你知道什么?
Memo to:
Memo to:
Oaktree Clients
Oaktree Clients
From:
From:
Howard Marks
Howard Marks
Re:
Re:
你知道吗?
Whad’Ya Know?
我总是让南希在我发出备忘录之前先读一遍。她似乎觉得作为我的妻子,就有资格对我直言不讳。“它们全都一个样,”她说,“就像你的领带。翻来覆去讲的都是高击球率有多重要、得避开输家,以及有多少事是没人能知道的。”
好吧,我承认我确实总爱唠叨那些投资者想知道却又无从知晓的事……还有那些声称自己知道的人。不过这次我积攒了些好料,专门拿来吐槽一下那些“我知道”学派——自以为知道、其实并不知道的家伙。所以我又开讲了(篇幅偏长,先道个歉)。
I always ask Nancy to read my memos before I send them out. She seems to think being my wife gives her license to be brutally frank. “They’re all the same,” she says, “like your ties. They all talk about the importance of a high batting average, the need to avoid losers, and how much there is that no one can know.” Well, I guess I do tend to go on about everything that investors would like to know but is unknowable . . . and about all the people who claim to know it. But I’ve saved up some good stuff for a “rant” regarding the “I know” school people who think they know but don’t. So here I go again (with apologies for the length).
投资的“巨型虾”
The “Jumbo Shrimp” of Investing
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我最喜欢的矛盾修辞之一便是“常识”。知识本身就稀缺,而常人所知的,往往又没什么知识含量。
2 月 4 日,《今日美国》援引一位策略师的话说:“当前投资者的反感情绪或许暗藏一线曙光,因为大量现金正堆积在场外,而沉重的抛售已榨干了大部分下跌空间。”人人都知道,除非场外积攒了一定现金,否则股市不可能止跌并开启新一轮牛市行情。因此,人人都盼着卖盘超过买盘。这听起来极其合理。
正因如此,它成了我最大的心头之患之一。它有道理、显而易见,而且人们说了几十年,于是变成了“常识”。但它是错的!根本不存在所谓“净卖出”这回事!股市交易也不可能让现金堆积起来!想想看,每笔股票交易都有一个买方和一个卖方。卖盘怎么可能超过买盘?买方投入市场的钱与卖方取出的钱一样多。卖盘又如何能让场外现金堆积?
跟往常一样,有一个不那么简单化的解释,更贴近真相:
One of my favorite oxymorons is “common knowledge.” Knowledge just isn’t that common, and that which is common often contains little knowledge. On February 4, USA Today cited a strategist as saying “there might be a silver lining to the current investor backlash, because a lot of cash is piling up on the sidelines, and the heavy selling has wrung out most of the downside.” Everyone knows the stock market can’t stop sliding and begin a new bull phase rally until some cash has piled up on the sidelines. And thus everyone wants to see selling exceed buying. That seems eminently reasonable. And that’s what makes it one of my greatest pet peeves. It makes sense, it’s obvious, and people have been saying it for decades, so it has become common knowledge. But it’s wrong! There’s no such thing as net selling! And stock market transactions can’t cause cash to build up! Think about it. In every stock trade there’s a buyer and a seller. So how can selling exceed buying? And the buyer puts as much money into the market as the seller takes out. So how can selling create cash on the sidelines? As usual, there is a less simplistic explanation that’s closer to the truth:
虽然卖出的量不可能超过买入的量,但潜在的卖家可能比潜在的买家更多。而且,卖家想卖的意愿可能比买家想买的意愿更强烈。这些因素反映出市场情绪悲观,可能引发一场抛售高潮,从而形成市场底部,因此它们能预示下跌行情(最终)的结束。
While there can’t be more selling than buying, there can be more would-be sellers than wouldbe buyers. And the sellers’ desire to sell can be stronger than the buyers’ desire to buy. These factors are indicators of negative sentiment, and they can lead to a selling climax that creates a market bottom, so they can presage the (eventual) end of a decline.
显然,未投资的现金等同于潜在的购买力,因此也是推动上涨的潜在燃料。但是,未投资的现金不可能来自卖出(卖出需要买方投入与卖方取出同等数额的先前未投资现金)。相反,潜在
And clearly, uninvested cash equates to potential buying power, and thus potential fuel for a rise. But uninvested cash can’t result from selling (which requires a buyer to put in the same amount of previously-uninvested cash as the seller takes out). Rather, a buildup of potentially
2003 年,橡树资本管理有限合伙公司。
2003 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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可投资现金必须来自市场之外的外部来源,比如家庭收入、储蓄、退税,以及向养老金或捐赠基金注入的现金。
结论是:“人尽皆知”的东西往往毫无智慧可言。而在投资领域,这一点表现得尤为突出。
investable cash must come from sources that are exogenous to the market, such as household income, savings, tax refunds, and cash contributions to pension funds or endowments. The bottom line: there’s often no wisdom in the stuff that “everyone knows.” And nowhere is that more true than in investing.
理解市场波动之路径
Toward Understanding Market Movements
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1995 年初的某一天,美元兑日元汇率大幅波动。上班路上,我收听电台的东京记者报道说,当天日经平均指数大跌。他兴致勃勃地解释原因:投资者担忧日元疲软。下班回家途中,同一家电台又报道说美国股市也大幅下跌。给出的解释是:投资者担忧美元走强。
这怎么可能说得通呢。如果一种货币相对另一种货币变动,两国的企业怎么可能都比前一天更糟?我觉得这件事能说明几个要点。第一,人们对经济事件及其影响的理解普遍相当欠缺。第二,人人都想解释市场走势,而且为了解释,什么借口都抓得住。第三,他们的评论多半毫无用处。当然,第四点就是,市场常常做出违背逻辑的事情——但人们还是照样解释个不停。
One day in early 1995, the dollar made a big move against the yen. On my way to work, my radio station’s Tokyo correspondent reported that the Nikkei average of Japanese stocks had been off big that day. He was glad to explain why: investors were worried about the weakness of the yen. On my way home, the same station reported that the U.S. stock market also had declined a lot. The explanation given: investors were concerned about the strength of the dollar. Well that just can’t be. If one currency moves relative to another, how can companies in both countries be worse off than they were the day before? I think this episode illustrates a few themes. First, the general understanding of economic events and their implications is very poor. Second, everyone wants to explain the movements of the markets, and they’ll grasp at any straw with which to do so. Third, much of their commentary is useless. And, of course fourth, markets often do things that defy logical explanation – but people keep explaining them anyway.
《纽约客》杂志,1981 年
New Yorker Magazine, 1981
每天我们都会听到或读到“市场因希望……而上涨”或“……因为投资者对……消息感到振奋”。或者也许是“市场因担忧……而下跌”或“……因为对……的负面反应”。这些评论员怎么知道的?他们从哪里得知每天波动的缘由?难道非得有个解释吗?为什么我们从没听过,“今天市场上涨了,但没人知道为什么?!”
Every day we hear or read that “the market rose on hopes that . . .” or “. . . because investors were cheered by the news that . . .” Or perhaps it’s “the market fell on fears that . . .” or “. . . because of negative reaction to . . .” How do the commentators know? Where do they look to learn the reason for each day’s move? Does there have to be an explanation? Why don’t we ever hear, “The market rose today, but no one knows why”?! U
2003 年橡树资本管理有限合伙企业
2003 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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那么重点何在?
So What’s The Point?
