政治现实

2016 (inferred) · memo · 原文约 8916 词
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Memo to:

Memo to:

Oaktree Clients

Oaktree Clients

From:

From:

Howard Marks

Howard Marks

Re:

Re:

Political Reality

Political Reality

我上一份备忘录写于五月,主题是“经济现实”。目的是描述经济规律强加的现实,并指出政府、尤其是竞选公职的候选人,无视并承诺推翻这些现实的种种方式。自那以后,事态发展把经济现实推到了舞台中央,这让我深有感触。当然,其中最突出的,是 6 月 23 日英国脱欧的公投结果:英国是否应脱离欧盟。我无意就脱欧本身写一份备忘录。这件事牵涉的变数太多,过往经验太少,各方意见分歧太大,而且脱欧如何推进毫无眉目。眼下有不少专家在告诉我们脱欧会带来什么后果。我唯一确定的是,他们大多数人都会说错;如果我加入他们行列,大概也会错。

My last memo, in May, was on the subject of “Economic Reality.” Its goal was to describe the realities imposed by economics and point out the many ways in which governments and, especially, candidates for elected office ignore and promise to override them. Since then I have been struck by the way developments have moved economic reality to center stage. Of course, foremost among them has been the affirmative vote of June 23 on Brexit: whether the United Kingdom should leave the European Union. I have no interest in writing a memo about Brexit itself. There’s a huge number of moving parts, too little past experience, too many varying opinions, and zero clarity on how the departure will be handled. There are many pundits out there telling us what the consequences of Brexit will be. The only thing I’m sure of is that most of them are wrong, and if I were to join their ranks, I’d probably be wrong, too.

经济现实:选择与后果

五月份的那份备忘录描述了经济学如何在商业、投资和日常生活中定义并约束现实。经济学确立了游戏规则和赛场的边界,这些东西无法忽视。它们可以被改变,但改变必然带来后果。经济学的现实是严酷而一贯的,但也是合乎逻辑的。它们不像物理定律(比如万有引力)那样绝对,但总能可靠地确立趋势和限度。如果某样东西的价格上涨,消费量很可能会下降。如果工资上涨,从事某项任务的人数很可能会减少。如果税率提高,很可能到达某个临界点后,工作的激励减少,产出也随之下降。如果政府增加支出,要支付账单,它要么印钱(这往往具有通胀效应),要么加税,要么借债。

在发布《经济现实》之后不久,我在橡树资本网站上的版本中新增了一节,指出经济学在很大程度上是研究选择的学问。如果你只有 10 美元,你想买一本 10 美元的书,还是两个 5 美元的汉堡,或者送出 10 美元的礼物,又或者把 10 美元存起来?我们唯一确定的是,你不可能样样都做。进一步说,决策和行动都会带来后果。比如,消费能带给我们享受,但也会让我们变得更穷。

Economic Reality: Choices and Consequences The May memo described the ways in which economics defines and constrains reality in business, investing and everyday life. Economics establishes the rules of the game and the boundaries of the playing field, and these things can’t be ignored. They can be altered, but not without consequences. The realities of economics are stark and consistent, but also logical. They aren’t absolute, like the laws of physics (e.g., gravity), but they reliably establish tendencies and limits. If the price of something goes up, the amount consumed is likely to go down. If wages rise, the number of people employed for a task is likely to decline. If tax rates go up, there’s likely to come a point at which there’s less incentive to work, and thus less output. If a government spends more, to pay the bills it has to either print money (which tends to be inflationary), raise taxes or borrow. Shortly after publishing “Economic Reality,” I added a new section to the version appearing on Oaktree’s website, saying economics is largely the study of choice. If you only have $10, do you want to buy a $10 book or two $5 hamburgers, or make a $10 gift, or add $10 to your savings? The only thing we know you can’t do is do them all. Further, decisions and actions have consequences. For example, spending can provide us with enjoyment, but it will also make us poorer.

政治中的现实

我一向喜欢矛盾修辞法——那些内部自相矛盾的短语,比如“巨虾”和“常识”。我要把“政治现实”也加进这个清单。政治世界自有其被扭曲的现实,在那里,经济现实往往似乎毫无影响。无需做出任何取舍:候选人可以承诺一切。而且没有任何后果。如果某件事在现实世界中可能带来负面后果,政客们似乎也毫不在意地将其忽略。如果有人讨厌,比如记者或对手候选人,追问可能的后果,如今轻松就能歪曲事实或矢口否认。而如果事实证明代价或后果是被故意……

Reality in Politics I’ve always gotten a kick out of oxymorons – phrases that are internally contradictory – such as “jumbo shrimp” and “common sense.” I’ll add “political reality” to the list. The world of politics has its own, altered reality, in which economic reality often seems not to impinge. No choices need be made: candidates can promise it all. And there are no consequences. If something might have negative consequences in the real world, politicians seem to feel free to ignore them. If someone annoying, like a journalist or an opposing candidate, asks about potential consequences, it’s easy these days to misrepresent them or deny they exist. And if it turns out that costs or consequences were willfully

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不予理会,也就无从纠正:基于未兑现承诺的竞选胜利无法撤销,候选人也不会因竞选演说中的谎言被起诉。

在《经济现实》的附录中,我指出候选人很少谈论选择。相反,他们很可能承诺“所有选项都要”。而且他们几乎从不提及某件事附带成本或负面效应,比如“我给你 A,但你得放弃 B。”我猜想《政客手册》第一页一定写着“绝不要传递坏消息。”

在《我担心什么》(2008 年 8 月)中,我写道:

想象两位总统候选人。一位说,“我要给你们八年的纪律和克制——加税、减支——但我会让国家变得更好。”另一位说,“我有一个秘密计划,能解决我们所有的问题,而且不需要你们做出任何牺牲。”你觉得谁会赢?

举个现实中的例子如何?1984 年,沃尔特·蒙代尔作为民主党总统候选人,迎战共和党在任总统罗纳德·里根。蒙代尔在接受党内提名时因坦率而闻名:

无论谁在 1 月宣誓就职,美国人民都得付里根先生的账单。预算会被挤压。税收会增加。任何说不会的人都是在对美国人民撒谎……里根先生会加税,我也会。他不会告诉你们。我刚刚说了。

结果如何?蒙代尔以压倒性劣势落败,普选票 59% 比 41%,这是总统选举历史上第七大的得票率差距。更糟的是,在 538 张选举人票中,他只赢得 13 张(哥伦比亚特区和他的家乡明尼苏达州)。那是自 1824 年以来,总统竞选中第二名获得选举人票第二少的纪录。坦率的益处也就到此为止。

如今许多政客承诺保护社会保障体系,但我们很少听到任何人谈论(a)削减福利,(b)提高社会保障税率,(c)提高征税工资上限,(d)推迟福利发放年龄,或(e)对受益人进行收入调查。然而,要么这些措施的某种组合,要么该体系的破产,是精算上的必然。相反,我们听到的是候选人的口头禅:人人更多,没有代价或后果……而在社会保障的问题上,则是完全没有进展。

ignored, no redress is available: election victories based on unmet promises can’t be rescinded, and candidates can’t be sued over falsehoods on the stump. In the addendum to “Economic Reality,” I pointed out that candidates rarely talk about choice. Instead, they’re likely to promise “all of the above.” And rarely if ever do they mention the cost that will be attached to something, or the downside, as in “I’ll give you A, but you’ll have to give up B.” I imagine page one of The Politician’s Handbook must say “never deliver an unpleasant message.” In “What Worries Me” (August 2008), I wrote: Imagine two candidates for president. One says, “I’m going to give you eight years of discipline and denial – of higher taxes and lower spending – but I’ll leave the country in better shape.” The other says, “I have a secret plan that will solve all of our problems without requiring any sacrifice on your part.” Who do you think would win? How about a real-world example? In 1984, Walter Mondale was the Democratic candidate for president, running against Republican incumbent Ronald Reagan. Mondale became famous for his candor in accepting his party’s nomination: Whoever is inaugurated in January, the American people will have to pay Mr. Reagan’s bills. The budget will be squeezed. Taxes will go up. And anyone who says they won’t is not telling the truth to the American people. . . . Mr. Reagan will raise taxes, and so will I. He won’t tell you. I just did. The result? Mondale lost in a landslide, with the popular vote of 59% to 41% representing the seventhbiggest percentage deficit in presidential election history. Far worse, of the 538 electoral votes, he won only 13 (the District of Columbia and his home state of Minnesota). That stands as the second-lowest electoral total for a presidential runner-up since 1824. So much for the benefits of candor. Today many politicians promise to safeguard the Social Security system, but rarely do we hear anyone talk about (a) reduced benefits, (b) higher Social Security tax rates, (c) a higher ceiling on wages taxed, (d) delayed onset of benefits, or (e) means-testing for recipients. And yet, either some combination of these or the insolvency of the system is an actuarial certainty. Instead, we get the candidate’s mantra: more for all, with no cost or consequences . . . and, in the case of Social Security, a complete absence of progress.

英国脱欧:政治现实付诸实践

英国脱欧公投期间我恰在欧洲,得以亲眼目睹政治现实的种种不完美之处。这里列举几点:

Brexit: Political Reality in Action Being in Europe at the time of the Brexit vote gave me an opportunity to see the imperfections of political reality in action. I’ll review a few: 

决定举行公投,不过是政治权宜之计(权宜之计的定义是“行事方便实用,哪怕可能不当或不道德”)。保守党内部亲欧派与疑欧派(读作“skeptics”)之间的裂痕,再加上英国独立党(UKIP)的反对,险些让工党拿下 2015 年大选。为平息这一威胁,保守党领袖戴维·卡梅伦在 2013 年承诺,将是否留在欧盟的问题交由全民投票决定。我们常看到政客用承诺来粉饰问题。

The decision to conduct the referendum was a matter of political expediency (defined as “the quality of being convenient and practical despite possibly being improper or immoral”). A schism in the Conservative Party between the pro-Europe faction and the Euro-sceptics (pronounced “skeptics”) – as well as opposition from the UK Independence Party, or UKIP – threatened to hand Britain’s 2015 election to the Labour Party. To put down this threat, Conservative Party leader David Cameron promised in 2013 to put the issue of membership in the European Union to a popular vote. We often see politicians paper over a problem with promises

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如今,人们倾向于把可能的后果推迟到明天去面对(他们似乎假设明天永远不会到来——见第 4 页)。这是一个非常实用的策略,因为当选的官员们往往在后果显现之前就已经离任,而且无论如何,输掉选举都没有安慰奖,所以候选人还不如竭尽全力去赢得选举。

today, preferring to put off the possible consequences until tomorrow (they seem to assume tomorrow will never come – see page 4). This is a very practical stratagem, since elected officials often leave office well before consequences appear, and at any rate, there’s no consolation prize for losing an election, so a candidate might as well do everything he can to win. 

