今日的风险与回报

2004 (explicit) · memo · 原文约 3324 词

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Memo to:

Oaktree Clients

From:

Howard Marks

Re:

风险与回报的现状

Risk and Return Today

一个词足以概括当今整个投资世界：平淡。2004 年迄今为止，股票和债券的回报几乎全线相当温和。几乎各地坦诚的基金经理都承认，可买的标的寥寥无几。在许多领域，尤其是非传统投资领域，人人都认同“钱太多，追逐的想法太少”。一切资产的价格怎么会都低到只能带来微薄回报？这过剩的钱又从何而来？下面我给出自己的解释。请原谅我从一些基础构件讲起。风险/回报的基础

A single word is enough to describe the overall investment world today: lackluster. Stock and bond returns thus far in 2004 are quite modest virtually across the board. Candid managers almost everywhere admit there’s little to buy. In many areas, especially in non-traditional investments, everyone agrees there’s “too much money chasing too few ideas.” How can everything be priced to provide low returns? Where does this excess money come from? I’ll provide my explanation below. Pardon me if I start with some rudimentary building blocks. Risk/Return Foundations

0BU

当今投资理论与实务最深层的假设，是风险厌恶的普遍性。人们被认为天生不喜欢风险，偏爱安全。证明很简单：如果一项安全投资和一项风险投资——比如 30 天期美国国库券和一家初创公司的 30 年期债券——都提供 5% 的收益率，几乎没人会选后者。因此，投资者要承担风险，就必须被诱导，而诱惑的形式就是更高的预期回报。简而言之，市场必须如此定价，让投资者预期风险更高的投资能带来更高的回报。（我多次说过，那些更高的回报绝不能视为可靠；如果风险投资能指望必然产生更高回报，那它们就不算风险了。所以，它们的预期回报必须显得更高，才能吸引资本，但更高的预期回报总是伴随更宽的结果区间，其中可能包括亏损。）

The most fundamental assumption underlying investment theory and practice today regards the universality of risk aversion. It is assumed that people dislike risk and prefer safety. The proof is simple: if a safe investment and risky investment – e.g., a 30-day U.S. Treasury bill and a start-up company’s 30-year bond – both offer a 5% yield, virtually no one will choose the latter. Thus, if investors are going to bear risk, they must be induced to do so, with the incentive coming in the form of a higher expected return. In short then, the market must set prices such that investors will expect riskier investments to deliver higher returns. (I have said many times that those higher returns must not be viewed as dependable; if risky investments could be counted on to produce higher returns, they wouldn’t be risky. Thus their expected returns must appear to be higher in order to attract capital, but the higher expected return will always be accompanied by a range of possible outcomes that is wider and may include losses.)

Return

由于人们普遍认为感知风险与感知收益潜力之间存在关联，下图已广泛用于描绘市场的基本运作机制：

Because of the assumed correlation between perceived risk and perceived return potential, the following graphic has come into widespread use to depict the market’s basic workings:

2004 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

2004 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

Risk

如图所示，无风险资产所能带来的回报率较低，而随着潜在风险的增加，预期回报率也随之上升。因此，我们得到一条“资本市场线”，正如学者们所言，“它向右上方倾斜”。（通常认为，“无风险资产”是指期限最短的美国国库券，投资者不必担心信用风险，也不必担心在到期偿还本金之前，通货膨胀会侵蚀本金购买力的风险。）

市场运转中

As the graphic suggests, there is a low return that can be earned on the riskless asset and, from there, prospective return will rise with prospective risk. Thus we have a “capital market line” that, as the academics say, “is upward sloping to the right.” (The “riskless asset” is generally felt to be the shortest U.S. Treasury bill, with regard to which investors don’t worry about credit risk or the risk that inflation will erode the purchasing power of principal before it’s repaid upon maturity.) The Market at Work

1BU

我拿几年前一个“典型”市场来举例，说明这在现实中怎么运作：当时 30 天期国库券利率可能是 4%。于是投资者说，“要是让我把期限拉到五年，我得要 5%。买 10 年期国债，我得拿到 6%。”他要求更高的利率来延长期限，因为他担心购买力风险，这种风险被认为随期限延长而加大。这就是为什么收益率曲线——实际上只是资本市场线的一部分——通常随资产期限延长而上扬。

