政治现实与经济现实

2018 (inferred) · memo · 原文约 7284 词
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Memo to:

Memo to:

Oaktree Clients

Oaktree Clients

From:

From:

Howard Marks

Howard Marks

Re:

Re:

政治现实遇上经济现实

Political Reality Meets Economic Reality

2016 年,我先后写过两篇备忘录:5 月的《经济现实》和 8 月的《政治现实》,都是关于我认为重要且正当其时的话题。在后一篇里,我把《经济现实》的要点概括如下:

[它] 描述了经济学如何定义并约束商业、投资和日常生活中的现实。经济学制定了游戏规则,划定了赛场的边界,这些东西不能视而不见。规则可以改变,但不可能不付出代价。

经济学的现实是冷峻而一贯的,但也是合乎逻辑的。它们不像物理定律(比如万有引力)那样绝对,但能可靠地确立趋势和边界。

关键在于,经济学这个领域涵盖了个人和组织面临的选择;成本、可能的回报和潜在的后果;以及对这些选择如何做出决定。这些是人们进行经济交易的基础。或许更重要的是,经济学是对选择的研究。

三个月后,在《政治现实》中,我说:

我一直对矛盾修辞法——那些内部自相矛盾的短语——乐此不疲,比如“大虾米”和“常识”。我要把“政治现实”也加进这个清单。政治世界有自己的、被扭曲的现实,在其中,经济现实常常似乎插不上手。不需要做出选择:候选人们可以什么都承诺。而且也没有后果。如果某件事在现实世界里可能带来负面影响,政客们似乎可以毫无顾忌地无视它们……

这篇备忘录的目的,是描述政治行为与经济现实相碰撞时会发生什么,以两个领域为例:一个是政府正在采取措施的领域——关税;另一个是政客们争论正热的领域——对资本主义制度的限制。

在往下讲之前,我想像 2016 年在《经济现实》里那样先把话说在前头:我写这些,不是要作政治评判,也不是要让哪个政客或政党难堪。但经济方面的言说,是没法跟发表言说的人撇清关系的。如果你读到结尾,你会看到,我对两党成员的做法都有话要抱怨。

In 2016 I wrote Economic Reality (in May) and Political Reality (in August), two memos covering subjects I thought were important and timely. In the latter, I summed up Economic Reality as follows: [It] describes the ways in which economics defines and constrains reality in business, investing and everyday life. Economics establishes the rules of the game and the boundaries of the playing field, and these things can’t be ignored. They can be altered, but not without consequences. The realities of economics are stark and consistent, but also logical. They aren’t absolute, like the laws of physics (e.g., gravity), but they reliably establish tendencies and limits. The point is that the field of economics covers the choices people and organizations face; the costs, possible rewards and potential consequences; and how decisions regarding those choices are made. These are the bases on which people enter into economic transactions. More than anything else, perhaps, economics is the study of choice. Three months later, in Political Reality, I said: I’ve always gotten a kick out of oxymorons – phrases that are internally contradictory – such as “jumbo shrimp” and “common sense.” I’ll add “political reality” to the list. The world of politics has its own, altered reality, in which economic reality often seems not to impinge. No choices need be made: candidates can promise it all. And there are no consequences. If something might have negative consequences in the real world, politicians seem to feel free to ignore them. . . . The purpose of this memo is to describe what happens when political behavior collides with economic reality, as illustrated in one area where the government is taking steps – tariffs – and another in which debate among politicians is heating up – restrictions on the capitalist system. Before I move forward, I’d like to state up front, as I did in Economic Reality in 2016, that I’m not writing to make political judgments or to make any politician or party look bad. But economic pronouncements can’t be separated from the people who make them. If you read through to the end, you’ll see I find something to complain about in the approach of members of both parties.

关税

近来关税频频见诸报端,其复杂性令人极易犯错,因此在此讨论颇为恰当。

Tariffs Tariffs are very much in the news these days, and their complexity renders them ripe for error and thus appropriate for discussion here.

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许多人——尽管特朗普总统的支持者比一般经济学家更常为此喝彩——对他决定对中国加征关税拍手叫好。表面故事是,他这样做是为了(a)减少对华贸易逆差,(b)支持美国制造商,(c)保护美国就业,但背后另有文章。在 10 月 20 日的《华尔街日报》上,外交关系委员会(一个独立、无党派的组织)主席理查德·哈斯列举了对中国在贸易领域的种种不满:

……过高的关税和非关税壁垒、强制技术转让、知识产权窃取、政府补贴以及旨在压低出口价格、减少进口需求的汇率操纵。

所有知情人士都告诉我,这些不满是有道理的。虽然这些并非新问题,但历任总统似乎并未对此采取多少行动,或者说至少没拿出什么结果。显然,特朗普喜欢采取行动,也不回避对抗。鉴于中国经济对美出口的依赖程度远高于美国经济对华出口的依赖——且鉴于中国为实现其目标需要快速经济增长——加征关税是特朗普促使中国改变行为的可行途径。

因此,我不打算批评特朗普的关税政策,而是将其作为一个例子,来说明本备忘录的核心要义:(a)经济行动都有成本和后果,(b)正因如此,一般来说可以说,复杂问题没有简单解决方案,(c)鉴于问题的复杂性,很少有人透彻理解经济学,(d)正因这种理解上的欠缺,政客们提出的解决方案往往得不到应有的审视。

首先,存在误解。美国与其大多数贸易伙伴都存在长期贸易逆差,2017 年对华逆差达 3350 亿美元。特朗普将这些逆差视为我们的贸易伙伴在赢、我们在输。“有些国家多年来一直在占我们便宜……我们有贸易逆差;他们有顺差。”他尤其声称“中国一直在坑我们”,暗示贸易逆差中有什么见不得人的勾当。但这是正确的推论吗?前几天我去理发店理发,付钱时,我就产生了贸易逆差。他拿走了我的钱,我理了个发。我并不觉得自己亏了。同样,中国企业从美国赚钱,美国消费者买到他们想要的低价商品。在我看来,双方都是赢家。

特朗普曾说:“如果我们不贸易,我们能省下大笔钱。”真的吗?只有在我们不再购买一直进口的东西,或者能在国内以更低价格买到的情况下,这才成立。不跟中国贸易,真能给我们省钱吗?

归根结底,谁在付关税?关税是由出口商缴纳的税,很可能转嫁给进口国家的消费者。所以,光说“出口商在支付更高的关税”是不够的。更可能的是,美国消费者也在为他们消费的商品支付更高的价格。

如果关税由进口国的消费者支付,那么加征关税又能达到什么目的?简而言之,是为了提高外国商品的成本,从而抑制消费。但这又引出了连锁效应:还会发生什么?

Many people – albeit President Trump’s supporters more often than economists in general – applaud his decision to impose tariffs against China. Whereas the simple story was that he was doing so to (a) reduce our trade deficit with China, (b) support U.S. manufacturers and (c) protect U.S. jobs, there’s more in play. In The Wall Street Journal of October 20, Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, an independent, nonpartisan organization, enumerated complaints that have been lodged against China in the area of trade: . . . higher-than-warranted tariff and non-tariff barriers, forced transfers of technology, theft of intellectual property, government subsidies and currency manipulation designed to make exports cheaper and to reduce the demand for imports. Everyone knowledgeable tells me these complaints are warranted. While they’re not new, past presidents don’t seem to have done much about them, or at any rate didn’t produce any results. Clearly Trump likes to take action and doesn’t shy away from confrontation. Given that China’s economy is much more reliant on exports to the U.S. than ours is on exports to China – and given China’s need for rapid economic growth in order to reach its goals – imposing tariffs represents a possible way for Trump to get China to alter its behavior. Thus rather than criticize Trump’s tariffs, I’m going to use them as an example to illustrate the central messages of this memo: (a) economic actions have costs and consequences, (b) for that reason, it’s generally safe to say there are no simple solutions to complex problems, (c) given the complexities, few people thoroughly understand economics, and (d) because of that understanding deficit, politicians’ proposed solutions often fail to receive the scrutiny they should. First, there’s misunderstanding. The U.S. runs chronic trade deficits with most of its trading partners, and with China it amounted to $335 billion in 2017. Trump takes these deficits to mean our trading partners are winning and we’re losing. “We have countries ripping us off for years. . . . We have trade deficits; they have surpluses.” In particular, he says “China’s been killing us,” suggesting there’s something nefarious about trade deficits. But is that the correct inference? The other day I went to the barber for a haircut, and when I paid him, I ran a trade deficit. He got my money, and I got a haircut. I didn’t feel like I had lost. Likewise, Chinese businesses make money from the U.S., and U.S. consumers get the lowpriced goods they want. Both sound like winners to me. Trump has said, “If we didn’t trade, we’d save a hell of a lot of money.” Would we? That would be true only if we didn’t otherwise buy the things we’ve been importing, or if we were able to buy them cheaper domestically. Would it really save us money to not trade with China? After all, who pays tariffs? They’re a tax paid by exporters and presumably passed on to consumers in the countries into which goods are imported. So it’s not enough to say “exporters are paying increased tariffs.” It’s also likely that U.S. consumers are paying increased prices for the goods they consume. If tariffs are paid by consumers in the importing nations, what’s to be accomplished by imposing them? In short, it’s done to raise the cost of foreign goods and thus discourage their consumption. But that leads us to the knock-on effects: what else happens?

