专家意见

2017 (explicit) · memo · 原文约 5718 词
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Memo to:

Memo to:

Oaktree Clients

Oaktree Clients

From:

From:

Howard Marks

Howard Marks

Re:

Re:

Expert Opinion

Expert Opinion

去年八月我提到,给备忘录起名《政治现实》部分是因为我偏爱矛盾修辞法。我把这个标题和那些内在自相矛盾的表述归为一类,比如“大虾米”和“常识”。现在我要再讨论一个:“专家意见”。

这篇备忘录的灵感来自选举结果落定那一刻脑海中闪过的念头。你可能会指出,在 11 月 14 日的备忘录《自己算算吧!》结尾,我说过不再写政治话题。没错,但我没说不再思考政治。反正,这篇备忘录谈的不是政治,而是意见。

去年春天我参加了一场晚宴,希拉里·克林顿的一位高级顾问在场征集建议,当时她和她的竞选团队正绞尽脑汁,想拿出有效的招数来应对伯尼·桑德斯的民粹主义信息。在场大多数人对此都面露无奈,直到一位资历深厚、人脉广泛的民主党人向众人保证:“别担心。她会赢的。数学不可抗拒。”希拉里的支持者们松了口气,而事实证明他是对的:她轻松拿下了提名。

到了十月下旬,克林顿的私人电邮服务器问题和联邦调查局的新调查继续困扰着她,有人问那位同样老练的民主党人,选举是否岌岌可危。“别担心,”他说,“她会赢的。数学不可抗拒。”结果我们都知道了。

专家对未来的意见被赋予很大分量……但它们终究只是意见。专家也许比我们普通人更常正确,但他们不太可能永远正确,或者说接近永远正确。今年的选举季给了我们大量机会见识专家意见的实际表现。我这就以此开篇,回顾一二。

In August, I mentioned that I had chosen the title “Political Reality” for my memo in part because of my liking for oxymorons. I classed that title with other internally contradictory statements, such as “jumbo shrimp” and “common sense.” Now I’m going to discuss one more: “expert opinion.” This memo was inspired by a thought that popped into my head when the outcome of the election settled in. You may point out that at the end of my November 14 memo “Go Figure!,” I said I wouldn’t write any more about politics. True, but I didn’t say I wouldn’t think about politics. Anyway, this memo isn’t about politics, it’s about opinions. Last spring I attended a dinner where one of Hillary Clinton’s senior advisers was soliciting input, as she and her campaign were struggling to come up with an effective counter to Bernie Sanders’s populist message. Most of those present expressed frustration on the subject, until an experienced, connected Democrat assured everyone, “Don’t worry. She’ll win. The math is irresistible.” The Hillary supporters were relieved, and he turned out to be right: she won the nomination going away. In late October, with the issue of Clinton’s private email server and the FBI’s new investigation further dogging her, that same seasoned Democrat was asked whether the election was in jeopardy. “Don’t worry,” he said. “She’ll win. The math is irresistible.” We all know the result. The opinions of experts concerning the future are accorded great weight . . . but they’re still just opinions. Experts may be right more often than the rest of us, but they’re unlikely to be right all the time, or anything close to it. This year’s election season gave us plenty of opportunities to see expert opinion in action. I’ll start this memo by reflecting on them.

民意调查失灵的一年

去年伊始,民调机构就出师不利,6 月英国就是否脱离欧盟举行公投。直到最后一刻,民调机构和博彩公司都认为英国公民有 70% 的可能性投票留在欧盟。但最终,“脱欧”派以几个百分点的优势胜出。

结果令人震惊。支持和反对脱欧的选民都没有预料到这一结局。一两天之内,英国主要政党的领袖相继辞职。人们开始认真讨论这一结果意味着什么,以及“英国脱欧”将如何实现。

对民调失准的解释集中在英国在民意调查方面经验较少、专业度不足上。这种事不可能发生在美国。事实上,在 2008 年和 2012 年的总统选举中,网站 FiveThirtyEight 的主人内特·西尔弗曾分别准确预测了全部 50 个州和其中 49 个州的选举结果。

2016 年,FiveThirtyEight 在 7 月共和党全国代表大会结束之际估计,希拉里·克林顿获胜的几率略高于五五开。随后在 8 月,民主党大会闭幕、唐纳德·特朗普的失误被认为达到顶峰时,该网站认为她获胜的几率为 8 比 1。接着,它……

The Year Polls Stopped Working Pollsters got off to a tough start last year with the June referendum concerning Britain’s membership in the European Union. Right up to the end, both pollsters and bookmakers considered U.K. citizens 70% likely to vote to remain a member. But, in the end, “Leave” won by a few percent. The reaction was shock. Voters on both sides of the issue were unprepared for the outcome. Within a day or two, the leaders of Britain’s main political parties had stepped down. People began to seriously discuss what that outcome meant and how “Brexit” would be accomplished. The explanations for the pollsters’ error centered around Britain’s lower level of experience with, and expertise in, polling. It couldn’t happen in the U.S. In fact, in the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections, Nate Silver, the proprietor of website FiveThirtyEight, correctly predicted the outcome in all 50 states once and in 49 the other time. In 2016, FiveThirtyEight estimated the odds of Hillary Clinton winning as slightly better than 50/50 as of the end of the Republican convention in July. Then it had her as an 8-to-1 favorite in August, when the Democrats concluded their convention and Donald Trump’s perceived missteps peaked. And then it

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她再次表示,在 9 月 26 日首场总统辩论前,自己略微领先。民调从未把她描成弱势一方。选举日当天,民调估计她获胜概率为 71.4%。* 多数其他民调机构给出的胜率在 80% 到 99% 之间,仅有一家认为特朗普是热门人选。

最终,当然,特朗普在选举人团投票中以 304 票对 227 票胜出,尽管普选票落后近 290 万张,约合 2%。尤为突出的是,他在宾夕法尼亚、密歇根和威斯康星等若干“摇摆州”胜出,而这些地方的民调显示他远远落后。专家预测就此失效。

最后,为 2016 年民调失灵画上句号的,是意大利总理马泰奥·伦齐押上仕途的修宪公投——此前被认为落后 3%——最终以 20% 的差距落败。结果不算意外,但差距确实惊人。

没人真正知道去年民调为何失准如此惨重。显然,一股民粹、反建制、反圈内人的情绪在涌动,但难道不该被察觉吗?尤其是,特朗普在西班牙裔和受过大学教育的女性等重要群体中的表现,远比预期要好(或者说糟糕程度轻得多)。