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我并不反对人们通过发表超出自己认知范围、毫无价值的观点来赚钱。我想这是人之常情。但我不满的是,当人们利用严肃的平台陈述自己毫无根据的看法时,会误导他人、伤害旁观者。他们让经济和市场动态看起来如此容易理解,仿佛可以轻松从中获利。正如没有人应该在电视上提供法律建议或医疗诊断一样,媒体也应该停止提供经济和市场分析。
我认为 1998—1999 年泡沫的最大推手之一就是媒体的那些“脱口秀专家”。他们对每一件事都给出不容置疑的解释,并量化其盈利影响。这些“专家”动辄给出建议,表现出百分之百的确定性。正如我以前说过的,他们从不说这几句话:“我真不知道”“这种事很难预测”和“但我可能错了”。
在 20 世纪 90 年代末,对“我全知道”学派的崇拜没有给任何人带来好处:大街上的普通民众被吸引到华尔街投资,却并不了解所需的技能或所涉的风险。市场乃至整个经济都被推入了极端的繁荣—萧条周期。冒险的“投资枪手”被捧上神坛,谨慎的价值投资者被打入冷宫。而那些“神谕者”最终也跌落神坛——与四年前相比,他们如今在免费兜售“智慧”和“稳赚不赔”的买入建议方面似乎收敛了许多。
I don’t begrudge people wanting to make money by expressing views that are beyond their ken and of no value. I guess it’s human nature. My complaint, however, is that it’s misleading and injurious to bystanders when people use serious platforms to state their unfounded views. They make it seem so easy to understand economic and market developments, and thus to profit from them. Just as no one should give legal advice or medical diagnoses on TV, the media should desist from providing economic and market analysis as well. I think some of the greatest contributors to the 1998-99 bubble were the talking heads of the media. For every event they provided a without-a-doubt explanation and quantified its profit implications. These “experts” were free with recommendations and exuded 100% certainty. As I’ve said before, there are a few things they never said: “darned if I know,” “it’s hard to predict these things,” and “but I could be wrong.” Nobody was well served by the veneration of the “I know” school in the late 1990s: Main Streeters were lured to invest in Wall Street without an understanding of the skills required or the risks entailed. The market and thus the economy were put through an extreme boom-bust cycle. Risktaking investment gunslingers were anointed, and cautious value seekers were rendered irrelevant. And the oracles themselves eventually were brought low – they seem much less free with gratuitous wisdom and can’t-miss buy recommendations today than they were four years ago.
《纽约时报》,2001 年 3 月 15 日
New York Times, March 15, 2001
2003 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司
2003 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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版权所有,保留所有权利。
All Rights Reserved
战略家们都去哪儿了?
Where Were the Strategists?
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还有一类风光不再的人,是券商策略师。90 年代他们备受推崇,有些人甚至成了“家喻户晓”的名字。但据我所知,没有哪位策略师帮助客户躲过过去三年的痛苦。
我觉得检验标准很简单:他们有没有看穿 TMT 泡沫?事后看一目了然,当年许多科技、媒体、电信公司及其战略,介于异想天开和凭空捏造之间;估值倍数荒谬至极;投资者行为疯狂;华尔街变成了一台追逐短期涨幅的机器。既然事后这么明显,那么多策略师——他们唯一的职责就是搞清楚正在发生什么、对未来意味着什么——当时怎么也该有所察觉吧。
这是我们投资生涯至今最极端的行情,而且它是几年间在众目睽睽之下逐步积累起来的(并非突发、惊人的外部冲击所致),策略师们难道不该看出来吗?皇帝已经赤身裸体到极点,券商策略师却没人指出这一点。
阿比·约瑟夫·科恩是策略师中最出名的,她连续十多年准确预测股价上涨,着实闯出了名头。(还是说她不过是个死多头,无论股价什么水平都唱多不变,在 90 年代显得很神?)我在市场接近顶部时参加过她的一场会议,亲耳听到她为维持看多而做的痛苦辩解,大意是:“股票是贵了,但贵得不多,所以按我们对利率等因素的展望,仍然可以买。”我的看法有点不一样:当一项资产已经高估,它就不能买。
回顾过去十年的种种,我的结论是,策略师们没能警示股市风险,原因不外乎这么几点的组合:(a)他们天生看多,(b)华尔街在预测股价上涨这件事上有切身利益,(c)预知未来本身就有严重的局限性。拿这么多钱、出这么点力的人,还真是少见。
说到这儿,《纽约时报》1 月 27 日报道:
巴顿·比格斯上周宣布辞去摩根士丹利首席全球策略师一职,这可能标志着一个牛市现象的终结——市场策略师变身名人导师。……
好几家华尔街公司正在重新评估高薪股票策略师的角色。在熊市中削减人力成本的压力巨大,投行们不仅降低了策略师的地位,还在质疑这个职位以目前的形式存在,在如今复杂的市场环境中还有没有意义。……
这些担忧在繁荣年代很少出现,那时候阿普尔盖特先生(曾任教雷曼兄弟)和加尔文先生(曾任教瑞士信贷第一波士顿)靠印刷品和 CNBC 上打造的新潮人设,成了小名人。……
雷曼兄弟和瑞士信贷不愿就策略师离职置评,但两家公司都已决定,至少眼下,没有出名的预言家也能运转。
Another group that’s no longer riding quite as tall in the saddle are the brokerage house strategists. They attracted a lot of respect in the ‘90s, and some even attained “household name” status. But I don’t know of any who helped their clients avoid the pain of the last three years. I think the test is simple: Did they call the TMT bubble? It’s obvious in retrospect that many of the tech/media/telecom companies and their strategies were somewhere between fanciful and fictitious; the valuation multiples were ridiculous; investor behavior was nuts; and Wall Street had turned into a machine for short-term appreciation. If it’s so obvious in retrospect, lots of the strategists (whose sole job it is to figure out what’s going on and what it means for the future) should have had an inkling at the time. Since this was the most extreme event of our investment lifetime thus far, and since it built up in plain sight over a period of years (as opposed to being the result of a sudden and surprising exogenous influence), shouldn’t the strategists have seen it? The emperor was as naked as he’s ever been, but the brokerage strategists failed to point it out. Abby Joseph Cohen was the most prominent of the strategists, having made a real name for herself by correctly predicting stock price gains for a decade or more. (Or was she simply an unmitigated bull who never changed her tune regardless of the level of stock prices and looked smart in the ‘90s?) I attended a meeting with her near the top and heard the tortured rationalization that allowed her to stay bullish, something like: “Stocks are overpriced, but not by a lot, so based on our outlook for interest rates and other factors, they’re still a buy.” My opinion’s a little different: When an asset’s overpriced, it can’t be a buy. When I think about the events of the past decade, I conclude that the strategists failed to warn about the risk in stocks because of some combination of (a) their congenital bullishness, (b) Wall Street’s vested interest in predicting stock price appreciation, and (c) the serious limitations on knowing what the future holds. Rarely have so many been paid so much for contributing so little. On that note, The New York Times wrote on January 27: When Barton Biggs announced last week that he would be leaving his job as Morgan Stanley’s chief global strategist, it may have marked the end of a bull market phenomenon – the transformation of market strategists into celebrity gurus. . . Several Wall Street firms are reassessing the role of the highly paid stock strategist. Under intense pressure to cut staff costs in the bear market, investment banks not only have been downgrading the role of the strategist, but also have been questioning whether the position as it exists is relevant in today’s complex market environment. . . These concerns rarely appeared during the boom years, when Mr. Applegate [late of Lehman Brothers] and Mr. Galvin [ex. Credit Suisse First Boston] became minicelebrities by cultivating hip personas in print and on CNBC. . . Lehman Brothers and Credit Suisse, which declined to comment on the strategists’ departures, have decided that, for now at least, they can make do without well-known prognosticators.
2003 年 橡树资本管理有限合伙公司
2003 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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或许财经网站 FierceFinance 当天总结得最到位:“如今,华尔街的公司在琢磨,明星策略师是不是已经过时了。这让我想起英国关于现代社会还需不需要王室的常年争论。”
Perhaps the website FierceFinance summed it up best that same day: “Now, Wall Street firms are pondering whether [star strategists] have become anachronisms. It reminds me of the perennial debate in Great Britain about the need for royalty in the modern era.”