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先看去年贸易战升级的第一枪:对进口钢征收 25% 关税,对进口铝征收 10% 关税。下面罗列其中一些可能出现的复杂情况、连锁反应和间接后果:

Let’s take the first shot fired in last year’s escalation on trade: the imposition of tariffs of 25% on imported steel and 10% on imported aluminum. Here are some of the many possible complications, ramifications and second-order consequences: 

对进口的钢铁、铝等中间商品征收关税,可能会提高美国制成品的成本,若这些制成品的售价上调,竞争力就会下降(若不上调,利润则会减少)。据 2018 年 7 月 4 日《纽约时报》报道:代表美国铝业主要力量的美国铝业协会表示,美国 97% 的铝业岗位集中在所谓的“下游”企业,这些企业将铝材加工成汽车零部件等各类商品。这些公司因特朗普的关税政策而受损,因为如今他们必须为原材料支付更高的价格。

Tariffs on imported intermediate goods such as steel and aluminum might increase the cost of finished goods manufactured in the U.S., rendering them less competitive if their prices are raised (or less profitable if they’re not). According to The New York Times of July 4, 2018: The Aluminum Association, which represents the bulk of the American industry, says that 97 percent of American jobs in aluminum are at what are called “downstream” businesses that shape the metal into things like auto parts and other goods. Those companies are hurt by Mr. Trump’s tariffs, because they now must pay higher prices for their raw materials.

为了避免缴纳关税,美国制造商可以减少进口用于生产成品的国外钢铁和铝,转而增加进口用国外钢铁和铝在海外制成的成品——这些成品不受关税限制。

To avoid paying tariffs, American manufacturers could reduce their imports of foreign steel and aluminum for use in the finished goods they make, and instead increase their imports of finished goods – which are not subject to the tariffs – made abroad with foreign steel and aluminum.

除了进口成品之外,美国企业还可以将生产转移到海外,从而削减国内就业岗位。那些未征税的低成本金属在海外被用于制造,当这些成品进口到美国时,便能为企业带来竞争优势。

Going beyond importing finished goods, American companies could move their manufacturing overseas, cutting domestic jobs. The overseas use of untaxed, low-cost metals could provide a competitive edge when those finished goods are imported into the U.S.

非美国公司同样可能在与美国竞争对手的较量中占据优势。它们使用免税、低成本的材料,在向美国出口成品时,可能获得更低的销售价格或更高的利润率。

Non-U.S. companies likewise could gain an advantage over their American competitors. Their use of untaxed, low-cost materials could give them lower selling prices or higher profit margins when exporting finished goods to the U.S.

尽管关税推高了成本,进口未必真会被抑制,美国本土生产也未必能受刺激,原因很简单:美国根本没有那么多产能。

“现实是,这里的铝产量不够,”荷兰铝业公司康斯泰利姆(Constellium NV)负责北美汽车业务的埃里克·克雷普斯(Eric Krepps)说,“就算我们想全从美国采购,也做不到。”……因为美国每年使用的 560 万吨原铝中,本土只生产 13%。(《华尔街日报》,2018 年 7 月 18 日)

Despite the cost increases caused by tariffs, imports might not actually be discouraged and U.S. production encouraged, simply because U.S. capacity doesn’t exist: “The reality is there’s not enough aluminum made here,” said Eric Krepps, who runs the North American automotive business at Constellium NV, a Dutch aluminum company. “We could not source everything out of the U.S. even if we wanted to,” . . . since the U.S. produces just 13% of the 5.6 million metric tons of raw aluminum it uses each year. (The Wall Street Journal, July 18, 2018)

关税一旦推高进口商品(或含进口材料、部件的商品)的售价,这些进口货竞争力下降,国内生产商就有空间跟着涨价。到头来,各品牌的消费者价格都会水涨船高。

Since tariffs might raise selling prices on imported goods (or goods incorporating imported materials and components), the reduced competitiveness of those imports could enable domestic producers to raise their prices. The result would be higher consumer prices on all brands.

商品遭到加征关税的国家,不太可能乖乖坐以待毙。报复总是理所当然的预期。《纽约时报》2018 年 8 月 7 日报道:“虽然关税帮助了一些公司,却可能伤害成千上万的其他企业。依赖海外市场准入的企业,正遭受报复性关税的打击……”

Countries whose goods are subjected to tariff increases are unlikely to just sit there and take it. Retaliation is always a reasonable expectation. “While tariffs help some companies, they have the potential to hurt thousands of others. Businesses that depend on access to overseas markets are being hit with retaliatory tariffs . . . .” (The New York Times, August 7, 2018)

最后,以不断升级的关税为核心的贸易战,会让全球环境变得更不稳定,降低可预测性,增加不确定性。这对任何经济体都不是好事。

Finally, a trade war centered on escalating tariffs makes the global environment less stable, reducing predictability and increasing uncertainty. This isn’t good for any economy.

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在钢铁和铝之外,过去一年里大部分时间都在讨论提高进口汽车及汽车零部件的关税。上述关于钢铁和铝的一些考量并不适用于汽车,因为汽车是成品,而非中间产品。但一系列额外因素带来了极大的复杂性:

Going beyond steel and aluminum, increased tariffs on imported automobiles and auto components have been under discussion for much of the past year. Some of the considerations described above regarding steel and aluminum don’t apply to cars, since they’re finished goods, not intermediate goods. But a number of additional elements create exceptional complexity:      

美国公司在美国本土制造汽车,销往海外。美国公司在海外制造汽车,进口到美国。美国境内一些最大的汽车制造商,其实是外国公司。外国公司在美国生产的许多汽车,都用于出口。美国制造的汽车,零部件大量来自其他地区。去年美国市场上售出的汽车中,44% 为进口车。

U.S. companies manufacture cars in the U.S. for sale abroad. U.S. companies manufacture cars abroad for import to the U.S. Some of the biggest manufacturers of cars in the U.S. are non-U.S. companies. Many of the cars produced in the U.S. by non-U.S. companies are destined for export. Cars made in the U.S. incorporate a lot of components made elsewhere. Of the cars sold in the U.S. last year, 44% were imported.

7 月 20 日,《纽约时报》在讨论汽车关税上调的可能性时这样写道:如果实施,这些关税对经济造成的冲击,很可能比针对鱼类或钢铁的征税更深远、更广泛。汽车并非在单一工厂、由同一批劳动力组装完成——它们是数百家企业协同合作的最终产物,这条供应链可能蜿蜒穿过美国的小镇,跨越重洋。因此,对汽车进口加征关税可能会带来:

On July 20, The New York Times discussed the possibility of increased tariffs on autos as follows: If imposed, the tariffs would most likely have deeper and wider-reaching repercussions for the economies than levies on fish or steel. Cars don’t come together in one plant, with one work force – they’re the final result of hundreds of companies working together in a supply chain that can snake through small American towns and cross oceans. Thus increased tariffs on automotive imports could bring about:    

美国民众购买的所有汽车价格上涨,

由此导致汽车销量下降,

制造商、经销商、配套企业及其员工的日子更加艰难,

进而引发整体经济收缩。(2018 年 7 月,国际货币基金组织预测,“如果目前宣布的关税措施持续生效并动摇消费者信心,到 2020 年将使全球经济产出减少 4300 亿美元,即 0.5%。”(《纽约时报》,2018 年 7 月 23 日))

an increase in the price of all cars bought by Americans, a resultant decline in the number of cars sold, tougher times for manufacturers, dealers, support businesses and their employees, and thus a general contraction of the economy. (In July the IMF projected that “currently announced tariffs would reduce global economic output by $430 billion, or half a percent, in 2020, if they remained in place and shook consumer confidence.” (The New York Times, July 23, 2018))

