前方有何挑战?
Memo to:
Memo to:
Oaktree Clients
Oaktree Clients
From:
From:
Howard Marks
Howard Marks
Re:
Re:
接下来会怎样?
What Lies Ahead?
写给我的客户备忘录让我感到极大的满足。我很感激有机会与你们分享我的想法,也感谢你们对这些想法的接纳。写下“纽约手记”对我帮助很大,那是我在袭击事件之后、在投资领域之外处理各种问题的方式。
我必须承认,我一直不太愿意写一份关于这次袭击对经济和投资影响的备忘录。我的很多看法是悲观的,而且我也不是经济学家。但我想把我思考的成果,哪怕是如此这般的一点心得,也分享给你们。
展望未来——所有的经济学、商业和投资都离不开与未来打交道。经济学家预测未来的状况。商人建造并经营组织,以便在未来的环境中获利。当然,投资者则试图弄清楚未来几年事物会值多少钱,并据此行事。其他职业更多与过去打交道(比如会计师和历史学家)或现在(医生和律师),但我们的工作是要应对未来。
Writing my client memos gives me great satisfaction. I appreciate the opportunities to share my views with you as well as your receptivity to them. Setting down my "Notes from New York" did me a lot of good as my way of dealing with post-attack issues outside the investment arena. I must admit that I haven't been looking forward to writing a memo about the economic and investment implications of the attacks. Many of my views are negative, and I'm no economist. But I want to give you the benefit of my thinking, such as it is. Looking to the Future – All of economics, business and investing entails dealing with the future. Economists predict future conditions. Businesspeople build and manage organizations so as to profit in the coming environment. And, of course, investors try to figure out what things will come to be worth in the years ahead and act accordingly. Other professions deal more with the past (e.g., accountants and historians) or the present (doctors and lawyers), but it is our job to cope with the future. U
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这正是投资之所以有趣、富有挑战,时而回报丰厚的原因。如果投资无须我们对未来下结论,或者未来并非不确定,那么所有人的回报都会相同——但也不会太高。我们偶尔能获得高回报,是因为我们面对的是不确定的未来;正因为未来充满不确定性,卓越的投资者才能占据优势。
That's what makes investing interesting, challenging and occasionally lucrative. If it didn't require us to reach conclusions about the future, or if the future wasn't uncertain, then everyone's returns would be the same – but not very high. We achieve high returns on occasion because we deal with an uncertain future, and it's because the future is uncertain that superior investors can get an edge. U
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投资的过程,本质上就是在预判未来——预判盈利与价值——并把那个未来转化成今天愿意支付的价格。显然,要做到这一点,就得先设想明天世界会是什么样,以及企业和它们的产品在那个世界里会有什么表现。
我们每个人每天都会做出成千上万个判断,依据的就是我们对“正常”的理解。我们拧开右边的水龙头喝水,因为冷水一直是从那儿出来的。我们倾向于再买一辆同品牌的车——或同一支牙膏——因为上一次用着满意。看到绿灯过马路,因为我们相信迎面而来的司机会在红灯时停下。
这类假设我们非做不可,哪怕心里明白它们不会每次都成立。要是每次做决定都得从头推演一遍,结果就是寸步难行。所以,我们总是先假设过去管用的东西,将来多半还管用,但同时也留出余地,承认它有可能失灵。
The process of investing consists entirely of divining the future – in terms of profits and values – and translating that future into prices that should be paid today. Obviously, doing so requires a view of what the world will look like tomorrow and how businesses and their products will fare in that world. We each make thousands of judgments a day based on our understanding of what's normal. We turn the right faucet for a drink because that's where the cold water always has been. We tend to buy another car – or another tube of toothpaste – of the same brand because we were happy with the last one. We cross the street on a green light because we trust on-coming drivers to stop on red. We must make assumptions like these, even though we know they won't hold true all the time. If we had to start from scratch every time we faced a decision, the result would be paralysis. Thus we start by assuming that the things that worked in the past are likely to work in the future, but we also make allowances for the possibility that they won't.
