变革之风

2020 (explicit) · memo · 原文约 8977 词
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Memo to:

Memo to:

Oaktree Clients

Oaktree Clients

From:

From:

Howard Marks

Howard Marks

Re:

Re:

变革之风

The Winds of Change

过去 20 个月是一段极不寻常的时期,主要归因于疫情,但许多事情在这段时间里感觉似乎没什么变化。每天仿佛都与昨日无异。南希和我大多待在家里,处理电子邮件和 Zoom 电话——无论是工作事务还是孙子孙女的事。工作日和周末的感觉没什么区别(这在疫苗问世前尤其如此,那时我们很少外出就餐或拜访他人)。两年里我们只度过了一次一周的假期。最好的概括就是拿《土拨鼠之日》来类比:每一天都感觉和前一天十分相似。过去 12 个月里,我们的环境发生了什么变化?我们见证了一场选举和总统更迭,以及对种族、不平等和气候变化问题的关注度提升——但迄今为止,实际成果寥寥。幸运的是,疫苗被研发出来并获得批准、分发。因此,新冠病疫情有所缓解,但德尔塔毒株又引发了疫情复燃,而且未来可能还会有更多变数。

在商业领域,几乎没有什么新鲜事:

The last 20 months have been a most unusual period, thanks primarily to the pandemic, yet many things feel like they haven’t changed over that time span. Each day seems like all the others. Nancy and I mostly stay home and deal with email and Zoom calls – whether relating to work matters or grandchildren. Weekdays don’t feel that different from weekends (this was especially true pre-vaccine, when we rarely ate out or visited others). We’ve had only one one-week vacation in two years. The best way to sum it up is through a comparison to Groundhog Day: every day feels a lot like the day before. What has changed in our environment in the last 12 months? We’ve seen an election and change of president, as well as increased sensitivity on issues of race, inequality and climate change – but so far with few tangible results. Fortunately, vaccines were developed, approved and distributed. Thus, Covid19 subsided, but there was a reemergence spurred by the Delta variant, and there might be more. In the business world, there’s little that’s new: • • •

2020 年第三季度开始的经济复苏——以美国历史上最大的单季 GDP 增幅——仍在持续。证券市场自 2020 年 3 月开始反弹,延续升势。对通胀上升的担忧迄今被证明是有道理的,但关于其主要原因(美联储政策还是供应链/劳动力市场瓶颈?)以及它是暂时性还是长期性的问题,仍无共识。

The economic resurgence that began in the third quarter of 2020 – with the greatest quarterly GDP gain in U.S. history – remains underway. The securities markets, which began to rally in March 2020, have continued to rise. Worry about rising inflation has turned out to be well founded thus far, but there is still no consensus as to its primary cause (Federal Reserve policy or supply chain/labor market bottlenecks?) or whether it will prove transitory or long-lasting.

上述三个条件在数月前便已全部具备,如今变化甚微。因此,就投资环境而言,依然是“土拨鼠之日”的重演。然而,变化正在发生,且这些变化将成为本备忘录的主题。我关注的重点并非“小宏观”变化,诸如明年 GDP、通胀和利率的走向,而是那些将对我们的生活产生多年影响的“大宏观”变化。其中许多变化眼下尚无法付诸行动,但这并不意味着我们不应将其铭记于心。

投资环境的变迁

正如我此前所写,我所记忆中的 50、60 乃至 70 年前的世界,是一个相当静止的地方。事物似乎变化不大,也不快。1970 年的住宅、汽车、读物、商业技术及总体环境,与 1950 年相比并无显著差异。我们以广播电视为娱乐,驾驶依赖化油器的汽油动力汽车,大部分计算在纸上完成,用打字机撰写文件(以复写纸制作副本),通过信件和电话沟通,信息主要来源于图书馆所藏的书籍。四功能计算器、个人电脑、手机、电子邮件和互联网当时尚不存在,其中一些还要等上许久才会问世。我将这种环境描述为一种基本不变的背景——我把它想作剧场中的布景——在其前,事件与周期循环上演。

All three of the conditions listed above were present months ago, and they’re little changed today. Thus, in the investment environment, it’s still Groundhog Day. Yet there are changes taking place, and they’ll be the subject of this memo. My focus isn’t the “little macro” changes, like what will happen to GDP, inflation and interest rates next year, but rather the “big macro” changes that will have an impact on our lives for many years. Many aren’t actionable today, but that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t bear them in mind. The Changing Environment for Investing As I’ve written before, the world I remember of 50, 60 and 70 years ago was a pretty static place. Things didn’t seem to change very much or very fast. The homes, cars, reading matter, business technology and general environment of 1970 weren’t very different from those of 1950. We were entertained by broadcast TV and radio, drove gasoline-powered cars dependent on carburetors, did most calculations on paper, composed documents on typewriters (with copies made using carbon paper), communicated via letters and phone calls, and got information primarily from books housed in libraries. The four-function calculator, personal computer, cellular phone, email and Internet didn’t yet exist, and some of them wouldn’t for a good while longer. I describe this environment as a mostly unchanging backdrop – I think of it as scenery in the theater – in front of which events and cycles played out.

2021 年橡树资本管理有限合伙企业

2021 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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20 世纪 60 年代真正发生的一大变化,是“成长投资”的兴起,投资者追逐那些快速成长的公司,其中不少是相当年轻的企业。我经常提到的“漂亮五十”在 60 年代末主宰了股市:这个群体包括办公设备制造商 IBM 和施乐,摄影巨头柯达和宝丽来,默克和礼来这样的制药公司,惠普和德州仪器等科技公司,以及可口可乐和雅芳这类先进的营销/消费品企业。

这些公司的股票市盈率极高,达到 80 甚至 90 倍。显然,投资者只有在确信这些公司未来几十年都能保持领先地位时,才应该(如果有这种可能的话)支付这样的倍数。而投资者确实确信不疑。事实上,当时普遍认为这些公司不会遇到任何坏事,永远不可能被颠覆。这是战后美国第一次大规模与“新事物”亲密接触——而且,一个很好的逻辑荒谬的例子是,投资者拥抱这些公司,正因为它们革命性的新,却又莫名其妙地认定,一个更新更好的新东西永远不会出现来取代它们。

当然,这些投资者是在自找苦吃。如果你在我 1969 年开始工作时买入“美国最伟大公司”的股票,并坚定持有五年,你几乎亏光了所有钱。第一个原因是 60 年代末的市盈率实在太高,在随后的市场修正中被彻底打回原形。但也许更重要的是,这些“永恒”公司中有许多被证明经不起变化。

漂亮五十的公司代表着新世界中变化的第一波绽放,而它们中的许多后来成了最早一批受害者。这些号称坚不可摧的公司,至少有一半要么倒闭,要么被收购。数码相机一出现,柯达和宝丽来就失去了存在的理由。施乐把干法复印业务的大半江山拱手让给了来自海外的低价竞争。当分布式计算和个人电脑取代大型主机时,IBM 暴露出脆弱。你最近见过挨家挨户推销的人吗?没有了,而且我们也很少再听说“雅芳小姐”。还有当年备受宠爱的辛普利希图案公司呢?今天谁还自己做衣服?

从那以后的岁月里,我们的环境发生了巨大变化。今天,不像五六十年代,一切似乎每天都在变。要找出一个在未来岁月里既不会颠覆别人也不会被颠覆(或两者兼有)的公司或行业,尤其困难。任何相信今天领先成长公司榜单上的所有企业五年或十年后还会屹立不倒的人,很可能被证明是错的。

对投资者来说,这意味着一个新的世界秩序。“稳定”“防御性”“护城河”这些词在未来的相关性将降低。许多投资将需要比过去更多的技术专长。而基于“明天会和昨天一样”的假设所做出的投资,必须接受大幅提高的审视。

商业性质的变化

美国商业正日益虚拟化、数字化、信息化,不再专注于农业或制造实体产品。即使是那些确实生产实体商品或服务的公司,也在越来越多地采用信息产品和其他技术。这些元素将对哪些传统企业能存活、哪些护城河能守住、哪些新来者能取代在位者,以及我们这个世界十年或二十年后会是什么样子,产生深远影响。

One of the biggest changes that did take place in the 1960s was the emergence of “growth investing” via fast-growing companies, many of which were quite new. The “Nifty Fifty” I talk about so much ruled the stock market in the late 1960s: this group included office equipment manufacturers IBM and Xerox, photography titans Kodak and Polaroid, drug companies like Merck and Eli Lilly, tech companies including Hewlett Packard and Texas Instruments, and advanced marketing/consumer goods companies such as Coca-Cola and Avon. These companies’ stocks carried very high price/earnings ratios, reaching up to 80 and 90. Obviously, investors should only pay multiples like these (if ever) if they’re sure the companies will be preeminent for decades to come. And investors were sure. In fact, it was widely believed that nothing bad could happen to these companies and they could never be disrupted. This was one of post-war America’s first major brushes with newness and – in a good example of illogicality – investors embraced these companies, with their revolutionary newness, but somehow assumed that a newer and better new thing could never come along to displace them. Of course, those investors were riding for a fall. If you bought the stocks of “the greatest companies in America” when I started working in 1969, and held them steadfastly for five years, you lost almost all your money. The first reason is that the multiples in the late 1960s were far too high, and they were gutted in the subsequent market correction. But, perhaps more importantly, many of these “forever” companies turned out to be vulnerable to change. The companies of the Nifty Fifty represented the first flowering of change in the new world, and many of them went on to be its early victims. At least half of these supposedly impregnable companies have either gone out of business or been acquired by others. Kodak and Polaroid lost their raison d’etre when digital cameras appeared. Xerox ceded much of the dry copying business to low-priced competition from abroad. IBM proved vulnerable when decentralized computing and PCs took over from massive mainframes. Seen any door-to-door salespeople lately? No, and we don’t hear much about “Avon ladies.” And what about one of the darlings of the day: Simplicity Pattern? Who do you know today who makes their own clothes? The years since then have seen a massive shift in our environment. Today, unlike in the 1950s and ’60s, everything seems to change every day. It’s particularly hard to think of a company or industry that won’t either be a disrupter or be disrupted (or both) in the years ahead. Anyone who believes all the firms on today’s list of leading growth companies will still be there in five or ten years has a good chance of being proved wrong. For investors, this means there’s a new world order. Words like “stable,” “defensive” and “moat” will be less relevant in the future. Much of investing will require more technological expertise than it did in the past. And investments made on the assumptions that tomorrow will look like yesterday must be subject to vastly increased scrutiny. The Changing Nature of Business Increasingly, U.S. business is virtual, digital and information-oriented, no longer devoted to agriculture or to manufacturing physical products. Even those companies that do produce physical goods or services increasingly employ information products and other aspects of technology. These elements will have a profound impact on which legacy businesses will survive, which moats will hold up, and which newcomers will supplant the incumbents, as well as what our world will look like ten or twenty years from now.