他们如何评级?
How Do They Rate?
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既然说到“谁知道什么呢”,就不得不提信用评级机构。这些机构专门评估债务证券的质量,存在了几十年,被视为客观中立。它们的评级备受推崇,甚至被当作监管标准写进法律,连美国证券交易委员会(SEC)都给它们贴了个特别标签:“全国认可的统计评级机构”。可它们真有什么用吗?
我承认:我爱死评级机构了!没有它们,橡树资本简直寸步难行。我的整个职业生涯和橡树资本的许多业务,都建立在信用评级制造的机会之上。
先扯远一点:在有效市场里,主动管理根本捞不到超额回报。主动管理者需要的是低效市场。什么叫低效市场?就是会犯错的市场;资产价格偏离其公允价值,因此可以低于内在价值买进(或高于价值卖出)。要出现这种错误,必须有信息匮乏、疏忽大意、不透明、偏见、情绪化,或其他阻碍客观、有见地决策的因素。
评级机构正是这样一个障碍。我最爱举的例子:穆迪几十年来对 B 级债券的定义始终是“普遍缺乏理想投资的特性”。它们怎么能单凭风险、完全不考虑价格或约定回报就说这种话?一旦暗示“这种债券不管什么价位都不值得买”,人们就会避而远之,把它压得很便宜。这反倒给捡便宜货的人创造了机会。
而且评级机构经常看走眼。不是每次,但在关键节点上。它们相信自己干得不赖,因为自己评低的债券违约率确实高于评高的。但大多数投机级债券从未违约,偶尔也有投资级债券爆雷。这两种情况都有重大的财务后果。
例如,评级机构未能预见违约、错误地维持投资级评级,就会让本该卖 20 美元的债券卖到 80 美元。这就是机会:投资级债券经理可以赶在违约前脱身来证明自己,对冲基金也能靠做空获利。而当高评级带来的安全感破灭时,投资级债券经理可能被迫甩卖这些不再合规的债券,给不良资产买家砸出便宜货。
如果评级机构每次都判断准确,债市就会变得有效;每只债券的收益率与其风险严丝合缝,就不会有免费午餐,也没有超额回报。如果压根没有评级机构,我们就没有一套现成的机制可以对着干。这两种情况都会减少橡树资本替客户低价买入的机会。但我看这种风险根本不存在。准确评级的概念早已死亡;评级机构万岁!
While we’re on the subject of who knows what, we should consider the credit rating agencies. These organizations are dedicated to assessing the quality of debt securities. They’ve been around for scores of years and are viewed as objective. So highly are they thought of that their ratings are accepted as regulatory standards and incorporated into law; there’s even a special SEC label for them: “nationally recognized statistical rating organizations.” But do they do any good? I confess: I love the rating agencies! Oaktree would be lost without them. My whole career and many of Oaktree’s activities are based on opportunities created by credit ratings. First, a digression: In an efficient market, there’s no chance for superior returns through active management. Active managers need markets that are inefficient. What are inefficient markets? They’re markets where mistakes are made; where assets sell for prices different from their fair value and thus can be bought for less (or sold for more) than they’re worth. In order for those mistakes to occur, there has to be ignorance, inadvertence, opacity, prejudice, emotion, or some other obstacle to objective, insightful decision making. The ratings agencies constitute just such an obstacle. My favorite example: literally for decades, Moody’s has defined B-rated bonds by saying they “generally lack characteristics of the desirable investment.” How can they say that based on the risk alone, without any reference to price or promised return? Once they imply “there’s no price at which this bond could be a good buy,” people will shun it, making it cheap. That can create an opportunity for a bargain hunter. And the ratings agencies are wrong a lot. Not in every case, but at the margin where it counts. The agencies are convinced they do a good job because the bonds they rate low default more often than the bonds they rate high. But the majority of speculative grade bonds never default, and every once in a while an investment grade bond does. Both of these phenomena have significant financial consequences. For example, by failing to anticipate a default and thus mistakenly maintaining an investment grade rating, the agencies allow bonds to sell at 80 that should sell at 20. That’s an opportunity: for investment grade bond managers to distinguish themselves by getting out before the default, and for hedge funds to profit from selling short. And when the sense of security caused by those high ratings is dashed, investment grade bond managers can be forced to dump these nownonconforming bonds, creating bargain-priced opportunities for buyers of distressed debt. If the rating agencies were right every time, the bond market would be efficient; every bond’s yield would be just right for its risk, and there would be no free lunch, no excess return. And if there were no rating agencies, there’d be no organized process for us to game against. In either case the opportunities for Oaktree to buy cheap on behalf of its clients would be reduced. But I don’t think there’s any risk of that. The concept of accurate ratings is dead; long live the rating agencies!
2003 年橡树资本管理公司
2003 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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常常犯错,却从不怀疑自己(也从不吝于分享)。
Often Wrong But Never In Doubt (or Hesitant to Share)
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1 月 6 日的《养老金与投资》杂志刊登了 2003 年投资展望。二十位机构资金管理人慷慨地分享了他们对来年的看法,从谨慎看多到彻底看多不一而足。那些更克制的预测标题包括:
“二次探底的可能性”
“逆风中的复苏”
“国际意外或接踵而至”
“横盘走向牛市”
“这将是一个个股精选的市场”
以及“归咎于伊拉克”
彻底乐观派则说:
“最坏的时刻已经过去”
“不久便会风生水起”
“愈合过程早已步入正轨”
“看好信贷”
“信心危机已结束”
“看多股票”
“我们……正处于复苏之中”
以及“对 2003 年极度看多”
最谨慎的预测者说市场可能接近持平;没人说“下跌”。
我对预测者最大的不满之一,是他们似乎对自己的过往记录视而不见。我从没听谁说过,“我预测某某事会发生(而我最近 10 次预测有 7 次落空)”或者“我预测某某事会发生(顺便说一句,去年我预测过同样的事,结果错了)”。然而,《养老金与投资》做了件不寻常的事,它认真回顾了上一年的预测。它稍稍嘲弄了一位西海岸管理人,此人曾预测标普 500 指数在 2002 年会上涨 15%,结果指数反而下跌了 22%。(他今年又预测 2003 年上涨 15%;只要他坚持够久,总有一天会蒙对。)但《养老金与投资》更进一步,指出在 2002 年初——股市历史上最糟的年份之一——“接受采访的 19 位股票管理人中,没有一位……预测美国股市会出现负回报”。
让我感到不可思议的是,这些人还会一本正经地继续做预测,而媒体也会继续报道他们。
The January 6 issue of “Pensions & Investments” contained its 2003 Investment Outlook. Twenty institutional money managers generously provided their views on what the coming year holds. They ranged from cautiously bullish to outright bullish. The headlines on the more restrained forecasts included: “‘Double-Dip’ a Possibility,” “Recovery with Headwinds,” “International Surprises Likely,” “Moving Sideways Toward a Bull Market,” “It Will Be a Stock-Selective Market,” and “Blame Iraq” The outright optimists said: “The Worst is Behind Us,” “Rocking and Rolling Before Long,” “Healing Process Is Already Well Along,” “Bullish on Credit,” “Crisis of Confidence Is Over,” “Bullish on Equities,” “We Are . . . in a Recovery,” and “Extraordinarily Bullish for 2003.” The most guarded forecaster said the market could be close to flat; nobody said “down.” One of my greatest complaints about forecasters is that they seem to ignore their own records. I’ve never heard one say, “I predict such-and-such will happen (and 7 out of my last 10 forecasts were off the mark)” or “I predict such-and-such will happen (and, by the way, I predicted the same thing last year and was wrong).” However, P&I did the unusual by critically reviewing the previous year’s forecasts. It poked a little fun at the West Coast manager who predicted the S&P 500 would gain 15% in 2002, whereas it declined 22% instead. (He’s again predicting a 15% increase for 2003; if he keeps at it long enough, he’s bound to be right someday.) But P&I went one better by pointing out that at the start of 2002, one of the worst years in stock market history, “not a single one of 19 stock managers interviewed . . . predicted a negative return for the U.S. stock market.” The amazing thing to me is that these people will go on making predictions with a straight face, and the media will continue to carry them.