归根结底,关税并非简单的解决方案或板上钉钉的事。它是一种工具或策略,带来潜在好处的同时,也伴随成本和风险。它能帮助部分经济领域,同时也可能损害其他领域。换句话说,这是一种权衡,而权衡正是经济学中的关键词。问题在于,这样做是否值得,很大程度上取决于你问谁。

一项关于奥巴马时期轮胎关税的研究发现,仅在 2011 年一年间,由于这项关税(至多保住了 1200 个工作岗位),美国人为此在轮胎上多花了 11 亿美元。这相当于每个岗位近 100 万美元,而这些岗位的平均年薪约为 4 万美元。

2002 年乔治·W·布什总统征收的钢铁关税也产生了类似结果,不仅惩罚了消费者,还波及了使用钢铁制造其他产品的公司,比如建筑公司和汽车制造商。达特茅斯学院经济学家道格拉斯·欧文估计,美国有 14 万名工人从事钢铁生产,而生产含钢产品的工人多达 650 万名。

欧文表示:“如果你出于某种原因说‘我们只是想帮助钢铁生产商、股东,或许还有钢铁工人’,那这样做说得通。但如果你关心的是制造业就业或整个制造业部门,那就不合理了。”(《纽约时报》,2018 年 9 月 17 日)

The bottom line is that tariffs aren’t a simple solution or a sure thing. They’re a tool or tactic with potential benefits, but also costs and risks. They can help some parts of the economy and simultaneously harm others. In other words, they’re a tradeoff. That’s the key word in economics. The question is whether they’re worth it. In good part, it depends on whom you ask. One study of the Obama tire tariffs found in a single year, 2011, Americans spent an extra $1.1 billion on tires as a result of a tariff that preserved, at most, 1,200 jobs. That is almost $1 million per job, for jobs paying an average of about $40,000. Steel tariffs imposed in 2002 by President George W. Bush yielded similar results, penalizing not just consumers but companies that use steel to make other products, like construction companies and carmakers. The Dartmouth economist Douglas Irwin estimated 140,000 American workers make steel, while 6.5 million workers make products that include steel. “If for some reason you said, ‘We just want to help steel producers, shareholders, possibly steel workers,’ it makes sense,” Mr. Irwin said. “If you care about manufacturing employment or the manufacturing sector, it doesn’t make sense.” (The New York Times, September 17, 2018)

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我将在关税这个话题上收尾,引用《经济现实》中的几段文字:

那些认为“把工作带回来”是个好主意的选民们,有没有想过按美国工资水平制造的 goods——或者旨在将中国商品成本提高到同等水平的关税——会对他们的生活成本产生什么影响?我猜他们没有想过。据估计有 320 万美国人因中国而失去制造业岗位,他们的利益如何与数亿必须为进口商品支付更多费用的消费者相平衡?这不是一个容易回答的问题。

配额、关税和补贴都是国家保护那些无法在国际竞争中立足的产业的手段,没有这些手段它们就无法自保。因此,它们是政策决策可能导致扭曲的绝佳例证。既然享受关税和补贴的产业,按定义就是没有这些手段就无法竞争的产业,那么要实施这些政策,总得有人做出决定:(a)这些产业应当被维持下去,(b)这些产业的消费者应当被阻止享受更低的价格——如果消费者能自由获取无关税的国外商品,这些价格本会出现……。

归根结底,就像我在这里讨论的许多其他事情一样,经济规律不能被忽视,也不能指望神奇的解决方案凭空出现。虽然这远非全部原因,但美国制造业工作岗位流失到国外的首要原因是,那里的人愿意以低得多的工资工作。在这个全球化的世界里,这意味着美国人不能同时拥有过去那种高薪制造业岗位和最近一直在购买的廉价商品。征收关税无法解决这个难题。

去年夏天两次讨论钢铁和铝关税时,《华尔街日报》很好地总结了关键考量:

影响尽管目前有限,却说明了保护某些公司的努力可能给其他公司带来意想不到的伤害。(2018 年 6 月 4 日)

关税付诸实施后,成为一种复杂的经济武器,其波及范围可能连支持者都无法预料。(2018 年 7 月 17 日)

如前所述,我在这里写作并非要批评关税(或实施关税的政府),而是要说明(a)政府行动并不容易改善经济运作,以及(b)总有需要考量的后果。关税是经济现实的典型代表,而经济现实是复杂的,很大程度上是因为它主要是把资源在参与者之间分配,而不是为所有人创造更多。正如经济学家喜欢说的:“天下没有免费的午餐。”

I’ll move to wrap up on the subject of tariffs with a few paragraphs from Economic Reality: Have the voters who think it’s a great idea to “bring back the jobs” thought about what goods manufactured at U.S. wages – or tariffs designed to bring the cost of Chinese goods up to those levels – would do to their cost of living? I’d guess not. How will the interests of the 3.2 million Americans estimated to have lost their manufacturing jobs to China be balanced against the hundreds of millions who would have to pay considerably more for imported goods? Not an easy question. Quotas, tariffs and subsidies are all ways for countries to protect industries that can’t hold their own against international competitors without these things. Thus they’re a good example of ways in which policy decisions can lead to distortions. Since the industries for which tariffs and subsidies are established are, by definition, industries that can’t compete without them, for these things to be enacted, someone has to make a decision that (a) these industries should be kept afloat and (b) consumers of these industries’ goods should be prevented from paying the lower prices that would prevail if consumers had easy access to goods from abroad, free of tariffs. . . . The bottom line, as with so many of the things I’m discussing here, is that economic laws cannot be ignored or magical solutions willed to appear. While it’s far from the entire explanation, the main reason the U.S. has lost manufacturing jobs to foreign countries is that people there are willing to work for much less. In this globalized world, that means Americans can’t enjoy both the high-paying manufacturing jobs they used to have and the low-cost goods they’ve been buying of late. The imposition of tariffs can’t solve that conundrum. On two occasions last summer, while discussing the steel and aluminum tariffs, The Wall Street Journal did a good job of summing up the key considerations: The fallout, while so far limited, illustrates how efforts to protect some companies can cause unintended pain for others. (June 4, 2018) Put into practice, tariffs are a complex economic weapon that can ricochet through an economy in ways even proponents don’t expect. (July 17, 2018) As mentioned earlier, I’m not writing here to criticize tariffs (or administrations that impose them), but rather to show (a) it’s not easy for government actions to improve the functioning of economies and (b) there are ramifications to be considered. Tariffs are typical of economic reality, and economic reality is complex, in large part because it consists mainly of dividing resources among participants, not of creating more for everyone. As economists like to say, “There’s no such thing as a free lunch.”

反资本主义

还有一件事,比加征关税更让我忧心:反资本主义的情绪正在抬头。

Anti-Capitalism Something else is going on that I worry about far more than the imposition of tariffs: increasing anti-capitalist sentiment.

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近年来政治领域的一大趋势是民粹主义的抬头。尽管民粹主义有些模糊不清,但就本备忘录而言,可采用如下定义:

一种支持人民权利和力量、与特权精英阶层抗争的政治哲学。(《自由词典》)

我认为,对于将民粹主义作为一种政治策略来采纳,有必要再加上一个词:它利用了“人民”对“精英”的怨恨情绪。

民粹主义在欧洲已抬头多年,通常与政治右翼相关,特点是怨恨经济界、自由派和城市精英。它常伴随威权主义而来,让有魅力的强势人物得以把自己塑造成保护“人民”免受移民等迫在眉睫威胁的角色。

唐纳德·特朗普在 2016 年当选总统,相当大一部分功劳同样被归因于民粹主义。这一波民粹同样来自右翼,很大程度上建立在农村、白人、年长、受教育程度较低的选民对城市、建制派、受过教育的文化精英的怨恨之上,同时也源于他们对正在打破现状的社会和人口趋势的不满。

但正如 2016 年总统选举民主党初选及其后所显示的,另一波民粹主义浪潮从左翼兴起。我最担心的是,在这一波浪潮中,民众怨恨的主要目标是资本主义和资本家。

2016 年初选季的大新闻之一是自称民主社会主义者的参议员伯尼·桑德斯的成功。桑德斯对希拉里·克林顿发起挑战,后者是民主党领导层的当然继承人,最终也成了党内提名人。桑德斯赢得了大量追随者,让希拉里吃足了苦头,尤其是他大力强调经济正义、金钱(特别是企业资金)在政治中的腐蚀作用,以及全民医保和全民教育的承诺。

在桑德斯的表现之后,民主党所谓的“进步派”或左翼正成为一个不可小觑的阵营。我预计进步派在未来几年将成为一股必须正视的力量。他们将在 2020 年初选中强势亮相并影响辩论走向。事实上,他们的影响已经显现出来。这也是我写下本备忘录这一部分的原因。