2021 年橡树资本管理有限合伙企业

2021 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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在一月份的备忘录《有价值的东西》中,我描述了科技正在商业世界中带来的一些变化,其中包括:

In my January memo, Something of Value, I described some of the changes technology is making in the business world. They included: • • • •

基于信息型业务的超常盈利能力;

这类企业增量生产的成本很低,扩张相对容易,业务规模扩大时利润率不降反升,不会遭遇回报递减;

它们在成长过程中对追加资本和扩建厂房的需求不大,更依赖少数受过教育的编码人员,而非大批体力或非技术工人。

the exceptional profitability of information-based businesses; these companies’ low cost of incremental production, relative ease of scaling, and ability to see margins rise as the business expands, rather than suffer diminishing returns; their modest need for additional capital and bigger plants as they grow, and their reliance on a relatively small number of educated coders rather than masses of manual or unskilled workers.

这些因素不仅可能造就巨大的赢家并击垮其他企业,还会对整个经济产生深远影响。其中有一个因素我思考得最多。(由于橡树资本和我一般不投资科技领域,我对上述大部分内容并不需要持有明确观点。)这个因素就是:随着科技和信息在商业及我们生活中扮演越来越重要的角色,劳动力变得不再那么必要。

一百年前,美国是农业强国,而农业是高度劳动密集型的产业。因此,大量非熟练工人在美国农场就业,主要集中在美国南部和中西部。随着机械化设备的发明,农业对劳动力的需求下降。被拖拉机取代的大量工人涌向中西部北部,在工厂里生产新发明的汽车和家用电器。就这样,从某一行业被排挤出来的工人在另一行业找到了工作——当时既有走下坡路的行业,也有蒸蒸日上的行业。

快进到 21 世纪。那些工人及其后代当初转入的行业,如今也正在失去工作岗位,这一次的原因是用廉价劳动力制造的进口商品,尤其是自动化。随着美国制造业走下坡路,取而代之的是科技行业——信息、人工智能、通信和娱乐等领域——它们正在取代金属加工的地位。正如前面提到的,科技公司可以在不按比例增加雇员人数的情况下提高产量和销售额。

乐观派说:“总会有新的劳动力需求冒出来”(就像 1920 年到 1970 年前后的制造业那样)。但(一)在正在崛起的科技行业中,你看不到多少这种迹象——它们就是不属于劳动密集型;(二)科技行业需要的工人,受教育程度普遍高于那些被制造业抛弃的工人。鉴于美国公立教育质量不断下滑,后一点尤其令人担忧。(不过,服务业确实存在就业增长的空间。)

我担心的是,制造业不再需要的工人将去哪里找工作。对于那些指望政府提供解决方案的人来说,最可能的答案是发放扶助金,以保证每个人都有维持生计的收入。但我们能负担得起养活日益增多的失业工人及其家庭吗?我们又该如何替代工作带来的非金钱收益:比如每天有个去处,以及把工作做好的成就感。坐在门廊上发呆,真的能替代一份工作吗?我相信,例如阿片类药物泛滥就与失业率高度相关。政府的慷慨施舍无法真正替代工作。

Not only do these factors have the potential to create massive winners and bring down others, but they have profound implications for the overall economy. I think about one of them more than the rest. (Since Oaktree and I generally don’t invest in technology, I’m not required to have opinions on much of the foregoing.) That one is the fact that as technology and information play a bigger role in business and our lives, labor becomes less necessary. One hundred years ago, the U.S. was an agricultural powerhouse, and agriculture was highly laborintensive. Thus large numbers of unskilled workers were employed on U.S. farms, largely in the South and Midwest. With the invention of machine-powered equipment, the need for labor in agriculture declined. Large numbers of workers displaced by tractors made their way to the upper Midwest to work in plants producing newly invented automobiles and household appliances. Thus workers who were displaced from one field found employment in another – there were industries on the way up as well as on the way down. Fast forward to the 21st century. The industries to which those workers and their descendants shifted are in turn losing jobs, this time due to the importation of foreign goods made with cheap labor and, especially, automation. With manufacturing on the decline in the U.S., it’s technological industries – in fields such as information, artificial intelligence, communications and entertainment – that are rising to take the place of metal-bending. And as mentioned above, tech firms can increase their production and sales without a proportional increase in the number of workers employed. The optimists say, “some new need for labor always pops up” (as it did in manufacturing between 1920 and, say, 1970). But (a) you can’t see much sign of that in the tech-based industries that are on the rise – they’re just not labor-intensive – and (b) the workers that technological industries require are generally better educated than those cut adrift from the manufacturing sector. This latter element is especially worrisome given the declining quality of public education available in the U.S. (There is, however, room for growth in jobs in the service sector.) I worry about where the workers no longer needed in manufacturing will find employment. For those who look to government for solutions, the most likely answer is support payments designed to guarantee everyone a living wage. But can we afford to support growing numbers of unemployed workers and their families? And how will we replace the non-monetary benefits from work: things like having a place to go each day and satisfaction with a job well done. Is sitting on the porch really a viable substitute for a job? I believe the opioid epidemic, for example, is highly correlated with job losses. Government largesse isn’t an adequate substitute for jobs.

2021 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

2021 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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原件此处是表格,PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失,下面只剩按列读出的数字,行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。

通货膨胀/通货紧缩

近来关于通货膨胀我已经写了很多,尤其是四个月前那篇《宏观思考》。既然我们对未来的认知如此有限,这个话题我实在没什么可补充的了。但通货紧缩的可能性呢?过去几年里,人们一直在同时发出通胀和通缩的警告。我唯一确信的就是,这两种情况不太可能同时发生。

最近我看到一段凯西·伍德谈通货紧缩的视频。可能有人不知道,凯西是 2020 年声名鹊起的投资人,当时她重仓 FAANG、特斯拉和其他科技股,这些股票的表现远超市场的其余部分(2020 年,她管理的七只 ETF 中有五只平均回报率达到 141%)。视频里,凯西说:

“我们一直在说,经济的风险更多在通缩一侧而非通胀。所以,随着新冠带来那样的破坏、供应链被彻底打乱,我们经历了一段通胀时期,我认为投资者已经把这一点计入预期了……”

“……我上大学是在上世纪 70 年代,当时通胀肆虐,所以我知道通胀是什么样,我确信我们不会回到那个年代,谁要是按那个场景做规划,很可能要犯错误……”

“在创新这一侧,技术驱动的创新——我们正处于前所未有的时期。前所未有!要知道,得回到电话、电力和汽车的时代,才能看到三大技术驱动的创新源同时演进。今天我们有五大平台:DNA 测序、机器人、储能、人工智能和区块链技术,全都是通缩性的,而且影响不是一点点。”(强调为原文所加)

她还引用杰夫·冈拉克、雷·达利欧和我,也许还有斯坦·德鲁肯米勒,说我们都担心通缩式崩盘。(说实话,我唯一可能与该论断沾边的评论是:技术进步可以成为通缩因素——而不是整体结果会是通缩。)她接着说:

“我们认为(通缩式崩盘)会被通缩式繁荣所平衡,这就是我们的分歧所在。但我们达成共识的是,有些公司以为世界永远不会变,一直在迎合那些想要每股多赚一两分钱的短线股东,靠让公司加杠杆、借更多债、缩减股本的方式来实现,他们还在专注派息。这些公司很可能背负着会过时的产品和服务,因为当今正在发生的创新规模是破纪录的。而为了偿还债务,他们只能降价,把这些本来就在衰落的产品和服务卖出去……所以这意味着,我们即将看到的传统 GDP 数字会非常低,增长会显得极为稀缺……”

“会有大量岗位被替代,这一点毫无疑问。事实上,我们 2014 年创业时,牛津大学刚发布一份报告,说美国 47% 的工作岗位会在 2035 年前被自动化和人工智能取代。报告就到此为止。当时媒体一片惊呼,头条哗然,大家谈自动化色变。我们每次会议都遇到这个问题。而他们没做的事——我们做了——就是把故事讲完。”

Inflation/Deflation I’ve written extensively on the subject of inflation of late, especially in Thinking About Macro four months ago. Since our knowledge of the future is so limited, there’s little for me to add on the subject. But what about the possibility of deflation? People have been warning about both inflation and deflation for the last several years. The only thing I’ve been confident about is that we’re unlikely to have both at the same time. I recently came across a video of Cathie Wood speaking on the subject of deflation. For those who don’t know, Cathie is the investor who gained great fame in 2020 for having been heavily concentrated in the FAANGs, Tesla and other tech stocks, which vastly outperformed the rest of the stock market (in 2020, the average return on five of her seven ETFs was 141%). In the video, Cathie says: We’ve been saying for some time that the risk to the economy is more on the side of deflation than inflation. So, as Covid created all the destruction that it did and with supply chains really being thrown off, we’ve been through a period here of inflation which I think investors are baking into the cake. . . . . . . I was in college [during the 1970s], when inflation was raging, so I know what that is, and I truly believe we are not going back there, and that anyone planning for it is probably going to be making some mistakes. . . On the innovation side, technologically enabled innovation – we are in a period today like we have never been. Never! I mean you have to go back to the telephone, electricity and the automobile to see three major technologically enabled sources of innovation evolving at the same time. Today we have five platforms: DNA sequencing, robotics, energy storage, artificial intelligence and blockchain technology, all of which are deflationary, and not just by a little bit, either. (Emphasis added) She goes on to cite Jeff Gundlach, Ray Dalio and me, and maybe Stan Druckenmiller, as being concerned about a deflationary bust. (To be honest, my only comment possibly relevant to that assertion was to say that technological gains can be a deflationary factor – not that the overall result would be deflation.) She continues: We think [the deflationary bust] is going to be balanced by a deflationary boom, so that’s where we differ. But where we agree is that there are companies who thought the world would never change and have been catering to short-term shareholders who wanted that extra penny or two in earnings and so got it by having the companies lever up and take more debt and shrink the number of shares, and they’ve also been focused on dividends. They are probably saddled with products and services that will become obsolete because of the record-breaking amount of innovation taking place today. And in order to service their debt, they are going to have to cut prices and move those goods and services that are on their way out anyway. . . So what it will mean is that the traditional GDP numbers we’re going to be seeing are going to be very low and growth will seem very scarce. . . . There will be a lot of job displacement, there will be, no question about it. In fact, when we started our company in 2014, Oxford University had just put out a piece that said 47% of all jobs in the United States would be lost to automation and artificial intelligence by 2035. And they left it there. Hair on fire, headlines screaming, a lot of fear about automation. We got the question in every meeting. And what they had neglected to do – which we did – was finish the story.

