无人知晓

2008 (explicit) · memo · 原文约 2930 词
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Memo to:

Memo to:

Oaktree Clients

Oaktree Clients

From:

From:

Howard Marks

Howard Marks

Re:

Re:

Nobody Knows

Nobody Knows

这份备忘录的标题不是开玩笑,我是认真的。没人真正了解金融界近期事件的重大意义,也没人知道未来会怎样。每个人都有意见——有个带点颜色的笑话说的正是这个——但意见和知识完全是两码事。和往常一样,看多的人乐观,看空的人悲观,剩下的人则摇摆不定。

现在正是引用我最喜欢的一句约翰·肯尼斯·加尔布雷斯名言的好时机:“预测者有两种:一种是无知的,另一种是不知道自己无知的。”没人知道未来会如何,这话现在比以往任何时候都更真切……字面上的意思。

金融机构犯下的过度行为,其规模之大、范围之广,我们前所未见,而且许多前所未见的新发明也已就位。所以显然,没人能知道事情会如何收场。

我确信这一点,这让我不必费力去系统评估经济和机构的强弱,也让我得以把话只限于我认为的战略现实。

人们来征求我的意见,我很荣幸,我会给出我的看法。但那仅仅是一个看法。在写下来的时候,我会重复一些以前写过的东西。所以如果你觉得某段话像是第二次读到,那很可能你没错。

The title of this memo isn’t a joke; I mean it. Nobody knows the real significance of the recent events in the financial world, or what the future holds. Everyone has an opinion – there’s an off-color joke to that effect – but opinions are entirely different from knowledge. As usual, the bulls are optimistic, the bears are pessimistic, and the rest are uncertain. This is a great time for my favorite quote from John Kenneth Galbraith: “There are two kinds of forecasters: those who don’t know, and those who don’t know they don’t know.” No one knows about the future, and that’s more true now than ever . . . literally. Excesses were committed at financial institutions that we’ve never seen before in terms of their scale or their breadth, and many new inventions are in place that never existed before. So clearly no one can know how things will pan out. My conviction that this is true frees me from having to methodically assess the strength and weakness of economies and institutions, and it permits me to limit my comments to what I consider strategic realities. I’m flattered that people have asked for my opinion, and I will give it. But that’s all it is: an opinion. In setting it down, I will repeat things I’ve written before. So if you find something that you think you’re reading for the second time, you’re probably right.

Boom-Bust

Boom-Bust

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“繁荣”和“萧条”这两个词道尽了一切。有繁荣,终将有萧条。繁荣持续得越久,随后的萧条可能就越惨烈。反之,若是没有繁荣,自然也未必有萧条。

2003 年至 2007 年间,美国经济并无大的繁荣,这也是为什么尽管近期金融市场动荡,美国经济却依然表现得相当稳健的原因之一。

但金融领域确实经历了一场令人瞠目的繁荣,随之而来的也是一场令人瞠目的萧条。(其影响是否会波及实体经济,目前尚待观察。如您所知,我们认为影响终将显现。)

最后,美国股市并没有出现繁荣,因此也谈不上崩盘。(如果您觉得自己的股票令您痛苦,不妨想想,其跌幅与席卷金融界的“世界末日”般的悲观论调相比,实属微不足道。)

Those two words say it all. If you have a boom, eventually you’ll have a bust. And the further the boom goes, the worse the bust is likely to be. If there’s no boom, on the other hand, there needn’t be a bust. There was no great boom in the U.S. economy in 2003-07, and that’s one of the reasons why it has held up reasonably well despite the recent turmoil. But there was an incredible boom in the financial sector, and it has led to an incredible bust. (It remains to be seen whether its effects will slop over into the real economy. As you know, we think they will.) Finally, there wasn’t a boom in the U.S. stock market, and so it hasn’t busted. (If you think your stocks have given you pain, realize that their decline isn’t at all commensurate with the end-of-the-world thinking roiling the financial sector).