在一个可能孤立但很能说明问题的事件中,去年纽约皇后区的一场民主党国会初选里,亚历山德里娅·奥卡西奥-科尔特斯从极左阵营杀出,击败了连任十届、立场中间偏左的国会议员乔·克劳利。克劳利在众议院民主党领导层中排名第四,被视为南希·佩洛西之后众议院议长的可能接班人。结果他却败给了奥卡西奥-科尔特斯:她当时 28 岁,履历像童话一样,工薪阶层家庭出身,学业优异,当过调酒师和服务员。她一直有政治倾向,但从未担任过民选公职。然而她成了有史以来当选国会议员的最年轻女性。此后她一直非常敢言,作为新科议员吸引了超乎寻常的关注。

奥卡西奥-科尔特斯和桑德斯一样,是美国民主社会主义者的成员,她也坦然接受“激进分子”这个标签。《纽约客》一篇题为《可能的左翼》的文章引用了她的话:

One of the big trends in politics in recent years has been the rise of populism. While populism is somewhat amorphous, here’s a definition for the purposes of this memo: A political philosophy supporting the rights and power of the people in their struggle against the privileged elite. (The Free Dictionary) I think it’s important to add another word with regard to the adoption of populism as a political strategy: it plays on resentment on the part of “the people” toward “the elite.” Populism has been on the rise in Europe for a number of years, generally associated with the political right and characterized by resentment toward economic, liberal and urban elites. It has often been accompanied by authoritarianism, allowing charismatic strongmen to present themselves as protecting “the people” from looming threats like immigration. A good part of the credit for Donald Trump’s election in 2016 has likewise been attributed to populism. This instance, also coming from the right, was largely built on resentment from rural, white, older and less-educated voters directed at urban, establishment, educated and cultural elites, as well as unhappiness with social and demographic trends that are disrupting the status quo. But as shown in the 2016 presidential Democratic primary contests and since, another wave of populism has arisen from the left. I’m most concerned that in this case, the principal targets of popular resentment are capitalism and capitalists. One of the big stories of the 2016 primary season was the success of avowed Democratic Socialist Senator Bernie Sanders. Sanders launched a challenge to Hillary Clinton, the heir-apparent to the leadership of the Democratic Party and eventually the chosen nominee. He gained a lot of followers and gave Clinton a run for her money, in particular by emphasizing economic justice, the corrosive effect of money (and especially corporate money) in politics, and the promise of healthcare and education for all. Following on Sanders’s performance, the so-called “progressive” or left wing of the Democratic Party is becoming a formidable bloc. I expect progressives to be a force to be reckoned with in the coming years. They will show up strongly in the 2020 primaries and influence the debate. In fact, their influence is already being seen. And thus this section of my memo. In a possibly isolated but telling incident, in a Democratic congressional primary last year in Queens, New York, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez came from the far left to beat Joe Crowley, a ten-term, center/left congressman. Crowley was #4 in the Democratic leadership in the House of Representatives and considered a likely eventual successor to Nancy Pelosi as House Speaker. Instead he was ousted by Ocasio-Cortez: 28 years old at the time and sporting a storybook bio featuring a working-class upbringing, academic distinction and stints as a bartender and waitress. She had been politically oriented but had never held elected office. And yet she became the youngest woman ever elected to Congress. She’s been very outspoken since and has attracted disproportionate attention for a freshman legislator. Ocasio-Cortez, like Sanders, is a member of the Democratic Socialists of America, and she willingly accepts the label “radical.” A New Yorker article titled “Left Wing of the Possible” quotes her as follows:

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我确实认为我们正处在晚期资本主义的危机之中,人们一周工作六十、八十个小时,却养不起家人。这个国家在经济上有太多令人沮丧的地方。所以人们愿意接受变革,原因就在这里。(2018 年 7 月 23 日)

另一位民主社会主义者(D.S.A.)成员朱莉娅·萨拉查,去年也挤掉了一位民主党在任议员,在“奥卡西奥-科尔特斯的热情支持下”当选纽约州参议员。同一篇文章里有一句她的话,让我不寒而栗:

……民主社会主义者“认识到资本主义制度本质上具有压迫性,并正在积极致力于推翻它,赋权于工人阶级和我们社会中被边缘化的人。”

这帮人真的想废除资本主义吗?好在同篇文章接下来也反映了一些温和的声音:

《异议》杂志共同主编、民主社会主义者成员迈克尔·卡津[说]:“激进左派在美国历史上的主要影响,就是把自由派、进步派往左推。影响会是这样。我不相信在我有生之年美国会发生社会主义转型。”

7 月,《纽约时报》这样探讨民主社会主义者的议程:

“那我们在这儿谈的到底是什么?”主持人斯蒂芬妮·鲁尔在 MSNBC 的一个节目里问道,背景图表突出显示民主社会主义“不是社会主义”、“不是共产主义”,而更像是对社会保险和 Amtrak 铁路的一种偏爱。民主社会主义者本身既接受又拒绝这类友好的定义,解释说它“为今天的改革而战”,但仍寻求推翻“一个靠私人利润、异化劳动和其他剥削形式维系的国际经济秩序”。……

当今的左派谈到社会主义时,他们会指向瑞典、法国这样的地方(那里有完善的产假和全民医疗),甚至指向美国不久前的失落遗迹(稳定的工作、工会力量、对人类福利的集体投入)。(2018 年 7 月 22 日)

奥卡西奥-科尔特斯和萨拉查可能并不代表一场广泛的运动,毕竟她们都来自纽约市——在那种地方,民主党候选人赢得大选是十拿九稳的事,极端立场不太可能成为障碍。但我们公民中的某些趋势,确实很值得注意。根据上文引用的《纽约客》文章:

2016 年,哈佛肯尼迪学院的政治研究所对 18 至 29 岁人群做了民调,发现对资本主义的支持率低得惊人。该群体中有 51% 的人拒绝资本主义;33% 的人支持社会主义。后来一轮调查发现,51% 的人“对未来感到恐惧”,只有 20% 的人抱有希望。……

78% 全职工作的美国人过着月光族生活;近半数人手头连 400 美元都拿不出来。……

I do think we are in a crisis of late-stage capitalism, where people are working sixty, eighty hours a week and they can’t feed their families. There is a lot that is economically dystopic in this country. So that’s why people are open to change. (July 23, 2018) Julia Salazar, another member of the D.S.A., also ousted a Democratic incumbent last year and won election to the New York State Senate with the “ardent support of Ocasio-Cortez.” The same article included a statement from her that I found chilling: . . . a democratic socialist “recognizes the capitalist system as being inherently oppressive, and is actively working to dismantle it and to empower the working class and the marginalized in our society.” Does this group genuinely want to abolish capitalism? Thankfully, the same article went on to reflect some moderate sentiment: Michael Kazin, a co-editor of Dissent and a D.S.A. member, [said]: “The radical left’s major influence in American history is to push liberals, progressives, to the left. And that is going to be the impact. I don’t believe we are going to have a socialist transformation of America in my lifetime.” In July, The New York Times explored the Democratic Socialists’ agenda as follows: “So what are we talking about here?” the host Stephanie Ruhle asked in an MSNBC segment, with background graphics highlighting that democratic socialism is “NOT Socialism” and “NOT Communism” but something more like a fondness for Social Security and Amtrak. The D.S.A. itself both embraces and rejects such friendly definitions, explaining that it “fights for reforms today” but still seeks to overturn “an international economic order sustained by private profit, alienated labor” and other forms of exploitation. . . . When today’s leftists talk about socialism, they point to places like Sweden and France (home to robust maternity leave and universal health care) or even to lost relics of America’s recent past (stable jobs, union power, a collective investment in human welfare). (July 22, 2018) Ocasio-Cortez and Salazar may not be indicative of a broad movement, as they hail from New York City, where a Democratic candidate is a sure thing in a general election and extremism is unlikely to be an impediment. But some trends among our citizens are very much worth noting. According to the New Yorker article cited above: In 2016, the Institute of Politics, at Harvard’s Kennedy School, polled people between the ages of eighteen and twenty-nine, and discovered that support for capitalism was surprisingly low. Fifty-one percent of the cohort rejected capitalism; thirty-three percent supported socialism. A later edition of the survey found that fifty-one percent were “fearful about the future,” while only twenty percent were hopeful. . . . Seventy-eight percent of Americans working full time live paycheck to paycheck; nearly half do not have four hundred dollars at the ready. . . .