2001 年橡树资本管理公司
2001 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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作为投资者,我们的职责同样如此。我们期待管理良好、拥有优质产品的公司能够盈利,并获得相应的市场估值。我们假定有资金的公司会履行其债券义务。我们信赖经济能从低迷中复苏,并随时间推移持续增长。
因此,我们的大部分行动都依赖于外推。当然,在投资领域,我们依赖的预测都假设未来与过去大体相似。大多数时候,这些预测是正确的。我对预测者的主要不满有两点:
- 虽然大多数预测认为未来与过去非常相似,但真正有价值的预测是那些预示剧烈变化的。然而,预测者很少做出这样的预测,而做出此类预测的人又很少正确。
- 大多数预测者呈现其工作时,所要求的信任度超出了其应得。简而言之,他们很少说:“这是我的预测,如果我是你,我会对它将信将疑。”
即便在今天,仍有预测者依据历史,发布对经济和市场的预测。但在我看来,未来与过去相似的可能性,可能比以往任何时候都要低,而我们从未考虑过的事情,也有可能发生。
袭击发生后不久,就有文章开始引用市场在历次危机后恢复所需的时间。但谁能说那些先例就具有参考价值?例如,我读到,在伊拉克入侵科威特后,市场低迷了五个月,但随后很快收复了全部失地,甚至还有所上涨。但那一次的结果非常有利。我们都希望这次也能同样顺利、同样迅速,但我们愿意为此下注吗?
我们都渴望一种确定感。我们希望生活在一个未来可知、依赖正常外推的决策可以信赖的世界。我们希望相信,这个国家的生活能回到 9 月 11 日前无忧无虑的日子。我们希望相信,我们的领导人能够稳住航向,并设法解决难题。因此,我认为我们热衷于接受那些认为这些情况会持续下去的预测。但在今天,做关于未来的决策时,假定回归原状,是否明智?
新的未来——在我看来,我们今天对未来的了解,比平时还要少,而平时本来就不多。
We do the same in our roles as investors. We expect well-managed companies with good products to make money and be valued accordingly. We assume companies that have the money will service their bonds. We count on the economy to recover from slowdowns and grow over time. So most of our actions depend on extrapolation. Certainly in investing, we rely on forecasts that assume the future will look a lot like the past. And most of the time they're right. My main quibbles with forecasters are two: 1. While most forecasts call for a future that's a lot like the past, the truly valuable forecasts are those that call for radical change. Forecasters rarely make such forecasts, however, and those who do are rarely right. 2. Most forecasters present their work as deserving more credence than it does. In short, they rarely say, "Here's my forecast, and if I were you, I'd take it with a grain of salt." Even today, forecasters are out there with predictions for the economy and the market that are based primarily on history. And yet it seems to me that the future may be less likely to look like the past than it has until now, and that things we've never even considered before have a chance of happening. Immediately after the attacks, there began to appear articles citing how long it has taken the market to recover after past crises. But who's to say those precedents are at all relevant? For example, I read that the market sagged for five months after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait but made up all of that ground, and then some, soon thereafter. But that experience had a very favorable outcome. We all want this one to be as good and as quick, but are we willing to bet that it will? We all want a feeling of assurance. We want to live in a world where the future seems knowable and decisions that extrapolate normalcy can be depended on. We want to believe life in this country will return to the carefree days pre-September 11. We want to believe our leaders will be able to keep the ship upright and manage their way out of problems. So I think we're eager to embrace predictions that these things will hold true. But is it prudent today in making decisions regarding the future to assume a return to the status quo? The New Future – It seems to me that today we know even less about the future than we usually do, and that's never a lot. U
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1. 关于恐怖主义。我们需担忧的情形有多少源自奥萨马·本·拉登和基地组织,又有多少涉及其他组织?本·拉登的计划和资源有多少投入了“9·11”袭击,还有多少蓄势待发?本·拉登是让我们无计可施的魔鬼天才,还是一个侥幸得手的纸老虎?是否还有后续的靴子落地?每年是否会出现一次高调袭击?还是中东式的暴力将蔓延开来?