现在把信用风险加进来。“如果 10 年期国债付 6%，我不会去买 10 年期单一 A 级公司债，除非对方承诺给我 7%。”这就引出了信用利差的概念。我们这位假设中的投资者想要 100 个基点，才肯从“国债”挪到“公司债”。如果投资者的共识都是这样，利差就会定在那里。

要是我们离开投资级债券呢？“除非比同期限国债多拿 600 个基点，否则我绝不碰高收益债。”所以高收益债要吸引买家，就得给出 12% 的收益率，也就是比国债高 6 个百分点。

接下来干脆彻底离开固定收益。事情变得更难了，因为你翻遍所有地方也找不到股票这类投资的前瞻回报在哪里（这说白了是因为它们的回报靠推测，不是“固定”的）。但投资者对这些东西有感觉。“历史上标普股票回报率是 10%，我只有在认为它们会继续如此时才会买。”所以理论上，普通股投资者算出每股收益、收益增长率和股息支付率，再把它们输入估值模型，得出标普股票能回报 10% 的价格（虽然我不确定实际操作真这么有条不紊）。“风险更高的股票应该回报更多；除非我觉得能拿到 13%，否则我不会买纳斯达克。”

从那里就是一路往上加。“如果股票能给我 10%，那我就得要 15%，才肯接受房地产带来的流动性差和不确定性。要是投资收购，得给我 25%……要让我去碰风险投资那种低成功率的东西，得 30%。”

事情本该这么运转，而且我觉得大体上确实如此（尽管不同时期的要求并不一样）。结果就是一条资本市场线，我们很多人对它已经相当熟悉，如下页所示。

I’ll use a “typical” market of a few years back to illustrate how this works in real life: The interest rate on the 30-day T-bill might have been 4%. So an investor says, “If I’m going to go out five years, I want 5%. And to buy the 10-year note I have to get 6%.” He demands a higher rate to extend maturity because he’s concerned about the risk to purchasing power, a risk that is assumed to increase with time to maturity. That’s why the yield curve, which in reality is a portion of the capital market line, normally slopes upward with the increase in asset life. Now let’s factor in credit risk. “If the 10-year Treasury pays 6%, I’m not going to buy a 10year single-A corporate unless I’m promised 7%.” This introduces the concept of credit spreads. Our hypothetical investor wants 100 basis points to go from a “guvvie” to a “corporate.” If the consensus of investors feels the same, that’s what the spread will be. What if we depart from investment grade bonds? “I’m not going to touch a high yield bond unless I get 600 over a Treasury note of comparable maturity.” So high yield bonds are required to yield 12%, for a spread of 6 percent over the Treasury note, if they’re going to attract buyers. Now let’s leave fixed income altogether. Things get tougher, because you can’t look anywhere to find the prospective return on investments like stocks (that’s because, simply put, their returns are conjectural, not “fixed”). But investors have a sense for these things. “Historically S&P stocks have returned 10%, and I’ll only buy them if I think they’re going to keep doing so.” So in theory, the common stock investor determines earnings per share, earnings growth rate and dividend payout ratio and inputs them into a valuation model to arrive at the price from which S&P stocks will return 10% (although I’m not sure the process is nearly that methodical in actuality). “And riskier stocks should return more; I won’t buy on the NASDAQ unless I think I’m going to get 13%.” From there it’s onward and upward. “If I can get 10% from stocks, I need 15% to accept the illiquidity and uncertainty associated with real estate. And 25% if I’m going to invest in buyouts . . . and 30% to induce me to go for venture capital, with its low success ratio.” That’s the way it’s supposed to work, and in fact I think it generally does (although the requirements aren’t the same at all times). The result is a capital market line of the sort that has become familiar to many of us, as shown on the next page.