2008 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

2008 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

版权所有,保留所有权利。

All Rights Reserved

事情是怎么变成这样的

How Things Got This Way

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当前困境的很大一部分可以归咎于金融领域长达数十年的泡沫。这个泡沫让金融业成了显而易见的首选雇主,吸引了那些“最优秀、最聪明”的人才(虽然往往缺乏经验磨炼),助长了贪婪与冒险,驱散了恐惧与怀疑,并把机构、行为、预期及资产价格推向了不可持续的水平。

Much of the current problem can be attributed to a decades-long bubble in the financial sector that made it the employer of obvious choice; attracted employees who were “the best and the brightest” (although often untrammeled by experience); contributed to greed and risk taking; drove out fear and skepticism; and carried institutions, behavior, expectations and asset prices to unsustainable levels. What are the factors that got us in the current mess?         

 

过剩的流动性,不得不寻找出路。

为刺激经济而降息。

对低风险投资由此带来的预期回报感到不满。

风险厌恶情绪不足,因而愿意沿着风险曲线向上移动,以追求更高回报。

广泛愿意尝试新事物,例如结构性产品和衍生品,并动用巨额杠杆。

金融机构渴望用自营风险承担带来的利润补充经营收入——也就是说,要“更像高盛”。

一种脱媒、转售和层层分割的系统,使许多参与者忽视风险,相信风险已被设计消除。

过度依赖评级机构,它们远不足以应对这些新工具,也依赖那些外推近期历史的黑箱金融模型。

不加质疑地接受金融陈词滥调,而不思考环境变化和资产价格上涨是否已使其失去意义:

o 房屋和公寓是好投资,可以指望升值。

o 抵押贷款很少违约。

o 房价永远不会出现全国性下跌。

o 如果你通过衍生品对冲得足够多,资产负债表上大幅加杠杆是可以的。

o 如果概率上的期望值为正,借入并投资相当于股本资本巨额倍数的资金是安全的,因为“灾难很少发生”。

像抵押贷款经纪人和借款人这样的个人,被赋予了做出错误行为的激励。

新出炉的金融“宇宙主宰者”被鼓励为自己和雇主最大化回报,而不关心他们是否在为金融体系增值,或是在危及它。

Excess liquidity, which had to find a home. Interest rates that had been reduced to stimulate the economy. Dissatisfaction with the resulting prospective returns on low-risk investments. Inadequate risk aversion, and thus a willingness to step out on the risk curve in search of higher returns. A broad-scale willingness to try new things, such as structured products and derivatives, and to employ massive leverage. A desire on the part of financial institutions to supplement operating income with profits from proprietary risk taking – that is, to be “more like Goldman.” A system of disintermediation, selling onward, and slicing and dicing that caused many participants to overlook risk in the belief that it had been engineered away. Excessive reliance on rating agencies which were far from competent to cope with the new instruments, and on black-box financial models that extrapolated recent history. Unquestioning acceptance of financial platitudes without wondering whether altered circumstances and elevated asset prices had rendered them irrelevant: o Houses and condos are good investments and can be counted on to appreciate. o Mortgages rarely go into default. o There can never be a nation-wide decline in home prices. o It’s okay to grossly lever a balance sheet if you’ve hedged enough through derivatives. o It’s safe to borrow and invest funds equal to a huge multiple of your equity capital if the probabilistic expected value is positive, because “disasters rarely happen.” Individuals such as mortgage brokers and mortgage borrowers who were given incentives to do the wrong thing. Newly minted financial “masters of the universe” encouraged to maximize returns for themselves and their employers without concern for whether they were adding value to the financial system or endangering it.