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借助自动化和人工智能,生产率将大幅提升。我们认为其提升幅度将超越以往任何时期,至少在现代史上如此。生产率的提高会带来更多的财富创造和国内生产总值(GDP)增长。根据我们的估算,到 2035 年,由于自动化和人工智能的作用,美国 GDP 将不会是 28 万亿美元——若按线性增长推算,这是当时的水平——而会达到 40 万亿美元……

在继续之前,我想就凯西·伍德的观点花点时间说明:科技将被证明具有通缩效应,其对生产率的正面影响将推动 GDP 跃升。但 GDP 是工作小时数乘以每小时劳动生产率的结果。因此,如果科技大幅提高每小时产出,即便工作小时数下降,GDP 依然可以增长。换句话说,科技有可能在推高 GDP 的同时加剧失业问题。

如今,我们很少听到关于通缩可能性的讨论,这确实看似不太可能发生。我们也很少听到科技带来的通缩影响,但我们不应忽视这一观点。

工作前景展望

在谈论工作这一话题时,我想提及几项可能汇聚成巨大变革(“深刻或显著的转变”)的变化。长期以来,宗教习俗使工人在安息日休息成为传统,而到了 20 世纪初,亨利·福特开始让他的工人周六和周日都休息。(他并非仅仅出于慷慨。他想卖车,并认为如果人们有两天周末可以去享受汽车,他们会买得更多。)那是一项重大创新,但如今周六和周日休息已如此普遍,很少有人会去想周末是如何形成的。

现在,我们可能正面临工作模式的又一次重大变革。不久之前,大多数人还渴望全职工作,追求有晋升机会的职业。然而如今,许多这类观念已被抛诸脑后。

With automation and artificial intelligence, productivity is going to go up dramatically. We think more than it ever has, certainly in modern times. And with productivity increases comes more wealth creation, and more GDP creation, and according to our estimates, in the year 2035, because of automation and artificial intelligence, we believe that GDP here in the United States will not be $28 trillion, which, if you drew linear growth, that’s where it would be, but instead will be $40 trillion . . . Before I move on, I want to spend a minute on exactly what Cathie Wood said: technology will prove deflationary, and its positive impact on productivity will contribute to a jump in GDP. But GDP is the product of the number of hours worked times labor productivity per hour. Thus, if technology produces a big increase in output per hour worked, GDP can grow even if the number of hours worked declines. In other words, technology has the potential to boost GDP while adding to unemployment. We don’t hear much these days about the possibility of deflation, and it certainly seems unlikely to arise. We also don’t hear much about the deflationary impact of technology, but we shouldn’t dismiss the idea. The Outlook for Work While on the subject of work, I want to mention a few changes that could add up to a sea change (“a profound or notable transformation”). Whereas religious observance had long made it traditional for workers to have a day off on their Sabbath, in the early 1900s Henry Ford began to give his workers both Saturday and Sunday off. (He wasn’t motivated solely by generosity. He wanted to sell cars and figured people would buy more of them if they had two-day weekends during which to enjoy them.) That was a major innovation, but today having Saturday and Sunday off is so universal that few people wonder how weekends came to be. Now, we might be in for another major change in work patterns. It wasn’t long ago that most people wanted full-time employment and pursued careers affording opportunities for advancement. Now, however, a lot of that is out the window. • • • • •

计算机的出现让跟踪那些想做零散工作的人变得容易——这里干一两天,那里干几个小时——于是 Uber 司机这样的“零工”渐渐流行起来。

疫情让居家办公成了家常便饭,五天坐班制也不再是默认选项。

过去一年,数百万人离职,掀起“大辞职潮”:仅 9 月就有 440 万人离开岗位。

很多人似乎不再那么看重终身职业和晋升。

失业率相当低,却有数百万职位空缺。10 月美国供应管理协会发布的服务业报告写道:“劳动力仍是问题,找不到也不容易招到愿意干活的人,服务业、货运和仓储物流尤其缺人。”

Computers made it easier to track people who wanted to work irregularly – a day or two here and a few hours there – and “gig work” such as driving for Uber became popular. The pandemic made working from home commonplace and the requirement to work in an office five days a week less of a default solution. Millions of people have left jobs over the last year as part of the “Great Resignation”: 4.4 million in September alone. Many people seem to attach less importance to lifetime careers and advancement. The unemployment rate is quite low, even as millions of jobs are unfilled. Per the October Institute for Supply Management report on services: “Labor is still an issue, as it’s hard to find and get people who want to work, especially in services, trucking and warehouse fulfillment.”

这些变化带来了重要影响:工作安排不再那么标准化,员工对稳定薪水的兴趣似乎减弱,许多雇员期望被允许居家办公。2020 年,我们看到劳动力参与率(处于工作年龄的美国人中就业或求职者的比例)从 63.4% 降至 60.2%,此后仅回升至 61.1%。这些变化背后是什么原因?既然经济现象不受物理定律支配,确切原因难以确定。就此事而言,我能想到大量可能的解释:

These changes have important implications: work arrangements are less standardized, workers seem less enthralled by a steady paycheck, and many employees expect to be allowed to work from home. In 2020 we saw a drop in the labor force participation rate (the percentage of working-age Americans employed or looking for work) from 63.4% to 60.2%, and it has since rebounded to only 61.1%. What’s behind these developments? Since economic phenomena aren’t governed by physical laws, precise causes are hard to ascertain. In this case, I can think of a large number of possible explanations:

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• • •

• • • •

• • • • • •

2000 年前后开始出现的经济增长放缓,减少了就业机会和晋升空间,这或许让职业和长期雇佣这类概念对某些年轻人失去了吸引力。

类似地,部分年轻一代可能因收入不平等加剧、经济流动性前景变差而感到失望。

许多人承受得起不工作的代价——至少短期如此——也许是因为他们不工作赚的钱反而比工作时还多(得益于刺激支票和/或扩大的失业救济金)。这些来源的钱在储蓄账户里越积越多,可能还没完全花掉。

有房一族可能正沉浸在房屋账面升值的喜悦中,并以此抵押借款,让自己可以不必再靠工资过活。

疫情期间大规模居家办公的经历,让人们脱离了“去上班”的习惯,使这件事不再那么理所当然。这段经历也可能凸显了通勤的烦人之处,降低了一些人重新回归办公室的意愿。

火爆的市场可能鼓动了一些人辞掉工作,转而去搞日内交易或投资加密货币。

疫情中有人搬了家,或是为了躲避新冠,或纯粹因为居家办公让搬家成为可能。如今有些人不想回来了。尤其是,居家办公让一些人不再需要住在生活成本高昂的城市工作区附近。其他人或许享受了与家人相处的时光,于是决定换一份能更多陪伴家人的工作。

看到父母在身边对孩子的好处后,一些家庭可能选择变成单职工家庭,放弃双收入带来的快节奏和可能更高的生活水准。

临近退休的人可能选择现在就退休,而不是再找份工作过渡一下。

劳动力短缺(比如卡车司机行业)提高了工人的议价能力,让他们能跳到薪资更高的工作岗位。

雇主的困境让一些公司降低了招聘门槛,使工人得以从低薪工作向上流动。

想重返岗位的人可能难以找到托儿服务,因为低薪的育儿工作者也许能找到报酬更高的工作。

最后,有些人可能仍因害怕感染新冠而无法重返工作岗位。

The slower economic growth seen since roughly 2000 reduced the rate of job creation and advancement, and this may have made concepts like career and long-term employment less appealing to some young people. Along similar lines, some members of younger generations may have become disaffected because of the increase in income inequality and decrease in prospects for economic mobility. Many people can afford not to work – at least for a while – perhaps because they’ve made more money not working than they did working (thanks to stimulus checks and/or expanded unemployment benefits). Money from these sources piled up in savings accounts, and it may not have been entirely spent yet. Homeowners may be reveling in the paper appreciation on their homes and borrowing against it to allow them to forgo a paycheck. The extensive work-from-home experience during the pandemic got people out of the habit of “going to work” and made doing so less automatic. The experience may also have highlighted how unpleasant commuting is, reducing some people’s willingness to reengage in it. The ebullient markets may have encouraged some to quit their jobs in order to take up day trading or cryptocurrency investments. Some people moved during the pandemic, whether to escape Covid-19 or simply because WFH permitted it. Now some don’t want to return. In particular, WFH reduced the need for some to live near jobs in urban areas with a high cost of living. Others may have enjoyed spending time with family and decided to switch to jobs permitting them to do more of it. Having seen how good it is for kids to have parents around, some families may have opted to become one-worker households, giving up on the fast track and potentially higher standards of living facilitated by two incomes. People nearing retirement may be choosing to start it now rather than seek a job for the interim. Labor shortages (e.g., involving truck drivers) have increased workers’ bargaining power and given them the ability to move to better-paying jobs. Employers’ desperate straits have caused some to lower job requirements, enabling workers to move up from low-paying jobs. People wanting to return to work may be having trouble finding childcare, since low-paid childcare workers may be able to find jobs that pay more. Finally, some people may still be prevented from returning to work by fear of Covid-19.