2004 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

2004 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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市场运行实录——2004 年版

The Market at Work – 2004 Version

2BU

今天投资回报面临的一个大问题，根源在于这一过程的起点：

无风险利率不是 4%，而是接近 1%。2004 年，利率达到了数代人以来的最低点。美联储在当年大部分时间里将短期利率维持在低位，尽管近几个月略有上调。这样做是为了（a）刺激自上次衰退以来一直相当低迷的经济，（b）保护经济免受外部冲击的负面影响，最突出的是 2001-02 年的公司丑闻和 9/11 恐怖袭击（以及更多袭击的可能性）；事实上，低利率被称为“紧急利率”。我们的典型投资者若想承担时间风险，仍然要求更高回报，但既然起点是 1% 以上，现在 10 年期国债的合理利率应为 4%（而非 6%）。除非能获得 6-7% 的回报，否则他不会进入股市。而收益率低于 7% 的垃圾债券可能不值得投资。房地产必须提供 8% 左右的收益率。收购要有吸引力，就必须承诺 15% 的回报，如此等等。因此，我们现在的资本市场线如下所示，它（a）处于低得多的水平，（b）更加平坦。

A big problem for investment returns today stems from the starting point for this process: The riskless rate isn’t 4%; it’s closer to 1%. Interest rates reached multi-generational lows in 2004. The Fed kept short rates low for much of the year, although they’ve been inching up in recent months. This was done (a) to stimulate an economy that has been quite sluggish since the last recession and (b) to protect the economy against negative effects from exogenous shocks, most prominently the corporate scandals of 2001-02 and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (and the possibility of more); in fact, the low rates have been described as “emergency rates.” Our typical investor still wants more return if he’s going to accept time risk, but with the starting point at 1+%, now 4% is the right rate for the 10-year (not 6%). He won’t go into stocks unless he gets 6-7%. And junk bonds may not be worth it at yields below 7%. Real estate has to yield 8% or so. For buyouts to be attractive they have to appear to promise 15%, and so on. Thus we now have a capital market line like the one shown below that is (a) at a much lower level and (b) much flatter. ●

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2004 年，橡树资本管理有限合伙企业。

2004 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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Risk

该线较低的位置可以通过低利率来解释，低利率的起点是低无风险利率。归根结底，投资思维过程是一条链条，其中每项投资都为下一项设定了要求。每项投资都必须与其他投资竞争资本，但今年，由于利率较低，每一项风险逐步递增的投资的门槛都比我职业生涯中的任何时候都要低。

为何曲线更平缓？

The lower level of the line is explained by the low interest rates, the starting point for which is the low riskless rate. After all, the investment thought process is a chain in which each investment sets the requirement for the next. Each investment has to compete with others for capital, but this year, due to the low interest rates, the bar for each successively riskier investment has been set lower than at any time in my career. Why a Flatter Line?

3BU

资本市场的回报率曲线如今不仅处于低水平，而且多种因素还共同作用，将其压得更平。首先，投资者争先恐后地逃离低风险、低回报的投资。当你特别急于避开安全的投资 A 时，吸引你去接受高风险的投资 B，所需的补偿（以预期回报计）就比往常更少。因为如今人们如此迫切地想摆脱 1% 回报的货币市场投资和 3–4% 回报的国库券，他们愿意接受的 risk 补偿也就低于正常水平。

其次，高风险投资在二十多年里一直回报丰厚，尤其在 2003 年表现突出。除了偶尔出现、容易被遗忘的例外，我们见证了普通股、低质量股票、新兴市场股票、高收益债券、困境债务、私人股权等领域的高回报…… 这样的例子不胜枚举。因此，相比其他情况，投资者对高风险投资的吸引力更大（或者说排斥更小），他们转向这类投资所需的 risk 补偿也就更少。

第三，投资者如今认为 risk 相当有限。由于通胀上升不被视为重大风险，债券投资者在延长期限时要求的溢价不高。同时，经济复苏与宽松资本市场的结合，将违约率推至历史低位，投资者对信用 risk 毫不担忧，因此愿意接受低于平均水平的信用利差。预期回报的存在是为了补偿 perceived risk，而当 perceived risk 不多时，预期回报也不太可能丰厚。

