让我担忧的事
Memo to:
Memo to:
Oaktree Clients
Oaktree Clients
From:
From:
Howard Marks
Howard Marks
Re:
Re:
什么让我担忧
What Worries Me
尤其在眼下这样的时期,人们常问我什么让我夜不能寐。那我就告诉你们几件不让我失眠的事:橡树资本突然背离投资理念;我们有些账户一年跑输基准;市场弱到赚不到回报(或者强到没有便宜货可捡)。当然更不会是因为我撞上那辆总听人念叨的公交车。我真正的担忧关乎大局和长远。其中大部分与美国的未来、与我的子孙后代将生活的世界有关。就这一点而言,我觉得值得担心的事很多。我不打算在这篇备忘录里讨论像投资周期那样 mundane 的事,或者像环境恶化、全球变暖、恐怖主义那样宏大如宇宙的事。不碰那些领域,单说大体上的经济议题就够聊的了。把这些讲完,我保证回到本行去想投资的事。
Especially in times like these, people often ask what keeps me up at night. Well I’ll tell you a few things it’s not: that Oaktree will suddenly depart from its investment philosophy; that some of our accounts will trail their benchmark for a year; or that the markets will be so weak that we can’t earn returns (or so strong that there aren’t any bargains). And it’s certainly not that I’ll meet up with that bus I hear so much about. My real worries concern the big picture and the long term. Most of them have to do with America’s future and the world in which my children and grandchildren will live. In this regard, I think there’s a lot to worry about. I’m not going to spend this memo discussing things as mundane as investment cycles, or as cosmic as environmental deterioration, global warming or terrorism. There’s enough to talk about in terms of largely economic issues without going into areas like those. And having covered them below, I promise to go back to my day job thinking about investments. I hope this memo will be well received. I fear some may think it’s un-American or unpatriotic, but I assure you I’m neither. It’ll certainly seem negative and dreary; I admit up front that I see the problems more clearly than the solutions. But I hope this memo will raise some questions in readers’ minds and contribute to constructive debate. Further, I hope it’ll be of interest to Oaktree’s clients outside the U.S. While you may not be exposed to these issues to the degree we are at home, (a) you may want to know what I think the U.S. is up against, and (b) at bottom, we’re all in this together – all nations are intertwined. And who knows: you might be looking for farsighted help with your countries’ long-term problems, just like I am.
我希望这篇备忘录能被好好接受。我怕有人会觉得它不够美国、不够爱国,但我向你们保证,我两者都不是。它看起来肯定消极又沉闷;我事先承认,我看到问题比看到解决办法更清楚。但我希望这篇备忘录能在读者心里提出一些问题,促成建设性的讨论。另外,我也希望它对橡树资本在美国以外的客户有用。虽然你们或许不像我们身处国内那样直接面对这些问题,(一)你们可能想知道我认为美国面对的是什么,(二)说到底,我们都在这条船上——所有国家都交织在一起。谁知道呢:你们也许正在为各自国家的长远问题寻找有远见的帮助,就像我一样。
The American Century The truth is that it’s great to live in America. Ours isn’t the only wonderful country, or the only good place to live, but we’ve benefited from:
美国世纪
230 years of stable democratic government; 140 years without civil war; the generally peaceful co-existence of a highly heterogeneous population; very high levels of personal freedom and opportunity; a highly functioning free-market economy; great educational institutions; vast land mass and natural resources; and a highly productive, inventive and entrepreneurial citizenry.
事实是,生活在美国很好。我们不是唯一美好的国家,也不是唯一适合生活的地方,但我们享受到了以下好处:
2008 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
230 年稳定的民主政府;
140 年没有内战;
高度多元的人口总体上和平共处;
极高的个人自由和机会;
运转良好的自由市场经济;
出色的教育机构;
广袤的国土和自然资源;
以及高产、富有创造力和创业精神的国民。
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2008 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司
No one alive today has experienced anything other than American preeminence. In fact, the twentieth century has been called “The American Century.” But there’s no reason why the twenty-first century necessarily will be another. National preeminence – like most other things – is cyclical, not permanent. Given time, leading nations overextend themselves, lose their energy or squander their advantages. They get fat and happy, and they relax. Underdogs try harder and rise from a lower base. Perhaps they study the leaders and learn how to emulate them. And perhaps they begin to make better use of untapped resources and underutilized labor forces. They may even benefit as the leaders share the wealth (such as the U.S. did through the Marshall Plan after World War II). Regardless of the reasons, just as the U.S. supplanted colonial powers like England, France, Spain and Portugal that had held sway earlier, countries like China, India, Russia and Brazil now seem likely to grow faster than the U.S. in the twenty-first century, narrow the gap and enjoy their time in the sun.
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In Praise of the Melting Pot One of the greatest sources of America’s growth and preeminence has been the bounty of immigration. With the exception of the Native American Indians, there was no one here 500 years ago. We’re a country of immigrants. We’ve benefited as waves of foreigners moved to the U.S. to escape mistreatment or seek opportunity. I never forget that my grandparents weren’t born here, and how far I’ve been able to progress nonetheless. When I was a kid in the 1950s, a joke asked why we were ahead of the Russians in technology. The answer: our German scientists were better than theirs. This country attracted people from all over the world, gave them unprecedented opportunity, and permitted the most talented to rise to the top. What a great recipe for success. But today the outlook isn’t the same:
今天活着的人,除了美国的卓越地位之外没经历过别的。事实上,二十世纪被称为“美国世纪”。但没有理由认为二十一世纪必然还是另一个美国世纪。
国家的卓越——像大多数事物一样——是周期性的,不是永久的。假以时日,领先的国家会过度扩张,失去活力,或者挥霍掉自己的优势。它们变得又肥又安逸,开始松懈。追赶者更努力,从更低的起点往上爬。也许它们研究领先者,学会如何效仿。也许它们开始更好地利用未开发的资源和未被充分利用的劳动力。它们甚至可能因为领先者分享财富而受益(比如美国二战后通过马歇尔计划所做的那样)。不管原因是什么,正如美国取代了早先掌权的英国、法国、西班牙、葡萄牙这些殖民国家,中国、印度、俄罗斯、巴西这些国家如今看来很可能在二十一世纪比美国增长更快,缩小差距,享受它们的好时光。
The stick isn’t as strong as it used to be: economies and living conditions in other countries have gotten better and continue to do so. The carrot isn’t as strong, either: we’re no longer the only country offering opportunity. The barriers to entry threaten to rise, as some Americans consider immigration one of our biggest problems. And 9/11 has made visas, including those for students, much harder to obtain.
为大熔炉喝彩
My involvement as a university trustee has exposed me to a developing trend. It used to be that foreign students were eager to come to the U.S. to gain a higher education and then stay to pursue their fortunes. They still want to come for the education, but today many want to return to participate in economic booms in their native countries. This makes me wonder whether there’ll come a day when the opportunity for a first-class U.S. education isn’t as much of a draw, because other countries will have developed
美国增长和卓越的最大源泉之一,是移民带来的丰沛人才。除了印第安原住民,五百年前这里什么人也没有。我们是一个移民国家。一波又一波外国人来到美国逃避迫害或寻求机会,我们从中受益。我从不忘记我的祖父母不是在这里出生的,而即便如此我依然能走到今天。
我小时候在上世纪五十年代,有个笑话问为什么我们在技术上领先俄国人。答案是:我们的德国科学家比他们的好。这个国家吸引了全世界的人,给他们前所未有的机会,让最有才华的人爬上顶峰。这是多么了不起的成功配方。
但今天前景不一样了:
2008 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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棍子不如以前硬了:其他国家的经济和居住条件已经改善,而且还在继续改善。
胡萝卜也不如以前甜了:我们不再是唯一提供机会的国家。
进入门槛有抬高的危险,因为有些美国人把移民看作我们最大的问题之一。而且 9·11 之后,签证——包括学生签证——难拿多了。
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我作为大学校董的参与让我看到一种正在发展的趋势。过去外国学生渴望来美国接受高等教育,然后留下来追求财富。他们现在仍然想来受教育,但如今很多人想回去参与祖国的经济腾飞。这让我琢磨,会不会有一天,一流美国教育的吸引力不再那么强,因为其他国家会发展出自己相当的教育机构。那一天似乎还很远——这样的机构不会一夜之间冒出来——但并非不可能。
许多初到美国的人在工程领域获得成功,在那里他们的技术能力能派上用场,语言能力可能不那么关键。但现在我们听到硅谷说,由于上述趋势,工程师更难吸引和留住了。有人告诉我,在某些领域(比如航空航天),美国工程师人数在下降,平均年龄在上升。
美国的卓越部分取决于持续吸引世界上最优秀最聪明的人,但在这方面前景已不如过去。
comparable educational institutions of their own. That day seems far off – institutions like these don’t arise in an instant – but it isn’t an impossibility. Many newcomers to the U.S. have found success in engineering, where their technical skills could be put to good use and language skills may have been less critical. Now, however, we hear from Silicon Valley that engineers are harder to attract and retain because of the trends described above. I’m told that in certain fields (like aerospace), U.S. engineers are declining in number and their average age is rising. America’s preeminence depends in part on continuing to attract the world’s best and brightest, but the outlook for doing so is not all it was in the past.