潜在的后果常常被忽视或未被理解。当然,2013 年时无法预知英国脱欧公投的种种影响;即便到了 2016 年的现在,尽管退出决定已成既定事实,也无人知晓最终结果会怎样。将如此重要且影响长远的决策交由投票者的简单多数来决定,是个明显的错误。公投本可以设计成要求退出决定需获得投票者中的绝对多数,或者登记选民(不论是否投票)中的多数支持。由于这两项要求均未设置,最终做出了让英国退出欧盟的决定——这可能使国家四分五裂(例如,苏格兰极有可能脱离英国,因为它之前就曾有此念头,并强烈希望留在欧盟内)——因为 37% 的登记选民表示这是他们的意愿(而 35% 投票支持留欧,其余 28% 未参与投票)。

Potential consequences are often overlooked or not understood. Of course, the ramifications of a Brexit referendum couldn’t be known in 2013; even now in 2016 no one knows what they’ll be, although the decision to leave is a fait accompli. It was a glaring error to leave a decision of this importance and permanence up to a simple majority of those going to the polls. The referendum could have been structured so that a decision to leave required a supermajority of those voting, or a majority of registered voters (whether they voted or not). Since neither of these was required, the decision was made to take the UK out of the EU – possibly tearing the country asunder (e.g., Scotland may well secede from the UK, since it was tempted to do so before and strongly wishes to be part of the EU) – because 37% of registered voters said that’s what they wanted (whereas 35% voted to Remain and the other 28% didn’t vote).

这一决定很可能受到了事实失实和虚假承诺的影响。例如,或许最重要的是,“脱欧”选民被告知,退出欧盟将使英国能够控制自己的边界,从而排除移民。此外,选民还被告知,英国每周向欧盟支付 3.5 亿英镑,脱欧后这笔钱可以转而用于国民健康服务体系。然而,选举结束几天之内,一些作出这些承诺的人就承认:(a)保持对欧洲市场——及其 5 亿消费者——的无障碍准入,很可能使英国无法对来自欧洲的移民关闭边界;(b)3.5 亿英镑是一个毛额数字,忽略了欧盟返还给英国用于补贴农民的资金,实际净额更接近每周 2 亿英镑;(c)没有人真以为全部节省下来的钱都能投入国民健康服务体系——也许只是“一大部分”。

The decision was likely influenced by factual inaccuracies and false promises. For example, probably most importantly, “Leave” voters were told that exiting the EU would enable Britain to gain control over its borders and thus exclude immigrants. Further, voters were told the UK was sending £350 million weekly to the EU, and leaving would enable that to be spent on the National Health Service instead. Within days after the election, however, some of those who had made the promises admitted that (a) maintaining unfettered access to the European market – and its 500 million consumers – will probably make it impossible to close Britain’s borders to immigrants from Europe; (b) the £350 million was a gross figure that ignored the money the EU sent back to subsidize British farmers, and the real net figure was closer to £200 million per week; and (c) no one really thought the whole savings could go to the NHS – maybe just “a good part.”

此后不久,人们便明白赢得选举和实施决定是两码事。英国很快发现,(一)没人制定脱欧的具体方案,(二)实施过程远不如竞选那般有趣。因此:

It became clear soon afterward that winning the election and implementing the decision are two different things. Britain soon saw that (a) no one had a plan for how the departure would take place and (b) implementing wouldn’t be as much fun as campaigning. Thus: o

o

o

o

o

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o

戴维·卡梅伦(曾呼吁投票支持“留欧”)次日宣布,既然他不是操刀“脱欧”的合适人选,他将辞去首相和保守党领袖的职务。

前伦敦市长鲍里斯·约翰逊是保守党内支持“脱欧”的主要鼓动者,外界普遍认为他将成为下一任首相,但在一次近乎政变的行动中,他的不胜任被暴露无遗,随后他退出了角逐。

工党领袖杰里米·科尔宾,其不温不火的努力未能反映党内成员对欧洲的强烈支持,在下议院工党议员中遭遇了 172 票对 40 票的不信任投票。

英国独立党领袖奈杰尔·法拉奇辞职,表示在多年倡导英国脱离欧洲之后,他想要回归自己的生活。

David Cameron (who had urged a vote to “Remain”) announced the next day that, since he wasn’t the right person to engineer a departure, he would resign as Prime Minister and head of the Conservative Party. Ex-London Mayor Boris Johnson, a leading Conservative agitator for Leave, who it was widely assumed would become the next Prime Minister, walked away after his unsuitability was made clear in something of a coup. Jeremy Corbyn, the head of the Labour Party, whose tepid effort failed to reflect his party members’ strong support for Europe, was the subject of a 172-40 no-confidence vote by the Labour members of the House of Commons. The leader of UKIP, Nigel Farage, stepped down, saying he wanted his life back after many years of advocating for Britain’s departure from Europe.

因此,公投两周后,无人知晓这些政党将由谁来领导。(此后,特蕾莎·梅出人意料地迅速升任首相,并成为保守党多数党派的领袖。)

英语中有句绝妙的话:“狗食早餐”。意思很简单:一团糟。我想这用来形容英国脱欧公投再贴切不过了。

Thus, two weeks after the referendum, no one knew who would lead any of these parties. (Since then Theresa May has ascended, surprisingly quickly, as Prime Minister and head of the majority Conservatives.) The English have a great expression: “a dog’s breakfast.” The meaning is simple: a complete mess. I think that’s an apt way to describe the Brexit referendum.

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把备忘录这部分收个尾。托马斯·弗里德曼 6 月 29 日在《纽约时报》上描述英国处境的写法,我怎么赞誉都不过分:

一个欧洲大国,长久以来捍卫自由民主、多元主义和自由市场,却落入少数几个投机政客的掌控,他们瞅准机会,利用公众对移民的恐惧来给自己升官铺路。他们把一件极其复杂、很少有人能看清全貌的事情,硬生生弄成一个非黑即白的二元选择——留下,还是退出欧盟。

这些政客以为,狗永远追不上汽车,自己能两头占便宜——既反对一样不得人心的事,又不必承担公众真投票把它赶走的后果。可他们把这场辩论用谎言、煽动恐惧和误导搅得一团糟,加上只要简单多数就能赢,结果脱欧派以微弱优势胜出。狗追上了汽车。当然,它根本不知道拿这车怎么办。没有计划。只有乱叫。

To pull this part of the memo together, I can’t overstate my appreciation for the way Thomas Friedman described the UK’s situation in The New York Times on June 29: A major European power, a long-time defender of liberal democracy, pluralism and free markets, falls under the sway of a few cynical politicians who see a chance to exploit public fears of immigration to advance their careers. They create a stark, binary choice on an incredibly complex issue, of which few people understand the full scope – stay or quit the E.U. These politicians assume that the dog will never catch the car and they will have the best of both worlds – opposing something unpopular but not having to deal with the implications of the public actually voting to get rid of it. But they so dumb down the debate with lies, fear-mongering and misdirection, and with only a simple majority required to win, that the leave-the-E.U. crowd carries the day by a small margin. The dog catches the car. And, of course, it has no idea what to do with this car. There is no plan. There is just barking.

投票箱

现在让我们想一想选举的本质。本·格雷厄姆在《聪明的投资者》里说,股市长期看是一台称重机,短期看是一台投票机。他所谓“投票机”的意思是,短期内内在价值往往被抛在脑后,表现最好的股票通常是那些能赢得人气竞赛的股票。

我相信,随着时间推移,选举已经越来越像人气竞赛。成功的竞选演说,不是把挑战分析得最透彻、给出最优解决方案的那一场,而是最能投听众所好的那一场。

在商业和投资中,人们向来会把 A 的收益与成本和 B 的收益与成本放到一起比较,然后选出预期净结果更好的那个选项(最好那种坏结果也能扛得住的选项)。过程中会犯很多错,有时候路子也不对,但做出好的经济决策的努力是实打实存在的。决策通常有清晰的后果,而且在责任人离任之前往往就已经见分晓了。

相比之下,政客们倾向于相信,最好的决策就是最有可能让自己当选或连任的那一个。对结果的责任分散得极广,而且后果可能要等到选举结束、决策落地之后好几年甚至几十年才看得清楚。很少有选民有能力评估候选人承诺的合理性,而且——考虑到前面说的时滞——想根据在任表现来判断候选人是否值得连任,往往也很难。

这里插一句:我并不是说私营部门的人在做“上帝的工作”。但当激励摆对位置的时候,我们通常会齐心协力为集体利益干活。橡树资本的每个人都想提升自己的财务状况、地位和职业前景,但我确信他们也希望橡树和它的客户成功,因为那是每个人自身成功的前提,也会是自身成功的主要推动力。而在华盛顿,另一方面,很多当选的官员(共和党人和民主党人都是如此)给人的印象是,政府——以及国家——的成功要让位于两件事:第一,确保自己和本党同僚当选并连任;第二,确保对方党派的人选不上。为了这个目的,A 党的一些人似乎觉得,让 B 党捞不到任何政绩,比政府办好实事更重要。