总而言之，用“量化专家”的话来说，risk 厌恶情绪已经下降。2003 年 5 月，我们橡树资本开始担心投资者的盲目行为（当然，我们对市场过热的担忧总是偏早）。我们惊讶于不到一年前还惊恐万状的投资者，竟如此迅速地变得自信而激进。我们在 2002 年夏天以 30%–70% 收益率买入的“受压”债券，如今能以 6%–9% 的收益率卖出。在投资者心理特有的这种炼金术下，“任何价格我都不会碰”不知怎地变成了“在我看来是稳健的投资”。结果，资金大量从低收益的安全投资涌向看似提供更高回报的高风险投资（尽管我们认为那些回报还不够高）。

作为回应，我在 2003 年 5 月 6 日发布的备忘录“正在发生什么？”中，写了一篇题为“猫、树、胡萝卜和棍子”的文章。我写道，我认为安全投资的低预期回报与高风险投资近期的丰厚回报相结合，正把许多投资者推向投资树上危险的高枝。那些树枝在如此重压下可能断裂。因此，在形势改变之前，我建议待在更接近地面的位置。

2004 年橡树资本管理有限公司

Not only is the capital market line at a low level today in terms of return, but in addition a number of factors have conspired to flatten it. First, investors have fallen over themselves in their effort to get away from low-risk, low-return investments. When you’re especially eager not to make safe investment A, it takes less compensation than usual (in terms of prospective return) to get you to accept risky investment B. Because people today are so motivated to get away from 1% money market investments and 3-4% Treasury notes, they’ll accept less risk compensation than usual. Second, risky investments have been very rewarding for more than twenty years and did particularly well in 2003. With only occasional, easily forgotten exceptions, we’ve seen high returns from common stocks, low-quality stocks, emerging market stocks, high yield bonds, distressed debt, private equity . . . the list goes on. Thus investors are attracted more (or repelled less) by risky investments than perhaps might otherwise be the case and require less risk compensation to move to them. Third, investors perceive risk as being quite limited today. Because rising inflation isn’t seen as a significant risk, bond investors don’t require much of a premium to extend maturity. And because the combination of a recovering economy and an accommodating capital market has brought default rates to record lows, investors are unconcerned about credit risk and thus are willing to accept below-average credit spreads. Prospective return exists to compensate for perceived risk, and when there isn’t much perceived risk, there isn’t likely to be much prospective return. In summary, to use the words of the “quants,” risk aversion is down. In May 2003 we at Oaktree began to worry about investors’ indiscriminate behavior (of course, we’re usually early in worrying about overheated markets). We were struck by the rapidity with which the terrified investors of less than a year earlier had become confident and aggressive. “Stressed” bonds that we had bought at yields of 30% to 70% in the summer of 2002 now could be sold at yields of 6% to 9%. Somehow, in that alchemy unique to investor psychology, “I wouldn’t touch it at any price” had morphed into “looks like a solid investment to me.” As a result, money was flooding out of low-yielding safe investments and into risky investments that appeared to offer higher returns (although we didn’t think the returns were high enough). In response, I wrote a piece called “The Cat, the Tree, the Carrot and the Stick” as part of my memo “What’s Going On?” published on May 6, 2003. I said I thought the combination of low prospective returns on safe investments and recent high returns on risky investments was pushing many investors to dangerously high branches of the investment tree. Those branches are subject to cracking under all that weight. Therefore, until conditions changed, I suggested something closer to the ground. 2004 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

金钱，无处不有

Money, Money Everywhere

但怎么可能同时有太多资本涌入如此多的市场呢？我们可以理解投资者资本从一个市场流向另一个市场，但投资资本的总量难道不是有限吗？“更多的钱”从哪里来？

我认为投资资本的总额通常是相当固定的（尽管许多公司正在缴付养老金以弥补资金不足），而且事实上我并不觉得真的“到处都是更多的钱”。只是没有人愿意持有收益率为 1% 的现金、3% 至 5% 的高等级债券，或 6% 至 7% 的股票（2000 年至 2002 年股票让投资者大失所望后，这正是大多数人预期它们现在能带来的回报）。

