进入超级泡沫

2022 · 随笔 · 原文约 3626 词
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进入超级泡沫的终章:杰里米·格兰瑟姆观点 | 2022 年 8 月 31 日

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投资者职业生涯中真正重要的市场事件只有寥寥几个,而其中最重要的就是超级泡沫。¹ 这些超级泡沫是独一无二的事件:普通泡沫在我们看来,是指偏离趋势达到 2 个西格玛的事件,而超级泡沫则达到 2.5 个西格玛或更高。历史上的超级泡沫屈指可数,可供投资者研究,但它们有着鲜明的共同特征。

真正的美国超级泡沫——即 2.5 个西格玛以上的事件——是 1929 年、2000 年和 2021 年。 1972 年的“漂亮五十”时期算是荣誉成员。 那一次在价格上只是“普通”的 2 西格玛泡沫事件,但市场破裂后实际跌幅达 62%,仍是 1929 年以来最惨烈的下跌。 从某些角度看,它缺少其他泡沫中那种疯狂的投机,但它有史以来第一次让标普 500 指数中主导的优质股板块相对于市场其余部分出现 50% 的溢价,并被冠以“一决定股票”之名——因为据说它们如此优秀,一旦买入就该永久持有——整个银行业体系当时都信奉这一信念,而那时它们管理着所有资金。 事后看来,让整个体系都相信“一决定股票”——其中好几只在随后五年内破产——与任何其他投机行为一样疯狂。

其中一个特征是在初始杀估值阶段之后、经济明显开始恶化之前出现的熊市反弹——超级泡沫破裂时经济总会恶化。 在所有三次先例中,这种反弹都收复了市场最初跌幅的一半以上,诱使轻率的投资者重新入场,恰好赶上市场再次转向下跌——而且势头更猛——同时经济开始走弱。 今年夏季的反弹迄今完美契合了这一模式。

美国股市仍然非常昂贵,而今年通胀上升一向冲击市盈率,尽管这次速度比往常缓慢。 但如今基本面也开始大幅且出乎意料地恶化:中国的新冠疫情、欧洲的战争、粮食和能源危机、创纪录的财政紧缩等等,前景远比 1 月份所能预见的更加严峻。 长期来看,广泛且永久性的粮食和资源短缺正构成威胁,而不断加剧的气候变化让一切雪上加霜。

ENTERING THE SUPERBUBBLE’S JEREMY GRANTHAM VIEWPOINTS FINAL ACT Jeremy Grantham | August 31, 2022 Executive Summary Only a few market events in an investor’s career really matter, and among the most important of all are superbubbles.1 These superbubbles are events unlike any others: while Ordinary bubbles are, to us, those that reach a 2 sigma there are only a few in history for investors to study, they have clear features in common. deviation from trend. Superbubbles reach 2.5 sigma or greater. The true U.S. superbubbles – 2.5+ sigma events – One of those features is the bear market rally after the initial derating stage of the are 1929, 2000, and 2021. The honorary member is 1972, decline but before the economy has clearly begun to deteriorate, as it always has when the “Nifty Fifty” period. This last one was an “ordinary” just superbubbles burst. This in all three previous cases recovered over half the market’s 2-sigma bubble event on price but the market declined 62% in real terms after breaking, still the worst drop since 1929. initial losses, luring unwary investors back just in time for the market to turn down In some ways, it lacked the crazy speculation of the others again, only more viciously, and the economy to weaken. This summer’s rally has so far but caused, for the only time ever, the highest quality perfectly fit the pattern. segment (that dominates the S&P 500) to go to a 50% premium versus the rest of the market and to be called The U.S. stock market remains very expensive and an increase in inflation like the “one-decision stocks” because once bought they would be held forever, because they were so good – a belief system one this year has always hurt multiples, although more slowly than normal this bought into by the entire banking establishment that still time. But now the fundamentals have also started to deteriorate enormously and managed all the money back then. Perhaps, in hindsight, to surprisingly: between COVID in China, war in Europe, food and energy crises, record have the entire system buy into the belief in one-decision stocks – several of which went bust in the following five fiscal tightening, and more, the outlook is far grimmer than could have been foreseen years – was just as crazy as any other speculation. in January. Longer term, a broad and permanent food and resource shortage is 2 threatening, all made worse by accelerating climate damage.

