世上最糟糕的七个词
Memo to:
Memo to:
Oaktree Clients
Oaktree Clients
From:
From:
Howard Marks
Howard Marks
Re:
Re:
世界上七个最糟糕的词
The Seven Worst Words in the World
我有一本新书下周出版,书名叫《掌握市场周期:让胜算站在你这边》。这不是一本讲金融史或经济学的书,也不高深晦涩:里面几乎没有数字。相反,这本书的目标,就像我的备忘录一样,是分享我的思维方式,这次是围绕周期这个主题。如你所知,我强烈认为,投资者虽然不知道前方会发生什么,但如果他们依据对市场在周期中所处位置的感觉来行事,就能提高成功的概率。
贯穿全书的思想,用马克·吐温的一句话来概括最为贴切:“历史不会重演,但总会押韵。”尽管市场周期的细节(比如时机、幅度和波动的速度)每次各不相同,具体的原因和结果也不一样,但有一些主题在每一个周期中反复出现。书中的下面这段文字可以说明这一点:
在每个繁荣/萧条周期中发出警示信号的主题都是普遍性的:过度乐观是危险的事;风险规避是市场安全的关键要素;过度慷慨的资本市场最终会导致不明智的融资,从而给参与者带来危险。
投资成功的一个重要组成部分,在于认清上述要素何时导致市场参与者行为不明智、资产价格抬高、风险升高,以及何时情况相反。当这些趋势使市场变得岌岌可危时,我们应降低风险;当情况相反时,我们应更加积极进取。
我写过的最满意的备忘录之一是 2007 年 2 月的《竞相压价》。它始于我的一个观点:投资市场是一个拍卖行,拍卖品归出价最高的人(也就是愿意为自己的资金接受最低回报的人)所有。在投资中,购买资产或发放贷款的机会归愿意支付最高价格的人,而这意味着接受最低的预期回报,并承担最大的风险。
I have a new book coming out next week titled Mastering the Market Cycle: Getting the Odds on Your Side. It’s not a book about financial history or economics, and it isn’t highly technical: there are almost no numbers in it. Rather, the goal of the book, as with my memos, is to share how I think, this time on the subject of cycles. As you know, it’s my strong view that, while they may not know what lies ahead, investors can enhance their likelihood of success if they base their actions on a sense for where the market stands in its cycle. The ideas that run through the book are best captured by an observation attributed to Mark Twain: “History doesn’t repeat itself, but it does rhyme.” While the details of market cycles (such as their timing, amplitude and speed of fluctuations) differ from one to the next, as do their particular causes and effects, there are certain themes that prove relevant in cycle after cycle. The following paragraph from the book serves to illustrate: The themes that provide warning signals in every boom/bust are the general ones: that excessive optimism is a dangerous thing; that risk aversion is an essential ingredient for the market to be safe; and that overly generous capital markets ultimately lead to unwise financing, and thus to danger for participants. An important ingredient in investment success consists of recognizing when the elements mentioned above make for unwise behavior on the part of market participants, elevated asset prices and high risk, and when the opposite is true. We should cut our risk when trends in these things render the market precarious, and we should turn more aggressive when the reverse is true. One of the memos I’m happiest about having written is The Race to the Bottom from February 2007. It started with my view that investment markets are an auction house where the item that’s up for sale goes to the person who bids the most (that is, who’s willing to accept the least for his or her money). In investing, the opportunity to buy an asset or make a loan goes to the person who’s willing to pay the highest price, and that means accepting the lowest expected return and shouldering the most risk.
和任何一场拍卖一样,当潜在买家稀少、手头拮据或不愿掏钱时,待售的东西就会无人问津,成交价格也会偏低。
但当买家众多、资金充裕且急于寻找投资机会时,竞标就会激烈,成交价格也会水涨船高。这种情况下,买家花出去的钱就换不来多少实惠:在其他条件相同的情况下,预期回报会偏低,而风险会偏高。
Like any other auction, when potential buyers are scarce and don’t have much money or are reluctant to part with the money they have, the things on sale will go begging and the prices paid will be low. But when there are many would-be buyers and they have a lot of money and are eager to put it to work, the bidding will be heated and the prices paid will be high. When that’s the case, buyers won’t get much for their money: all else being equal, prospective returns will be low and risk will be high.
因此,这份备忘录的想法源于投资界最糟糕的七个字:“钱太多,追逐的项目太少。”
Thus the idea for this memo came from the seven worst words in the investment world: “too much money chasing too few deals.”
2018 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司
2018 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
版权所有。
All Rights Reserved
2005 至 2006 年间,橡树资本采取了高度防御性的姿态。我们出售了大量资产;清算规模较大的不良债务基金,代之以较小的;回避杠杆率最高的杠杆收购高收益债券;并普遍提高了我们对所投资项目的标准。重要的是,尽管我们历史上不良债务基金的规模曾高达约 20 亿美元,但在 2007 年初,我们宣布成立一只基金,预备持有,直到出现特殊的买入机会。其承诺资本最终达到近 110 亿美元。
是什么让我们对市场环境如此悲观?当时经济运行相当不错。股票并未特别高估。我可以向你们保证,我们当时完全没想到次贷和次贷抵押证券会大规模违约,进而引发全球金融危机。实际上,原因很简单:美联储为防范问题而降息,导致投资者过于急切地将资本投向高风险但期望回报更高的资产。因此,几乎每天我们都能看到一些交易,我们认为在具备适当谨慎、纪律、怀疑和风险厌恶的市场中这些交易根本不可能达成。正如沃伦·巴菲特所言,“别人行事越不谨慎,我们行事就越应谨慎。”因此,2005 至 2006 年间那些不谨慎的交易,足以成为我们提高警惕的理由。
In 2005-06, Oaktree adopted a highly defensive posture. We sold lots of assets; liquidated larger distressed debt funds and replaced them with smaller ones; avoided the high yield bonds of the most highly levered LBOs; and generally raised our standards for the investments we would make. Importantly, whereas the size of our distressed debt funds historically had ranged up to $2 billion or so, in early 2007 we announced the formation of a fund to be held in reserve until a special buying opportunity materialized. Its committed capital eventually reached nearly $11 billion. What caused us to turn so negative on the environment? The economy was doing quite well. Stocks weren’t particularly overpriced. And I can assure you we had no idea that sub-prime mortgages and sub-prime mortgage backed securities would go bad in huge numbers, bringing on the Global Financial Crisis. Rather, the reason was simple: with the Fed having cut interest rates in order to prevent problems, investors were too eager to deploy capital in risky but hopefully higher-returning assets. Thus almost every day we saw deals being done that we felt wouldn’t be doable in a market marked by appropriate levels of caution, discipline, skepticism and risk aversion. As Warren Buffett says, “the less prudence with which others conduct their affairs, the greater the prudence with which we should conduct our own affairs.” Thus the imprudent deals that were getting done in 2005-06 were reason enough for us to increase our caution.