The Voting Booth Now let’s think about the nature of elections. In The Intelligent Investor, Ben Graham described the stock market as a weighing machine in the long run but a voting machine in the short run. What he meant by the latter reference was that in the short run, intrinsic value is often ignored and the stocks that do best are usually the ones capable of winning a popularity contest. I believe that, over time, elections have become more like popularity contests. The successful campaign speech isn’t one that does the best job of analyzing the challenges and supplying optimal solutions. It’s one that most provides what people want to hear. In business and investing, people invariably compare the benefits and costs of A against the benefits and costs of B. Then they select the alternative with the better expected net result (and hopefully one whose bad outcomes are survivable). A lot of mistakes may be made, and the process is sometimes misguided, but the effort to make good economic decisions is undeniably there. Decisions usually have clear consequences, and they are likely to become known before the people responsible depart. In contrast, politicians tend to believe the best decision is the one that is most likely to lead to election or reelection. Responsibility for outcomes is highly diffused, and the results may only become clear years – or decades – after the elections are held and the decisions are made. Few voters have the ability to assess the reasonableness of candidates’ promises, and – given the time lags mentioned just above – it can be difficult to judge candidates for reelection on the basis of their performance on the job. Time for an aside: I don’t claim that people in the private sector “do God’s work.” But we generally pull together to work for the collective good when the incentives are aligned properly. While everyone at Oaktree wants to advance his or her own financial position, status and career potential, I’m certain they also want Oaktree and its clients to succeed, as that is a prerequisite for – and will be a prime contributor to – each individual’s own success. In Washington, on the other hand, many elected officials (Republicans and Democrats alike) give the impression that the success of the government – and the country – takes a backseat to making sure that (a) they and their fellow party members are elected and reelected and (b) members of the other party aren’t. To this end, some members of party A seem to consider it more important to ensure that party B is unable to claim any accomplishments, than it is that

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甲方确实能办成些事。我在电视上看到一位政治顾问接受采访时,被问到什么能让政客成功,他回答说是“赢得选民连任”。接着他很快改口说“是推动立法”,但意思已经明了。

party A actually gets something done. I saw a political advisor interviewed on TV, and when asked what makes a politician successful, he answered, “getting reelected by his or her constituents.” He quickly amended that to “getting legislation done,” but the message was clear.

辩论的质量

我犹豫再三,才用了这个标题来概括我下面想讲的内容。第一,当今的政治言论似乎谈不上什么质量;第二,我也没看到多少辩论(按维基百科的说法,辩论是一种“以有纪律的方式正式陈述论点的办法”)。

The Quality of Debate It’s only hesitantly that I use the above section heading to describe what I want to cover here. First, it seems there’s little of quality in political speech today, and second, I don’t see a lot of debate (in the sense of “a method of formally presenting an argument in a disciplined manner” – Wikipedia). 

如今的选民,至少在美国,面对的早已不是有条有理的正面交锋,而是断章取义的口号、互相攻击和不着边际的断言。回想 2012 年那场总统辩论,跟今天比起来,真是既拘谨又彬彬有礼。当时,一位候选人在主持人指出他没有回答问题时,直接回了一句:“你问了你想问的问题,我答了我爱答的问题。”

Rather than organized point and counterpoint, voters today – certainly in the U.S. – are subjected to sound bites, insults and assertions that aren’t in response to anything. During a presidential debate in 2012 (which in retrospect seems so prim and well-mannered compared to today), one candidate – when told by the moderator that he hadn’t answered the question – said “you asked the question you wanted to ask; I answered the question I wanted to answer.”

与往年不同,如今似乎没有什么规则能约束人们会说些什么,或者哪些话题是禁区了。

Unlike earlier years, there do not seem to be any rules governing what some people will say, or subjects that are off-limits.

有些候选人似乎认为真相可有可无。在过去的选举中,候选人若被证实说过不准确或不实的话,可能会遭受重创。而这次,真相似乎并未被普遍赋予高度优先。据独立事实核查机构 PolitiFact 统计,希拉里·克林顿被核查的言论中,28% 被评为“基本不实”或更糟。而唐纳德·特朗普的情况更是惊人,达到了 70%。

Some candidates seem to believe the truth is dispensable. In past elections, candidates could be heavily damaged if it could be shown that they’d said something inaccurate or untrue. This time around, the truth doesn’t seem to be accorded a universally high priority. According to PolitiFact, an independent fact-checking outlet, 28% of Hillary Clinton statements that they’ve checked are “Mostly False” or worse. In Donald Trump’s case, it’s an astounding 70%.

事实上,在我看来,部分选民中,很少有人在意说了什么——只在乎怎么说。在电视上我反复听到人们讲:“我支持特朗普,因为他实话实说。”他们未必是在评论他的政策或言论的准确性;更可能是欣赏他的直言不讳和对政治正确的蔑视。近几十年来,似乎“这人我愿意和他喝杯啤酒”取代了“这人最适合领导国家”成为评判标准。

In fact, it seems to me that, among certain portions of the electorate, there’s little concern for what’s said – just how it’s said. Over and over I hear people on TV say, “I like Trump because he tells it like it is.” They’re not necessarily commenting on his policies or the accuracy of his statements; more likely it’s his outspokenness and disdain for political correctness. In recent decades, it seems “this is someone I’d like to have a beer with” has taken the place of “this is the person who’s best qualified to lead the country.”

过去一年里,我总觉得共和党初选“辩论”给我的感觉,最像小时候在电视上看的职业摔跤比赛。每个摔跤手都有一个人设,吸引观众里某一部分人群,那些恶棍的粉丝会扯着嗓子喊支持,脸都扭曲成愤怒的样子。肮脏手段和作弊不会让这些粉丝退避三舍——事实上,这些只会激起他们的嗜血欲。如今某些竞选时刻似乎确实如此。政治和职业摔跤之间的相似之处,甚至可能延伸到操纵结果的企图上。就在上个月,民主党全国委员会主席被迫辞职,因为工作人员泄露的邮件显示,他们打算偏袒某一位候选人。

I’ve thought for the last year that the Republican primary “debates” had the feeling, more than anything else, of the professional wrestling matches I watched on television when I was a boy. Each wrestler had a persona that appealed to a certain segment of the crowd, and the fans of the villains would scream their support, faces contorted in rage. Dirty tricks and cheating didn’t push away these fans – in fact, these things just stirred their bloodlust. That certainly seems to be the case with some of today’s campaign moments. The parallels between politics and pro wrestling might even extend to attempts to rig the outcome. Just last month, the head of the Democratic National Committee was forced to resign because of staffers’ leaked emails proposing that it favor one candidate over another.

无视经济现实

我在上面列举了一些虚假承诺,正是这些承诺让英国脱欧公投中“脱欧”一方获胜。我还提到,投票后的几周里,这些承诺大多被打了折扣。现在我想谈谈美国大选前夕出现的一些站不住脚的说法。

Ignoring Economic Reality I listed above some of the false promises that led to the victory for “Leave” in the Brexit referendum. I also mentioned that there was a lot of backtracking on those promises in the weeks following the vote. Now I want to discuss a few questionable statements that have been made in the lead-up to the U.S. presidential election.

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唐纳德·特朗普最引人注目的经济言论,多集中在进口、就业流失和贸易平衡这几方面。

Some of Donald Trump’s most prominent economic pronouncements have been with regard to imports, job losses and the balance of trade. o

他谈到中国时说“他们正在要我们的命”。但贸易是双向的。排除不公平竞争的因素,当我们出现贸易逆差——也就是我们从他国购买的商品多于他们从我们这里购买的——主要原因只有一个:他们提供的价格与价值比我们更优。他们卖出产品(并带走工作岗位),但我们得到了实惠。在这种情况下,中国并没有“赢”,美国也没有“输”:这对两国来说是双赢。当然,同样正确的是,尽管从整体上看结果对两国可能是有利的,但对个人来说仍可能带来负面影响。例如,人们可能因廉价进口商品而失业,社会应该采取措施减轻他们的损失。我稍后会再谈这个问题。

He says of China, “they’re killing us.” But trade is a two-way street. Barring unfair competition, when we run trade deficits – meaning we buy more from other countries than they buy from us – it’s for one main reason: they provide a better price/value proposition than we do. They sell products (and take jobs), but we get bargains. China isn’t “winning” in that case, and the U.S. isn’t “losing”: it’s a win for both countries. Of course it’s also true that while the result may be positive for the countries overall, there still can be negative consequences for individuals. For example, people may lose their jobs because of cheap imports, and society should take steps to ease their loss. I’ll return to this later.

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特朗普把来自中国的不公平竞争,说成我们制造业岗位流失的主因。可我在《经济现实》里已经点明,近几十年来,美国因生产率提升、机械化和自动化而失去的潜在岗位,是流向中国低成本竞争的实际岗位的将近十倍。

Trump cites unfair competition from China as a main source of our loss of manufacturing jobs. As I pointed out in “Economic Reality,” however, in recent decades the U.S. has lost roughly ten times as many potential jobs to increased productivity, mechanization and automation as it has actual jobs to low-cost competition from China.

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特朗普将中国能售卖廉价商品的部分原因,归咎于其人为压低人民币兑美元汇率。但有趣的是,当中国最近放宽汇率弹性时,人民币非但未升反贬,这或许表明,其汇率并非像他所称的那样被人为压低。

Trump blames part of China’s ability to sell cheap goods on the fact that it has held its currency artificially low versus the dollar. But it’s interesting to note that when China recently made its exchange rate less rigid, the yuan declined rather than rose, suggesting that perhaps it hadn’t been held artificially low.

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至于经济现实,特朗普从未说过这样的话:“我们也许能通过征收保护性关税来增加制造业就业,但那将要求所有消费者为购买外国商品支付更高的价格。” 如果进口商品被禁止、被限制或被重税,普通美国人日常购物的体验又会是怎样一番景象呢?

As for economic reality, never has Trump said anything like this: “We may be able to increase manufacturing jobs by imposing protective tariffs, but that would require all consumers to pay higher prices for their purchases of goods from abroad.” What would the average American’s everyday shopping experience be if imported goods were barred, discouraged or heavily taxed?