我们对 1925 年以来这些极端乐观与悲观时期的粗略估算。

Our rough estimate of these times of extreme bullishness and bearishness since 1925.

当前这个超级泡沫中,跨资产类别出现了前所未有的危险组合:债券、房地产和股票均严重高估,且如今迅速失去上涨动力。没有什么比在狂热牛市中说熊话更让金融界恼火的了,因为此时金融圈正在大把赚钱。每个周期都不同——但所有历史相似点都表明,最坏的情况尚未到来。因此,遵循宣传入门第一课,绝大多数死多头(perma-bulls)指责少数发表看空言论的人是死空头(perma-bears)。(幸运的是——他声称《对投资者真正重要的时代》——就我而言,我实际发布的季度信函和其他报告都有存档可查;它们让我在 2017 年因看多“这次不一样”的论点而被吉姆·格兰特(Jim Grant)扣上了“价值异教徒”的帽子。这些档案还表明,我在 2009 年 3 月《再投资于恐慌之时》和 2018 年 1 月《为可能出现的短期上涨做好准备》中都提出了看多理由,并与泡沫专家爱德华·钱塞勒(Edward Chancellor)——著有《最后的赢家》和《时间的价格》——在 2016 年共同反驳了市场泡沫的存在。)死多头采用始终满仓的投资方式,厌恶调整仓位,仿佛市场是有效的,且价格波动幅度并非比收益和股利的实际增长所证明的合理水平高出 17 倍(席勒(Shiller)已证明这一点)。如果你能相信,你仍然可以看到为 1929 年估值合理以及 1987 年股灾是市场对变化的合理反应而辩护的理由。超级泡沫的终章 | 第 2 页 这 15% 的时间与普通的牛市和熊市截然不同。将普通的牛熊市与这几个极端异常值混在一起平均,会稀释数据并产生误导信号。我强烈建议将超级泡沫——2.5 到 3 个标准差事件——视为特殊的、整体上独一无二的事件。这就像投资者行为发生了相变。在一个长期的经济扩张和漫长的牛市之后,当金融和经济体系看起来近乎完美,尤其是低通胀和高利润率,加上当局态度友好,特别是对廉价杠杆态度友好时,就会出现一个引爆点,就像那个夏夜,所有飞蚁同时起飞。幸运的是,这种效应会在市场上创造出可衡量的现象。因此,你可以看到信心和投机活动以及疯狂的一厢情愿想法爆发,无论你如何定义价值。而这组独特的超级泡沫(在当前这次之前,现代美国仅出现过三次)的结果确实特殊:我们反复讨论的保守型股票与投机型股票之间的分歧;本文后面将讨论的快速熊市反弹;经济衰退的迅速到来(迄今为止三次全部应验,一次温和——2000 年,另外两次——1929 年和 1972 年——严重);以及最后,进一步发生意外金融和经济事故的可能性大大增加。