出于某种原因,2016 年这三个国家的民调机构要么没有接触到有代表性的选民样本,要么未能引出诚实回答,要么没能准确解读数据。因此,未来它们的意见可能不再那么受重视。

again said she was slightly ahead just before the first presidential debate on September 26. It never made her out to be an underdog. And on election day, it estimated that she was 71.4% likely to win.* Most other pollsters put her chances of winning at between 80% and 99%, and only one considered Trump the favorite. In the end, of course, Trump won in the Electoral College by a final count of 304 to 227, despite losing the popular vote by almost 2.9 million votes, or about 2%. In particular, he won in a number of “swing states,” such as Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin, where the polls had him well behind. So much for experts’ forecasts. Finally, rounding out the pollsters’ failures in 2016, the reform referendum that Italy’s Prime Minister Matteo Renzi bet his career on – which had been considered 3% behind – lost by 20%. The outcome wasn’t a surprise, but the margin certainly was. No one really knows why polling failed so miserably last year. Clearly there was a groundswell of populist, anti-establishment and anti-insider sentiment, but shouldn’t it have been detected? In particular, Trump did much better than predicted (or much less badly) with a number of important groups, such as Hispanics and college-educated women. For some reason, in 2016 pollsters in all three countries either failed to talk to a representative sample of voters, failed to elicit honest responses, or failed to accurately interpret the data. Thus their opinions may be accorded less weight in the future.

专家们也不过如此

意见可以如此戏剧性地摇摆,令我印象深刻:

So Much for the Experts I’m struck by how dramatically opinion can flip-flop: 

选举前夕,克林顿的竞选组织和“地面战”被视为老练、高效且势不可挡,而特朗普的则被看作是乌合之众、资金不足且缺乏协调。如今,特朗普的竞选机器被形容为高度有效,而克林顿的则被指错过了重要迹象和机遇。

During the run-up to the election, Clinton’s campaign organization and “ground game” were considered sophisticated, efficient and unstoppable, and Trump’s were thought of as rag-tag, underfunded and uncoordinated. Now Trump’s machine is described as having been highly effective, and Clinton’s as having missed important signs and opportunities.

克林顿的讯息被认为可能对广大选民群体产生重大影响,而特朗普的则被认为深深吸引着少数热情但狭隘的边缘支持者,这些选民数量不足以让他胜选。事后看来,人们形容特朗普拥有“完美的音准”,而克林顿则是“音盲”。

Clinton’s message was thought likely to carry a lot of weight with a broad swath of the electorate, while Trump’s was viewed as appealing deeply to a few fervent but narrow fringe constituencies without enough voters for him to win. After the fact, Trump is described as having had “perfect pitch” and Clinton as having a “tin ear.”

特别是在当下,人们普遍认为,克林顿未能回应白人男性的关切,也没有为那些失业、被经济发展甩在身后的人提出解决方案,这是一大失误。但在竞选期间,却没有人指出这一错误。

In particular, now it’s considered to have been a big mistake for Clinton to fail to address the concerns of white men and set out a solution for those who lost jobs and were omitted from economic progress. But during the campaign, no one pointed to this error.

应当指出的是——这也是他的可贵之处——西尔弗一再坚持特朗普可能获胜。事实上,他常常提醒追随者,大多数人预期的希拉里压倒性胜利,其可能性并不比特朗普小胜更高。西尔弗在选举日当天还提出,特朗普输掉普选却赢得总统职位的概率为 10.5%。我们不能说他预测到了这一结果,但(一)他对此比大多数人更明确,(二)他给一个过去相当罕见的事件赋予了相当可观的可能性(所以不能说他只是简单外推)。

  • It should be noted – to his credit – that Silver insisted repeatedly that Trump could win. In fact, he often

reminded his followers that the Clinton landslide most people expected was no more likely than a modest Trump victory. Silver also entered Election Day citing a 10.5% probability that Trump would lose the popular vote but win the presidency. We can’t say he predicted that outcome, but (a) he was more explicit about it than most and (b) he assigned a fairly material probability to an event that in the past has been quite rare (so it can’t be said that he was just extrapolating).

2017 年,橡树资本管理有限合伙公司(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)

2017 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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直到选举日之前,大多数观察者(包括我在内)都在谈论共和党在选举后可能陷入分裂,夹在传统派系——茶党保守派,与特朗普那群经济上心怀不满、反建制的支持者之间。这或许会成真,但如今民主党也被认为面临同样的风险,因为克林顿式的温和派与桑德斯/沃伦的进步派之间出现了裂痕。

Finally, up until Election Day, most observers (including me) talked about the likelihood that the Republican Party would emerge from the election torn between its traditional faction, the Tea Party conservatives, and Trump’s economically disgruntled, anti-establishment supporters. That may turn out to be the case, but now the Democratic Party is described as being at risk as well because of the schism between the Clinton-type moderates and the Sanders/Warren progressives.

这是我在选举结束六天后,发表在《算算看吧!》中的部分内容:

Here’s some of what I wrote in “Go Figure!,” six days after the election:

回想一下上周选举之前的情形。我们当时知道些什么?

Think back to just before last week’s election. What did we know?  

民调几乎一致预测希拉里·克林顿将胜出……市场普遍认为,特朗普获胜——尽管胜算渺茫——对市场将是利空。

The polls were almost unanimous in saying Hillary Clinton would win . . . There was a near-universal belief that a Trump victory – as unlikely as it was – would be bad for the markets.

那么到底发生了什么?首先,克林顿没有赢……其次,美国股市迎来了自 2014 年以来表现最好的一周!……因此,基于上周的事态发展,可以得出两个关键观察:

-

-

So what happened? First Clinton didn’t win. . . . And second, the U.S. stock market had its best week since 2014! . . . Thus two key observations can be made based on last week’s developments:  

首先,没有人真正知道未来会发生什么事件。

其次,也没有人知道市场对这些事件会作何反应。

First, no one really knows what events are going to transpire. And second, no one knows what the market’s reaction to those events will be.

2016 年的种种意外,让我们得出一个关键结论:各路专家常常看不懂民众及其诉求。显而易见,媒体从业者没能理解许多普通美国民众;受过高等教育的人没能理解没受过高等教育的人;而生活在大都市和沿海地区的人,也没能理解美国其他地方的人。强烈的情绪和信念左右了一场关键选举,其方式完全超出了专家们的预期,他们原以为这几乎不可能发生。

One of the key conclusions we should draw from the surprises of 2016 is that the pundits often failed to understand people and their views. It’s clear that people who work in the media hadn’t understood many average Americans; people with college degrees hadn’t understood those without them; and people living on the coasts and in metropolises hadn’t understood the rest. Strong sentiments and beliefs swung a pivotal election in ways the experts absolutely failed to grasp and thought were virtually impossible.

当然,大多数未来事件并无“事实”可言,只有观点。专家——尤其是那些靠专业意见吃饭的人——常常把自己的话包装成事实,但这并不意味着它们一定会实现。

Of course there are no “facts” regarding most future events, just opinions. Experts – especially people who are paid to be experts – often couch their statements as facts, but that doesn’t mean they’re sure to come true.