当前环境
哪些因素造就了当下的投资环境?在我看来,有以下几点:
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The Current Environment What are the elements that have created the current investment environment? In my view, they’re these:
为应对危机带来的紧缩效应,全球央行向经济体注入了大量流动性,并以人为压低利率提供信贷。这使得风险收益谱系中偏安全端的投资收益率,从美国的史上低位,一路低至欧洲及其他地区的负值(或接近零)。以往会流入低风险投资(如货币市场工具、美国国债和高等级债券)的资金,至少有相当一部分转向他处,寻找更合适的回报。(如今在美国,多数捐赠基金和固定收益型养老金计划要求的年回报率在 7.5%—8% 之间。有意思的是,美国以外的投资机构对“要求回报率”这个概念远没有那么看重;即便有,目标也低得多。)
危机肆虐时,我曾以为这场阵痛会让投资者长期保持高度避险心态,因而不愿提供风险资本——但美联储通过向经济大量注入流动性并降低利率,限制了损失,强行重开了信贷窗口,重新点燃了投资者承担风险的意愿。
对回报的渴求加上承担风险的意愿,导致大量资金涌入小众的风险资产细分市场,这些市场在一个低回报的世界里提供了高回报的可能。而这样的资金流入会带来什么后果?价格走高、预期回报下降、安全结构弱化、风险加大。
In order to counter the contractionary effects of the Crisis, the world’s central banks flooded their economies with liquidity and made credit available at artificially low interest rates. This caused the yields on investments at the safer end of the risk/return continuum to range from historically low in the United States to negative (and near zero) in Europe and elsewhere. At least some of the money that in the past would have gone into low-risk investments, such as money market instruments, Treasurys and high grade bonds, turned elsewhere in search of more suitable returns. (In the U.S. today, most endowments and defined-benefit pension funds require annual returns in the range of 7½-8%. It’s interesting to note that the notion of required returns is much less prevalent among investing institutions outside the U.S., and where they do exist, the targets are much lower.) Whereas I thought while it was raging that the pain of the Crisis would cause investors to remain highly risk-averse for years – and thus to refuse to provide risk capital – by injecting massive liquidity into the economy and lowering interest rates, the Fed limited the losses and forced the credit window back open, rekindling investors’ willingness to bear risk. The combination of the need for return and the willingness to bear risk caused large amounts of capital to flow to the smaller niche markets for risk assets offering the possibility of high returns in a low-return world. And what are the effects of such flows? Higher prices, lower prospective returns, weaker security structures and increased risk.
在当前金融环境下,“十”这个数字被赋予了特殊的意义:
In the current financial environment, the number “ten” has taken on particular significance:
本月是雷曼兄弟于 2008 年 9 月 15 日申请破产十周年的日子,这场危机也随之进入了最终的崩溃阶段。
This month marks the tenth anniversary of Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy filing on September 15, 2008, and with it the arrival of the terminal melt-down phase of the Crisis.
2018 年橡树资本管理公司(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)
2018 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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保留所有权利。
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得益于美联储与财政部对此次危机的应对,美国经历了约十年的超低利率、量化宽松及其他形式的刺激措施。
由此带来的美国经济复苏已进入第十个年头(值得一提的是,美国有记录以来最长的经济复苏期就持续了十年)。
市场自危机低点以来的上涨也已进入第十年。有人将牛市定义为市场上涨且未出现 20% 跌幅的时期。8 月 22 日,标普 500 指数突破了连续 3453 天(113 个月)未现此跌幅的关口,成为史上最长的牛市。(也有人对此存有异议,因为如果你愿意忽略 1990 年 19.92% 的下跌——即未满 20%——那么 1987 年至 2000 年间市场上涨天数可算作 4494 天。我觉得这个问题的精确答案并不重要。我们能确定的是,股票已上涨了很长时间。)
Thanks to the response of the Fed and the Treasury to the Crisis, the U.S. has seen roughly ten years of artificially low interest rates, quantitative easing and other forms of stimulus. The resulting economic recovery in the U.S. has entered its tenth year (and it’s worth noting that the longest U.S. recovery on record lasted ten years). The market’s upswing from its low during the Crisis is in its tenth year. Some people define a bull market as a period in which a market rises without experiencing a drop of 20%. On August 22, the S&P 500 passed the point at which it had done so for 3,453 days (113 months), making this the longest bull market in history. (Some quibble, since the market could be said to have risen for 4,494 days in 1987-2000 if you’re willing to overlook a decline in 1990 of 19.92% – i.e., not quite 20%. I don’t think the precise answer on this subject matters. What we can say for sure is that stocks have risen for a long time.)
这些事件意味着什么?我想是这样的:
What are the implications of these events? I think they’re these:
危机带来的创伤已经随着时间流逝逐渐消退;对那段可怕岁月的记忆变得模糊;严苛信贷标准的理由也已退入往事。我的朋友阿瑟·西格尔曾执掌 TA 联合房地产公司,如今在哈佛商学院教授房地产课程。他最近这样说道:“我告诉我的学生,房地产市场有十年周期,但幸运的是,银行家的记忆只有五年。”投资者已有充足的时间来适应货币刺激政策,以及依赖美联储注入流动性来支撑经济活动。
虽然没有硬性规定限制经济复苏只能持续十年,但根据历史经验,一个已持续十年的复苏要延续更长时间,可能性不大,这一假设似乎合理。(另一方面,由于本次复苏是自二战以来最缓慢的一次,有理由相信,尚未出现通常需要纠正的过度行为来终结复苏。一些观察人士认为,在未来一段时间,如果经济或股市出现疲软,一个积极主动或政治化的美联储很可能会重新开始降息——或至少停止加息。)
最后,值得指出的是,近十年来入市的投资者中没有谁经历过熊市,甚至没有经历过真正糟糕的年份,也没有见过不会迅速回升的回调。因此,新晋的投资经理们没有机会亲身了解风险规避的重要性,也未曾经历经济放缓、市场长期下跌、违约率上升或资本稀缺的考验。
Enough time has passed for the trauma of the Crisis to have worn off; memories of those terrible times to have grown dim; and the reasons for stringent credit standards to have receded into the past. My friend Arthur Segel was head of TA Associates Realty and now teaches real estate at Harvard Business School. Here’s how he recently put it: “I tell my students real estate has ten-year cycles, but luckily bankers have five-year memories.” Investors have had plenty of time to get used to monetary stimulus and reliance on the Fed to inject liquidity to support economic activity. While there certainly is no hard-and-fast rule that limits economic recoveries to ten years, it seems reasonable to assume based on history that the odds are against a ten-year-old recovery continuing much longer. (On the other hand, since the current recovery has been the slowest since World War II, it’s reasonable to believe there haven’t been the usual excesses that require correcting, bringing the recovery to an end. And some observers feel that in the period ahead, a proactive or politicized Fed might well return to cutting interest rates – or at least stop raising them – if weakness materializes in the economy or the stock market.) Finally, it’s worth noting that nobody who entered the market in nearly ten years has experienced a bear market or even a really bad year, or seen dips that didn’t correct quickly. Thus newly minted investment managers haven’t had a chance to learn firsthand about the importance of risk aversion, and they haven’t been tested in times of economic slowness, prolonged market declines, rising defaults or scarce capital.
基于上述原因,我认为新书引言中提到的市场泡沫条件已然具备,正如本备忘录首页所引述的那样。
For the reasons described above, I feel the requirements have been fulfilled for a frothy market as set forth in the citation from my new book on this memo’s first page.