总的来说,上述种种可归结为缺乏成熟监管、常识、怀疑精神、伦理关切以及老派审慎作风。正如繁荣期常见的情形,年轻人将长辈挤到一边,或令他们过于印象深刻。

那些错误清单能让人笑……或哭。我在《请先回顾后见之明》中提到,金融人士事后看来荒唐至极的行为何其频繁。但这从未阻止他们重蹈覆辙,或再犯新错。

In general, the above can be summed up as a shortage of adult supervision, common sense, skepticism, ethical concern and good old-fashioned prudence. As often happens in booms, the kids shouldered the adults aside or impressed them too much. The list of errors can make you laugh . . . or cry. I mentioned in “Hindsight First, Please” how often financial people do things that look downright silly afterwards. But that never stops them from repeating the old mistakes or making new ones.

2008 年 橡树资本管理有限合伙企业

2008 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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保留所有权利。

All Rights Reserved

如今我们看到,一些金融机构因为大量使用短期借款或存款进行投资,结果在罕见灾难——全国房价下跌——发生时,暴露出极大的风险。

环境变化也在多方面起到了推波助澜的作用。这些变化悄无声息地逐一出现,未被察觉,但它们的累积效应却不容小觑。例如,

So now we find financial institutions that endangered themselves by using extensive short-term borrowings or deposits to make investments that turned out to be enormously risky when an unlikely disaster – a nationwide decline in home prices – occurred. In many ways, changes in the environment contributed as well. They crept up one by one, unnoticed, but their combined effect is significant. For example, 

  

《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》被废除,允许商业银行与投资银行合并。(该法案于 1933 年出台,旨在禁止此类合并,因为当时认为这类合并是导致 1929 年大崩盘的推手之一。颇具讽刺意味——而且绝非无关紧要——的是,这项法案竟在 1999 年被废除,恰逢其时地助推了当前的信贷危机。)

限制卖空必须高于前一笔成交价的规则于 2007 年 7 月被取消,使得卖空行为可以毫无阻碍地将股价持续打压下去。

衍生品被创造出来,其价格取决于标的“真实”证券的价格;如今我们却看到,这些衍生品以爱丽丝梦游仙境般的方式,反过来能够影响真实证券的价格(详见下文)。

而按市值计价的会计方法,使那些杠杆高悬的机构暴露于风险之下——技术性因素驱动的资产价值下跌,可能会让它们虚弱到撑不到好转的那一天。

The Glass-Steagall Act was repealed, permitting banks and investment banks to combine. (It had been enacted in 1933 to outlaw such combinations because they were felt to have contributed to the Crash of ‘29. It’s ironic – and certainly not irrelevant – that it was repealed in 1999, in time to contribute to the current credit crunch.) The rule limiting short sales to up-ticks was revoked in July 2007, enabling short selling to force stock prices down unabated. Derivatives were created whose prices were determined by the price of their “real” underlying securities; now we see that in an Alice-in-Wonderland way, they’re able to influence the price of real securities (see below). And mark-to-market accounting exposed precariously leveraged institutions to the risk that technically-driven declines in asset values might leave them too weak to make it through to a better day.

It was during my working lifetime that the phrase “too big to fail” was coined. More

recently, Citibank caused some people to observe that it had become too big to manage.

In the current go-round, financial institutions have been described as too big to

understand and, finally, too big to disentangle (given the proliferation of derivatives and

swap transactions, a key element in assessing an institution’s essentialness is the degree

of counter-party risk it presents to others). There’s no doubt that these developments are

frightening. But heroes aren’t people who’re unafraid, but rather those who act bravely

despite their fears. Investors mustn’t let emotion control their actions.

Because of this combination of altered behavior, financial innovation and changes in

the environment, I feel unable to tell you what lies ahead. But that doesn’t mean

I’m not going to suggest a course of action.

It was during my working lifetime that the phrase “too big to fail” was coined. More recently, Citibank caused some people to observe that it had become too big to manage. In the current go-round, financial institutions have been described as too big to understand and, finally, too big to disentangle (given the proliferation of derivatives and swap transactions, a key element in assessing an institution’s essentialness is the degree of counter-party risk it presents to others). There’s no doubt that these developments are frightening. But heroes aren’t people who’re unafraid, but rather those who act bravely despite their fears. Investors mustn’t let emotion control their actions. Because of this combination of altered behavior, financial innovation and changes in the environment, I feel unable to tell you what lies ahead. But that doesn’t mean I’m not going to suggest a course of action.

