms – they create a seamless web of deserved trust. It’s the same with good football teams. Berkshire Hathaway is always trying to create a seamless web of deserved trust. Every once in a while, it doesn’t work, not because someone’s evil but because somebody drifts to inappropriate behavior and then rationalizes it. Our basic attitude is to create a seamless web of deserved trust. How can Berkshire Hathaway work with only 15 people at headquarters? Nobody can operate this way. But we do. Take Wesco. Every once in a while we get surprised by something – maybe once a decade. It’s what we all want. Who in the hell would not want to be in a family without a seamless web of deserved trust? We try for the same thing in business. It’s not rocket science; it’s elementary. Why more people don’t do it, I don’t know. Perhaps because it’s so elementary. We didn’t copy the Japanese until they were clobbering us – and they copied from us! Lowered Investment Standards at Berkshire Hathaway At Berkshire Hathaway, we’ve lowered our standards a little – we’re willing to invest with lower standards than in the past. We’re not waiting for 1974 or even 1984. If you have the money, you have to invest it somewhere. It may well be that you have to take something that obviously promises a lower return than you were used to. I think the people who say “I need more” and therefore try to get more than they need, are likely to get into terrible trouble. I know a man who owned his house free and clear, had $5 million of securities and lived on the income from those securities. But this left him a little short of what he wanted, so he said to himself, “I’ll go do a little work to get my return up,” and he sold puts, backed by his entire account. At the time, the highest price was on naked puts on Internet stocks and in due course he lost all of his money and now works in a restaurant. We Buy With Reduced Expectations Warren said at the annual meeting that with most of our present holdings, we’re not buying or selling. And when we do buy, it’s not, “Oh boy! A lollapalooza!” We buy with reduced expectations. How else can one behave? Would anyone want us to reduce Berkshire Hathaway’s assets to cash and sit around waiting for a calamity so Berkshire can put the cash to work? By No Means Have We Given Up on Putting Our Cash to Work Warren answered this at the [Berkshire] annual meeting. By no means have we given up on putting our cash to work. And if we don’t, the money is not going away. Did You Predict Berkshire’s Success? Well, some of our success we predicted and some of it was fortuitous. [Regardless,] like most human beings, we took a bow. (Laughter) Common Elements of Berkshire’s Best All-Time Investments Some eventualities came to pass. What the 15 best deals all have in common is that they all worked. There were different models – See’s Candies was different from Shaw Carpets. But both are good businesses that will generate durable returns for the grandchildren of people sitting in this room. The reason I keep talking about the record without the 15 best deals is that it shows how few deals you need in a lifetime. The people who need a deal every month, by and large, they all crater. Patience and aggressive opportunism is what you need – an odd combination, but it’s what works best. Berkshire and Wesco Buying Back Stock? Buffett answered this question [at the Berkshire annual meeting]. At some price, we’d buy back Berkshire, but it’s quite a bit less than the price that currently exists. We’re not looking for the chance to gleefully buy out shareholders at a substantial discount to its value. We like to behave so this doesn’t happen. As for Wesco, because you people have created this cult, it always trades at a premium to its liquidation value. Bull on Berkshire Despite my words, I’m a bull on Berkshire Hathaway. There may be some considerable waiting, but I think there are some good days ahead. Stocks We’re Buying [I missed the rest of the sentence, but at one point Munger said: “…the stocks [plural] that we’re buying today…”] Problem of Buffett Foundation Having to Eventually Sell Berkshire Stock I regard that as so easily solvable that I don’t give two seconds to it. If the foundation has to sell 5% of its stock [every year to comply with the law that says all foundations must give away 5% of their assets each year], then Berkshire could pay a dividend or buy back the stock. It wouldn’t bother me – we’re drowning in cash. The needs of any one shareholder are easily dealt with in our current circumstances. You lead a very favored life if you worry about things like that. COMMENTS ON BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY BUSINESSES Advantage of Berkshire’s AAA Credit Rating In Insurance There’s a little price tiering – there’s a difference among insurers based on their credit worthiness. But is there enough difference? The answer is no. Do I expect a cascade of business to Berkshire Hathaway? No. But there’s a modest and increasing trickle. People are not as credit-leery as they should be. Pricing Super-Cat Insurance Policies We’re very peculiar. We don’t have a department where we trust people to do it on their own. All decisions must be approved by Ajit Jain and Warren, and neither of them uses standard actuarial tables. In other words, after a long period with no hurricanes, the actuarial tables would tell you that the hurricane risk has gone down – that’s not how they think at Berkshire Hathaway. There’re very rational. We don’t use standard actuarial tables, just as we start with [companies’] reported financials, but then go from there. You don’t need dozens of people to write super-cat policies. So there’s our plan: get Ajit Jain, add Warren Buffett working for free and then raise tens of billions of dollars because people trust you and there you go. (Laughter) We Have Simple Compensation Systems It isn’t enough to buy the right business. You’ve also have to have a compensation system that’s satisfactory to the people running them. At Berkshire Hathaway, we have no [single] system; we have different systems. They’re very simple and we don’t tend to revisit them very often. It’s amazing how well it’s worked. We wrote a one-page deal with Chuck Huggins when we bought See’s and it’s never been touched. We have never hired a compensation consultant. Clayton Homes and the Disaster in the Manufactured Home Sector The recent historical experience of mobile homes – actually, it’s “manufactured”; they’re not manufactured to move – is that you had a bunch of no-good nut cases and a balloon of unfortunate, commission-sales-driven activity. Any time you let people on sales commission set the credit standards for people using margin [e.g., debt to buy the home], you create a disaster. It’s like mixing oxygen and hydrogen and lighting a match. The homes deteriorated... It was an absolute disaster. If it hadn’t been, we wouldn’t have been able to buy [Clayton Homes]. [The distress in the industry was so great that] they were losing their securitization capacity. Clayton was the best, but even they were at risk so they sold to us. What do you know about foreclosing on a house in a trailer park? And what do you do with it? We’re now the largest in the country. I think it will work quite well for Berkshire and Clayton. If Clayton were an independent company, they’d have trouble. The people who claim we underpaid for it are out of their minds. It’s amazing how many people think they know more than the people selling it. Cort Will Be Successful Over Time Cort benefited from the venture-capital-financed, new-company boom. You could argue that we made a macro mistake. These companies went away for a while and Cort was affected. But you can see in the first quarter earnings that it’s coming back. There’s a class of people that just want to rent, not own. They are trying to be the Enterprise Rent-A-Car in the furniture rental business. It’s not a gold mine, but we think it’ll be successful over time.
投资建议
基金经理的行为
如果你是一位基金经理,而他们因为你的业绩没跟上基准就要炒你鱿鱼,那这可能会在市场上引发一些怪事。这就是我们身处的世界,不管你喜不喜欢。它带来了一些反常的后果——其中之一就是伪装成主动管理的指数跟踪。你付给基金经理一大笔钱,结果他把 85% 的资产投得跟指数差不多。如果你面对的是这样一个体系,那你就是被人当傻子耍了。
投资管理界总是一阵一阵的风潮。现在有这么多的人、脑子和电脑,我看到各种按资产类别列出的风险数字,可我完全搞不懂它们是什么意思。那些人其实也不懂,但他们学会了一种风潮、一种思考方式。你要是学了个公式,就可以算个数、打印出来,但这不说明任何问题。
股票是不是太高了?
“太高”是个很滑稽的词——对于我们这些习惯于找真正便宜货的人来说,现在确实高。但这并不承诺(永远会有那样的便宜货)。我不觉得这不公平;我也不觉得高到让我们被剥夺了什么的地步。
我们未来的前景比以前差远了。但我 81 岁了,比起回报下降,我有更大的问题要面对。(笑声)
识别坏人
判断人的品性、智慧和其它特质的组合,很难。这一点都不简单,这也就解释了为什么会有这么多离婚。(笑声)想想人们在结婚对象身上了解到的信息有多少,却还是有那么多人分手。这不容易,但在某些情况下是容易的。如果有人像丹尼斯·科兹洛夫斯基那样挥金如土,派对上的伏特加就从某个身体部位喷出来,场面搞得像索多玛和蛾摩拉一样,那这大概不是你想要的。(笑声)但除此之外,就很难了。如果你在获取这种知识的过程中有过一些不愉快的经历,那好吧,欢迎来到人类世界。(笑声)
在中国投资赚钱很难
我认为在中国赚钱非常难。很多可怕的事情可能落到你头上,而你却没有好的应对办法。中国制造了大量便宜又好用的商品,但就算这个国家繁荣昌盛,我们可能也不会在那里找到有吸引力的投资机会。
INVESTMENT ADVICE Behavior of Investment Managers If you’re an investment manager and they’re going to fire you if you don’t keep up with your benchmark, that can cause some weird things to happen in the markets as a whole. That’s the world that we live in, whether you like it or not. It has some perverse consequences – for one thing, closet indexing. You’re paying a manager a fortune and he has 85% of his assets invested parallel to the indexes. If you have such a system, you’re being played for a sucker. You have these fads in investment management. With so many bodies and minds and computers, I see figures of risk by asset class, but I don’t have the faintest idea what they mean. They don’t either, but they learned a fad, a way of thinking. If you learn a formula, you can run the numbers and print it up, but it doesn’t mean anything. Are Stocks Too High? Too high is a funny word – they are high to those of us who are accustomed to finding real bargains. But it’s not a promise [that there will always be such bargains]. I don’t think it’s unfair; I don’t think it’s too high in the sense that we’re being deprived. Our future prospects are way worse than what they used to be. But I’m 81; I’ve got bigger problems than diminished returns. (Laughter) Spotting Bad People It’s hard to judge the combination of character and intelligence and other things. It’s not at all simple, which explains why we have so many divorces. (Laughter) Think about how much people know about the person they marry, yet so many break up. It’s not easy, it is in some cases. If people are splashing around with money like Dennis Kozlowski, with vodka at parties coming out of some body part, and if it looks like Sodom and Gomorrah, then maybe this isn’t what you’re looking for. (Laughter) But beyond that, it’s hard. If you have some unfortunate experiences while getting that knowledge, well, welcome to the human race. (Laughter) It’s Tough to Make Money Investing in China I think it’s very tough to make money in China. A lot of terrible things can happen to you and you have no good antidote. China makes a lot of cheap well-made goods, but it could be that we won’t have attractive investment opportunities in China even though the country may prosper.