投资者或许并不乐观,但低风险投资回报实在太低,迫使他们采取了近乎乐观的举动。同理,在上述低回报的环境里,要想取得过得去的结果,许多投资者不得不放下平时的风险厌恶,沿着风险曲线往外挪。这两股力量叠加,资本市场变得极为迁就。
Investors may not feel optimistic, but because the returns available on low-risk investments are so low, they’ve been forced to undertake optimistic-type actions. Likewise, in order to achieve acceptable results in the low-return world described above, many investors have had to abandon their usual risk aversion and move out the risk curve. As a result of the above two factors, capital markets have become very accommodating.
你不同意这些结论吗?如果不同意,或许就没必要往下读了。但这些是我的结论,也是此刻写下这份备忘录的原因。
Do you disagree with these conclusions? If so, you might not care to read further. But these are my conclusions, and they’re the reason for this memo at this time.
2018 年橡树资本管理有限合伙企业
2018 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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保留所有权利。
All Rights Reserved
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在过去 14 个月的备忘录和演示中,我提及了投资环境的某些具体方面,其中包括:
In memos and presentations over the last 14 months, I’ve made reference to some specific aspects of the investment environment. These have included:
FAANG 公司(Facebook、亚马逊、苹果、Netflix 和谷歌/Alphabet),其股价已包含对未来增长的高昂预期;
公司信贷,未偿金额不断增加,负债率攀升,契约条款消失,收益率利差收窄;
新兴市场债务,其收益率低于美国高收益债券,这在历史上仅第三次出现;
软银,正在筹建一只 1000 亿美元规模的科技投资基金;
私募股权,其募资规模超过历史上任何时期;以及
以比特币为首的加密货币,在 2017 年上涨了 1400%。
the FAANG companies (Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix and Google/Alphabet), whose stock prices incorporated lofty expectations for future growth; corporate credit, where the amounts outstanding were increasing, debt ratios were rising, covenants were disappearing, and yield spreads were shrinking; emerging market debt, where yields were below those on U.S. high yield bonds for only the third time in history; SoftBank, which was organizing a $100 billion fund for technology investment; private equity, which was able to raise more capital than at any other time in history; and cryptocurrencies led by Bitcoin, which appreciated by 1,400% in 2017.
我列举这些现象并非为了批评或揭露问题。我这样做,是因为这类现象告诉我,当前市场正被以下因素驱动:
I didn’t cite these things to criticize them or to blow the whistle on something amiss. Rather I did so because phenomena like these tell me the market is being driven by:
乐观情绪,
对未来的信任,
对投资及投资管理人的信心,
低水平的怀疑态度,
以及风险容忍,而非风险厌恶。
optimism, trust in the future, faith in investments and investment managers, a low level of skepticism, and risk tolerance, not risk aversion.
简而言之,诸如此类的特征并不会为回报和安全营造积极的环境。
假设你具备所需的资本和胆量,投资中那些巨大且相对容易赚到的钱,是在价格低廉、悲观情绪弥漫、投资者纷纷逃离风险时赚到的。上述因素告诉我,现在并非这样的时机。
In short, attributes like these don’t make for a positive climate for returns and safety. Assuming you have the requisite capital and nerve, the big and relatively easy money in investing is made when prices are low, pessimism is widespread and investors are fleeing from risk. The above factors tell me this is not such a time.
一个典型案例:直接借贷
危机后的最初几年,银行仍心有余悸,许多银行资本充足率偏低,因此不愿大量放贷。于是,少数精明的信贷投资者开始组建基金,从事“直接借贷”或“私人借贷”。由于银行受制于监管和有限的资本,非银行实体可以精挑细选自己的借款人,并能坚持要求高利率、低杠杆率和强有力的资产保护。
并非所有投资者都参与了 2010-2011 年的早期阶段。但后来更多人跟上了潮流,尤其是在私人借贷流行起来、更多管理人组建了直接借贷基金来迎合他们之后。正如《华尔街日报》8 月 13 日所报道的:
A Case In Point: Direct Lending In the years immediately following the Crisis, the banks – which remained traumatized and in many cases were marked by low capital ratios – were reluctant to do much lending. Thus a few bright credit investors began to organize funds to engage in “direct lending” or “private lending.” With the banks hamstrung by regulations and limited capital, non-bank entities could be selective in choosing their borrowers and could insist on high interest rates, low leverage ratios and strong asset protection. Not all investors participated in the early days of 2010-11. But many more got with the program in later years, after private lending had caught on and more managers had organized direct-lending funds to accommodate them. As the Wall Street Journal wrote on August 13: The influx of money has led to intense competition for borrowers. On bigger loans, that has driven rates closer to banks’ and led to a loosening of credit terms. For smaller loans, “I don’t think it could become any more borrower friendly than it is today,” said Kent Brown, who advises mid-sized companies on debt at investment bank Capstone Headwaters.
资金的大量涌入导致了对借款人的激烈竞争。在较大额的贷款上,这压低了利率,使其更接近银行的水平,并导致信贷条款放宽。对于较小额的贷款,“我认为情况不可能变得比现在更对借款人有利了,”投资银行 Capstone Headwaters 负责为中型企业提供债务咨询的肯特·布朗表示。
2018 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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市场蓄势待发,大型机构和小型机构都在争抢更多业务。
……总体而言,根据数据提供商 Preqin 的数据,2013 年至 2017 年间,各公司共为专注于此类贷款的 322 只基金完成募资,其中 71 只来自此前从未募集过此类基金的机构。相比之下,此前五年共有 85 只基金,其中包括 19 只首次募资的基金。(着重号为本文件所加)
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那么,这些贷款的品质又如何呢?《华尔街日报》继续写道:
The market is poised to grow as behemoths and smaller outfits angle for more action. . . . Overall, firms completed fundraising on 322 funds dedicated to this type of lending between 2013 and 2017, with 71 from firms that had never raised one before, according to data-provider Preqin. That compares with 85 funds, including 19 first-timers, in the previous five years. (Emphasis added) And what about the quality of the loans being made? The Journal goes on: Companies often turn to direct lenders because they don’t meet banks’ criteria. A borrower may have a one-time blip in its cash flows, have a lot of debt or operate in an out-of-favor sector. . . . Direct loans are typically floating-rate, meaning they earn more in a rising-rate environment. But borrowers accustomed to low rates may be unprepared for a jump in interest costs on what is often a big pile of debt. That risk, combined with the increasingly lenient terms and the relative inexperience of some direct lenders, could become a bigger issue in a downturn. Observations like these tempt me to apply what I consider the #1 investment adage: “What the wise man does in the beginning, the fool does in the end.” It seems obvious that direct lending is taking place today in a more competitive environment. More people are lending more money today, and they’re likely to compete for opportunities to lend by lowering their standards and easing their terms. That makes this form of lending less attractive than it used to be, all else being equal. Has direct lending reached the point at which it’s wrong to do? Nothing in the investment world is a good idea or a bad idea per se. It all depends on when it’s being done, and at what price and terms, and whether the person doing it has enough skill to take advantage of the mistakes of others, or so little skill that he or she is the one committing the mistakes. At the present time, the managers raising and investing large funds are showing the most growth. But in the eventual economic correction, they may be shown to have pursued asset growth and management fees over the ability to be selective regarding the credits they backed. Lending standards and credit skills are seldom tested in positive times like we’ve been enjoying. That’s what Warren Buffett had in mind when he said, “It’s only when the tide goes out that you learn who has been swimming naked.” Skillful, disciplined, careful lenders are likely to get through the next recession and credit crunch. Less-skilled managers may not.