生活水平
Standard of Living In many ways, including materially, Americans have enjoyed a wonderful standard of living over the last hundred years. Considering creature comforts such as housing, food, sanitation, healthcare, leisure and luxuries, ours may have been the highest standard of living in the world. That raises three questions:
- Why should we continue to enjoy the highest standard of living?
- Why should it continue to improve?
- And why should the rate of improvement outpace that of the rest of the world?
We often see poll results showing that increasing numbers of Americans doubt their children will live better than they do. We’d like them to, but why should they? Other than technological improvements which doubtless will continue to make life better for everyone, why should our standard of living improve monotonically? And improve relative to the rest of the world? Certainly the advantage in this regard can shift to other countries, just as it shifted to us in the past.
在许多方面,包括物质方面,美国人过去一百年享受了极好的生活水平。就住房、食品、卫生、医疗、休闲、奢侈品这些舒适条件而言,我们的可能是世界最高的生活水平。这带来三个问题:
一、凭什么我们该继续享有最高的生活水平?
二、凭什么它该继续提高?
三、凭什么提高速度该超过世界其他地方?
我们经常看到民调显示,越来越多的美国人怀疑自己的孩子会不会过得比他们好。我们希望他们会,但凭什么会呢?除了技术进步无疑会继续让每个人的生活更好之外,凭什么我们的生活水平该单调上升?而且相对于世界其他地方上升?在这方面,优势当然可能转移到别的国家,就像过去转移到我们身上一样。
The World’s Highest Earners One of the reasons for our high standard of living is the fact that Americans have been paid more for doing a given job than everyone else. This was fine as long as (a) the U.S. enjoyed the benefits listed on page one, and (b) significant barriers protected the status quo. But why should this go on? How can it go on? Think about two cities. City A has more jobs than people, and city B has more people than jobs. Initially, people in city A – where labor is relatively scarce – will be paid more for doing a given job than people in city B. The key to their continuing to earn more is the existence of barriers that prevent people from moving to city A. Otherwise, people will move from city B to city A until the ratio of people to jobs is the same in both cities and so are the wages. Among other things, geographic inequalities are dependent on the immobility of resources.
世界上收入最高的人
2008 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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我们高生活水平的原因之一,是美国人做同样的工作拿到的报酬比别人都高。只要(一)美国享有第一页列的那些好处,(二)有重大壁垒保护现状,这都还好。但凭什么这能持续?它怎么可能持续?
想想两个城市。A 城工作岗位比人多,B 城人口比岗位多。起初,A 城的人——劳动力相对稀缺——做同样的工作拿的报酬比 B 城的人高。他们能继续拿高薪的关键,在于存在阻止人们搬到 A 城的壁垒。否则,人们会从 B 城搬到 A 城,直到两个城市的人岗比相同,工资也相同。换句话说,地理上的不平等依赖于资源的不可流动性。
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在上世纪大部分时间里,壁垒保住了我们的高工资。别国的产品不如我们的好。有些缺乏投资资本,有些时不时被战争打得满目疮痍。也许它们没有我们产生技术进步的能力,或者没有我们的管理才能。高运输成本、关税、偏见(我小时候,“日本晶体管收音机”就是“劣质品”的同义词)或法律限制(比如不让外国航空公司在我们的市场自由竞争)可能保护了美国人的工资。国际贸易不像今天这样发达。但这一切都可能随着时间改变,而且很难看出美国工人的收入优势怎么能持续下去。
别的不说,我们的传统航空公司被高成本劳动合同压得喘不过气,全都通过破产来甩掉这些包袱。同样,高昂的医疗成本加到每辆美国制造的车上,伤害了我们的竞争力。于是美国汽车工业丢了国内市场份额,把生产转到海外,如今只剩三家家底不稳的公司。
保护主义倾向于筑起贸易壁垒,但通常因为其整体效果而遭到抵制。在国际贸易中,就像在本地市场一样,维持和扩大市场份额——从而保护盈利能力——的唯一真正办法,是提供价格与价值的最佳组合。法规和关税不会让我们在长期具有竞争力,而在一个壁垒更低的世界里,如果不能提供更划算的交易,我们生活水平的优势就保不住。
For much of the last century, barriers kept our pay high. Other countries’ output wasn’t as good as ours. Some lacked investment capital, and some were decimated by war from time to time. Perhaps they didn’t possess our ability to generate technological advancements or our managerial skills. High transportation costs, tariffs, prejudices (when I was a kid, “Japanese transistor radio” was synonymous with “low quality”) or legal restrictions (e.g., keeping foreign airlines from competing freely in our markets) may have protected American wages. International trade wasn’t what it is today. But all of these things can change over time, and it’s hard to see how the earnings supremacy of U.S. workers will be sustainable. Among other things, our legacy airlines became weighted down with high-cost labor contracts and all have gone through bankruptcy to shed them. Likewise, high healthcare costs added to the cost of every car built in the U.S. to an extent that hurt our competitiveness. Thus the U.S. auto industry lost domestic market share, sent production overseas, and consists of three companies of uncertain creditworthiness. Protectionism favors the erection of trade barriers, but it’s usually resisted based on the totality of its effects. In international trade, just as in local markets, the only real way to maintain and grow market share – and thus to protect earnings power – is to offer the best combination of price and value. Regulations and tariffs won’t make us competitive in the long run, and without offering a superior bargain, the supremacy of our standard of living will not be preserved in a world of lower barriers.
你们做什么?
我们都熟悉这样的模式:随着沟通改善、壁垒和运输成本下降,工作机会从美国流向中国、印度或其他低成本国家,背后是生产者追求更高利润或仅仅为了保持竞争力。甚至有个专门的词来描述它:外包。结果,年复一年,美国制造的越来越少,无论是满足自身需求还是世界需求。
我今天早上上班路上看了看自己。我身上穿的所有东西都是美国以外制造的:西装、衬衫、领带、鞋子、眼镜,甚至连内裤都是。我的车、电视和音响是进口货。电脑也是进口的。这些东西有些是我从美国公司买的,但产地都在别处。(我不觉得买这些就是不爱国:我只是在追求性价比最高的优质商品。)
这无可回避:我们不再制造多少东西了。那意味着什么?我得承认,我不知道。我的经济学知识不足以给出答案。但我一直在想一个问题:一个经济体系,如果它不再制造多少东西,还怎么运转?
乔给埃德做法律工作,埃德给乔记账。莎拉给鲍勃理发,鲍勃在莎拉常去的那家餐馆掌勺。里奇开着公交车,送苏去银行。
What Do You Make? We’re all familiar with the pattern: as communications improve and barriers and transportation costs come down, jobs move from the U.S. to China, India or some other low-cost country, spurred by producers’ desire to increase profits or just remain competitive. There’s even a word for it: outsourcing. As a result, with each passing year, the U.S. manufactures less of its needs and the world’s. I looked at myself on the way to work this morning. Everything I had on was made outside the U.S.: suit, shirt, tie, shoes, eyeglasses, even underwear. My car, TV and stereo are imports. So’s my computer. I bought some of these things from American companies, but they were made elsewhere. (I don’t think I’m unpatriotic in buying these things: I’m just pursuing high-quality goods at the best ratio of value to price.) There’s no way around it: we don’t make much anymore. What does that mean? I have to admit I don’t know. I’m not enough of an economist to have the answer. But I wonder a lot about how an economy can function if it doesn’t make much. Joe does Ed’s legal work, and Ed keeps Joe’s books. Sarah cuts Bob’s hair, and Bob cooks in the restaurant where Sarah eats. Rich drives the bus that takes Sue to the bank,
Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.,2008 年
2008 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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而苏会处理里奇的贷款申请。当然,像我这样的人会为所有人管理投资。但如果没人真正制造东西——而且我们不得不从其他国家购买所有物品——经济该如何运转?我这是夸张说法以强调问题,但你明白我的意思。我们每年制造的东西越来越少——而消费的却越来越多。
如果经济完全由服务提供者、政府工作人员和零售商组成,它还能成功吗?(想一想在即将到来的总统大选中你听到最多的那些工会:服务业雇员国际工会和美国州、县、市雇员联合会——不再是卡车司机工会和汽车工人工会。)一个国家不生产商品能繁荣吗?我真的不知道答案。
还有另一个问题:我们该从哪里得到所需的东西?当然,我们会从其他国家购买。但这引出了其他问题:廉价劳动力国家的通胀上升,会在多大程度上抬高我们如此依赖的进口商品成本?我们要向世界其他地方出售什么,才能换取购买他们商品的货币?他们又会买我们的东西多久?