我们希望中国人越来越富有
中国是一个核大国。我们别无选择,只能与中国保持友好关系——任何其他做法都极其愚蠢。我们希望中国人越来越富有。我对沃尔玛在中国扩张并不感到不满。
货币投资存在灾难风险
我确实认为,一个研究经济学和货币相对价值、并倾尽毕生精力、仅偶尔下注的超凡天才,有可能在货币投资上做得很好。但那不是我的天赋所在。
我更愿意做那些非零和博弈的事情。如果我投资股票——这些企业正在成长;例如,箭牌会生产更多口香糖。即使我什么都不做,它也在自动为我创造价值。但如果我投资货币,它不会为我创造价值。
如果我不靠股票谋生,也许会考虑货币投资。但我没必要这么做。股票投资出现重大灾难的可能性更小。货币的问题在于它会引诱你使用杠杆,如果市场走势与你的判断相反,而你坚信自己是对的,它就会让你越陷越深。然后,再拧一下螺丝……
如果你已经很有钱了,何必在那种条件下生活?我认为,遵循沃伦·巴菲特模式的人,通常会做得更好。
对其他公司的评论
我认为有沃尔玛对国家更有利
像沃尔玛这样的公司变得如此强大,我们是否与魔鬼做了交易?我的回答是,我认为有沃尔玛对国家更有利。它是一家了不起的企业,做了很多好事,为顾客创造了价值,这也是它成功的原因。我认为,拥有这套商品分销体系对国家更有利。
当我走进沃尔玛,我看到老年人当迎宾员——他们做兼职,这让他们走出家门,但有人会说,“沃尔玛剥削老年人,不是很恶劣吗?”
就我而言,我认为沃尔玛通过高效的配送做了很多好事。我是好事多的董事。我们真的希望企业家不那么努力吗?我们真的希望一早醒来就说,“让我们停止如此激烈的竞争吗?”我说,让赢家继续跑,而不是把钱投给输家。
我喜欢沃尔玛的文化。就我而言,沃尔玛是文明的荣耀之一。
We Want the Chinese to Get Richer China is a nuclear power. We have no option but to have friendly relations with China – anything else would be really stupid. We want the Chinese to get richer and richer. I’m not unhappy that Wal-Mart is expanding in China. Risk of a Calamity Investing in Currencies I do think that it’s conceivable that some enormously talented person that studied economics and relative value of currencies and devoted his life to it and only bet occasionally, that such a man could do very well [investing in currencies]. It’s not my line of talent. I’d rather do something that’s not such a zero-sum game. If I invest in equities – the businesses are growing; for example, Wrigley’s will make more gum. It’s automatically working for me, even if I do nothing. But if I invest in currencies, it’s not working for me. If I had to make a living outside of equities, it might be in currencies. But I don’t have to do it. There’s less chance of a big calamity in equities. The problem with currencies is that it sucks you into margin, and then if it moves against you but you’re sure you’re right, it sucks you in deeper. And then one more twist of the screw… If you’re already rich, why would you live under such conditions? I think more people will do well if they follow the Warren Buffett model. COMMENTS ON OTHER COMPANIES I Think the Country Is Better Off for Having Wal-Mart With Wal-Mart and the like getting so powerful, have we made a pact with the devil? My answer is I think the country is better off for having Wal-Mart. It’s a fabulous enterprise that does a lot of good and delivers value to the customer and that’s why it’s successful. I think the country is better off for having this system for distributing goods. When I go into Wal-Mart, I see elderly people as greeters – they’re working part time and it gets them out of the house, but people say, “Isn’t Wal-Mart nasty [for exploiting the elderly]?” As far as I’m concerned, I think Wal-Mart does a lot of good with efficient distribution. I’m a director of Costco. Do we really want our entrepreneurs not to try very hard? Do we really want to wake and say, “Let’s stop competing so hard?” I say, let winners run instead of investing in losers. I like Wal-Mart’s culture. As far as I’m concerned, Wal-Mart is one of the glories of civilization.
麦当劳是一所伟大的教育机构
我说“这是一所不错的大学,但真正伟大的教育机构是麦当劳”,总会被骂(我在参观大学做演讲时说的这句话)。他们恨我这么说,觉得我是个卑鄙的家伙。但麦当劳雇佣工作习惯不好的人,训练他们,教他们准时上班、养成良好工作习惯。我觉得麦当劳做的很多事情比哈佛强。
AIG 有很多强大而优秀的地方
我从未深入研究过 AIG。AIG 长期以来被一位真正才华横溢、强势的人物经营,业绩极好。我认为我们不会发现类似安然那样的欺诈案。更可能的情况是:一家好公司有一个或许在锦上添花的领袖。我认为他觉得帮助提升 AIG 的声誉是他的责任。他觉得 AIG 的声誉本应比实际更高。我同意。我认为每个企业领袖都有同感。我不认为那是烟雾弹。
在侵权改革等领域,我会非常想念汉克·格林伯格。他对我一直很诚实。在收购长期资本管理公司资产的那笔交易中,要么是他邀请我们,要么是我们邀请他。AIG 有很多强大而优秀的地方。
AIG、GE 信贷及套利交易的风险
话虽如此,AIG 很像 GE。它是一家极其成功的保险运营商,成功之后它演变成了一桩庞大的套利生意:以一个价格借入大量资金,再以另一个价格投资。AIG 是一家大型运营商,很像 GE 信贷。我们从未持有过其中任何一家,因为即使是最好、最聪明的人,在资产负债表膨胀的大规模信贷业务中也会让我们紧张。这么多人借入几十亿美元,这让我感到紧张。
从我们的运营中可以看出,我们保守得多。我们以更有利的条件借入更少的钱。我们对更少的杠杆感到更满意。他们很成功,但我们太胆小了,不敢加入他们。你可以说我们错了,这让我们损失了一大笔钱,但这并不困扰我们。错过一些机会从来不困扰我们。别人比你更富有一点又有什么错呢?担心这个太傻了。
那些套利交易游戏里有很多杠杆。其他人比我更确定飞机总能租得出去。
我绝不会做空通用汽车
我绝不会做空一家年销售额 1800 亿美元、市值 150 亿美元、又是美国标志性公司的企业。我做梦都不会去做这种空头。
McDonald’s Is a Great Educator I get flack for saying [when I visit a college and give a speech], “This is a nice college, but the really great educator is McDonald’s.” They hate me for saying this and think I’m a slimy creature. But McDonald’s hires people with bad work habits, trains them, and teaches them to come to work on time and have good work habits. I think a lot of what goes on there is better than at Harvard. There’s a Lot That Was Strong and Good at AIG I’ve never examined AIG in great detail. AIG was run by a truly brilliant, dominant personality for a long, long time and had a fabulous record. I don’t think we’re going to find a fraud like Enron. Rather, a good company with a chieftain that maybe gilded the lily. I think he thought it was his duty to help along the reputation of AIG. I think he thought it deserved a better reputation than it had. I agree. I think every corporate chieftain feels the same way. I don’t think it’s blue smoke and mirrors. I will miss Hank Greenberg dearly in areas like tort reform. He was always honest with us. He invited us or we invited him in the deal to buy the assets of Long Term Capital Management. There’s a lot that was strong and good at AIG. AIG, GE Credit and the Risks of the Carry Trade That said, it’s a lot like GE. It is a fabulously successful insurance operator, and with success it morphed into a massive carry business: borrowing a lot of money at one price and investing it at another price. AIG was a big operator that was a lot like GE Credit. We never owned either because even the best and wisest people make us nervous in great big credit operations with swollen balance sheets. It just makes me nervous, that many people borrowing so many billions. As you can tell in our operations, we are much more conservative. We borrow less, on more favorable terms. We’re happier with less leverage. They’ve been successful, but we’re too chicken to join them. You could argue that we’ve been wrong, and that it’s cost us a fortune, but that doesn’t bother us. Missing out on some opportunity never bothers us. What’s wrong with someone getting a little richer than you? It’s crazy to worry about this. There’s a lot of leverage in those carry-trade games. Other people are more certain than I am that aircraft can always be leased. I Would Never Dream of Shorting GM I would never short a company that was doing $180 billion [in sales] per year with a market cap of $15 billion that was such an iconic part of America. I would never dream of making that short.