企业之所以求助于直接贷款人,通常是因为它们达不到银行的标准。借款人的现金流可能出现一次性波动,背负大量债务,或身处不受青睐的行业……
直接贷款通常是浮动利率,这意味着在利率上升的环境中能赚得更多。但对于习惯了低利率的借款人来说,面对往往是巨额债务的利息成本激增,可能毫无准备。这一风险,加上日益宽松的条款以及部分直接贷款人相对缺乏经验,在经济低迷时期可能演变成更大的问题。
Signs of the Times Unfortunately, there is no single reliable gauge that one can look to for an indication of whether market participants’ behavior at a point in time is prudent or imprudent. All we can do is assemble anecdotal evidence and try to draw the correct inferences from it. Here are a few observations regarding the current environment (all relating to the U.S. unless stated otherwise):
诸如此类的观察,让我忍不住想应用我心目中排名第一的投资格言:“智者开头所行,愚者结尾效仿。”很明显,今天的直接借贷正发生在竞争更为激烈的环境中。现在有更多人贷出更多资金,而且他们很可能通过降低标准和放宽条款来争夺放贷机会。这使得这种借贷形式相比过去吸引力下降,其他条件相同的情况下。
2018 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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直接借贷是否已经到了不应再做的地步?在投资世界里,没有哪件事本身就绝对是好主意或坏主意。一切都取决于何时进行、以什么价格和条款进行,以及做这件事的人是否有足够技巧去利用他人的错误,还是技巧太过欠缺,以至于他自己就是那个犯错的人。
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Debt levels:
Debt levels:
目前,募集和投资大规模基金的管理人显示出最快的增长。但在最终的经济调整中,他们可能被发现追逐的是资产规模和管理费,而非对所投信贷进行审慎挑选的能力。
“One remarkable feature of the past decade is that between 2007 and 2017, the ratio of global debt to GDP jumped from 179 per cent to 217 per cent, according to the Bank for International Settlements.” (Financial Times) “In the last year Congress has passed a gargantuan tax cut and spending increase that, according to Deutsche Bank, represents the largest stimulus to the economy outside of a recession since the 1960s. It sets the federal debt, already the highest relative to GDP since the 1940s, on an even steeper trajectory [and] stimulates an economy already at or above full employment which could fuel inflation . . .” (Wall Street Journal) “Debt levels crept up as central banks suppressed [interest rates], with the proportion of global highly-leveraged companies – those with a debt-to-earnings ratio of five times or greater – hitting 37 percent in 2017 compared with 32 percent in 2007, according to S&P Global Ratings.” (Bloomberg) The debt of U.S. non-financial corporations as a percent of GDP has returned to its Crisis level and is near a post-World War II high. (New York Times) Total leveraged debt outstanding (high yield bonds and leveraged loans) is now $2.5 trillion, exactly double the amount in 2007. Leveraged loans have risen from $500 billion in 2008 to almost $1.1 trillion today. (S&P Global Market Intelligence) Most of this growth has been in levered loans, not high yield bonds. Whereas the amount of high yield bonds outstanding is roughly unchanged from the end of 2013, leveraged loans are up $400 billion. In the process, we think the risk level has risen in loans while remaining stable in high yield bonds. These trends in loans are due in large part to strong demand from new Collateralized Loan Obligations and other investors seeking floating-rate returns. “Some $104.6 billion of new [leveraged] loans were made in May, according to Moody’s Investors Service, topping a previous record of $91.4 billion set in January 2017, and the precrisis high of $81.8 billion in November 2007.” (Barron’s) BBB-rated bonds – the lowest investment grade category – now stand at $1.4 trillion in the U.S. and constitute the largest component of the investment grade universe (roughly 47% in both the U.S. and Europe, up from 35% and 19%, respectively, ten years ago). (IMF, NYT) The amount of CCC-rated debt outstanding currently stands 65% above the record set in the last cycle. (It is, however, down 10% from the peak in 2015, thanks primarily to reduced issuance of CCCs; numerous defaults of energy-related CCCs; and strong demand – largely from CLOs – for first lien loans rated B-, which otherwise might have been unsecured CCC bonds.) (Credit Suisse)
在我们一直享有的这种向好时期,放贷标准和信贷技巧很少受到考验。这正是沃伦·巴菲特所说的意思:“只有退潮时,你才知道谁在裸泳。”技巧娴熟、纪律严明、谨慎小心的贷款人很可能安然度过下一次衰退和信贷紧缩。而技巧欠佳的管理人则未必。
Quality of debt:
时代迹象
不幸的是,没有一个可靠单一的指标可以用来判断市场参与者在某一时点的行为是谨慎还是不谨慎。我们所能做的,就是收集零散证据,并尝试从中得出正确的推论。以下是关于当前环境的一些观察(除非另有说明,均与美国相关):
The average debt multiple of EBITDA on large corporate loans is just above the previous high set in 2007; the average multiple on large LBO loans is just below the 2007 high; and the average multiple on middle market loans is at a clear all-time high. (S&P GMI) $375 billion of covenant-lite loans were issued in 2017 (75% of total leveraged loan issuance), up from $97 billion (and 29% of total issuance) in 2007. (S&P GMI) BB-rated high yield bonds are now coming to market with the looser covenants common in investment grade bonds. More than 30% of LBO loans (and more than 50% of M&A loans) incorporate “EBITDA adjustments” these days, versus roughly 7% and 25%, respectively, ten years ago. A mid-
“过去十年一个显著特点是,根据国际清算银行的数据,2007 年至 2017 年间,全球债务与 GDP 之比从 179% 跃升至 217%。”(《金融时报》)
“去年国会通过了巨额的减税和增加开支法案,根据德意志银行的说法,这是自 1960 年代以来经济衰退之外最大规模的刺激措施。这使得本已是自 1940 年代以来相对于 GDP 最高的联邦债务,走上了更加陡峭的轨道,[并]刺激了一个已经处于或高于充分就业的经济,这可能助长通胀……”(《华尔街日报》)
“随着央行压低(利率),债务水平悄然攀升,根据标普全球评级的数据,全球高杠杆公司的比例——即债务与盈利之比达到五倍或以上的公司——在 2017 年达到 37%,而 2007 年为 32%。”(彭博社)
美国非金融企业债务占 GDP 的比例已回升至危机时的水平,并接近二战后的高点。(《纽约时报》)
未偿杠杆债务总额(高收益债券和杠杆贷款)目前为 2.5 万亿美元,正好是 2007 年的两倍。杠杆贷款已从 2008 年的 5000 亿美元增至如今的近 1.1 万亿美元。(标普全球市场财智)
大部分增长来自杠杆贷款,而非高收益债券。高收益债券的未偿金额自 2013 年底以来基本未变,而杠杆贷款增加了 4000 亿美元。在此过程中,我们认为贷款的风险水平有所上升,而高收益债券的风险则保持稳定。贷款方面的这些趋势很大程度上归因于新的贷款抵押债券(CLO)以及寻求浮动利率回报的其他投资者的强劲需求。
“根据穆迪投资者服务公司的数据,5 月份新增(杠杆)贷款约 1046 亿美元,超过了 2017 年 1 月创下的 914 亿美元纪录,以及 2007 年 11 月危机前 818 亿美元的高点。”(《巴伦周刊》)
BBB 级债券——最低的投资级类别——目前在美国达到 1.4 万亿美元,构成投资级债券市场中最大的组成部分(美国和欧洲均约占 47%,而十年前分别为 35% 和 19%)。(国际货币基金组织,《纽约时报》)
