天才不够(以及长期资本管理公司的其他教训)

1998 (explicit) · memo · 原文约 3545 词
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Memo to:

Memo to:

Oaktree 客户与朋友们

Oaktree Clients and Friends

From:

From:

Howard Marks

Howard Marks

Re:

Re:

才华横溢还不够(以及长期资本管理公司的其他教训)

Genius Isn't Enough (and Other Lessons from Long-Term Capital Management)

9 月 24 日,《华尔街日报》头版刊登了一篇精彩文章,谈及由鲁宾和萨默斯两位先生领衔的“精英团队”经济决策者,无力阻止新兴市场经济与货币的滑坡。文章栏题引用了戴维·哈尔伯斯坦讲述美国卷入越南战争的著作《最优秀与最聪明者》中的一句话:

如果说有什么能把人紧紧联结在一起……那就是这样一种信念:纯粹的智慧与理性能够解答并解决一切。

翻过一页——仅隔几栏之遥——又是一篇精彩文章,这次的主题是长期资本管理公司。我觉得哈尔伯斯坦的那段引语,对它同样适用。

长期资本的故事如今已广为人知。我在这里并非要讨论事实——虽然我会简略提一下——而是要谈谈该吸取的教训。长期资本是由前所罗门兄弟公司副董事长约翰·梅里韦瑟,连同几位备受尊敬的前所罗门合伙人、一位前美联储副主席,以及两位诺贝尔奖得主共同创立的。这家公司成立的目的是从事债券套利,即系统性地利用债券定价错误来获利。通过买入受类似因素影响而被低估的债券、卖空被高估的债券,就能持续获得收益,且不承担市场风险。长期资本管理者的智慧与成就,加上其强劲的年回报率,促使投资者纷纷投入资金,也让他们不必费心去弄清这家基金究竟在做什么。基金的操作方式或许从未向投资者完整交代过,投资组合也从未披露,经理人的行动甚至事后都不报告;40% 的年回报率足以让投资者心满意足。

你们大概听我们说过,债券投资是一场寸土必争的游戏。那么,长期资本凭什么大多数年份都能赚到 40% 甚至更高的回报?答案就是杠杆:他们借来足够的钱,买下相当于自身股本好几倍的债券。现在已知,长期资本普通合伙人的现金股本通过借款膨胀到约 15 亿美元,再加上 31 亿美元的有限合伙人资本。这 46 亿美元的股本,竟足以支撑长期资本持有总计约 1500 亿美元的投资,以及据说名义总额达 1.25 万亿美元的衍生品多头与空头头寸!

On September 24, The Wall Street Journal carried an excellent front-page article regarding the inability of the "crack team" of economic policy makers led by Messrs. Rubin and Summers to halt the slide of the emerging markets' economies and currencies. Heading the column was a quotation from David Halberstam's account of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, The Best and The Brightest: If there was ever anything that bound men ... together, it was the belief that sheer intelligence and rationality could answer and solve everything. Across the page -- just a few columns away -- was another excellent article, this time on the subject of Long-Term Capital Management. I think the Halberstam quotation is just as relevant to this one. The saga of Long-Term Capital is well known by now. My purpose here is not to discuss the facts, although I'll do so briefly, but rather the lessons to be learned. Long-Term was the creation of former Salomon Brothers vice chairman John Meriwether, along with several other well-respected ex-Salomon Partners, a former vice chairman of the Federal Reserve, and a pair of Nobel prize winners. It was formed to engage in bond arbitrage, the systematic exploitation of bond mispricings. By purchasing undervalued bonds and selling short overvalued bonds affected by similar factors, gains would be earned consistently and without exposure to market risk. The intellect and accomplishments of Long-Term's managers, and its strong annual returns, compelled investors to invest and freed them from feeling they had to understand exactly what the fund did. The fund's approach may not have been fully delineated to investors, its portfolio was never disclosed, and the managers' actions were not even reported after the fact; 40% annual returns were enough to keep investors satisfied. You've probably heard us say that bond investing is a game of inches. So then how was LongTerm able to earn returns of 40% or more most years? The answer was leverage: they borrowed enough money to buy bonds worth many times their equity. It is now known that Long-Term's general partners' cash equity was increased through borrowings to roughly $1.5 billion and paired with $3.1 billion of limited partners' capital. This $4.6 billion of equity was somehow sufficient to enable Long-Term to hold investments totaling about $150 billion and long and short positions in derivatives believed to have had an aggregate "notional value" of $1.25 trillion!