预测的价值(二)
The Value of Predictions II
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《养老金与投资》的调查让我想起自己在 1996 年以同样标题写的一份备忘录。那份备忘录回顾了《华尔街日报》几次半年度的经济调查,并提出了几个要点,其中任何一条我都不会改动:
The P&I survey reminded me of a memo I wrote in 1996 under the above title. It reviewed a few of The Wall Street Journal’s semiannual economic surveys and made several key points, not one of which I would alter:
2003 年 橡树资本管理有限合伙企业(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)
2003 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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普通的“专家”在预测未来方面几乎没能提供多少助益。倒不是说预测者总是出错;当变化不大时,他们往往是对的。问题在于,在重大变化发生的时刻(而恰恰这时准确预测能帮人赚钱或避免损失),预测者们却完全看走了眼。在被审视的那些年份里,专家共识未能预见任何一项重大发展。
这些预测从何而来?答案很简单:如果你想看到高相关性,不妨看看当前水平与预测未来水平之间的关系……总的来说,我们可以有把握地说,这些预测者告诉我们现状的能力远胜于告诉我们未来走向。
每隔六个月,《华尔街日报》报道新一轮预测调查时,都会借机引用上一轮调查中最接近准确的预测者……而事实是,赢家的准确度往往令人瞠目结舌……[然而,]关键不在于一次猜对,而在于持续猜对……正如《华尔街日报》自己指出的,“……放弃了共识带来的安稳,那些处于经济预测游戏边缘的人往往最终要么大赢要么大输……六个月前和一年前的赢家,这次连利率的走向都没猜对。”
这些事实对那些基于未来猜测进行投资的人而言,谈不上什么鼓舞。但显然,这也不足以让他们感到气馁,从而就此罢手。
The average “expert” added little in terms of predicting the future. It’s not that the forecasters were always wrong; when there was little change, they were often right. It’s just that in times of major changes (when accurate forecasts would have helped one make money or avoid a loss), the forecasters completely missed them. In the years reviewed, the expert consensus failed to predict all of the major developments. Where do these forecasts come from? The answer is simple: If you want to see a high correlation, take a look at the relationship between current levels and predicted future levels. . . In general we can say with certainty that these forecasters were much better at telling us where things stood than where they were going. Every six months, when the Journal reports on a new survey of forecasts, it takes the opportunity to cite the forecaster in the previous survey who came closest . . . And the truth is that the winner’s accuracy is often startling. . . . [However,] the important thing isn’t getting it right once. It’s doing so consistently. . . As the Journal itself pointed out, “ . . . by giving up the comfort of the consensus, those on the fringes of the economic prediction game often end up on the winning or losing end. . . the winners of six months and one year ago didn’t even get the direction of interest rates right this time.” None of this provides much encouragement for those who would invest based on guesses about the future. But neither, apparently, does it provide enough discouragement to make them stop.
预测那些影响市场走向的事件
Predicting the Events That Move Markets
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我经常写到,预测那些将决定市场走向的事情有多难。想想看:过去五年里,有哪些事件是你希望自己当初能预见到的?
I often write about how difficult it is to anticipate the things that will determine the direction of the market. Think about it: what events in the last five years do you wish you’d seen coming?
1998 年长期资本管理公司的崩盘。
上世纪 90 年代末的科技、媒体、电信繁荣。
2000 年科技、媒体、电信泡沫破裂。
2001 年的恐怖袭击。
2001 至 2002 年的企业丑闻。
2002 年的利率下行。
The meltdown of Long-Term Capital Management in 1998. The tech/media/telecom boom in the late 1990s. The tech/media/telecom collapse in 2000. The terrorist attacks in 2001. The corporate scandals in 2001-02. The interest rate decline in 2002.
你们是否预见到了这些事情中的许多?你们的基金经理预见到了吗?有没有人预见到?我表示怀疑。
市场的剧烈波动往往是对这类意外的反应。但在大多数情况下,共识是预期现状将延续下去(尤其是在一切顺利的时候)。意外在事先不会被计入价格(这是定义使然)。在我脑海中放映的电影里,“我早就知道”学派的成员一本正经地念叨:“我们可没料到什么意外”(浑然不觉这其中的讽刺意味)。只有在意外发生的时候,大笔利润才唾手可得——只要谁有能力预见到它们的话。可问题在于,这并非易事。
因此,与经济事件一样,靠预测行情盈利的前景同样黯淡:
Did you foresee many of these things? Did your money managers? Did anyone? I doubt it. The market’s big moves often come in reaction to surprises like these. But most of the time, the consensus anticipates continuation of the status quo (especially when things are going well). Surprises aren’t factored into prices ahead of time (by definition). In the movie that runs inside my head, the members of the “I know” school sagely intone, “We’re not expecting any surprises” (without appreciating the irony). It’s when surprises occur that big profits are there for the taking – by anyone capable of foreseeing them. It’s just that it’s not that easy. So, as with economic events, the outlook for profitable market forecasts is bleak:
2003 年,橡树资本管理有限合伙企业(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)
2003 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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如果你做出一个常规的、维持现状式的预测,大多数时候你可能是对的。但既然现状通常被广泛共识并已计入价格,维持现状式的预测帮不了你跑赢市场或判断其转折点(即使它是对的)。真正有盈利潜力的预测,是那些准确预判异常事件的预测。但这类特异性的预测大多数时候是错的(因此也不太可能盈利)。
If you make a conventional, status quo-type forecast, you’re likely to be right most of the time. But since the status quo usually is shared widely and factored into prices, a status quo forecast won’t help you beat the market or call its turns (even if it’s right). The forecasts with real profit potential are the ones that correctly predict unusual events. But idiosyncratic forecasts are wrong most of the time (and thereby unlikely to be profitable).
因此,如果(a)常规预测容易准确做出,但通常缺乏盈利潜力,而(b)非常规预测虽有理论上的盈利潜力,却难以准确把握,那么(c)显然,预测不太可能帮你对未来的了解足够深入,从而战胜市场。
So if (a) conventional forecasts are easy to make correctly but generally lack profit potential, and (b) unconventional forecasts have theoretical profit potential but are hard to make correctly, then (c) it should be clear that forecasts are unlikely to help you know enough about the future to beat the market.
有人会指出共识所不知道的东西吗?
Does Anyone Point Out What The Consensus Doesn’t Know?
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我非常坚定地认为,那些持有常规预测的数百位经济学家和策略师,对问题几乎没有增加什么价值。另一方面,摩根士丹利的拜伦·韦恩属于少数派,他们通过有意识地寻找意外情况,提供了非常有价值的服务(并且明知谈论那些可能不会发生的事情会带来风险,仍然愿意承担)。每年年初,拜伦都会发布一份清单,列出十件大多数人认为不会发生、但他认为有 50% 或更高概率发生的事情。
以下是关于 2003 年的一些例子:
I feel very strongly that the hundreds of economists and strategists with conventional forecasts add little to the equation. On the other hand, Byron Wein of Morgan Stanley is one of the small group who provide a very valuable service by consciously looking for surprises (and who knowingly accept the risk entailed in talking about things that probably won’t happen). At the beginning of each year Byron publishes a list of ten things that most people feel won’t happen but he thinks have a 50% or better chance of taking place. Here are some examples regarding 2003:
股市上涨 25%,很大程度上得益于外资支持。经济实际增长 4%,推动 10 年期国债收益率飙升至 5.5%。日本认真着手解决自身问题,日经指数飙升至 11,000 点。萨达姆下台,金正日参与谈判,我们避免了大规模军事行动。
The stock market gains 25%, largely due to foreign support. The economy shows 4% real growth, causing the 10-year Treasury yield to jump to 5.5%. Japan gets serious about fixing its problems, and the Nikkei soars to 11,000. Saddam steps down, Kim Jong Il negotiates, and we avoid major military action.