市场是否知道?

Does the Market Know?

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由于系统性原因和非系统性原因,市场在许多情况下跟随……市场自身的走势。价格下跌引发恐惧,进而导致进一步的价格下跌。

在某些情况下,忧虑加剧的信号来自信用违约互换价格的上涨,这类工具为债务违约提供保险。CDS 价格上涨意味着债权人变得更加担忧。这可能压低资产价格。

For reasons both systematic and unsystematic, the market is in many cases taking its lead from . . . the market. Price declines cause fear, and thus further price declines. In some cases, the signal for increased worry comes from increases in the price of credit default swaps, which provide insurance against debt defaults. Rising CDS prices imply that creditors have become more concerned. This can send down the prices of a

2008 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

2008 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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版权所有。

All Rights Reserved

公司股票和债务工具的价格,可能吓坏客户和储户去挤兑资金,进而导致信用评级下调乃至破产。换言之,信用保险价格的上涨可以演变成自我实现的预言。这是近期某项创新的意外后果。

我想提一下这种情况下存在的操纵空间。在某个公司信用违约互换(CDS)交投清淡的市场里,一笔强劲的违约保护买盘,就能大幅压低价值数十亿美元的股票和债务价格。显然,一个不择手段的做空者可以利用这一策略牟利。没人知道这种操作已渗透到何种程度……也不知道该如何制止。

归根结底,人们又得拿出怀疑精神和自己的判断力,这次是针对坏消息。市场是聪明还是愚蠢?它是在给我们一个该退出的有效信号,还是千载难逢的买入良机?我依稀记得一句有用的引语,大意是“市场是个蠢货”。因此我认为,做一个逆向投资者比随大流能赚更多的钱。

company’s stock and debt instruments and frighten customers and depositors into withdrawing funds, potentially leading to downgrading and failure. In other words, increases in prices for credit insurance can serve as self-fulfilling prophesies. This is the unintended consequence of one of the recent innovations. I want to mention the potential for manipulation present in this situation. One strong bid for default protection in the thin market for CDS on a given company can massively depress the price of billions of dollars worth of stock and/or debt. Clearly, an unscrupulous short-seller can use this tactic to his advantage. No one knows the extent to which it is in play . . . or how to stop it. In the end, people once again have to apply skepticism and their own judgment, this time to bad news. Is the market smart or dumb? Is it giving us a valid signal to get out or the buying opportunity of a lifetime? I seem to remember a useful quotation to the effect that “The market is an ass.” Thus I think there’s more money to be made by being a contrarian than a trend follower.

金融体系的终结

The End of the Financial System

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今天我们亲眼所见、亲耳所闻的事情,是过去想都没想到过的。

We’re seeing and hearing things today that we never imagined.     

雷曼兄弟、贝尔斯登、房利美和房地美的倒闭或政府救助。

对高盛和摩根士丹利生存能力的担忧,以及这两家公司股价的暴跌。

美国国债信用违约互换保护成本不断攀升。

短期国库券收益率接近零,源于极端的避险情绪。

我想,这是人们第一次意识到,美国政府的财力是有限的,它开动印钞机解决问题的能力也有边界。

The demise or bailout of Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae and AIG. Concern about the viability of Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, and huge declines in their stocks. Rising prices for CDS protection on U.S. Treasury securities. Rates on short-term T-bills close to zero because of an extreme flight to safety. Awareness for the first time, I think, that the U.S. government’s financial resources are finite, and that there are limits on its ability to run the printing press and solve problems.