1998 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

1998 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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当你的投资远超权益资本时,证券价格的小幅下跌就足以吞掉全部权益。从 8 月 1 日到 9 月下旬,除国债外的所有债券价格下跌、国债价格上涨(长期资本管理公司曾做空国债以对冲“多头”头寸的利率风险),以及股票下跌(它重仓了并购题材股),这些合计抹掉了长期资本管理公司 90% 的权益。再者,如果追加保证金通知迫使它那庞大的头寸被抛向全球不稳定的市场,变现所得可能低于借款金额,导致向其提供信贷的银行和券商计提坏账,甚至可能动摇它们自身。难以置信的是,关于长期资本管理公司的报道,在描述它可能面临的强制平仓时,用的词竟是“对世界金融体系稳定的威胁……”(《华尔街日报》,9 月 29 日)。这些情况促成了 14 家金融机构同意重组并追加投资。这是背景,现在说教训。

长期资本管理公司所用的技术曾被冠以各种名号,如“火箭科学”或“黑箱”。计算机被用来扫描数千种证券,寻找历史关系被打破的实例,以期在回归常态的过程中获利,这被称为“收敛交易”。据推测,长期资本管理公司用模型评估历史重演的概率,以及个别关系走偏时对整个投资组合的风险,以此确定可以安全承担的风险和杠杆水平。

彼得·伯恩斯坦在他那本精彩的《反脆弱》*(译注:此处原文为《Against the Gods》,中译名《与天为敌》)*中展示了概率研究的发展如何让有依据的赌博和有依据的投资(以及其他面向未来的决策形式)成为可能。但这一探索的成果终究只是概率,或者说合理的预期。可能发生的事有时不会发生,而不太可能发生的事有时偏偏发生。或者,就像我的朋友布鲁斯·纽伯格说的那样,当我在双陆棋里侥幸掷出那一下不太可能掷出的骰子赢了他时,“概率和结果之间可能有巨大的差距。”如果你能意识到“可能的结果”和“确定的结果”之间的差别,也许就不会把全部家当押上去。

投资世界也是如此;简而言之,那些理应成立的关系,有时就是会失效。这可能是因为市场和系统失灵(1987 年股灾中,投资组合保险商无法完成止损卖出),可能是因为外部事件未被充分预料(1994 年反向浮动利率债券崩盘,因为利率以每年 600 到 700 个基点的速度上涨,这在之前被认为是不可能的),或者仅仅因为人的不可靠(恐慌的人在关键时刻往往不会拿出真金白银)。一种关系的失效,往往恰恰发生在人们对它的信心达到顶峰、大量资金押注其上之时。无论出于何种原因,我们已经看到很多例子,概率模型没有为“不太可能发生的灾难”留出足够余地。

正如长期资本管理公司的梅里韦瑟在 9 月 2 日写给投资者的信中所说,“基金在预期收敛之际增加了头寸,然而……交易却急剧背离。”换句话说,有时候便宜的东西会更便宜,昂贵的东西会更昂贵。