总而言之,疫情期间许多上班族经历了一段“暂停期”——不工作、做兼职、在家办公,当然也免了出差。对很多人来说,这或许触发了一次重新校准,让他们有机会得出结论:“你知道吗,事业并不是全部;家庭和生活质量才更重要。我要重新调整生活重心,少放些精力在工作上。”眼下,美国大约有 740 万人失业,同时有 1120 万个职位空缺。听起来似乎很容易就能让所有人上岗、填满这些岗位。但失业的人可能缺乏所需技能,可能不愿接受一份无法居家办公的工作,可能不想受固定班次约束,也可能过不了药物检测,诸如此类。和供应链一样,要把所有活动部件安放到正确位置,恐怕还得花些时间。我在上面列了一大串变化,多数源于疫情。有些可能在接下来几个月里随着一切“回归正常”而消失,但另一些也许会就此定型,五年或十年后让我们感叹:“还记得 2020 年之前的世界有多不一样吗?”

To sum up, many workers experienced a “timeout” during the pandemic – not working, working parttime, working from home, and/or certainly not traveling on business. For many, this may have occasioned a reset, giving them an opportunity to conclude, “You know, my career isn’t everything; family and quality of life count for more. I’m going to reorient my life and put less emphasis on work.” At the present time, roughly 7.4 million Americans are unemployed and there are 11.2 million job openings. Sounds like it should be easy to put everyone to work and fill those positions. But the people who aren’t employed may lack the required qualifications, may be unwilling to accept a job that doesn’t allow them to work from home, may not want to adhere to fixed schedules, or may be unable to pass drug tests, etc. Just as with the supply chain, it may take a while to get all the moving parts to the right place. I’ve listed a large number of changes here, mostly stemming from the pandemic. Some may disappear in the coming months as things get “back to normal.” But others may turn out to be permanent and in five or ten years cause us to say, “Remember how different things were before 2020?”

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民主的前景

描述美国政治与治理现状,有一个贴切却少有人用的词:危如累卵(parlous)。谷歌的定义是“充满危险或不确定性;岌岌可危”。这个国家在政治上高度分裂,而话语似乎随着时间推移愈发走向极端。

部分责任要归咎于媒体(包括社交媒体)。原因很简单,却也很不幸:少数企业家发现,分裂能带来金钱。据我所知,在电视诞生之初,全国性电视网的经营者把新闻部门当作一项亏损运营的公共服务。在电视的早期几十年里(直到 20 世纪 70 年代),主要电视网都做平衡、客观的报道——由沃尔特·克朗凯特、切特·亨特利和大卫·布林克利这样德高望重的人物领衔——而且这些电视网至今大体上仍然如此。但在过去 20 年里,一些媒体机构通过迎合某一方或另一方来增加利润,往往还以煽动性的方式。最近,我们又听说社交媒体通过吸引高度党派化的受众来拉动流量,同时却对内容推卸责任。事实是,分歧好卖(你的日报多久会用一条正面标题作为头条?)。

结果危害极大。有些有线新闻台和社交媒体网站只提供争论中一面的说法,这已经够糟了。但更甚的是,它们还提供“另类事实”,让美国人得以生活在不同的现实中。这导致进一步的两极分化,以及对立场的敌意。分歧用不了多久就会变成厌恶。没有一套共同认可的事实,人们很容易怀疑持相反观点者的诚意,从而动摇我们民主的根基。

如今,美国人更倾向于住在跟自己政治观点相近的人附近,表达相似的看法,支持完全拥护本党议程的候选人。由于在绝大多数国会选举中,谁将赢得大选已成定局,真正的竞争在于主导政党提名的初选,而胜出的往往是鼓吹该党教条极端版本的候选人。赢家——通常由少数参与初选的党派核心选民选出——几乎总能继续赢得大选,从而造就一个充斥着两党极端分子的国会。

一些政客不仅助长了我们所见的分裂,还从中获益,形式是更多的竞选捐款和媒体关注。许多国会选举缺乏竞争性,这助长了过去被认为不可接受的行为:举止粗野、攻击同僚、发表以往属禁忌的言论、鼓吹极端措施。许多当选官员似乎在奉行“爱情与战争中一切皆可”的变体:只要能激励我的支持者、让我连任、帮助我的政党保住或夺取权力,一切手段都是可以的。

有人可能会认为,以上这些都无伤大雅——有点像电视剧。它加剧了僵局,而有些人认为僵局是我们对华盛顿所能期望的最好结果,因为政府的许多主动决策都有缺陷。但这些趋势有令人担忧的后果。政治领域的竞争已从思想/意识形态层面转向人身攻击。正如最近的投票所显示的,我们的国家正在一分为二,包括人口结构上。这可能并不新鲜,但分裂的力量正在增强。我认为“聚类”(clustering)——倾向于住在与自己相似的人附近的趋势——正在加剧,随之而来的是对“对方”的厌恶、不尊重和怨恨也在加深。

聚类带来的政治影响可能因选区划分而加剧,这使主导政党获得的席位和权力与其选民份额不成比例。(在许多州,选区划分掌握在州立法机构手中,主导政党可以利用其划分或操纵选区边界的能力,来延续甚至扩大自己对权力的掌控。)

The Outlook for Democracy There’s a great but little-used word to describe the state of U.S. politics and governance: parlous. Google defines it as “full of danger or uncertainty; precarious.” The country is highly divided in terms of politics, and discourse seems to move further toward the extremes with the passage of time. Part of the blame goes to the media (including social media). The explanation is simple but unfortunate: a few entrepreneurs figured out that there’s money in division. At the birth of television, as I understand it, the people who ran the national networks established the news division as a public service that ran losses. In TV’s early decades (through the 1970s), the main networks did balanced, objective reporting – led by august figures such as Walter Cronkite, Chet Huntley and David Brinkley – and these networks pretty much still do. But over the last 20 years, some media outlets have increased their profits by catering to one side or the other, often in an inflammatory manner. More recently, we’ve heard about social media driving traffic by appealing to highly partisan audiences and disclaiming responsibility for content. The truth is, discord sells (how often does your daily newspaper lead with a positive headline?). The result is very harmful. It’s bad enough that some cable news stations and social media sites deliver only one side of the argument on many issues. But increasingly, they provide “alternative facts” that allow Americans to inhabit different realities. This leads to further polarization and to hostility toward those with whom one disagrees. It doesn’t take long for disagreement to turn into dislike. Without a commonly agreed-on set of facts, it’s easy to doubt the good faith of those with contrary views, undermining the very basis of our democracy. Today, Americans are more likely to live near people who share their political views, express similar opinions, and favor candidates who fully back their party’s agenda. Because which party will win the general election is a foregone conclusion in the vast majority of congressional elections, the real competition is in the primary election for the dominant party’s nomination, which often goes to a candidate espousing an extreme version of the party’s dogma. The winner – typically chosen by the small number of partisans who vote in primaries – almost always goes on to win the general election, creating a Congress heavily weighted with extremists from both parties. Some politicians not only contribute to the division we’re seeing but also benefit from it in the form of increased campaign contributions and media attention. The non-competitive nature of many congressional elections encourages behavior that in the past was considered unacceptable: acting in an uncivil manner, attacking colleagues, expressing opinions that were previously taboo, and advocating extreme measures. Many elected officials appear to follow a variation on “all’s fair in love and war”: all tactics are okay if they motivate my supporters, get me reelected and help my party gain or retain power. One might conclude that all the above is innocuous – something like a TV drama. It contributes to gridlock, and there are people who believe gridlock is the best we can hope for from Washington, because so many of the government’s active decisions are flawed. But these trends have worrisome implications. Competition in the political arena has moved from intellectual/ideological to personal. As recent voting shows, our country is splitting in two, including in terms of demographics. This may be nothing new, but the forces of division are getting stronger. I believe “clustering” – the tendency to live near people like oneself – is growing, and along with it the level of dislike, disrespect and resentment toward “the other.” The political impact of clustering can be exacerbated by gerrymandering, which gives the dominant party seats and power disproportionate to its share of voters. (In many states, the drawing of voting districts is in the hands of the state legislature, where the dominant party can use its ability to gerrymander, or manipulate voting district boundaries, to perpetuate and perhaps increase its hold on power.)

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这些事情让我们所谓的民主生活变得复杂(根据牛津大学在线词典 Lexico 的定义,民主是“由全体人口或国家所有合格成员组成的政府体系”,或“由组织或团体多数成员掌控的管理方式”)。小时候,我们解决校园争端时坚持“少数服从多数”。然而,看看美国的体制,我们会发现我们的政府形式在许多方面违背了代议制民主、多数原则和“一人一票”等原则。例如:

These things complicate life in our so-called democracy (per Oxford University’s online dictionary Lexico, “a system of government by the whole population or all the eligible members of a state” or “control of an organization or group by the majority of its members”). When I was a kid, we settled schoolyard disputes by insisting “majority rules.” When we look at the U.S. system, however, we see numerous ways in which our form of government violates principles like representative democracy, majority rule, and “one person, one vote.” For example: •

众议院席位按各州人口比例分配,而参议院每州固定两个席位。加利福尼亚州拥有 3900 万人口,在参议院的影响力却与仅有 57.8 万人口的怀俄明州相同。因此,人口最少的 26 个州,总人口仅 5760 万(占美国总人口的 17.7%),理论上却可选出 52 名参议员,从而控制参议院。

Whereas seats in the House of Representatives are allocated to the states in proportion to their populations, each state has two seats in the Senate. California, with 39 million people, has the same clout in the Senate as Wyoming with its 578,000. Thus the 26 smallest states, with only 57.6 million people (17.7% of the total U.S. population), theoretically could elect 52 senators and control the Senate.