显然,美国商品的价格竞争力已经下降,其他国家也学会了为自己生产。想想我们出口什么。电影?电脑软件?其他国家越来越多地自己制造。金融产品?这倒是我们仍在出口的领域。但鉴于次贷和债务抵押债券(CDO)的后果,我们是否已经损害了这个特许经营权?(给你一个冷知识:我们按体积计算最大的出口产品是什么?这个刁钻问题的关键在于“按体积计算”这几个字,答案是回收废纸。这当然不表明我们在制造方面有优势,或我们为全球经济增加了什么价值。)
我们越来越多地被降级为为别处生产设计产品、款式、软件和媒体内容。这方面长期前景如何?别人还需要我们扮演这个角色多久?有人说我们正在变成一个翻汉堡包的国家。这当然是夸张,但夸张了多少?又会产生什么后果?最后一件事(别告诉我朋友我说过这话):当投资银行家和资金管理者——他们对经济产出的贡献相对较小——成为社会中收入最高的群体时,这意味着什么?
and Sue handles Rich’s loan application. And, of course, someone like me manages investments for all of them. But how does an economy function if nobody actually makes anything – and if we have to buy all of our stuff from other countries? I’m exaggerating for impact, but you get my meaning. We make less and less each year – and we consume more. Can an economy be successful if it consists of nothing but service providers, government workers and retailers? (Think about the unions you hear the most about in connection with the upcoming presidential election: the Service Employees International and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees – no longer the Teamsters and Auto Workers.) Can a nation prosper without producing goods? I just don’t know the answer. And then there’s the question of where we’ll get our stuff from. Of course, we’ll buy it from other countries. But that leads to other questions: To what extent will rising inflation in cheap-labor countries raise the cost of the imports on which we depend so thoroughly? What will we sell to the rest of the world in order to get currency with which to buy their stuff? And for how long will they buy it from us? Certainly American goods have become less price-competitive, and other countries have learned to produce for themselves. Think about what we export. Movies? Computer software? Other countries are increasingly making their own. Financial products? Now there’s an area where we’re still exporting. But given the results with subprime and CDOs, might we have damaged that franchise? (Here’s a piece of trivia for you: what’s our biggest export by volume? This trick question hinges on the inclusion of the words “by volume,” and the answer is waste paper for recycling. Certainly this doesn’t indicate a manufacturing advantage on our part, or value we’re adding to the global economy.) Increasingly, we’re reduced to designing products, styles, software and media content for production elsewhere. What’s the long-term outlook in that regard? How long will others need us in that role? It’s been said we’re becoming a nation of burger flippers. An exaggeration, certainly, but how much of one? And what are the ramifications? One last thing (and don’t tell my friends I said this): What does it mean when investment bankers and money managers – who add relatively little to economic output – are among a society’s highest paid members?
赚钱与花钱
我在其他国家与人见面时,是这样描述典型美国人的(再次说明,为了效果有所夸张):银行里存着 1000 美元,信用卡上欠着 1 万美元;税后年收入 2 万美元,开销却达 2.2 万美元。这未必完全准确,我也没核实过数据。但我认为它大致勾勒出了整体面貌。
许多人几乎没什么积蓄,甚至一文不名——我们常读到有人因一场病假就破产的报道——而储蓄率已经跌到近乎为零。
Earning and Spending When I meet with people in other countries, here’s how I describe the typical American (again, exaggerating for effect): $1,000 in the bank and $10,000 owed on the credit card; makes $20,000 a year after taxes and spends $22,000. That may not be strictly accurate, and I haven’t checked my facts. But I think it presents the general picture. Many people have little if anything saved up – we often read about people being bankrupted by a bout of sick leave – and the savings rate has fallen to roughly zero.
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人们大概认为,有了养老金计划、个人退休账户(IRA)和自有住房,就不再需要存钱了。但近来的事态恰恰暴露了这种想法的漏洞。美国消费者不断举债,似乎从没想过要还清欠款,也没想过怎么还(除非中彩票)。不管是刷信用卡,还是贷款——包括把房屋净值借出来花掉——入不敷出这件事好像压根不让人犯愁。在所有这类行为上,美国消费者似乎根本没想过这场戏会怎么收场(我上次提这个问题是在 2005 年 10 月《请先看后见之明》里)。说到底,就是人们想要的花费超出了收入的支撑。“我想要,但买不起”这句话,在今天的美利坚,听起来简直老掉牙了。
People probably think of their pension plans, IRAs and home ownership as eliminating the need for savings. But certainly recent events have shown the holes in that approach. U.S. consumers increase their debt continually, seemingly without ever thinking about paying off the balance or of how they might accomplish that (short of winning the lottery). It doesn’t seem to trouble people when they spend more than they earn, whether through the use of credit cards or by taking out loans, including borrowing and spending the equity in their homes. In all of these regards, the American consumer doesn’t seem to give any thought to how this movie will end (I last raised this in “Hindsight First, Please” in October 2005). It’s just a matter of people wanting to consume more than their income supports. Saying “I want it, but I can’t afford it” seems hopelessly oldfashioned in the America of today.
还有谁?
我倒希望只有消费者这么做。可你往回翻三段,再问问自己:我笔下那个典型美国人的做派,是不是同样适用于我们的政府——常年赤字开支,债务不断滚大。
我们的财政赤字和国债,跟其他发达国家比、跟我们的 GDP 比,都算不上巨大。而且我也不是要下个价值判断,说时不时搞点赤字就错了。财政政策的传统看法是,赤字开支应当逆周期使用:经济疲软时扩大赤字刺激经济,经济过热时就收缩(也许顺便还点债),泼点冷水。但我忍不住要怀疑,常年赤字、国债增速永远跑赢 GDP,长期来看能对吗?
眼下,美国财政部得靠借钱来填财政赤字。债务越滚越大,利息账单也跟着涨——顺带一提,国会刚把国债上限从 9.8 万亿美元提到 10.6 万亿美元,为的是救房利美和房地美。用不了多久,我们可能光付利息就得借钱。
我们会不会有还清债务的一天?怎么还?更重要的是,这笔债会带来什么后果?仰仗外国债主,等于把自己逼进了死胡同:
Who Else? I wish only consumers acted this way. Go back three paragraphs, though, and ask whether my description of the typical American doesn’t also relate equally to our government: constant deficit spending and continually increasing debt. Our fiscal deficit and national debt aren’t enormous relative to other developed nations and to our GDP. And I don’t make a value judgment that it’s wrong to run deficits from time to time. The traditional view of fiscal policy is that deficit spending should be used counter-cyclically, expanding it in weak times to stimulate the economy, and contracting it (perhaps paying down debt) to throw on some cold water when the economy becomes heated. But I wonder whether constant deficits, and a national debt that always grows faster than GDP, can be right in the long run. Right now, the U.S. Treasury has to borrow to cover our fiscal deficit. As the debt grows, the interest bill rises – and in connection with the rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Congress just approved an increase in the national debt ceiling from $9.8 trillion to $10.6 trillion. Pretty soon, we may have to borrow just to pay the interest. Might we ever pay off our debt? How? More importantly, what are its ramifications? Dependence on foreign lenders puts us in quite a box:
为了吸引外资,最好支付高额利息。但当经济放缓时,维持高利率的需求可能使刺激经济的任务变得更加复杂。我们的国际收支逆差将过剩美元注入海外流通,这可能对美元价值构成下行压力。美元走弱会让外国人不愿以美元持有储备,也不愿购买日后以美元偿还的国债,而这些美元届时能买到的商品会更少。当我们大量印出美元——且这些美元大幅贬值——以至于外国人拒绝接受我们的支付承诺时,情况会怎样?届时我们又将如何为赤字融资?
To attract foreign capital, it’s better to pay high interest rates. But the need to keep them high could complicate the job of stimulating our economy when it slows. The fact that our negative balance of payments pumps excess dollars into circulation abroad can put downward pressure on the value of the dollar. Weakness in the dollar can make foreigners reluctant to hold reserves in dollars, and to buy Treasury debt that will be repaid later in dollars that buy fewer goods. What happens when we pump out so many dollars – and they depreciate so much – that foreigners refuse to accept our promises of payment? How then will we fund our deficits?
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这场争论已经持续多年。我们的政客们想借钱,好继续维持入不敷出的开支。但我们难道不该问问,该给子孙后代留下多少债务才算合理?随着联邦赤字相对 GDP 不断攀升,国债也会水涨船高,未来几代人将被更沉重的利息负担压得喘不过气来(哪怕永远不必偿还本金)。
再说一次,我不是经济学家,回答不了这些问题。(就连经济学家对赤字和国债的意义也莫衷一是。)但我不禁要问,一个国家在经济景气和不景气时都寅吃卯粮,这算不算明智之举?
This debate has gone on for years. Our politicians want to borrow so they can continue to spend more than comes in via taxes. But shouldn’t we ask what amount of debt is right to leave for future generations? As the federal deficit grows relative to GDP, so will the national debt, and future generations will be saddled with an increased interest burden (even if there’s never a need to repay). Again, I’m not enough of an economist to know the answers. (And even economists disagree about the significance of national deficits and debt.) But I wonder whether it’s prudent for a country to spend more than it makes in both good times and bad.