此外,特朗普没有指出的是,若美国采取保护主义措施,其他国家可能会对美国制造的商品加征关税作为报复,从而导致一些美国人失业。以下是穆迪分析公司对其最初经济议程的评价(我尚未看到他对 8 月 8 日宣布的计划的分析):

总体而言,特朗普先生的经济提议将导致美国经济更加孤立。跨境贸易和移民将大幅减少,随着贸易和移民的减少,外国直接投资也将下降。尽管近几十年来全球化在美国经济中造就了赢家和输家,但它对美国经济的持续增长贡献巨大。因此,按照特朗普先生的提议退出全球化,将削弱国家的增长前景。

特朗普的竞选活动主要针对那些害怕被全球化抛在后面的人,而忽略了个人赢家和整体的积极影响(这与英国“脱欧”运动的做法颇为相似)。

Further, Trump doesn’t point out that, in response to the adoption of protectionist measures by the U.S., other countries could retaliate with increased tariffs on U.S.-made goods, costing some Americans their jobs. Here’s what Moody’s Analytics says about his original economic agenda (I haven’t yet seen analysis of the plan he announced on August 8): Broadly, Mr. Trump’s economic proposals would result in a more isolated U.S. economy. Cross-border trade and immigration will be significantly diminished, and with less trade and immigration, foreign direct investment will also be reduced. While globalization has created winners and losers in the U.S. economy in recent decades, it contributes substantially to the ongoing growth of the U.S. economy. Pulling back from globalization, as Mr. Trump is proposing, will thus diminish the nation’s growth prospects. Trump’s campaign is mainly targeting people who fear being left behind by globalization, and ignoring the individual winners and positive overall effects (much as “Leave” campaigners did in the UK).

特朗普声称,他的商业专长和经验能让美国经济走上更好的轨道。以下是穆迪对原计划的分析:

Trump claims his expertise and experience in business would enable him to put the U.S. economy on a better track. Here’s Moody’s take on the original plan:

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特朗普先生的经济主张还将导致联邦政府赤字扩大、债务负担加重。他提出的个人和企业减税方案规模庞大,同时他又计划大幅增加退伍军人和军费开支。鉴于他明确反对改革社会保障和医疗保险等福利项目,这种大幅削减税收收入却几乎不削减支出的组合,只能靠大幅增加政府借贷来填补。据穆迪测算,特朗普的方案将使联邦预算赤字从当前的 6400 亿美元增至 2026 年的 3.151 万亿美元(而现行法律下为 1.289 万亿美元),联邦政府债务则将从当前的 14 万亿美元增至 2026 年的超过 37 万亿美元(而现行法律下约为 24 万亿美元——以上数字均按 2009 年美元价值、经通胀调整计算)。

Mr. Trump’s economic proposals will also result in larger federal government deficits and a heavier debt load. His personal and corporate tax cuts are massive and his proposals to expand spending on veterans and the military are significant. Given his stated opposition to changing entitlement programs such as Social Security and Medicare, this mix of much lower tax revenues and few cuts in spending can only be financed by substantially more government borrowing. According to Moody’s, Trump’s program would cause the federal budget deficit to increase from $640 billion today to $3,151 billion in 2026 (rather than $1,289 billion under current law), and federal government debt to increase from $14 trillion today to over $37 trillion in 2026 (versus about $24 trillion under current law – all figures in 2009 dollars, adjusted for inflation). 

最后,我要提一下特朗普最不切实际的说法:他声称可以通过谈判,以折扣金额还清联邦债务。他的个人财富,一部分就是靠借钱不还堆起来的,而且他对旗下公司屡屡把破产当战略工具用,似乎还挺得意。但特朗普不像美国那样,需要持续从全球资本市场融资(他现在走的是轻资产路线,靠授权费赚钱,而不是持有资产;大概是因为他多次违约,信贷窗口已经对他关上了)。美国也可以拒绝全额还债——那叫“债务重组”或“违约”——但那样的话,我们恐怕很难再像现在这样进出信贷市场,也肯定会失去高信用评级带来的好处,以及随之而来的低利率。

Finally, I’ll mention Trump’s most unrealistic claim: that he could trim the federal debt by negotiating the ability to pay it off at a reduced amount. He built his net worth in part by borrowing money and not paying it back, and he seems proud of his companies’ repeated use of bankruptcy as a strategic tool. But Trump doesn’t have an ongoing need to tap the world capital markets, as the U.S. does (he now operates under an asset-lite business model that emphasizes licensing fees rather than asset ownership; perhaps this is because his multiple defaults have caused the credit window to be closed to him). The United States could refuse to pay its debts in full – that’s called “rescheduling” or “default” – but we’d be unlikely to have the same access to the credit markets, and we would certainly cease to enjoy the benefits of a high credit rating and resulting low interest rates.

我在这里批评特朗普的同时,也要赶紧指出克林顿作为候选人和潜在总统也有她自身的不足之处。她在担任国务卿期间使用私人电子邮件服务器就是一个典型例子。她还采纳了一些立场,比如反对《跨太平洋伙伴关系协定》以及承诺在特定收入水平下提供免费公立大学教育,这些举措看来纯粹是为了在初选中与伯尼·桑德斯竞争,并在大选中争取他的支持者。但我想公平地说,她在竞选活动中违背经济现实的程度远不及特朗普,而这正是我在此讨论的主题。

As for my picking on Trump here: I’m quick to point out that Clinton has her own shortcomings as a candidate and potential president. Her use of a private email server while Secretary of State is just one prime example. And she has embraced positions, such as opposition to the Trans-Pacific Partnership and her promise of free public college at certain income levels, that seem intended simply to help her compete against Bernie Sanders in the primaries and win over his supporters in the general election. But I think it’s fair to say that she hasn’t been anywhere near as guilty as Trump of defying economic reality on the campaign trail, and that’s my subject here.

今日分歧的根源

当今政坛的一个显著特征,是不满情绪的抬头,其中很大一部分源于经济层面。世界正在以多种方式变化,这让许多人感到不适,尤其是那些缺乏能力随之应变的人。以下是我在《什么让我忧虑》(2008 年 8 月)中写下的一些内容:

从许多方面看,包括物质层面,美国人在过去一百年里享受了极佳的生活水平。论及住房、食品、卫生、医疗、休闲和奢侈品等生活舒适条件,我们的水准可能是全世界最高的。这就引出了三个问题:

The Sources of Today’s Division One prominent characteristic of the political arena today is the rise in discontent, much of it based on economics. The world is changing in ways that are uncomfortable for many, especially those lacking the ability to change with it. Here’s some of what I wrote in “What Worries Me” (August 2008): In many ways, including materially, Americans have enjoyed a wonderful standard of living over the last hundred years. Considering creature comforts such as housing, food, sanitation, healthcare, leisure and luxuries, ours may have been the highest standard of living in the world. That raises three questions:   

我们凭什么继续享有全球最高的生活水准?

凭什么它还能不断提升?

又凭什么提升的速度要快过世界其他地方?

Why should we continue to enjoy the highest standard of living? Why should it continue to improve? And why should the rate of improvement outpace that of the rest of the world?

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我们常看到民调显示,越来越多美国人怀疑自己的孩子能否过得比他们更好。我们希望如此,但凭什么就该这样?除了技术进步无疑会持续改善每个人的生活外,我们凭什么指望生活水平只会单调上升?又凭什么相对于世界其他地方而上升?这方面的优势确实可能转移到其他国家,就像过去转移到我们头上一样。

我们高生活水平的原因之一,是美国人干同样的活拿到手的报酬比别人多。这在以下条件下没问题:(a)美国拥有战后显著的竞争优势;(b)存在强大的壁垒保护现状。但凭什么这种情况就该一直持续?它又怎么能一直持续?

想想两座城市。A 城工作岗位比人多,B 城人口比岗位多。起初,A 城的人——劳动力相对稀缺——干同样的活拿到的报酬会高于 B 城。他们能否继续拿高薪,关键在于是否存在壁垒阻止人们迁往 A 城。否则,人们会从 B 城搬到 A 城,直到两城的人岗比一致,工资也趋同。归根结底,地域性的收入差距有赖于资源的不可流动性。

上世纪的大部分时间里,壁垒维持了我们的高工资。别国的产品不如我们的好。有些国家缺乏投资资本,有些则屡遭战火摧残。也许它们不具备我们催生技术革新的能力或管理才能。高昂的运输成本、关税、偏见(我小时候,“日本晶体管收音机”就等同于“劣质品”)或法律限制(例如不让外国航空公司在我们的市场自由竞争)可能保护了美国人的工资。国际贸易远非今天的规模。但所有这些都可能随着时间改变,很难看出美国工人的收入优势能持续下去。(着重号为我所加)

不幸的是,这些 2008 年的观察,尤其是最后一句话,被证明是准确的。而核心问题——贸易全球化,即开放国界让商品自由流动——已引发严重争议,成为当前选举中的一个争论焦点。

自由贸易的好消息是,绝大多数经济学家相信它有助于经济进步。例如:

彼得森研究所的一项研究发现,过去的贸易自由化立法为普通家庭带来了 7100 至 1.29 万美元的额外收入。彼得·佩特里和迈克尔·普卢默的一项研究估计,《跨太平洋伙伴关系协定》——特朗普反对、希拉里多少也反对——将使美国人的收入增加 1310 亿美元。(戴维·布鲁克斯,《纽约时报》,7 月 1 日)

这些收益从何而来?主要来自专业化分工。当边界关闭时,每个国家都得自己生产所需的一切商品。但当边界开放时,每个国家会生产自己最能做或做得最便宜的东西。每个国家把部分产出卖给那些做不好或做不便宜的国家,同时从那些比自己做得更好的国家买进。

We often see poll results showing that increasing numbers of Americans doubt their children will live better than they do. We’d like them to, but why should they? Other than technological improvements which doubtless will continue to make life better for everyone, why should our standard of living improve monotonically? And improve relative to the rest of the world? Certainly the advantage in this regard can shift to other countries, just as it shifted to us in the past. One of the reasons for our high standard of living is the fact that Americans have been paid more for doing a given job than everyone else. This was fine as long as (a) the U.S. enjoyed significant post-war competitive advantages and (b) significant barriers protected the status quo. But why should this go on? How can it go on? Think about two cities. City A has more jobs than people, and city B has more people than jobs. Initially, people in city A – where labor is relatively scarce – will be paid more for doing a given job than people in city B. The key to their continuing to earn more is the existence of barriers that prevent people from moving to city A. Otherwise, people will move from city B to city A until the ratio of people to jobs is the same in both cities and so are the wages. Among other things, geographic inequalities are dependent on the immobility of resources. For much of the last century, barriers kept our pay high. Other countries’ output wasn’t as good as ours. Some lacked investment capital, and some were decimated by war from time to time. Perhaps they didn’t possess our ability to generate technological advancements or our managerial skills. High transportation costs, tariffs, prejudices (when I was a kid, “Japanese transistor radio” was considered synonymous with “low quality”) or legal restrictions (e.g., keeping foreign airlines from competing freely in our markets) may have protected American wages. International trade wasn’t what it is today. But all of these things can change over time, and it’s hard to see how the earnings supremacy of U.S. workers will be sustainable. (Emphasis added) Unfortunately, these 2008 observations, and especially the final sentence, proved to be on target. And the central issue – globalization of trade, or the opening of national borders for the free movement of goods – has raised serious issues and become a source of controversy in the current election. The good news about free trade is that an overwhelming majority of economists believe it contributes to economic progress. For example: A study by the Peterson Institute found that past trade liberalization laws added between $7,100 to $12,900 in additional income to the average household. A study by Peter Petri and Michael Plummer estimates that the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which Trump opposes and Clinton sort of opposes, would boost American incomes by $131 billion. (David Brooks, The New York Times, July 1) What’s the source of these gains? They come primarily from specialization. When borders are closed, each country has to produce all the goods it needs. But when borders are open, each country will produce the goods it can make best or cheapest. Each will sell some of its output to other nations that can’t make those things as well or as cheaply, and each will buy from other nations that which it can’t produce as well.