未偿 CCC 级债务的金额目前比上个周期创下的纪录高出 65%。(然而,较 2015 年的峰值下降了 10%,主要归因于 CCC 级债券发行减少;大量与能源相关的 CCC 级债券违约;以及强劲的需求——主要来自 CLO——对评级为 B- 的第一留置权贷款的需求,这些贷款原本可能是不受担保的 CCC 级债券。)(瑞士信贷)
2018 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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债务质量:
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大型企业贷款的平均 EBITDA 债务倍数略高于 2007 年创下的前高;大型杠杆收购贷款的平均倍数略低于 2007 年的高点;而中端市场贷款的平均倍数则明显处于历史最高水平。(标普全球市场财智)
2017 年发行了 3750 亿美元的无契约限制(cov-lite)贷款(占杠杆贷款发行总量的 75%),而 2007 年为 970 亿美元(占发行总量的 29%)。(标普全球市场财智)
BB 级高收益债券现在进入市场时,附带的是投资级债券中常见的较宽松契约条款。
如今超过 30% 的杠杆收购贷款(以及超过 50% 的并购贷款)包含“EBITDA 调整”,而十年前这一比例分别约为 7% 和 25%。中双位数百分比的杠杆收购贷款包含超过 0.5 倍 EBITDA 的调整,而十年前仅为几个百分点。(标普全球市场财智)
为股票回购或向股权所有者分红而筹集资金的贷款已回升至危机前的水平。(标普全球市场财智)
BB/BB- 级机构贷款的全包收益率利差已降至 200-250 个基点,而 2007 年末/2008 年初约为 300-400 个基点。B+/B 级贷款的利差也已收窄了 100-150 个基点。(标普全球市场财智)
teens percentage of LBO loans include adjustments of more than 0.5x EBITDA, as opposed to a few percent ten years ago. (S&P GMI) Loans to raise money for stock buybacks or dividends to equity owners are back to pre-Crisis levels. (S&P GMI) The all-in yield spread on BB/BB- institutional loans is down to 200-250 basis points, as opposed to roughly 300-400 bps in late 2007/early 2008. Spreads on B+/B loans also have narrowed by 100-150 bps. (S&P GMI)
Other observations:
Other observations:
2018 年初,2296 家私募股权基金正处于募资状态,寻求 7440 亿美元的股权资本。(《金融时报》)这些数字均创历史新高。
截至 6 月,软银为其用于科技投资的愿景基金(Vision Fund)寻求的 1000 亿美元中,已成功募集 930 亿美元,并试图通过员工激励计划筹集剩余 50 亿美元。由于缺乏资金,员工池将从软银借款,而软银则希望从日本银行获得贷款。(《金融时报》)
面对软银强大资金实力的竞争压力,其他风险投资基金也在扩张应对。它们寻求的资本规模远超以往投资额,而投资者——被顶级基金报告的回报率所吸引——急于提供资金。当然,这股资金洪流必然对未来回报产生不利影响。
“根据 Crunchbase 的数据,今年前七个月共有 268 轮风险投资巨额融资(每轮 1 亿美元),几乎相当于 2017 年全年创纪录的 273 轮巨额融资。仅在 7 月份,就有 50 笔融资交易,总额达 150 亿美元,创下月度新高。”(《罗宾报告》)
从 2005 年到 2015 年,石油压裂行业的净债务增长了 300%,尽管据吉姆·查诺斯称,从 2012 年年中到 2017 年年中,最大的 60 家压裂公司每季度现金流为负 90 亿美元。“利息支出增速仅为债务增速的一半,因为利率持续下降,”一位哥伦比亚大学研究员表示。(《纽约时报》)
自金融危机以来,学生债务翻了一倍多,达到 1.5 万亿美元,违约率从 7.5% 升至 11%。(《纽约时报》)
个人贷款也在激增。第一季度未偿还金额达到 1800 亿美元,增长 18%。“总部位于芝加哥的环联公司表示,2017 年金融科技公司发放的个人贷款占总量的 36%,而 2010 年这一比例不到 1%。”(彭博社)
新兴市场国家得以发行大量债务,其中许多以美元和欧元计价偿还,而它们对这些货币的获取渠道有限。“根据国际清算银行的数据……(全球)美元计价贷款总额已从 2009 年第一季度的 5.8 万亿美元跃升至如今的 11.4 万亿美元。其中,3.7 万亿美元流向新兴市场,该时期增长超过一倍。”(《纽约时报》)
在一个相对较小但极端的例子中,追求收益的日本投资者投入数十亿美元购买所谓的“双层”基金,这些基金投资于土耳其资产,和/或转换为以高收益(但贬值)的土耳其里拉计价的工具。(《金融时报》)
At the beginning of 2018, 2,296 private equity funds were in fund-raising mode, seeking $744 billion of equity capital. (FT) These are all-time highs. As of June, SoftBank had been able to raise $93 billion of the $100 billion it sought for its Vision Fund for technology investments, and it was trying to raise $5 billion of the remainder from an incentive scheme for its employees. Lacking capital, the employee pool would borrow it from SoftBank, which in turn hoped to borrow it from Japanese banks. (FT) Challenged to bid for deals against SoftBank’s huge firepower, other venture capital funds are expanding in response. They’re seeking capital in much greater amounts than they invested in the past, and investors – attracted by the returns being reported by the best funds – are eager to supply it. Of course this onslaught of money is bound to have a deleterious impact on future returns. “According to Crunchbase, there have been 268 [venture capital] mega-rounds ($100 million rounds), invested during the first seven months of this year, almost equal to a record of 273 mega-rounds for the entire year of 2017. And during the month of July alone, there were 50 financing deals totaling $15 billion, which is a new monthly high.” (The Robin Report) From 2005 to 2015, the oil fracking industry increased its net debt by 300 percent, even though, according to Jim Chanos, from mid-2012 to mid-2017 the 60 biggest fracking firms had negative cash flow of $9 billion per quarter. “Interest expenses increased at half the rate debt did because interest rates kept falling,” said a Columbia University fellow. (NYT) Student debt has more than doubled since the Crisis, to $1.5 trillion, and the delinquency rate has risen from 7½% to 11%. (NYT) Personal loans are surging, too. The amount outstanding reached $180 billion in the first quarter, up 18%. “Fintech companies originated 36% of total personal loans in 2017 compared with less than 1% in 2010, Chicago-based TransUnion said.” (Bloomberg) Emerging market countries have been able to issue vast amounts of debt, much of it repayable in dollars and euros to which they have only limited access. “According to the Bank for International Settlements, . . . the total amount of dollar-based loans [worldwide] has jumped from $5.8 trillion in the first quarter of 2009 to $11.4 trillion today. Of that, $3.7 trillion has gone to emerging markets, more than doubling in that period.” (NYT) In a relatively minor but extreme example, yield-hungry Japanese investors poured several billion dollars into so-called “double-decker” funds that invested in Turkish assets and/or swapped into wrappers denominated in high-yielding (but depreciating) Turkish lira. (FT)
从一般谈到具体,我请橡树资本的投资专家们,就像写《竞相触底》时那样,举出他们所见的不审慎交易案例。以下是他们提供的证据,显示资本市场过热、风险偏好强烈,个别情况附有他们的评论引述。(由于我儿子安德鲁常提醒我沃伦·巴菲特的告诫,“点名表扬,分类批评”,我就不指明涉及的公司了。)
Moving on from the general to the specific, I’ve asked Oaktree’s investment professionals, as I did at the time of The Race to the Bottom, for their nominees for imprudent deals they’ve seen. Here’s the evidence they provided of a heated capital market and a strong appetite for risk, with their commentary in quotes in a few cases. (Since my son Andrew often reminds me of Warren Buffett’s admonition, “praise by name, criticize by category,” I won’t identify the companies involved.)