养老的负担
大学时学宏观经济学,我了解到社会保障制度是防止大萧条重演的“安全网”的重要组成部分之一。有了个人储蓄和私人养老金体系的帮助,美国人本应能够负担得起退休生活,而不是晚年流落街头。
如今,我却为同胞们在这方面的前景感到担忧。正如我前面提到的,许多人的储蓄少得可怜。据汤姆·弗里德曼 6 月 29 日在《纽约时报》上撰文指出:“(自 2000 年以来,)我们的国民储蓄占国内生产总值的比重从 6% 降到了 1%……”
固定收益养老金体系正在萎缩,尤其是在新增参保人数方面。固定缴费计划和个人退休账户在一定程度上填补了这一空缺,但其自愿性质使安全网上留下了大窟窿。(我非常赞赏澳大利亚、丹麦和荷兰等国强制参与养老金计划的明智做法;人们往往很难克制消费去储蓄,所以在这方面给他们一点“鼓励”是个好主意。)
最后,社会保障体系即将面临的资金缺口已有大量翔实的记录,乐观者能说的最好也不过是“短期内不会出问题”。再加上人们寿命延长、退休岁月增多,以及在职缴费者与退休领取者的比例不断下降,前景着实堪忧。
会不会有大批美国人负担不起退休生活?他们会不会陷入贫困?会不会成为社区和国家的负担?对这些问题,我看不到轻松或令人愉快的答案。
Affording Retirement In college macroeconomics, I learned that Social Security was one of the important components of the “safety net” preventing a recurrence of the Depression. With help from their personal savings and the private pension system, Americans would be able to afford retirement, rather than end up on the streets in their old age. Now I worry about the outlook for my fellow Americans in this regard. Many have little saved, as I mentioned above. According to Tom Friedman, writing in The New York Times on June 29, “[Since 2000,] our national savings have gone from 6 percent of gross domestic product to 1 percent . . .” The defined benefit pension system is shrinking, especially with regard to new enrollments. Defined contribution plans and IRAs replace it somewhat, but their voluntary nature leaves big holes in the safety net. (I admire the wisdom of mandatory pension plan participation in countries like Australia, Denmark and the Netherlands; people can find it hard to save rather than spend, so it’s a good idea to give them “encouragement” in that regard.) Finally, the impending shortages in the Social Security System have been very well documented, and the best the optimists can say is “it won’t be a problem anytime soon.” Add in more years spent in retirement by people living longer and a declining ratio of workers paying into Social Security to retirees drawing out, and the outlook is very problematic. Will large numbers of Americans be unable to afford retirement? Will they experience deprivation? Will they become a burden on the community and the nation? I see no easy or pleasant answers to these questions.
医疗困境
医疗行业同样是一个呼唤解决方案的典型问题,但前进路上的障碍重重。
The Healthcare Dilemma Healthcare is another example of a problem crying out for a solution, but the stumbling blocks are many.
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医疗费用高昂,而且成本不断攀升,部分原因在于昂贵的新药和新技术不断问世。美国人寿命大幅延长,因而患病率高、医疗负担重的年份也相应增多。在现代社会,很少有人(这可以理解)愿意不抗争就任由身体衰败走向死亡。
令人诧异的是,在我们这个先进的社会里,营养和健康意识似乎正朝着错误的方向发展,相当一部分人群的运动水平也是如此。肥胖已成流行病,带来了严重的健康问题。
患者想要最好的治疗,医生也愿意提供最好的治疗。可当许多患者连医疗费用、甚至合理的自付部分都承担不起时,社会该如何回应这种需求?我曾读过《华尔街日报》上一篇关于医疗的评论文章,标题大意是“要是你买单,我就来份牛排”。当第三方承担大部分账单时,这是不可避免的结果。
分诊取舍很难:谁去告诉一位八九十岁的老人,他不该做关节置换或接受昂贵的药物治疗?如果医院或保险公司想说“不”,那就会掀起轩然大波。
医疗经济已经变得有些反社会。医生面临收入下降、地位下滑的困境,而旨在控制医疗成本的制度,又给医护人员压上了极其令人反感的行政负担。
令人难以置信的是,作为一个如此富裕的国家,美国医疗在发达世界中的排名却很低。(不过我猜,这是因为统计平均将大量享受优质医疗服务的人,与那些境遇远不如其他拥有更广泛政府资助计划国家同龄人的不幸者混在了一起。)
一个答案是某种形式的社会化或全民医疗,但这种体制天生可能成本高昂、官僚主义严重,且效率低下。其他国家有国民医疗体系,但预约困难,我想每个人得到的医疗服务大概是凑合尚可,却谈不上出色。
如果存在集体计划,能否强制最健康、最富有的人参与?如果不能,他们选择退出、抽走医疗资源去享受“高端定制”医疗服务,并从投保人群中带走低负担成员,那这个体系又该如何运转?
Healthcare is expensive, and the cost rises all the time, in part because costly new medicines and procedures are developed. Americans are living far longer, so there are more years in which sickness is high and costs are elevated. In the modern era, few people (understandably) are content to slip into decline and death without a fight. Remarkably in our advanced society, nutrition and health awareness seem to be going in the wrong direction, along with the level of exercise for large portions of the population. Obesity has become an epidemic, bringing with it serious health problems. Patients want the best care, and doctors want to provide it. How can society respond to this demand when many patients can’t afford the care, or even a reasonable copayment? I once read a Wall Street Journal op-ed piece on healthcare with a title something like, “If You’re Paying, I’ll Have Steak.” That’s the inevitable outcome when third parties foot much of the bill. It’s hard to effect triage: who’ll tell an 80- or 90-year-old that he shouldn’t get a joint replacement or costly drug therapy? If a hospital or the insurance company wants to say “no,” all hell breaks loose. The economics of medical care have become somewhat anti-social. Doctors face declining pay and status, and systems designed to control healthcare costs stick healthcare professionals with very distasteful administrative burdens. Amazingly for such a rich nation, statistics rank American healthcare low in the developed world. (I’d guess, however, that this is the result of averaging a lot of people enjoying very good treatment with the less fortunate who fare much worse than their counterparts in countries with broader government-sponsored programs.) One answer is some form of socialized or universal healthcare, but by nature such a system is likely to be costly, bureaucratic and/or ineffective. Other countries have national health systems, but it’s hard to get appointments, and I imagine everyone gets care that’s okay but not great. If there’s a collective scheme, can the healthiest and wealthiest be forced to participate? If not, how will it function if they opt out of it, pulling away healthcare resources for “concierge” medical service and draining low-burden members from the pool of insureds?
综合这些要点,可能找到折中方案,但无完美答案。归根结底,我们负担不起为每位公民提供最优医疗服务。任何国家都做不到,声称能做到的人大概正在竞选公职。我们只能选择:(a) 为所有人提供适度的医疗服务,或 (b) 保留现有体系,其结果千差万别,境遇较差者所得甚微。这两种方案都不完美,但我认为它们就是摆在面前的选择。
Taken together, these points suggest possible compromises but no ideal answer. The bottom line is that we can’t afford to give the best possible medical care to every citizen. No country can, and anyone who says we can is probably running for office. We can either (a) give moderate care to everyone or (b) retain a system under which the results are all over the map and the less fortunate get very little. Neither of those is perfect, but I think they’re the choices.
日益加剧的不平等现象
资本主义制度之所以能够创造收益,是因为它遵循一种达尔文式的进程,参与者受经济激励驱动,而最成功者享有丰厚回报。这一制度的运转,依赖于那些更有天赋和/或更为勤奋者……
Growing Inequality The capitalist system produces gains because of a Darwinian process in which participants are spurred on by economic incentives and the most successful enjoy great rewards. The system runs on the ability of those who are more talented and/or work
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比别人做得更好就更难。更好的生活不可避免地也会落到一些人身上,他们并不配得,只是运气好或生来富有;这让人不悦,但无法避免。可如果一些人比别人过得好的差距太大,那就不是好事了。
我记得是在 70 年代,读到过一个对美国经济成功的绝妙解释:
英国工厂工人看到老板开着劳斯莱斯出门,会说:“我真想在那车底下放颗炸弹。”可美国工人看到老板开着凯迪拉克出门,会说:“总有一天我也要弄一辆那样的车。”
这是那种蕴含大量真理的小故事。经济动力和机会感是强大的正向力量,而阶级仇视同样是强大的负向力量。我们希望美国继续保持精英体制,让所有公民都相信自己有能力向上走。差距过大,会侵蚀人们对这套制度的信心。
顶层薪酬相比其他一切已经爆炸式增长。80 年代中期,如果我没记错的话,花旗银行的首席执行官沃尔特·里斯顿——全世界最顶尖的银行家——年薪大约是 25 万美元。25 年之后,一家货币中心银行或大型公司的首席执行官能拿那个数的 50 到 100 倍……如果期权行权收益好的话,某一年能达到 400 倍。我们劳动力队伍里还有哪个群体表现这么好?我们正处在一个收入普遍停滞的时期,很多美国人没有像高管阶层那样取得进步……或者压根没任何进步。
我并不指望高管们自我克制,因为人们很少会做违背自身短期利益的事。但我希望董事会能采取这样的立场:巨额收入只有在给公司所有者带来巨大利益时才算合理。而且单一年份的出色表现,未必就该换来当年的巨额薪酬。对成功的高管,企业家式的奖励可以恰当,但应该只针对长期成功,而且一旦失败,这笔钱也要面临风险。
我深信自由市场体制,也认为最糟糕的事莫过于政府对工资或收入进行管制。可我也担心,当少数幸运儿获得的利益被其他人视为不公平地不成比例、与成就毫无关联时,会有什么后果。
过去,除了顶层收入没那么高之外,收入差距还因为底层的人也能过得不错而缩小。随着经济扩张,创造了数以百万计的体力劳动岗位和蓝领岗位。即使没受多少教育,人们也能享受生活里好东西,包括汽车、电视和度假,还能给孩子上不错的公立学校,而且大多数孩子有可能比父母找到更好的工作。如今,这些要素里还有哪个同样成立?