1. About terrorism. How much of what we have to worry about stems from Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, and how much relates to other groups? How much of bin Laden's plans and resources went into the September 11 attacks, and how much remains on tap? Is bin Laden a diabolical genius against whom we're powerless, or a paper tiger who got lucky? Are there additional shoes left to drop? Will there be a high-profile attack once a year? Or will Middle East-style violence
2001 年橡树资本管理公司(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)
2001 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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会侵入我们的日常生活吗?化学和生物武器是真实威胁吗?
- 关于我们的应对。我们能找到本·拉登吗?我们能抓获他和他的同伙吗?我们的军事行动能否成功,能否在不造成大量附带损害的前提下进行?我们能在不疏远民众和国家的情况下伸张正义吗?恐怖分子会报复我们的行动吗?他们的报复会动摇我们或我们盟友的决心吗?
- 关于经济。我们会陷入多深的衰退?会持续多久?什么能促使复苏,复苏会是什么形态?航空、酒店等行业会长期低迷,还是回到 9·11 之前的常态?流动性和购买欲望何时恢复?我们能否依赖这些方面的正常周期规律?如果再有恐怖袭击,这些因素会不会再次受挫?
我们中间谁敢说他知道这些问题的答案?谁又敢说没有这些答案,未来就能预见?
这些问题中有许多把我们带入未知领域,没人能说会发生什么。可能的答案里有些可能深刻影响经济和市场,让我担忧。投资中最棘手的困境,往往围绕概率极低但负面影响极大的事件。很难知道该如何应对,但我们至少该意识到它们的存在。
我们别无选择,只能假设未来大体上会像过去一样,但我们也必须考虑到,今天面临的可能未来范围比平时更广。换句话说,我觉得我们必须允许比平常更大的不确定性。
信心的作用——支撑一切经济活动的根基是个人支出单元,无论是企业还是家庭。每个单元在做决策时都包含对未来的预期。而这些预期在很大程度上由数据、观点和情绪塑造,它们汇集起来就是信心。有时我觉得,在经济中,信心就是一切。
intrude into our regular existence? Are chemical and biological weapons a real threat? 2. About our response. Can we find bin Laden? Can we capture him and his henchmen? Will our military actions be successful, and can they be undertaken without extensive collateral damage? Can we pursue justice without alienating people and nations? Will terrorists move to punish our actions? Will their doing so shake our resolve, or that of our allies? 3. About the economy. How deep a recession are we in for? How long will it last? What will prompt a recovery, and what shape will it take? Will industries like airlines and hotels be permanently depressed, or will they return to pre-9/11 normalcy? When will liquidity and a desire to buy things return? Can we rely on normal cyclical patterns in these things? Will these elements be set back again if there is further terrorism? Who among us can say he knows the answers to these questions? And who can say the future is foreseeable without those answers? Many of these questions take us into uncharted territory where no one can say what will happen. The possible answers include some that could profoundly affect the economy and the markets, and they worry me. Some of the greatest dilemmas in investing surround highly unlikely events with highly negative implications. It's hard to know what to do about them, but we should at least be aware of their existence. We have no alternative to assuming that the future will look mostly like the past, but we also must allow for the fact that we face a range of possible futures today that is wider than usual. In other words, I feel we must allow for greater-than-normal uncertainty. The Role of Confidence – The basic building block underlying all economic activity is the individual spending unit, be it a business or a household. Each of these units builds into its decisions expectations regarding the future. And those expectations are shaped to a great extent by the data, opinions and emotions that add up to confidence. Sometimes I think in the economy, confidence is all there is. U
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当人们信心满满时,他们会把繁荣趋势外推,争相借贷和购买。他们设想未来会一路向上,急着搭上这班车。他们担心,如果今天不买点什么,明天就得多花钱。也就是说,他们忧心的是不作为的成本。
当信心消退时,他们开始担忧失业,推迟消费。他们或许更愿意囤积现金或偿还债务,买东西时甘愿等一等,笃定以后还有更便宜的入手机会。换句话说,他们认为即便不动手,也不会错过太多。机会成本似乎就没那么要紧了。
When people are confident, they extrapolate prosperity and borrow and buy. They assume an upward-sloping future and want to jump on board. They worry that if they don't buy something today, it'll cost them more tomorrow. That is, they are concerned about the cost of inaction. When their confidence fades, they worry about losing jobs and defer purchases. They may prefer to build cash or pay down debt. They're willing to wait before buying, and they assume there'll be another chance to buy cheaper. In other words, they figure that if they don't act, they won't miss out on much. Opportunity costs just don't seem that important.