实际情况是,通用汽车很多非常正直的高管把事情搞砸了。他们面临着极为严峻的竞争挑战,却建立了一套会不断膨胀的终身医疗和养老金体系,如今正为此付出惨痛代价。
员工养老金计划的规模相当于所有股东持股总价值的 5 到 6 倍。(当时,通用汽车市值略高于 150 亿美元,而养老金负债备付金约为 900 亿美元。)通用汽车把公司的所有价值都给了员工,留给股东的几乎为零。他们没有遵循那条格言:小漏沉大船。他们根本就不该允许工会逐个公司谈判,搞垮一家公司,让另外两家抢走市场份额。他们本该作为一个整体去谈判。今天的局面,就是他们一年接一年不断让步累积的结果。
我认为通用汽车既是人类成就的奇迹,也是大规模管理失败的典型。如果我最终死了,没人能指责我——我尽量拖延了。通用汽车也尽量拖延了。他们拿到了一手很难打的牌,但我要说,他们还是打输了。
我不认为伯克希尔·哈撒韦会以这种方式把牌打输。绝不会发生这种事。为了防止未来产生极为严重的后果,我们会做一些非常不愉快的事。
核武器是一个非常严重的问题。(想到这件事太可怕了,)人们只能用黑色幽默。如果有人告诉你,现在有一颗核弹会在帕萨迪纳上空爆炸,你会怎么办?答案是:你只能钻到桌子底下,然后跟屁股说再见。(紧张的笑声)
关于乐居达及其电信投资的评论
我们认为乐居达的人非常聪明。有没有可能乐居达在某些投资上结果不太理想?当然,完全可能。
我看电信行业和所有的变化,反应就像塞缪尔·戈德曼说的:“算我一个,我不参与。”我就是不适合这个领域;我不知道怎么预测那些结果,所以我把这事留给别人。
关于经济问题的评论
资本泛滥
资本出现的方式很奇怪。我们国家现在以从未有过的方式把房子货币化了。问问乔,他怎么买的凯迪拉克新车——他是靠把房子抵押贷款买的。我们正处于资本泛滥之中。
What happened was that a lot of very decent people running GM basically blew it. They were facing a very serious competitive challenge and they set up a [lifetime healthcare and pension] system that will grow and grow and grow and they are paying one hell of a penalty. Employees have 5-6 times the value in their pension plan than all of the stockholders combined. [At the time, GM had a market cap slightly above $15 billion vs. approximately $90 billion set aside for pension liabilities.] GM gave all of the value of the company to employees and left shareholders with almost nothing. They didn’t observe the maxim that a small leak can sink a great ship. They never should have allowed the unions to bargain with each company and shut one company down and let the other two take share. They should have bargained as a unit. The result today is a combination of what they gave away one year at a time. I regard GM as such a marvel of human achievement, but also an example of massive management failure. I can’t be criticized if I eventually die – I delayed it as long as I could. GM delayed it as long as they could. They had a very tough hand to play, but I would argue that they blew it. I don’t think Berkshire Hathaway will blow its hand in this way. It would never do that. We would do some very unpleasant things to prevent something that would have very bad consequences far into the future. Nuclear weapons are a very serious problem. [It’s so awful to contemplate that] people use gallows humor. What would you do if you were told a nuclear bomb would be detonated over Pasadena right now? The answer: you’d crawl under the table and kiss your ass goodbye. (Nervous laughter) Comments on Leucadia and Its Investments in Telecom We regard the Leucadia people as very smart. Is it conceivable that the Leucadia people could have one outcome that didn’t work very well? Sure, it’s possible. I look at telecom and all the change and my reaction is that of Samuel Goldman: “Include me out.” I’m just not suited for this; I don’t know how to predict those outcomes, so I leave it to other people. COMMENTS ON ECONOMIC MATTERS Awash in Capital It is weird the way that capital occurs. We have monetized houses in this country in a way that’s never occurred before. Ask Joe how he bought a new Cadillac [and he’ll say] from borrowing on his house. We are awash in capital.
流动性泛滥正导致信用卡公司和次级贷机构做出极其恶劣的行为——一种肮脏的勾当,引诱人们陷入不利境地。这是一种制造农奴的新手段,而且手段卑劣。我们看到一些金融机构,包括那些鼎鼎大名的机构,向最无力偿还的人群发放高息贷款。我觉得其中很多做法令人作呕。自由市场并不意味着它就体面。
社会保险体系堪称神奇
我不太确定普通股能创造出什么奇迹。在英国,他们曾尝试建立类似计划,结果让经纪人和销售人员对老百姓大肆推销,最终变成了灾难。于是,他们(指美国那些主张允许人们自己投资社保储蓄的人)说:“我们不会那么做。我们只会把它们打包成指数基金。”但这种设置方式,本质上就像套利。一个人放弃社保的承诺,去换取指数基金的承诺。
我们运行社保体系的方式令人惊叹。它具备抗通胀能力。人们很容易对它嗤之以鼻,但它是有史以来最成功的政府项目之一。它成本低廉,而且鼓励人们工作。
有人说,如果你永远不改变收入基础,它就会没钱可用。但倘若 10 年后,这个国家富裕了 30% 到 40%,为什么不能用更高比例的 GDP 来支付给人们呢?年轻人同样受益——这笔钱付给那些可能会搬来和他们一起住的人。(笑声)每个人都会变老,但也会变得更富有,那为什么不能在他们身上花更高比例的 GDP 呢?这有什么不可思议的?我告诉你什么才是不可思议:居然有那么多人在这个问题上如此愚蠢!(笑声)
能源短缺的可能性
有很多证据表明——我们传统的石油开采技术最终会逐渐枯竭,这就是所谓的“休伯特峰值”理论。[该理论由壳牌石油公司的一位地质学家在 50 多年前首次提出,描述了石油和天然气产量如何上升到峰值,然后随着储量耗尽而迅速下降。]我确信最终会发生这种情况。但你永远无法百分之百确定。有些人认为能源储量并非来自已灭绝的古代生物——例如,太空中存在甲烷,而那里并没有古代生物。所以,可供使用的能源可能比人们想象的要多……
我记得读过一篇报道,雪佛龙公司在极深的地层发现了大量能源,某种氢化物——一个深层储层,里面锁着大量能量。所以,也许还会有最后一次喘息——烃类能源的最后一笔意外之财。如果人类不得不告别烃类能源,我们也能做到,只是会很不舒服。每天都有大量能量从太阳到达地球。如果非要调整不可,我们也能适应。
[Being] awash is leading to very terrible behavior by credit cards and subprime lenders -a very dirty business, luring people into a disadvantageous position. It’s a new way of getting serfs, and it’s a dirty business. We have financial institutions, including those with big names, extending high-cost credit to the least able people. I find a lot of it revolting. Just because it’s a free market doesn’t mean it’s honorable. Social Security Is Amazing I’m not so sure that common stocks will do wonders. In England, where they tried to create a scheme like this, they let the brokers and salespeople loose on the people and it was a disaster. So they [those in the U.S. who are pushing to allow people to invest their Social Security savings themselves] said, “We won’t do that. We’ll just package them in index funds.” But the way it’s set up, it’s like an arbitrage. A guy gives up the promise of Social Security to take the promise of an index fund. Social Security is amazing how we’ve run it. It’s inflation protected. It’s easy to sneer at it, but it’s one of the most successful government programs ever. It’s low cost and encourages work. People say if you never change the revenue base, it’ll run out of money. But if 10 years from now, the country is 30-40% richer, why not use a higher percentage of GDP to pay people? Young people benefit too – the money is paid to people who might be moving in with them. (Laughter) Everybody’s going to get older, but also richer, so why wouldn’t you spend a higher percentage of GDP on them? Why is that so unthinkable? I’ll tell you what’s unthinkable: that so many people are that stupid! (Laughter) Likelihood of an Energy Shortage There’s a lot of evidence of that – that our conventional techniques of extracting oil will eventually taper off, [a theory called] Hubert’s Peak. [First articulated more than 50 years ago by a Shell Oil geologist, this theory describes how production rates of oil and gas will increase to a peak and then rapidly taper off as reserves are depleted.] I’m sure that will happen eventually. But you can never be sure. Some people think that energy reserves are not from deceased former life – for example, there’s methane in the heavens where there was no former life. So there may be more energy than people expect… I recall reading something about Chevron finding a lot of energy way deep, some kind of hydride – a deep reserve with a lot of energy locked up. So there may be one last gasp – one more windfall coming of hydrocarbons. If we have to live without hydrocarbons, we can, but it would just be unpleasant. An awful lot of energy comes to the earth every day from the sun. If we had to adjust, we could.