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国际专业化分工自有其道理,总体而言,美国人从中受益匪浅。难道我们真想在美国本土生产 T 恤,为一件如今只卖 15 美元的东西付上 60 美元吗?(小布什总统任内经济顾问委员会主席格雷戈里·曼昆教授,7 月 15 日发表于《纽约时报》)显然,这一过程让全球生产体系整体上更高效——每样东西都在最合适的地方生产——从而让所有国家都受益……但并非所有人都受益。迄今为止,好处远未均匀分配。在美国,好处绝大部分流向了受教育程度更高、掌握技术诀窍的人,或者拥有获利企业的人。收入分配底层人群的实际收入充其量原地踏步,而参与劳动力市场(就业或求职)的美国人比例则在下降。

正如我在 2008 年所说,美国人历来的收入高于全球同行。这既刺激企业把生产转移到海外,也刺激它们在国内搞自动化。(这还营造出一种吸引移民——包括非法移民——的条件,他们愿意接受更低的工资。)自 1979 年以来,尽管经济增长、制造业产出增加,制造业就业人数却减少了三分之一。那些缺乏教育、只能从事体力劳动的美国人——一百年前他们或许能在农业找到工作,五十年前能在汽车厂或家电厂找到工作——如今却面临收入下滑的趋势……在某种程度上是绝对水平的下降,而与(a)受过教育、能获得更高收入的美国人相比,以及(b)过去的情形(尤其是他们父辈的情形)相比,差距更为显著。

过去,除了顶层收入没有现在这么夸张之外,收入差距之所以没那么大,还因为底层人群也能过得相当不错。经济扩张创造了数以百万计的体力劳动和蓝领岗位。即使没受过多少教育,人们也能享受生活中的好东西,包括汽车、电视、度假,还能让孩子接受良好的公立学校教育,而且大多数孩子很可能比父辈找到更好的工作。如今,这些要素中还有哪一条依然成立?(《我担忧什么》)

我记得自己第一次意识到收入不平等——当然也包括生活质量的不平等——是在 1970 年第一次出差去洛杉矶的时候。作为在纽约皇后区长大的孩子,我从未见过南加州那样绿意盎然的社区和海边小镇。如今,收入走势的分化正在撕裂我们的社会,影响政治走向。收入前景恶化、收入差距扩大,让受影响的人群滋生沮丧、怨恨、经济民族主义、保护主义和排外情绪。

正如《纽约时报》7 月 13 日所说:

在此后的岁月里〔上世纪 90 年代中期之后〕,非法居住在美国的移民数量先是翻倍,继而增至三倍,直到奥巴马政府时期才稳定在 1100 万左右。在某种程度上由全球贸易推动的去工业化,摧毁了那些习惯了没有大学文凭也能过上体面生活的白人男性的经济命运。

经济现实是,这些趋势——国际专业化分工、自动化、生产率提高、就业岗位流失、对教育的需求,以及受负面影响者的无助感——是真实存在且影响巨大的。无论我们喜不喜欢,它们都将长期存在。它们是经济现实,不容忽视,也无法否认。

There are good reasons for international specialization, and by and large Americans have benefited tremendously. Do we really want to produce T-shirts here and pay $60 for something that now costs $15? (Professor Gregory Mankiw, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under President George W. Bush, in The New York Times, July 15) Clearly this process makes the overall global production system more efficient – everything is made where it can be done best – to the enrichment of all nations . . . but not all people. The benefits to date have been far from evenly distributed. In the U.S. they have gone overwhelmingly to those who are better educated and technologically adept or who own the companies that profit. Real incomes for people in the lower portion of the distribution have been stagnant at best, and the percentage of Americans participating in the work force – either employed or looking for a job – has declined. As I described in 2008, Americans historically have been paid more than their counterparts around the globe. This creates incentives to both manufacture abroad and automate at home. (It also creates a condition that attracts immigrants – some illegal – who are willing to work for less.) Manufacturing employment is down a third since 1979, despite economic growth and increased manufacturing output. Americans who lack education and thus are suited only for manual work – who may have found jobs in agriculture a hundred years ago or in auto and appliance plants fifty years ago – now face declining income trends . . . to some degree in absolute terms, and significantly when compared to (a) Americans with the education required for higher incomes and (b) the way things used to be, especially for their parents. In the past, in addition to the fact that incomes weren’t so enormous at the top, the income gap was narrowed by the fact that people could do pretty well at the bottom. Millions of menial and blue-collar jobs were created as our economy expanded. Even without much education, people could enjoy the good things in life, including cars, TVs and vacations, along with good public school educations for their kids and the possibility that most of those kids would have better jobs than their parents. Which of those elements is equally true today? (“What Worries Me”) I remember first becoming aware of income inequality – and certainly of unequal quality of life – during my first business trip in 1970, which was to Los Angeles. As a kid who grew up in Queens, New York, I had never seen anything like the verdant neighborhoods and beach communities of Southern California. Now the divergent trends in income are tearing at our society and influencing political events. A deteriorating income outlook and increasing income disparity have led to frustration, resentment, economic nationalism, protectionism and xenophobia among those affected. As The New York Times put it on July 13: In the years that followed [the mid-1990s], the number of immigrants living in the United States illegally would double and then triple before leveling off under the Obama administration around 11 million. Deindustrialization, driven in part by global trade, would devastate the economic fortunes of white men accustomed to making a decent living without a college degree. The economic reality is that these trends – international specialization, automation, rising productivity, job losses, the need for education, and a feeling of hopelessness among those affected negatively – are real and powerfully influential. Whether we like them or not, they’re here to stay. They’re economic reality, and they cannot be ignored or refuted.

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我来总结一下当前状况的成因,引用托马斯·弗里德曼 6 月 30 日在《国际纽约时报》上的文章。我觉得他把形势刻画得很到位:

这是我们时代的故事:技术、全球化和气候变化的步伐,已经开始超过我们的政治体系建设社会、教育、社区、职场和政治创新的能力,而这些创新正是部分公民跟上时代所必需的。

我们将贸易和制造业全球化,引入机器人和人工智能系统,速度远远快于我们设计社会保障网、贸易浪涌保护器和教育晋升通道——这些本可以让被这场转型裹挟的人拥有时间、空间和工具去蓬勃发展。结果,很多人感到眩晕和失落。

弗里德曼的话深深打动了我,让我想起阿尔文·托夫勒 1970 年写的《未来的冲击》。托夫勒对未来冲击——他认为这一点正在动摇我们的社会——的定义非常简单:“在太短的时间里发生了太多的变化。”

小阿瑟·M·施莱辛格在《动荡的政治》中讨论了经济衰退和不满情绪的后果(引自 6 月 20 日《纽约时报》):

那些煽动家的追随者大多来自旧时的中下阶层,如今处于前所未有的挫败和恐惧状态,受到羞辱、剥夺和贫困的威胁……他们来自外省和传统上不关心政治的群体,被经济崩溃的冲击从冷漠中惊醒,近乎歇斯底里……老美国正满怀怨恨地反抗当代政治和当代经济。

这些话极其精准地概括了当前状况。但施莱辛格——2007 年去世——显然不是为了这个目的写下这些话,而是 1960 年描写大萧条时写的。我们今天看到的民粹主义并非独特现象,而是经济困难时期的常见产物。民粹主义有催生极具破坏力的领导人和运动的历史记录。

生产率提升和外国竞争的双重压力,对非技术性和半技术性劳动力——也就是所谓的“工人阶级”——打击尤为沉重。全球化发生时,在不具竞争力的行业就业的人尤其吃亏。他们的收入至少会下降,甚至可能失业,又找不到新工作。社会应该缓冲这些人受到的打击。这里有一个建议:

去年 3 月,愤怒的人群中包括 78% 的伯尼·桑德斯支持者,以及高达 98% 的唐纳德·J·特朗普拥护者。

超过一半的选民——包括 61% 的特朗普支持者——觉得自己的收入赶不上生活成本。四分之三的特朗普支持者认为,像他们这样的人的生活比 50 年前更糟。

这其中有一部分是不可逆转的力量所致。白人男性无争议地掌握政治权力、没有大学学历的年轻人能轻松找到高薪工作的日子,不会再回来了……

I’ll move toward summing up on the causes of today’s conditions by quoting from Thomas Friedman in The International New York Times of June 30. I think he did a great job of capturing the situation: It’s the story of our time: The pace of change in technology, globalization and climate have started to outrun the ability of our political systems to build the social, educational, community, workplace and political innovations needed for some citizens to keep up. We have globalized trade and manufacturing, and we have introduced robots and artificial intelligent systems, far faster than we have designed the social safety nets, trade surge protectors and educational advancement options that would allow people caught in this transition to have the time, space and tools to thrive. It’s left a lot of people dizzy and dislocated. Friedman’s statements appeal to me very strongly and remind me of Future Shock, a book written by Alvin Toffler in 1970. Toffler defined future shock – which he viewed as destabilizing our society – very simply: “too much change in too short a period of time.” Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. discussed the results of economic decline and dissatisfaction in The Politics of Upheaval (cited in The New York Times of June 20): The followers of the demagogues mostly came from the old lower-middle classes, now in an unprecedented stage of frustration and fear, menaced by humiliation, dispossession and poverty. . . . They came from provincial and traditionally non-political groups in the population, jolted from apathy into near-hysteria by the shock of economic collapse. . . . Old America [is] in resentful revolt against contemporary politics and contemporary economics. These words do an excellent job of summing up current conditions. But Schlesinger, who died in 2007, obviously didn’t write them for that purpose, but rather in 1960, to describe the Great Depression. The populism we’re seeing today is not a unique phenomenon, but rather a standard occurrence in periods of economic difficulty. Populism has a record of giving rise to very destructive leaders and movements. The combination of productivity improvements and foreign competition has been very hard on unskilled and semi-skilled labor – what’s called “the working class.” People employed in uncompetitive industries at the time globalization takes place are particularly disadvantaged. Their incomes decline at a minimum, and they may lose their jobs and be unable to find new ones. Society should cushion the blow on these people. Here’s one proposal: Last March, the ranks of the incensed included 78 percent of Bernie Sanders’s supporters and a whopping 98 percent of those backing Donald J. Trump. More than half of voters – including 61 percent of Mr. Trump’s supporters – feel they are not keeping up with the cost of living. Three quarters of Mr. Trump’s supporters feel that life for people like them is worse than it was 50 years ago. Some of this is due to irreversible forces. The days when white men kept an uncontested hold on political power, when young adults without a college degree could easily find a well-paid job, are not coming back. . . .

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上个月,四位学者——世纪基金会的杰夫·马德里克、威廉姆斯学院的乔恩·巴基亚、加州大学圣迭戈分校的莱恩·肯沃西,以及加州大学戴维斯分校的彼得·林德特——联合出版了一本类似指南的著作,题为《我们的政府应该有多大?》……

这几位学者提出了四项重要任务:提升国家生产力、增强工人的经济保障、投资教育以弥补低收入家庭的机会赤字,以及确保美国中产阶级能从增长成果中获得更大份额。

他们的策略包括:加大对摇摇欲坠的基础设施的投资,扩大失业保险和医疗保险覆盖面;主张带薪病假、育儿假,以及为换工作遭遇减薪的工人提供工资保险;同时呼吁为有孩子的贫困家庭提供更多资源,并推行普及性幼儿教育。(《国际纽约时报》,8 月 3 日,强调为原文所加)

这是一份相当自由派的议程,许多美国人会说,整个方案及其大部分内容都构成不受欢迎的政府干预。那么,如果真要采取行动,该做什么来扭转上述趋势?如果我们袖手旁观,收入和财富差距可能继续扩大,全球化的负面影响将持续显现,我们的政治进程也将继续被普遍的不满情绪撕裂。

经济学专栏作家爱德华多·波特在 5 月 25 日的《纽约时报》上精炼地总结道:

我们不应试图阻止全球化,哪怕我们真有能力做到。但如果我们不能更好地管理这个不断变化的世界经济,结局显然不会好……

上文讨论的这些趋势——以及人们对亲历这些变化的怨恨、对未来的恐惧,还有看到这些变化在自己社区里上演时的愤怒——在过去一年里,对特朗普的高人气贡献巨大,也助长了桑德斯对大量民主党初选选民的吸引力。类似情绪在英国脱欧公投中发挥了重要作用,在欧洲也日益升温。这些问题不会随着今年总统大选而终结。相反,我认为它们可能旷日持久且难以解决。这些问题,以及本次大选中发挥作用的经济之外的力量,很可能在未来多年对美国政治产生深远影响。

Last month, four academics – Jeff Madrick from the Century Foundation, Jon Bakija of Williams College, Lane Kenworthy of the University of California, San Diego, and Peter Lindert of the University of California, Davis – published a manual of sorts. It is titled “How Big Should Our Government Be?”. . . The scholars laid out four important tasks: improving the nation’s productivity, bolstering workers’ economic security, investing in education to close the opportunity deficit of low-income families, and ensuring that Middle America reaps a larger share of the spoils of growth. The strategy includes more investment in the nation’s buckling infrastructure and expanding unemployment and health insurance. It calls for paid sick leave, parental leave and wage insurance for workers who suffer a pay cut when changing jobs. And they argue for more resources for poor families with children and universal early childhood education. (The International New York Times, August 3, emphasis added) This is a very liberal agenda, and many Americans would say the whole and many of its parts constitute undesirable government intervention. What, then – if anything – should be done to arrest the trends described above? If we don’t do something, it’s likely that the income and wealth gap will continue to grow; the downside of globalization will continue to be felt; and our political process will continue to be riven by widespread dissatisfaction. Eduardo Porter, an economics columnist, summed up succinctly in The New York Times of May 25: We shouldn’t try to stop globalization, even if we could. But if we don’t do a better job managing a changing world economy, it seems clear that it will end badly . . . The trends discussed above – and resentment over experiencing them, fear of doing so, and anger upon seeing them at work in one’s community – have been big contributors to Trump’s popularity over the last year, and also to Sanders’s appeal to large numbers of Democratic primary voters. Similar sentiment played a big part in the Brexit vote to Leave and is on the rise in Europe. The issues won’t end with this year’s presidential election. Rather, I believe they are likely to prove long-lasting and difficult to resolve. They and the non-economic forces at play in this election are likely to have significant influence on U.S. politics for years to come.

未来政治的影响

两大政党的传统阵营划分在很长一段时间内相当稳固。在我人生的大部分时间里,民主党代表着“工人阶级”,主张更大、更积极的政府,更高的税收、更多的支出和财富再分配,以及更自由的社会政策。而共和党则被视为大企业和经济状况较好的美国人的政党,他们为自由企业制度而战,主张更小、更不活跃的政府,更低税收,强硬的国防姿态和对外干预,保守的社会政策,自由贸易,以及供给侧(“涓滴”)经济学。两大政党——以及它们的候选人和选民——大体上都坚守着这些意识形态。我见证了政党在上述立场上的演变,但只是温和而渐进的:

The Implications for Politics in the Future The historical alignment of the two main parties was quite stable for a long time. For most of my life, the Democrats have stood for “the working class”; a bigger and more active government; more taxation, spending and wealth redistribution; and more-liberal social policies. The Republicans, on the other hand, have been considered the party of big business and economically better-off Americans, and they have fought for free enterprise; smaller, less-activist government; lower taxes; a muscular defense posture and foreign intervention; conservative social policies; free trade; and supply-side (“trickle-down”) economics. The two parties – and their candidates and voters – generally have stuck to these ideologies. I’ve seen the parties evolve from the above positions, but only modestly and gradually:

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民主党转向支持民权运动,成为非白人群体的主要政党。比尔·克林顿执政期间,政府采取更为中间路线、不那么自由化的方针,逐渐淡出福利与经济再分配领域,转而对大企业和自由贸易更为同情。

The Democratic Party swung toward support for civil rights and became the primary party for non-whites. And when Bill Clinton’s administration adopted a more centrist, less-liberal approach, it stood less for welfare and economic redistribution and was more sympathetic to big business and free trade.

共和党则吸引了那些因民主党支持废除种族隔离而心生不满的农村白人。该党愈发受宗教、道德和个人自由的驱动,社会立场更趋保守,对维持军事实力的关注减弱,并且(除茶党一派外)对缩小政府规模和改革福利制度的热情也不如以往。

The Republicans, on the other hand, attracted rural whites antagonized by the Democrats’ support for desegregation. The party became more motivated by religion, morality and personal freedom, more socially conservative, and less concerned with maintaining military strength and (outside of the Tea Party faction) shrinking government and reforming entitlements.

在本届总统竞选中,唐纳德·特朗普和伯尼·桑德斯——两人都是传统政党的局外人——凭借数百万对既有政治安排及其应对当下状况方式不满的选民支持,表现相当出色。因此,变革似乎有所加速,人们开始谈论政治革命。

鉴于 2016 年发生的种种事件,上述立场很可能重新洗牌。未来可能会有一个主要围绕以下方面构建的政党:

In the current presidential race, Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders – both outsiders to the traditional parties – have fared quite well thanks to support from millions of voters who are unhappy with the historic political arrangement and how it deals with today’s conditions. Thus change appears to have accelerated, and there’s talk of political revolution. Given the events of 2016, the positions described above may well be realigned. There may be a party in the future built largely around:    

经济上的不利地位与不满,

“文化层面的不满情绪”以及对政治正确、专家、权威机构和经济社会政治及媒体精英的漠视,

对恐怖主义的恐惧、排外情绪、法律与秩序、本土主义、保护主义、封闭边界,

以及孤立主义,

务实主义和自身利益(国家和个人层面)优先于哲学和意识形态。

economic disadvantage and discontent, “cultural grievances” and disregard for political correctness, experts, establishments, and economic, social, political and media elites, fear of terrorism, xenophobia, law and order, nativism, protectionism, closed borders, and isolationism, and pragmatism and self-interest (national and individual) as opposed to philosophy and ideology.