那么媒体呢?

我年轻的时候,为数不多的媒体渠道是公众获取信息的主要来源。当时有三大电视网和四家本地电视台——频道上再没有多余的位置——直到 1987 年之前,它们都受制于联邦通讯委员会的“公平原则”,该原则要求广播公司讨论涉及公共利益的有争议话题,并播出对立观点。电视新闻主播爱德华·默罗曾是全美最受尊敬的人物之一,我经常引用他的一句话:“任何不感到困惑的人,其实并没有真正理解局势。”沃尔特·克朗凯特、切特·亨特利和戴维·布林克利同样备受信任。报纸或许带有民主党或共和党的倾向,但在社论版之外,它们在报道事件时大体上避免党派之争。

随后有线电视网的激增,掀起了争夺观众的激烈竞争。少数频道选择全天候播报新闻,另有一些谈话类广播电台加入。拉什·林博、罗杰·艾尔斯和鲁珀特·默多克意识到,高度党派化甚至煽动性的广播内容可以带来庞大的受众群体——以及巨额利润。像唐·伊穆斯和霍华德·斯特恩这样的电台“毒舌主持”不断侵蚀语言和行为的标准,新闻和脱口秀节目纷纷效仿。于是现在我们看到的,是直言不讳、喧嚣刺耳的言论,外加高度党派化的信息传播。

And the Media? When I was young, a limited number of media outlets were the public’s primary source of information. There were three TV networks and four local stations – no more room on the dial – and until 1987 they were subject to the FCC’s Fairness Doctrine that required broadcasters to discuss controversial matters of public interest and air contrasting views. Edward R. Murrow, a TV news anchor, was one of America’s most respected men, and I often make reference to the time he said, “Anyone who isn’t confused doesn’t really understand the situation.” Walter Cronkite, Chet Huntley and David Brinkley were similarly trusted. Newspapers may have had Democratic or Republican leanings, but outside the editorial pages they largely avoided partisanship in covering events. The subsequent proliferation of cable TV networks set off powerful competition for viewers. A few chose to be full-time purveyors of news, along with some talk-radio stations. Rush Limbaugh, Roger Ailes and Rupert Murdoch realized that a big following – and big money – could result from highly partisan, even inflammatory, broadcasting. Radio “shock jocks” like Don Imus and Howard Stern chipped away at standards for language and demeanor, and news and talk shows emulated them. So now we have outspoken, boisterous speech, along with highly partisan messaging.

2017 年,橡树资本管理公司(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)

2017 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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如今,新闻媒体与三四十年前的样貌已大不相同。许多媒体明显偏向某一方,让人们可以整天阅读、观看、收听,却从未接触问题的方方面面。因此,在 2016 年总统大选的媒体报道中,多数人都能找到抱怨的理由。

今天的媒体人物很少流露出穆罗当年的困惑。相反,他们倾向于把预测当作确定的事实来陈述。你什么时候听到电视评论员说“我认为”或“在我看来”?事实上,他们常常让我想起 20 世纪 70 年代听到的关于经济学家的描述:“从不按市价结算的投资组合经理。”也就是说,他们很容易忽视自己犯错的时刻。2015 年 8 月或 9 月,当唐纳德·特朗普在争取共和党提名过程中开始取得进展时,《纽约时报》的一位专栏作家直截了当地断言,因为特朗普无法忍受失败的后果,他会在 1 月初选开始前退出竞选。我们并未看到这一幕发生……也没有再听到他提及这一论断。

These days the news media shows little resemblance to what it was 30, 40 or 50 years ago. Many outlets are highly biased to one side or the other and make it possible to read, watch and listen all day and never be exposed to all aspects of the issues. Thus most people find something to complain about in the media coverage of the 2016 presidential election. Today’s media personalities rarely express the confusion Murrow did. Rather, they tend to state forecasts as certainties. When do you hear a TV commentator say “I think” or “it seems to me”? In fact, they often remind me of the description of economists I heard in the 1970s: “portfolio managers who never mark to market.” That is, they find it easy to overlook the times when they’re wrong. In August or September of 2015, when Donald Trump was beginning to achieve success in his pursuit of the Republican nomination, a New York Times columnist flatly stated that because Trump couldn’t stand the prospect of losing, he would drop out of the race before the primaries began in January. We didn’t see that happen . . . or any further mention of his assertion.

该如何应对媒体

考虑到总统候选人的性质、选择的严峻性,以及近期媒体报道的趋势,我去年花了大量时间通过网站、报纸和电视报道关注政治动态。我认识的大多数人都是如此,你或许也一样。对许多人来说,这成了一种执念,甚至近乎狂热。

我的儿子安德鲁帮我梳理了媒体的影响:

What to Do About the Media Given the nature of the candidates for the presidency, the starkness of the choice, and the recent trends in media coverage, I spent a great deal of time last year following political developments via websites, newspapers and television coverage. Most people I know did, and you may have as well. For many it became a preoccupation, even a mania. My son Andrew has helped me dope out the media effects:     

紧跟时事会让人误以为自己身处其中,消息灵通。

人们自认见多识广时,想问题和做决定都更有底气。

可媒体上的专家,洞见未必比我们普通人高明多少。

说到底,大家更爱追着那些印证自己既有观点的媒体跑,而不是专挑唱反调的看。

所以说,追着媒体专家跑,图个乐呵没问题,要说在思路上长进,十有八九是白费功夫。

Following events makes people feel they’re actively involved in them and well informed. People think and act with more confidence when they consider themselves informed. But the media pundits often are no more insightful than the rest of us. And anyway, people tend to follow media outlets that confirm their beliefs rather than challenge them. Thus following the media experts, while entertaining, can be a waste of time intellectually.

正因如此,我非常喜欢《观察家报》11 月 16 日(大选一周后)刊登的一篇文章,标题是《想真正让美国再次伟大?那就别看新闻了》。作者瑞安·霍利迪在文中谈到深陷新闻循环的滋味。由于种种原因,媒体界已经形成了一种……体系:它需要越来越多的眼球盯着越来越久,同时却在掏空高质量、可靠的信息来源。我们的“新闻”比以往任何时候都多,但原创报道却比以往任何时候都少;观点和分析类内容多了一个数量级,但正如作家兼学者汤姆·尼科尔斯所指出的,专业性却不知为何变少了。作家查克·克洛斯特曼曾感叹,走进一支橄榄球队的前台办公室,发现里面所有人都在看 ESPN,这事儿有多奇怪——难道他们的信息不比普通观众更灵通吗?

