论监管
Memo to:
Memo to:
Oaktree Clients
Oaktree Clients
From:
From:
Howard Marks
Howard Marks
Re:
Re:
On Regulation
On Regulation
有人问我,9 月 9 日到 12 月 1 日这十二周里为什么没有发备忘录。是没想法了?写不出来了?手腕劳损?还是被中情局调走了?答案是“都不是”。那段时间我正忙着给一本新书收尾,书名叫《最重要的事:睿智投资者的非常见思维》。这本书把我所有投资理念的脉络整合到一起,可以说是一篇超级备忘录。书将在 4 月底出版,希望你看完后能告诉我你的想法。
I’ve been asked why there weren’t any memos during the twelve weeks between September 9 and December 1. Lack of ideas? Writer’s block? Carpal tunnel syndrome? CIA posting? The answer is “none of the above.” I was putting the finishing touches on a book, The Most Important Thing: Uncommon Sense for the Thoughtful Investor. It pulls together all of the strands of my philosophy into what might be thought of as a super-memo. It will be published in late April and I hope you’ll let me know what you think.
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2007 年 7 月金融危机爆发以来的三年半里,人们广泛讨论了放松监管在危机形成中的作用,以及加强监管以防止下一场危机的必要性。上月金融危机调查委员会报告的发布重新点燃了这一争论。因此,如今我常被问及对监管的看法,以及我认为这方面未来会如何发展。
In the 3½ years since the financial crisis surfaced in July 2007, there has been extensive discussion of the part deregulation played in creating it, as well as the need for increased regulation to prevent the next one. The release last month of the report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission reawakened the debate. Thus I’m often asked nowadays how I feel about regulation and what I think the future holds in that regard.
监管钟摆的摆动
我以前写过,人们对监管的态度,和市场行为的其他大多数方面一样,也遵循类似的钟摆式摆动。这种摆动不仅受经济环境事件的推动,也因为完全监管和完全放松监管都拿不出一个让人完全满意的答案。和许多事情一样,没有完美解法。
要了解这个话题,一本很好的参考书是《华尔街受审》(Wall Street Under Oath),1939 年出版,讲 1929 年大崩盘的成因,作者费迪南德·佩科拉(Ferdinand Pecora)曾担任参议院调查崩盘事件的委员会的法律顾问,后来当过纽约州法官。我大约二十年前第一次读到这本书,2007 年又把它从储藏室里翻出来。这是一本典型的论战之作,按我推测的作者本人的哲学/政治倾向来归咎责任、鼓吹监管(见第 4 页)。
佩科拉描写的华尔街,一直到 20 世纪 20 年代(含),都像蛮荒西部。银行家和券商一心为自己赚钱;他们的行为基本上无人监管;他们自己和客户之间的利益冲突比比皆是,却无人理会。尤其是,按佩科拉的说法,披露标准根本不存在。
The Swing of the Regulatory Pendulum I’ve written before that attitudes toward regulation follow the same pendulum-like swing as most other aspects of market behavior. They oscillate not only in response to events in the economic environment, but also because neither total regulation nor total deregulation produces an entirely satisfactory answer. As in so many things, there’s no perfect solution. A great source on the subject is Wall Street Under Oath, a 1939 book on the causes of the Great Crash of 1929 written by Ferdinand Pecora, who was counsel to the Senate committee investigating the crash and later a New York State judge. I first read it about twenty years ago, and I brought it out of storage in 2007. It is a typical polemic, assigning blame and touting regulation pursuant to what I assume were the author’s philosophical/political biases (see page 4). Pecora describes a Wall Street that, up to and including the 1920s, was like the Wild West. Bankers and brokers were out to make money for themselves; their behavior was largely unregulated; and conflicts between their interests and those of their clients were widespread and disregarded. In particular, according to Pecora, disclosure standards were non-existent.