金融体系会崩溃吗,还是说这只是我们见过的最严重的一次下行周期?我的答案很简单:我们别无选择,只能假定这不是末日,只是又一个可以利用的周期。

我得承认:我这么说,主要是因为这是唯一可行的立场。理由如下:

Will the financial system melt down, or is this merely the greatest down cycle we’ve ever seen? My answer is simple: we have no choice but to assume that this isn’t the end, but just another cycle to take advantage of. I must admit it: I say that primarily because it is the only viable position. Here are my reasons:   

无法给“市场崩溃”这一情景赋予足够高的概率来支持据此行动。

就算你确信会崩盘,能做的也有限。* 如果你确信崩溃将至并采取了相应措施,而崩溃却没有发生,这些措施反而会酿成灾难。

It’s impossible to assign a high enough probability to the meltdown scenario to justify acting on it. Even if you did, there isn’t much you could do about it.* The things you might do if convinced of a meltdown would turn out to be disastrous if the meltdown didn’t occur.

2008 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

2008 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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版权所有。

All Rights Reserved

大多数时候,世界末日并没有到来。1987 年黑色星期一所传言的崩溃,以及 1998 年长期资本管理公司的危机,最终都不过是虚惊一场。

Most of the time, the end of the world doesn’t happen. The rumored collapses due to Black Monday in 1987 and Long-Term Capital Management in 1998 turned out to be just that.

钱总得有地方放;你会把资金放在哪里?如果放在短期国债里,这些美元能买到多少购买力?如果政府财政崩盘,你的美元还有什么用?哪家存款机构能幸免于难?如果你和许多人决定把数十亿美元投进黄金,你得付出什么价格?存在哪里,又怎么付钱雇卡车搬运?怎么花掉它去买你需要的必需品?别人用什么支付你的黄金,他们拿什么付给你?再者,如果你给所有持仓买了信用保险,谁来兑现你的索赔?

不,我看不到任何可行的办法来为世界末日做规划。我对其发生的概率不比任何人知道得多,但我觉得恐慌毫无用处。

我认为前景必须当作非黑即白来看:世界会不会终结?如果你不能说是,那就只能说不,并按此行事。尤其是,说它会终结会导致无所作为,而说它不会终结,才能让我们去做那些过去一向行之有效的事情。

我们将按照世界会继续下去来投资,假设企业会赚钱,会有价值,在低价买入它们的权益长期会奏效。除此之外,还有什么别的选择?

  • -- Money has to be someplace; where would you put yours? If you put it in T-bills,

what purchasing power would be accorded the dollars in which they’re denominated? If the government’s finances collapsed, what good would your dollars be, anyway? What depository wouldn’t be in danger? If you and many others decided to put billions into gold, what price would you have to pay for it? Where would you store it, and how would you pay for the truck to move it? How would you spend it to buy the things you need? What would people pay you for your gold, and what would they pay you with? And what if you bought credit insurance on all of your holdings: who would be able to make good on your claims? No, I don’t see any viable way to plan for the end of the world. I don’t know any more than anyone else about its probability, but I see no use in panicking. I think the outlook has to be viewed as binary: will the world end or won’t it? If you can’t say yes, you have to say no and act accordingly. In particular, saying it will end would lead to inaction, while saying it’s not going to will permit us to do the things that always have worked in the past. We will invest on the assumption that it will go on, that companies will make money, that they’ll have value, and that buying claims on them at low prices will work in the long run. What alternative is there?

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我们将面对怎样的未来?

What Kind of Future Do We Face?