When your investments so greatly exceed your equity, it doesn't take a big drop in security prices to wipe out that equity. Between August 1 and late September, price declines on all bonds other than Treasurys, appreciation on Treasury bonds (which Long-Term had shorted to offset its exposure to interest rates on "long" positions), and declines on equities (it had invested heavily in takeover stocks) were sufficient to erase 90% of Long-Term's equity. Further, if margin calls had caused its vast positions to be dumped on the world's unsteady markets, the proceeds might have been less than the amounts borrowed, causing write-offs at the banks and brokers that had provided Long-Term's credit and perhaps destabilizing them. Incredibly, articles about Long-Term describe its possible forced liquidation with phrases like "threat to the stability of the world financial system ... “ (The Wall Street Journal, September 29). These conditions gave rise to the restructuring and additional investment agreed to by 14 financial institutions. That's the background; now for the lessons. The techniques employed at Long-Term have been variously described as "rocket science" or “black box.” Computers were used to scan thousands of securities to detect instances where historic relationships had been violated and profit could be earned on the return to the norm; these are referred to as "convergence trades." Assumedly, Long-Term used models to assess the probability of history reasserting itself and the risk to the overall portfolio of individual relationships going the wrong way. Thus would they determine the amount of risk and leverage that could safely be taken on. In his wonderful book, Against the Gods, Peter Bernstein shows how development of the study of probability made possible both informed gambling and informed investing (along with other forms of decision making concerning the future). But the products of this pursuit remain mere probabilities, or reasonable expectations. Likely events sometimes fail to occur, and unlikely events sometimes do. Or, as my friend Bruce Newberg says when I get the one improbable roll of the dice needed to beat him in backgammon, “there can be a big difference between probability and outcome.” If you are conscious of the difference between a likely outcome and a certain one, you may not want to bet the ranch. The same is true in the world of investments; put simply, relationships that are supposed to hold sometimes fail to do so. This may happen because markets and systems don't work (in the Crash of 1987, portfolio insurers couldn't get their stop-loss sales off), because external events aren't fully anticipated (inverse floaters tanked in 1994 because interest rates rose at annual rates of 600 or 700 basis points that had been considered impossible), or simply because of the unreliability of the human participants (scared people often fail to step forward with cash at the times that matter most). A relationship's failure to hold often comes just when faith in it has reached an excessive level and huge sums have been bet on it. For whatever reason, we have seen many instances when probabilistic models turned out not to have made sufficient allowance for an “improbable disaster.” As Long-Term's Meriwether wrote in his September 2 letter to investors, “the Fund added to its positions in anticipation of convergence, yet ... the trades diverged dramatically.” In other words, sometimes things that are cheap just get cheaper and things that are dear get dearer.

1998 年,橡树资本管理有限合伙公司(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)

1998 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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自由市场要达到均衡,恐惧与贪婪这两种驱动因素之间必须存在一种健康的张力。参与者若同时感受到两者,贪婪会推着他去冒险,而恐惧则给他承担的风险设下限度。然而,两者并不总是处于平衡——常常是其中一方占据上风。过去几年里,恐惧太少,贪婪和冒险行为主导了一切。长期资本管理公司的经理们,其聪明才智或许让他们自以为这套流程万无一失,以至于恐惧感太少,承担的风险过头。每个时代都有一个显赫的参与者成为象征,而长期资本很可能会在很长一段时间里被当作 1990 年代的“代言人”。

我认为投资者总在寻找“银弹”。他们追求一种能带来高额利润而无风险的行动路径——于是他们追捧 1970 年代的“漂亮五十”投资法、1980 年代的投资组合保险,以及 1990 年代的市场中性策略。他们常常把自己的命运托付给所谓的“天才”,希望这些人能让一切变得轻松——无论是乔·格兰维尔、伊莱恩·加扎雷利、戴维·阿斯金还是约翰·梅里韦瑟。

但银弹并不存在。没有任何策略能在不承担风险的情况下产生高回报率。也没有人掌握所有答案;我们都只是凡人。聪明,就像骄傲一样,常常在摔倒之前先行一步。它不仅不足以让拥有它的人掌控未来,而且人们对它的敬畏会使追随者不问该问的问题,不为不可避免的雨天预留足够的储备。这可能是长期资本管理公司最大的教训。还有其他教训,我将在下面逐一回顾。

1)正如我以前写过的,“波动性加杠杆等于炸药。”长期资本崩溃的主要原因可能不是它的证券选择,也不是市场下跌,而是它的杠杆。平均而言,它的头寸可能只下跌了几个百分点。但当你的资产超过净资产的 25 倍时,即使 4% 的价格下跌也足以让你彻底出局。如今,大多数人把“杠杆”和“债务”混为一谈。但按我第一次学到的含义来理解更好:营收顶线的变化被放大到底线的程度。这就是为什么英国人叫它“齿轮传动”。在拉斯维加斯,人们说“你赌得越多,赢的时候赢越多。”他们从不补充“……而输的时候也输更多。”杠杆只是让你下注超过自己资本的方式,它让你面对更多的好和更多的坏。杠杆确实可以成为炸药。

橡树的所有投资组合都不使用杠杆来投资超过我们资本的部分(尽管我们的新兴市场基金能在有限程度上这样做)。我们审视过几次杠杆机会,但直到最近为止,在风险容忍度较高的环境下,我们没找到值得加杠杆的基础回报。例如,尽管过去五年里多次受邀,我们拒绝组织担保贷款债券(杠杆高收益债券组合)。这源于我们的信念:杠杆绝不能被用来把低利差变成高利差,只能用于利用已经很高的利差。长期资本的经理们使用巨额杠杆,试图从微小的利差中获取巨额利润,最终这毁了他们。