2018 年橡树资本管理有限合伙企业(Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.)
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某资本设备公司 A 发行债务,为私募股权基金收购该公司提供融资。“我们本以为最初的定价讨论过于紧凑,但该交易获得超额认购并扩大了规模,定价随即收紧 25 个基点。最终条款极为激进:采用宽限条款结构(covenant-lite)、对 EBITDA 进行无上限调整,并拥有很大的举债空间。”该公司在发行后的头两个季度未达预期,由此第一留置权贷款下跌多达 5 个点,高收益债券下跌多达 15 个点。
欧洲市场也未能免受这种宽松化趋势的影响。公司 B 是一家优质的服务型企业,尽管对周期性终端市场有所暴露;规模小于同业;利润率较低、杠杆较高、现金生成能力有限;而且几年前刚经历过重组。然而,凭借经调整的 EBITDA(相当于其报告数字的 150%),该公司成功发行了七年期债券,票息仅略高于 5%。
能源产品公司 C 最近上市。尽管留存亏损达 24 亿美元,且 S-1 文件中写明“我们过去曾遭受重大亏损,且预计在可预见的未来不会盈利”,其股票在 IPO 价格上仍获得超额认购,目前股价已上涨 67%。一位股票分析师表示,这个估值合理,因为相当于预计 2020 年营收的 5 倍。另一位分析师给出的目标价较当前股价低 25%,但为得出该估值,这位分析师假设公司未来 12 年毛利率每年能扩大 30%,并在 2030 年以 6 倍 EBITDA 估值。
过去两年,公司 D 用于回购的金额相当于其一年的 EBITDA 的 85%。部分由于回购,该公司目前的债务远高于两年前。与过去两年相比,我们估算在此前的七年里,其回购支出仅为最近两年的十分之一,平均回购价格比最近两年的平均价低 85%。
一家收购基金刚刚收购了公司 E——一家出色的公司——价格为 15 倍 EBITDA,这是一个非常高的“封面数字”。该价格基于经调整的 EBITDA,这一数字为报告 EBITDA 的 125%;因此交易价格相当于报告 EBITDA 的 19 倍。对外宣称的杠杆为经调整 EBITDA 的 7 倍,即意味着报告 EBITDA 的 9 倍。“我们不是说这一定会变成一笔糟糕的交易。只是说,如果这最终变成一笔糟糕的交易,没有人会感到意外。每个人事后都会说,‘他们付了太多钱,在资产负债表上放了太多债务,从一开始就注定失败。’”
公司 F 赚取大量 EBITDA,但其中 60% 来自一个不可靠的单一客户,而且其增长受地域限制。我们得出的价格本可构成一笔不错的投资,但卖方想要两倍的价格……而他们从一家收购基金那里拿到了。“我们普遍看到财务赞助方极为激进,在银行和非传统贷款机构非常宽松的放贷实践下,按完美情形定价,几乎没有容错空间。我们都知道这样会怎样收场。”
一年前,一家收购基金通过其一家被投公司以 100% 债务融资收购公司 G,并为自己提取了股息。该交易在营销时使用的经调整 EBITDA 数字为该公司报告 EBITDA 的 190%。基于调整后的数字,总杠杆超过 7 倍;基于报告数字,则为 13.5 倍。这些债券目前交易价格高于面值,第一留置权票据的最差收益率利差低于 250 个基点。
公司 H 是一家优质且增长中的公司,我们正准备退出,投行发出了 100 份“推介书”。我们收到了 35 份意向:3 份来自战略买家,32 份来自财务赞助方。“战略买家给出的估值最低;当毫无协同效应指望的财务赞助方出价高出许多时,这始终是一个重大警示信号。”
Capital equipment company A issued debt to finance its acquisition by a private equity fund. “While we thought the initial price talk was far too tight, the deal was oversubscribed and upsized, and the pricing was tightened by 25 bps. Final terms were highly aggressive with covenant-lite structure, uncapped adjustments to EBITDA, and a large debt incurrence capacity.” The company missed expectations in the first two quarters after issuance, in reaction to which the first lien loan traded down by as much as five points and the high yield bonds traded down by as much as 15. The European market isn’t insulated from the trend toward generosity. Company B is a good services company, albeit with exposure to cyclical end-markets; is smaller than its peers; has lower margins, higher leverage and limited cash-generation ability; and went through a restructuring a few years ago. Nevertheless, on the back of adjusted EBITDA equal to 150% of its reported figure, the company was able to issue seven-year bonds paying just over 5%. Energy product company C recently went public. Despite a retained deficit of $2.4 billion and an S-1 stating “we have incurred significant losses in the past and do not expect to be profitable for the foreseeable future,” its shares were oversubscribed at the IPO price and are now selling 67% higher. One equity analyst says that’s a reasonable valuation, since it’s 5x estimated 2020 revenues. Another has a target price 25% below the current price, although to get to that valuation the analyst assumes the company will be able to expand its gross margin by 30% a year for the next 12 years and be valued at 6x EBITDA in 2030. Over the last two years, company D has spent an amount on buybacks equal to 85% of a year’s EBITDA. In part because of the buybacks, the company now has much more debt than it did two years ago. In contrast to the last two years, we estimate that in the seven preceding years, it spent only one-tenth as much on buybacks as in the last two years, at an average purchase price 85% below the more recent average. A buyout fund just bought company E, a terrific company, for 15x EBITDA, a very high “headline figure.” The price is based on adjusted EBITDA which is 125% of reported EBITDA; thus the transaction price equates to 19x reported EBITDA. Stated leverage is 7x adjusted EBITDA, meaning 9x reported EBITDA. “We aren’t saying this will wind up being a bad deal. Just saying that IF this ends up being a bad deal, no one will be surprised. Everyone will say, with the benefit of hindsight, ‘they paid way too much and put way too much debt on the balance sheet, and it was doomed out of the gate.’ ” Company F earns substantial EBITDA, but 60% comes from a single unreliable customer, and its growth is constrained by geography. We arrived at a price where we thought it would constitute a good investment for us. But the owners wanted twice as much . . . and they got it from a buyout fund. “We are generally seeing financial sponsors being very aggressive, pricing to perfection with very little room for error, on the back of very liberal lending practices by banks and non-traditional lenders. We all know how this will end.” A year ago, a buyout fund financed the acquisition of company G by one of its portfolio companies with 100% debt and took out a dividend for itself. The deal was marketed with an adjusted EBITDA figure that was 190% of the company’s reported EBITDA. Based on the adjusted figure, total leverage was more than 7x, and based on the reported figure it was 13.5x. The bonds are now trading above par, and the yield spread to worst on the first lien notes is below 250 bps. Company H is a good, growing company that we were ready to exit, and our bankers sent out 100 “teasers.” We received 35 indications of interest: three from strategic buyers and 32 from financial sponsors. “The strategic buyers offered the lowest valuations; it’s always a big warning sign when financial sponsors with no hope of synergies are offering prices much
2018 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司
2018 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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“比战略买家出价更高。”我们收到了四份来自收购基金的购买要约,其中一份价格栏空白。最终我们以 14 倍 EBITDA 的价格售出,总杠杆率超过 7 倍。
2017 年,投资者买入了超过 100 亿美元阿根廷和土耳其本地货币盈利企业发行的债券,如今这些债券的平均利差比发行时扩大了 500 个基点(例如,目前收益率 11%,而发行时为 6%)。
新兴市场债务的高点(或者说低点?)是阿根廷在 2017 年 6 月成功发行 27.5 亿美元的超额认购 100 年期债券,尽管其金融历史在 1980 年、1982 年、1984 年、1987 年、1989 年和 2001 年屡遭危机。该债券定价 90,收益率 7.92%。现在交易价为 75,16 个月内贬值 17%。
higher than strategics.” We received four purchase offers from buyout funds, one with the price left blank. We ended up selling at 14x EBITDA, with total leverage of more than 7x. In 2017, investors bought over $10 billion of debt from Argentine and Turkish localcurrency-earning corporates that now trades, on average, 500 bps wider than at issuance (e.g., at an 11% yield today versus 6% at issue). The high point in emerging market debt (or was it the low point?) was Argentina’s ability in June 2017 to issue $2.75 billion of oversubscribed 100-year bonds despite a financial history marked by crises in 1980, 1982, 1984, 1987, 1989 and 2001. The bond was priced at 90 for a yield of 7.92%. Now it’s trading at 75, implying a mark-down of 17% in 16 months.