2001 年橡树资本管理有限合伙企业(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)
2001 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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谁会否认 9·11 事件动摇了人们的信心?此前我们用于形容国内安全的词汇,诸如与世隔绝、无懈可击、固若金汤,如今似乎都已烟消云散。谁不觉得比一个月前少了几分安全感?因此,大多数人不再怀有做出购买或投资决定所需的那份积极情绪,平均而言,他们可能会“蛰伏观望”。
许多经济单位得出的结论是,在这个更加不确定的世界里,有必要保留更多的现金储备——这既有理性的考量,也有情绪的因素。个人担心失业、招聘放缓、奖金和加薪缩水——他们清楚自己储蓄太少,还动用了房屋净值来维持开销。购房和购车计划将被推迟。企业投资将趋于缓慢,尤其是考虑到产能利用率在 9·11 之前就已偏低且持续下滑。这些决定中的每一个都会从经济中抽走一个潜在的增长来源,加剧放缓的步伐。这正是经济周期下行段的成因(我们相信下行段早已持续了数月之久)。
当所有可推迟的开支都被推迟之后,下滑会逐渐减速,继而停止。届时,会有人判断情况不会更糟,价格不会再降。某个潜在买家会走出观望,下出一笔订单;某个工人会被招来履行订单;某个制造商会预见到业务增长而购置一台新机器。还会有某个人决定买入一家企业的股份,甚至尝试创业。这便启动了上行段。
这一切都取决于心理的潮起潮落。在我看来,关键问题是:“恢复信心需要多长时间?”我不敢说知道答案,但我认为可能要过一阵子。
刺激举措——联邦政府今年一直在积极应对经济疲软,采取了大胆行动。一切经济趋势都始于边际,而政府的行动正是在边际上发挥作用。它们可以防止形势恶化到本可能更糟的地步——但无法左右大局。
Who would say that confidence wasn't shaken by the events of September 11? Words we would have applied to our domestic security before, like insulated, invulnerable and impregnable, now seem to be out the window. Who doesn't feel at least a little less safe than a month ago? Thus most people are less full of the positive feelings that are required for a purchasing or investing decision, and on average they may "hunker down." Many economic units have concluded that in this more uncertain world, greater cash reserves are in order – for rational as well as emotional reasons. Individuals fear that jobs will be lost, hiring will be slow, and bonuses and raises will be less generous – and they know they've saved too little and tapped their home equity to keep spending. Home and car purchases will be deferred. Business investment will be slow, especially given that capacity utilization was low and falling even prior to September 11. Each of these decisions will take away a potential source of growth from the economy and contribute to a slowdown. That's what makes for the down-leg of the economic cycle (and we believe one has been well under way for several months). And when every expenditure that can be delayed has been delayed, the decline will slow and then stop. Then one person will conclude it's not going to get any worse, or prices any lower. One potential buyer will come off the sidelines and place an order; one worker will be hired to fill that order; and one manufacturer will buy a new machine in anticipation of increased business. And one person will decide to buy a share in a business, or even try to start one. And that's what gets the up-leg going. It's all based on the ebb and flow of psychology. In my opinion, the key question is "How long will it take to restore confidence?" I don't claim to have the answer, but I think it may be a while. Stimulative Actions – The federal government has acted boldly to combat economic weakness, as it has been doing all year. All economic trends start at the margin, and that's where the government's actions can help. They can keep things from getting as bad as they otherwise would have gotten – but they cannot call the tune.