特朗普将这些主张概括为“美国优先”和“让美国再次伟大”,上述因素很可能会重新洗牌或取代两党的传统立场。部分取决于当前选举的结果,很可能出现这样的情况——正如许多人所说——过去的共和党建制派已经失去了对党的掌控。因此,上文所述的政党可能是今天所谓的“共和党”,也可能是一个全新的东西。虽然民主党建制派目前仍掌控局面,但桑德斯撼动了它,吸引了大批少数派追随其社会主义原则。

特别耐人寻味的是,历史上这些政治阵营可能重新组合成三个政党,而非两个。会不会有一个由当今特朗普支持者组成的“不满者党”出现,与共和党和民主党同时竞争?桑德斯的支持者——他们同样厌恶自由贸易、银行和大资本,敌视精英和华盛顿建制派,倾向于经济再分配,并对自身经济前景感到失望——会不会加入其中?疏离与不满的黏合剂能否弥合这两个群体在政治、人口和文化上的巨大差异?如果特朗普今年落选,这个群体会逐渐消散,还是在更传统的政客领导下制度化?这些事会随着时间明朗。

这里有一个特别引人深思的潜在问题:我们的宪法规定,总统由选举人团多数票选出。但如果出现三个主要政党,很容易想象没有任何候选人获得多数票。那会怎样?一年前,多数美国人可能不知道答案,但我想许多人已经开始研究这个问题,未来几年还会有更多人这么做。我来告诉你答案:在没有选举人多数的情况下,总统由众议院投票选出,每个州拥有一票……

The above factors, which Trump sums up as “America First” and “Make America Great Again,” may well rearrange or supplant the traditional positions of the parties. Depending in part on the outcome of the current election, it may turn out – as many people are saying – that the Republican establishment of the past has lost control of its party. Thus the party described above may be what today is called “Republican,” or it may be something brand new. While the Democratic Party establishment remains in control at present, Sanders shook it, assembling a substantial minority attracted to his socialist principles. It is particularly intriguing to consider the possibility of a reshuffling of the historical blocs into three parties rather than two. Will a party of “the Dissatisfieds” be formed from today’s Trump supporters to compete against both the Republicans and the Democrats? Might they be joined by Sanders supporters, with their own dislike of free trade, banks and big money; hostility toward elites and the Washington establishment; preference for economic redistribution; and disappointment with their economic prospects? Can the glue of alienation and dissatisfaction overcome these two groups’ vast political, demographic and cultural differences? If Trump loses this year, will this group fade away or become institutionalized under the leadership of more conventional politicians? These things will become clear over time. Here’s a particularly provocative potential issue to consider: Our constitution calls for election of the president by a majority of the electoral college. But if there come to be three major parties, it’s easy to imagine no candidate getting a majority. What happens then? Few Americans may have known the answer a year ago, but I think many have begun to research it, and still more are likely to do so in the years ahead. I’ll give you the answer: in the absence of an electoral majority, the president is chosen through a vote of the House of Representatives, with each state having

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一张选票。如此,理论上,人口最少的 26 个州——仅占美国人口的 17%,且按定义几乎不含任何大城市——就能选出总统。对我而言,无论众议院的政党构成如何,比例选举制的丧失都令人极为担忧,尤其是考虑到众议院的选举方式(见下文)。

one vote. Thus, theoretically, the 26 least-populous states – containing just 17% of America’s people and, by definition, almost none of its big cities – could choose the president. For me, regardless of the political makeup of the House, the loss of proportional election is of great concern, particularly given the way the House is elected (see below).

我的处方

我喜爱并钦佩我遇到的许多政界人士——两党都有。我只是不喜欢这个体制集体产生的作为(或不作为)。所以我想说清楚,我对政界人士整体的保留态度,并不像上面听起来那么一概而论。以下是我在《我担忧什么》里写的话:

对政界人士的谴责不必是全盘的。实际上确实有一些我喜欢的。他们最突出的标志是 bipartisan 精神。他们不把政治当作血腥运动,在其中唯一重要的目标就是让对手难堪、赢得选举,而是想解决我们国家的问题。

尽管如此,底线是我发现自己忧虑多于乐观(同样出自《我担忧什么》):

我承认,我觉得形势对政府变好不利。看报纸和电视新闻的人少了,对国内和国际事务的兴趣在下降,短句式言论的作用越来越大,注意力普遍越来越短,自我牺牲的精神在消失,自我优先主义在抬头……在这方面乐观从何而来?我们可以抱有希望,但我没那么乐观。事实是,大多数人投票给在电视广告里看起来和听起来最好的候选人,给说他们想听的话的人,给他们认为今天能往口袋里塞钱、明天能让生活更美好的人。

在以上之外,我还要加上一股非常强大的力量:媒体中立的衰落。不像我年轻时广播公司还受“公平原则”约束,如今有些电视网(以及报纸和网站)更像是一党或另一党的代言人,而不是公正的记者。这使得通过这些渠道跟踪选举新闻的人只能听到一党的言论,完全接触不到另一方的立场。这助长了极端主义,拉大了人与人、党与党之间的鸿沟(这方面的统计证据很有说服力),也让两党合作更不可能。

当前的政治状况能改善吗?局面绝望吗?虽然上文讨论的经济和社会趋势不容易改变,但确实有一些“机制性”的修补能让我们的政治过程运转得更好。

第一,众议院选举的选区划分应该去政治化。按现行规则,每十年人口普查后,由控制各州议会的政党重新划分选区。这意味着他们能够对国会地图进行“杰利蝾螈”,把反对派选民集中到少数几个选区,让执政党赢得比例偏高的大量众议院席位。例如,2012 年宾夕法尼亚州选举中,民主党人获得众议院选票的 51%。但是,由于选区由共和党主导的州议会划定,这 51% 的多数被挤进少数几个选区,结果民主党人只赢下宾州十八个众议院席位中的五个(即 28%)。

My Prescriptions I like and admire many of the politicians I meet – of both parties. I just don’t like the actions (or inaction) the system produces collectively. So I want to make it clear that my reservations about politicians in general are not as sweeping as I may make them sound above. Here’s what I said in “What Worries Me”: Condemnation of politicians needn’t be universal. There actually are some I like. More than anything else, they’re marked by a spirit of bipartisanship. Rather than consider politics a blood sport in which the only important goals are to embarrass the other side and win elections, they want to solve our nation’s problems. Nevertheless, despite the above, the bottom line is that I find myself more worried than optimistic (also from “What Worries Me”): I confess that I feel the deck is stacked against government getting better. Less attention paid to newspapers and TV news, declining interest in national and international affairs, the rising role of the sound bite, generally shorter attention spans, a vanishing spirit of self-sacrifice, rising me-first-ism . . . where would optimism come from in this regard? We can hope, but I’m not that hopeful. The truth is that most people vote for the candidate who looks and sounds best in TV ads, who says what they want to hear, and who they think will put money in their pocketbooks today and brighten their lives tomorrow. To the above I would add a very powerful force: the decline of balance in the media. Unlike the days of my youth, in which broadcasters operated under the “fairness doctrine,” today there are networks (as well as newspapers and websites) that act more like spokespeople for one party or the other than like impartial journalists. That enables people who follow election news through these outlets to hear only one party’s rhetoric and avoid all exposure to the other side’s case. This encourages extremism, widens the gulf between people and parties (the statistical evidence in this regard is compelling), and makes bipartisanship less likely. Can the current political conditions be improved upon? Is the situation hopeless? While the economic and social trends discussed above won’t be easily altered, there are some “mechanical” fixes that could make our political process work better. First, the drawing of district lines for elections to the House of Representatives should be depoliticized. Under the current rules, district lines are redrawn every ten years, after the census, by the party controlling each state’s legislature. That means they’re able to “gerrymander” the congressional map, drawing the lines so that opposition voters are concentrated into a small number of districts and allowing the party in power to win a disproportionately high number of House seats. Thus, for example, in the 2012 election in Pennsylvania, Democrats received 51% of the votes for the House of Representatives. But, thanks to the way the lines had been drawn by the Republican-dominated state legislature, that 51% majority was crammed mostly into a small number of districts, such that the Democrats won only five (or 28%) of Pennsylvania’s eighteen House seats.

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由于选区划分不公(gerrymandering),众议院多数席位对划定选区的政党来说唾手可得,而许多剩余席位对反对党而言同样易如反掌。因此,众议院绝大多数席位被视为“无竞争性”:只有一个政党能赢。

94% 的众议院选举结果已成定局。这种事若发生在除美国以外的任何国家,我们都会质疑它还算不算民主国家。(《基督教科学箴言报》,2014 年 10 月 14 日)

例如,据《纽约时报》报道,在下面所述的重新划分选区和初选改革实施前的十年里,加利福尼亚州的国会席位稳固到在 255 场选举中,只有一场从一党控制转手到另一党。

如果众议院选区的界线由独立、非政治性的委员会来划定,我认为众议员平均来说会少一些意识形态色彩,更可能妥协,治理过程也会少一些好斗、多一些成效。这一做法在我老家加利福尼亚州已经展开。2011 年,国会选区由独立委员会重新划定。虽然评判结果还为时过早,但新选区遵循更自然的地理和人口边界——再加上下面所述的初选新制度——似乎造就了更具竞争性、更倾向温和的选举。

第二,初选结构应当改革。如前所述,选区界线通常确保某个政党稳赢每一席众议院席位。这意味着在无竞争性选区,被不可战胜的政党提名就等同于当选。所以今天的真正较量在初选,而初选往往由意识形态狂热的候选人胜出。原因在于:(a)据 fivethirtyeight 网站统计,2014 年只有不到 15% 的合格选民参加了国会初选;(b)少数参加初选投票的人往往是党内外最积极、因而也最有意识形态倾向的党员;(c)选区划分不公让稳赢政党的候选人不必去争取对方党人或独立选民的支持。三者叠加,助长极端主义。

如果规则规定:(a)只有一场初选,人人可投票;(b)初选中得票最高的两人——不分党派——进入大选对决,结果可能大不相同。举例来说,在共和党占绝对优势的选区,一席众议员的大选候选人可能都是共和党人,没有民主党人占据一个他毫无胜算的选票位置。那样的话,两位共和党人中较温和的那位,可能在普通选举中吸引更多温和共和党人的支持(他们在大选中投票人数更多),也能拉到民主党人的票,从而当选国会议员。

这种“双雄对决初选”(top-two primary)制度已在加利福尼亚州、路易斯安那州和华盛顿州实行,有潜力选出温和派而非极端分子。据 fivethirtyeight 统计,2014 年华盛顿州第 4 选区的情况正是如此。一位“茶党英雄”在初选中以 32% 对 26% 击败了温和共和党人,而领先的民主党人只拿到 12% 的选票。在共和党与民主党分别举行初选的州,这位茶党人会在大选中对阵民主党人,稳操胜券。但在华盛顿州,两位得票领先的共和党人正面交锋,较温和的候选人依靠温和共和党人和部分民主党人的支持获胜。