尤其值得注意的是,橡树资本美国高收益债券联合投资组合经理戴维·罗森伯格提供了一个危机后约束放松的例子。政府的杠杆贷款指引“于 2013 年出台,旨在遏制过度冒险行为,将杠杆率上限设定为 6 倍——在特定条件下——并促使受监管银行减少激进交易……”如今,货币监理署署长表示,“由银行自行决定在杠杆贷款中愿意承担多大的风险……”以下是货币监理署署长就此话题的发言:“我们告诉银行的是,你们有资本和预期损失模型,因此如果你们为预期损失预留了足够的资本,那么你们就应该能够做出这一决定。”(以上引文来自 Debtwire。)而我的回应是:上一次这样做的结果如何?
戴维接着说:“毫不意外,银行家们告诉我,他们现在正在试探 7.5 倍杠杆的杠杆收购。一位银行家最近告诉我,自 2007 年以来首次,他参加了一次信贷审查,听到信贷副行长合理化批准一笔高风险交易,理由是它只是更大投资组合中的一小部分,所以他们承受得起这笔交易出问题,而且如果放弃这笔交易,他们就会把市场份额输给竞争对手。”这听起来很像“音乐响起时,你必须起舞”。我再说一遍:上一次结果如何?
最根本的问题很简单:上述所有证据归根结底表明,今天的市场参与者是谨慎还是乐观?是怀疑还是接受简单解决方案?是坚持安全还是害怕错过?是审慎还是不审慎?是厌恶风险还是容忍风险?在我看来,每个问题的答案都倾向于后者,这意味着结论不言自明。
Of particular note, David Rosenberg, Oaktree’s co-portfolio manager for U.S. high yield bonds, provides an example of post-Crisis restraints being loosened. The government’s Leverage Lending Guidelines, “introduced in 2013 to curb excessive risk-taking, capped leverage at 6x – subject to certain conditions – and contributed to less aggressive dealmaking [sic] among regulated banks. . . .” Now the head of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has indicated, “it’s up to the banks to decide what level of risk they are comfortable with in leveraged lending. . . .” Here’s what the OCC head said on the subject: “What we are telling banks is you have capital and expected loss models and so if you are reserving sufficient capital against expected losses, then you should be able to make that decision.” (The quotes above are from Debtwire.) And here’s my response: how did that work out last time? David goes on: “Not surprisingly, bankers have told me they are now testing the waters with 7.5x levered LBOs. A banker recently told me that for the first time since 2007, he has been in a credit review and heard the credit deputy rationalize approving a risky deal because it is a small part of a larger portfolio so they can afford for it to go wrong, and if they pass on the deal they will lose market share to their competitors.” That sounds an awful lot like “if the music’s playing, you’ve gotta dance.” I repeat: how’d that work out last time? The bottom-line question is simple: does the sum of the above evidence suggest today’s market participants are guarded or optimistic? Skeptical or accepting of easy solutions? Insisting on safety or afraid of missing out? Prudent or imprudent? Risk-averse or risk-tolerant? To me, the answer in each case favors the latter, meaning the implications are clear.
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在结束之前,我想分享我的看法:股票价格处于高位,但(除科技和社交媒体等少数特定板块外)并未高得离谱——尤其是相对于其他资产类别而言——并且不太可能成为金融市场麻烦的主要源头。我发现当前股票的位置与 2005 至 2006 年相似,那时股票在引发金融危机中几乎没有起作用。(当然,这并未让股票投资者免于痛苦;他们仍然遭受了超过 50% 的下跌。)
而非股票,2007 至 2008 年金融危机的主要构成要素是次级抵押贷款支持证券、其他由债务打造的结构化和杠杆投资产品,以及衍生品,这些都是金融工程的例子。换句话说,问题不在于证券和债务工具本身,而在于它们被如何使用。
Before closing, I want to share my view that equities are priced high but (other than a few specific groups, such as technology and social media) not extremely high – especially relative to other asset classes – and are unlikely to be the principal source of trouble for the financial markets. I find the position of equities today similar to that in 2005-06, from which they played little or no role in precipitating the Crisis. (Of course, that didn’t exempt equity investors from pain; they were hit nevertheless with declines of more than 50%.) Instead of equities, the main building blocks for the Crisis of 2007-08 were sub-prime mortgage backed securities, other structured and levered investment products fashioned from debt, and derivatives, all examples of financial engineering. In other words, not securities and debt instruments themselves, but the uses to which they were put.
2018 年橡树资本管理公司(Oaktree Capital Management,L.P.)