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立即向金融体系注入创纪录的流动性,避免了一些在基础设施受损情况下原本可能出现的问题。资金流动和证券交易结算方面的困难得以避免,使体系能够正常运转,也让美国人对其保持信心。迅速采取货币行动再次成功化解了一场潜在危机,正如 1987 年和 1998 年那样。财政政策,即涉及税收和支出的政策,也将产生影响。政府支出具有刺激作用,因为它用钱购买商品或支付给民众,而民众可能会转而花掉这笔钱。赤字向经济注入的资金多于其通过税收抽取的资金。(这与我们原以为会走向的盈余不同,盈余具有紧缩性,因为政府抽取的比回馈的多。)在恐怖袭击发生后的数周内,政府宣布的各项计划足以消耗掉本财年预计的盈余。其中包括 400 亿美元紧急资金、150 亿美元航空公司补贴和贷款,以及
Immediately providing a record amount of liquidity to the financial system prevented some problems that otherwise would have arisen given the damage to our infrastructure. Difficulties in the movement of funds and settlement of securities transactions were avoided, enabling the system to work and Americans to maintain faith in it. Prompt monetary action worked again to avert a potential crisis, as it did in 1987 and 1998. Fiscal policy, which relates to taxing and spending, also will have an impact. Government spending is stimulative, in that it uses money to purchase goods or to pay people who may turn around and spend it. Deficits put more money into the economy than they take out in taxes. (This is unlike the surpluses we thought we were heading for, which are restrictive because the government takes out more than it puts back.) In the weeks since the terrorist attacks, the administration has announced programs sufficient to consume the surplus that had been projected for the current fiscal year. These include $40 billion in emergency funds, $15 billion in subsidies and loans for the airlines, and
2001 年橡树资本管理有限合伙企业
2001 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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为“经济振兴”投入 600 亿至 750 亿美元。短期来看,正如瑞士信贷第一波士顿(CSFB)所言,这将“为经济活动放缓提供缓冲”。(长期效果可能没那么正面,因为财政赤字及支撑赤字所需的国债发行可能引发通胀、推高利率,并挤出非政府借款人的融资空间。)
降息同样有助于缓解紧缩,我们可能还会看到更多降息举措。降息在边际上会起作用,但我不预期短期内能给经济带来多大提振。商业词汇里最生动的说法之一是“推绳子”,在经济全面收缩的环境下,降息可能就相当于这种情形。如果人们已失去消费意愿,低利率会促使他们买房买车吗?对于那些意识到储蓄不足、负债过重的人,低利率能起作用吗?如果企业已有产能闲置,低利率会促使它们投资扩张吗?
这些问题没人知道答案,但也不应假定答案会是一片乐观。日本长达十年的低迷可作一个令人沮丧的类比。日本政府把利率压到接近零,并不断向金融体系注资。但谨慎的日本民众每次拿到一点日元就存进银行,经济增长始终难以复苏。但愿美国人的消费倾向更高,会带来不一样的结果。
所以归根结底,我觉得一切还是要看信心。消费者和企业支出总会在某个时点回升,政府可以鼓励,但没法促成。投资者反应——9 月 17 日,金融巿场休市四天后重新开市,道琼斯指数下跌 685 点,跌幅 7%。我听到首日下跌消息时的第一反应是:“这不算太糟——只是 1987 年崩盘跌幅的四分之一。”经过第一周交易的进一步下跌之后,股市已收复了大部分失地。
$60-$75 billion for "economic revival." In the short run, as CSFB says, this will "create a buffer to the slowdown in activity." (The long-term effects may be less positive, in that deficits and the Treasury borrowing required to support them can lead to inflation, higher interest rates and crowding out of non-government borrowers). Interest rate reductions also can help ease the contraction, and we may see more of them. They will work at the margin, but I don't expect them to give the economy much of a boost in the short run. One of the most vivid phrases in the business vocabulary is "pushing on a string," and that's what rate reductions can amount to in a hunkered-down world. Will low interest rates get people to buy homes and cars if they've lost their willingness to spend? Will they work with people who realize they have inadequate savings and are overly indebted? Will they cause businesses to invest in expansion if they already have capacity sitting idle? No one knows the answers to these questions, but they should not be assumed to be overwhelmingly positive. A discouraging analogy can be seen in Japan's decade-long doldrums. The government has pushed interest rates nearly to zero and keeps pumping money into the system. But every time the cautious Japanese citizen gets a few yen he puts it in the bank, and economic growth fails to revive. Hopefully, a difference may lie in Americans' higher propensity to spend. So in the end, I feel it all goes back to confidence. Consumer and business spending will pick up at some point, and the government can encourage it, but it can't make it happen. Investor Reaction – On September 17, after a four-day hiatus, the nation's financial markets reopened, with the Dow falling 685 points, or 7%. When I heard about that first day's loss, my reaction was immediate: "That's not so bad – just a quarter of the percentage decline in the crash of 1987." And after declining further in that first week of trading, stocks have recovered most of their losses.