关于人生及其他方面的建议
设定现实的期望
人们需要问自己:“我该如何打好手中的牌?”世界不会因为你想要更高的回报就给你额外回报。你必须极其精明且勤奋工作,才能多得到一点点。降低自己的欲望要容易得多。这个世界上聪明人很多,而且其中不少人在作弊,所以想赢并不容易。(紧张的笑声)
人生成功的关键
永远不要为了争取新客户而滥用现有客户。想想这在婚姻中会怎样——如果你在追求另一个女人时忽略了现在的妻子。(笑声)老派的处事方式依然管用。如果你活得够长、行为端正、并且有些头脑,你会过得不错。
美国的未来
从长期来看,伟大文明被超越的概率是 100%。所以你知道结局会怎样。(笑声)
我对这个国家好的一面的持久力更为乐观。但仅仅因为你有一个出色的配偶,并不意味着你可以对她不好。我有种感觉,一些(曾让这个国家伟大的)古老美德正在减弱。但剩下的好东西和力量仍然如此之多,我不会指望这个国家会突然崩塌。
但有些发展会促使我们回归老路。我认为某些阶层的人如果被扫除,那倒是件好事。(笑声)
我们生活方式的最大威胁
沃伦在股东大会上回答过这个问题。未来 60 年最大的威胁是一场真正令人不快的核事件。其次是一些人利用病原体做出可怕的事情。我不认为这两件事在未来 60 年内不太可能发生。如果我们要经历一些衰退和动荡,与核事件相比,这些都不算什么。这个房间里的人当然应该足够聪明,能够掌控自己的生活,这样即使在长期恶劣的经济环境下也能过得不错。我认为重大威胁不是我们在这里讨论的这些。
里克·盖林并不疯狂——我们才疯
[盖林是巴菲特著名演讲《格雷厄姆-多德部落的超级投资者》中提到的投资者之一]
我认为可以公平地说,一旦他变得富有,他就停止了花时间试图变得更富有。他组建了新家庭。他 75 岁,有一个 12 岁的孩子。他做很多事情是因为他喜欢做。他不再试图变得更富有了。这没什么疯狂的地方。我们才是疯狂的人。(笑声)
关于阅读的建议和安然公司的极端邪恶
我相信阅读最优秀的人的作品,而且阅读是因为你喜欢学习。我不会花时间读侦探小说或浪漫小说。尽管沃伦曾说出那句关于我“晚做总比不做好”的俏皮话……[我没听清这句话的其余部分]
但像我刚推荐的那本书——《傻瓜的阴谋》,库尔特·艾肯沃尔德著——那本关于安然公司的书确实值得一读,因为其邪恶程度如此极端。你会看到人们被身边的邪恶所吞噬。你学到的东西太多了。你知道结局——就像一部悲剧。不是每个人都喜欢悲剧——我带妻子去看了一部描写一战中老鼠啃食阵亡士兵尸体的电影。之后,她告诉我:“你可能喜欢这个,但我再也不想看另一部了。”那部电影叫《国王与国家》。
推荐书籍
除了《傻瓜的阴谋》,还有没有其他喜欢的书可以推荐?是啊,你花 49 美元买这本书。[笑声。《穷查理宝典》在西科股东大会上出售。]如果你发现自己不喜欢,你总是可以把它送给一个更聪明的朋友。今年我没有别的真正吸引我的书了。那本关于安然公司的书对我产生了非常强烈的情感共鸣。
幽默
一位股东在提问结束时说:“我想我是一个建议乞丐。”芒格回答说:“没关系——我们这里有很多这样的人。”
找到自己内心大量爱的一个方法就是让自己身边围满一群铁杆的怪人。是的,我做到了。你们是我这一类人——我这种古怪的人。
ADVICE ON LIFE AND OTHER Have Realistic Expectations People need to ask, “How do I play the hand that has been dealt me?” The world is not going to give you extra return just because you want it. You have to be very shrewd and hard working to get a little extra. It’s so much easier to reduce your wants. There are a lot of smart people and a lot of them cheat, so it’s not easy to win. (Nervous laughter) Keys to Success in Life Never abuse current clients by trying to get new ones. Think how this would work with matrimony – if you ignore your current wife while you pursue another one. (Laughter) The old attitudes will work fine. If you live long enough and act well, and have some intelligence, you’ll do fine. Future of the United States Over the long term, the eclipse rate of great civilizations being overtaken is 100%. So you know how it’s going to end. (Laughter) I’m more optimistic about the staying power of what’s good in this country. But just because you have a wonderful spouse doesn’t mean you should treat her badly. You have the feeling that some of the old virtues [that made this country great] are lessening. But there’s so much good and so much strength left that I would not expect this country to suddenly founder. But there are some developments that would make us commit to the old ways. I think there are certain classes of people who if they were swept away, it would be desirable. (Laughter) Biggest Threat to Our Way of Life Warren answered this at the annual meeting. The biggest threat in the next 60 years is a really unpleasant nuclear event. Next is that someone does some terrible things with pathogens. I don’t think either is unlikely in the next 60 years. If we have to go through some recessions and convulsions, these are minor compared to nuclear events. People in this room certainly should be wise enough to handle their lives so they can do OK even in big stretches of unpleasant economic conditions. I think the big threats are not the ones we’re talking about here. Rick Guerin’s Not Crazy – We Are [Guerin was one of the investors Buffett profiled in his famous speech, The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville] I think it’s fair to say that once he got rich, he stopped spending his time trying to get richer. He has a new family. He’s 75 and has a 12-year-old child. He does a lot of things because he enjoys doing them. He’s stopped trying to get richer. There’s nothing crazy about that. We’re the crazy ones. (Laughter) Advice on Reading and Enron’s Extreme Evil I believe in reading the best people, and reading because you like learning. I don’t spend my time reading detective stories or romances. In spite of Warren’s wise-ass comment about better late than never about me...[I missed the rest of this sentence] But a book like the one I just recommended [Conspiracy of Fools, by Kurt Eichenwald] – that Enron book is really worth reading because the evil is so extreme. You see people getting sucked in by the evil all around them. You just learn so much. You know the outcome – it’s like a tragedy. Not everyone likes tragedy – I took my wife to a movie where the rats were eating the bodies of the dead soldiers in World War I. Afterward, she told me, “You may like this, but I never want to go to another one.” It was King & Country. Book Recommendations Any other favorite books [in addition to Conspiracy of Fools] to recommend? Yeah, you’re paying $49 for it. [Laughter. Poor Charlie’s Almanack was for sale at the Wesco meeting.] If you find you don’t like it, you can always give it to a more intelligent friend. I don’t have another one that really grabbed me this year. That Enron book had a really powerful emotional connection for me. Humor One of the shareholders ended his question by saying: “I guess I’m an advice mooch,” to which Munger replied: “That’s OK – we get a lot of them.” One way to find a lot of love in yourself is to surround yourself with a lot of hard-core nut cases. Yes I do. You’re my kind of people – my kind of screwy.
2005 年西科金融股东大会笔记(第二部分)
2005 年 5 月 4 日
作者:惠特尼·蒂尔森
注:这不是正式记录。会议现场不允许使用录音设备,因此本文基于数小时的快速打字记录,并结合我的记忆。我对他的回答按主题做了重新整理。方括号 [ ] 内的文字是我的评论或编辑。
若要查看我之前关于伯克希尔和西科会议的专栏文章和笔记,请点击这里。
查理·芒格在问答环节中的回答
伯克希尔以一张应得的信任之网运作
每个人都喜欢被欣赏、被公平对待,而那些有能力经营企业的强势人物,尤其喜欢被信任。一个被信任、能拿到计算机房钥匙的孩子说过:“被信任的感觉真好。”
这就是我们运作伯克希尔的方式——一张应得的信任之网。我们剔除那些疯狂的做法,比如派人检查以确保事情做对了。当你拥有这样一张应得的信任之网时,效率会高得惊人。日本人当年在制造业里把我们打得落花流水,靠的就是这个:供应商、员工、采购公司、管理层——所有人共同编织了一张应得的信任之网。这就是公司存在的原因——它们创造了一张应得的信任之网。优秀的橄榄球队也是如此。
伯克希尔·哈撒韦始终在努力编织一张应得的信任之网。偶尔也会出问题,不是因为有人心存恶意,而是因为有人行为逐渐偏离正轨,然后又将其合理化。我们的基本态度就是,要创造一张应得的信任之网。
伯克希尔·哈撒韦怎么能在总部只有 15 个人的情况下运转?按常理没人能做到。但我们做到了。
就拿西科来说吧。每隔一阵子,我们会遇到点意外情况——大概十年一次吧。这就是我们想要的状态。谁他妈的愿意生活在一个没有应得的信任之网的家庭里?在商业中,我们也追求同样的东西。这不是什么高深的火箭科学,这是最基本的东西。为什么大多数人不这么做,我搞不懂。也许正因为太基本了?我们还是在日本人把我们打得鼻青脸肿之后才去学他们的——而他们又是从我们这里学去的!
Notes from 2005 Wesco Financial Annual Meeting, Part Two May 4, 2005 By Whitney Tilson Note: This is not a transcript. No recording devices were allowed at the meeting, so this is based on many hours of rapid typing, combined with my memory. I have reorganized his comments by subject matter. Words in [brackets] are my comments or edits. For my columns and notes on previous Berkshire and Wesco meetings, click here. CHARLIE MUNGER RESPONSES DURING Q&A SESSION Berkshire Operates With a Seamless Web of Deserved Trust Everybody likes being appreciated and treated fairly, and dominant personalities who are capable of running a business like being trusted. A kid trusted with the key to the computer room said, “It’s wonderful to be trusted.” That’s how we operate Berkshire – a seamless web of deserved trust. We get rid of the craziness, of people checking to make sure it’s done right. When you get a seamless web of deserved trust, you get enormous efficiencies. It’s what the Japanese did to beat our brains out in manufacturing: suppliers, employers, the purchasing company, management – all created a seamless web of deserved trust. That’s why we have firms – they create a seamless web of deserved trust. It’s the same with good football teams. Berkshire Hathaway is always trying to create a seamless web of deserved trust. Every once in a while, it doesn’t work, not because someone’s evil but because somebody drifts to inappropriate behavior and then rationalizes it. Our basic attitude is to create a seamless web of deserved trust. How can Berkshire Hathaway work with only 15 people at headquarters? Nobody can operate this way. But we do. Take Wesco. Every once in a while we get surprised by something – maybe once a decade. It’s what we all want. Who in the hell would not want to be in a family without a seamless web of deserved trust? We try for the same thing in business. It’s not rocket science; it’s elementary. Why more people don’t do it, I don’t know. Perhaps because it’s so elementary. We didn’t copy the Japanese until they were clobbering us – and they copied from us!
伯克希尔·哈撒韦的投资标准降低了
在伯克希尔·哈撒韦,我们已经把标准稍微降了一点——我们愿意用比过去更低的标准来投资。我们不是在等 1974 年,甚至不是在等 1984 年。如果你手里有钱,你就得找个地方投出去。很可能你不得不接受一些明显回报低于以往水平的东西。
我认为那些嘴上说“我需要更多”,于是拼命想得到超出自己所需的人,很可能陷入大麻烦。我认识一个人,他拥有完全自有无贷的住房,持有 500 万美元的证券,靠这些证券的收入生活。但这离他想要的生活还差一点,于是他对自已说:“我去干点小活儿,把回报率提一提,”然后他用全部账户作抵押,卖出看跌期权。当时价格最高的是互联网股票的裸看跌期权,结果不出所料,他输光了所有钱,现在在一家餐馆打工。
我们降低预期来买入
沃伦在股东大会上说过,对于目前我们持有的大部分资产,我们既不买也不卖。而当我们确实买入时,那也不是“好家伙!了不起的大机会!”那种感觉。我们是以降低的预期来买入的。还能怎么做呢?难道有人希望我们把伯克希尔·哈撒韦的资产全变成现金,干坐着等一场灾难,好让伯克希尔把钱投出去?