For these reasons, I greatly enjoyed an article that appeared in the Observer on November 16, a week after the election. It was entitled “Want to Really Make America Great Again? Stop Reading the News.” Ryan Holiday, its author, talked about what it’s like to be caught up in the news cycle. For a number of reasons, there has arisen in the media: . . . a system that needs more and more eyeballs for longer periods of time while gutting high-quality, reliable sources of information. We have more “news” but less original reporting than ever before, an order of magnitude more in the way of opinion and analysis, but as [author and academic] Tom Nichols has pointed out, somehow less expertise. Chuck Klosterman [a writer on American culture] once remarked at how strange it was to walk through the front offices of a football team and find that everyone there was watching ESPN. Didn’t they have better information than the average viewer or

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记者的吗?结果并非如此——他们和我们一样沉迷于同样的媒体,也难以逃脱同样的群体思维……

推特的设计初衷并不是帮你以最快速度获取最佳信息然后抽身离开——它要么把你拖进充满争吵和辩论的纷争世界,要么把你困在一个回音室里,让你不断确认所有人都和你想的一样……我们“参与”这个生态,是因为它让人上瘾,也因为我们好奇。

于是,作家霍利迪给出了一个实用的药方作为回应:

我并非要躲到地下,或者彻底切断与当下事件的联系。而是我已经决定,不再实时围观它们的发展。我每个周日还是会看圣徒队的比赛,但不会自欺欺人地以为,周二打开《体育中心》节目会有什么帮助。

如果很多人能接受这样一个事实——媒体对某件即将发生之事的报道,以及你看或不看,都不会对结果产生任何影响——他们的生活就会更平静,也更有成效。

reporter? Turns out, no – they’re addicted to the same media we are and subject to the same groupthink. . . . Twitter isn’t designed to help you get in and out with the best information as quickly as possible – it’s supposed to suck you into either a contentious world of argument and debate or an echo chamber that reassures you everyone thinks like you do. . . . We’re “participating” in the ecosystem because it’s addicting and because we’re curious. So author Holiday came up with a useful prescription in response: It’s not that I am going underground or completely disconnecting from current events. It’s that I have decided I am no longer going to watch them develop in real time. I’m going to watch the Saints play every Sunday, [but] I’m not going to fool myself into thinking that tuning into “Sports Center” on Tuesday will help. A lot of people’s lives would be more tranquil and more productive if they accepted that what the media says about an upcoming event – and whether you watch or not – won’t have any impact on the outcome.

专家们知道什么?

我之所以用这种方式写这份备忘录,其中一个原因是想有机会回到 2015 年我提到过的一个话题:《纽约邮报》的“NFL 投注指南”。在每个橄榄球赛季的每周,该报的十一位专家都会给读者建议押注哪些球队。以下是这些专家在整个 17 周赛季、覆盖 256 场比赛中的表现:

What Do the Experts Know? One of the reasons I crafted this memo this way is so I would have a chance to return to a subject I introduced in 2015: the New York Post’s “NFL Bettor’s Guide.” Each week during football season, the Post’s eleven experts advise its readers as to which teams to bet on. Here’s how the experts did over the full 17-week season, covering 256 games:   

选股最准的人,正确率是 55.1%。

最不准的人,正确率也有 48.8%。

平均来看,这些选股人猜对的概率是 51.6%。

The best picker was right 55.1% of the time. The worst picker was right 48.8% of the time. On average the pickers were right 51.6% of the time.

专家们还通过每周最多给出三只“最佳荐股”来进一步帮助读者。以下便是他们在最强力推荐上的表现:

The experts further help readers by specifying up to three “best bets” each week. Here’s how they did on their strongest picks:   

选股最准的那位,正确率 62.7%。最差的那位,正确率 43.1%。平均而言,这些选股者的正确率为 54.0%。

The best picker was right 62.7% of the time. The worst picker was right 43.1% of the time. On average the pickers were right 54.0% of the time.

从这些数据中可得的观察结果如下:

The available observations from this data are as follows:   

整体结果在 50/50 左右分布,说明这些专家的挑选过程跟抛硬币差不多。

平均而言,专家们在“最有把握的选择”上,正确率只比他们的全部选择高出 2.4%。

其中两位专家在“最有把握的选择”上的表现,甚至还不如其他选择。

The way the overall results are distributed around 50/50 suggests the experts’ process is little more than a coin toss. On average the experts were right just 2.4% more often on their “best bets” than on all their picks. Two of the experts did worse on their “best bets” than on their other picks.

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十一位挑选者中有八位猜对的比例超过一半。但考虑到平均每周下注需支付约 5% 的费用,这十一位专家剔除费用后,几乎没人能在整体选择上带来增值(听着耳熟吗?)。即便是专家们“最佳下注”的平均水平,扣除费用后也难以获得正回报。

Eight of the eleven pickers were right more than half the time. But since it costs about 5% per week on average to bet with the bookies, virtually none of the eleven experts’ overall picks added value after fees (sound familiar?). Even the average of the experts’ “best bets” wouldn’t have produced a positive return after fees.

另外还有两点观察:

Two additional observations: 

第 16 周,十一位专家全部预测受青睐的纽约巨人队将击败费城老鹰队,其中五位认为不被看好的纽约喷气机队将战胜新英格兰爱国者队(两种情况下,均依据博彩公司为使两队获胜机会均等而设定的“让分”调整了比分)。比赛结果,受青睐的巨人队以 5 分之差落败(意味着在减去 2.5 分让分后,他们的表现甚至更差),而喷气机队(本预期输 16.5 分)却以 38 分之差惨败。换言之,(a)专家们可能严重偏袒纽约球队,(b)在这两场比赛中,他们的判断有 73% 的时间是错的。

In week 16, all eleven of the experts predicted the favored New York Giants would beat the Philadelphia Eagles, and five of the eleven thought the underdog New York Jets would beat the New England Patriots (in both cases, after adjusting the scores for the “point spread” that the bookies impose to equalize the two teams’ chances of winning). When the games were played, the favored Giants lost by five points (meaning they did even worse after the 2½point spread was subtracted from their score), and the Jets (who were expected to lose by 16½ points) lost by 38 instead. In other words, (a) the experts may have been heavily biased in favor of the New York teams and (b) they were wrong 73% of the time on these two games.

下注者也可以选择押某场比赛的“大小分”——也就是两队总得分会超过还是低于博彩公司设定的门槛。这只是赌客们找“参与感”的另一种方式。结果显示,专家们在 128 场比赛中押对(52% 的命中率),在 123 场中押错(另有 5 场平局)。同样毫无附加值,尤其在扣除费用之后。

Bettors also have the option to bet on the “over/under” in a game – that is, whether the two teams’ combined score will exceed or fall short of a threshold set by the bookies. It’s just another way for bettors to get “action.” The results show the experts were right in 128 games (52% of the time) and wrong in 123 (there were five ties). Again no value added, especially after fees.