这些事情似乎都不太可能发生。但重点就在这里:如果它们看起来有可能,就不会被市场主流当作不屑一顾的选项,也早就会被计入市场价格了。拜伦给我们的帮助是,(a)提醒我们留意一些值得关注的事情,(b)也许更重要的是,提醒我们真正能撼动市场的往往是意外之事……虽然未必是这些。我建议大家认真看看他的这份清单;它讲的恰恰是投资者(当然也包括市场主流)所不知道的东西。
None of these things seems highly likely. But that’s the point: if they seemed likely, they wouldn’t be on the list of things the consensus has dismissed. And they would be factored into market prices. What Byron does for us is (a) call attention to some things to watch for and (b) perhaps more importantly, remind us that the things that move the market are the surprises . . . although maybe not these. I commend his list to your attention; it’s all about what investors (and certainly the consensus) don’t know. U
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顺带一提,拜伦每年还额外提供一项服务:他会重印自己一年前的预测清单,让我们来评估哪些应验了。多数年份,确有少数预测成真,但事前根本无法知道会是哪些。回顾来看,他关于 2002 年的预测中,有一半看起来相当亮眼。
And by the way, Byron performs an additional service each year: he reprints his year-earlier list and lets us assess which ones came true. Most years, a few have materialized, but there was no way to know in advance which ones. In retrospect, half of his calls regarding 2002 look quite impressive:
美国未发生重大恐怖袭击事件。
美国经济初现的强势被证明是昙花一现。
10 年期国债收益率跌破 4%。
日本经济衰退持续。
养老基金偿付能力成为重大议题。
No major terrorist event occurs in the U.S. Early strength in the U.S. economy proves short-lived. The yield on the 10-year Treasury drops below 4%. Japan’s recession continues. Pension fund solvency becomes a major issue.
2003 年,橡树资本管理公司。
2003 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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另一方面,这些则不然:
On the other hand, these don’t:
伊拉克拒绝让核查小组入境。
人们重新开始出行,航空和酒店成了回报丰厚的投资。
技术和电信设备订单回暖。
安然事件后的民粹浪潮席卷全美,民主党夺回国会两院控制权。
Iraq refuses to admit inspection teams. People start traveling again; airlines and hotels prove rewarding investments. Technology and telecom equipment orders improve. Post-Enron populism sweeps the U.S.; Democrats take control of both houses of Congress.
拜伦的清单告诉我们两点:(一)确实有些即将到来的意外是可以预见的,(二)但要做到高可靠性地预测却几乎不可能。因此,单凭他列出的潜在意外清单——或者任何类似的清单——来下注,能否获利,还真说不准。
Byron’s list shows us that (a) it is possible to predict some coming surprises, but (b) it isn’t possible to do so with high reliability. Thus it’s not clear that betting on his list of potential surprises – or any such list – would be profitable.
给你一个非共识的预测。
Here’s A Non-Consensus Forecast for You
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如果你想找一位特立独行、反共识的预测大师来赚点钱,不妨看看罗伯特·普莱切特。正如《彭博市场》杂志二月刊所说:
别指望道琼斯工业平均指数会回到 11000 点。试试大萧条时代不足 1000 点的水平吧。也别涌向债券寻求安全:市政债会违约,公司债会被降级潮打得千疮百孔。就连美国政府的信用地位也可能跌到让短期国库券变得岌岌可危的地步。
你听说过极限运动;普莱切特近期的纪录大概算是极限预测者的常态。他跻身著名预测大师之列,靠的是那必不可少的“一次蒙对”(而且蒙得很大):他在 1987 年 10 月 19 日崩盘前两周预言了暴跌,从此一战成名。然后,据彭博社报道,“他错失了将近十年的牛市。”而且他至今本性未改。“我再次预言那些没几个人预料到的事件,”他说。“他的研究现在和以往一样切中要害,”亨利·范德埃尔布说。“一个江湖骗子,”迈克尔·索尔森说。
而这正是关键所在。他的预测当然是反共识的,如果你跟着他走而且他蒙对了,你会发大财(或者至少避免亏大钱)。但谁愿意跟着他走?正如我在《预测的价值 II》中所写:
面对一种反共识的未来观点,(1)相信它,(2)据此行动,(3)在早期迹象表明它错了时坚持它,(4)最终被证明是对的——这很难。
像罗伯特·普莱切特这样特立独行的预测者,对未来到底真正知道多少?他们的预测能帮你了解多少?你又愿意拿多少钱去赌他们是对的呢?
If you’re looking for an idiosyncratic, non-consensus forecast to make some money on, see Robert Prechter. As the February issue of “Bloomberg Markets” magazine stated: Forget about the Dow Jones Industrial Average returning to 11,000. Try Depression-era levels of less than 1,000. And don’t flock to bonds for safety: Municipalities will default and corporate bonds will be wracked by downgrades. Even the U.S. government’s credit status may sink low enough to make Treasury bills shaky. You’ve heard of extreme sports; Prechter’s recent record probably represents the norm for an extreme forecaster. He joined the pantheon of famous forecasters by being right the obligatory once in a row (but in a big way): he predicted a crash two weeks before October 19, 1987 made him right. Then, according to Bloomberg, “he missed the almost decade-long bull market.” And he hasn’t changed his spots since. “I’m once again calling for events that few expect,” he says. “His work is as relevant now as it ever was,” says Henry Van der Erb. “A quack,” says Michael Thorson. And that’s the point. His forecast certainly is non-consensus, and if you follow him and he’s right, you’ll make a fortune (or at least avoid losing one). But who’ll follow him? As I wrote in “The Value of Predictions II,” It’s difficult with regard to a non-consensus view of the future (1) to believe in it, (2) to act on it, (3) to stand by it if the early going suggests it’s wrong, and (4) to be right. How much do idiosyncratic forecasters like Robert Prechter really know about the future? How much can their forecasts help you to know? And how much are you willing to bet on their being right?
依赖薄弱的数据
Reliance on Weak Data
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投资专家们热衷于翻出数据来支撑他们的观点,自从 20 世纪 60 年代计算机开始应用于股市以来,已经发现了并记录了大量引人注目的现象。12 月 11 日,《华尔街日报》详细报道了“所谓的‘一月效应’——即某些股票在 1 月份往往上涨,因为基金经理会为了税务目的调整其持仓。”
Investment experts love to dredge up data supporting their observations, and ever since computers began to be applied to the stock market in the 1960s, a remarkable number of phenomena have been discovered and documented. On December 11, the Wall Street Journal went into detail concerning “the so-called January effect – the tendency of certain stocks to rise in January after money managers tweak their holdings for tax purposes.”