我们绝没有放弃把现金用起来
沃伦在(伯克希尔)股东大会上回答过这个问题。我们绝没有放弃把现金用起来。如果我们没用上,这笔钱也不会凭空消失。
你预测到伯克希尔的成功了吗?
嗯,我们的一部分成功是预测到的,另一部分则是运气使然。(不管怎样,)和大多数人一样,我们也就接受了赞扬。(笑声)
伯克希尔史上最佳投资的共同要素
有些预想的结果最终还是实现了。那 15 笔最佳交易共同的特点是——它们全都成功了。模式各不相同——喜诗糖果与肖氏地毯不同。但两者都是好生意,能为在座各位的子孙后代带来持久的回报。我反复提起剔除前 15 笔最佳交易后的业绩记录,原因就在于它说明:你一辈子需要的交易少之又少。那些每个月都需要做一笔交易的人,到头来基本都垮了。你需要的是耐心和激进的进取心——这是一个奇怪的组合,但正是最有效的做法。
Lowered Investment Standards at Berkshire Hathaway At Berkshire Hathaway, we’ve lowered our standards a little – we’re willing to invest with lower standards than in the past. We’re not waiting for 1974 or even 1984. If you have the money, you have to invest it somewhere. It may well be that you have to take something that obviously promises a lower return than you were used to. I think the people who say “I need more” and therefore try to get more than they need, are likely to get into terrible trouble. I know a man who owned his house free and clear, had $5 million of securities and lived on the income from those securities. But this left him a little short of what he wanted, so he said to himself, “I’ll go do a little work to get my return up,” and he sold puts, backed by his entire account. At the time, the highest price was on naked puts on Internet stocks and in due course he lost all of his money and now works in a restaurant. We Buy With Reduced Expectations Warren said at the annual meeting that with most of our present holdings, we’re not buying or selling. And when we do buy, it’s not, “Oh boy! A lollapalooza!” We buy with reduced expectations. How else can one behave? Would anyone want us to reduce Berkshire Hathaway’s assets to cash and sit around waiting for a calamity so Berkshire can put the cash to work? By No Means Have We Given Up on Putting Our Cash to Work Warren answered this at the [Berkshire] annual meeting. By no means have we given up on putting our cash to work. And if we don’t, the money is not going away. Did You Predict Berkshire’s Success? Well, some of our success we predicted and some of it was fortuitous. [Regardless,] like most human beings, we took a bow. (Laughter) Common Elements of Berkshire’s Best All-Time Investments Some eventualities came to pass. What the 15 best deals all have in common is that they all worked. There were different models – See’s Candies was different from Shaw Carpets. But both are good businesses that will generate durable returns for the grandchildren of people sitting in this room. The reason I keep talking about the record without the 15 best deals is that it shows how few deals you need in a lifetime. The people who need a deal every month, by and large, they all crater. Patience and aggressive opportunism is what you need – an odd combination, but it’s what works best.
伯克希尔与西科回购股票?
巴菲特[在伯克希尔股东大会上]回答了这个问题。在某个价格上,我们会回购伯克希尔的股票,但这个价格远低于当前股价。我们并不是在寻找机会,以远低于内在价值的价格兴高采烈地把股东扫地出门。我们希望自己的行为能避免这种情况发生。
至于西科金融,因为你们这些人制造了这种崇拜效应,它的股价总是高于清算价值。
看好伯克希尔
虽然我说了这些话,但我本人看好伯克希尔·哈撒韦。可能得等上一段时间,但我认为未来会有好日子。
我们正在买入的股票
[我没听清这句话的后半段,但芒格有句话说:“……我们目前正在买入的那些股票……”]
巴菲特基金会最终不得不卖出伯克希尔股票的问题
我认为这个问题太好解决了,根本不会为它花两秒钟。如果基金会每年必须卖出 5% 的持股[以遵守所有基金会每年必须捐出 5% 资产的法律规定],那么伯克希尔可以派发股息或者回购股票。我一点都不会介意——我们的现金多到泛滥。在当前情况下,任何一位股东的需求都很容易处理。如果你担心这类问题,那你的日子过得也太滋润了。
对伯克希尔·哈撒韦旗下业务的评论
伯克希尔 AAA 级信用评级在保险业务中的优势
保险费率确实有一点分层——保险公司之间基于信用状况存在差别。但这种差别足够大吗?答案是不够。我是否预期大量业务会涌入伯克希尔·哈撒韦?不。但确实有少量且不断增多的细流在流入。人们对信用风险的警惕性远没有达到应有的程度。
巨灾再保险保单定价
我们非常独特。我们没有设立一个可以让别人自行决策的部门。所有决策都必须经过阿吉特·贾恩和沃伦的批准,而他们俩都不使用标准的精算表。换句话说,在长期没有飓风之后,精算表会告诉你飓风风险已经降低——但伯克希尔·哈撒韦的人可不这么想。他们非常理性。我们不用标准的精算表,就像我们分析一家公司时,会先看它公布的财务报表,但然后会进一步深入研究。
你不需要几十个人来写巨灾再保险保单。所以我们的计划是:找到阿吉特·贾恩,再加上沃伦·巴菲特免费干活,然后筹集数百亿美元,因为人们信任你,事情就成了。(笑声)
我们有简单的薪酬体系
仅仅买下好的企业还不够。你还得有一套能让管理这些企业的人满意的薪酬体系。在伯克希尔·哈撒韦,我们没有一套单一的系统;我们有不同的系统。它们非常简单,我们也很少去修改。令人惊讶的是,这套做法运转得如此之好。我们买下喜诗糖果时,和查克·哈金斯签了一份一页纸的协议,之后从未动过。我们从未请过薪酬顾问。
克莱顿住宅与活动房屋行业的灾难
活动房屋近年来经历的历史是——实际上,应该叫“工厂制造房屋”;它们并不是为了移动而制造的——是一大帮糟糕透顶的疯子,以及一篮子不幸的、由佣金销售驱动的活动。任何时候,只要你让拿销售佣金的人来为使用杠杆[比如贷款买房]的客户设定信用标准,你就会制造一场灾难。这就像把氧气和氢气混在一起再划一根火柴。
房屋质量越来越差……这绝对是一场灾难。如果不是这样,我们也不可能买到[克莱顿住宅]。[行业内的困境如此严重,以至于] 它们失去了资产证券化的能力。克莱顿是最好的公司,但连它们也岌岌可危,所以它们把公司卖给了我们。
你对在活动房屋公园里取消一栋房屋的赎回权了解多少?你又能拿它怎么办?我们现在是全国最大的。我认为这对伯克希尔和克莱顿来说会运作得相当好。如果克莱顿是一家独立公司,它会有麻烦。那些声称我们买得太便宜的人简直是疯了。居然有这么多人认为自己比卖家更懂行,真是令人吃惊。
Cort 公司长期会成功
Cort 公司受益于风险资本支持的新公司热潮。你可以说我们犯了一个宏观错误。这些新公司消失了一段时间,Cort 也受到了影响。但你可以从第一季度的盈利中看到,它正在复苏。有一类人就是只想租,不想买。他们正试图成为家具租赁行业的 Enterprise 租车公司。这不是一座金矿,但我们认为长期来看它会成功。
Berkshire and Wesco Buying Back Stock? Buffett answered this question [at the Berkshire annual meeting]. At some price, we’d buy back Berkshire, but it’s quite a bit less than the price that currently exists. We’re not looking for the chance to gleefully buy out shareholders at a substantial discount to its value. We like to behave so this doesn’t happen. As for Wesco, because you people have created this cult, it always trades at a premium to its liquidation value. Bull on Berkshire Despite my words, I’m a bull on Berkshire Hathaway. There may be some considerable waiting, but I think there are some good days ahead. Stocks We’re Buying [I missed the rest of the sentence, but at one point Munger said: “…the stocks [plural] that we’re buying today…”] Problem of Buffett Foundation Having to Eventually Sell Berkshire Stock I regard that as so easily solvable that I don’t give two seconds to it. If the foundation has to sell 5% of its stock [every year to comply with the law that says all foundations must give away 5% of their assets each year], then Berkshire could pay a dividend or buy back the stock. It wouldn’t bother me – we’re drowning in cash. The needs of any one shareholder are easily dealt with in our current circumstances. You lead a very favored life if you worry about things like that. COMMENTS ON BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY BUSINESSES Advantage of Berkshire’s AAA Credit Rating In Insurance There’s a little price tiering – there’s a difference among insurers based on their credit worthiness. But is there enough difference? The answer is no. Do I expect a cascade of business to Berkshire Hathaway? No. But there’s a modest and increasing trickle. People are not as credit-leery as they should be. Pricing Super-Cat Insurance Policies We’re very peculiar. We don’t have a department where we trust people to do it on their own. All decisions must be approved by Ajit Jain and Warren, and neither of them uses standard actuarial tables. In other words, after a long period with no hurricanes, the actuarial tables would tell you that the hurricane risk has gone down – that’s not how they think at Berkshire Hathaway. There’re very rational. We don’t use standard actuarial tables, just as we start with [companies’] reported financials, but then go from there. You don’t need dozens of people to write super-cat policies. So there’s our plan: get Ajit Jain, add Warren Buffett working for free and then raise tens of billions of dollars because people trust you and there you go. (Laughter) We Have Simple Compensation Systems It isn’t enough to buy the right business. You’ve also have to have a compensation system that’s satisfactory to the people running them. At Berkshire Hathaway, we have no [single] system; we have different systems. They’re very simple and we don’t tend to revisit them very often. It’s amazing how well it’s worked. We wrote a one-page deal with Chuck Huggins when we bought See’s and it’s never been touched. We have never hired a compensation consultant. Clayton Homes and the Disaster in the Manufactured Home Sector The recent historical experience of mobile homes – actually, it’s “manufactured”; they’re not manufactured to move – is that you had a bunch of no-good nut cases and a balloon of unfortunate, commission-sales-driven activity. Any time you let people on sales commission set the credit standards for people using margin [e.g., debt to buy the home], you create a disaster. It’s like mixing oxygen and hydrogen and lighting a match. The homes deteriorated... It was an absolute disaster. If it hadn’t been, we wouldn’t have been able to buy [Clayton Homes]. [The distress in the industry was so great that] they were losing their securitization capacity. Clayton was the best, but even they were at risk so they sold to us. What do you know about foreclosing on a house in a trailer park? And what do you do with it? We’re now the largest in the country. I think it will work quite well for Berkshire and Clayton. If Clayton were an independent company, they’d have trouble. The people who claim we underpaid for it are out of their minds. It’s amazing how many people think they know more than the people selling it. Cort Will Be Successful Over Time Cort benefited from the venture-capital-financed, new-company boom. You could argue that we made a macro mistake. These companies went away for a while and Cort was affected. But you can see in the first quarter earnings that it’s coming back. There’s a class of people that just want to rent, not own. They are trying to be the Enterprise Rent-A-Car in the furniture rental business. It’s not a gold mine, but we think it’ll be successful over time.