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这些事实与其他原因共同引发了一场规模空前的市场崩盘:损失遍及各处,资本枯竭,通货紧缩,随之而来的大萧条将失业率推高至 25%。不出所料,矛头指向了前任政府,政治权力随之转移到主张政府积极干预的人手中。最持久的后果,是一批法律法规的出台,它们主导了金融体系数十年,许多至今仍然有效:《证券法》、《证券交易法》和《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法》。因此,20 世纪 30 年代见证了钟摆大幅摆向监管一侧。
接下来华尔街的几十年——或许得益于这些法律的影响——是一段相对平静的时期。这让人产生一种看法:市场参与者天性守规矩,少有例外。此外,经济稳步增长,仅有温和回调,又让人以为经济本质上是良性而富有生产性的,只要松开监管的枷锁,还能取得更大成就。卡特总统在 20 世纪 70 年代末放松了对运输业的管制,为本世纪初建立起来的大量监管体系松绑打开了大门。罗纳德·里根以著名的自由市场观点著称,恰逢和平繁荣时期,他引领了放松管制的潮流。英国在玛格丽特·撒切尔的领导下也出现了类似转向;苏联解体,资本主义取得压倒性胜利;自由市场信徒艾伦·格林斯潘和乔治·W·布什登上权力高位。
经济与金融体系带来繁荣,人们想要更多同样的一切。制造业衰退之际,我们严重依赖金融部门为 GDP、就业创造和生活水平做出更大贡献。当时的主流看法是,监管越少,商业和金融就越有生产力。再说,一个不受监管的经济,有什么可担心的呢?过去十年的结果,用一句可惜我找不到出处的好报纸引语来说,就是“来自一个不相信监管的政府所给予的那种监管”。
于是,从 20 世纪 30 年代走了一个完整循环,从 1999 年起我们看到:《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法》被废止;限制卖空须在股价上涨时进行的提价规则被取消;一项关键决定将衍生品豁免于监管之外;投行的允许杠杆率提高;监管机构的预算遭到削减。这些变化之后,便是 2007-08 年的全球金融危机。巧合还是因果?
自由市场是危险的——监管不可或缺
自由市场资本主义体系靠自利和对利润的渴望运转。我们需要监管来确保这些因素保持在合理限度内。因此,金融监管的目标大致如下:
These facts combined with other causes to produce a market crash of epic proportions; widespread losses; a drying up of capital; deflation; and a massive depression with a resulting increase in unemployment to 25%. Unsurprisingly, fingers were pointed at the prior administration and political power shifted to believers in an activist role for government. The most lasting result was the enactment of laws that governed the financial system for decades and in many cases still do: the Securities Act, the Securities and Exchange Act, and the GlassSteagall Act. Thus the 1930s saw a massive swing of the pendulum in favor of regulation. The next several decades on Wall Street were – perhaps thanks to the impact of those laws – a relatively placid period. This led to a view that, with rare exceptions, market participants are well-behaved by nature. Further, steady growth with only moderate dips caused a perception of an inherently benign and productive economy that could achieve even more if only the regulatory shackles were loosened. After President Carter deregulated the transportation industry in the late 1970s, the door was open for much of the regulatory apparatus built in the early part of the century to be relaxed. Ronald Reagan, whose famously free-market views coincided with a period of peace and prosperity, led the deregulatory charge. We saw a similar turn in Britain under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher; the collapse of the USSR and a resounding victory for capitalism; and the ascendance of free market adherents Alan Greenspan and George W. Bush. With the economy and financial system generating prosperity, people wanted more of the same. And with manufacturing in decline, we relied heavily on the financial sector for an increased contribution to GDP, job creation and standards of living. The prevailing view was that the less regulation we had, the more productive business and finance could be. And what was there to be feared from an unregulated economy, anyway? The result in the past decade, according to a great newspaper quote that sadly I can’t locate, was “the kind of regulation you get from an administration that doesn’t believe in regulation.” Thus, coming full circle from the 1930s, starting in 1999 we saw revocation of Glass-Steagall; elimination of the up-tick rule limiting short sales to instances when stock prices were rising; a pivotal decision to exempt derivatives from regulation; increased permitted leverage at investment banks; and starvation of regulatory agency budgets. These developments were followed by the global financial crisis of 2007-08. Coincidence or causality? Free Markets Are Dangerous – Regulation is Essential The free-market, capitalist system runs on self interest and the desire for profit. We need regulation to ensure those things are kept within reasonable limits. Thus the goals of financial regulation are roughly as follows:
为限制风险,特别是对整个金融体系的风险,
为限制经济力量的集中,
为保护客户,尤其是“小人物”,
为防止错误、欺诈、虚假陈述和盗窃,以及
为实现金融民主化,使其成为社会政策的工具。
to limit risk, especially risk to the overall financial system, to restrict the concentration of economic power, to protect customers, especially “the little guy,” to prevent error, fraud, misrepresentation and theft, and to democratize finance and make it a tool of social policy.