2003 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司
2003 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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明白了。人人都知道股市在一月通常表现不错。但既然这不是什么秘密,到现在大家应该早就学会赶在“一月效应”出现之前抢先买入,这样一来,效应就该被对冲掉了。正如我在《埃托雷的智慧》里写的:要是人人都挤进快车道,快车道也就不再是快车道了。
不过,就算真有一月效应,那篇《华尔街日报》文章里我最欣赏的部分,是它建议 2002 年大家该等到 12 月底再买入,而不是更早进场。理由是:12 月通常是个强势月份,但 2002 年有个“统计上的小褶皱”,可能让 12 月反而变成弱势月。“自 1897 年以来,道琼斯工业平均指数在前 11 个月下跌 10% 或更多的情形共出现 21 次——今年它下跌了 11.2%——其中超过一半的年份,12 月表现疲软。”
听起来挺有道理,对吧?但别急。第一,这些数据可以追溯到 1897 年,我可不敢确定一百年前的老黄历今天还管用。第二,这种情形历史上只出现过 21 次,样本量实在小得可怜。第三,“超过一半”又有什么意义?如果我告诉你,轮盘赌转了 21 次,有 12 或 13 次落在黑色上,你会因此把全部家当押在黑色上吗?我表示怀疑。如果我告诉你 21 次里出了 20 次黑色,那你可能会考虑一下。要是 10 万次旋转里出了 6 万次黑色,你大概会冲回赌桌(而且会发现我也在那儿)。
那么,这个“人人都知道”的一月效应,后来到底怎么样了?2 月 3 日《华尔街日报》报道:
……道琼斯工业平均指数以 3.5% 的跌幅结束(1 月)。对新年来说,这是个不吉利的开局,更糟的是,之前 12 月刚跌了 6%。从历史上看,12 月一直是股票最强的月份,自 1900 年以来,该指数在 72% 的 12 月里都是上涨的。12 月和 1 月连续下跌的情况很少见;自 1900 年以来只发生过 9 次。在这 9 年里有 5 年,市场在 1 月行情熄火后继续下跌。
这下好了,看涨的一月效应被抛弃了,看跌的“12 月—1 月效应”又冒出来让我们认真对待。那篇《华尔街日报》的文章到底证明了什么?证明我们不能再指望一月效应了?还是说当 12 月和 1 月都下跌时,持有股票就是坏事?我觉得,这两点它都没证明。它真正证明的是:数据更多,并不意味着信息更多。那篇文章把“12 月—1 月规律”当作资金管理的指南来推荐,但要让我为此押上一分钱,就凭 9 次里出现 5 次?我可不会。(毕竟,抛 9 次硬币,总有一面至少会出现 5 次。)
再举个例子。那篇《华尔街日报》文章旁边有张图表,标题是“美国开战时股市会发生什么”。图里说:“股市在预期战争爆发时通常会走弱,但战事一旦推进,往往强劲反弹。”你真的觉得,一百年里只发生过四五次的事情,能从中得出什么有意义的结论吗?人们该据此交易吗?如果不能,那刊发这种文章又是图什么?谁能受益?
我认为,统计数字就像火柴——不懂事的人不该拿来玩。一旦摆到公众面前,它们往往让人分不清可能性、概率和必然性,也分不清随机事件和因果关系。
Okay, that makes sense. Everyone knows stocks usually do well in January. But since it’s no secret, by now people should have learned to buy stocks ahead of the phenomenon, and that should have negated it. As I wrote in “Etorre’s Wisdom,” if everyone moves into the fast lane, it’ll stop being the fast lane. But let’s say there is a January effect. My favorite part of the Journal article was where it suggested that in 2002 people should wait until the end of December to buy, rather than entering the market sooner. The reason: while December’s usually a strong month, in 2002 a “statistical wrinkle” had the potential to make it a weak month instead. “In more than half the 21 instances since 1897 when the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell by 10% or more in the first 11 months of the year – it was down 11.2% this year – December was a weak month.” Sounds astute, right? But wait. First, the data reaches back to 1897, and I’m not sure 100-year-old observations are relevant today. Second, this set of facts has applied only 21 times in history, and that’s not much of a sample. Third, what’s the significance of “more than half”? If I told you a roulette wheel had come up black in 12 or 13 out of 21 spins, would that make you bet the ranch on black? I doubt it. If I told you it was 20 out of 21, that might make you consider it. And if it had been black 60,000 times out of 100,000 spins, you might race to the table (and find me there). So what did happen to the January effect that “everyone knows about”? On February 3 the Wall Street Journal reported: . . . The Dow Jones Industrial Average finished [January] with a 3.5% drop. That is an inauspicious beginning to the year, doubly so because it follows a 6% decline during December. Historically, December has been the strongest month for stocks, with the industrial average rising in 72% of the Decembers since 1900. A back-to-back December-January decline is rare; it has happened only 9 times since 1900. In five of those nine years, the market fell after the January fizzle. So now the bullish January effect is discarded, and the bearish December-January effect demands our consideration. What has the Journal proved? That we can no longer count on the January effect? That it’s bad to hold stocks when both December and January show declines? Neither of these, I think. What’s been proved is that more data doesn’t necessarily mean more information. The Journal suggests the December-January rule as a guideline for managing money, but I wouldn’t bet a penny on something because it happened five times out of nine. (After all, if you flip a coin nine times, it has to come up at least five times on one side or the other.) For another example, my attention was drawn to the graphic accompanying the Journal story, titled “What Happens to Stocks When the U.S. Goes to War.” It said, “The stock market has generally weakened while anticipating war, but rebounded strongly when fighting proceeded.” Do you really think a meaningful inference can be drawn from something that’s happened four or five times in a century? Should people trade on it? And if not, why run the story? Who’s helped? I think statistics are like matches – the unsophisticated shouldn’t play with them. When shown to the public, they tend to produce confusion between possibility, probability and a sure thing, and between random occurrence and cause-and-effect.
2003 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司
2003 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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好买卖我一眼就能看出来。
I Know a Good Thing When I See It
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在《不良债务的教训》一文中,我提到沃伦·巴菲特的观点:短期内,市场是一场人气竞赛。既然人人都能分辨好坏公司,预测人气竞赛的赢家并获取超额收益似乎易如反掌。《CFA 文摘》是投资管理与研究协会的出版物,提供学术文章的两页摘要,以及两页摘要的一段式浓缩(对忙碌人士极为实用)。2002 年 11 月号评论了《金融研究杂志》上的一篇文章,题为“最佳小公司是最佳投资吗?”文中引用了 1985 年至 1995 年间《商业周刊》发布的十一份年度“最佳”小公司调查。
如文章所示,这些调查在寻找股市利润方面毫无价值——等等——甚至具有负价值。入选公司的股票在调查前三年大幅跑赢几个股票指数,但在公布后三年却表现不佳。
总之,作者表明,投资于出现在《商业周刊》“100 家最佳小公司”榜单后的股票,平均而言,相对基准产生负超额回报。作者认为,企业经营业绩的均值回归、过于乐观的增长预测,以及成长股价格被推高至不切实际的水平,是导致表现不佳的潜在因素。作者总结道,“任何试图从‘热门成长’榜单中寻找赢家投资的做法……似乎都是徒劳的。”
因此,我要问:你对哪些公司是最好的了解多少,而这一了解又告诉了你什么关于你从中获利的能力?
In “Lessons from Distressed Debt” I referred to Warren Buffett’s observation that, in the short run, the market’s a popularity contest. And since anyone can tell a good company from a bad one, it should be easy to predict the winners of the popularity contest and rack up above average gains. The CFA Digest is a publication of the Association for Investment Management and Research that provides two-page summaries of scholarly articles, and one-paragraph summaries of the two-page summaries (making it very useful for busy people). The November 2002 issue reviewed an article from the Journal of Financial Research entitled “Are the Best Small Companies the Best Investments?” It cited eleven annual surveys of the “best” small companies that ran in Business Week from 1985 to 1995. As the article shows, these surveys were of absolutely no value – check that; negative value – in the search for stock market profits. Whereas the stocks of the chosen companies had far outperformed a couple of stock indices in the three years prior to the surveys, they underperformed in the three years following publication. In sum, the authors show that investing in stocks subsequent to their appearance in Business Week’s “100 Best Small Companies,” on average, provides negative excess returns relative to the benchmarks. The authors identify mean reversion of corporate operating performance, overly optimistic growth projections, and the bidding up of the prices of growth stocks to unrealistic levels as potential factors in this underperformance. The authors conclude that “any attempt to find winning investments from a ‘hot growth’ listing . . . appears futile.” So, I ask: what do you know about which companies are the best, and what does that tell you about your ability to profit from that knowledge?