如果经济学家们不愿公开自己的业绩数据,《华盛顿邮报》至少做了一件好事,展示了其橄榄球专家的表现。归根结底,他们的观点帮助甚微,而相关报道却完全回避了这些预测毫无价值这一事实。

If economists won’t publish their performance data, the Post at least performs a service by showing how its football experts did. The bottom line is that their opinions are of little help, and the related coverage omits all discussion of their lack of predictive value.

宏观因素的重要性

过去十几年里,人们对“宏观”的兴趣显著升温。我认为这很大程度上源于格林斯潘领导下的美联储更加积极的干预姿态,以及投资者对它的密切关注。如今,许多分析师似乎把心思全放在央行行为、政府举措、利率和汇率走势,以及市场波动上,而不是个别公司的命运。

这些几乎成了我们听到的全部内容。大多数人认为,对它们前景的研判才是投资成功的关键。因此,我想把这一点作为这里的重要话题来谈。

我经常与客户、潜在客户、CFA 协会和学生团体交流,有很多机会了解大家在想什么。他们通常聚焦在为数不多的问题上。过去几年,我最常被问到的是这些:

The Importance of the Macro Interest in “macro” has amped up meaningfully over the last dozen years or so. I think it largely started with the increased activism on the part of the Greenspan Fed, and investors’ heightened interest in it. Today many analysts seem preoccupied with central bank behavior, government actions, trends in interest rates and currencies, and the movement of markets, as opposed to the fortunes of individual companies. These things are almost all we hear about. And most people think knowledge regarding the outlook for them holds the key to investment success. Thus I want to make this a major topic here. Since I speak a lot to clients, prospects, CFA societies and student groups, I get a lot of chances to hear what’s on people’s minds. And usually they focus on a relatively small number of questions. Over the last few years, the ones I’ve gotten most often have been these:    

美联储会在哪个月加息?

经济或市场可能出什么问题?

我们现在处于什么阶段?

在我访问的每个国家,那个国家的前景如何?

What month will the Fed raise interest rates? What could go wrong in the economy or the market? What inning are we in? And in each country I visit, how’s the outlook for that country?

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美联储何时会加息?——2013 年 5 月 22 日,时任美联储主席本·伯南克在向国会作证时语出惊人:“如果我们看到持续改善,并且有信心这种改善能够维持,那么在未来几次会议上,我们可能会放慢购债步伐……”这番话暗示美联储可能“缩减”债券购买规模——也就是其刺激计划中举足轻重的量化宽松——伯南克由此预示,被压制多年的利率将要开始上升。

从那以后,人们一直念念不忘利率何时会上升,这也是我被问到最多的问题。我的回答始终如一:我怎么会知道?你又何必在意?

先说第一点,我怎么会知道?我总是指出,我不是经济学家,也不是美联储观察人士。而且我认为经济学家和美联储观察人士同样不知道答案。没有人能提前准确预知这类事情的时机,尤其是美联储自己恐怕也不知道。

但更重要的是,何必在意?如果我说是 12 月,我会反问他们,你会采取什么行动?如果我把时间改成 3 月,你会做出不同的选择吗?认为预期 3 月加息就会采取不同行动、而预期 12 月加息就不然,这种想法忽略了 3 月加息的预期很可能早在 3 月之前就开始反映在资产价格中。也就是说,加息的具体日期并不是什么有用的信息。

什么可能出问题?——多年来,多数人都觉得我们身处一种“刚刚好”的环境:不太热也不太冷。经济增长既没有慢到引发衰退或通缩,也没有快到带来恶性通胀和必须采取紧缩措施的程度。市场强劲到足以预示向好,但又不至于强到像泡沫。投资者心态也是如此。

多数人不想靠嘴上说一切都会永远顺利来考验命运,事实上他们也知道不会。只是他们说不准到底什么会出问题。说实话,虽然我能列出那些显而易见的候选者(油价、利率、汇率的变化等等),但它们很可能早已被市场预期并大体反映在价格之中。真正能让市场剧烈波动的,是那些谁都无法预料的意外。但(a)多数人想象不到它们,(b)大多数时候它们也不会发生。所以才叫“意外”。

所以我只能猜测一些“不太可能发生的灾难”,比如战争行为、反通胀或者经济突然停摆,但这些都不太可能发生,而且我对它们的了解也不比其他人多。过去三年影响最大的单一因素,无疑是 2014 年 6 月到 2016 年 2 月油价下跌 75%。但谁预料到了?

在我 2007 年 7 月的备忘录《一切安好》里,金融危机近在眼前,我坚持认为好日子不可能永远持续下去。但我并不知道引爆恶化的导火索会是次贷,而且当我列出所有候选者时,我最后写的是“我还没想到的事情”。那大概已经是我能做的极限了……对多数人来说恐怕也是如此。

我们打到第几局了?——也许没人能说清楚到底是什么会给当下的积极趋势敲响丧钟,但人们还是想知道这个过程走了多远,进而知道何时会结束。2008 年金融危机期间,人们就开始问我我们打到第几局了,从那时起这个问题就一直没停过。

When will the Fed raise interest rates? – On May 22, 2013, in testimony to Congress, then Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke surprised the world by saying, “If we see continued improvement, and we have confidence that that is going to be sustained, in the next few meetings we could take a step down in our pace of purchases [of bonds]. . . .” By indicating the Fed could “taper” its bond buying – the quantitative easing that was an important part of its stimulus program – Bernanke was foreshadowing that interest rates, which had been suppressed for years, would begin to rise. Ever since then, people have been preoccupied with when interest rate increases would take place, and that’s the question I’ve been asked most often. My response has been consistent: How would I know, and why do you care? First, how would I know? I always point out that I’m not an economist or Fed watcher. And I don’t think economists or Fed watchers know the answer, either. No one consistently knows the timing of these things in advance, in particular because the Fed itself probably doesn’t know. But more importantly, why would anyone care? If I say December, I ask them, what actions would you take? And if I changed that to March, would you do something different? The idea that you would do something different with a March expectation rather than a December expectation ignores the likelihood that the expectation of a March rate rise would begin to be reflected in asset prices well before March. That means the likely date of a rate rise is not a very useful piece of information. What could go wrong? – For years it has felt to most people that we’ve been in a Goldilocks environment: neither too hot nor too cold. The economy hasn’t grown slowly enough to cause recession or deflation, or fast enough to bring on hyperinflation and the need for restrictive action. The markets have been strong enough to bode well, but not so strong as to suggest a bubble. Ditto for investor psychology. Most people don’t want to tempt fate by saying things will go well forever, and in fact they know they won’t. It’s just that they can’t decide what it is that will go wrong. The truth is that while I can enumerate them, the obvious candidates (changes in oil prices, interest rates, exchange rates, etc.) are likely to already be anticipated and largely priced in. It’s the surprises no one can anticipate that would move markets most if they were to happen. But (a) most people can’t imagine them and (b) most of the time they don’t happen. That’s why they’re called surprises. So I can guess at “improbable disasters” like acts of war, disinflation or a sudden seizing up of the economy, but they’re unlikely to happen, and I don’t know much more about them than anyone else. The greatest single influence of the last three years was doubtless the 75% decline in the price of oil from June 2014 to February 2016. But who predicted it? In my memo “It’s All Good” (July 2007), on the doorstep of the financial crisis, I insisted that the good times couldn’t roll on forever. But I didn’t know it was sub-prime mortgages that would be the catalyst for a turn for the worst, and when I listed my candidates, I ended with “the things I haven’t thought of.” That’s still about the best I can do . . . or most others, it seems. What inning are we in? – Perhaps no one can say just what it is that will ring the bell on today’s positive trends, but people still want to know how advanced we are in the process, and thus when it will come to an end. People began to ask me what inning we’re in during the financial crisis of 2008, and they’ve continued ever since.