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显然,降息正在助推股价。它们让投资者觉得美联储正在采取措施改善前景。它们也在边际上促进了经济活动。通过降低浮动利率房贷的还款额,人们有了更多可支配的钱。而通过压低固定收益回报,它们减少了现金和债券带来的竞争,从而让股票在相对比较上更具吸引力。
但没有人知道经济前景会如何。没有人知道 2001 年或 2002 年的企业盈利会是什么样,尽管它们似乎很可能会下滑。此外,地缘政治的不确定性也在地平线上若隐若现。因此,道指仅比 9 月 10 日袭击前的收盘价低不到 6%,我不禁怀疑,投资者的震荡是否还不够充分,或者自满情绪是否回归得太快了。
自 9 月 24 日复苏启动以来,道指已上涨 10%,其中包括本周的 200 多点。股市似乎在说:“好吧,我很高兴那件事过去了。”坦率地讲,我对昨天《华尔街日报》一篇文章中展现出的那种态度感到担忧:
Clearly, the interest rate cuts are helping stock prices. They make investors feel the Fed is doing something to improve the outlook. They contribute to economic activity at the margin. By reducing floating-rate mortgage payments they leave people with more spending money. And by lowering fixed income returns they reduce the competition that comes from cash and bonds, thus making stocks more attractive in relative terms. But no one knows what the economic future will look like. No one knows what corporate earnings will be in 2001 or 2002, although they appear likely to decline. In addition, geopolitical uncertainties dot the horizon. Thus with the Dow off less than 6% from its September 10 pre-attack close, I wonder whether investors weren't shaken enough, or whether complacency has returned too quickly. The Dow has risen 10% since the start of the recovery on September 24, including 200+ points this week. The stock market seems to be saying "Well, I'm glad that's over." Frankly, I worry about attitudes like those displayed in an article in yesterday's Wall Street Journal:
2001 年橡树资本管理公司(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)
2001 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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股票投资者展现出一种“安心”水平;降息推动股指上涨 113.76 点
……美联储表示,9 月 11 日的恐怖袭击“显著加剧了”本已疲弱经济中的不确定性。尽管如此,尽管美联储感到担忧,迹象正在蔓延,表明一些专业投资者正逐渐将资金重新投入股市。“市场已经达到一个让人们对最坏情况已经过去感到更加安心的水平,”……
我无法告诉你我多么希望我们已经看到了最坏的情况,无论是在世界大事还是市场方面。但我不愿在这个假设上大举下注。如果按照“别人恐惧时我贪婪”的原则,我应该更加恐惧,那么像这样的文章告诉我,有太多值得担忧的事情。
我总是强调,投资必须留有充裕的误差余地,并为负面情况出现的可能性做好准备。恐怖袭击虽然确实难以想象,但显示了为意外不利因素留出空间的必要性。只有当资产价格明显处于非理性的低水平时,这种谨慎才可以被忽略。在我看来,随着投资者的冷静情绪如此强劲地反弹,大多数股票并不处于这样的水平。
那我们该怎么办?——我们可以假设,本已疲弱的经济进一步走弱,加上持续的恐怖主义,将构成一个非常艰难的环境。如果我们随后基于这一假设制定投资流程,我们会持有现金,很少做出承诺。我称之为“单一情景投资”。问题显然在于,将我们的投资组合安排得能在如此悲观的情景下成功,意味着在大多数其他情景下会失败。如你所知,我们不相信基于宏观预测来行动,而且我们当然不认为我们能够那么准确。
Stock Investors Show a "Comfort" Level; Rate Cut Spurs 113.76-Point Rise . . . the Fed said the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks "have significantly heightened" uncertainty in an already weak economy. Yet despite the Fed's concern, signs are spreading that some professional investors are gradually putting money back into stocks. "The market has reached a level that makes people feel a lot more comfortable that we have seen the worst of what could happen," . . . I can't tell you how much I hope we've seen the worst, both in terms of world events and in the markets. But I am not willing to bet heavily on that assumption. And if I'm supposed to be more afraid when others are less afraid, articles like this one tell me there's plenty to worry about. I always stress that investments must leave a substantial margin for error and allow for the possibility