当然,即便假设经济终将复苏,我们也必须思考复苏会以何种形态呈现。正如我在《说不通》一文中所写,我们并不指望出现“V”形反转。我们将继续侧重于那些我们认为服务于基本经济功能、即便在困境中也能表现相对良好的公司。经济中的许多方面正遭受损害,尤其是信心,这些可能需要相当长的时间才能恢复。特别是,资本供给机制已严重失灵,而信贷减少无疑意味着复苏放缓、增长乏力。

金融机构值得特别一提。如果说有哪个行业已陷入绝境,大概非此莫属。然而,橡树投资通常要求比多数机构所提供的更高透明度才肯投入。通过尽职调查几乎无法查明它们的状况,若无权查阅其账目则更是不可能。例如,潜在买家或许会发现雷曼兄弟的风险根本无法分析。正如《华尔街日报》周二所言,

Of course, even assuming there will be a recovery, we have to think about what it will look like. As I wrote in “Doesn’t Make Sense,” we aren’t counting on a “V.” We will continue to emphasize companies that we feel serve basic economic functions and can do relatively well even in bad times. Many elements in the economy are being damaged, especially confidence, and they may take a relatively long time to recover. In particular, the mechanism for providing capital is in great disrepair, and less credit certainly means a slower recovery and less growth. The financial institutions deserve a special mention. If there’s ever been a sector that’s down-and-out, this is probably it. Nevertheless, Oaktree generally demands more transparency in order to invest than most of them provide. It can seem almost impossible to ascertain their condition through due diligence, and absolutely impossible without access to their books. For example, possible buyers probably found the risks at Lehman Brothers to be unanalyzable. As The Wall Street Journal said on Tuesday,

2008 年橡树资本管理有限合伙企业(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)

2008 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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即便理解雷曼当时的交易头寸也绝非易事。

雷曼持有的利率互换(一种衍生品投资)合约多达约两百万份……

要搞懂两百万份衍生品头寸的含义需要付出怎样的努力:它们是充分对冲了,还是整体看多或看空?还有雷曼数百万份其他衍生品和复杂证券又该如何?这种不透明,加上高杠杆、依赖短期资金、流动性问题以及刻意承担风险,正是恐慌时期任何金融机构都可能遭遇信心丧失的原因。

未来的华尔街会是什么样子?我们看到——也毫不怀疑——至少在一段时间内,它会规模更小、杠杆更低、盈利更少、监管更严。但我也认为,竞争和风险都会减弱。

在我的职业生涯中,华尔街经历了从(1)为赚取佣金处理无风险交易的经纪人,到(2)为赚取价差买卖库存的交易商,到(3)在市场流动性不足时大量购入股票的大宗交易者,再到(4)为机构利益冒险使用自有资金的做市商的演变。逆转这一进程并非世界上最糟糕的事。

Even understanding Lehman’s current trading positions was tough. Lehman’s roster of interest-rate swaps (a type of derivative investment) ran about two million strong . . . What kind of effort would it require to understand the significance of two million derivatives positions: are they thoroughly hedged, or bullish or bearish on balance? And what about Lehman’s millions of other derivatives and complex securities? This opacity, combined with heavy leverage, reliance on short-term funds, liquidity and conscious risk taking, is the reason why a loss of confidence is conceivable at any financial institution in times of panic. What will the Wall Street of the future look like? We read – and I don’t doubt – that for at least a while it will be smaller, less leveraged, less profitable, and more highly regulated. But I also think it will be less competitive and less risky. In the course of my career, Wall Street went from being (1) brokers handling riskless trades for commission to (2) dealers buying and selling inventory for a spread to (3) block traders purchasing large amounts of stock when market liquidity was inadequate to (4) proprietary traders risking their own capital in pursuit of profit for the house. Backing down this progression wouldn’t be the worst thing in the world.

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什么将启动复苏?

What Will Start the Recovery?

终会有人从人群中走出来,趁低吸纳。

他可能会创办一家投行,不受遗留亏损头寸的拖累。

或者像沃伦·巴菲特当年在 MBIA 和 Ambac 受损时那样,投身债券保险业。

复苏的起因无法预测。或许根本看不见明显的起因。

也许只是价格跌得太狠,跌到无法再低。

(在古老的历史里——2001 年 11 月——我曾写过《你无法预测;但能准备》,详尽描述了周期如何基于自身能量展开。这段文字或许值得翻出来重读。)