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…出生于二十世纪四十年代的人中,九成收入超过父母——这是美国人的传统期待——而这一比例在八十年代出生的人中已降至五成。〔当然,他们可能还太年轻,尚未达到超越父母的年纪。〕奥卡西奥-科尔特斯引用的正是这些反乌托邦趋势,也由此催生了左翼对资本主义的不满,以及当今民粹主义的抬头。

依我看,二战结束后的六十年里,全球大部分地区都沐浴在繁荣的浪潮中,水涨船高,人人受益。这让几乎所有人都感到经济上的满足,因此对资本主义和自由市场解决方案抱持善意。尽管有些人比其他人过得好,但大多数人都相当不错。生活水平提高,贫困率下降。罗纳德·里根和玛格丽特·撒切尔盛赞自由市场的功效,世界也深表认同。

如今,经济进步的步伐已经放缓,当下的趋势不再令人鼓舞:

1.

2.

3.

4.

. . .while ninety percent of people born in the nineteen-forties outearned their parents – the traditional American expectation – this number has fallen to fifty percent for people born in the nineteen-eighties. [Of course, they could be too young to have done so yet.] These are the dystopic trends Ocasio-Cortez cites and the source of the resentment of capitalism that gives rise to today’s populism from the left. As I see it, for the 60 years immediately following World War II, much of the world enjoyed a rising tide of prosperity that lifted all boats. That made nearly everyone economically content and thus happy with capitalism and free-market solutions. Even though some people did better than others, most did quite well. Living standards rose and the incidence of poverty declined. Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher celebrated the efficacy of free markets, and the world agreed. Now the rate of economic progress has receded and current trends are less cheering: 1. 2. 3. 4.

一、经济增长可能慢于战后时期的速度

二、全球化和自动化对特定群体的负面影响

三、高等教育或资本所有权的重要性日益凸显

四、由于上述第二点和第三点的结果,收入不平等加剧

The possibility that economic growth will be slower than that of the post-war period The negative impact of globalism and automation on specific groups The increased importance of advanced education or the ownership of capital As a consequence of numbers 2 and 3 above, increased income inequality

简而言之,潮水不再像从前那样高涨,感到处境满意、前景乐观的人越来越少了。他们的不满凝聚成了民粹主义。而民粹主义需要一个靶子。为什么不能是资本主义呢?

我在这里想说的是,正如我上面所言,我预计左翼影响力的上升将影响 2020 年选举周期。左翼民主党候选人将向党内的温和派发起挑战,而后者不得不调整自己的主张以应对竞争。而且这已经开始发生。我特别举出近期两位知名民主党人提出的两项立法提案:

In short, the tide is no longer rising to the same extent, and many fewer people are happy with their circumstances and outlook. Their unhappiness crystalizes in populism. And it needs a target. Why not capitalism? My point here is that, as I said above, I expect the rising influence of the left to impact the 2020 election cycle. Left-wing Democratic candidates will present challenges to moderates in their party, and the latter will have to tailor their messages to compete. And it’s starting. In particular, I cite two pieces of proposed legislation that emerged recently from prominent Democrats: 

原件此处是表格,PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失,下面只剩按列读出的数字,行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。

伊丽莎白·沃伦参议员,已宣布参加 2020 年总统竞选,提出了她的《问责资本主义法案》。其中两项条款引起了我的注意:

……大公司的注册将变为联邦事务,……这些联邦特许公司将被强制要求考虑一系列利益相关者的利益,从投资者到员工、客户和社区。如果这些群体认为公司未尽其责,他们可以提起诉讼。……

……沃伦参议员的法案要求 40% 的董事由员工选举产生。(《金融时报》,2018 年 9 月 24 日)

Senator Elizabeth Warren, already an announced 2020 presidential candidate, has introduced her Accountable Capitalism Act. Two of its provisions caught my attention: . . . incorporation for large companies would become a federal matter, . . . These federally chartered companies would be mandated to consider the interests of a list of stakeholders, from investors to employees to customers and communities. These groups could then sue if they deemed the company had breached their duties. . . . . . . Senator Warren’s legislation calls for 40 percent of directors to be elected by employees. (The Financial Times, September 24, 2018)

新泽西州参议员科里·布克(Cory Booker),常被视为总统竞选的热门人选,提出了一项我视之为相关的法案:《员工红利法案》将强制要求回购自家股票的公司,同时向其员工支付一笔金额,这笔金额取回购总价值或超过 2.5 亿美元利润的 50% 中较低者。(Vox,2019 年 1 月 10 日)

Senator Cory Booker of New Jersey, often mentioned as a presidential hopeful, has introduced legislation that I view as related: The Worker Dividend Act would mandate that companies buying their own shares must also pay out to their own employees a sum equal to the lesser of either the total value of the buyback or 50 percent of all profits beyond $250 million. (Vox, January 10, 2019)

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我绝对不是在为股票回购辩护,也不是在批评董事会中的劳工代表。我反对的是(a)政府决定公司如何运营的想法,以及(b)把公司的经济利益分配给所有者以外的群体。如果把企业的一部分资本转给工人,或者要求工人进入公司董事会,会带来什么后果?显然,做前者无异于对股东说:“你以为你拥有的东西——那家公司——其实你并不真正拥有。”股票回购是向公司所有者返还资本的一种方式。为什么每一次回购都要同时给工人等额的钱?下一步是不是要说:“公司每次派息,都必须给工人同样多的钱?”那岂不等于说:“至于公司资本,工人占一半?”后果如何?你问问自己,如果未来创办公司意味着工人有权分走一半收益,还有谁会去创办公司?

至于要求工人进入董事会呢?迄今为止,公司董事的职责一直是代表股东。如果要求 40% 的董事是工人,实质上等于另一种说法:股东没有完全控制权。如果工人进了董事会,他们代表谁的利益:公司及其股东,还是劳工?他们为谁的利益而工作?比如说,如果出现一个通过投资自动化来提高效率和盈利能力的机会,劳工董事们会怎么投票?

这就引出了要求公司服务于多重利益的问题。如今,董事只要为公司的利益(进而为股东的利益)运用“商业判断”,法律上就认定他们尽到了职责。如果要求他们同时为公司和所有者的利益,以及工人、客户和社区的利益服务,他们该怎么办?你能想象,因为某个群体拿多了而另一个群体拿少了,会引发多少诉讼吗?法院怎么能判定多个利益群体是否按适当比例受益了?

我想做的是,把一些进步派政客和不太信奉资本主义的年轻人叫到一个房间里,问他们一个简单的问题:过去一百年美国在世界上的领先地位,以及其人民普遍较高的生活水平,你们归因于什么?简而言之,是什么推动了美国登上顶峰?

我绝对清楚不是什么原因:不是因为我们更优越,更聪明,更好,更有美德,或更该得到这些。相反,我认为是我们的民主、我们的自由,以及我们不那么僵化的社会和经济结构。但极其重要的是,我也认为资本主义/自由企业、自由市场体系、经济激励、私有财产权、个人经济机会,以及政府对经济的有限介入,都做出了巨大的贡献。

资本主义是一个不完美的经济体系,因为在追求经济成功的过程中,表现的差异——加上运气——导致(a)有人不那么成功,也有人更成功,(b)还有少数人极其成功。显然,我是从资本主义中受益的人,所以我的观点可能被认为偏见深重。然而,我百分之百确信,资本主义体系为我们的社会带来了最大的总收益,实现了非凡的整体进步,也让大多数人的生活变得更好。对我而言,对资本主义最好的评价,就是温斯顿·丘吉尔对民主的评价:

I absolutely am not writing to defend stock buybacks or criticize labor representation on boards. What I oppose is (a) the idea of governments deciding how companies will be run and (b) the appropriation of corporations’ economics for parties other than their owners. What would be the effects of turning over some of businesses’ capital to workers, or requiring that they be put on corporate boards? Clearly, to do the former would be comparable to saying to shareholders, “That thing you thought you owned – the company – you don’t really own that.” Stock buybacks are a way of returning capital to companies’ owners. Why should each one be accompanied by giving an equivalent amount to workers? Wouldn’t the next step be to say, “Whenever a company pays a dividend, it has to distribute an equal amount to its workers”? And wouldn’t that be tantamount to saying, “As for corporate capital, the workers own half”? Consequences? Ask yourself who would start a corporation in the future if it meant the workers would be entitled to half the gains. What about requiring that workers be put on boards? To date, it has been the job of a corporation’s directors to represent its shareholders. Requiring that 40% of them be workers would be, in essence, another way of saying the shareholders aren’t in full control. If workers were put on boards, whose interests would they represent: the corporation and its shareholders, or labor? To whom would they work to deliver benefits? If an opportunity arose to increase efficiency and profitability by investing in automation, for example, how would labor’s directors be expected to vote? And that leads to the matter of requiring corporations to serve multiple interests. Today, directors are legally deemed to have done their jobs if they applied “business judgment” for the benefit of the company (and thus its shareholders). How would they be expected to simultaneously work for the good of the company and its owners as well as its workers, customers and communities? Can you imagine the lawsuits that would fly over the issue of whether too much had gone to one group rather than another? How could a court decide whether the multiple constituencies had benefitted in the appropriate proportions? What I’d like to do is get some of the progressive politicians and the less-capitalist young people in a room and ask them a simple question: To what do you attribute America’s preeminence in the world over the last hundred years and the generally superior living standards of its people? In short, what has been behind the United States’ progress to the top of the heap? What’s absolutely clear to me is what it’s not: that we’re superior people, smarter, better, more virtuous or more deserving. Instead, I think it’s our democracy, our freedoms, and our less rigid social and financial structures. But, extremely importantly, I also think there have been enormous contributions from capitalism/free enterprise, the free-market system, economic incentives, private ownership of property, individual economic opportunity, and the very limited involvement of government in the economy. Capitalism is an imperfect economic system, because differential performance in the pursuit of economic success – as well as luck – results in there being (a) some people who are less successful as well as some who are more and (b) a few who are glaringly successful. Obviously I’m someone who has profited from capitalism, so my views could be dismissed as hopelessly biased. However, I’m 100% convinced that the capitalist system has produced the most aggregate gains for our society, exceptional overall progress, and a better life for most. For me, the best assessment of capitalism is the one Winston Churchill applied to democracy:

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没有人假称民主制度完美无瑕或无所不知。确实,有人说过,民主是最糟糕的政府形式——除了那些时不时被尝试过的所有其他形式之外。

同样,我相信资本主义也是最糟糕的经济制度……除了所有其他制度之外。没有其他经济体像美国这样,在实现巨大成就的同时,还伴随广泛的个人自由,尤其是那些由政府集中控制的经济体更是望尘莫及。特别是,没有其他经济体像美国一样,催生了如此多的发明和创新——并普及了改善生活的产品——像美国这样。

我并不是在为企业的无拘无束行为辩护。不能允许它们用任何手段来谋求出人头地。不能让它们相互之间不公平竞争、做出反社会的举动,或者为了追求利润而损害他人。因此,需要法律、法规以及尽职尽责的董事们的积极监督来约束企业行为。我还认为,社会领袖应当鼓励企业带着良知经营,自觉为社区福祉而努力。但这必须在美国之所以伟大的那些要素框架内进行——而不是去颠覆它们。

另外,我觉得政府必须建立有效的安全网,帮助那些最终落在收入分配底层的弱势社会成员。资本主义可以通过经济激励和健康竞争让国家取得成功,但我不赞成毫不留情的“狗咬狗”或“适者生存”。

进步派和民主社会主义者承诺提高收入平等,改善顶层以下人群的生活。这些是值得追求的目标,我支持它们。但试图通过拆解资本主义来实现这些目标,对几乎所有人来说只会更糟。没有证据表明,限制资本主义和让政府介入经济能促进平等,除非是缩小整个蛋糕。想象一下,如果美国没有私有财产的神圣不可侵犯性、没有私营企业的高效率、没有个人经济上进的动力,那会是什么样子。强硬左派认为政府能比自由市场做得更好,能提高福祉。你想让哪个政府机构来管理我们的经济引擎?

左派经济方针的很大一部分建立在缩小收入差距上,不仅是通过改善底层民众的生活,还要把顶层的人拉下来。

No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time. In the same way, I’m convinced that capitalism is the worst economic system . . . except for all the rest. No other economy has accomplished what the U.S. has, accompanied by extensive personal freedom, and especially not the ones centrally controlled by government. In particular, no other economy has produced inventions and innovations – and distributed life-enhancing products – like the U.S. has. I’m not arguing in favor of unfettered behavior on the part of corporations. They can’t be allowed to use just any tactics to get ahead. They mustn’t be permitted to compete unfairly against each other, behave in anti-social ways, or do damage in pursuit of profit. Thus laws, regulations and active supervision on the part of diligent directors are needed to police corporate behavior. I also think the leaders of society should encourage companies to operate with a conscience and voluntarily work for the betterment of their communities. But this must be done within the framework of the elements that made America great – not by subverting them. Also, I feel it’s essential that governments create effective safety nets to assist the less-fortunate members of society who end up at the bottom of the income distribution. Capitalism can make countries successful through the operation of economic incentives and healthy competition, but I’m not in favor of unmitigated “dog eat dog” or “survival of the fittest.” Progressives and Democratic Socialists promise increased equality of income and improvement for people below the top. These are worthy goals, and I support them. But trying to achieve them by dismantling capitalism would be worse for just about everyone. There is no proof that restrictions on capitalism and government involvement in economies can promote equality other than by shrinking the pie. Consider what it would be like if the U.S. didn’t have the sanctity of private ownership, the efficiency of privately run business, and the incentive of personal economic advancement. The hardleft thinks government can do things better than free markets and increase wellbeing. Which government agencies would you like to see managing our economic engine? A lot of the left’s economic approach is based on closing the income gap, not just by making things better for people at the bottom, but also by pulling down people at the top.

因此在电视节目《60 分钟》上,奥卡西奥-科尔特斯对年收入超过 1000 万美元部分征收最高 70% 的联邦所得税率表达了喜爱之情。例如,加上纽约州和纽约市的最高税率,政府将拿走最高税档人群边际收入的 83%。(这与法国共产党 2017 年总统候选人让-吕克·梅朗雄的提议相差不远,他主张对超过 40 万欧元(即法国平均工资的 20 倍)的收入征收 100% 的税率。)

类似地,11 月众议院议员们考虑调整规则,要求对占美国人口最底层 80% 的人群增税需获得 60% 的绝对多数票,而对最顶层 20% 的人群增税只需简单多数即可。政府在对不同群体征税时采用不同的规则,这样做公平吗?

Thus on the TV show 60 Minutes, Ocasio-Cortez expressed fondness for a top federal income tax rate of up to 70% on incomes over $10 million. Combined with the top New York State and City rates, for example, that would give government 83% of the marginal income of people in the top bracket. (That’s not terribly far from the suggestion from Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the Communist Party’s candidate for president of France in 2017, of a 100% tax rate on incomes above €400,000, or 20 times France’s average wage.) Not dissimilarly, in November members of the House considered adjusting its rules to require a 60% super-majority to increase income taxes on the bottom 80% of Americans, but only a simple majority to raise taxes on the top 20%. Is it fair for government to employ different sets of rules when deciding how different groups will be taxed?

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1 月 24 日,就在这份备忘录即将定稿的截止时间前,伊丽莎白·沃伦把差别征税的问题推到了极致:征收财富税。我就让她自己在推特上的话来说吧:

有钱有势的人操控着华盛顿。以下是他们为自己谋得的一项好处:在经济中捞够了他们操纵的油水之后,他们不为这些累积的财富缴税。要我说,这是一个为顶层人士量身定做的体制。我们需要结构性变革。这就是为什么我提议一项全新措施——对美国最富有群体的财富征收年度税。我称之为“超百万富翁税”,适用于最顶层的 0.1%——那些净资产超过 5000 万美元的人。

这里面有任何迎合怨恨情绪的民粹主义味道吗?

那么,“有钱有势的人……为自己谋得的好处”到底是什么呢?是他们能保留税后挣得的收入。沃伦参议员没有提到,在美国这套体制下,没有人要为累积的财富缴税。但她确实把富人不缴这笔税说得像是极其恶劣的事。富人并没有给自己安排什么豁免;压根就没有财富税这回事。可为什么要让这些事实妨碍政治辞令呢?

On January 24, just under the wire for inclusion in this memo, Elizabeth Warren took the issue of differential taxation to its ultimate extreme: a wealth tax. I’ll let her words on Twitter speak for themselves: The rich & powerful run Washington. Here’s one benefit they wrote for themselves: After making a killing from the economy they’ve rigged, they don’t pay taxes on that accumulated wealth. It’s a system that’s rigged for the top if I ever saw one. We need structural change. That’s why I’m proposing something brand new – an annual tax on the wealth of the richest Americans. I’m calling it the “UltraMillionaire Tax” & it applies to that tippy top 0.1% – those with a net worth of over $50M. Any populist appeal to resentment there? And what exactly is the benefit that the “rich & powerful . . . wrote for themselves”? That they get to keep what they earn net of taxes. Senator Warren omits to mention that under the American system, nobody pays tax on accumulated wealth. But she sure makes it sound egregious that the rich don’t do so. The rich didn’t arrange an exemption for themselves; there is no wealth tax. But why let facts like those get in the way of political rhetoric?