因此，我认为目前的情况如下：

But how can it be that there’s too much capital trying to access so many markets at once? We can understand investor capital flowing from one market to another, but isn’t the total amount of investment capital finite? Where does “more money” come from? I think the amount of investment capital usually is rather fixed, (although many corporations are making pension fund contributions to correct under-funding), and in fact I don’t think there’s really “more money everywhere.” It’s just that no one wants to hold more cash at 1%, high grades at 3-5% or stocks at 6-7% (after stocks treated investors so poorly in 2000-02, that’s what most people think they’re now poised to return). Thus I think the present situation is as follows: 

钱总有个去处，数量就那么多。

There’s a given amount of money looking for a home.



其中相对较少的部分流入主流股票和债券这两大市场。

Relatively little of it is going into mainstream stocks and bonds, the two biggest markets.



这些资本被重新导向规模较小的非传统市场，引发了一场足以淹没这些市场的洪流：推高价格、压低预期回报，使得有吸引力的投资变得如同鸡齿般稀有。

The redirection of that capital to the smaller non-traditional markets has given rise to a deluge capable of overwhelming those markets: driving up prices, lowering prospective returns and rendering attractive investments scarce as hens’ teeth.

所以说，问题不在于市场上钱变多了多少，而是潜在的买家个个乐观、无所畏惧、对回报不挑剔，还成群结队涌向小规模资产类别。资产的持有者同样乐观，他们通过决定在哪儿卖出，也参与定下了市场价格。结果就是一幅倒胃口、容忍风险、价格高企的投资图景。正是这种时候，我最爱引用的巴菲特那句话最贴切：“别人越是不谨慎地打理自己的事务，我们就越要谨慎地打理自己的事务。”

对投资的启示

So it’s not that there’s that much more money around. It’s that would-be buyers are optimistic, unafraid, undemanding in terms of return, and moving en masse to small asset classes. Holders of assets, who play a part in setting market prices by deciding where they’ll sell, also are optimistic. The result is an unappetizing, risk-tolerant, high-priced investment landscape. It’s for times like this that my favorite Warren Buffett quotation is most appropriate: “The less prudence with which others conduct their affairs, the greater the prudence with which we must conduct our own affairs.” Implications for Investing

提升投资业绩的一个途径——我们在橡树资本努力践行的——是思考“今天的错误”可能是什么，并设法避开它。投资中有时候可能犯的错误包括：

One way to improve investment results – which we try hard to apply at Oaktree – is to think about what “today’s mistake” might be and try to avoid it. There are times in investing when the likely mistake consists of:      

不买，

买得不够，

在拍卖中不再加一次价，

持有过多现金，

没有用足杠杆，或者

没有承担足够风险。

not buying, not buying enough, not making one more bid in an auction, holding too much cash, not using enough leverage, or not taking enough risk.

我觉得这句话描述的不是今天的情况。我一直听人说，没人会在等着做心脏手术时抱怨，“我真希望我多去办公室待着。”同样，我也不认为未来几年会有人回过头来说，“我真希望我在 2004 年多投资一些。”

I don’t think that describes today. I’ve always heard that no one awaiting heart surgery ever complained, “I wish I’d gone to the office more.” Well, likewise I don’t think anyone in the next few years is going to look back and say, “I wish I’d invested more in 2004.”

2004 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

2004 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

不过，我认为今年的错误将会被证明是：

Rather, I think this year’s mistake is going to turn out to be:     

买得太多，出手太激进，多喊了一次价，杠杆用得太重，为了追求更高回报而冒了太大的险。

buying too much, buying too aggressively, making one bid too many, using too much leverage, and taking too much risk in the pursuit of superior returns.