For free markets to operate at equilibrium, there must be healthy tension between two motivating factors: fear and greed. If a participant feels both, greed will push him to take chances but fear will put limits on the risk he assumes. However, the two are not always in balance -- one or the other is often in the ascendancy. For the last few years, too little fear has been present, and greed and risk-taking have dominated. Long-Term's managers' brainpower may have let them consider their process foolproof, so that they felt too little fear and took on too much risk. In every era, one prominent participant becomes emblematic, and Long-Term is likely to be known for a long time as the "poster boy" of the 1990s. I think investors are always looking for “the silver bullet.” They seek a course of action that will lead to large profits without risk -- and thus they pursued Nifty-Fifty investing in the 1970s, portfolio insurance in the '80s and market-neutral strategies in the '90s. Often, they align themselves with "geniuses" who they hope will make it easy for them -- be it Joe Granville, Elaine Garzarelli, David Askin or John Meriwether. But the silver bullet doesn't exist. No strategy can produce high rates of return without some risk. And nobody has all of the answers; we’re all just human. Brilliance, like pride, often goes before the fall. Not only is it insufficient to enable those possessing it to control the future, but awe of it can cause people to follow without asking the questions they should and without reserving enough for the rainy day that inevitably comes. This is probably the greatest lesson of Long-Term Capital Management. There are others, which I'll review below. 1) As I've written before, "volatility + leverage = dynamite." The main cause of Long-Term's collapse probably wasn't its security selection, or the declines in its markets, but rather its leverage. On average, its positions may have declined just a few percent. But when your assets exceed 25 times your equity, even a 4% price decline is enough to wipe you out. Nowadays, most people use the word "leverage" interchangeably with "debt." But it's better understood in the sense I first learned: the extent to which a change in the top line is magnified by the time it reaches the bottom line. That's why the British call it "gearing." In Las Vegas they say “the more you bet, the more you win when you win.” They never add "… and the more you lose when you lose.” Leverage is just a way to let you bet more than your capital, and it exposes you to more of the good and more of the bad. Leverage can truly be dynamite. None of Oaktree's portfolios use leverage to invest more than our capital (although our Emerging Markets Fund will be able to do so to a limited extent). We have reviewed several opportunities for leverage, but in the risk-tolerant climate prevailing until recently, we didn't find base returns worth leveraging up. For example, despite repeatedly being invited to do so over the last five years, we declined to organize CBOs (leveraged high yield bond portfolios). This followed from our conviction that leverage should never be used in an attempt to turn low spreads into wide ones, only to take advantage of already-wide spreads. The managers of Long-Term used enormous leverage in an attempt to profit hugely from minute spreads, and it eventually did them in.

1998 年,橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

1998 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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2)对冲基金本身并没有任何魔力。正如我们在四月份关于另类投资的文章中所说,对冲基金只有两个共同点:私募合伙身份和通过普通合伙人分享净收益的收费机制。对冲基金投资者的先天权利肯定不包括高回报或低风险。但对冲基金的结构可能会带来一些后果,而这些后果似乎只有像长期资本那样的投资者在问题出现之后才能意识到。我们题为《当今市场的风险》(1994 年 2 月 17 日)的备忘录对当时还算成功的对冲基金提出了以下疑问:去年股票或债券平均回报率为 10% 至 15%,一些对冲基金凭什么赚了 70% 甚至更多?靠的是大胆的高杠杆操作……如果管理者的计算被证明是错的会怎样?……对冲基金爱好者知道自己在承担多大风险吗?他们的资金被锁定了多久?他们对所采用的策略了解多少?我们从不想看到自己的警告最终被证实有必要,但通常又觉得这不可避免。长期资本的案例表明,对冲基金并非万灵药,而且往往带有重大缺陷。只有在深入审查了基础策略并且对管理者的信心得到充分证实之后,才应该进入这种封闭式结构。3)“如果一件事好得不像真的,那它很可能就是假的。”这句老话时不时会过时,但每次有快速致富的骗局被揭穿时,它又会卷土重来。许多“无风险”的套利、对冲和市场中性策略,最终被证明所涉及的风险远比表面看起来的更大。我小时候在一部 1930 年代的电影里看到,罗斯柴尔德家族积累财富是因为他们独家使用信鸽,能够在伦敦以一种汇率买入某种货币,同时又在巴黎以另一种汇率卖出。那是纯粹的套利:同一时间以不同价格交易同一资产。但一旦你交易的是不同资产,而且它们同步变动的概率不是 100%,你就引入了“基差风险”,即被套利的资产不会朝着预期方向变动的风险。这正是杀死长期资本的原因;他们的债券收益率本该收敛,结果却发散开来。历史关系被证明远不如人们以为的那么可靠。4)“总会有事。”这是罗丝安·罗萨娜达娜在《周六夜现场》里的口头禅,这话千真万确——最终,总会出点岔子。任何依赖万事顺利的行动路径都是不安全的,但长期资本 25 倍以上的杠杆背后肯定就是这种预期。沃伦·巴菲特坚持“留出犯错余地”,绝不会下这种赌注(尽管他曾在重组前的几个小时里,愿意和高盛、美国国际集团一起,以 2.5 亿美元的低价竞购长期资本,而当时后者的净资产据估计还有 6 亿美元)。