harder to do better than others. Inevitably the better life also goes to some who are undeserving and just lucky or born into wealth; that’s undesirable but inescapable. But it’s not good if the margin by which some do better than others is too big. I think it was in the ’70s that I came across a great explanation for America’s economic success: When the English factory worker sees the boss drive out in his Rolls Royce, he says, “I’d like to put a bomb under that car.” But when the American worker sees the boss drive out in his Cadillac, he says, “I’m going to own a car like that some day.” That’s one of those little stories containing a great deal of truth. Economic motivation and a feeling of opportunity are great positive forces, while class resentment is equally negative. We want America to remain a meritocracy where all citizens believe in their ability to get ahead. Too much of a disparity could eat into the belief in our system. Pay at the top has exploded relative to all else. At Citibank in the mid-1980s if my memory’s correct, CEO Walter Wriston, the world’s top banker, made about $250,000 a year. Twenty-five years later, the CEO of a money-center bank or large corporation makes 50 to 100 times that . . . and 400 times in a year when options pay off big. What other segment of our workforce has done as well? We’re in a period of general income stagnation, when lots of Americans haven’t made strides like the executive class . . . or any strides at all. I don’t expect executives to indulge in self-restraint, since people rarely do things against their own short-term interests. But I’d like to see boards take the position that huge incomes should come only with great benefits for the companies’ owners. And that a single great year might not merit enormous compensation that year. Entrepreneurial rewards can be appropriate for successful executives, but they should come only for longterm success and should be at risk in the event of failure. I believe thoroughly in the free market system, and that the worst thing imaginable would be government regulation of salaries or incomes. But I also worry about the consequences when the benefits to the fortunate few are perceived by everyone else to be unfairly disproportionate and unrelated to achievement. In the past, in addition to the fact that incomes weren’t so enormous at the top, the income gap was narrowed by the fact that people could do pretty well at the bottom. Millions of menial and blue-collar jobs were created as our economy expanded. Even without much education, people could enjoy the good things in life, including cars, TVs and vacations, along with good public school educations for their kids and the possibility that most of those kids would have better jobs than their parents. Which of those elements is equally true today?
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在“信息时代”,没有大学学历或不懂电脑,如今面临的障碍远比过去大得多。随着非信息类工作不断外包海外,我们那些教育程度较低的公民还能从事什么工作?你可能会说答案在于教育,但(一)我们的公立教育体系正在衰退,(二)尤其是考虑到这些工作生产力更高,怎么可能有足够的科技类岗位让全体国民都充分就业?
In the “Information Age,” the lack of a college degree or computer literacy is a much greater handicap than it used to be. With non-information jobs increasingly moving overseas, what jobs will our less-educated citizens occupy? You might say education holds the answer, but (a) our public education system is in decline, and (b) how, especially given these jobs’ greater productivity, can there be enough tech-based jobs to keep our entire population gainfully employed?
能源问题
1964 年我开始开车时,原油每桶 4 美元,汽油每加仑 29 美分。到了 1973 年,石油输出国组织对石油出口实施禁运。我们看到加油站的队伍绕过了街区,而且只允许隔天加满一次油。油价到 1980 年前后飙升至每桶 35 美元,随后回落。从 1986 年到 2001 年,油价一直在每桶 10 到 30 美元之间徘徊,之后在 2007 年涨到 92 美元,今年早些时候更是达到 148 美元。
不过,归根结底,从大约 1880 年到几年前,我们一直处于廉价能源的环境中。一百多年来,油价没有上涨,这意味着按通胀调整后的实际价格计算,能源变得极其便宜。这恰恰催生了人们预期中的行为:石油消费快速增长,供应增长滞后,对替代能源的开发关注甚少,公共交通投资不足,节能努力薄弱。
我们在能源消费上挥霍无度,难辞其咎。美国人开着能载八个人或拉巨量货物的 SUV 或皮卡去买菜。他们还心安理得地住在距离工作地点 50 到 75 英里以外的地方,每天开着自己的庞然大物独自通勤。我们只是缺乏节约用能的动力。
也许你对能源浪费有自己最典型的例子;我想到的是超市拆掉冷冻展示柜的门。你能想象未来的考古学家会怎么评价这种为了更方便买冷冻食品而把整家店都制冷降温的决定吗?
石油价格高企的欧洲,单位国内生产总值的能耗远低于我们,这绝非巧合。由于高税率,欧洲的汽油价格历来是美国的两到四倍。如今大约是每加仑 9 美元,不过我并没怎么听到欧洲人抱怨。这是因为他们开的是更小、更省油的车,住得离工作地点更近,并且大量使用公共交通。他们甚至骑自行车上班。
应对能源问题最关键的因素是昂贵的油价。低油价刺激了高需求,同时抑制了供应的增加。只有价格高企,情况才会反过来。政客们试图通过人为压低油价来讨好民众——比如动用水力压裂战略石油储备、禁止“投机”或免除汽油税,正如今年春天两党总统候选人都曾提议的那样——这只会增加需求、压低供应,毫无益处。
The Energy Problem When I began to drive in 1964, oil was $4 a barrel and gasoline was 29 cents a gallon. Then, in 1973, OPEC put an embargo on oil exports. We saw lines around the block at gas stations, and we were permitted to fill up just every other day. The price of oil jumped to $35 by 1980 or so, and then it subsided. It spent the period from 1986 to 2001 between $10 and $30 before going on to hit $92 in 2007 and $148 earlier this year. The bottom line, however, is that from about 1880 until a few years ago, we were in an environment of cheap energy. For over a hundred years, the price of oil didn’t rise, meaning it got dramatically cheaper in inflation-adjusted terms. This encouraged exactly the behavior one would expect: rapidly growing oil consumption, lagging increases in supply, little attention to the development of alternative energy sources, insufficient investment in mass transit, and weak efforts at conservation. We’re guilty of profligate energy consumption. Americans use SUVs or pickups capable of carrying eight people or huge payloads to do their grocery shopping. And they feel free to live 50 to 75 miles from work and to drive there alone in their behemoths. We just haven’t had incentives to use energy thoughtfully. Maybe you have your favorite example of energy waste; mine is supermarkets’ removal of doors from their freezer displays. Can you imagine what future archaeologists will say about the decision to cool a whole store just to make it easier to buy some frozen food? It’s not a coincidence that with oil much more expensive, Europe uses far less energy per unit of GDP than we do. Because of high taxes, gasoline traditionally has cost 2 to 4 times as much in Europe as it has in the U.S. Today it’s about $9 per gallon, and yet I don’t hear Europeans complain much. That’s because they drive smaller, more fuelefficient cars, live closer to their jobs, and make major use of mass transit. They even ride bicycles to work. The most important element in responding to the energy problem is expensive oil. Low prices have encouraged high demand and discouraged additions to supply. The opposite will be the case only if prices are high. Politicians’ attempts to play to the crowd by artificially reducing the price of oil – through releases from the government’s Strategic Petroleum Reserve, banning “speculation” or providing a holiday from gas taxes, as was suggested in the spring by would-be presidential candidates from both parties – will do nothing but add to demand and depress supply.