The current superbubble features an unprecedentedly dangerous mix of cross-asset Nothing annoys the financial establishment more than overvaluation (with bonds, housing, and stocks all critically overpriced and now rapidly bearish comments during these bullish frenzies, when so losing momentum), commodity shock, and Fed hawkishness. Each cycle is different and much money is being made by the financial community. unique – but every historical parallel suggests that the worst is yet to come. Thus, following Propaganda 101, this huge majority of permabulls accuse the tiny minority making bearish comments of being permabears. (Fortunately – he claims The Times that Really Matter for Investors – in my case, my actual Quarterly Letters and other reports Most of the time (85% or thereabouts) markets behave quite normally. In these periods, are on file and available; they earned me the epithet of investors (managers, clients, and individuals) are happy enough, but alas these periods “value apostate” for my bullish “this time is different” argument from Jim Grant in 2017. The files also show me do not truly matter. It is only the other 15% of the time that matters, when investors get making bullish cases in both March 2009 in Reinvesting carried away and become irrational. Mostly (about 12% of the time2), this irrationality When Terrified and January 2018 in Bracing Yourself for is excessive optimism, when you see meme stock squeezes and IPO frenzies, such as a Possible Near-Term Melt-Up, as well as arguing against in the last 2 years; and just now and then (about 3% of the time), investors panic and the existence of a market bubble in 2016 with Edward Chancellor, no less, the bubble expert – author of Devil sell regardless of value, as they did at 666 on the S&P in 2009 and with many stocks Take The Hindmost and The Price Of Time.) Permabulls trading at a 2.5 P/E in 1974. These times of euphoria and panic are the most important use the approach of 100% invested at all times and loathe for portfolios and the most dangerous for careers. (Keynes’ famous Chapter 12 would changes in exposure, as if the market were efficient and were not 17 times more volatile in price than is justified by suggest that when confronted with a bubble, running off the cliff with company is the the actual progress of earnings and dividends as proved by safest strategy for managers, whose business imperative, after all, is to be a permabull, Shiller. If you can believe it, you can still read justifications where the real money can be made. This is a strategy adopted reasonably enough by of 1929 as reasonably priced and the 87 crash as a reasonable response to change. almost everyone.3) Entering the Superbubble’s Final Act | p2 This 15% is very different from ordinary bull and bear markets. Averaging ordinary bull and bear markets with this handful of outliers dilutes the data and produces misleading signals. My strong suggestion is to treat the superbubbles – 2.5 to 3 sigma events – as special, collectively unique occasions. It is as if there is a phase change in investor behavior. After a long economic upswing and a long bull market, when the financial and economic systems look nearly perfect, especially with low inflation and high profit margins, as does the friendliness of the authorities, especially toward cheap leverage, there gets to be a flashpoint, like that summer evening when every last flying ant takes off simultaneously. This effect luckily creates measurable events in the market. So you can see the explosion of confidence and speculation and crazy wishful thinking regardless of value however you wish to define it. And outcomes from this unique group of superbubbles (just three in modern times in the U.S. before this current one) are indeed special: the much discussed (by us) divergence between conservative and speculative stocks; the rapid bear market rallies discussed later here; the rapid onset of recession (3 out of 3 incidents to date, with 1 mild – 2000 – and the other 2 – 1929 and 1972 – severe); and finally, the much increased probabilities of further unexpected financial and economic accidents.

我们已经身处这样一个时期——一个名副其实的超级泡沫——有段时间了。这里首先要记住的是,这些超级泡沫,连同普通的二西格玛泡沫,在发达股票市场中,历来都会回归到趋势线上。因此,它们涨得越高,就必然会跌得越深。

We’ve been in such a period, a true superbubble, for a little while now. And the first thing to remember here is that these superbubbles, as well as ordinary 2 sigma bubbles, have always – in developed equity markets – broken back to trend. The higher they go, therefore, the further they have to fall.

超级泡沫的多个阶段。我的理论是,这类超级泡沫的破裂会经历多个阶段。首先是泡沫形成;第二是出现一次挫折——就像今年上半年刚刚发生的那样,经济或政治环境中出现某处波折,使投资者意识到完美终究不可能永远持续,估值随之退后半步。接下来就是我们刚看到的——熊市反弹。第四也是最后,基本面恶化,市场跌至低点。

The Stages of a Superbubble My theory is that the breaking of these superbubbles takes multiple stages. First, the bubble forms; second, a setback occurs, as it just did in the first half of this year, when some wrinkle in the economic or political environment causes investors to realize that perfection will, after all, not last forever, and valuations take a half-step back. Then there is what we have just seen – the bear market rally. Fourth and finally, fundamentals deteriorate and the market declines to a low.

让我们回到当前进程中的位置。超级泡沫中的熊市反弹比任何其他反弹都更轻松、更迅猛。投资者会推断:这只股票 6 个月前卖 100 美元,现在跌到 50 美元、60 美元或 70 美元,那肯定很便宜。而在超级泡沫的晚期阶段之外,创出新高是缓慢而谨慎的,因为投资者意识到,之前从未有人以这个价格买过这只股票:所以通常是前进四步、后退三步,小心翼翼地探索未知领域。熊市反弹则恰恰相反:它之前卖过 100 美元,说不定还能再卖到 100 美元。

Let’s return to where we are in this process today. Bear market rallies in superbubbles are easier and faster than any other rallies. Investors surmise, this stock sold for $100 6 months ago, so now at $50, or $60, or $70, it must be cheap. Outside of the late stage of a superbubble, new highs are slow and nervous as investors realize that no one has ever bought this stock at this price before: so it is four steps forward, three steps back, gingerly exploring terra incognita. Bear market rallies are the opposite: it sold at $100 before, maybe it could sell at $100 again.