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监管的两难困境
如果说依靠道德、自律、个人责任、对风险的敬畏和分寸感就能万事大吉,那我们几乎不需要什么监管。但遗憾的是,这些靠不住。
既然逐利动机会驱使金融机构铤而走险、犯下错误甚至做出不当行为,监管就被指望用来防范这些事。人们还担心,个人的自利行为可能汇聚成一股力量,最终损害公司和整个社会。
自由市场在配置经济资源方面功不可没——尤其从长期平均来看——但误判带来的短期波动可能让人难以忍受,必须加以调节。这让监管变得不可或缺。归根结底:金融体系不能交给不受约束的自由市场。
监管并不完美,甚至有害——但自由市场并非万能
另一方面,监管又太过不完美,不能完全指望。(感谢“软绵绵”斯威特的辩证思路——见 2010 年 12 月 17 日的“闪光的不全是金子”。)制定硬性规则很容易,但规则有时会带来过高的成本,或以不尽人意的方式限制活动。而且规则越是具体,就越容易被绕过去。金融机构一门心思搞创新,规则往往跟不上步伐,监管者通常只能被动追赶。规则的制定是被动反应式的:规则是针对上一个问题写的,而不是为了预见和防范下一个问题——而下一个问题总是花样翻新。此外,监管者缺乏那种经济利益驱动,而正是这种驱动让有些人能从绕过规则、钻漏洞中获利。
既然规则会过时、会被规避,也许用原则来监管更好。换句话说,监管条文不设数字界限和明确边界,而是用概括性语言来推动对理想和政策目标的遵从。但这样做需要做出判断,而监管者很少被赋予做判断所需的自由度。想想看,如果某位监管者认定某家金融机构的行为违反了模糊的原则,随之而来的将是铺天盖地的质疑、法律上诉和打给国会议员的电话……尤其是在风平浪静的繁荣时期,警告过的后果迟迟不来。
以原则为基础的监管不仅需要灵活性——这种灵活性在官僚体系里很难建立和培育——还需要相当敏锐的商业嗅觉、洞察力和前瞻性。证据摆在眼前:极少有人看到次级抵押贷款和结构化抵押产品带来的风险,监管者肯定没看到。据我所知,没有人——无论是监管者还是其他人——预见到这些东西会对银行、货币市场基金和商业票据市场产生什么影响。
为什么监管者对评级机构向结构化抵押工具发放成千上万个 AAA 评级一声不吭?为什么高度受监管的银行成了金融危机的重灾区,而没什么监管的对冲基金却相对毫发无损?我实在无法想象监管者能有能力完全预见到快速发展的金融体系变化带来的后果,或者预见到发展的走向。
If ethics, self-regulation, personal responsibility, respect for risk and a sense of limits could be counted on, we wouldn’t need much in the way of regulation. But, sadly, they can’t. Since the profit motive can lead financial institutions to aggressive risk taking, error and even misdeeds, regulation is counted on to prevent these things. There’s also concern that individuals’ self-interest might drive them to actions that collectively might injure their companies and society. Free markets do a great job of allocating economic resources – especially on average over the long run – but the interim fluctuations produced by miscalculation can be intolerable and have to be modulated. This makes regulation indispensable. Bottom line: the financial system can’t be entrusted to untrammeled free markets. Regulation is Imperfect and Harmful – Free Markets Do It Best On the other hand, regulation is too imperfect to be relied on. (Thanks to “Soggy” Sweat for this dialectical approach – see “All that Glitters,” December 17, 2010.) It’s easy to write hardand-fast rules, but rules sometimes impose undue costs or restrict activity in undesirable ways. And their specificity often makes them capable of being circumvented. Because financial institutions are intent on innovation, rules rarely keep pace and regulators usually find themselves playing catch-up. Rule-writing is reactive: rules are written in response to the last problem, not to foresee and prevent the next one, which invariably is different. In addition, regulators lack the financial motivation that drives those who can profit from getting around regulations and exploiting loopholes. Since rules become outdated and circumvented, it might be preferable to regulate through principles. In other words, rather than numerical limits and defined borders, regulations might be written in general terms to produce adherence to ideals and policy goals. But regulating this way requires that judgments be made, and regulators are rarely accorded the license required for judgment-making. Imagine the second-guessing, legal appeals and phone calls to congressmen that would follow an individual regulator’s decision that a financial institution’s actions have violated vague principles . . . especially during a halcyon period when the warned-of consequences are slow in coming. Principle-based regulation requires not only flexibility that is hard to build into and nurture in bureaucracies, but also significant business acumen, perspicacity and foresight. The evidence is prima facie: very few people saw the risk posed by sub-prime mortgages and structured