2008 年橡树资本管理有限合伙企业(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)
2008 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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未来,前工业社会将实现工业化,全球数百万新晋中产阶级会想要汽车。我们需要一项着眼长远的建设性能源政策,鼓励我们减少石油消耗,同时寻找更多石油。如今人人都在抱怨油价,寻找替罪羊。但只要汽油价格远低于 Snapple 或依云水,资源就会被错配,我们也不会看到真正的进展。
我们还应受益于强制燃油效率、鼓励替代能源、惩罚高油耗(或至少不激励相反行为)的法规。多年来,企业使用 SUV 一直受到税收规则的助长,这些规则依据重量,给予它们等同于卡车的优惠折旧待遇。毫无疑问,这是汽车公司游说的结果,它们从 SUV 的高利润中获益。因此,企业使用一辆 3 万美元的 SUV 比使用一辆 3 万美元的轿车更便宜。我们和我们的政府必须做出更负责任的决定。
最后,要真正有所作为,我们必须大规模投资于公共交通、能源效率和非石油基能源。这将带来短期后果:税收增加、增长放缓、其他领域政府支出减少、赤字上升和/或消费水平下降,这些影响会以某种组合出现。我们不能一边花钱解决能源问题,一边又避开所有这些效应。在别无选择的那一天到来之前,我们是否具备这样做的意愿?
与其动用战略石油储备(它是为紧急情况而设,而高油价并非紧急情况),我们不如增加储备。我们可以说:“让我们少用一些现有且负担得起的石油,为子孙后代留一些。”但这需要克己和远见,而这远非当下风尚。
In the future, pre-industrial societies will become industrialized, and millions of newcomers to the middle class worldwide will want cars. We need an energy policy that is constructive for the long run, encouraging us to use less oil and find more. Everyone’s squawking about gas prices and looking for culprits. But as long as gasoline costs much less than Snapple or Evian water, resources will be misallocated and we won’t see real progress. We also would benefit from regulations that mandate fuel efficiency, encourage alternatives and penalize high oil use (or at least don’t motivate the opposite). Business use of SUVs has been abetted over the years by tax rules giving them the superior depreciation treatment accorded trucks, based on weight. No doubt this was a result of lobbying on the part of auto companies enjoying the high profitability of SUVs. Thus it’s been cheaper for businesses to use a $30,000 SUV than a $30,000 car. We and our government have to make more responsible decisions. Finally, in order to make a genuine difference, we must invest on a vast scale in mass transit, energy efficiency and non-petroleum-based energy. This will have short term consequences: some combination of higher taxes, slower growth, reduced government spending in other areas, higher deficits and/or lower consumption levels. We can’t spend to solve the energy problem and simultaneously avoid all of these effects. Does the will exist to do these things in advance of the day we have no alternative? Rather than tap the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (which is designated for emergencies, and high prices aren’t an emergency), we could add to it. We could say, “Let’s use less than all the oil that’s available – and that we can afford – so as to leave some for future generations.” But that requires selflessness and farsightedness that’s far from in fashion.
谁将拥有世界?
除了能源问题带来的实际影响和地缘政治后果之外,我们还应当考虑金融层面的影响。20 世纪 70 年代油价跳涨时,用来换油的美元开始以巨量规模流向海外。这些美元回流的过程后来被称为“石油美元回流”。这一过程既有好处,也有风险。
本月早些时候有报道称,由于外国对我们产品的购买增加,6 月份我们的贸易逆差有所下降。这是美元在海外堆积以及我们的美元计价商品在外国人眼里显得便宜所带来的积极效应之一。简言之,我们有东西要卖,而买家来了,我们乐见其成。
但有时候我们又会对他们的出现心生不快。排外情绪很容易就会冒头。20 世纪 80 年代,有人担心日本的经济巨轮会带来日本买家对美国资产的大规模收购。几年前,有项拟议
Who’ll Own the World? In addition to the practical and geopolitical ramifications of the energy situation, we’d better consider the financial ones. When the price of oil gapped up in the 1970s, vastly increasing numbers of dollars started to move offshore in exchange for oil. The process of bringing them back came to be called “recycling petrodollars.” There are both benefits and risks in this process. Earlier this month it was reported that our trade deficit declined in June because of rising foreign purchases of our products. That’s one of the positive effects of the piling up of dollars abroad, and also of the fact that our goods priced in dollars look cheap to those outside the U.S. In short, we like having buyers for the things we have to sell. But sometimes we resent their presence. It doesn’t take much for xenophobia to rear its ugly head. In the 1980s, there was fear that Japan’s economic juggernaut would lead to a wholesale takeover of U.S. assets by Japanese buyers. A couple of years ago, proposed
2008 年橡树资本管理有限公司(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)
2008 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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中国和迪拜对我们在石油和港口行业的投资遭到拒绝,去年秋天,在大家尚未清楚我们多么迫切地需要更多资本之前,人们就已经对主权财富基金在我们金融机构中日益增长的影响力颇有微词。
那么,你期待发生什么呢?如果我们入不敷出,因而将美元送往海外来支付账单,那么期待其中一部分美元被带回并在国内消费,难道不合理吗?显然,石油生产国将有能力购买我们的资产。而有些国家,如卡塔尔和阿布扎比,规模太小,无法将如此庞大的资金投资或消费在国内而不加剧其本已严重的通胀。
我们已经看到这些影响了。金融机构在需要增加资本时,纷纷求助于主权财富基金——还有谁能提供帮助呢?全球酒店的房价以美元计正在飙升。受外国购买力推动,当代艺术市场的价格高得离谱,伦敦及其他热门城市的高端房地产价格也是如此。上个月有报道称,法国南部一座别墅以 7.5 亿美元卖给了一位俄罗斯人:这对卖家来说是个极好的结果,但也预示着我们最终可能被挤出自己的资产之外。
随着美元流向海外且汇率对我们不利,美国人可能会发现,自己更难负担起习惯了的商品和生活水平,更难享受海外假期,也更难守住资产而不是屈服于出价。
涉及的数字非常庞大。7 月 10 日《纽约时报》写道:
油价逼近每桶 140 美元,分析师预计波斯湾国家每年将产生 3000 亿美元的现金盈余……该地区的主权基金到 2020 年预计将达到 15 万亿美元的规模。
当然,这些数字只会随着时间的推移不断增长。前几天,有人给我一个简化的思考方式:在某个时间点,每桶石油价格每上涨 1 美元,此后一百年内大约会有 1 万亿美元从石油消费国流向石油生产国。油价为 120 美元,意味着生产国将收获约 120 万亿美元。为了让你更直观地理解,目前全球股市总市值约为 47 万亿美元。因此,说石油生产国可能拥有整个世界,并不算太夸张。
你可能会争辩说,更省油的汽车、电动汽车、原子能汽车、氢动力和冷聚变将改变这一等式,阻止这种大规模的财富转移。我们确信,高油价会减少需求,鼓励勘探,并使发明创造和替代方案变得经济可行。但我认为,更明智的做法是深入思考这个问题,而不是仅仅指望事情会自行解决。
investments by China and Dubai in our oil and port industries were rebuffed, and last fall (before it was clear how desperately we needed more capital), people were grumbling about sovereign wealth funds’ growing influence over our financial institutions. Well, what do you expect to happen? If we spend more than we bring in, and thus send dollars overseas to pay our tab, isn’t it reasonable to expect that some will be brought back and spent here? Clearly, the oil producers will have the ability to buy our assets. And some, like Qatar and Abu Dhabi, are far too small for the amounts involved to be invested or spent in those countries without making their inflation worse than it already is. We’re already seeing the effects. Financial institutions ran to sovereign wealth funds when they needed to add to their capital; who else is there? Room rates in hotels around the world are soaring in dollar terms. Powered by foreign buying, prices in the contemporary art market are moving out of sight, and so are high-end real estate prices in London and other cities of choice. Last month it was reported that a villa in the south of France had been sold to a Russian for $750 million: a great outcome for the seller, but also a sign that eventually we may be priced out of our own assets. With dollars moving abroad and exchange rates going against us, Americans are likely to find it harder to afford the goods and the standard of living they’re used to, enjoy holidays overseas, and hold on to assets rather than succumbing to bids. The numbers involved are very substantial. On July 10, The New York Times wrote: With oil hovering near $140 a barrel, analysts expect countries in the [Persian] gulf to generate yearly cash surpluses of $300 billion . . . with sovereign funds in this area forecast to reach a size of $15 trillion by 2020. And of course, the numbers will do nothing but increase with time. The other day I was given a shorthand way to think about the situation: for every $1 in the price of a barrel of oil at a point in time, approximately $1 trillion will move from oil consumers to oil producers over the subsequent hundred years. Oil at $120 means the producers will reap about $120 trillion. To put this into perspective, the total value of the world’s stock markets currently stands at about $47 trillion. So it’s not much of an exaggeration to say the oil producers could own the world. You might argue that more fuel-efficient cars, electric cars, atomic cars, hydrogen power and cold fusion will alter the equation and prevent this massive shift of wealth. And we know for sure that high oil prices will reduce demand, encourage exploration and make invention and substitution economic. But I think it’s smarter to think about the issue than just count on things to work out.