2) Hedge funds offer no magic per se. As we described in our April piece on alternative investments, hedge funds carry only two common threads: private partnership status and a fee mechanism through which general partners share in net gains. The hedge fund investor's birthright certainly does not include either high returns or low risk. But the hedge fund structure can have ramifications which investors (such as Long-Term's) seem to recognize only after problems arise. Our memo entitled "Risk In Today's Markets" (February 17, 1994) asked the following about 'til-then successful hedge funds: With the average stock or bond returning 10-15% last year, how did some hedge funds make 70% or more? It was through bold and heavily-leveraged plays ...What would have happened if the managers' calculations had proved wrong? ... Do the hedge fund aficionados know how much risk they are taking? For how long are they tying up their money? How much do they know about the strategies being employed? We never hope that our warnings will turn out to be needed, but we usually feel it is inevitable. The case of Long-Term demonstrates that hedge funds represent no panacea and often hold significant drawbacks. The c1osed-end structure should be entered into only after the underlying strategy has been reviewed in depth and confidence in the managers has been fully justified. 3) “If it seems too good to be true, it probably is." This old saw goes out of style from time to time, but it makes a comeback each time a get-rich-quick scheme is exposed. Many "riskless" arbitrage, hedge and market-neutral strategies have turned out to involve more risk than was let on. When I was a kid, I saw in a 1930s movie that the Rothschilds built their fortune because their exclusive use of carrier pigeons allowed them to simultaneously buy a currency at one rate in London and sell it at a different rate in Paris. That's pure arbitrage: trading the same asset at different prices at the same time. But as soon as you deal in different assets that have less than a 100% probability of moving in tandem, you introduce “basis risk,” or the risk that the assets being arbitraged won't go in the anticipated directions. That's what killed Long-Term; their bonds' yields diverged when they were supposed to converge. Historic relationships proved to be less dependable than had been thought. 4) “It's always something.” That's what Roseanne Rosanadana used to say on Saturday Night Live, and it's very true -- eventually, something always goes awry. Any course of action which depends on everything going right is unsafe, but such an expectation has to have been behind Long-Term’s 25-plus times leverage. Warren Buffet, with his insistence on "margin for error," would never make such a bet (although he was willing in the hours just before the restructuring to join Goldman Sachs and AIG in a low-ball bid of $250 million for Long-Term at a time when its net worth is thought to have been $600 million).

1998 年 橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

1998 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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在《你是投资者还是投机者》(1997 年 9 月 3 日)一文中,我们写道:

什么可能导致市场下跌?投资者信心下滑——也许是当今最充裕的商品——很可能是关键因素,但原因难以预见。“我们不预期任何意外,”人们这样说,而这成了我们最新的最爱矛盾修辞。意外从来不会被预期——按定义如此——然而正是意外在推动市场……下一个意外可能是地缘政治性的(石油禁运、朝鲜战争)、经济性的(货币紧缩、利润增长放缓),或市场内部的(高利率债券的竞争、欺诈行为的曝光),但它最有可能来自没有人预料到的事情——包括我们。