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首先——我承认这里有点较真——人们很少说明他们问的是哪一场比赛。是经济复苏、信贷扩张、连续多年的低违约率、投资者心理的上扬,还是股市的上涨?当然,每一项的答案可能都不一样。但更重要的是,这个问题暗含了一个前提:我们知道自己要谈的比赛会持续多久。一场标准棒球赛有九局,所以“第二局”“第六局”或“第九局”都有明确的含义。但对我们现在关心的这些事情来说,我们永远不知道比赛会打多长。

所以,与其问“第几局”,我建议投资者改问:事情是否处于某种极端状态。心理是低迷、正常还是狂热?资本市场是紧闭、正常还是毫无底线地慷慨?这些问题能给出有用的答案,而不是比赛离结束还有多远——后者没人知道答案。

某个国家的展望如何?——对我来说,核心在于:人们往往把一般智力、良好的投资记录、特定领域的专长和全方位的洞察力混为一谈。所以我再重申一遍:我不是经济学家(即便我是,我判断正确的概率也有限)。然后我要补充:作为投资者的经验,甚至可能有的聪明才智,并不能说明你能预知某个国家的宏观潜力。

我在一个国家待上一两天后,人们常来问我的结论。但在访问过程中,我通常(a)只去大城市,(b)只见金融圈的人,(c)花在回答问题上的时间比收集信息还多。事实上,最近一次访问时,面对那个老问题,我告诉听众:我希望在座每位对你们国家的了解都比我多。我有时会对访问的国家产生某种直觉印象,但这些印象通常没什么数据支撑,就算最终能应验,也大概率只能发生在极其漫长的未来。

First of all – admittedly I’m being picky here – people rarely specify which game they’re asking about. Is it the economic recovery, the credit expansion, the string of low-default years, the upswing in investor psychology, or the stock market rise? Certainly the answer could be different for each. But, more importantly, the question assumes we know how long each game will go on. A standard baseball game consists of nine innings, so “second inning,” “sixth” or “ninth” has a clear meaning. But with the things we’re wondering about here, we never know how long the game will run. So rather than “what inning,” I’d suggest investors ask whether things are or are not in an extended state. Is psychology depressed, average or euphoric? Is the capital market shut tight, normal or unthinkingly generous? These are questions that can be answered in a helpful way, not how close the game is to being over. No one knows the answer to the latter. What’s the outlook for country xyz? – The bottom line for me here is that people tend to confuse general intelligence, good investment records, expertise in specific areas, and all-around insight. Thus I’ll reiterate that I’m no economist (and even if I were, my chances of being right would be limited). And then I’ll add that being experienced as an investor and even hopefully intelligent says nothing about being able to divine a specific country’s macro potential. After I spend a day or two in a country, people often ask for my conclusions. But in the course of my visits, I generally (a) visit only big cities, (b) meet only with financial types, and (c) spend more time answering questions than gathering information. In fact, on one recent visit I responded to the usual question by telling my audience that I hoped each member knew more about their country than I did. I sometimes gain visceral impressions of the countries I visit, but they’re usually data-lite and likely to come true only in the longest run, if at all.

选举的影响

当然,2016 年最大的新闻是总统大选,它给我带来了没完没了的问题。谁会赢?我和所有人看的是同样的民调,住在沿海地区,也得出了同样的结论。我拿不出任何独到的见解,来质疑克林顿胜选的可能性。

两位候选人当上总统后会有什么不同?不需要什么聪明才智就能得出这样的结论:克林顿政府相当可预测,行事会在相当狭窄的范围内;而特朗普当总统则一切皆有可能——有些方面可能比克林顿好,但也有相当大的可能更糟。

选举日当天和刚过后我都在澳大利亚,关于选举影响的问题马上就来了。事实上,正是这些问题促使我在接下来那个周末在首尔写下了“算算看!”一文。在那篇文章里,我把以下几个问题列为悬而未决的:

Implications of the Election Of course, the U.S. presidential election was the biggest story of 2016, and it brought me endless questions. Who would win? I’d read the same polls as everyone else, lived on the coasts, and reached the same conclusions. I could bring no unique insight on the basis of which to question the likelihood of a Clinton victory. How would the two candidates differ as president? It didn’t take any brilliance to conclude that a Clinton administration would be quite predictable and operate within rather narrow boundaries, while anything was possible from a Trump presidency – in some cases better than a Clinton one, but also with considerable potential for worse. I was in Australia on Election Day and just after, and questions about the implications started immediately. In fact, they’re what inspired me to write “Go Figure!” over the following weekend in Seoul. In it, I described the following questions as being open:   

特朗普在竞选时说的话,他认真有多少?他想实现的,又有多少真正打算落实?而他想落实的,最终又能办成几成?

How much of what Trump said while campaigning did he mean? How much of what he actually meant will he try to implement? And how much of what he tries to implement will he be able to effect?

2017 年 橡树资本管理有限合伙企业。

2017 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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我们依然没有答案。说到市场,特朗普显然打算做一个极力亲商的总统。但他会采取哪些行动、能否奏效,都还是未知数。当然,自大选以来才过去九周。任何专家若告诉你特朗普政府会怎样——或英国脱欧后如何;意大利在缺乏改革和伦齐的情况下怎样;印度经济在取消 85% 流通货币后(为打击腐败和地下经济,面额最大的 500 卢比和 1000 卢比纸币被宣布不再合法)会如何;或法国和德国即将到来的大选会怎样——都是在胡说八道。

We still don’t have answers. As for the markets, it’s clear Trump intends to be a very pro-business president. But what actions he’ll take and whether they’ll succeed is very much up in the air. Of course, only nine weeks have elapsed since the election. Any expert who tells you what’s in store from the Trump administration – or from Britain’s departure from the EU; Italy without reform and Renzi; the Indian economy with 85% of its currency cancelled (the highest-denomination notes, 500 and 1000 rupees, were declared no longer legal tender in order to rein in corruption and the underground economy); or the coming elections in France and Germany – is talking through his hat.