mortgage products, and certainly not the regulators. And no one I know of – regulator or otherwise – foresaw the effect these things would have on banks, money market funds and the commercial paper market. Why didn’t regulators say a word about rating agencies’ dispensing many thousands of triple-A ratings to structured mortgage vehicles? Why were the highly regulated banks ground zero for the consequences of the financial crisis, while unregulated hedge funds were relatively unscathed? I just can’t imagine that regulators will ever have the ability to fully anticipate the consequences of changes in the fast-developing financial system, or to foresee the development
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对于尚无规则和应对之策的新问题,情况更是如此。以下是《金融时报》1 月 27 日引述渣打银行首席执行官彼得·桑兹的话:“尚不清楚为何一些在危机前就在任的监管者,会相信自己如今已握有全部正确的解决方案。”哪位监管者能凭一己之力,保护我们的金融机构(以及整体经济)免受 2004 至 2007 年那些事态发展的冲击?况且,鉴于他的才能在私营部门何等宝贵,他还能在监管岗位上待多久?不,指望政府雇员来守护金融体系,根本说不通。结论无可回避:金融体系安全的责任,不能交给监管者。
of new problems for which rules and responses have yet to be drawn up. Here’s how Peter Sands, chief executive of Standard Chartered, was quoted in the Financial Times of January 27: “It is not clear why some regulators who were there before the crisis should believe they now have all the right solutions.” What regulator would have been able to make a difference in protecting our financial institutions (and the overall economy) from the developments of 2004-07? And given how valuable his skills would be in the private sector, how long would he have remained a regulator? No, it just doesn’t make sense to expect government employees to safeguard the financial system. The conclusion is inescapable: responsibility for the safety of the financial system can’t be delegated to regulators.
态度的由来
我在十二月写过一篇关于黄金的文章,说它就像宗教:信则信,不信则不信。我认为,对商业和经济的监管,也可以说同样的话。
主张扩大政府作用的自由派往往支持监管,而赞成自由放任政策、限制政府权力的保守派则会激烈反对。民主党人通常喜欢积极有为的政府:这正是他们成为民主党人的原因。共和党人则不这样。
从经济增长中获益的人往往偏爱自由市场,反对进一步监管,因为他们对现状很满意。那些没能分享到增长成果的人,以及在公共部门工作的人,态度则相反……尽管两边都有数以百万计的例外。相信经济会为自己带来好处的企业主通常反对监管,而劳工阶层希望监管能防止自己被管理层和资本所有者占便宜。
我认为我们在这方面的态度与父母高度相关,很大程度上取决于我们成长的时代和地点。接触对立的观点可以改变态度,但我认为,大多数人对监管的态度,更多源自家庭教养和环境,而非分析和理性思考。对监管的态度,就像政治立场一样,很大程度上是继承来的,即便会变,也变得极慢。
The Origin of Attitudes In December I wrote of gold that it’s like religion: either you believe in it or you don’t. I think something very similar can be said about regulation of business and the economy. Liberals who champion an expanded role for government tend to be pro-regulation, while conservatives favoring laissez-faire policies and limitations on government will argue against it with vehemence. Democrats generally like an activist government: that’s what makes them Democrats. Republicans don’t. Those partaking in the benefits of economic growth tend to favor free-markets and oppose further regulation, since they’re happy with things the way they are. The reverse is true for those who are failing to participate and those working in the public sector . . . although there are millions of exceptions on both sides. Businesspeople who trust the economy to perform for them generally oppose regulation, while members of labor want it to prevent their being taken advantage of by management and the owners of capital. I think our attitudes in this regard are highly correlated with those of our parents and largely a function of the time and place we grew up in. They can be altered through exposure to opposing points of view, but I think most people’s attitudes toward regulation stem far more from upbringing and circumstances than from analytical and intellectual processes. Attitudes toward regulation, like politics, are largely hereditary and change slowly if at all.