that negatives will arise. The terrorist attacks, while certainly not imaginable, show the importance of allowing for adverse surprises. Only when asset prices are clearly at irrationally low levels can this caution be ignored. In my view, with investors' sangfroid having bounced back so strongly, most stocks aren't at such levels. So What Do We Do Now? – We could assume that the combination of further weakening of the already-weak economy plus continued terrorism will make for a very difficult environment. If we then based our investment process on that assumption, we would hold cash and make very few commitments. I call this "single scenario investing." The problem, obviously, is that arranging our portfolio so that it will succeed under a scenario as negative as that means setting it up to fail under most others. We do not believe in basing our actions on macro-forecasts, as you know, and we certainly don't think we could ever be that right.
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因此,橡树资本将继续秉持“明天与昨日大体相似”的假设进行投资——迄今为止,这一假设始终被证明是正确的。
同时,我们将继续坚持一套预见计划未必总按预期发展的投资流程,以及能够在多种情景下取得成功的选股策略。正如长期客户所知,这部分理念从未改变。在当前环境下,我们将预留非常大的容错空间。
我们将继续只在低效市场中运作,因为我们相信,在那里低风险不一定意味着低回报,上行潜力可以与下行保护并存。
我们将继续力求在良好市场中实现健康回报,在恶劣市场中实现卓越回报。我们并不承诺在市场表现良好时跑赢大盘,但我们也不认为那才是投资卓越性的关键所在。
我是否会放弃审慎立场?——9 月 24 日,《洛杉矶商业杂志》刊登了我接受采访的摘录(内容相当准确,U
Thus Oaktree will continue to invest under the assumption that tomorrow will look a lot like yesterday – an assumption that to date has always proved correct. At the same time, we will continue to insist on an investment process that anticipates things not always going as planned, and on selections that can succeed under a wide variety of scenarios. As long-term clients know, this part of the story never changes. In the current environment, we will allow a very substantial margin for error. We will continue to work only in inefficient markets, because we feel it's there that low risk needn't mean low returns, and upside potential can coexist with downside protection. And we will continue to strive for healthy returns in good markets and superior returns in bad markets. We do not promise to beat the markets when they do well, but we also don't think that's an essential part of excellence in investing. Will I Ever Drop My Cautionary Stance? – On September 24 the Los Angeles Business Journal printed excerpts from an interview with me (and a pretty accurate one U
2001 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司
2001 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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整体)以“熊市视角”为标题发表。因为我对这个标题并不十分热衷,所以不久后收到合伙人史蒂夫·卡普兰发来的邮件时,我很高兴。他在邮件中写道:
我从未把你视为悲观主义者,也不认为你是。恰恰相反,对于你相信自己能够掌控的事情,你抱有乐观的看法……你的谨慎围绕那些不可控的因素,而你认识到,在那些事情上,所谓专家们的判断很大程度上纯属猜测。
我非常感激史蒂夫的话,而且我认为——也希望——他说得没错。我对当悲观主义者或熊派毫无兴趣,也不喜欢这样看待自己。我只是可能比大多数人更深刻地感受到未来的不可知性。每当我回想自己使用的那些格言警句,似乎有一半都关乎我们对前路所知何其有限。
如此谨慎,是对还是错?没人能断言。我的这种心态,以及橡树资本由此形成的投资方法,是否在好年景里让我们损失了利润?也许吧。我们是否为坏时代和不利发展做好了充分准备,并对此感到满意?绝对如此。如果我们坚持的防御程度最终被证明过了头,最糟糕的后果无非是你们的利润比原本可能达到的水平略低一些。我不觉得这是世界上最糟糕的事情。而且归根结底,我相信橡树资本同仁们的技能、经验和纪律将继续弥补我们较低的风险偏好,让我们的长期回报保持充分的竞争力。