我对观点的一点看法

这些话题多年来我已反复讲过很多,这里就简明扼要地总结一下:

My Opinion of Opinions Since I’ve discussed these things at great length over the years, I‘ll try here to sum up succinctly: 

关于未来没有事实,只有观点。任何坚信自己能预判宏观未来的人,都是在夸大自己的远见,无论是出于无知、傲慢还是不诚实。

There are no facts about the future, just opinions. Anyone who asserts with conviction what he thinks will happen in the macro future is overstating his foresight, whether out of ignorance, hubris or dishonesty.

经济、利率、汇率和市场的变化并非科学过程的结果。人的参与——带着他们的情绪、弱点和偏见——让这些变化变得高度不可预测。正如物理学家理查德·费曼所说:“想象一下,如果电子也有感情,物理学该有多难!”

Developments in economies, interest rates, currencies and markets aren’t the result of scientific processes. The involvement in them of people – with their emotions, foibles and biases – renders them highly unpredictable. As physicist Richard Feynman put it, “Imagine how much harder physics would be if electrons had feelings!”

对这些问题有自己的看法是一回事,但确信这些看法正确(并据此行事)则完全是另一回事。

It’s one thing to have opinions on these subjects, but something very different to be confident they’re right (and act on them).

根据对不确定事情的预测采取大胆行动,不仅大错特错,而且危险重重。正如马克·吐温所说:“让你惹上麻烦的不是你不知道的事,而是你确信不疑却并不为真的事。”

Taking bold action based on forecasts of things that are uncertain isn’t just misguided; it’s dangerous. As Mark Twain said, “It ain’t what you don’t know that gets you into trouble. It’s what you know for certain that just ain’t true.”

橡树资本的每个人对宏观形势都有自己的看法。当我们看到市场,尤其是资本市场行为出现极端情况时,往往会采取果断行动。但我们很清楚自己不知道什么,当市况温和或不明朗时,就不会重仓下注。

Everyone at Oaktree has opinions on the macro. And when we see extremes in markets and, especially, capital market behavior, we’re apt to take strong action. But we’re highly aware of what we don’t know, and when conditions are moderate or indistinct, we don’t bet heavily.

我会以分享我对宏观形势的最新顿悟来结束本节。在我从事投资行业的头几十年里,变化来得如此缓慢,以至于人们往往把环境视为一个固定不变的背景,周期性在其中规律而可靠地轮转。但大约从二十年前开始——主要源于技术创新的加速——事物开始以如此迅猛的速度变化,固定背景的观点或许已不再适用。

如今,技术发展、颠覆创新、人口结构变化、政治不稳定和媒体趋势等力量,造就了一个不断演变的环境,也带来了未必再与过去相似的周期。这使得那些敢于预测宏观走势的人面临前所未有的挑战。

I’ll end this section by sharing my latest epiphany on the macro. I realized recently that in my early decades in the investment business, change came so slowly that people tended to think of the environment as a fixed context in which cycles played out regularly and dependably. But starting about twenty years ago – keyed primarily by the acceleration in technological innovation – things began to change so rapidly that the fixed-backdrop view may no longer be applicable. Now forces like technological developments, disruption, demographic change, political instability and media trends give rise to an ever-changing environment, as well as to cycles that no longer necessarily resemble those of the past. That makes the job of those who dare to predict the macro more challenging than ever.

2017 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司。

2017 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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关于“事实”之我见

我对预测素无好感,尤其是那些把个人观点包装成事实的说法,但我确实相信,世上存在“事实”这种东西。遗憾的是,在党派之争愈演愈烈的环境里,“事实”这个概念也成了牺牲品。近来我们看到,“非事实”被捧上神坛,而“真事实”却被拉下泥潭。

“假新闻”在 2016 年成为一个重大问题。有人认为它左右了大选结果。社交媒体的便捷,让人可以轻易炮制和传播他人信以为真的言论——哪怕完全是凭空捏造。那家披萨店被说成是希拉里·克林顿操纵的虐童团伙的幌子,不过是 2016 年更离谱的例子之一。我预计,围绕社交媒体在删除不实帖子方面应扮演什么角色,以及在捍卫言论自由与阻止虚假信息传播之间如何取舍,这些讨论还会持续下去。

与此同时,我也担心“真事实”正在消失。如今,几乎任何事都可以被贴上“存疑”的标签。科学家们普遍认同人类在气候变化中扮演了重要角色——在位的世界各国领导人也普遍如此认为——但我们却听到这种观点被斥为“一家之言”。前几天,我听到一位前美国参议员、如今执掌一家政策智库的人,把一份国会预算办公室的报告称为“假新闻”,只因他的机构对该报告有异议。如果连无党派的国会预算办公室都不能被认为是客观真实的,那还有谁能?

在党派对立剑拔弩张、专家意见备受轻慢、公共话语标准急剧滑坡的时代,还有“事实”这回事吗?观点、事实和虚假事实之间,当真没有区别?还能不能出现一个人人信赖的人物,另一个爱德华·R. 默罗?任何说法,只要不是百分之百可量化、可证明,就注定要被贬损吗?如果没有影像资料,历史就可以被无限改写吗?我们的孙辈会被教导“真实”一词是什么意思?他们会信任哪些权威?我们确实生活在有趣的时代。

宏观投资者的业绩

检验投资策略的试金石,是看它能否交出漂亮的成绩单。所以,让我们看看现状:第一,“人人都知道”宏观因素如今是投资者表现的关键决定因素;第二,近期宏观层面发生了许多重大事件,为有远见者施展预测本领提供了机会。因此,宏观导向型投资者大展拳脚的要素已经齐备。

让我们看看两只对冲基金研究公司的宏观基金指数的业绩,并拿它们与对冲基金研究公司的全对冲基金指数做个对比:

截至 2016 年 11 月 30 日

年化净回报率

What about Facts? While I take a dim view of forecasts, and especially of opinions presented as facts, I do believe there are such things as facts. Unfortunately, however, the concept of “facts” is among the casualties of the increasingly partisan environment. Recently we have seen both the elevation in status of “non-facts,” as well as the tearing down of “real facts.” “Fake news” emerged as a significant issue in 2016. Some people believe it influenced the election. Ease of access to social media makes it quite simple to create and disseminate statements that others will believe, even if they’re total fabrications. The pizzeria fronting for a child-abuse ring led by Hillary Clinton is just one of 2016’s wilder examples. I expect to see continuing discussion of the proper role of social media in taking down untrue posts, and of the conflict between defending freedom of expression and preventing the publication of falsehoods. At the same time, I’m concerned about the disappearance of real facts. Nowadays it seems almost anything can be characterized as questionable. There’s broad agreement among scientists that humans play a significant role in climate change – as there is among sitting world leaders – and yet we hear this idea dismissed as “a matter of opinion.” The other day I heard a former U.S. Senator who now leads a policy think tank describe as “fake news” a Congressional Budget Office report with which his organization takes issue. If the non-partisan CBO isn’t accepted as objective and truthful, who will be? In a time of raging partisanship, disrespect for experts, and drastically debased standards for discourse, is there such a thing as a fact? Can there be no distinction between opinion, fact and fake fact? Can there be a figure everyone trusts, another Edward R. Murrow? Can any statement be safe from disparagement even though it’s not 100% measurable and provable? Is history subject to unlimited revision if there are no video images? What will our grandchildren be taught is the meaning of the word “true”? What authorities will they trust? We certainly live in interesting times. Macro Investor Performance The acid test of an investment strategy is whether it produces good results. So here we are: first, “everyone knows” macro is a key determinant of investor performance these days, and second, there have been a lot of significant macro developments of late, providing opportunities for those with foresight to apply their predictive powers. Thus the ingredients have been in place for significant gains on the part of macro-oriented investors. Let’s take a look at the results for two Hedge Fund Research macro fund indices and compare them against the HFR index of all hedge funds: Periods ended November 30, 2016 Annualized Net Returns

1 year

1 year

3 years

3 years

5 years

5 years

HFRI 宏观(综合)指数

HFRI 宏观:主观主题指数*

HFRI Macro (Total) Index HFRI Macro: Discretionary Thematic Index*

( 1.17%)

( 1.96)

( 1.17%) ( 1.96)

1.64%

( 0.47)

1.64% ( 0.47)

0.74%

0.35

0.74% 0.35

HFRI 基金加权综合指数

HFRI Fund Weighted Composite Index

3.37

3.37

2.46

2.46

4.23

4.23

  • 由个人管理的宏观基金,而非算法驱动的基金
  • Macro funds run by individuals, not algorithms

2017 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

2017 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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虽然对冲基金的平均回报微薄,但公平地说,宏观基金的平均回报严重不足。事实上,宏观基金的平均净回报在统计上可能与零无异。因此,根据指数来看,很难说那些受雇从宏观事件中获利的经理们确实做到了这一点。

While the average hedge fund’s return has been puny, I think it’s fair to say the average macro fund’s return has been seriously deficient. In fact, the average macro fund’s net return may not have been statistically different from zero. Thus, based on the indices, it’s hard to say managers paid to profit from macro developments have done so.

最后的话

最后,我想把最近的几点思考编织在一起:

第一,大约一年前,我与沃伦·巴菲特共进晚餐,他指出了一个道理:一条信息若要值得追索,它应当重要,也应当可知。如今,投资者比以往任何时候都更急切地渴望关于宏观未来的洞见,因为那确实重要:它搅动市场。但这里有个障碍:沃伦和我都认为这些事情基本上不可知。他很少据此做出投资决策,橡树资本也一样。

第二,我想引用我之前提到的那篇关于媒体的《观察家》文章的最后一段话。我觉得它妙不可言:

“若想精进,”爱比克泰德(公元一世纪希腊哲学家)曾说,“就要甘愿在无关紧要的事情上显得无知或愚蠢。”在我们这个超连接、全天候的媒体世界里,人类能做的最有力的事情之一,就是说出:“我不知道。”或者更具挑衅性地说:“我不在乎。”当然,不是对所有事情——只是对大多数事情。因为大多数事情无关紧要,大多数新闻不值得追踪。(着重号为原文所加)

最后,我想讲讲今年春天接到的一个很棒的电话,来电者是我上世纪 70 年代初共事过的一位卖方经济学家,此后我们一直保持联系。“你改变了我的人生,”他说。“我不再做预测了。我研究数据,报告我的推断。但我再也不对未来发表看法了。”任务完成。

The Last Word To close, I’ll weave together a few recent inputs: First, I had dinner with Warren Buffett about a year ago, and he pointed out that for a piece of information to be worth pursuing, it should be important, and it should be knowable. These days, investors are clamoring more than ever for insights regarding the macro future, because it’s important: it moves markets. But there’s a hitch: Warren and I both consider these things largely unknowable. He rarely bases his investment actions on them, and neither does Oaktree. Second, I want to include a final paragraph from the Observer article about the media that I mentioned earlier. I think it’s golden: “If you wish to improve,” Epictetus [first-century Greek philosopher] once said, “be content to appear clueless or stupid in extraneous matters.” One of the most powerful things we can do as a human being in our hyperconnected, 24/7 media world is say: “I don’t know.” Or more provocatively, “I don’t care.” Not about everything, of course – just most things. Because most things don’t matter, and most news stories aren’t worth tracking. (Emphasis added) Finally, I want to describe a great phone call I received this past spring, from a sell-side economist I worked with in the early ’70s and have stayed in touch with since. “You’ve changed my life,” he said. “I’ve stopped making forecasts. I study data and report on my inferences. But I no longer express opinions about the future.” Mission accomplished.

2017 年 1 月 10 日

附赠部分:我收集(并反复引用)名言已经有近四十年了,其中关于预测的比什么都多。下面这五条是最好的。它们放在一起,几乎把该说的都说尽了:

我们有两类预测者:一类是不知道自己不知道的——另一类是不知道自己不知道的。

——约翰·肯尼斯·加尔布雷斯

January 10, 2017 Bonus section: I’ve been collecting (and recycling) quotations for almost forty years, more of them concerning forecasts than anything else. Here are five of the very best. Together they say virtually everything that has to be said on the subject: We have two classes of forecasters: Those who don’t know – and those who don’t know they don’t know. – John Kenneth Galbraith

再有技巧也无法回避一个事实:你对过去的知识再丰富,决策却是面向未来的。

——伊恩·威尔逊(通用电气前高管)

No amount of sophistication is going to allay the fact that all of your knowledge is about the past and all your decisions are about the future. – Ian Wilson (former GE executive)

2017 年奥克特资本管理公司(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)

2017 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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预测制造了未来可知的幻象。

——彼得·伯恩斯坦

Forecasts create the mirage that the future is knowable. – Peter Bernstein

预测通常更多地揭示预测者本身,而非未来。

——沃伦·巴菲特

我从不思考未来——它来得够快了。

——阿尔伯特·爱因斯坦

Forecasts usually tell us more of the forecaster than of the future. – Warren Buffett I never think of the future – it comes soon enough. – Albert Einstein

2017 年橡树资本管理公司(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)

2017 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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