2018 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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这一次,备受追捧的又是公共和私人债务——投资者在无相应风险的情况下追逐回报,加上前述的激进行为。因此,当事情再次出错时,债务工具似乎将处于震中。正如《格兰特利率观察家》所言:
自然,三千年来的最低利率已在人们借贷的方式上留下了印记。如(富国证券分析师戴维·)普雷斯顿所言,公司信贷“评级更低、杠杆更高。投资级公司债如此,贷款市场如此,私人信贷也是如此。”
因此,公司债务是一个软肋,或许是本周期最大的软肋。它的脆弱并非源于低迷,而恰恰源于繁荣的复苏。繁荣程度越高(利率越低),警惕性就越弱。正是警惕性的缺失,让错误固化,最终导致信心危机。
整体状况远没有 2007 年那么糟糕,当时银行杠杆高达 32 倍;高杠杆投资产品每天都在被发明(并被吞下);金融机构大举投资于完全缺乏实质、由次贷支撑的投资工具。因此,我不是在描述信贷泡沫,也不是在预测由此引发的崩盘。但我确实认为,当前这种环境——资金过多、追逐过少的交易——投资者应当把谨慎放在比激进更优先的位置。
另一方面——投资中总有另一只手——在我们看到经济严重疲软之前,几乎没有理由认为今天的冒险行为会导致违约和损失。而且肯定没有理由认为疲软会很快到来。经济在增长,但相对没有过度,眼下感觉还能再持续一阵子。
但还有第三只手:经济过度刺激、通胀上升、紧缩性货币政策、利率走高、企业偿债负担加重、政府赤字飙升以及贸易争端升级,这些潜在影响确实带来了不确定性。事情就是这样。
This time around, it’s mainly public and private debt that’s the subject of highly increased popularity, the hunt by investors for return without commensurate risk, and the aggressive behavior described above. Thus it appears to be debt instruments that will be found at ground zero when things next go wrong. As often, Grant’s Interest Rate Observer puts it well: Naturally, the lowest interest rates in 3,000 years have made their mark on the way people lend and borrow. Corporate credit, as [Wells Fargo Securities analyst David] Preston observes, is “lower-rated and higher-levered. This is true of investmentgrade corporate debt. This is true in the loan market. This is true in private credit.” So corporate debt is a soft spot, perhaps the soft spot of the cycle. It is vulnerable not in spite of, but because of, resurgent prosperity. The greater the prosperity (and the lower the interest rates), the weaker the vigilance. It’s the vigilance deficit that crystalizes the errors that lead to a crisis of confidence. Conditions overall aren’t nearly as bad as they were in 2007, when banks were levered 32-to-1; highly levered investment products were being invented (and swallowed) daily; and financial institutions were investing heavily in investment vehicles built out of sub-prime mortgages totally lacking in substance. Thus I’m not describing a credit bubble or predicting a resulting crash. But I do think this is the kind of environment – marked by too much money chasing too few deals – in which investors should emphasize caution over aggressiveness. On the other hand – and in investing there’s always another hand – there is little reason to think today’s risky behavior will result in defaults and losses until we see serious economic weakness. And there’s certainly no reason to think weakness will arrive anytime soon. The economy, growing but relatively free of excesses, feels right now like it could go on a good bit longer. But on the third hand, the possible effects of economic overstimulation, increasing inflation, contractionary monetary policy, rising interest rates, rising corporate debt service burdens, soaring government deficits and escalating trade disputes do create uncertainty. And so it goes.
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警惕他人发行劣质证券、实施短期骗局的能力,是我所称“给市场量体温”的重要组成部分。再把历史高估值和狂热的投资者情绪纳入考量,量体温能让我们感知市场是否处于周期高位、是否到了加强防御的时候。这个过程能让你感觉到损失正在酝酿,但当然无法告诉你衰退何时发生、程度多大。记住,《竞相逐底》写于 2007 年 2 月,事后看似乎是正确而及时的,但全球金融危机的真正痛苦直到 2008 年 9 月才显现。中间隔了 19 个月,正如那句老话所说,“比时代超前太多,与犯错难以区分。”在投资中,我们可能预感到将要发生什么,但永远不知道何时发生。
Being alert for the ability of others to issue flimsy securities and execute fly-by-night schemes is a big part of what I call “taking the temperature of the market.” By also incorporating awareness of historically high valuations and euphoric investor attitudes, taking the temperature can give us a sense for whether a market is elevated in its cycle and it’s time for increased defensiveness. This process can give you a sense that the stage is being set for losses, although certainly not when or to what extent a downturn will occur. Remember that The Race to the Bottom, which in retrospect seems to have been correct and timely, was written in February 2007, whereas the real pain of the Global Financial Crisis didn’t set in until September 2008. Thus there were 19 months when, according to the old saying, “being too far ahead of one’s time was indistinguishable from being wrong.” In investing we may have a sense for what’s going to happen, but we never know when.
2018 年橡树资本管理有限合伙
2018 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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因此,我们所能做的最好的事情,就是在形势变得岌岌可危时转为谨慎。我们永远无法确切知道“岌岌可危”何时——甚至是否——会变成“崩盘”。
最后,我要借用《竞相逐底》结尾的两段话。这样做让我得以提供一个绝佳例证,说明历史何其相似:
当今金融市场状况可以简单概括:全球流动性泛滥,对传统投资兴趣寥寥,对风险几乎不加担忧,各处预期回报微薄。因此,为了获得可能足够的回报(尽管低于过去承诺的水平),投资者欣然接受重大风险,形式包括更高的杠杆、未经检验的衍生品和脆弱的交易结构……
这篇备忘录可以简单总结:一场竞相逐底正在进行,反映出投资者和资金提供方的审慎程度普遍下降。目前没有人能证明参与者会受到惩罚,或者他们的长期业绩不会超过那些唱反调的人。但通常的规律就是这样。
如今十一年过去了,我想不出更好的表述。
我绝对不是说人们今天不应投资,或者不应投资债务。橡树资本近来的口号一直是、也将继续是“前行,但保持谨慎”。前景并不那么糟,资产价格也没那么高,不值得持有现金或类现金资产。以潜在机会成本来衡量,离开市场的代价太大,难以证明其合理。
但对我而言,以上所有的要义在于:投资者应当倾向于那些在下跌中限制损失、而不是在上涨中确保充分参与的策略、管理人和方法。鱼与熊掌不可兼得。
投资世界中几乎一切事情都可以激进地做,也可以防御性地做。在我看来,当前市场环境决定了这是一个需要谨慎的时刻。
Thus the best we can do is turn cautious when the situation becomes precarious. We never know for sure when – or even whether – “precarious” is going to turn into “collapse.” To close, I’m going to recycle two of the final paragraphs of The Race to the Bottom. Doing so permits me to provide an excellent example of history’s tendency to rhyme: Today’s financial market conditions are easily summed up: There’s a global glut of liquidity, minimal interest in traditional investments, little apparent concern about risk, and skimpy prospective returns everywhere. Thus, as the price for accessing returns that are potentially adequate (but lower than those promised in the past), investors are readily accepting significant risk in the form of heightened leverage, untested derivatives and weak deal structures. . . . This memo can be recapped simply: there’s a race to the bottom going on, reflecting a widespread reduction in the level of prudence on the part of investors and capital providers. No one can prove at this point that those who participate will be punished, or that their long-run performance won’t exceed that of the naysayers. But that is the usual pattern. It’s now eleven years later, but I can’t improve on that. I’m absolutely not saying people shouldn’t invest today, or shouldn’t invest in debt. Oaktree’s mantra recently has been, and continues to be, “move forward, but with caution.” The outlook is not so bad, and asset prices are not so high, that one should be in cash or near-cash. The penalty in terms of likely opportunity cost is just too great to justify being out of the markets. But for me, the import of all the above is that investors should favor strategies, managers and approaches that emphasize limiting losses in declines above ensuring full participation in gains. You simply can’t have it both ways. Just about everything in the investment world can be done either aggressively or defensively. In my view, market conditions make this a time for caution.
September 26, 2018
September 26, 2018
2018 年橡树资本管理有限合伙
2018 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.
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