两种立场的调和
我认为,由于自由市场和监管制度都并非尽善尽美——加之人们的政治与哲学偏见根深蒂固——我们永远无法在完全自由的市场或彻底受监管的体系之间做出永久抉择。任何一种立场都不过是暂时的,钟摆仍将持续摆向光谱的一端,然后再摆回另一端。
Reconciling the Two Positions It’s my belief that because both free markets and regulation are imperfect – and because of the strength of people’s political and philosophical biases – we will never settle permanently on either a completely free market or a thoroughly regulated system. Any position will prove merely temporary, and the pendulum will continue to swing toward one end of the spectrum and then back toward the other.
丑闻与崩盘会引发要求加强监管的呼声。监管将遏制过度行为、惩罚违规者,从而阻止此类事件重演。
Scandals and crashes will cause a cry for regulation. Regulation will curb the excesses and punish the wrongdoers, discouraging repetition.
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环境终将归于平静,经济进步将成为常态。
引发监管呼声的那些事件记忆会逐渐消退。
自由市场主义者将占据上风,他们会主张,如果制度进一步放松管制,我们本可以做得更好。
管制将会放宽。
冒险行为和不当行径将抬头。
丑闻和危机将重新上演。
支持监管的力量将重新获得影响力,自由市场主义者将失势。
钟摆将再次摆回监管一端。
The environment will calm, and economic progress will become the rule. Memory of the events behind the demand for regulation will fade. Free-marketeers will gain sway, and they’ll argue that we could do even better if the system were deregulated. Regulation will be eased. Risk-taking and misdeeds will rise. Scandals and crashes will occur anew. Pro-regulation forces will regain influence, and free-marketeers will be in the doghouse. And the pendulum will swing back toward regulation.
关于全面监管或完全自由市场,永远不会达成彻底、持久的共识。然而,重要的是,两种极端之间的折中方案,其结果可能恰恰最为危险。
There will never be total, lasting agreement on either complete regulation or totally free markets. Importantly, however, it might well be the case that compromise between the two has the most dangerous consequences.
危机前的十年里,政治风向偏向支持住房自有和宽松的抵押贷款可得性。这些力量,加上不受监管的抵押贷款证券市场,催生了过度放贷、对抵押贷款证券的需求虚高(在安全的假象之下),进而导致抵押贷款利率被人为压低、贷款条件过分宽松。
In the decade leading up to the crisis, politics favored home ownership and liberal mortgage availability. These forces, combined with unregulated mortgage securities markets, gave rise to excessive lending, exaggerated demand for mortgage securities (given the illusion of safety), and thus artificially low mortgage rates and loose terms.
哪些接受救助的企业仍是最大的无底洞,几乎没有机会偿还政府的投资?答案是房利美和房地美,这两家由政府设立的房贷机构:名义上的私营企业,其运作却因隐含的联邦担保而扭曲。它们从事不经济的行为,推进让买不起房的人也能拥有住房的政策目标,并基于不足的资本承担巨大风险,因为它们(及其贷款方)不担心亏损。
Which bailout recipients remain the biggest sinkholes, without any real chance of repaying the government’s investment? The answer is Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government-created mortgage agencies: supposedly private enterprises whose operations were distorted by a tacit federal guarantee. They engaged in uneconomic behavior, advancing the policy goal of making home ownership available to people who couldn’t afford it, and accepting vast risk on the basis of inadequate capital because they (and their lenders) had no fear of loss.
立法者把监管权交给了私营部门,让信用评级机构负责金融机构的投资标准,这给了商业机构过度的权威光环。金钱诱惑促使它们降低标准,一旦屈服,原本神圣不可侵犯的 AAA 评级就沦为了毫无意义的标签。
Legislators turned regulation over to the private sector by putting credit rating agencies in charge of financial institutions’ investing standards, giving commercial organizations excessive imprimatur. Financial temptation pressured them to drop their standards, and when they succumbed, the previously sacrosanct triple-A rating became a meaningless label.