美国总统不是由谁获得普选票最多来决定的,而是由谁在选举人团中获得多数票来决定。选举人团的 538 名选举人按各州人口比例分配,这看起来是民主的,但在 48 个州,选举人票采取赢者通吃的规则,这点并不民主。因此,一位候选人只需在人口最少的 39 个州以及华盛顿特区各以 1 票之差胜出(如果所有注册选民都去投票,这 39 个州和特区合计 9390 万张票中只需赢得 4700 万张),就能拿到全部 270 张选举人票,进而赢得总统职位——即使另一位候选人在人口最多的 11 个州以 100% 的得票率拿下全部 1.2 亿张选票也无济于事。换句话说,在这个极端例子中,一位美国总统可以仅凭 4700 万张选票(占总票数的 22.0%)当选,而其对手却拿到 1.669 亿张票。(注意,如果人口最少的这些州投票率低于其他州,那么前者甚至可以用更低的普选票比例选出总统。)

过去 100 年里,总统常常以显著的普选票多数当选。得票率最高的是林登·约翰逊——1964 年为 61.1%;富兰克林·罗斯福——1936 年为 60.8%;理查德·尼克松——1972 年为 60.7%;罗纳德·里根——1984 年为 58.8%。但最近 8 次总统选举的获胜者只拿到 43.0% 到 52.9% 的选票,而且有两次当选总统的普选票数低于败选的对手。

U.S. presidents aren’t chosen on the basis of who gets the most popular votes, but by who gets a majority in the Electoral College. The 538 electors in the College are apportioned to the states on the basis of population, which is democratic, but in 48 states the Electoral College votes go to candidates on a winner-take-all basis, which is not. Thus, a candidate could win by one vote in each of the 39 least-populated states and Washington, D.C. (receiving 47.0 million out of their combined 93.9 million votes if all the registered voters went to the polls); get all 270 of their electors; and win the presidency even if another candidate got 100% of the 120.0 million votes in the 11 most populous states. In other words, in this extreme example, a U.S. president can be elected with just 47.0 million votes (22.0% of the total) versus 166.9 million for his or her opponent. (Note that if the percentage turnout in the least-populated states were lower than in the others, the former could elect a president with an even smaller percentage of the total popular vote.) In the last 100 years, presidents have often been elected with significant majorities of the popular vote. The highest were for Lyndon B. Johnson – 61.1% in 1964; Franklin D. Roosevelt – 60.8% in 1936; Richard Nixon – 60.7% in 1972; and Ronald Reagan – 58.8% in 1984. But the winner of the last eight presidential elections only received between 43.0% and 52.9% of the vote, and presidents were elected twice with fewer popular votes than the loser.

我们体制中这些反民主的方面已经存在了几个世纪。但美国的民主版本通常能运转,是因为人和政党通常:(一)认识到民主是脆弱的,只有大多数公民感到体制公平且合法时才能存续;(二)相信多数人统治应受尊重少数人权利的制约;(三)对国家进步的重视程度至少不亚于对政治权力的重视。因此,政治领袖遵守不成文的规则,恪守旨在促进民主稳定的传统行为规范。在我们历史的大部分时间里,只有边缘声音曾暗示选举可能被操纵或质疑结果。现在,这种想法正走向主流。我担心这个趋势。

选区划分和地域拉票(gerrymandering)在许多州加剧了某一政党本已举足轻重的影响力,而州立法机构对选举的控制为可能的舞弊行为打开了大门。历史上,州务卿和选举委员会成员一直是无党派职位(而且相当无聊)。如今,任命或选举越来越可能让党派官员掌管选举过程。新法律和新政治规范似乎都为立法者和选举官员打开了大门,让他们做出以前不可想象的行为。最终,没有任何机制阻止州立法机构任命一套选举人,无论本州普选结果如何,这些选举人都会投票给主导政党的提名人。对我们的民主存在严重潜在威胁,没人能说这方面未来会怎样。

These anti-democratic aspects of our system of government have been present for centuries. But the U.S. version of democracy generally worked because people and parties generally: (a) recognized that democracy is fragile and can only survive if most citizens feel the system is fair and legitimate; (b) believed that majority rule should be tempered by respect for minority rights; and (c) valued progress for the country at least as highly as political power. Thus, political leaders played by unwritten rules and hewed to traditional norms of behavior intended to foster a stable democracy. For most of our history, only fringe voices suggested our elections could be conducted dishonestly or questioned the outcome. Now, this thinking is going mainstream. I worry about this trend. Clustering and gerrymandering increase the already-substantial influence of one party or the other in many states, and state legislatures’ control over elections opens the door for possible shenanigans. Secretary of state and membership on boards of elections have historically been non-partisan positions (and pretty boring). Increasingly, appointment or election can put partisan officials in charge of the election process. Both new laws and new political norms seem to have opened the door for legislators and election officials to behave in ways that were previously unthinkable. Ultimately, there’s nothing to keep state legislatures from appointing slates of electors who will vote for the dominant party’s nominee regardless of the popular vote in their states. Serious potential threats to our democracy exist, and no one can say what the future holds in this regard.

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我过去曾写过,我参与了“无标签”组织,以及它对我国问题两党解决方案的支持。我们这个组织汇集了民主党人和共和党人——以及此前几乎从不交谈的参议员和众议员——我认为,今年以两党合作方式通过的一些重要法律,“无标签”组织功不可没,最显著的是拜登总统刚刚签署成为法律的基础设施法案。

在我作为“无标签”组织活跃成员的六年里,我的眼界被打开,认识到了一些以前没意识到的事情。简而言之,我觉得很少有人真正体会到国会有多么不民主。在我看来,国会两院都牢牢控制在多数党选出的领袖手中。在重大事项上,如果众议院议长或参议院多数党领袖想让某件事通过,一般就能通过。如果领袖不想让某件事通过,一般就通不过。这种一人独断的规则(a)在一个自称民主的国家里显得极为可疑,(b)让人不禁要问,我们送参议员和众议员到华盛顿干什么(也就是说,如果领袖能定议程、告诉议员们怎么投票,那干脆让每院的领袖全权运作算了?)。如果对立双方的立法者都听从各自领袖的指示——这些指示大概严格按党派划线——那么两党立法从定义上就不可能存在。

我认为,两党政府和两党立法对我们民主制度的健康绝对至关重要。否则,多数党就会为所欲为,包括通过没有另一党同意的法律。(在参议院,有些措施可以通过所谓的“和解”程序,仅凭 51 票就能通过,从而绕开冗长辩论的阻挠——见下文)。当任何一党仅凭本党投票通过立法时:

• • •

I’ve written in the past about my involvement with the group No Labels and its backing of bipartisan solutions to our nation’s problems. Our organization brings together both Democrats and Republicans – as well as both senators and representatives, who heretofore rarely spoke to each other – and I think No Labels deserves credit for some of the important laws that have been enacted this year on a bipartisan basis, most notably the infrastructure bill President Biden just signed into law. In the six years I’ve been an active member of No Labels, my eyes have been opened to something I wasn’t aware of. In short, I think very few people appreciate how undemocratic Congress is. As I see it, each house of Congress has been firmly under the control of the leader elected by the majority party. On matters of importance, if the Speaker of the House or Majority Leader of the Senate wanted something to happen, it generally happened. And if a leader didn’t want something to happen, it generally didn’t happen. This one-person rule (a) seems highly suspect in what purports to be a democracy and (b) makes you wonder why we send senators and representatives to Washington (that is, if the leader can set the agenda and tell the members how to vote, why not just let the leader in each house run the whole thing?). And if the legislators on the two opposing sides follow the instructions from their leaders, which presumably are on a strict party-line basis, by definition there can’t be bipartisan legislation. And I think bipartisan government and bipartisan legislation are absolutely essential for the health of our democracy. The alternative is that the majority party does what it wants, including passing laws with no concurrence from the other party. (Some measures can be passed in the Senate with as few as 51 votes under a process called “reconciliation,” overcoming resistance via filibuster – see below). When either party passes legislation on a straight party-line vote: • • •

这项立法不需要温和到能吸引对方党派的选票。少数党很容易对新法律及其幕后推动者大加挞伐。一旦少数党获得多数席位,极有可能推翻这项立法——这将损害那些需要稳定、可预期的环境来生活和经商的美国民众的利益。

The legislation doesn’t have to be moderate enough to attract votes from the other side. It’s easy for the minority party to vilify the new law and the people behind it. There’s every likelihood that the minority party will reverse it when they gain a majority – to the detriment of Americans who need a stable, predictable environment in which to live and do business.

这让我想到 11 月 15 日签署成为法律的基础设施法案,以及它与刚才我所描述的情况截然不同的奇特经历。首先,该法案于 8 月 10 日在参议院通过,获得了全部 50 名民主党人以及 19 名共和党人的支持(在这种情况下,少数党领袖米奇·麦康奈尔允许他的成员凭良心投票)。但该法案在众议院遇到了阻力,所谓的进步派民主党人拒绝投票支持,除非众议院先通过一项“重建更好未来”法案,该法案包含数万亿美元与实体基础设施无关的社会安全网项目。这成为过去三个月上演的错综复杂的“歌舞伎剧场”式政治秀的基础。参议院批准的基础设施法案本可以在 8 月就于众议院通过。但党派之争使其岌岌可危,因为大多数共和党人不想让拜登总统的民主党政府获得胜利,而一些进步派民主党人则想利用他们的筹码扣押该法案,直到温和派投票支持他们的法案。众议院议长南希·佩洛西(或许是想安抚她民主党党团中的进步派成员)并没有立即对基础设施法案进行投票,而是将两项法案捆绑在一起,尽管“重建更好未来”法案当时尚未成形、未经辩论,也未曾就其联邦预算影响进行“评分”。后来,在压力之下,她书面同意努力通过基础设施法案,并在 9 月 27 日前举行投票,但她未能兑现(并且没有任何后果)。随后发生的是一场真正的“懦夫博弈”。议长要求温和派首先承诺投票支持“重建更好未来”法案,但少数温和派(其数量足以阻止民主党达到通过法案所需的 218 票多数门槛)拒绝这样做,并要求对基础设施法案进行投票——

And that brings me to the infrastructure bill signed into law on November 15 and the unusual course it took in contrast to what I just described. First, it passed in the Senate on August 10 with support from all 50 Democrats but also 19 Republicans (in this case, Minority Leader Mitch McConnell freed his members to vote their conscience). But the bill encountered resistance in the House, where so-called progressive Democrats refused to vote for it unless the House first passed a “Build Back Better” bill, with trillions of dollars for safety-net programs unrelated to physical infrastructure. That became the basis for the intricate kabuki theater that played out over the last three months. The infrastructure bill approved by the Senate could have been passed in the House in August. But partisan squabbles imperiled it, since most Republicans didn’t want to give President Biden’s Democratic administration a victory and some progressive Democrats wanted to use their leverage to hold the bill hostage until the moderates voted for theirs. Rather than call a vote immediately on the infrastructure bill, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (perhaps wanting to placate the progressive members of her Democratic caucus) tied the two bills together, even though the BBB bill had yet to be fleshed out, debated, or “scored” in terms of its effect on the federal budget. Later, under pressure, she agreed in writing to work to pass the infrastructure bill and hold a vote on it by September 27, but she failed to do so (with no consequences). What ensued was a real game of chicken. The Speaker demanded that the moderates commit to vote for the BBB bill first, but a small number of moderates (enough to prevent Democrats from achieving the necessary 218-vote majority threshold for passing a bill) refused to do so and demanded a vote on the