我小时候,父亲常拿一个习惯性赌徒开玩笑,那人终于听说有一场只有一匹马参赛的赛马。他把房租钱押了上去,结果那匹马跳过围栏跑掉了,他输了个精光。天下没有稳赢的事,只有好一些和差一些的赌注,任何不带“会出岔子”预期去做投资的人,玩的都是最危险的游戏。

5)“永远不要把牛市里的聪明误当本事。”1990 年代开始时,经济和股市都处于极低水平。结果,成功来得容易,承担风险有回报,最高回报往往归于冒险最大的人。他们及其策略被视为最好的。

在我看来,(a)成功的三大要素是时机、进取心和技能,(b)如果你在正确的时间有足够的进取心,就不需要太多技能。但那些主要靠时机恰当的进取心获得成功的人,不能指望他们重演——尤其在艰难时期。评估投资业绩记录时,必须衡量这三者各自的作用。

6)信贷可得性的变化是一股强大的力量,我在投资行业待得越久,越尊重信贷周期的角色。例如,虽然我们希望自己的执行增添了价值,但我们 1990 年的困境债务基金获得 50% 的总回报,很大程度上是因为(a)恐惧和政府的行动关闭了信贷窗口,(b)1980 年代的杠杆收购无法再融资,成群违约,(c)因此这些债务可以低价买进。一场严重的衰退助长了这场大火,但慷慨的资本市场本可让公司融资脱困(就像它们 1993 年到 1998 年年中那样),而紧缩的市场在 1990-92 年把公司压垮了。

贷款人的产品是钱,把它们卖出货架是他们的工作。因为钱是最终极的无差别商品,贷款人在繁荣期只能通过比对手承担更大风险、收取更低利息或接受更宽松条款来竞争市场份额。这些策略在形势艰难时会瞬间逆转,造成巨大痛苦,导致信贷收缩。

In “Are You an Investor or a Speculator” (September 3, 1997), we wrote: What could cause a market decline? A drop in investor confidence -- perhaps the commodity that's most freely available today -- would likely be the key, but the reason is hard to foresee. “We're not expecting any surprises,” people say, and that has become our new favorite oxymoron. Surprises are never expected -- by definition -- and yet they're what move the market….The next surprise could be geo-political (oil embargo, war in Korea), economic (tight money, slowing profit growth), or internal to the market (competition from bonds at higher interest rates, discovery of a fraud), but it's most likely to be something that no one has anticipated -- including us. When I was a kid, my dad used to joke about the habitual gambler who finally heard about a race with only one horse in it. He bet the rent money on it, but he lost when the horse jumped over the fence and ran away. There is no sure thing, only better and worse bets, and anyone who invests without expecting something to go wrong is playing the most dangerous game around. 5) “Never confuse brains with a bull market.” When the 1990s began, the economy and the stock market were at very low levels. As a result, success came easily, risk-bearing paid off and the highest returns often went to those who took the most risk. They and their strategies were accepted as the best. In my opinion, (a) the three ingredients behind success are timing, aggressiveness and skill, and (b) if you have enough aggressiveness at the right time, you don't need that much skill. But those who have attained their success primarily through well-timed aggressiveness can't be depended on to repeat it -- especially in tough times. When an investment track record is considered, it's essential that the relative roles of these three factors be assessed. 6) Change in the availability of credit is a powerful force, and the longer I'm in the investment business, the more I respect the role of the credit cycle. For example, although we hope we added value through our implementation, our 1990 distressed debt funds earned their 50% gross returns largely because (a) fear and the government's actions closed the credit window, (b) the LBOs of the 1980s couldn't refinance their debt and defaulted in droves, and (c) that debt could therefore be bought for a song. A significant recession contributed to the conflagration, but whereas a generous capital market would have let companies finance their way out of trouble (as they did from 1993 through mid-1998), a tight one brought them down in 1990-92. The product of lenders is money, and it's their job to move it off the shelves. Because money is the ultimate undifferentiable commodity, lenders can compete for market share in boom times only by taking on bigger risks than the next guy, charging less interest or accepting looser terms. All of these tactics turn on a dime when things get tough, inflicting great pain and causing lending to contract.