检验布丁的成色,在于这些熊市反弹的速度和规模。

The proof of the pudding is the speed and scale of these bear market rallies.

1. 从 1929 年 11 月的低点到 1930 年 4 月的高点,市场反弹了 46%——收复了从顶部下跌以来损失中的 55%。

1. From the November low in 1929 to the April 1930 high, the market rallied 46% – a 55% recovery of the loss from the peak.

2. 1973 年,标普 500 指数在最初下跌之后出现了夏季反弹,收复了从高点以来总跌幅的 59%。

2. In 1973, the summer rally after the initial decline recovered 59% of the S&P 500's total loss from the high.

3. 2000 年,纳斯达克指数(当时科技泡沫的主角)在短短两个月内就收复了最初跌幅的 60%。

3. In 2000, the NASDAQ (which had been the main event of the tech bubble) recovered 60% of its initial losses in just 2 months.

4\. 2022 年,在 8 月 16 日盘中高点时,标普指数已收复自 6 月低点以来跌幅的 58%。因此我们可以说,到目前为止,当前这一事件的走势与历史上其他超级泡沫惊人地相似。

4. In 2022, at the intraday peak on August 16th, the S&P had made back 58% of its losses since its June low. Thus we could say the current event, so far, is looking eerily similar to these other historic superbubbles.

进入超级泡沫的终章 | p3 基本面面临崩盘威胁

经济数据必然滞后于经济中的重大转折点。更糟的是,在像 2000 年和 2007 年这样的拐点时刻,企业利润和就业等数据序列随后可能被大幅向下修正。正是在这种滞后阶段,通常会出现熊市反弹。

Entering the Superbubble’s Final Act | p3 Fundamentals Threaten to Fall Apart Economic data inevitably lags major turning points in the economy. To make matters worse, at the turn of events like 2000 and 2007, data series like corporate profits and employment can subsequently be massively revised downwards. It is during this lag that the bear market rally typically occurs.

为什么历史上的超级泡沫总是紧随重大经济衰退?也许是因为它们都发生在市场和经济力量长期累积之后——最后阶段还夹杂着一波巨大的乐观情绪。在巅峰时期,经济看起来总是近乎完美:充分就业、强劲的 GDP、无通胀、利润率创纪录。1929 年、1972 年、1999 年,以及日本(最重要的非美国超级泡沫)的情况都是如此。经济周期老化叠加基本面短暂性的近乎完美,使得经济和金融数据只剩一条路可走。

Why are the historic superbubbles always followed by major economic setbacks? Perhaps because they occurred after a very extended build-up of market and economic forces – with a major surge of optimism thrown in at the end. At the peak, the economy always looks near perfect: full employment, strong GDP, no inflation, record margins. This was the case in 1929, 1972, 1999, and in Japan (the most important non-U.S. superbubble). The ageing cycle and temporary near perfection of fundamentals leave economic and financial data with only one way to go.

我们“解读市盈率”4 图表的展示内容与此类似。当今超级泡沫的第一轮下跌,被“解释”为通胀上升所致——在经历了 2021 年下半年前所未有的滞后之后,通胀一直是历史估值的主要驱动因素。(尽管最具投机性的股票从 2021 年初就受到了快速而沉重的打击。)如果说有什么值得追问的话,GMO 的我们想问:为什么 2021 年这种历史性的通胀飙升没有立即更大幅度地冲击大盘市盈率?是因为股市新手不熟悉通胀?还是对美联储支持市场的能力过度迷信,因而过分相信通胀只是暂时性的?模型接下来的变化很可能由利润率下降驱动。我们最乐观的估计是,解读市盈率水平将降至 15 倍左右,而当前解读市盈率水平略低于 20 倍,实际市盈率却在 8 月中旬从 30 倍升至 34 倍,这很可能只是一次熊市反弹。(当然,如果模型确实在不久的将来由利润率下降驱动,那么利润也会随市盈率一起下降。正如你所见,这意味着市场将比我们之前暗示的还要低得多!)