投资建议
投资经理的行为
如果你是一名投资经理,他们准备在你跟不上基准时炒你鱿鱼,那整个市场可能会因此出现一些怪事。不管你喜欢与否,这就是我们身处的世界。它会带来一些反常的后果——其中之一就是“伪装指数化”。你付给经理一大笔钱,他却把 85% 的资产按指数方向配置。碰上这种体系,你就是在被人当冤大头耍。
投资管理领域还有各种时髦潮流。面对这么多的人脑、大脑和计算机,我看到各种按资产类别划分的风险指标,但我完全搞不懂它们是什么意思。别人也不懂,但他们学会了一种时髦的思维方式。只要你学会一个公式,就可以跑数据、打印出来,但这根本不意味着什么。
股市是否过高?
“过高”是个有趣的词——在我们这些习惯了找真正便宜货的人看来,确实偏高。但这并不是承诺永远会有这种便宜货。我不认为这有什么不公平;我也不觉得股市高到了让我们被剥夺机会的地步。
我们未来的前景比过去糟糕得多。但我已经 81 岁了;回报率下降对我来说,比起更大的麻烦还算小事。(笑声)
识别坏人
判断人品、智慧以及其他特质组合起来的东西,很难。这绝不是件简单的事,这也解释了为什么离婚率这么高。(笑声)想想人们对结婚对象了解得那么多,结果还是有那么多人分手。这不容易,但在某些情况下却很容易。如果有人像丹尼斯·科兹洛夫斯基那样挥金如土,派对上伏特加从身体的某个部位喷出来,场面像所多玛和蛾摩拉一样,那也许就不是你在找的人了。(笑声)但除此之外,就很难了。如果你在积累这些认知的过程中有过一些不幸的经历,那好吧,欢迎来到人类大家庭。(笑声)
在中国投资赚钱很难
我觉得在中国赚钱非常难。你可能会遭遇很多糟糕的事情,而且没有什么好的应对方法。中国生产大量价廉物美的商品,但即便这个国家经济繁荣,我们也不一定能在那里找到有吸引力的投资机会。
INVESTMENT ADVICE Behavior of Investment Managers If you’re an investment manager and they’re going to fire you if you don’t keep up with your benchmark, that can cause some weird things to happen in the markets as a whole. That’s the world that we live in, whether you like it or not. It has some perverse consequences – for one thing, closet indexing. You’re paying a manager a fortune and he has 85% of his assets invested parallel to the indexes. If you have such a system, you’re being played for a sucker. You have these fads in investment management. With so many bodies and minds and computers, I see figures of risk by asset class, but I don’t have the faintest idea what they mean. They don’t either, but they learned a fad, a way of thinking. If you learn a formula, you can run the numbers and print it up, but it doesn’t mean anything. Are Stocks Too High? Too high is a funny word – they are high to those of us who are accustomed to finding real bargains. But it’s not a promise [that there will always be such bargains]. I don’t think it’s unfair; I don’t think it’s too high in the sense that we’re being deprived. Our future prospects are way worse than what they used to be. But I’m 81; I’ve got bigger problems than diminished returns. (Laughter) Spotting Bad People It’s hard to judge the combination of character and intelligence and other things. It’s not at all simple, which explains why we have so many divorces. (Laughter) Think about how much people know about the person they marry, yet so many break up. It’s not easy, it is in some cases. If people are splashing around with money like Dennis Kozlowski, with vodka at parties coming out of some body part, and if it looks like Sodom and Gomorrah, then maybe this isn’t what you’re looking for. (Laughter) But beyond that, it’s hard. If you have some unfortunate experiences while getting that knowledge, well, welcome to the human race. (Laughter) It’s Tough to Make Money Investing in China I think it’s very tough to make money in China. A lot of terrible things can happen to you and you have no good antidote. China makes a lot of cheap well-made goods, but it could be that we won’t have attractive investment opportunities in China even though the country may prosper.
我们希望中国人变得更富有
中国是一个拥核国家。除了与中国保持友好关系,我们别无选择——任何其他做法都极其愚蠢。我们希望中国人越来越富有。我并不为沃尔玛在中国扩张感到不快。
货币投资的风险
我确实认为,有这样一种可能性:某个极其有天赋的人,研究经济学和货币的相对价值,并为此倾注一生,只偶尔下注,这样的人[投资货币]可能做得非常好。但这不属于我的才能范畴。
我更愿意做些不是零和博弈的事。如果投资股票——企业是在成长的;例如,箭牌会制造更多口香糖。即使我什么都不做,它也自动为我创造价值。但如果投资货币,它不会为我创造价值。
如果我不得不在股票之外谋生,那可能会是货币领域。但我不必这么做。股票遭遇重大灾难的风险较小。货币的问题在于,它会引诱你用保证金,然后如果走势对你不利,而你确信自己是对的,它又会把你引向更深的深渊。接着再来一次致命一击……
如果你已经富有,为什么还要生活在这样的条件下?我认为,如果更多人效仿沃伦·巴菲特模式,他们会做得更好。
对其他公司的评论
我认为拥有沃尔玛让这个国家变得更好
像沃尔玛这样的公司变得如此强大,我们是不是与魔鬼做了交易?我的回答是,我认为拥有沃尔玛让这个国家变得更好。它是一家出色的企业,做了很多好事,为客户传递价值,这正是它成功的原因。我认为拥有这种商品分销体系让这个国家变得更好。
当我走进沃尔玛,我看到老年人在做迎宾员——他们做兼职,这让他们走出家门,但人们会说,“沃尔玛真恶劣[利用老年人]?”
就我而言,我认为沃尔玛凭借高效的分销做了很多好事。我是好市多的董事。难道我们真的希望我们的企业家不竭尽全力吗?难道我们真的想一觉醒来就说,“让我们别那么拼命竞争了?”我说,让赢家跑下去,而不是把资金投给输家。
We Want the Chinese to Get Richer China is a nuclear power. We have no option but to have friendly relations with China – anything else would be really stupid. We want the Chinese to get richer and richer. I’m not unhappy that Wal-Mart is expanding in China. Risk of a Calamity Investing in Currencies I do think that it’s conceivable that some enormously talented person that studied economics and relative value of currencies and devoted his life to it and only bet occasionally, that such a man could do very well [investing in currencies]. It’s not my line of talent. I’d rather do something that’s not such a zero-sum game. If I invest in equities – the businesses are growing; for example, Wrigley’s will make more gum. It’s automatically working for me, even if I do nothing. But if I invest in currencies, it’s not working for me. If I had to make a living outside of equities, it might be in currencies. But I don’t have to do it. There’s less chance of a big calamity in equities. The problem with currencies is that it sucks you into margin, and then if it moves against you but you’re sure you’re right, it sucks you in deeper. And then one more twist of the screw… If you’re already rich, why would you live under such conditions? I think more people will do well if they follow the Warren Buffett model. COMMENTS ON OTHER COMPANIES I Think the Country Is Better Off for Having Wal-Mart With Wal-Mart and the like getting so powerful, have we made a pact with the devil? My answer is I think the country is better off for having Wal-Mart. It’s a fabulous enterprise that does a lot of good and delivers value to the customer and that’s why it’s successful. I think the country is better off for having this system for distributing goods. When I go into Wal-Mart, I see elderly people as greeters – they’re working part time and it gets them out of the house, but people say, “Isn’t Wal-Mart nasty [for exploiting the elderly]?” As far as I’m concerned, I think Wal-Mart does a lot of good with efficient distribution. I’m a director of Costco. Do we really want our entrepreneurs not to try very hard? Do we really want to wake and say, “Let’s stop competing so hard?” I say, let winners run instead of investing in losers.