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首先说基建法案。温和派议员的行动感觉像是近年来难得一见的对众议院领导层的反抗。但随后在 11 月 2 日,民主党人丢掉了弗吉尼亚州的州长职位,在民主党占绝对优势的新泽西州也险些失守。拜登政府因此急需一场“胜利”,法案在三天后就被送到众议院表决,除了六名进步派议员外,所有民主党人都投了赞成票,另有 13 名温和派共和党人也投了赞成票。最终以 228 票对 206 票获得通过,尽管议长直到最后一刻还在抵制。

不想支持某项法案的议员很容易就能找到他们声称有问题的条款,这次也不例外。但我认为,总体来看,基建法的条款将惠及绝大多数国会选区;因此我怀疑投反对票的那 206 名众议员中,有些人是在牺牲本选区选民可能获得的利益。这个词该怎么说?我的答案是“政治”,牛津词典对它的部分定义是“个人或政党之间为获得或希望获得权力而进行的辩论或冲突”。

对两大主要政党的普遍不满,有可能会催生一个吸引美国中间选民的第三党。但如果有两个以上主要政党分走选票,其中任何一个要取得明确胜利都会遇到重大障碍。麻烦也就出在这里。在美国这种政体下,少数党候选人能否当选、能否组建联盟,是很值得怀疑的。更重要的是,如果两个以上主要政党的候选人都来竞争总统职位,要在选举人团中赢得多数就很困难。那样的话,选举就由众议院来决定,每个州不管人口多少只有一票。于是我们又回到了第 8 页谈到的参议院问题:26 个人口占比很小的州最终可能决定总统人选。虽然我举的例子是极端假设的情形,但这些担忧并不是凭空想象。

最后在政治这个标题下,我谈谈阻挠议事。不熟悉的人可能不知道,阻挠议事是一种程序性工具,允许参议院少数党把法案搁置起来,要求达到 60 票才能通过,而不是简单的 51 票多数。因为执政党通常拿不到 60 个席位,就像现在这样(席位是 50 对 50),阻挠议事往往让少数党对法案拥有否决权。过去两党虽然在政策上一直有较量,但如今事情已经高度政治化,少数党往往除了阻挠多数党的议程之外别无目标。

由于共和党人反对民主党的许多优先事项,民主党内部要求利用参议院微弱多数取消阻挠议事的压力越来越大(副总统主持参议院,意味着现任民主党副总统有能力打破 50 对 50 的平局)。

民主党人会取消阻挠议事吗?他们应该取消吗?如果他们真这么做了,将来共和党占多数、不再受阻挠议事约束时,他们又会作何感想?我不打算把整个辩论重新讲一遍,只指出其中的两难困境。阻挠议事的支持者认为,它迫使执政党制定能吸引少数党支持的法案,从而防止极端法律获得通过。但反对者指出,如今少数党往往一心只想着捣乱,阻挠议事的存在只会确保什么事情都办不成。(不过值得注意的是,基建法案的结果表明两党合作并非完全不可能,而且很多次要立法就是这样通过的,没引起多少关注。)以一票多数通过法律的能力助长了多数人的暴政。但 41 名参议员就能阻止法案推进的能力,则允许了少数人的暴政。哪个更糟?显然,在这种暴政之间做选择,是我们民主制度面临的挑战之一。没有简单的答案。(而且,如果民主党的传统派不取消阻挠议事,又有什么能阻止共和党下次占多数时把它废掉呢?)

infrastructure bill first. The moderates’ action felt like an uprising against the House leadership of a sort that has rarely been seen in recent years. But then on November 2, Democrats lost the governorship in Virginia and nearly lost it in highly Democratic New Jersey. The Biden administration’s resultant need for a “win” caused the bill to be brought to the House floor just three days later, where it was approved by all the Democrats except for six progressives, as well as by 13 moderate Republicans. The result was passage by a vote of 228 to 206, an outcome achieved despite resistance from the Speaker up to the last moment. It’s easy for legislators who don’t want to support a bill to find provisions they say are objectionable, and they did so in this case. But I believe that on balance the provisions of the infrastructure law will help the vast majority of congressional districts; thus I suspect some of the 206 representatives who voted against it may have done so at the expense of potential benefits for their constituents. What’s the word for that? My answer is “politics,” which is, in part, defined by Oxford as “the debate or conflict among individuals or parties having or hoping to achieve power.” Widespread dissatisfaction with both major parties could conceivably lead to the creation of a third party to appeal to Americans in the middle. But with more than two main parties dividing up the votes, there would be significant obstacles to any one of them achieving a clear win. And that’s where the complications set in. Under the U.S. form of government, it’s doubtful that minority party candidates can be elected and coalitions formed. More importantly, if candidates from more than two major parties vie for the presidency, it would be difficult for one to achieve a majority in the Electoral College. In that case, the election would be decided by the House of Representatives, with each state having one vote regardless of population. Thus, we’d be back to the problem regarding the Senate described on page eight: 26 states with a tiny share of the total population could end up appointing the president. While my examples describe extreme hypothetical outcomes, these are not imaginary concerns. Finally under the heading of politics, I’ll touch on the filibuster. For those who are unfamiliar with it, the filibuster is a procedural tool that allows the minority in the Senate to bottle up legislation and require 60 votes for passage, rather than a simple majority of 51. Because the party in power usually has fewer than 60 seats, as is the case today (seats are 50/50), the filibuster often gives the minority party a veto over legislation. And whereas the parties have always done battle over policy, today things are so politicized that the minority party often has no goal other than to thwart the majority party’s agenda. Because of Republicans’ opposition to many Democratic priorities, there is growing pressure within the Democratic party to use their slim majority in the Senate to eliminate the filibuster (the vice president presides over the Senate, meaning today’s Democratic vice president has the ability to break the 50/50 tie). Will the Democrats eliminate the filibuster? Should they? And if they do, how will they feel when the Republicans someday are in the majority and are no longer constrained by the filibuster? Without rehashing the entire debate, I’ll merely point to the dilemma involved. Proponents of the filibuster argue that it requires the party in power to shape legislation capable of attracting minority-party support and that this prevents the passage of extreme laws. But opponents point out that these days, with the minority often dedicated to nothing but obstruction, the existence of the filibuster merely ensures inaction. (Note, however, that the results with the infrastructure bill show that bipartisan action isn’t entirely impossible, and a lot of minor legislation is passed that way with little attention.) The ability to pass laws with a one-seat majority facilitates the tyranny of the majority. But the ability of 41 Senators to halt a bill’s progress permits the tyranny of the minority. Which is worse? Obviously, this choice of tyrannies is one of the challenges faced in our democracy. There are no easy answers. (And if Democratic traditionalists refrain from eliminating the filibuster, what’s to keep Republicans from getting rid of it the next time they have a majority?)

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代际不公

社会保障和医疗保险分别是帮助美国老年人的福利项目,到 2037 年和 2026 年,它们很可能将无力继续支付现有的福利。然而,我们听不到任何关于削减福利、延迟资格、增税或经济状况审查的讨论,而这些本应是任何解决方案的一部分。事实上,过去 18 个月里,华盛顿已批准超过 9 万亿美元用于新冠疫情救济和基础设施,但两党对修复这些关键项目都只字未提。这大概是因为,哪个党削减这些项目,就可能在大选中受到惩罚。

婴儿潮一代共有 7120 万人(大约出生于 1946 年至 1964 年间),是之前沉默一代 2300 万人的三倍,比之后 X 世代 6500 万人多 10%。婴儿潮一代的选票和财力规模,在过去 40 年里赋予了他们巨大的政治影响力。结果是,为满足婴儿潮一代想要的,政府大量赤字支出,而对需要修复的福利项目却不加调整,这一切都以牺牲后代为代价。

这是近几十年来持续存在的代际不公的一个例证。简而言之——许多美国人可能并未意识到——两党政府一直(并且仍在)大手大脚花钱,相对于支出征税不足(由此产生赤字),不断累积国家债务,很大程度上偏袒如今构成美国庞大退休群体的婴儿潮一代。以下是美国国家债务的历史:

年份国家债务(单位:十亿美元)
1955274.4
1975541.9
19954,974.0
201518,120.1
201922,719.4
202128,635.5

Generational Inequity In 2037 and 2026, respectively, Social Security and Medicare, benefit programs that aid older Americans, will likely become unable to continue paying today’s benefits. And yet we don’t hear any discussion of the benefit cuts, delayed eligibility, tax increases, or means testing that would have to be part of any solution. In fact, in the last 18 months Washington has approved more than $9 trillion of spending on Covid-19 relief and infrastructure, but we haven’t heard a word from either party about fixing these essential programs. That’s presumably because the party that trims these programs would likely be penalized at the polls. The 71.2 million members of the Baby Boom generation (people born between roughly 1946 and 1964) are triple the 23.0 members of the Silent Generation that preceded them and 10% more than the 65.0 million Generation Xers that followed. The magnitude of the Boomers’ votes and financial resources have given them enormous political influence over the last 40 years. The result has been extensive deficit spending on things the Boomers want and a failure to modify benefit programs that need fixing, all at the expense of future generations. This is an example of the generational unfairness that has been perpetrated in recent decades. In short – in a way that many Americans probably don’t recognize – administrations of both parties have been (and still are) spending vast amounts, taxing less than they should relative to their spending (thus incurring deficits), and running up the national debt, largely favoring the Baby Boomers who are now America’s very numerous retirees. Here’s the history of the U.S. national debt: Year 1955 1975 1995 2015 2019 2021