2008 年橡树资本管理有限合伙企业
2008 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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我们是政府派来帮你们的
上个月,我在《不合逻辑》那篇文章里说,美国企业界最糟糕的问题是对短期的痴迷。但短期主义远不止存在于企业界。我们被治理的方式更糟。
2004 年,《洛杉矶时报》请我写一篇书评,评皮特·彼得森那本关于迫在眉睫的财政危机的好书——《油尽灯枯》。他的一个观点是,政客们越来越不愿意碰未来的大问题。凭什么要碰?前景不愉快,任何解决方案都伴随痛苦。哪个政客愿意为了解决那些在他或她退休很久之后才可能爆发的问题,而牺牲今天的选票?正如彼得森所说:
……虽然我们的问题还没到不可收拾的地步,但两个政党都越来越不可救药。他们不面对问题,而是逃避问题。他们困在一种否认、分心、自我放纵的政治里,只有像你这样的读者,把国家从左派和右派的空谈家与舆论操控者手里夺回来,才能打破这种局面……
两个政党都抱着一套近乎靠信仰驱动的教条,对分析和证据基本无动于衷,也似乎脱离了任何严肃的政治道德,它们结成了不神圣的同盟——一场对未来的不宣之战。也就是说,一场对我们的孩子的不宣之战。从任何一党那里,我们都听不到任何为更好明天而牺牲今天的话。从某种意义上说,我们最严峻的挑战,也许就是领导者对我们财政病灶扩散的那种令人困惑的漠然。正如前财政部长劳伦斯·萨默斯所说:“我们唯一要恐惧的,就是缺乏恐惧本身。”(强调为原文所加)
不需要高等数学就能看出,我们在联邦赤字、国际收支、国际竞争力、能源、社会保障、医疗保险和教育这些领域都面临严重问题。这些问题当然不会自己解决。但你上一次听说有人对它们进行严肃辩论是什么时候?
就拿社会保障制度来说。只有四种可能:(1)加税,(2)降福利,(3)私有化,(4) 等问题发生时再处理无力偿债。但前两种不受欢迎,第三种在政治上争议很大,因为它天生比现行制度更不平等,还可能导致政府最后兜底、变成最后付款人。所以就剩第四种……我们也就停在原地。这根本不是解决问题的可取办法。
同样,每个人都知道税法过于复杂、难以理解,而且塞满了照顾特殊利益集团的条款。它迫切需要彻底重写,但没人认为这在政治上行得通。
We’re From the Government and We’re Here to Help Last month, in “Doesn’t Make Sense,” I labeled the obsession with the short term the worst thing about American business. But short-termism is far from limited to business. The process under which we’re governed is even worse. In 2004, the Los Angeles Times asked me to write a review of Pete Peterson’s excellent book on the looming fiscal crisis, “Running on Empty.” One of his messages was that politicians are increasingly loath to take on the big issues of the future. Why should they? The prospects are unpleasant, and any solutions will entail pain. What politician would trade away votes today to solve problems that are likely to come to a head long after he or she has retired? As Peterson put it: . . . while our problems are not yet intractable, both political parties are increasingly incorrigible. They are not facing our problems, they are running from them. They are locked into a politics of denial, distraction, and self-indulgence that can only be overcome if readers like you take back this country from the ideologues and spin doctors of both the left and the right. . . . With faith-driven catechisms that are largely impervious to analysis or evidence, and that seem removed from any kind of serious political morality, both political parties have formed an unholy alliance – an undeclared war on the future. An undeclared war, that is, on our children. From neither party do we hear anything about sacrificing today for a better tomorrow. In some ways, our most formidable challenge may be our leaders’ baffling indifference to our fiscal metastasis. As former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers puts it, “The only thing we have to fear is the lack of fear itself.” (Emphasis added) It doesn’t require higher math to see that we face serious problems in areas such as Federal deficits, the balance of payments, international competitiveness, energy, Social Security, Medicare and education. Certainly those problems won’t solve themselves. But when did you last hear of any serious debate on them? Take the Social Security system. There are only four possibilities: (1) higher taxes, (2) lower benefits, (3) privatization, or (4) dealing with the system’s insolvency when it occurs. But the first two are unpopular, and the third is politically contentious, given that it’s inherently less egalitarian than the current system and could result in the government being on the hook as the payer of last resort. So that leaves the fourth . . . which is where we stay. This just is not an acceptable approach to problem solving. Likewise, everyone knows the tax code is overly complex, indecipherable and larded with provisions benefiting special interests. It desperately needs reworking from the ground up, but no one considers that politically doable.
2008 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司
2008 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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《华尔街日报》6 月 24 日指出:
克林顿总统试图改革医疗体系时,在他所属政党掌控的国会里,连一个委员会的表决都没能争取到。
小布什总统试图改革社会保障制度时,同样在他所属政党掌控的国会里,连一个委员会的表决都没能争取到。
华盛顿解决重大问题的失败实在让我按捺不住,让我想起威尔·罗杰斯的一句名言:“你观察政治越多,就越得承认,两党一个比一个糟。”
对政客的谴责也不必全盘否定。确实有一些人是我欣赏的。他们最突出的特点是怀有跨党派合作的精神。他们不把政治当作一场血淋淋的竞技,在那里唯一要紧的目标就是让对方难堪、赢得选举,而是真心想解决我们国家的问题。我只是觉得,这样的人寥寥无几,比我年轻时记得的少得多。
我承认,我感觉政府处境不利,难有起色。报纸和电视新闻受关注减少,对国内国际事务的兴趣下降,快讯式片段的作用越来越大,人们注意力普遍变短,自我牺牲精神日渐消亡,唯我主义不断抬头……在这方面,乐观从何而来?我们可以抱希望,但我没那么乐观。事实是,大多数人投票给那个在电视广告里形象最好、话说得最动听的人,那个说他们爱听的话的人,那个他们认为今天能把钱放进他们口袋、明天能让生活更美好的人。
设想两位总统候选人。一位说:“我要给你们八年的纪律和克制——加税、减支出——但我会让这个国家变得更好。”另一位说:“我有一个秘密计划,能解决我们所有的问题,而你们无需任何牺牲。”你觉得谁会赢?
As The Wall Street Journal pointed out on June 24: When President Clinton tried to overhaul the health-care system, he couldn’t get even a committee vote on his plan in a Congress his party controlled. When President George W. Bush tried to revamp Social Security, he couldn’t get even a committee vote on his plan in a Congress his party controlled. Washington’s failure to solve the big problems really gets me going, calling to mind a great quote from Will Rogers: “The more you observe politics, the more you've got to admit that each party is worse than the other.” Condemnation of politicians needn’t be universal. There actually are some I like. More than anything else, they’re marked by a spirit of bipartisanship. Rather than consider politics a blood sport in which the only important goals are to embarrass the other side and win elections, they want to solve our nation’s problems. I just think they’re few in number, and much fewer than I recall from my youth. I confess that I feel the deck is stacked against government getting better. Less attention paid to newspapers and TV news, declining interest in national and international affairs, the rising role of the sound bite, generally shorter attention spans, a vanishing spirit of self-sacrifice, rising me-first-ism . . . where would optimism come from in this regard? We can hope, but I’m not that hopeful. The truth is that most people vote for the candidate who looks and sounds best in TV ads, who says what they want to hear, and who they think will put money in their pocketbooks today and brighten their lives tomorrow. Imagine two candidates for president. One says, “I’m going to give you eight years of discipline and denial – of higher taxes and lower spending – but I’ll leave the country in better shape.” The other says, “I have a secret plan that will solve all of our problems without requiring any sacrifice on your part.” Who do you think would win?
什么办法不管用
这些问题没有简单的解决办法。但这并不会阻止人们要求简单的解决办法。有两个领域,我们很可能会看到有人试图动手,那就是税收累进和全球贸易。
这个选举季,某些候选人说了不少民粹主义的话。如果他们当选,可能会试图通过提高顶端税率来调节收入差距。和往常一样,他们会说:“我们不是要‘宰富人’,只是让他们交该交的份额。”我不知道民粹主义者会从哪里找到“该交的份额”的定义,但我相当确定,到头来它只是“更多”的同义词。
What Won’t Work There are no simple solutions to these issues. But that’s not going to keep simple solutions from being demanded. Two areas where we’re likely to see them tried are tax progressiveness and global trade. A lot of populist rhetoric is coming from certain candidates for office this season, and if they’re elected, they might try to redress the income disparity through tax increases at the top. As usual, they’ll say, “We’re not out to ‘soak the rich.’ We’re just trying to make them pay their fair share.” I don’t know where the populists will go for their definition of a “fair share,” but I’m pretty sure it’ll turn out to be just a synonym for “more.”