在这个行业待得越久,我就越不相信投资者的灵活性。大多数人似乎固守在多头、空头或介于两者之间的某个位置上。大多数人要么永远激进,要么永远防御。大多数人要么总觉得自己能看清未来,要么永远觉得自己看不清。大多数人要么永远偏好价值,要么永远偏好成长。鲜有人心智足够灵活,能在不同思维方式之间切换,即便他们在理论上具备所需的洞察力。相反,大多数人拥有一种基本固定的风格和观点,他们最多只能指望在执行中做到娴熟——而我也不把橡树资本和自己排除在这一观察之外。
但这也没那么糟。我的结论是,如果你在公交车站等得够久,你一定会等到你的那班车;而如果你在整个公交线路上四处游荡,可能每一班车都会错过。所以橡树资本将坚定不移地秉持其防御性、风险意识强的投资理念,并努力以娴熟的技巧和严格的纪律去执行。我们认为这才是长期投资成功的关键——尤其是在今天这个充满不确定性的环境中。
overall) under the title "A Bear's Eye View." Because I wasn't crazy about that title, I was glad soon thereafter to receive the following e-mail from my partner Steve Kaplan: I have never viewed you as, nor do I believe you are, a pessimist. To the contrary, I think you have an optimistic view when it comes to things you believe you can control. . . . Your caution revolves around the uncontrollable, for which you recognize that a lot of the judgments of the so-called experts are in large part pure guesswork. I greatly appreciate Steve's comments, and I think – and hope – he got it right. I have no interest in being a pessimist or a bear, and I don't like to think of myself that way. I just may be more impressed by the unknowability of the future than most people. When I reflect on all of the mottoes I use, it seems half of them relate to how little we can know about what lies ahead. Am I right or wrong in being this cautious? No one can say. Does my mindset, and Oaktree's resultant approach to investing, cost us profits in good years? Probably. Are we well prepared for bad times and untoward developments, and are we happy with that? Absolutely. If we insist on a degree of defensiveness that turns out to be excessive, the worst consequence should be that your profits will be a little lower than they otherwise might have been. I don't think that's the worst thing in the world. And in the end, I think the skill, experience and discipline of Oaktree's people will continue to make up for its lower risk profile and keep our long-term returns more than competitive. The longer I'm in this business, the less I believe in investor agility. Most people seem stuck in positions as bulls, bears or something in between. Most are always aggressive or always defensive. Most either always feel they can see the future or never feel they can see the future. Most always prefer value or always prefer growth. Few people's psyches are flexible enough to allow them to switch from one way of thinking to another, even if they theoretically possessed the needed perspicacity. Rather, most people have a largely fixed style and point of view, and the most they can hope for is skill in implementing it – and I don't exempt Oaktree and myself from that observation. But that's not so bad. It's my conclusion that if you wait at a bus stop long enough, you're sure to catch your bus, while if you keep wandering all over the bus route, you may miss them all. So Oaktree will adhere steadfastly to its defensive, risk-conscious philosophy and try to implement it with skill and discipline. We think that's the key to successful long-term investing – especially in today's uncertain environment.
October 4, 2001
October 4, 2001
2001 年,橡树资本管理有限合伙公司
2001 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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