1998 年 橡树资本管理有限合伙公司(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)

1998 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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在宽松的货币环境下,本不该繁荣的公司却蒸蒸日上,正如在资金紧张时,本该成功的公司也会倒闭。宽松的货币环境是长期资本管理公司早期成功和后来崩溃的关键因素。银行家和经纪人让普通合伙人得以加杠杆,放大其股权资本,并承担远超常规规模的头寸。他们贷出的金额,无论对长期资本管理公司还是对自身而言,都不安全。我猜想,他们被长期资本管理公司的卓越才华所诱惑,却对其总借款规模或投资组合状况一无所知。

信贷周期的剧烈波动——通常比实体经济本身的波动要剧烈得多——是商业和投资世界中许多极端事件背后的推手。过度放贷在 1989 至 1992 年房地产崩盘和 1997 至 1998 年新兴市场危机之前的繁荣中贡献巨大,正如紧缩的信贷加剧了 1990 至 1992 年的破产潮一样。下次危机来临时,环顾四周,你很可能会发现一个放贷者。

7)“他们忘记得多快。”尽管能够预见未来会是件很棒的事(而且利润丰厚),但事实是,我们中很少有人能做到。不过,你并不需要未卜先知,也能明智投资,同时避开最危险的陷阱。对过去的了解,能帮你走完大半段路。

长期资本管理公司的教训,与预见未来毫无关系。杠杆总是危险的。总会有事情最终出岔子。那些获得高回报的人,常常把承担风险误认为天才。信贷周期的波动能压倒所有其他因素。每一次繁荣都孕育着衰落的种子(正如每一次萧条都为复苏奠定基础)。忘掉预测吧——只要你牢记过去的教训,你就能远远走在前面。

我们都听过乔治·桑塔亚那那句名言:“那些忘记过去的人,注定要重蹈覆辙。”然而,今天有多少错误,不过是把过去重演了一遍?三十年前,“最优秀公司”的股票市盈率高达五十倍甚至更多,最终从高处崩塌。十年前,高杠杆的投资靠过桥贷款融资,而当融资窗口关闭时,投资银行家被套牢在这些贷款上。五年前,银行因衍生品陷入大麻烦。而在 1998 年,这一切再次给那些遗忘历史、或在新范式下将其无关紧要合理化的人带来麻烦。

我之前推荐过约翰·肯尼斯·加尔布雷思的精彩小书《金融狂热简史》。虽然我不认同它对高收益债券的抨击,但我认为任何想逆势思考和投资的人,都该读一读这本书。加尔布雷思说:

促成……狂热的,还有两个在我们这个时代或过去时代都很少被注意的因素。第一个是金融记忆极其短暂。因此,金融灾难很快就被遗忘。进而,当相同或极为相似的情况再次出现时,有时仅仅隔了几年,就会被新一代人——往往是年轻人,且总是极为自信——欢呼为金融乃至更广泛经济世界中一项辉煌的创新。人类活动中很少有哪个领域,能像这样……

In times of easy money, companies prosper that should not, just as deserving companies fail when money's tight. Easy money was key in Long-Term's early success and later collapse. The bankers and brokers let the General Partners lever up their equity capital and take on far out-sized positions. They loaned amounts of money that were unsafe both for Long-Term Capital and for themselves. I assume that, seduced by Long-Term's brilliance, they did so without knowing how much it had borrowed in total or what its portfolio looked like. The violent swings of the credit cycle -- usually far more volatile than the underlying economy -- are behind many of the extreme occurrences in the business and investment world. Excessive lending contributed greatly to booms preceding the collapses in real estate in 1989-92 and emerging markets in 1997-98, just as tight lending added to the bankruptcies of 1990-92. Look around the next time there's a crisis; you'll probably find a lender. 7) “How Quickly They Forget.” While it would be great (and very profitable) to be able to see the future, the truth is that few of us can. But you don't have to be prescient to be able to invest intelligently while avoiding the most dangerous hazards. Knowledge of the past will get you a good part of the way there. The relevance of the lessons of Long-Term has nothing to do with knowledge of the future. Leverage is always dangerous. Something always goes wrong eventually. Those who see high returns often mistake risk bearing for genius. The swings of the credit cycle can overwhelm all other factors. Every boom carries within itself the seeds of decline (just as every bust lays the groundwork for recovery). Forget forecasting -- you'll be well ahead if you simply bear in mind the lessons of the past. We've all heard George Santayana's famous observation that "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." And yet, how many of today's mistakes are just replays of the past? Thirty years ago, the stocks of "the best companies" reached P/Es of fifty and more from which they eventually collapsed. Ten years ago, highly leveraged investments were financed with bridge loans which investment bankers were stuck with when the financing window closed. Five years ago, banks got into big trouble with derivatives. All of these are causing problems again in 1998 for those who forgot history or rationalized its irrelevance in the "new paradigm." I've previously recommended John Kenneth Galbraith's excellent little book, A Short History of Financial Euphoria. Although I don't appreciate its swipes at high yield bonds, I consider it must reading for anyone who wants to think and invest against the grain. Galbraith says: Contributing to ... euphoria are two further factors little noted in our time or in past times. The first is the extreme brevity of the financial memory. In consequence, financial disaster is quickly forgotten. In further consequence, when the same or closely similar circumstances occur again, sometimes in only a few years, they are hailed by a new, often youthful, and always supremely self-confident generation as a brilliantly innovative discovery in the financial and larger economic world. There can be few fields of human endeavor in