援助正在路上(还是遥遥无期?)
Help Is On the Way (Or Is It?)
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几个月来,投资预测师频频登上新闻——却不是什么光彩的事。纽约州总检察长、美国证券交易委员会(SEC)和全美证券交易商协会(NASD)一直在追究华尔街券商及其分析师在 20 世纪 90 年代末科技、媒体、电信热潮中的责任。如今众所周知,许多顶尖分析师的盈利预测、目标价和买卖建议里,几乎没有多少“信息”可言。盈利预测往往不过是把管理层的话原样复述一遍。目标价往往是分析师认为股价可能达到的价位(而非他们认为理应达到的价位)。而许多“买入”建议,到头来发现是为了拉投资银行业务,而不是替券商客户赚钱。
检察官和监管机构拿出的补救办法是:(a)进一步把券商的研究职能与投资银行业务分开;(b)要求券商为零售客户购买独立研究服务。对后者能否带来预期效果,我有几个很严肃的疑问:
For several months now, investment forecasters have been in the news – but not in a favorable sense. The New York Attorney General, the SEC and the NASD have been all over Wall Street brokerage firms and their analysts for their part in the tech/media/telecom craze of the late 1990s. As everyone now knows, there was little or no “information” in many leading analysts’ profit forecasts, target prices and buy/sell recommendations. Profit forecasts often represented little more than regurgitation of what management said. Target prices tended to be the levels analysts thought stocks might reach (as opposed to what they thought was merited). And many of the “buy” recommendations turned out to have been made to garner investment banking business, not to make money for brokerage clients. The remedies that prosecutors and regulators have arrived at are (a) to further separate the firms’ research function from investment banking and (b) to require brokerage firms to buy independent research for their retail customers. I have some serious questions about whether the latter will produce the hoped-for result:
2003 年,橡树资本管理有限合伙企业。
2003 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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拥有最优质信息的研究精品店,会把信息提供给散户投资者吗?顶尖研究机构愿意通过大型券商来传递信息(并因此牺牲其独特性,以及它们与机构投资者的关系)吗?
散户投资者(或代表他们的券商)愿意为最优质的研究支付高价吗?还是这些研究将继续流向机构投资者,而个人投资者只能捡些残羹冷炙?
如果独立研究机构通过向华尔街巨头出售研究换取巨额收入,它们还能不受投行业务考量影响,保持独立于新客户之外吗?
监管机构希望券商提供独立的买入-持有-卖出建议。一份千篇一律的推荐能适合所有人吗?
个人投资者有多大机会接触到并读懂买卖建议背后的分析?又能真正理解其中的门道?
真的有人能产出足以帮助投资者在股市获利的研究吗?
Will research boutiques with the best information provide it to retail investors? Will the top research shops want to communicate their information via the massive brokerages (and thereby sacrifice its uniqueness, and their relationships with institutional investors)? Will retail investors (or the brokerages on their behalf) be willing to pay top dollar for the best research? Or will it continue to go to institutional investors, with individuals getting the dregs? If independent research providers earn big dollars by selling their research to the Wall Street giants, will they remain insulated from the investment banking considerations that affect their new customers? The regulators want brokers to provide independent buy-hold-sell advice. Can a blanket recommendation be right for everyone? What chance is there that individual investors will gain access to and read the analysis behind the buy-sell recommendations? And make sense of it? Can anyone really produce research capable of helping investors achieve stock market profits?
《纽约时报》12 月 23 日有评论者写道:“这项和解的惊人之处在于,投资者仍将白得好处,而这恰恰是当初滋生这些丑闻的根源。”换言之,当佣金不再固定、提供研究不再有利可图时,投资研究便不再服务于投资者。正是在佣金变得可议、研究报酬枯竭之际,这些公司开始少想经纪客户,多想投资银行业务。变的是什么?
As one observer noted in The New York Times of December 23, “What’s amazing about this settlement is that the investor will continue to get something for nothing, which is why we had these scandals in the first place.” In other words, investment research stopped being about investors when commissions became unfixed and providing research became unprofitable. It was when commissions became negotiable and payments for research dried up that the firms started thinking less about their brokerage customers and more about investment banking. What’s changed?
监管者能做些什么?
How Might the Regulators Help?
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让普通散户掌握安全且出色的投资工具,障碍重重。我最为坚定地认为,答案不在于给他们提供“独立研究”,这类研究一旦获得官方背书,便很可能再次被过度依赖,成为新的痛苦之源。相反,监管者应确保投资者接受教育,了解(a)成功投资所需的条件,以及(b)预测和建议的严重局限性。当投资显得轻松又安全时,券商自然受益,但他们的客户绝非如此。
12 月 21 日,《纽约时报》登载了一篇关于杰克·格鲁布曼的文章,他堪称分析师渎职行为的典型代表。然而,真正吸引我注意的是 88 岁高龄的亨利·霍赫曼的引述,他在世通公司上损失了近 1070 万美元。“我破产了。现在必须开始攒每一分钱。我无法再过以前习惯的生活了。这影响了我的健康。史密斯·巴尼告诉我,这是电信公司里最好的。格鲁布曼写的每一个字听起来都很棒。”
当然,在此事上,格鲁布曼和史密斯·巴尼远非毫无过错,但霍赫曼先生自己也犯了错误(尽管很可能并非无人怂恿)。从他拥有 1070 万美元可供损失这一点来看,我们或许会猜测他曾是一位精明的商人。那么,他在年近九十之时,为何还要将足以摧毁其财务世界的资金投入成长股——而且只押注一只股票?如果他不知道这是危险之举,早该有人告诉他。
我并非说提供这种教育是监管者的职责。但如果他们真要插手投资过程,我更希望他们谈论你所无法知晓的事,而非你所可能知晓的事。
There are numerous obstacles to equipping retail investors with the tools they need to invest safely and well. I feel most strongly that the answer doesn’t lie in giving them “independent research” that has been blessed and thus is likely to once again be overly depended on and just a new source of pain. Instead, the regulators should make sure investors are educated as to (a) the requirements for successful investing and (b) the severe limitations on forecasts and recommendations. Brokerage firms are aided when investing is made to look easy and safe, but their customers certainly are not. On December 21, The New York Times carried an article about Jack Grubman, who seems to be the poster boy for analyst malfeasance. What caught my eye, however, was the quote from Henry Hochman, 88, who lost almost $10.7 million on WorldCom. “I’m broke. I have to start saving pennies now. I can’t live the way I was accustomed to living. It has affected my health. Smith Barney told me this was the best of the telecom companies. Whatever Grubman wrote sounded very good.” Of course, Grubman and Smith Barney are far from without fault in this matter, but Mr. Hochman made his own mistake (although likely not unaided). From the fact that he had $10.7 million to lose, we might guess that he had been an astute businessman. So what was he doing, in his late eighties, investing enough in growth stocks – and in a single stock – to wreck his financial world? If he didn’t know this was a dangerous course of action, someone should have told him so. I’m not saying it’s the regulators’ job to provide this education. But if they’re going to get tangled up in the investment process, I’d rather see them talk about what you can’t know than what you
2003 年橡树资本管理有限合伙企业
2003 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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可以。换句话说,不要向投资者提供他们会依赖以获取确定利润的新预测。告诉他们根本没有这回事。那将是一项公共服务!大多数深思熟虑、立场客观的观察者认为,普通个人投资者通过长期投资于共同基金,尤其是指数基金,能得到更好的服务。这才是他们应该听到的信息。
can. In other words, don’t give investors new forecasts that they’ll count on to lead them to sure profits. Tell them there’s no such thing. That would be a public service! Most thoughtful, unconflicted observers think the average individual investor is better served through long-term investment in mutual funds, and index funds at that. That’s the message he or she should be given.