我喜欢沃尔玛的文化。在我看来,沃尔玛是文明世界的杰出成就之一。
麦当劳是伟大的教育机构
因为我说过这样的话——“这是一所好大学,但真正伟大的教育机构是麦当劳”——我挨过不少骂。他们恨我这么说,觉得我是个滑头。可麦当劳雇的是习惯不好的人,训练他们,教会他们按时上班、养成好习惯。我觉得麦当劳在很多方面做得比哈佛还强。
AIG 身上有很多强大而优秀的东西
我从来没有仔细研究过 AIG。AIG 长期被一位极为杰出、极具支配力的人掌控,业绩辉煌。我不认为我们会再遇到安然那样的欺诈案。它更像是一家好公司,老板可能只是给百合花镀了金。我觉得他认为是自己的责任来抬高 AIG 的声誉,也认为 AIG 值得比当时更好的名声。我同意这个看法。我觉得每个企业领袖都有同样的想法。我不认为那是靠烟幕和镜花水月。
在侵权改革这类事情上,我会非常想念汉克·格林伯格。他对我们一向坦诚。在收购长期资本管理公司资产那笔交易里,要么是他邀请我们,要么是我们邀请他。AIG 身上有很多强大而优秀的东西。
AIG、GE 信贷以及套利交易的风险
话虽如此,它和 GE 很像。它是一家极其成功的保险运营商,成功之后它变形为庞大的套利业务:用一笔价格大量借钱,再用另一笔价格投出去。AIG 是一家大运营商,和 GE 信贷非常像。我们从来没买过这两家,因为即使在最优秀、最聪明的人手里,庞大的信贷业务配上膨胀的资产负债表,也会让我们紧张。这么多人借了这么多亿美元,这本身就让我不安。
你们看看我们的业务就知道,我们保守得多。我们借得更少,条件更优惠。我们更乐意用更少的杠杆。它们很成功,但我们太胆小了,不敢学它们。你可以说我们错了,让我们损失了一大笔钱,但那不会困扰我们。错过一些机会从来没困扰过我们。别人比你富一点有什么不对?为这种事发愁太荒唐了。
那些套利交易游戏里杠杆很高。其他人比我更确信飞机总能租得出去。
I like Wal-Mart’s culture. As far as I’m concerned, Wal-Mart is one of the glories of civilization. McDonald’s Is a Great Educator I get flack for saying [when I visit a college and give a speech], “This is a nice college, but the really great educator is McDonald’s.” They hate me for saying this and think I’m a slimy creature. But McDonald’s hires people with bad work habits, trains them, and teaches them to come to work on time and have good work habits. I think a lot of what goes on there is better than at Harvard. There’s a Lot That Was Strong and Good at AIG I’ve never examined AIG in great detail. AIG was run by a truly brilliant, dominant personality for a long, long time and had a fabulous record. I don’t think we’re going to find a fraud like Enron. Rather, a good company with a chieftain that maybe gilded the lily. I think he thought it was his duty to help along the reputation of AIG. I think he thought it deserved a better reputation than it had. I agree. I think every corporate chieftain feels the same way. I don’t think it’s blue smoke and mirrors. I will miss Hank Greenberg dearly in areas like tort reform. He was always honest with us. He invited us or we invited him in the deal to buy the assets of Long Term Capital Management. There’s a lot that was strong and good at AIG. AIG, GE Credit and the Risks of the Carry Trade That said, it’s a lot like GE. It is a fabulously successful insurance operator, and with success it morphed into a massive carry business: borrowing a lot of money at one price and investing it at another price. AIG was a big operator that was a lot like GE Credit. We never owned either because even the best and wisest people make us nervous in great big credit operations with swollen balance sheets. It just makes me nervous, that many people borrowing so many billions. As you can tell in our operations, we are much more conservative. We borrow less, on more favorable terms. We’re happier with less leverage. They’ve been successful, but we’re too chicken to join them. You could argue that we’ve been wrong, and that it’s cost us a fortune, but that doesn’t bother us. Missing out on some opportunity never bothers us. What’s wrong with someone getting a little richer than you? It’s crazy to worry about this. There’s a lot of leverage in those carry-trade games. Other people are more certain than I am that aircraft can always be leased.
我根本不会想做空通用汽车
我永远不会做空一家年销售额 1800 亿美元、市值 150 亿美元、又是美国如此标志性组成部分的公司。我根本不会动做空的念头。
问题是,通用汽车的管理层——一群相当正派的人——基本上搞砸了。他们面对非常严峻的竞争挑战,却建立了一个[终身医疗和养老金]体系,这个体系会不断膨胀、膨胀、再膨胀,而他们正在为此付出惨重代价。
员工养老金计划的规模是全体股东权益总和的 5 到 6 倍。[当时,通用汽车市值略高于 150 亿美元,而养老金负债已拨备约 900 亿美元。]通用汽车把公司的全部价值都给了员工,留给股东的几乎为零。他们没有遵守那条格言:小洞不补,大洞吃苦。他们绝不应该让工会逐个公司谈判,先让一家公司停产,再让另外两家抢占份额。他们本该作为一个整体来谈判。今天的局面,就是多年来一年又一年让步积累的结果。
我认为通用汽车是人类的成就奇迹,但也是大规模管理失败的典型。如果我最终死了,没人能指责我——我已经尽量拖得够久了。通用汽车也尽量拖得够久。他们拿到的牌确实很难打,但我认为他们打输了。
我不认为伯克希尔·哈撒韦会这样打烂自己的牌。绝不会。我们会采取一些非常不愉快的措施,来防止那些在遥远未来造成极坏后果的事情发生。
核武器是一个非常严重的问题。[一想到就让人不寒而栗]人们只好用黑色幽默来应对。如果有人告诉你核弹马上就要在帕萨迪纳上空爆炸,你会怎么做?答案是:钻到桌子底下,跟自己的屁股说拜拜。(紧张的笑声)
对 Leucadia 及其电信投资的评论
我们认为 Leucadia 那伙人非常聪明。有没有可能 Leucadia 也会出现某个结果不太理想的情况?当然有,可能。
我看电信行业和所有那些变化,反应就像塞缪尔·戈德曼说的:“把我排除在外。”这行我真的不适合;我不知道怎么预测那些结果,所以留给别人去做吧。
I Would Never Dream of Shorting GM I would never short a company that was doing $180 billion [in sales] per year with a market cap of $15 billion that was such an iconic part of America. I would never dream of making that short. What happened was that a lot of very decent people running GM basically blew it. They were facing a very serious competitive challenge and they set up a [lifetime healthcare and pension] system that will grow and grow and grow and they are paying one hell of a penalty. Employees have 5-6 times the value in their pension plan than all of the stockholders combined. [At the time, GM had a market cap slightly above $15 billion vs. approximately $90 billion set aside for pension liabilities.] GM gave all of the value of the company to employees and left shareholders with almost nothing. They didn’t observe the maxim that a small leak can sink a great ship. They never should have allowed the unions to bargain with each company and shut one company down and let the other two take share. They should have bargained as a unit. The result today is a combination of what they gave away one year at a time. I regard GM as such a marvel of human achievement, but also an example of massive management failure. I can’t be criticized if I eventually die – I delayed it as long as I could. GM delayed it as long as they could. They had a very tough hand to play, but I would argue that they blew it. I don’t think Berkshire Hathaway will blow its hand in this way. It would never do that. We would do some very unpleasant things to prevent something that would have very bad consequences far into the future. Nuclear weapons are a very serious problem. [It’s so awful to contemplate that] people use gallows humor. What would you do if you were told a nuclear bomb would be detonated over Pasadena right now? The answer: you’d crawl under the table and kiss your ass goodbye. (Nervous laughter) Comments on Leucadia and Its Investments in Telecom We regard the Leucadia people as very smart. Is it conceivable that the Leucadia people could have one outcome that didn’t work very well? Sure, it’s possible. I look at telecom and all the change and my reaction is that of Samuel Goldman: “Include me out.” I’m just not suited for this; I don’t know how to predict those outcomes, so I leave it to other people.