1998 年,橡树资本管理有限合伙企业(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)

1998 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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在金融世界里,历史几乎无足轻重。过去的经验,即便还残留在记忆中,也被视为那些缺乏洞察力、无法欣赏当下惊人奇迹之人的原始避难所。【强调部分为附加】

阿门。那些自认为有能力无限认知和掌控未来的人,自然无需研习历史。而对我们其余的人来说,历史正是我们手中最有力的工具之一。

which history counts for so little as in the world of finance. Past experience, to the extent that it is part of memory at all, is dismissed as the primitive refuge of those who do not have the insight to appreciate the incredible wonders of the present. [Emphasis added] Amen. People who acknowledge no limits on their ability to know and control the future have no need to study history. For the rest of us, it's one of the best tools we've got. *

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想不起自己无法预知未来,这是常见的毛病,也是许多重大财务困境的根源。它是最容易助长傲慢自负——高估自己所能知晓和掌控之事——的因素之一。通用汽车的查尔斯·弗罗朗说,长期信用银行的人们“过于自信”。亨利·考夫曼最近也就此话题被引述道:“亏钱的有两种人:一种是一无所知的人,另一种是自以为无所不知的人。”肮脏的哈里插了一句:“人得知道自己的局限。”我其实觉得我母亲说得最妙:“不知而自以为知者,是愚人;远离他。”

橡树资本建立在以下这些基本原则之上(此外还有不少):

——我们不可能全知未来,而问题越是“宏观”,我们越难知道答案。

——我们必须始终预期会有意外发生,并留出容错空间。

——当市场弥漫太多贪婪时,我们必须警觉其中潜伏的风险。当市场过度转向恐惧时,我们则要利用由此出现的廉价机会。

——我们必须不断提醒自己认清局限,致力于避免傲慢自负。如果我们的方法论是有效的,我们的员工是有才华的,那么傲慢自负是为数不多能让我们栽跟头的东西之一。

长期资本的经验教训并不只适用于那一家公司。相反,它们揭示了投资中放之四海而皆准的几条真理。在这里,你不会看到它们被遗忘。

Inability to remember that you can't know what the future holds is a common failing and the cause of some of the biggest financial difficulties. It's one of the greatest contributors to hubris -- the over-estimation of what you can know and do. General Motors's Charles Froland says the people of Long- Term Credit developed "too much conviction." Henry Kaufman was recently quoted on the subject as saying "there are two kinds of people who lose money: those who know nothing and those who know everything." Dirty Harry weighed in, saying "a man has to know his limitations." I actually think my mother had it best: "He who knows not and knows not he knows not is a fool; shun him." Oaktree is built on the following axioms (among many others): -- We can't know everything about the future, and the “bigger picture” the question, the less we can know the answer. -- We must always expect that something will go wrong and build in margin for error. -- When the market embodies too much greed, we must be conscious of the risk that's present. When it swings too far toward fear, we should take advantage of the bargains that result. -- We must constantly remind ourselves of our limitations and dedicate ourselves to the avoidance of hubris. If our methodologies are valid and our people are talented, hubris is one of the few things that could make us fail. The applicability of the lessons of Long-Term is not limited to that company alone. Instead, they illustrate several of the universal truths in investing. You won't see them forgotten here.

October 9, 1998

October 9, 1998

1998 年 橡树资本管理公司(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)

1998 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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