嘿,免费信息,快来拿!
Hey, Get Yer Free Information!
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我谈过那些策略师、经济学家、分析师和基金经理,他们的观点在券商报告和媒体上免费就能看到。我的结论是,总体而言他们没多大贡献。偶尔有人大对大赚一次,但频率不足以让人信赖。另一些人多数时候小对,但他们通常随大流、顺着当前形势外推,所以也没增添什么价值。
数据说明一切。没有任何证据表明有多少经理人长期能跑赢市场,也没证据表明那些自称预知未来的专业人士真能预知未来。
但还有一个更简单的检验:如果预测是对的,为什么要免费送人?关于未来的正确信息,价值无可比拟。有了期货和期权的杠杆力量,谁真能看准未来,眨眼间就能成为亿万富翁。所以当你看到有人免费提供预测时,我建议你问问自己:“他为什么白给我?”问过这一句,我怀疑你不会再照那位专家的指点行事。一如既往,沃伦·巴菲特说得清清楚楚:
你没有任何理由指望某个券商告诉你,两个月后你能不能在股指期货、期权或某只股票上赚钱。他要是知道怎么赚,就不会跟投资者聊天了。他早就退休享福去了。(《钱》杂志,1987 年秋季刊)
或者,说得更直白一点:
华尔街是唯一一个人们坐着劳斯莱斯去讨教、而讨教对象却坐地铁的地方。(《洛杉矶时报杂志》,1991 年 4 月 7 日)
I’ve talked about the strategists, economists, analysts and money managers whose views are available free in brokerage house reports and in the media. The bottom line for me is that on balance they don’t contribute much. Some are right in a big way once in a while, but not often enough to be dependable. Others are a little right a lot of the time, but they usually agree with the consensus and extrapolate current conditions, and thus they add little value. The statistics are clear. There just isn’t any evidence that many managers can beat the market in the long run, or that many of the professionals who profess to know the future actually do. But there’s another test that’s even easier: if the forecast is correct, why is it being given away? Nothing could be more valuable than correct information about the future. Given the leveraging power of futures and options, anyone who saw the future correctly could become a billionaire in no time. So when you see a forecast available gratis, I suggest you ask yourself, “Why is it being given to me?” Having made that inquiry, I doubt you’ll end up doing what the pundit said to do. As usual, Warren Buffett has put it clearly: There’s no reason in the world you should expect some broker to tell you whether you can make money on index futures or options or some stock in two months. If he knew how to do that, he wouldn’t be talking to investors. He’d have retired long ago. (Money, Fall 1987) Or, putting it a little more bluntly: Wall Street is the only place that people ride to in a Rolls-Royce to get advice from those who take the subway. (Los Angeles Times Magazine, April 7, 1991)
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我猜我已经很清楚地表明了,我对“我懂”派有多不屑。那些人只看到自己以为知道的那点东西,其实远远不够。
大多数天生的多头——这类人在大市值股票的信徒里似乎是主流——市场大涨时赚得盆满钵满,但在差年景里又全数吐回去。少数天生的空头躲过了下跌市场的完整参与……但同时也没赶上上涨行情。而大多数主动型基金经理买卖频繁,节奏快得惊人,好像他们什么都懂。可据我所知,很少有人能靠精准踩中市场的涨跌节奏,或是在人人都在关注的股票里挑出赢家,从而持续跑赢市场。
靠灵巧地把握进出股市的时机、预测哪个行业最风光、只拿那些涨得最猛的股票来管钱,听起来可能很刺激。但我在股票研究这行干了十年(之后又当了二十五年旁观者),学到的就是这纯属傻瓜游戏。庞大
I guess I’ve made it obvious how little I think of the “I know” school. Its members simply do not know all they think they do. Most congenital bulls – who seem to be the norm among big-stock devotees – make a ton when the market soars but give it back in the bad years. The few congenital bears avoid participating fully in down markets . . . and up markets as well. And most active managers buy and sell at a furious clip, implying they know a lot. Yet I’m aware of few people who have beaten the market consistently by correctly timing its ups and downs, or by picking among the stocks that everyone follows. It might be exciting to manage money by adroitly timing exposure to the stock market, predicting which industries will do best, and holding only the stocks that will go up the most. But my ten years in equity research (and 25 years since as an observer) have taught me it’s a fool’s game. Massive
2003 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司
2003 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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大量的脑力和算力都投入到了这项任务上,但没有证据表明它能成功。(在这方面,你可能会感兴趣地了解到,在 2002 年,P&I 列出的固定缴费计划最常使用的 100 只股票基金中,有多少是盈利的:没有一只!)这并非无缘无故,1978 年我离开股票研究岗位时,曾告诉花旗银行,“我什么都愿意做,但不愿把余生花在默克和礼来之间做选择上。”
所以,我是“不知道学派”的正式成员。不是因为这样让生活更有趣,而是因为它为在聪明且竞争激烈的市场中,在自身局限内工作提供了指导原则。
我小时候,母亲常通过谚语教导我。其中最好的一条是这样的:
不知道自己不知道的人是个傻瓜;避开他。
知道自己不知道的人是饥饿的;教导他。
知道自己知道但不知道自己知道的人是沉睡的;唤醒他。
但知道自己知道且知道自己知道的人是智慧的;跟随他。
amounts of brainpower and computer power have been devoted to the task, but there’s no evidence it can be done. (In that connection, you might be interested to know how many profitable funds there were in 2002 among the 100 equity funds that P&I says are most used by defined contribution plans: none!) It wasn’t for nothing that when I left equity research in 1978, I told Citibank “I would do anything but spend the rest of my life choosing between Merck and Lilly.” So I’m a card-carrying member of the “I don’t know school.” Not because it makes life more fun, but because it provides guidelines for working within the limitations of an intelligent, highly competitive market. When I was a kid, my mother often taught me through adages. One of the best went this way: He who knows not and knows not he knows not is a fool; shun him. He who knows not and knows he knows not is hungry; teach him. He who knows and knows not he knows is asleep; wake him. But he who knows and knows he knows is wise; follow him.
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高估自己所能了解或做到的事情可能极其危险——无论是脑外科手术、横渡大洋的航海,还是投资。正如“肮脏哈里”所说:“一个人应当知道自己的局限。”承认自己认知的边界——并在这些界限内行事,而非冒险越界——能给你带来巨大优势。
在橡树资本,我们相信,由于我们对未来有太多无法预知,因此只应在分析显示最坏情况可以承受的领域进行投资。我们力求避开那些预期回报很高,但同时也存在相当大可能被彻底清盘的处境。彼得·伯恩斯坦在 2003 年 1 月 1 日《经济学与投资组合策略》中言简意赅地指出:
在不确定条件下做决策时,后果必须压过概率。我们永远无法预知未来。
或者,也许金发炸弹的看法最为深刻:
Overestimating what you’re capable of knowing or doing can be extremely dangerous – in brain surgery, cross-ocean racing or investing. As Dirty Harry said, “A man should know his limitations.” Acknowledging the boundaries of what you can know – and working within those limits rather than venturing beyond – can give you a great advantage. At Oaktree, we believe that because there’s so much we can’t know about the future, we should invest only where our analysis tells us the worst case is tolerable. We try to avoid situations that entail high expected returns but also a meaningful chance of being wiped out. Peter Bernstein put it simply but elegantly in “Economics and Portfolio Strategy,” January 1, 2003: In making decisions under conditions of uncertainty, the consequences must dominate the probabilities. We never know the future. Or perhaps Blondie’s take was the most profound:
circa 1973
circa 1973
March 11, 2003
March 11, 2003
2003 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司
2003 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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