关于经济问题的看法
资本泛滥
资本的生成方式很奇怪。在美国,我们以前所未有的方式将房屋货币化。问问乔他是怎么买新凯迪拉克的——他会说从房子里借钱买的。我们正处在资本泛滥之中。
资本泛滥正导致信用卡和次级贷款机构出现非常恶劣的行为——这是一个非常肮脏的行业,引诱人们陷入不利境地。这是一种制造农奴的新方式,是个肮脏的勾当。我们有金融机构,包括那些声名显赫的,向最无力偿还的人提供高息信贷。我觉得其中很多行为令人作呕。自由市场并不意味着它就体面。
社保体系令人惊叹
我不太确定普通股会创造奇迹。在英国,他们曾尝试建立类似的计划,结果让经纪人和销售人员对民众尽情忽悠,最终酿成灾难。所以推行者(美国那些推动允许人们自行投资社保储蓄的人)说:“我们不会那么做。我们会把它们打包成指数基金。”但按照这种设定,它就像一种套利。一个人放弃社保的承诺,转而接受指数基金的承诺。
社保体系的运作方式令人惊叹。它有通胀保护。人们很容易对它嗤之以鼻,但它是有史以来最成功的政府项目之一。它成本低廉,并且鼓励工作。
人们说,如果永远不改变收入基础,它会没钱。但如果十年后,国家富裕了 30% - 40%,为什么不能用更高比例的 GDP 来支付给人们呢?年轻人也受益——这笔钱付给了那些可能搬来和他们同住的人。(笑声)每个人都会变老,但也会变得更富有,那为什么不在他们身上花更高比例的 GDP 呢?这有什么不可思议的?我来告诉你们什么才不可思议:这么多人居然这么蠢!(笑声)
能源短缺的可能性
有很多证据表明这一点——我们传统的石油开采技术最终会逐渐衰退,这一理论被称为“胡伯特峰值”。[这个理论由壳牌石油公司的一位地质学家在 50 多年前首次提出,描述石油和天然气的产量如何先增至峰值,然后随着储量枯竭而迅速下降。]我确信这种情况最终会发生。但你永远无法确定。有些人认为能源储量并非来自已灭绝的远古生命——比如,太空中存在甲烷,那里并没有生命存在过。因此,实际的能源可能比人们预想的要多……
COMMENTS ON ECONOMIC MATTERS Awash in Capital It is weird the way that capital occurs. We have monetized houses in this country in a way that’s never occurred before. Ask Joe how he bought a new Cadillac [and he’ll say] from borrowing on his house. We are awash in capital. [Being] awash is leading to very terrible behavior by credit cards and subprime lenders -- a very dirty business, luring people into a disadvantageous position. It’s a new way of getting serfs, and it’s a dirty business. We have financial institutions, including those with big names, extending high-cost credit to the least able people. I find a lot of it revolting. Just because it’s a free market doesn’t mean it’s honorable. Social Security Is Amazing I’m not so sure that common stocks will do wonders. In England, where they tried to create a scheme like this, they let the brokers and salespeople loose on the people and it was a disaster. So they [those in the U.S. who are pushing to allow people to invest their Social Security savings themselves] said, “We won’t do that. We’ll just package them in index funds.” But the way it’s set up, it’s like an arbitrage. A guy gives up the promise of Social Security to take the promise of an index fund. Social Security is amazing how we’ve run it. It’s inflation protected. It’s easy to sneer at it, but it’s one of the most successful government programs ever. It’s low cost and encourages work. People say if you never change the revenue base, it’ll run out of money. But if 10 years from now, the country is 30-40% richer, why not use a higher percentage of GDP to pay people? Young people benefit too – the money is paid to people who might be moving in with them. (Laughter) Everybody’s going to get older, but also richer, so why wouldn’t you spend a higher percentage of GDP on them? Why is that so unthinkable? I’ll tell you what’s unthinkable: that so many people are that stupid! (Laughter) Likelihood of an Energy Shortage There’s a lot of evidence of that – that our conventional techniques of extracting oil will eventually taper off, [a theory called] Hubert’s Peak. [First articulated more than 50 years ago by a Shell Oil geologist, this theory describes how production rates of oil and gas will increase to a peak and then rapidly taper off as reserves are depleted.] I’m sure that will happen eventually. But you can never be sure. Some people think that energy reserves are not from deceased former life – for example, there’s methane in the heavens where there was no former life. So there may be more energy than people expect…
我记得读过一条消息,雪佛龙在极深地层发现了大量能源,是一种氢化物——深层储层里封存着巨量能量。所以,也许还有最后一口气——化石能源还能再来一次意外之财。如果我们不得不过上没有碳氢化合物的日子,我们也能过,但会很不舒服。每天都有海量能源从太阳抵达地球。如果我们不得不调整适应,我们也能做到。
I recall reading something about Chevron finding a lot of energy way deep, some kind of hydride – a deep reserve with a lot of energy locked up. So there may be one last gasp – one more windfall coming of hydrocarbons. If we have to live without hydrocarbons, we can, but it would just be unpleasant. An awful lot of energy comes to the earth every day from the sun. If we had to adjust, we could.
关于人生及其他方面的建议
设定合理的期望
人们需要问自己:“我该如何打好手里这副牌?” 这个世界不会因为你想要更高的回报,就多给你一分。你必须非常精明、非常努力,才能多赚一点点。而降低自己的欲望,要容易得多。这世上有太多聪明人,而且其中不少人还在作弊,所以想赢并不容易。(紧张的笑声)
人生成功的关键
永远不要为了争取新客户而怠慢现有客户。想想看,如果把这种做法用到婚姻上会怎样——你要是忽略现任太太,却去追求另一个女人。(笑声)老一套的待人方式依然管用。只要你活得够长、表现够好,再加上一点智慧,你就能过得不错。
美国的未来
长期来看,伟大文明被超越的概率是 100%。所以你知道结局会怎样。(笑声)
对这个国家美好一面的持久力,我更为乐观。但你不能因为娶了一位了不起的太太,就对她不好。你会感觉到,有些曾让这个国家伟大的古老美德正在减弱。但这里依然有那么多好的东西、那么强的力量,我不会指望这个国家会突然崩溃。
不过,有些发展确实会迫使我们回归老路。我觉得,某些特定阶层的人,如果被扫除干净,反而是件好事。(笑声)
对我们生活方式的最大威胁
沃伦在股东大会上回答过这个问题。未来 60 年最大的威胁,是一场极为严重的核事件。其次,是有人用病原体干出可怕的事情。我并不认为这两件事在 60 年内发生的可能性很小。如果我们还得经历一些衰退和动荡,那跟核事件比起来都算是小事。
在座的各位当然应该有足够的智慧来安排好自己的人生,这样你们就能做到……
ADVICE ON LIFE AND OTHER Have Realistic Expectations People need to ask, “How do I play the hand that has been dealt me?” The world is not going to give you extra return just because you want it. You have to be very shrewd and hard working to get a little extra. It’s so much easier to reduce your wants. There are a lot of smart people and a lot of them cheat, so it’s not easy to win. (Nervous laughter) Keys to Success in Life Never abuse current clients by trying to get new ones. Think how this would work with matrimony – if you ignore your current wife while you pursue another one. (Laughter) The old attitudes will work fine. If you live long enough and act well, and have some intelligence, you’ll do fine. Future of the United States Over the long term, the eclipse rate of great civilizations being overtaken is 100%. So you know how it’s going to end. (Laughter) I’m more optimistic about the staying power of what’s good in this country. But just because you have a wonderful spouse doesn’t mean you should treat her badly. You have the feeling that some of the old virtues [that made this country great] are lessening. But there’s so much good and so much strength left that I would not expect this country to suddenly founder. But there are some developments that would make us commit to the old ways. I think there are certain classes of people who if they were swept away, it would be desirable. (Laughter) Biggest Threat to Our Way of Life Warren answered this at the annual meeting. The biggest threat in the next 60 years is a really unpleasant nuclear event. Next is that someone does some terrible things with pathogens. I don’t think either is unlikely in the next 60 years. If we have to go through some recessions and convulsions, these are minor compared to nuclear events. People in this room certainly should be wise enough to handle their lives so they can do
即使经济环境长期糟糕也没事。我认为真正的威胁不是我们今天讨论的这些。
里克·盖林没疯——我们才疯了
[盖林是巴菲特著名演讲《格雷厄姆-多德都市的超级投资者》中提到的投资者之一]
我觉得可以这么说:他有钱之后,就不再花时间追求更富有了。他有了新家庭,75 岁还有个 12 岁的孩子。他做很多事是因为喜欢做。他已经不再追求更富有了。这没什么疯狂的。我们才是疯了的那个。(笑声)
读书建议与安然公司的极端恶行
我相信阅读最优秀的人写的书,读书是因为你喜欢学习。我不会花时间读侦探小说或爱情小说。尽管沃伦刻薄地评论我说“晚读总比不读好”……[我没听清这句话后面的部分]。但我刚推荐的那本书[《傻瓜的阴谋》,作者库尔特·艾肯沃尔德]——那本关于安然的书确实值得一读,因为其中的恶行太极端了。你会看到人们被周围的邪恶所吞噬。你能学到太多东西。你知道结局——就像一出悲剧。不是每个人都喜欢悲剧——我带妻子去看一部电影,里面一战中老鼠在啃食阵亡士兵的尸体。看完后她对我说:“你可能喜欢这个,但我再也不想看下一部了。”那部电影叫《国王与国家》。
书单推荐
[除了《傻瓜的阴谋》]还有没有其他喜欢的书推荐?有,你花 49 美元就能买到。[笑声。《穷查理宝典》在威斯科年会上有售。]如果你发现不喜欢,可以送给一个比你更聪明的朋友。今年我没读到另一本真正打动我的书。那本关于安然的书让我产生了极其强烈的情感共鸣。
幽默
一位股东结束提问时说:“我想我算是个蹭建议的。”芒格回答:“没关系——我们这儿这种人多的是。”
要想在自己身上找到很多爱,一个办法是让自己身边围满死硬派的怪人。是的,我确实这么干。你们就是我的同类——跟我一样疯疯癫癫。
OK even in big stretches of unpleasant economic conditions. I think the big threats are not the ones we’re talking about here. Rick Guerin’s Not Crazy – We Are [Guerin was one of the investors Buffett profiled in his famous speech, The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville] I think it’s fair to say that once he got rich, he stopped spending his time trying to get richer. He has a new family. He’s 75 and has a 12-year-old child. He does a lot of things because he enjoys doing them. He’s stopped trying to get richer. There’s nothing crazy about that. We’re the crazy ones. (Laughter) Advice on Reading and Enron’s Extreme Evil I believe in reading the best people, and reading because you like learning. I don’t spend my time reading detective stories or romances. In spite of Warren’s wise-ass comment about better late than never about me...[I missed the rest of this sentence] But a book like the one I just recommended [Conspiracy of Fools, by Kurt Eichenwald] – that Enron book is really worth reading because the evil is so extreme. You see people getting sucked in by the evil all around them. You just learn so much. You know the outcome – it’s like a tragedy. Not everyone likes tragedy – I took my wife to a movie where the rats were eating the bodies of the dead soldiers in World War I. Afterward, she told me, “You may like this, but I never want to go to another one.” It was King & Country. Book Recommendations Any other favorite books [in addition to Conspiracy of Fools] to recommend? Yeah, you’re paying $49 for it. [Laughter. Poor Charlie’s Almanack was for sale at the Wesco meeting.] If you find you don’t like it, you can always give it to a more intelligent friend. I don’t have another one that really grabbed me this year. That Enron book had a really powerful emotional connection for me. Humor One of the shareholders ended his question by saying: “I guess I’m an advice mooch,” to which Munger replied: “That’s OK – we get a lot of them.” One way to find a lot of love in yourself is to surround yourself with a lot of hard-core nut cases. Yes I do. You’re my kind of people – my kind of screwy.