我喜欢指出,即便事后回顾,也没人能说清 2000 年科技股泡沫崩盘的导火索是什么。但它确实崩了……我想,只是因为股价涨得实在太高。反过来也一样。

在三月的《潮水退去》中,我提到了牛市的三个阶段,这个想法在我脑子里转了大约 35 年:

Eventually, someone will walk out of the crowd and take advantage of the lows. He may start an investment bank unburdened with a legacy of losing positions. Or a bond insurer like Warren Buffett did when MBIA and Ambac became impaired. The cause of the recovery can’t be predicted. There may not even be a visible one. Maybe things will just get so cheap that they can’t stay down. (In ancient history – November 2001 – I wrote “You Can’t Predict; You Can Prepare,” with a thorough description of how cycles happen, based on energy all their own. It might be worth digging up.) I like to point out that, even in retrospect, no one can say what started the collapse of the tech stock bubble in 2000. But it did start . . . just, I think, because stock prices rose far too high. That works in reverse, too. In March, in “The Tide Goes Out,” I mentioned the three stages of a bull market, a notion I’ve been carrying around in my head for about 35 years:   

第一阶段,少数有远见的人开始相信情况会好转;

第二阶段,大多数投资者意识到改善确实在进行中;

第三阶段,所有人都确信情况会永远好下去。

the first, when a few forward-looking people begin to believe things will get better, the second, when most investors realize improvement is actually underway, and the third, when everyone’s sure things will get better forever.

2008 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

2008 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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众所周知,在第一阶段买入可以带来丰厚利润,而在最后那个狂热阶段买入,通常只会导致灾难性的后果。接着,我又反过来总结出了熊市的三个阶段:

As we all know, buying during the first stage can be highly profitable, while buying during the last euphoric stage usually leads to disaster. Then I went on to create the converse of the above, the three stages of a bear market:   

第一种情况,当只有少数几位谨慎的投资者意识到,尽管市场普遍看涨,但形势不会一直乐观;

第二种情况,当大多数投资者都察觉到情况正在恶化;

第三种情况,当所有人都确信情况只会变得更糟。

the first, when just a few prudent investors recognize that, despite the prevailing bullishness, things won’t always be rosy, the second, when most investors recognize things are deteriorating, and the third, when everyone’s convinced things can only get worse.

最后一阶段,你可以在价格几乎不含任何乐观预期的水平上买入资产。

毫无疑问,就许多金融机构而言,我们已经处在第三阶段。不一定到了谷底,但正处在一个持续悲观的严峻时期。似乎没人能想象当前这种恶性循环会如何被打断。但我想我们必须假定它会被打断。

必须指出的是,正如两年前那样,人们正在把从未成立过的事情当作事实来接受。那时,人们断言,金融工程的奇迹已让高杠杆资产负债表变得安全。如今,人们又在断言,关键金融部门及其最伟大的机构已无法生存。

人人都乐于在 18 到 24 或 36 个月前买入,那时天朗气清,资产价格高企。如今,前所未有的风险摆在桌面上、已计入价格,正适合四处寻觅便宜货——那些被连同洗澡水一起倒掉的婴儿。我们正在行动。

In the final stage, you can buy assets at prices that reflect little or no optimism. There can be no doubt that we are in the third stage with regard to many financial institutions. Not necessarily at the bottom, but in a serious period of unremitting pessimism. No one seems able to imagine how the current vicious circle will be interrupted. But I think we must assume it will be. It must be noted that, just like two years ago, people are accepting as true something that has never held true before. Then, it was the proposition that massively levered balance sheets had been rendered safe by the miracle of financial engineering. Today, it’s the non-viability of the essential financial sector and its greatest institutions. Everyone was happy to buy 18-24-36 months ago, when the horizon was cloudless and asset prices were sky-high. Now, with heretofore unimaginable risks on the table and priced in, it’s appropriate to sniff around for bargains: the babies that are being thrown out with the bath water. We’re on the case.

September 19, 2008

September 19, 2008

2008 年 橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

2008 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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