目睹银行与金融体系获救后,我们如今身处一个体系之中:自由市场的回报将继续激励冒险行为,而没人相信,那些玩得过火的“大而不倒”机构最终会付出代价——即彻底崩溃。被道德风险侵蚀的自由市场机制,也许在 95% 的时间运转良好,但在剩余的时间里将构成可怕的风险。
Having witnessed the rescue of the banks and the financial system, we now have a system where free-market rewards will continue to motivate risk taking and no one believes the ultimate price – meltdown – will be demanded of too-big-to-fail institutions that take it too far. A free-market mechanism undercut by moral hazard may perform adequately 95% of the time, but it will pose terrible risks in the remainder.
真正的底线在于,既然自由市场和监管都不完美,我们的金融体系也注定无法完美。大多数时候它们会运转良好,虽谈不上尽善尽美,但每隔几十年,总免不了要经历泡沫和危机(但愿不会更频繁)。
The real bottom line is that since both free markets and regulation are imperfect, our financial systems will continue to be imperfect. They will work well for us most of the time, although not perfectly, and they will be subject to bubbles and crises every few decades (hopefully not more often).
2011 年 橡树资本管理有限合伙企业
2011 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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近年之经历
回看这几年:金融危机之深重、其带来的伤痛、危机背后的种种失误(甚至更糟)、金融部门因此被迫的救助,以及普通民众在感到被弃之不顾后所激起的怨恨。再加上白宫与国会皆由民主党掌控,他们倾向于政府介入经济。这无疑是一剂强力监管上扬的配方。在这样的背景下,我反倒惊讶于政府行动并未更加活跃。在我看来,新的金融监管措施温和且受限。与欧洲相比,美国在提高金融机构资本要求和管控高管薪酬方面,总体上更为温和。没有人像安然/阿德尔菲亚时代那样锒铛入狱(甚至无人受到重罚)。对“富人”的税收也未出现惩罚性上调。
然而,迈向监管的步骤已足够多,其局限性也暴露无遗。去年新金融改革法案的核心内容之一是所谓的沃尔克规则,依照该规则,银行不能再以自有资金进行交易和投资冒险。我所接触的银行家们纷纷抱怨,这将在多大程度上妨碍他们服务客户和分散风险的能力。他们更进一步抱怨,做市行为固有的操作与沃尔克规则的违规行为难以区分。用于交易和对冲的头寸,其边界在哪里,自营交易又从何处开始?想想高盛对次贷的押注:
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The Recent Experience Think about the last few years: the depth of the financial crisis, the pain it caused, the blunders (or worse) that were behind the crisis, the financial sector bailouts it necessitated, and the acrimony they elicited from a Main Street feeling left to fend for itself. Then add in a White House and Congress controlled by Democrats, with their leaning toward government involvement in the economy. Certainly this was a formula for a powerful upswing in regulation. In this context, I’m surprised that we haven’t seen much more government activism. The new financial regulations are mild and constrained, in my opinion. Increases in financial institution capital requirements and controls over executive compensation have generally been more moderate in the U.S. than in Europe. No one has gone to jail (or even been subjected to heavy fines) as in the Enron/Adelphia era. And there have been no punitive increases in taxes on “the rich.” And yet there have been enough steps toward regulation for their limitations to be manifest. One of the primary components of last year’s new financial reform law was the so-called Volcker Rule, under which banks can no longer risk their capital on trading and investing for their own account. The bankers I meet with rail against the extent to which this will interfere with their ability to serve their customers and lay off risk. They further complain that actions inherent in market-making can be hard to distinguish from Volcker Rule violations. Where do positions held for trading and hedging stop and prop trading start? Think about Goldman Sachs’s bets against subprime mortgages:
他们有没有对冲高盛在抵押贷款上的多头仓位?
有没有降低高盛整体投资组合的风险?
是不是在跟高盛的客户对赌?
还是说,这些操作让高盛得以建仓服务客户、并开展其他客户撮合业务?
Did they hedge Goldman’s long positions in mortgages? Did they lessen the risk in Goldman’s overall portfolio? Were they bets against Goldman’s clients? Or did they enable Goldman to take positions that served its clients and otherwise engage in client facilitation?