如果更多温和派能胜出——正如几十年前更常见的情形——就不难想象两党携手合作,达成妥协而非僵局。有些人认为僵局比政府有所作为更可取,但我看,有些严重问题亟待解决,而只要国会两院握在极端分子手里,

As a result of gerrymandering, most House races are easy pickings for the party that drew the lines, and many that remain are equally easy pickings for the opposition party. Thus the vast majority of seats in the House are viewed as “noncompetitive”: there’s only one party that can win. The outcome of 94 percent of House races is a foregone conclusion. If this happened in any country but the U.S., we’d question whether it was a democracy. (Christian Science Monitor, October 14, 2014) For example, according to The New York Times, in the ten years prior to the enactment of the changes in redistricting and primaries described below, congressional seats in California were so safe that in 255 elections, only one shifted from the control of one party to the other. If the lines for House districts were drawn by independent, non-political committees, I think House members would be less ideological and more likely to compromise, on average, and the process of governing would be less combative and more productive. This process is underway already in my former home state of California. Congressional districts were redrawn by an independent commission in 2011. Although it’s too early to judge the results, it appears that the new districts, which follow more natural geographic and demographic boundaries – combined with the new primary system described below – have created races that are more competitive and more inclined toward moderation. Second, the structure of primaries should be reformed. As described above, district lines usually ensure that a given party will win each House seat. That means in a noncompetitive district, being nominated by the unbeatable party is tantamount to being elected. Thus the real contest today is in the primaries, which are likely to be won by ideologically-zealous candidates. This is so because (a) according to the website fivethirtyeight, in 2014 less than 15% of eligible voters participated in congressional primaries, (b) the few who do vote in primaries are likely to be the most motivated, and thus ideological, party members, and (c) gerrymandering has freed the candidate of the inevitable winning party from having to appeal to members of the other party or to independents. This combination encourages extremism. The results might be different if the rules provided that (a) there’s only one primary, in which everyone can vote, and (b) the two top vote-getters in that primary – regardless of party – get to run in the general election. Thus, for example, both of the general election candidates for a House seat in a heavily Republican district could be Republicans, with no Democrat taking up space on the ballot in an election he has no chance to win. In that case, the more moderate of the two Republicans might pick up support from other moderate Republicans (when they turn out in greater numbers in the general election), as well as from Democrats, and be elected to Congress. This “top-two primary” system is already in place in California, Louisiana and Washington, with the potential to elect moderates rather than extremists. According to fivethirtyeight, that’s exactly what happened in Washington’s 4th district in 2014. A “Tea Party hero” beat out a moderate Republican in the primary, 32% to 26%, while the leading Democrat got only 12% of the vote. In a state with separate Republican and Democratic primaries, the Tea Partier would have run against the Democrat in the general election and been a sure winner. But in Washington, the top two Republicans faced off, and the more moderate candidate won with support from moderate Republicans and some Democrats. If more moderates won – as was much more common a few decades ago – it would be easier to imagine the two parties working together, producing compromise rather than gridlock. Some people think gridlock is more desirable than government action, but the way I see it, there are serious problems that need solving, and as long as the two houses of Congress are in the hands of extremists from

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两方政党——或两党均由与白宫执政党不同的极端分子领导——那么解决方案就很难找到。第三项改进是减少金钱在政治中的作用。金钱在美国政治中无处不在,而且这方面的趋势是负面的。

two different parties – or are both led by extremists from a party that’s different from the one occupying the White House – solutions are unlikely to be found. The third improvement would be a reduction in the role of money in politics. Money is everywhere in American politics, and the trends are negative in this regard.      

2012 年总统大选总花费达 20 亿美元,2016 年可能更胜一筹。2012 年所有联邦选举的总支出估计为 70 亿美元。几乎所有资金都来自私人利益,而非像其他国家那样由公共财政支持。除了个人捐助者,企业和工会也能施加巨大影响。近期的法院裁决使得捐款数额可以增加,同时让工会成员更难拒绝分担其工会的政治献金。政治捐款被解释为一种言论自由形式,这使得监管变得相当困难。游说行业拥有超过 1.1 万名成员,每年账单超过 30 亿美元。每个利益集团都有其付费说客,尤其是那些(如 50 年前的烟草业)只有阻止改革才能维持利润的行业。

The 2012 presidential election cost a total of $2 billion, and 2016’s may dwarf that. The total amount spent on all federal elections in 2012 is estimated at $7 billion. Virtually all the cash comes from private interests, rather than public funding as in some other countries. In addition to individual donors, corporations and unions can have great influence. Recent court decisions have made it possible for the amounts given to increase and harder for union members to refuse to share in their union’s giving. Political giving has been interpreted to be a form of free speech, making it quite difficult to regulate. The lobbying industry has over 11,000 members and bills over $3 billion per year. Every interest group has its paid lobbyists, especially the ones (like tobacco 50 years ago) that will only maintain profits if they can hold back reforms.

经选举产生的代表必须四处筹集资金,以充实自己的竞选金库。哪位政客能不支持自己的大金主呢?于是,有些人可能渐渐更像利益代言人,而非审慎的政策制定者。

几年前,我遇到一位年轻人,决定支持他第一次竞选众议员。当选次日他打电话来,我以为是来庆祝和道谢的。结果他开口就要我为他的下一场竞选捐款!众议员任期只有两年,所以国会议员永远都处在竞选状态。这只是筹款在美国选举中分量过重的一个例子。

我还有第四条建议,好在在联邦层面这一条是多余的:避免用公投来做决策。开国元勋们很明智,在治理美国的程序中没设公投这一环。我宁愿相信,这是因为他们深知不该把重大决定直接交给民众投票,也担心“多数人的暴政”;但看来他们也预料到公投会出现在州层面。

结合当下语境,回顾撒切尔夫人 1975 年反对公投的立场(当时她是在为不受欢迎的欧盟成员国身份辩护),颇有意思:

她说,在没有成文宪法所提供的保护和界定之下,公投是拿议会主权去换取政治权宜之计。在英国这样的体制里,这会用多数主义取代自由民主,从而威胁到少数群体的利益。“也许已故的艾德礼勋爵说得对,”她指出,“他说公投是独裁者和煽动家的工具。”(《金融时报》,2007 年 9 月 11 日)

我们绝不能让简单多数的投票者直接决定脱欧这样的重大议题。首先,实际投票的人数比我们希望的要少,所以决定可能只取决于一小群人的意愿。其次,许多选民可能缺乏做出良好决策所需的知识和分析能力。想想脱欧投票结束后几小时内,英国谷歌上被问得最多的问题:“离开欧盟意味着什么?”以及“什么是欧盟?”问这些问题的,大概正是刚决定了英国前途的那些人。要是他们在投票前问过这些问题,就好了。

Elected representatives have to drum up contributions in order to fill their war chests. What politician can fail to support his big donors? Thus some may come to serve more as advocates than prudent policymakers. Several years back I met a young man whom I decided to support in his first House race. When he called me the day after his election, I assumed it was to celebrate and thank me. But instead he asked for a contribution for his next race! With terms of just two years, Congressmen are never not running. This is only one example of the ways in which fundraising is too important in American elections. I have a fourth suggestion, but fortunately it’s one that is superfluous at the Federal level: avoid the use of referendums to make decisions. Wisely, the Founding Fathers omitted referendums from the process that governs the U.S. I like to think it was because they knew better than to leave big decisions up to a direct vote of the populace and were worried about “the tyranny of the majority,” but it also seems they expected the referendums to occur at the state level. It’s interesting in the current context to note Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s 1975 opposition to referendums (in defending membership in the European Union against its unpopularity): Without the protections and definition afforded by a written constitution, referendums, she said, sacrificed parliamentary sovereignty to political expediency. In a system such as Britain's, that threatened minorities by trading liberal democracy for majoritarianism. “Perhaps the late Lord Attlee was right,” she observed, “when he said that the referendum was a device of dictators and demagogues.” (Financial Times, September 11, 2007) We just cannot allow a simple majority of those who vote to directly decide important issues like Brexit. First, fewer people vote than we would hope, so decisions can turn on the wishes of a relatively small group. And second, many voters may lack the knowledge and analytical skills necessary for good decision-making. Consider the questions asked most often on Google in the UK in the hours after the Brexit polls closed: “What does it mean to leave the EU?” and “What is the EU?” Presumably many of the people asking these questions were the same ones who had just decided Britain’s future. It might have been better if they had asked those questions before the vote.

2016 橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

2016 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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我写下这份备忘录,是想解释今年英国发生了什么,以及我认为美国正在发生什么。我想指出,政治很少遵循经济现实;相反,它有自己的一套现实逻辑。近年来收入、财富、贸易和就业方面的趋势,在美国和欧洲引发了大量不满,我预计这些趋势会在未来多年对政治产生强烈冲击。大范围的经济失序可能让选民选错领导人。美国也不例外,在这方面我们必须高度警惕。

I wrote this memo to explain what happened in the UK this year and what I think is happening in the U.S. I wanted to point out that politics rarely hews to economic reality; rather, it has a reality all its own. The recent trends in income, wealth, trade and employment are causing a lot of dissatisfaction in the U.S. and Europe, and I expect them to have a strong impact on politics for years to come. Widespread economic dislocation can cause voters to choose the wrong leaders. The U.S. is not exempt, and we must be highly vigilant in this regard.

August 17, 2016

August 17, 2016

附言有些读者可能觉得,我对总统候选人发表任何言论,并批评我所看到的特朗普在经济问题上的立场,是不妥当的。另一些人可能只是不同意我的观点——但这是我的观点,我希望你们认为我有权利表达它们。我努力坚持讨论经济和事实问题,而不是非经济政策或计划、观点或个人偏好。如果我的言论引起不快,我很抱歉。任何人如果对我所说的某些事实有异议,欢迎告诉我。

P.S.Some readers may feel it’s wrong for me to make any statements regarding the presidential

candidates, and to criticize what I see as Trump’s take on economic issues. Others may simply disagree with my views – but they are my views, and I hope you’ll feel I have the right to express them. I’ve tried hard to stick to matters of economics and fact, rather than non-economic policy or programs, opinion or personal preference. I’m sorry if my statements cause unhappiness. Anyone who takes factual issue with anything I say here is welcome to let me know.

2016 橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

2016 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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All Rights Reserved