2008 年橡树资本管理公司(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)
2008 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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结果将是,那些——并非依据价值判断,而是纯粹从经济角度看——最富生产力的公民面临加税。这类加税并非解决之道,反而可能对经济产生负面影响。回溯上世纪 70 年代英国的低迷时期,最高所得税率处于 90% 以上(我小时候美国也是如此),我读到一位银行家请假一周回家刷房子的故事。算盘很简单:放弃一周税后薪水,比付油漆工账单更划算。
税收会催生各种动机:少干活、隐藏收入,最终把收入转移出去避税。当一位专业人士发现放弃报酬去做体力活在经济上更划算时,整体经济的净结果是损失。这不是我们该提供的激励。上世纪 80 年代,供给学派做的事,是让立法者相信税收决策对宏观经济运行的影响。他们的教训不能忘。
同样,贸易壁垒听起来像简单的解决办法,但实际上行不通。
The result would be tax increases on people who – not according to value judgments, but in sheer economic terms – are our most productive citizens. Such increases aren’t the answer, and they can affect the economy negatively. Back in Britain’s low days in the 1970s, the top income tax rate was in the mid-90s (as was ours when I was a boy), and I read about a banker taking a week off from work to paint his house. The calculus was simple: it was cheaper for him to give up a week of after-tax salary than to pay the painter’s bill. Taxation creates incentives: to work less, to hide income and, ultimately, to relocate income to avoid taxes. When a professional finds it economically attractive to forgo his pay to perform a physical task, the net result is a loss for the aggregate economy. This isn’t the kind of incentive we should be presenting. What supply-siders did in the 1980s was convince lawmakers of the effect of tax decisions on the operation of the macro economy. Their lesson mustn’t be forgotten. Likewise, trade barriers sound like an easy solution but don’t work.
在自由运作下,全球贸易使每种商品都在能以最低成本、最高质量生产的地方制造。这样一来,整体效率达到最大化,社会总福利也随之最大化。任何妨碍效率、干扰自由市场资源配置的行动,必然会对整体产生负面影响。我们想要对别国抬高壁垒、加征关税,而不招致对方报复,可能性微乎其微。一项贸易保护决定,不过是在潜在受益者之间做个选择。比如,禁止进口廉价服装,能保住美国服装和纺织业工人的收入,却让全体美国人为穿衣付出更高代价。
Operating freely, global trade causes each good to be produced where it can be done cheapest and best. In this way, aggregate efficiency is maximized, and thus so is aggregate societal welfare. Actions that interfere with efficiency and the free-market allocation of resources invariably will have a negative overall effect. It’s highly unlikely that we can raise barriers and tariffs against others without causing them to retaliate. A protectionist decision is just a choice among potential beneficiaries. A ban on imports of cheap clothing, for example, would protect the incomes of Americans working in the garment and textile industries but cause all Americans to pay more for what they wear.
正如最后一点所暗示的,税收和关税并不会增值,也不会让社会变得更好;它们仅仅代表了关于社会中某些群体相对于其他群体如何被对待的决策。然而,通过干扰资源的自由市场配置,它们极有可能损害整体经济。归根结底:谨慎对待。
As the last bullet point suggests, taxes and tariffs don’t add value or make society better off; they merely represent decisions about how some elements in society are to be treated via-à-vis others. However, by interfering with the free-market allocation of resources, they’re highly likely to detract from the overall economy. Bottom line: handle with care.
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我越是思考如何去解决问题,就越发相信其中一个关键的选择在于时间框架。短期答案与长期答案截然不同。美国的问题在本质上属于长期问题,需要长期的解决方案。有些办法短期内或许有帮助,但长期来看却可能适得其反,我们不能让这些办法挡了路。就拿之前关于油价的讨论来说吧。我们知道,高油价会抑制消费,促进节约、提升燃油效率、推动勘探以及促进新能源的发展。
The more I think about solving problems, the more I believe one of the crucial choices is with regard to time frame. Short-term answers are very different from long-term answers. America’s problems are long-term in nature and require long-term solutions. There are things that can help in the short term but be counterproductive in the long term, and we mustn’t let them get in the way. Take the earlier discussion of oil prices. We know high prices discourage consumption and encourage conservation, fuel efficiency, exploration and the development of
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替代方案,而低价则起到相反作用。当人们抱怨价格高涨时,渴望选票的政客们会迅速推出短期缓解措施。但速效对策只会加剧长期问题,而短期痛苦或许是解决问题的必要组成部分。为了长期压低油价,我们在短期内需要高油价。
由于汽油价格上涨,美国人在 6 月的驾驶里程比去年同期减少了 122 亿英里(降幅 5%),这是连续第八个月下降。换言之,高价格让人们把能源当作一种有限且宝贵的商品来对待。高价并不令人愉快,但最终可能帮助我们达成理想结果。俗话说“没有付出,就没有收获”,这话不无道理。(正因如此,过去六周油价下跌 20% 不应被视为纯粹的利好。)
当下似乎主导一切的短期享乐原则,将使针对上述问题实施有纪律且或许令人痛苦的解决方案变得困难重重,但这是唯一的出路。
alternatives, and that low prices do the opposite. When people complain about high prices, vote-hungry politicians rush forward with short-term palliatives. But quick fixes will do nothing but exacerbate the long-term problem, while short-term pain is probably an essential part of its solution. In order to bring down oil prices in the long run, we need high oil prices in the short run. Because gasoline prices were up, Americans drove 12.2 billion (or 5%) fewer miles in June than they did a year earlier. That was the eighth down month in a row. In other words, high prices made people treat energy like the finite and valuable commodity it is. High prices aren’t pleasant, but eventually they could help get us to the desired result. It’s not for nothing that they say “no pain, no gain.” (And for this reason, the 20% decline in oil prices over the last six weeks shouldn’t be viewed as an unmitigated boon.) The short-term pleasure principle that seemingly governs today will make it challenging to implement disciplined and possibly painful solutions to the problems enumerated above, but they’re the only way forward.
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希望你们能把这份备忘录当作建设性的意见,它能引发思考或激发辩论。我提出的问题,解决方案并不显而易见,也不会轻易到手。但正因如此,这些事情必须由政府内外的、娴熟且不带政治色彩的问题解决者来着手处理。我们的领导者需要勇气、辛勤工作和决心。我们需要那些能够想象出比输掉选举更糟糕结果的官员。我心里就有好几位。
我们总是从一个危机跌跌撞撞地走向另一个危机。在像今天这样的艰难时期,我们忙于扑火,无暇顾及长期问题。而当危机退去,人们庆祝经济复苏,又把遥远的未来和大局抛到脑后。我们都希望不必面对我列出的这些问题。确实,我们希望它们不存在。但它们确实存在,我们必须应对它们。而且,没有比现在更好的时机了。
I hope you’ll consider this memo constructive, and that it’ll inform or inspire debate. The solutions to the problems I raise aren’t obvious and won’t come easily. But that’s why these things must be tackled by skilled, apolitical problem solvers in and out of government. We need boldness, hard work and resolve from our leaders. And we need officeholders capable of imagining outcomes worse than losing an election. I can think of several. We tend to lurch from crisis to crisis. In difficult times like today, we’re too busy putting out fires to pay attention to long-term problems. And then, when the crises recede, people celebrate the return of prosperity and forget about the distant future and the big picture. We’d all like to not have to face the problems I list. Indeed, we wish they didn’t exist. But they do exist, and we must deal with them. And there can’t be a better time than the present.
August 28, 2008
August 28, 2008
p.s.:我的备忘录在发布前照例都会发给同事征求意见,这次理查德·马森给了我一条相当精彩的反馈。他是个很有想法的人,尤其擅长看大局——带点自由意志主义色彩,但又让人无法简单归类。我希望你也能看到他的回应:
P.s.: I always circulate my memos for comment before they’re published, and this time I got a good one from Richard Masson. He’s a very thoughtful guy, especially on biggerpicture matters – a bit of a libertarian, but also impossible to pigeonhole. I want you to have the benefit of his response:
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我们这个国家最可贵之处,在于国民的机变能力,以及制度与法律的灵活性。创造性的破坏加上运行良好的市场经济,能够确保随着时间的推移,变化总是朝着最优解推进。你提出的种种观察与担忧,我大体上都认同,但我相信我们有能力在时间中摸索出解决办法,而不是靠强加或立法来推行。或许美国会迎来一场制造业的复兴,或许油价的高企会迫使社区重新聚拢,让邻里之间重新建立起更紧密的相互依存?或许经济放缓会让移民潮降温,为本国教育程度较低的公民(以及年轻人)腾出就业机会?或许我们最优秀、最聪明的头脑会转向工程与科学,而不是金融。从许多方面看,下一代人即便生活水准明显下降,生活质量仍可能更高。我倒是真心希望理查德说得对。
The best thing about our country is the resourcefulness of our citizenry and the flexibility of our institutions and laws. Creative destruction and a functioning market economy assure change toward the best solution over time. I generally agree with all your observations and concerns, but I have faith in our ability to create (rather than impose or legislate) solutions over time. Perhaps America will enjoy a manufacturing renaissance, or the cost of oil will force communities back together and facilitate greater interdependence between neighbors? Perhaps a slowing economy will slow immigration and create job opportunities for our less educated citizens (and youngsters). Perhaps our best and brightest will gravitate toward engineering and science rather than finance. In many ways, the next generation could enjoy a higher quality of life even at a measurably lower standard of living. I’d love it if Richard turned out to be right.
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