我猜答案是“以上所有”。但显然,做市商若允许通过对冲头寸来转移风险,其提供流动性的能力要大得多。
做空抵押贷款也让高盛的财务状况更加稳健,使其成为最不缺钱的金融机构之一。我们更愿意多拥有哪一个——高盛,还是雷曼兄弟?后者在缺乏有效风控的情况下大举涉足抵押贷款和衍生品,最终破产。然而,高盛的行为却遭到口诛笔伐,自营投资也被明令禁止。
2 月 6 日,《纽约时报》头版一则报道表明,遏制自由市场力量与私利之心何其艰难。尽管华盛顿推动金融机构以股票期权方式向高管发放薪酬,以期与股东利益保持一致(并在最高层强制实施),但该报道讲述了未受强制约束的员工如何成功对冲自身持股,从而规避了影响其公司的风险敞口。
I’d guess the answer is “all of the above.” Clearly, however, a market maker can do far more to provide liquidity if it is allowed to hedge through offsetting positions. Mortgage shorts also shored up Goldman’s finances and made it one of the least needy financial institutions. Which would we like to have more of, Goldman Sachs or Lehman Brothers, which plunged into mortgages and derivatives without significant risk control and consequently went bankrupt? And yet Goldman’s actions have been vilified and proprietary investing has been outlawed. On February 6, a front-page New York Times story indicated how difficult it is to rein in freemarket forces and self-interest. Although Washington pushed financial institutions to compensate executives through stock grants in order to align interests with shareholders (and mandated it at the very top), the article described non-mandated employees’ success in hedging their shareholdings and thus sidestepping exposure to the risks affecting their companies.
2011 年 橡树资本管理公司(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)
2011 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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“华尔街声称,通过向高管授予股票,让他们承担这项投资的长期风险,是在自我改革,”美国证券交易委员会前首席会计师林恩·E·特纳说,“对冲风险能在很大程度上抵消这项改革……”
更广泛地说,批评人士认为,对冲操作是对金融改革的又一次迂回突破。
例如,针对借记卡手续费出台的新规,已导致几家大银行取消免费支票账户。各公司还计划通过调整业务,以适应针对衍生品及银行自有资金交易更严格的新监管,来弥补收入缺口。
《华尔街日报》2 月 18 日的报道提供了另一个例子:去年 11 月,巴克莱银行悄悄更改了其在英国本土主要美国子公司的法律分类,使该子公司不再受联邦银行资本要求的约束……
这一操作使他们得以规避金融改革法案中的一项条款,该条款迫使数十亿美元的新资本注入这些被称为银行控股公司的美国实体。
“把那么多资本困在控股公司里,实在不划算,”一位为银行提供重组咨询的纽约律师说。
这些举动是银行如何争相缓冲世界各地新法律和规则影响的最新例证。
该文章接着说明,这种零散拼凑的监管体系如何能被“监管套利”所规避。巴克莱通过将子公司注销为银行控股公司,逃脱了美联储的监管,因为美联储会坚持要求更高的资本。相反,其旗下机构现在归联邦存款保险公司和证券交易委员会管辖,而这两家机构不会提出此类要求。
在我看来,关键在于:你可以制定法律或规则,明确告诉企业该怎么做,但你无法让经济或公司服从政策和社会的目标。监管的范围和效果有限,就像气球一样,你按下一处,出于自利的行为就会从另一处冒出来。正如这些文章所示,制定法规的人有时初看似乎做对了,但他们很少能预料和控制被监管者的反应,或是规则带来的二阶后果。
“Wall Street is saying it is reforming itself by granting stock to executives and exposing them to the long-term risk of that investment,” said Lynn E. Turner, a former chief accountant at the Securities and Exchange Commission. “Hedging the risk can substantially undo that reform. . . .” More broadly, critics say, the practice of hedging represents another end run around financial reform. For example, new rules that cracked down on debit card fees have led several big banks to eliminate free checking. Firms also plan to make up missing revenue by adapting their businesses to the tougher new regulations on derivatives and trading with the banks’ own capital. The Wall Street Journal of February 18 provided another example: In November, Barclays PLC quietly changed the legal classification of the U.K. bank’s main subsidiary in the U.S. so that the unit would no longer be subject to federal bank capital requirements. . . . The maneuver allows them to escape a provision of the financial-overhaul law that forces the pumping of billions of dollars of new capital into the U.S. entities, known as bank-holding companies. “It’s just not worth it to have all that capital trapped” in the holding company, said a New York lawyer who is advising banks on how to restructure. The moves are the latest example of how banks are scrambling to cushion the impact of new laws and rules around the world. The article went on to illustrate how a patchwork system can be evaded through regulator-shopping. By deregistering its subsidiary as a bank-holding company, Barclays escaped regulation by the Federal Reserve Bank, which would insist on greater capital. Instead its units now fall under the FDIC and the SEC, which will impose no such requirement. The bottom line as far as I’m concerned is that you can enact a law or rule and tell businesspeople precisely what to do, but you can’t make the economy or companies comply with policies and social aims. Regulations are limited in their scope and effect, and like a balloon, when you push in one place, self-interested behavior pops out in another. As these articles indicate, those who enact regulation sometimes get it right at first glance, but they’re rarely able to anticipate and control the response of those being regulated or the secondorder consequences of the rules.