Billions

$

274

533

4,794

18,151

22,719

28,400

Billions $ 274 533 4,794 18,151 22,719 28,400

% of GDP

64%

31

64

100

107

125

% of GDP 64% 31 64 100 107 125

简而言之,婴儿潮一代过去和现在一直在消费超过他们应得的蛋糕份额。这将使后代背负沉重的债务,而这些债务源于他们并未按比例受益的开支。

社会保障虽不属联邦预算范畴,却是个典型例子。它并非设立为资金预筹项目,而是按现收现付制运作的保险计划,即用当前工人的缴款支付退休人员的养老金。社会保障税收并未注入基金池,除临时性积累外,福利金直接从工人当期税款中支出,而非依靠基金收益。但如今,每位退休人员对应的在职工作者人数减少,且退休人员寿命延长。这些趋势危及该体系。变革势在必行,却迟迟未动。因此,16 年后(甚至更早),社会保障税不得不提高,福利(或至少其增速)不得不削减,抑或社会保障不得不转为联邦义务而非自给自足的保险计划,从而加剧赤字。这仅是未来世代因我辈过度支出而付出代价的诸多方式之一。

In short, the Baby Boomers have been and still are consuming more than their fair share of the pie. This will leave future generations saddled with substantial debt stemming from expenditures they didn’t benefit from proportionally. Social Security, while not part of the federal budget, provides a good example. It wasn’t set up as a funded program, but as an insurance scheme operating on a pay-as-you-go-basis, under which current receipts from workers are used to make payments to retirees. Social Security tax receipts aren’t added to an endowment, other than on a temporary basis, and benefits are paid out of current taxes on workers, not endowment income. But nowadays we have fewer people working for each retiree they support, and retirees are living longer than they used to. These trends endanger the system. Changes have to be made, but they’re not. Thus, 16 years from now (if not before), Social Security taxes will have to be raised, benefits (or at least their rate of increase) will have to be trimmed, and/or Social Security will have to become a federal obligation rather than a self-sustaining insurance scheme, adding to the deficit. This is only one of the many ways in which future generations will be penalized for the overspending my generation engaged in.

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基金会和大学在捐赠基金的支出上有自己的规则,设立这些规则的主要目的是平衡当代人与后代人的利益。这是所有捐赠机构的首要受托责任。同样,今天的多数父母也不会无节制地刷爆信用卡,把债务包袱甩给后代。国家债务的重要性固然可以争论,多少债务才算“过多”也是个问题,但很难说华盛顿近几届政府在平衡各代人利益这件事上做到了恰到好处。(顺带说一句,当今这几代人也乐于消耗地球资源中不可持续的那一份来支撑自己的生活方式,这必然给后人留下一个日益恶化的环境。这是代际不公的另一个深层面向。)

2008 年 8 月,在我那篇《我担心什么》备忘录收尾时,我引用了皮特·彼得森 2004 年出版的《空转》一书中的一段话(给那些 20 世纪不在商界打拼的人说明一下:皮特在政府中担任过重要职务,并与史蒂夫·施瓦茨曼共同创立了黑石集团):

……虽然我们的问题尚未到束手无策的地步,但两个政党都越来越不可救药。他们不正视问题,而是在逃避问题。他们陷入了一种否认、转移视线和自我纵容的政治之中,只有像你这样的读者把国家从左右两派的意识形态信徒和舆论操弄者手中夺回来,这种政治才能被克服……

两党都信奉那些几乎不受分析和证据影响的教条式信条,似乎与任何严肃的政治道德相去甚远,它们由此结成了一种不神圣的同盟——一场对未来的不宣之战。也就是说,一场对我们的孩子的不宣之战。我们听不到任何一个政党谈论为了更好的明天而牺牲今天。在某种程度上,我们最棘手的挑战,或许是我们的领导人对财政危机的蔓延所表现出的令人费解的漠然。(强调为引者所加)

好消息是,尽管存在这些问题,我们还是勉强度过了难关,享受了相当的繁荣。坏消息是,对这些问题的治理几乎没有取得任何进展。

美联储的角色

这个话题我不打算花太多时间,因为人人都知道是怎么回事。但一份旨在讨论正在发生的重大变化的备忘录,绕不开这个话题。

历史上,中央银行的工作是控制通胀水平,并确保经济增长速度足以创造“充分就业”。然而近年来,美联储似乎又承担了一项额外任务:让证券市场保持上行轨迹。实现这一目标的手段是激进地降低利率,并向经济中注入大量流动性。

联邦基金利率——美国短期利率的风向标——在 2008 至 2009 年全球金融危机期间首次被降至零。这一招奏效了——随之而来的是美国历史上最长的一轮经济复苏。但复苏最强劲的时候利率并没有上调,等到 2017 至 2018 年终于加息时,市场又大闹情绪,美联储便退缩了,转而降息。

如今联邦基金利率再次归零,市场点位远高于上一个十年,而我们正看到严重的通胀。美联储已宣布将“缩减”其刺激性的债券购买计划,市场普遍预期它将在明年开始加息。这是否会

Foundations and universities have rules governing endowment spending, the main purpose of which is to balance the interests of the current generation against those of generations to come. This is a prime fiduciary responsibility of endowed institutions. Likewise, most of today’s parents won’t spend their way to unreasonable credit card balances and saddle their heirs with debt. While the significance of national debt is debatable, as is the question of how much debt is “too much,” it’s hard to argue that recent administrations in Washington have been appropriately balancing the interests of all generations. (And, by the way, today’s generations have been happy to consume an unsustainable share of the earth’s resources to fuel their lifestyles, which is certain to leave future generations with a degraded environment. This is another profound aspect of generational inequity.) In August 2008, on the way to ending my memo What Worries Me, I included a passage from the 2004 book Running on Empty by Pete Peterson (for those who weren’t in the business world in the 20th century, Pete held important positions in government and co-founded Blackstone with Steve Schwarzman): . . . while our problems are not yet intractable, both political parties are increasingly incorrigible. They are not facing our problems, they are running from them. They are locked into a politics of denial, distraction, and self-indulgence that can only be overcome if readers like you take back this country from the ideologues and spin doctors of both the left and the right. . . . With faith-driven catechisms that are largely impervious to analysis or evidence, and that seem removed from any kind of serious political morality, both political parties have formed an unholy alliance – an undeclared war on the future. An undeclared war, that is, on our children. From neither party do we hear anything about sacrificing today for a better tomorrow. In some ways, our most formidable challenge may be our leaders’ baffling indifference to our fiscal metastasis. (Emphasis added) The good news is that we’ve muddled through and enjoyed a good measure of prosperity despite the existence of these issues. The bad news is that little or nothing has been done about them. The Role of the Fed I won’t spend a great deal of time on this subject since everyone knows the story. But it has to be part of a memo that purports to discuss important changes that are underway. Historically, the job of central banks has been to control the level of inflation and make sure the economy grows fast enough to create “full employment.” In recent years, however, the Fed seems to have taken on the additional task of keeping the securities markets on an upward trajectory. This has been achieved through the radical lowering of interest rates and the injection of massive amounts of liquidity into the economy. The Fed funds rate – the bellwether of short-term interest rates in the U.S. – was reduced to zero for the first time during the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-09. And it worked – what followed was the longest economic recovery in U.S. history. But rates weren’t raised when the recovery was at its strongest, and when they finally were raised in 2017-18, the markets threw a tantrum and the Fed backed down, cutting rates instead. Now the Fed funds rate is zero again, the markets are far higher than they were in the last decade, and we’re seeing serious inflation. The Fed has announced that it’s going to “taper” its stimulative program of bond buying, and it is widely expected that it will begin to raise interest rates next year. Will the

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对经济的影响会不会非常负面?市场会不会再度抗议,而市场的修正会不会说服美联储回到低利率 regime?美联储会不会像乐观主义者认为的那样,永远让资产价格持续上涨,并将其视为自己的职责?

在我看来,指望美联储能无间断地推动经济和市场上涨,这好得令人难以置信。我依然相信,从长远来看,如果经济是自由市场经济,运行会最为出色,因为自由市场能最有效地把资源导向最优用途。正如我的橡树资本联合创始人理查德·马森在 2008 年所写的:“创造性的破坏和健全的市场经济确保随着时间推移会朝着最优解改变。”我们在货币领域也需要一个自由市场。

财政稳定中心主席拉里·古德曼最近写道:

自 2010 年以来,美联储购买国债为整个政府借款需求的 60% 到 80% 提供了资金。换句话说,美联储的行动已超过十年排挤了私人部门的定价发现,将收益率压低至低点,将股价推至创纪录高位……

在 2021 财年,美联储购买了 1 万亿美元的国债,而财政部从其美联储储蓄账户中提取了 1.6 万亿美元。这些行动几乎覆盖了全部预算赤字,相当于……几乎全部与疫情相关的政府借款。

根据月度估算,今年夏天实际上还出现了资金盈余。难怪尽管通胀率高企,10 年期国债收益率在 8 月份还是触及了 1.17% 的低点。(《华尔街日报》,2021 年 11 月 18 日)

所以你猜怎么着:美国仍然能够以低利率发行债务,这是买家对其信誉的有力背书。而提供这种背书的主要买家是谁?是美国自己。

顺便提一下,一些进步派民主党人已经宣布反对杰罗姆·鲍威尔连任美联储主席,因为他们认为他在应对气候变化方面不够积极。于是,现在我们有一个美联储,既应控制通胀,又应促进增长和就业,还要支持市场,还要对抗气候变化。一个机构能承担多少角色,还能保持连贯的努力?