几个世纪以来,成功民主政体的终结,往往源于多数人意识到:他们可以通过向顶层人群征税,为自己攫取更多利益。这就是所谓的“多数人的暴政”的一个例证。正如《纽约时报》前几天所说,尽管它直接指向的是英国脱欧:

在美国宪法辩论期间,詹姆斯·麦迪逊在后来成为《联邦党人文集》的一篇文章中警告说,不受约束的多数主义曾使早期的民主政体“在暴力中灭亡,其寿命之短如同其暴烈之甚”。他写道,只有由代表组成、受规则和制度以及公众约束的“共和国”,“才有望带来我们所寻求的良方”。

……正如麦迪逊在《联邦党人文集》中警告的那样,一种凭借“压倒性多数”的“优势力量”强加的民主,未必永远保持民主。

(2019 年 1 月 22 日)

左派是否理解多数人对富人征收没收性税收的长期后果?他们真的想要这些后果吗?降低多赚多得的激励(或促使成功的美国人将国籍转移到其他国家)真的能改善大多数人的境况吗?

美国人普遍接受累进税率的概念。但税率绝不能是惩罚性的、令人丧失动力的。在此请注意,2015 年,最富有的 5% 纳税人(拥有 37% 的全部收入)缴纳了 60% 的全部所得税,而最富有的 1% 纳税人(拥有 21% 的收入)缴纳了 39%。向政治左派发问:这些纳税比例“公平”吗?如果它们高得多,还算公平吗?

(我想明确表示,我相信对最高收入者提高税率确实存在空间,因为(a)目前 37% 的最高税率是美国所得税 106 年历史中最低的之一,而且(b)股息和资本利得的税率还要低得多。可以说,所有形式的收入都应当被同等征税。)

Over the centuries, one thing that has brought successful democracies to an end has been the realization on the part of the majority that they can appropriate more for themselves by taxing those at the top. This is an example of the so-called “tyranny of the majority.” As The New York Times said the other day, albeit in direct reference to Brexit: During debates over the American Constitution, James Madison warned in one of the essays that became the Federalist Papers that unbridled majoritarianism had made earlier democracies “as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths.” Only “a republic” of representatives subject to rules and institutions as well as the public, he wrote, “promises the cure for which we are seeking.” . . . as Mr. Madison warned in the Federalist Papers, a democracy imposed “by the superior force” of an “overbearing majority” may not always remain democratic. (January 22, 2019) Does the left understand the long-term consequences of the majority imposing confiscatory taxes on the rich, and do they really want them? Will reducing the incentive to earn more (or incentivizing successful Americans to transfer their citizenship to other nations) really result in the betterment of most people? Americans generally accept the concept of progressive tax rates. But they must not be punitive and de-motivating. Note in this regard that in 2015, the top 5% of taxpayers (with 37% of all income) paid 60% of all income taxes, and the top 1% (with 21% of income) paid 39%. To the political left: are those proportions of taxes paid “fair”? And would it still be fair if they were much higher? (I want to make clear that I believe room does exist for increases in tax rates on the biggest earners since (a) today’s top rate of 37% is one of the lowest in the 106-year history of the U.S. income tax and (b) dividends and capital gains are taxed at rates that are far lower still. It could be argued that all forms of income should be taxed the same.)

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虽然这套体系仍有改进空间,但在我看来,那些一边谴责资本主义、一边却不承认其好处的人,本身就有问题。想想看,政客们一边通过推特和脸书(用 iPhone 访问)批评资本主义制度,一边在靠航空公司和汽车(可能还用了优步这类网约车服务)到达的集会上发言,一边喝着星巴克咖啡开会,一边通过有线电视新闻网发表观点——这多讽刺。这些创新全都来自这样一套体系:它鼓励人们承担巨大风险去创业,前提是如果企业成功,他们能收获所有权的回报。

我相信,如果他们真去想一想,自己离不开的创新清单会很长——从药品到消费品,再到服务和技术。如果没了逐利动机和积累财富的可能性,今天这些东西我们还能拥有多少?而没有了这些预期,我们又该指望谁来创造未来的创新?在这方面,苏联、古巴和委内瑞拉这些非资本主义国家的成绩单又如何?

美国经济取得的大量进步,源自人们追求赚得更多、活得更好的渴望。把这份渴望拿掉,我们还剩下什么?底层的人将没有那么多顶层的人可去怨恨;但如果没有那些立志登顶之人的贡献,所有人都将失去更多可享受的东西(附录里有个寓意深刻的小故事,不妨一读)。正因如此,我对资本主义负面情绪抬头、以及人们对在资本主义下成功者的敌意与日俱增,感到担忧。

While there are ways in which the system can be improved, I consider it problematic when people denounce capitalism without acknowledging its benefits. It’s ironic to think of politicians criticizing the capitalist system via platforms like Twitter and Facebook (accessed on their iPhones); at rallies reached via airlines and cars (perhaps employing ride-sharing services such as Uber); in meetings over a Starbucks coffee; and via cable news networks. All of these are innovations that came out of a system that encourages people to take significant risks to start companies on the premise that they’ll reap the rewards of ownership if their businesses succeed. I'm sure if they thought about it, the list of innovations these people wouldn’t want to live without – ranging from drugs to consumer products, to services, to technology – would be a long one. Which of those would we have today if not for the profit motive and the possibility of ending up with accumulated wealth? And in the absence of those expectations, to whom would we look for the innovations of the future? How’s the record of non-capitalist countries such as the U.S.S.R., Cuba and Venezuela in this regard? A great deal of America’s economic progress has resulted from people’s aspiration to make more and live better. Take that away and what do we have? The people at the bottom won’t have as many at the top to resent. But without the contributions of those who aim for the top, everyone will have less to enjoy (see the appendix for an informative parable). This is why I worry about the rise of negative sentiment toward capitalism and antipathy toward those who succeed under it.

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政客们,无论持何种意识形态,都能提出一些简单的问题,暗示着对人们所面临问题的简单解决方案,比如这些:

Politicians, depending on their ideology, can pose simple questions that suggest simple solutions to the problems people face, like these:    

我们应该对进口商品加征关税来保住美国的就业岗位吗?

工人是否应该对企业如何运营拥有发言权?

我们是否应该实施租金管制法律,以保护租户免受租金上涨的影响?

政府是否应该为所有人提供就业机会?

Should we impose tariffs on imports to save American jobs? Should workers have a say in how companies are run? Should we enact rent control laws to protect tenants from rent increases? Should the government provide jobs for all?

对很多人来说,答案很容易脱口而出“是”。做这些事情的好处显而易见。谁会反对呢?

但事实证明,这些问题并不那么简单,因为经济现实表明,它们全都带有弊大于利的可能性:

For many people, it’s easy to answer “yes.” The benefits from doing these things are obvious. Who would oppose them? But it turns out they aren’t such easy questions, since economic reality shows them all to have downsides that just might exceed their upsides: 

我们是否应该对进口商品征收关税以保住美国就业岗位?

  • 少数工人可能获得的收益,是否值得全体消费者普遍承担成本上升的代价?

Should we impose tariffs on imports in order to save American jobs? o Do the potential gains for a limited number of workers warrant the broadly shared increase in costs to all consumers?

工人是否应当在公司治理中拥有发言权?

他们会不会从公司整体利益、全社会利益出发,还是只顾及劳工自身的利益?

Should workers have a say in how companies are run? o Will they act in the interests of the companies, society as a whole, or only labor?

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如果我们实施租金管制法来保护租户免受租金上涨的影响?

o 如果租金受到管制,房东会维护并扩大出租住房的存量吗?

Should we enact rent control laws to protect tenants from rent increases? o If rents are regulated, will landlords maintain and expand the stock of rental housing?

政府应该保证每个公民都有工作吗?

如果就业有了保障,人们还有什么努力工作的动力?

Should the government assure every citizen a job? o What incentive will people have to work hard if they’re guaranteed employment?