2011 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司
2011 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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只要不完美、自私自利的人类涉足过度冒险,错误与劣迹就总会发生。而只要这些事情引发泡沫及其后的崩盘,那么,无论监管存在何种局限,人们彻底摒弃监管、完全依赖自由市场的意愿就永远不会完整。
Errors and misdeeds will occur as long as imperfect, self-interested humans stray into excessive risk-taking. And as long as these things lead to bubbles and resulting crashes, the willingness to dispense with regulation and rely on free markets will never be complete, regardless of regulation’s limitations.
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我相信自由市场是最好的决策者,它能让金融资源、劳动力和智力资本流向最具价值的地方,从而获得最优回报的潜力。但这条路必然崎岖不平,而且社会的某些目标将难以实现。当然,那些主张限制政府介入商业的人会辩称,金融和市场监管不应成为推行社会政策的工具。苏联的崩溃显示了全面管控经济的局限。另一方面,中国过去十年的瞩目成就,很可能得益于其经济的管控性,使得资源流动在短期内可以按中央指令进行。中国的目标明确令人印象深刻,如果完全依赖自由市场力量,中国取得的成就或许会打折扣。我们是否愿意用我们的体制(及成果)去交换他们的?二十年后我们的答案还会一样吗?而中国是会保持现状,还是当高度管控的体制提升了生活水平之后,人们也会要求更自由的市场?
这场争论必将继续下去:
I believe a free market is the best decision maker, causing financial resources, labor and intellectual capital to flow where they are most valuable and thus have the potential to be best rewarded. But the ride will be bumpy – by necessity – and some of society’s goals will go unfulfilled. Of course, those who favor limits on government involvement in business argue that financial and market regulation shouldn’t be a vehicle for implementing social policy. The collapse of the USSR shows the limits of a thoroughly controlled economy. On the other hand, it’s likely that China’s impressive accomplishments over the last decade have been aided by the fact that its economy is controlled, such that the movement of resources can be centrally mandated in the short run. China’s purposefulness is impressive, and China likely would have accomplished less if it had to work entirely through free-market forces. Would we trade our system (and results) for theirs? Will our answer be the same in twenty years? And will China remain the same, or once the highly regulated system has raised standards of living, will people insist on freer markets as well? The debate will inevitably go on:
什么样的制度最有可能产生我们所追求的结果?过去几年,我们看到有人呼吁通过监管来要求“审慎”的抵押贷款,并防止“过高”的薪酬。哪种制度最能界定这些模糊的措辞并实现这些结果?
经济目标将如何与社会的其他优先事项整合并取得平衡,又是否应该如此?
自由放任的经济学与金融监管将如何共存,其后果又会是什么?
What system is most likely to produce the results we seek? In the last few years we’ve seen calls for regulations to require “prudent” mortgage lending and prevent “excessive” compensation. What system is best able to define these amorphous terms and produce these results? How will economic goals be integrated and balanced with society’s other priorities, and should they be? How will laissez-faire economics and financial regulation coexist, and what will be the consequences?
这些问题永远不会有定论。钟摆的摆动将会持续不停。
These questions will never be answered conclusively. The swing of the pendulum will continue unabated.
March 2, 2011
March 2, 2011
以下是该段落的译文:
2011 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司
2011 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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