中国的发展

自 1978 年毛时代结束以来的 43 年里,中国一直是世界上增长最快的主要经济体。2020 年,其他大型经济体都在萎缩,而中国却继续增长。这种卓越的增长会持续吗?中国会成为世界最大经济体吗?这些问题的答案将非常重要。

我的关键观察是,中国不得不应对异常多的转型:

impact on the economy be highly negative? Will the markets revolt again, and will a market correction convince the Fed to go back to a low-interest-rate regime? Will the Fed keep asset prices rising in perpetuity as the optimists think is now its job? For me, the expectation that the Fed can keep the economy and markets rising without interruption is too good to be true. And I continue to believe the economy will perform best in the long run if it’s a free market economy, which does the best job of moving resources to their optimal use. As Richard Masson, my Oaktree co-founder, wrote in 2008, “Creative destruction and a functioning market economy assure change toward the best solution over time.” We could use a free market in money. Larry Goodman, president of the Center for Fiscal Stability, recently wrote as follows: Since [2010], Fed purchases of Treasury debt have funded as much as 60% to 80% of the entire government borrowing requirement. In other words, Fed actions have crowded out private-sector price discovery for more than 10 years, pushing yields to lows and stock prices to record highs. . . . In fiscal 2021, the Fed purchased $1 trillion in Treasury debt, and the Treasury drained $1.6 trillion from its savings account at the Fed. These actions covered nearly the entire budget deficit, equal to . . . nearly all the pandemic-related government borrowing. Based on monthly estimates, there was actually a funding surplus this past summer. It is no wonder the 10-year Treasury yield reached a low of 1.17% in August despite high inflation rates. (The Wall Street Journal, November 18, 2021) So guess what: The U.S. is still able to issue debt at low interest rates, a ringing endorsement of its creditworthiness from buyers. And who’s the main buyer supplying that endorsement? The U.S. By the way, a few progressive Democrats have announced their opposition to the reappointment of Jerome Powell as Fed chair, because they think he’s not active enough in addressing climate change. So now we have a Fed that’s supposed to control inflation, foster growth and employment, support markets, and fight climate change. How many roles can one institution have and still maintain a coherent effort? Developments in China In the 43 years since the Maoist period ended in 1978, China has been the fastest growing major economy in the world. And it continued to grow in 2020, when no other large economies did. Will the superior growth continue? Will China become the world’s biggest economy? The answers to these questions will be very important. My key observation is that China has had to navigate an unusually large number of transitions: • • • • • •

从乡村到城市,

从农业到制造业与服务业,

从普遍贫困到庞大的中产阶级,

从依赖出口的经济到依靠内需消费,

从资本投资驱动的增长到更具内生性的有机增长,

以及从新兴国家到世界强国。

from farm to city, from agriculture to manufacturing and services, from mass poor to a significant middle class, from economic reliance on exports to domestic consumption, from growth based on capital investment to more organic growth, and from emerging nation to world power.

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随着这些进程在未来数年内推进,中国将需要在中央控制与自由企业制度之间寻求平衡(他们深知后者的必要性)。与此同时,这个国家既要尊重法治,又要推行自己希望实施的政策。而且我相信,它必须摆脱对北京方面纾困的依赖,并接受破产、由此产生的损失以及,恕我直言,经济周期性。我觉得最有趣的一个问题是,中国如何在追求经济效率和坚持社会主义意识形态的同时,一手管住经济大局,一手放开私人企业。我在中国的这 15 年里,这个问题一直困扰着我。中国人民对共产党怀有极大的敬意,而党及其领导人手中握有许多可用的杠杆,不受那种名为民主的累赘之物的阻碍。但私营部门充满了企业家精神,而且运转得似乎相当不错。

在过去一年里,习近平主席对金融名人、经济不平等以及被认为对社会不健康的行业(如营利性教育)进行了打击。尽管如此,我相信每一个掌权者都注意到了,在摒弃毛主义、以利润动机取代配额制和平均分配之后,中国出现了经济奇迹。我的猜测是,中国的“双轨体制”将继续运转良好,私人企业将继续受到尊重,只要它的运营方式与“习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想”保持一致。

上述转型已经在进行中。同时应对所有这些转型,无疑是一项艰巨的任务。但中国拥有丰富的资源以及强有力的中央控制。没有人能证明它们能成功,也没有人能证明它们不能——对于这类问题,我们能拥有的最好的东西就是直觉。我的直觉是,中国经济将继续以快于世界其他地区的速度增长,而且很可能成为最大的经济体。我相信,随着时间推移,我们将看到上述所有转型都得以实现。只是这个过程不会一帆风顺、没有波折。

过去几年里,我一直是上海国际金融咨询顾问委员会的成员。这让我得以看到中国在多大程度上致力于吸引外资、把上海打造成世界金融中心,而且我相信中国明白,要做到这一点,就必须遵守法治,并作为国际社会的一员善尽责任。希望这意味着,关于其行为的种种最坏担忧不会成为现实。

“万亿”这个词

就我所知,2020 年是“万亿”一词进入日常使用的第一年。埃弗雷特·德克森(伊利诺伊州共和党人)据说(或许只是传闻)讲过这样的话:“这里十亿,那里十亿,很快你就说的是真金白银了。”如今,十亿已缩水成零花钱,要论“真金白银”,得拿万亿来说事。

我怀疑大多数人根本解释不清万亿是什么概念(也就是说,他们很可能不知道一万亿就是一千个十亿,或者说一百万个一百万)。而万亿的量级几乎令人难以理解。三四十年前我就曾大为震撼地得知,一百万美元按每秒 10 美元算,能数 28 个小时;而十亿美元按每秒 10 美元算,要数 38 个月。现在再想想一万亿:按每秒 10 美元,要数 3000 多年。就像我说的,几乎无法想象。

民选官员们随口就抛出万亿这样的词(而且花着万亿级别的钱),却完全没有意识到这意味着什么。接下来会是什么?前几天我看到一幅很棒的漫画,画的是国会大厦穹顶,配文写着“万亿之后是什么?”如果我们活得够长,我相信我们会知道的。

As these processes move forward in the years ahead, China will have to balance central control and free enterprise (for which they understand the need). At the same time, the country has to respect the rule of law but still enact the policies it wants. And I believe it will have to eliminate the reliance on bailouts from Beijing and put up with bankruptcies, the resultant losses and, dare I say, economic cyclicality. The question I find most interesting is how China simultaneously manages central control of the economy and private enterprise, while both pursuing economic efficiency and upholding socialist ideology. This has puzzled me throughout the 15 years I’ve been going there. The Chinese people have great respect for the Communist Party, and it and its leaders have a lot of levers to pull, free of the impediments that come with that cumbersome thing called democracy. But the private sector is full of entrepreneurship and seems to run very well. Within the last year, President Xi has cracked down on financial celebrities, economic inequality and industries considered unhealthy for society, such as for-profit education. Nevertheless, I believe everyone in a position of power has taken note of the economic miracle that followed the elimination of Maoism and the substitution of the profit motive for quotas and equal sharing. It’s my guess that China’s “dual system” will continue to function well and private enterprise will continue to be respected, as long as it operates in a way consistent with “Xi Jinping Thought.” The transitions listed above are already underway. Tackling all of them simultaneously has to be seen as a daunting task. But China has extensive resources as well as strong centralized control. No one can prove they will pull it off or that they won’t – the best we can have on questions like this is a hunch. Mine is that the Chinese economy will continue to grow faster than the rest of the world and may well become the largest economy. I believe with time we’ll see all the above transitions take place. The process just won’t be smooth and free of glitches. For the last few years, I’ve been a member of the Shanghai International Financial Advisory Council. This has permitted me to see the extent to which China is dedicated to attracting foreign capital and making Shanghai a world financial center, and I believe China understands that doing so will require adherence to the rule of law and good conduct as a member of the global community. Hopefully that means the worst fears regarding its behavior won’t be realized. The T-Word As best I can tell, 2020 was the first year the word “trillion” came into common use. Everett Dirksen (RIL) is described (perhaps apocryphally) as having said, “A billion here, a billion there, and pretty soon you’re talking real money.” Now billions have been reduced to pocket change, and it takes trillions to amount to “real money.” I doubt most people could actually explain what a trillion is (that is, they likely have no idea that it’s a thousand billion, or a million million). And the scale of a trillion is almost incomprehensible. I was struck 30-40 years ago to learn that whereas a million dollars is $10 a second for 28 hours, a billion dollars is $10 a second for 38 months. Now let’s think about a trillion: $10 a second for more than 3,000 years. As I said, almost incomprehensible. Elected officials throw around the term trillions (and spend trillions) without a way to really appreciate the implications. What’s next? I saw a great cartoon the other day that consisted of a drawing of the Capitol dome and the caption “What comes after trillions?” If we live long enough, I’m sure we’ll find out.

2021 年橡树资本管理有限合伙企业

2021 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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当前各种重大变化接连不断,人们很容易觉得这世界格外复杂,怀念从前的老日子。不过,每到这种时候,我就会想起达拉斯牛仔队前四分卫唐·梅雷迪思在《周一橄榄球之夜》解说时说的一段话:“如今的人跟过去不一样了。可是话说回来,过去的人也没好到哪儿去。”眼下的日子总觉得艰难,而记忆里的早年间总是那么美好。可过去未必有我们记得的那么舒坦,面临的挑战比我们回想起来的要多得多。

我们的资深经济顾问尼尔·欧文 2020 年 4 月 16 日在《纽约时报》上把我们眼下的处境概括得很到位(这句引文我借用来放进了 2020 年 5 月的备忘录《不确定性》里):

世界经济是一张无限复杂的互联网络。我们每个人都能看到一系列直接的经济关系:我们光顾的商店、发我们工资的雇主、给我们房贷的银行。可一旦往外面延伸两层、三层,那些联系究竟如何运转,真的没法有把握地弄清。……今后的年月里,我们会看到这张网被撕破[疫情及随之而来的封锁]之后会发生什么,看到数百万条这样的联系同时崩塌。而这开启了一种可能:全球经济将变得与近几十年盛行的样貌截然不同。

我想补充的,只有我关于未来那句老话:走着瞧吧。

2021 年 11 月 23 日

With all these significant changes underway, it’s easy to think the world is unusually complicated these days and to long for the way things were in the old days. On the other hand, at times like this I think back to something former Dallas Cowboys quarterback Don Meredith once said while providing commentary on Monday Night Football: “They don’t make ’em the way they used to. But then again, they never did.” Current times usually seem difficult, and we fondly remember the halcyon earlier days. But the past certainly wasn’t as comfortable as we remember it, and there were more challenges than we often recall. Senior economics consultant Neil Irwin summed up our situation very well in The New York Times on April 16, 2020 (I borrowed this quote for inclusion in my May 2020 memo Uncertainty.): The world economy is an infinitely complicated web of interconnections. We each have a series of direct economic interrelationships we can see: the stores we buy from, the employer that pays our salary, the bank that gives us a home loan. But once you get two or three levels out, it’s really impossible to know with any confidence how those connections work. . . . In the years ahead we will learn what happens when that web is torn apart [by the pandemic and resultant lock-down], when millions of those links are destroyed all at once. And it opens the possibility of a global economy completely different from the one that has prevailed in recent decades. All I have to add to that is my usual observation regarding the future: We’ll see. November 23, 2021

2021 年橡树资本管理有限合伙公司

2021 Oaktree Capital Management, L.P.

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