有些时候，投资错误属于“不作为”：那些你本应去做却没有做的事。而如今，我认为错误恐怕属于“乱作为”：那些你本不该做却做了的事。有些时候应当进取，而我认为此刻应当谨慎。

并非每位投资者都有条件持有大量现金。养老基金必须追逐其精算回报，若连续多年只赚取货币市场利率，便很可能无法达成目标。每年须花掉资产 5% 的基金会，以及依靠投资收益生活的个人，情况同样如此。但当我今天环顾身边那些有能力持有现金的聪明人，我看到的是大笔余额。正如沃伦·巴菲特在 2003 年年报中所写：“我们的资本眼下利用不足……这很痛苦——但总比干蠢事强。”

有些时候，大规模基金是好事——当更多资金带来的市场力量成为助力时。而我认为，当下总体上是募资应保持节制的时候——小规模所附带的筛选力与灵活性将证明是关键。尽管如此，一些管理人仍在凭借近期的强劲业绩募集越来越大的基金，并拓展新策略。但这并不意味着跟随羊群就是明智之举。

在我 2003 年 9 月 5 日关于投资与体育的备忘录《你的比赛计划是什么？》中，我提到“在自身能力范围内打球”或“不去尝试自己力不能及的事，或是在现有环境下根本无法完成的事”的重要性。

当投资机会并不存在时，我们根本创造不出来。我们的不良债务基金新基金第一年就取得了 64% 的净内部收益率，这个数字令人瞠目……而且短期内绝无可能复制。那我们该怎么办？是落袋为安、分配收益，还是延长持有期、或是在新仓位上尝试重演佳绩？再去募集一只大型新基金是否明智？如果现有持仓的预期回报不足、新的投资机会又有限，上述哪一条都不该做。我们可能干的最蠢的事，就是执意延续高回报——结果把利润又吐了回去。机会不在，空想也无济于事。我们能做的，永远只是市场给什么，就拿什么。

没有人愿意在投资回报面前认输。没有人愿意承认，自己的聪明才智和勤奋努力不足以达成目标。但当市场提供的绝对回报微薄、承担风险所获补偿不足时，认输是唯一的选择。

There are times when the investing errors are of omission: the things you should have done but didn’t. Today I think the errors are probably of commission: the things you shouldn’t have done but did. There are times for aggressiveness. I think this is a time for caution. Not every investor has the option of holding a lot of cash. A pension fund has to pursue its actuarial return, and too many years spent earning money market rates can ensure it won’t be achieved. The same can be true for a foundation that has to spend 5% of its assets each year, and for an individual living on his or her investment income. But when I look today at the smart people I know who have the ability to hold cash, I see large balances. As Warren Buffett wrote in his 2003 Annual Report, “Our capital is underutilized now . . . . It’s a painful condition to be in – but not as painful as doing something stupid.” There are times when big funds are a good thing – when the market power that comes with more money is a help. I think this is generally a time for moderation in fund raising – a time when the selectivity and agility that come with smallness will prove to be key. Still, some managers are raising ever-larger funds and extending into new strategies on the back of recent strong results. That doesn’t mean it’s smart to join the herd of participants. In my memo “What’s Your Game Plan” on investing and sports (September 5, 2003), I mentioned the importance of “playing within yourself,” or “not trying to do things you’re not capable of, or things that can’t be accomplished within the environment as it exists.” We simply cannot create investment opportunities when they’re not there. In its first year, our newest distressed debt fund produced a 64% net IRR that’s eyepopping . . . and impossible to replicate any time soon. So what should we do now? Rather than take profits and distribute the proceeds, should we prolong our holding periods or try to repeat our gains in new positions? And would it be smart to raise a big new fund? None of these, if the prospective returns on our holdings are inadequate and new investment opportunities are limited. The dumbest thing we could do is to insist on perpetuating our high returns – and give back our profits in the process. If it’s not there, hoping won’t make it so. All we ever can do is take what they give us. No one wants to throw in the towel with regard to investment returns. No one likes to admit that their intelligence and hard work won’t be enough to get them to their target. But at times when the markets are offering paltry absolute returns and inadequate compensation for bearing risk, it’s the only thing to do.