贯穿经济学的一条主线就是它的复杂性:我们面对的决策很少不是多变量交织、且不带有第二层和第三层后果的。因此,我们不该因为关税之类的措施可能带来好处就贸然行动,而不去权衡它们的代价。同样,我们也不该因为资本主义这类制度不完美就一味谴责,而不去考虑它们的好处。

由于经济学只关乎金钱和消费,人们便容易以为它凭直觉就能理解。但事实是,受过经济学教育的人寥寥无几,而它的复杂性和层层牵连让它的理解难度远超许多人的想象。不过,尽管这些内容错综复杂,我们都能通过运用一些常识而受益。你不必是经济学家也能明白:提高投入品价格会推高商品成本、减少销量;降低对成功的回报,创造价值的动力就会减弱。

归根结底,政客们能抛出看似诱人却经不起现实检验的简单经济方案。由于政治在很大程度上关乎成本与收益的分配——而非提升总体收益——政客们的那些简单化经济处方绝不能被照单全收。

One of the key elements running through economics is its complexity: there are few decisions that face us that aren’t multivariate and that are free of second- and third-order consequences. Thus we shouldn’t take actions – like imposing tariffs – just because they offer potential benefits, without considering their costs. And we shouldn’t condemn things – like capitalism – solely because they’re imperfect, without taking into account their benefits. Because economics is just about dollars and consumption, the belief is encouraged that it can be understood intuitively. The truth, however, is that few people are educated regarding economics, and its complexity and ramifications render it far less easy to understand than many people may believe. Yet, while this stuff is complicated, we can all benefit by applying some common sense. You don’t have to be an economist to recognize that if you raise the prices of inputs, it increases the cost of goods and reduces the quantity sold, and if you reduce the rewards for success, you’ll get less effort to create value. The bottom line is that politicians are able to offer simple economic solutions that have considerable appeal but fail to hold up in real life. Since politics is largely about how costs and benefits are distributed – rather than about increasing aggregate benefits – politicians’ simplistic economic prescriptions mustn’t be swallowed whole.

January 30, 2019

January 30, 2019

附言:就在本文付印之前(这一领域的进展快得让我几乎跟不上!),我收到了一封来自纽约市公共倡导人(实际上是“公众监督者”)候选人发来的群发邮件,其中写道:

……我们争取并赢得了 15 美元的最低时薪,但众所周知,15 美元在这个城市根本养不活一个家庭。所以我们得继续奋斗。……把纽约市政府雇员和雇佣超过 75 名员工的企业的最低时薪提高到 30 美元,并按通胀调整,这只是起点。

这让我想起温斯顿·丘吉尔对“一个国家试图靠税收走向繁荣”这种愚蠢行为的形容:“就像一个人站在桶里,想抓住提手把自己拎起来。”

P.s.: Just prior to publication (I can hardly keep up with the developments in this area!) I received a mass email from a candidate for New York City’s Public Advocate, effectively a “public watchdog,” stating the following: . . . we fought for, and won, a $15 minimum wage, though as we all know, $15 just isn’t enough to support a family in this city. So we need to keep fighting. . . . A $30 minimum wage, adjusted with inflation, for New York City government workers and businesses that employ over 75 New Yorkers would be where we start. This brings to mind the description Winston Churchill used regarding the folly of a nation trying to tax its way to prosperity: “like a man standing in a bucket and trying to lift himself up by the handle.”

2019 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

2019 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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附录:用啤酒解释税收制度

Appendix: The Tax System Explained in Beer

假设每天有十个人去喝啤酒,十个人的账单总共是 100 美元。如果他们像我们纳税那样(按纳税人十分位)分摊账单,结果大概是这样:最穷的前四个人不用付钱。第五个人付 1 美元。第六个人付 3 美元。第七个人付 7 美元。第八个人付 12 美元。第九个人付 18 美元。第十个人(最富的)付 59 美元。于是他们决定就这么办。这十个人每天在酒吧喝酒,对这个安排似乎相当满意,直到有一天,酒吧老板抛出一个变数。“既然你们都是这么好的顾客,”他说,“我打算把你们每天的啤酒钱减少 20 美元。”十个人的酒钱现在只要 80 美元。这群人仍然想按我们纳税的方式来分摊账单。所以前四个人不受影响,他们照样免费喝。但另外六个人怎么办?怎么分这 20 美元的意外之财,才能让每个人都拿到公平的一份?酒吧老板提议,按他们一直用的税制原则,越穷的人账单减免比例应该越高,这样才公平,于是他接着给出每个人现在该付的新金额。于是第五个人,和前四个人一样,现在一分钱不用付(省了 100%)。第六个人现在付 2 美元而不是 3 美元(省了 33%)。第七个人现在付 5 美元而不是 7 美元(省了 29%)。第八个人现在付 9 美元而不是 12 美元(省了 25%)。第九个人现在付 14 美元而不是 18 美元(省了 22%)。第十个人现在付 50 美元而不是 59 美元(省了 15%)。前四个人继续免费喝,后面六个人都比以前更宽裕了。但一出酒吧,这几个人就开始比较各自的节省。“这 20 美元里我只拿到 1 美元,”第五个人说,他指着第十个人,“可他拿了 9 美元!”“对,没错,”第六个人嚷道,“我也只省了 1 美元。他省的钱是我的九倍,这不公平!”“说得对!”第七个人喊道,“为什么他能拿回 9 美元,而我只能拿回 2 美元?有钱人占尽了好处!”“等等,”前四个人齐声喊道,“我们什么都没拿到。这个新税制……”

Suppose that every day, ten men go out for beer, and the bill for all ten comes to $100. If they paid their bill the way we pay our taxes (by taxpayer decile), it would go something like this: The first four men (the poorest) would pay nothing. The fifth would pay $1. The sixth would pay $3. The seventh would pay $7. The eighth would pay $12. The ninth would pay $18. The tenth man (the richest) would pay $59. So, that’s what they decided to do. The ten men drank in the bar every day and seemed quite happy with the arrangement, until one day, the owner threw them a curve ball. “Since you’re all such good customers,” he said, “I’m going to reduce the cost of your daily beer by $20.” Drinks for the ten men would now cost just $80. The group still wanted to pay their bill the way we pay our taxes. So the first four men were unaffected. They would still drink for free. But what about the other six? How could they divide up the $20 windfall so that everyone would get his fair share? The bar owner suggested that it would be fair to reduce each man’s bill by a higher percentage the poorer he was, to follow the principle of the tax system they had been using, and he proceeded to suggest the new lower amounts each should now pay. And so the fifth man, like the first four, now paid nothing (a 100% saving). The sixth now paid $2 instead of $3 (a 33% saving). The seventh now paid $5 instead of $7 (a 29% saving). The eighth now paid $9 instead of $12 (a 25% saving). The ninth now paid $14 instead of $18 (a 22% saving). The tenth now paid $50 instead of $59 (a 15% saving). The first four continued to drink for free, and the latter six were all better off than before. But, once outside the bar, the men began to compare their savings. “I only got a dollar out of the $20 saving,” declared the fifth man. He pointed to the tenth man, “But he got $9!” “Yeah, that’s right,” exclaimed the sixth man. “I only saved a dollar, too. It’s unfair that he saved nine times more than me!” “That’s true!” shouted the seventh man. “Why should he get $9 back, when I got only $2? The wealthy get all the breaks!” “Wait a minute,” yelled the first four men in unison, “we didn’t get anything at all. This new tax system

2019 年橡树资本管理有限合伙企业(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)

2019 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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“这是在剥削穷人!”

九个男人围住第十个人,把他揍了一顿。

第二天,第十个人没来,其他九个人坐下来,没等他,自己喝起了啤酒。

但到结账的时候,他们发现了一件重要的事:他们凑在一起的钱,连账单的一半都付不起!

这就是我们税收制度的运作方式。已经缴纳最高税额的人,自然会从减税中获得最大好处。税征得太重,又因为他们有钱就横加指责,他们可能干脆就不出现了。事实上,他们说不定会跑到国外去喝,那里的气氛更友好。

exploits the poor!” The nine men surrounded the tenth and beat him up. The next day, the tenth man didn’t show up, so the other nine sat down and had their beers without him. But when it came time to pay the bill, they discovered something important: They didn’t have enough money between all of them for even half of the bill! And that is how our tax system works. The people who already pay the highest taxes will naturally get the most benefit from a tax reduction. Tax them too much, attack them for being wealthy, and they just may not show up anymore. In fact, they might start drinking overseas, where the atmosphere is friendlier.

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我一直等着机会用上这组数字。具体数字可能不完全准确,但道理没错。一个无可争辩的事实是:每个人对税收制度公平性的看法——就像大多数此类问题一样——很大程度上取决于你从哪个角度看它。

I’ve been waiting a long time for a chance to use this. The numbers may not be exactly right, but the idea is. The unarguable bottom line is that everyone’s view of the fairness of the tax system – like most such matters – depends largely on the angle from which you look at it. HM

2019 年橡树资本管理有限合伙企业

2019 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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