2004 年，橡树资本管理有限合伙公司。

2004 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

那还有什么别的办法？否认事实吗？为追求高回报去冒更大的风险？当价格高企、太多资本争相涌入时，这么做根本无济于事。事实是，有些时候你必须强调谨慎、拒绝为回报而勉强出手、放低期望，并保持低调。我认为现在就属于这样的时刻。

顺便说一句，我不是说所有资产都定价过高、注定崩盘。我是说大多数资产的定价都无法带来高回报或足够的风险补偿。某个市场是否会迎来剧烈回调，取决于投资者提高回报要求的幅度和速度。记住，预期回报要想快速提升，只有一条路：通过价格回调。另一方面，预期回报的缓慢而渐进的重申，可以通过数年的价格停滞来实现。但无论哪种前景，都不支持今天大举进攻的投资策略。

至于具体的资产类别，

What’s the alternative? Deny the facts? Take on more risk in pursuit of high returns? Doing so won’t help when prices are high and too much capital is jostling for admittance. The fact is there are times when you have to stress caution, refuse to stretch for return, moderate your expectations, and keep your head down. I think this is one of those. By the way, I’m not saying all investments are priced too high and bound to collapse. I’m saying most aren’t priced to give high returns or adequate risk compensation. Whether a strong price correction is coming in a given market depends on the extent and speed with which investors increase their return demands. Remember, there’s only one way for prospective returns to increase quickly: through a price correction. On the other hand, a slow and gradual reassertion of prospective return can be accomplished through several years of price stagnation. Neither prospect, however, argues for aggressive investing today. As for individual asset classes, 

最大的乱象似乎集中在一些另类投资上，人们为追求回报而纷纷涌入这些领域。私募股权、困境债务、对冲基金及其他同类投资，恐怕难以成为人们所期望的“银弹”。

The greatest excesses seem to be centered in some of the alternative investments to which people have fled in search of return. Private equity, distressed debt, hedge funds and others of that ilk are unlikely to prove the “silver bullets” that people are hoping for.



毫无疑问，各类债券注定只能带来低回报——事实上，这是我见过的最低长期债券回报。谈到 10% 收益率的十年期债券时，你还可以争论未来几年的回报会是 15%、10%、5% 还是零。但谈到 5% 收益率的债券时，回报区间从定义上讲就必须低得多。

There’s no question that bonds of all stripes are fated to produce low returns – in fact, the lowest long-term bond returns I’ve ever seen. When you’re talking about a 10% 10year bond, you can argue about whether the return over the next few years will be 15%, 10%, 5% or zero. But when you’re talking about a 5% bond, the range by definition has to be significantly lower.



最后，股价已从高点显著回落；随着当前企业盈利总体走高，估值不再那么离谱；股价也没有被资金流入托举上天。但另一方面，市盈率的绝对水平仍然偏高，背后有低利率撑腰，而且一旦人们意识到股票的长期回报大概率由中个位数的利润增速驱动，估值就有向下调整的风险。

Finally, stocks are well down from their highs; their valuations have been rendered less excessive by today’s generally higher corporate earnings; and they aren’t being borne aloft by capital inflows. On the other hand, absolute p/e ratios are still high, supported by the low level of interest rates, and there’s the risk of downward valuation when people realize that the long-term return on stocks is likely to be driven by profits growth in mid-single digits.

综合以上所有因素，我认为当前的投资成功之路可能在于选择“最不坏”的行动方案。一年多来，我一直在向我所任职的董事会表达我的看法，即解决方案在于“特殊的利基，特殊的人才”。因为绝大多数资产类别价格高企且拥挤不堪，关键在于找到那些相对不那么拥挤的领域。同样重要的是，要选择那些有足够才华和纪律的经理人，以充分利用当前形势。

和往常一样，我的观察未必全部正确，但我愿意分享我对当前投资市场状况的一些思考。

2004 年 10 月 27 日

Taking all of the above into consideration, I feel this is a time when the route to investment success may be via the “least bad” course of action. For over a year I’ve been telling the boards on which I serve that I view the solution as “special niches, special people.” Because the vast majority of asset classes are high priced and crowded, the key is to find those that are less so. Similarly, it’s important to choose managers with enough talent and discipline to make the most of the current situation. None of my observations is sure to be right, as always, but I want to share my thinking about what’s going on in the investment markets today. October 27, 2004

2004 年，橡树资本管理有限合伙（Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.）

2004 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.