Our “Explaining P/E”4 exhibit says something similar. The first leg down in today’s superbubble was “explained” by rising inflation, which has been the main driver of historical valuations, after an unprecedented lag during the second half of 2021. (Although the most speculative stocks were hit fast and hard from the beginning of 2021.) If anything, the question for us at GMO is why such a historic inflation surge in 2021 did not immediately hit broad market P/Es more substantially: new players in the stock market unfamiliar with inflation? Excessive belief in the Fed’s ability to support markets and hence too much faith that inflation would be transitory? The next leg for the model is likely to be driven by falling margins. Our best guess is that the level of explained P/E will fall toward 15x, compared to the current level of explained P/E of just under 20x, while the actual P/E just rose from 30x to 34x in mid-August in what was probably a bear market rally. (Of course, if the model is indeed driven by falling margins in the near future, then the E will fall as well as the P/E. As you can see, this would imply a substantially lower market than even we have suggested!)

GMO“市盈率解释模型” | 一次非典型偏离 | 1) 净资产收益率 | 20 | 50 | 2) 通胀波动率 | 2020-12 | 2021-04 | 2021-08 | 2021-12 | 3) GDP 波动率 | 1925 | 1935 | 1945 | 1955 | 1965 | 1975 | 1985 | 1995 | 2005 | 2015 | 预测市盈率 10 | 实际市盈率 10 | 截至 2022 年 7 月 20 日 | 数据来源:GMO | 该模型并不试图以任何方式为市场价格辩护。它仅仅展示了那些在历史上能够从统计上解释同期市盈率的财务输入变量。我的文章《等待最后一舞》和《让狂野喧嚣开始吧》曾指出一个简单的观点:在美国,那些伴随疯狂投资者行为和 2.5 倍以上超估值的近乎完美的三次市场,其后都伴随着 50% 的大幅市场下跌。文章对基本面几乎只字未提,除了预期会出现一定程度的恶化。而现在,我们正处于泡沫破裂的第一轮下跌和一次大规模熊市反弹之后,我们发现基本面远比预期要糟糕得多。进入超级泡沫的最后阶段 | 第 4 页

GMO “EXPLAINING P/E” MODEL An Atypical Divergence 1) Return on Equity 20 50 2) Inflation Volatility Dec-20 Apr-21 Aug-21 Dec-21 3) GDP Volatility 1925 1935 1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 2015 Predicted P/E 10 Realized P/E 10 As of 7/20/2022 | Source: GMO This model does not attempt to justify market prices in any way. It merely shows those financial inputs that have My papers, “Waiting for the Last Dance” and “Let The Wild Rumpus Begin,” made a simple in the past statistically explained contemporaneous P/E point: in the U.S., the three near perfect markets with crazy investor behavior and 2.5+ multiples. sigma overvaluation have always been followed by big market declines of 50%. The Entering the Superbubble’s Final Act | p4 papers said nothing about fundamentals except to expect some deterioration. Now here we are, having experienced the first leg down of the bubble bursting and a substantial bear market rally, and we find the fundamentals are far worse than expected.

全世界现在都在盯着通胀、利率以及能源短缺这类战时因素对经济增长的拖累。此外,还有几个不那么明显的短期问题。与此同时,人口、资源和气候方面的长期问题只会越来越糟,现在连短期内也开始显现出影响。

The whole world is now fixated on the growth-reducing implications of inflation, rates, and wartime issues such as the energy squeeze. In addition, there are several less obvious short-term problems. Meanwhile, the long-term problems of demographics, resources, and climate are only getting worse and now are beginning to bite even in the short run.

近期问题 ■ 乌克兰战争加剧了粮食 / 能源 / 化肥问题,在新兴市场(尤其是非洲),情况比我们听说的欧洲能源问题还要糟糕。俄罗斯和白俄罗斯占全球钾肥(一种关键化肥)出口量的 40%,这使得小麦 / 玉米 / 大豆价格在今年早些时候创下纪录。粮食和能源价格上涨正在最脆弱的国家引发严重的贸易失衡和民众骚乱,例如斯里兰卡经济几乎在极短时间内崩溃。能源冲击现在几乎必然将欧洲推入衰退;尽管美国市场历来无视外国问题及相互影响,全球经济增长无疑正在放缓。

NEAR-TERM PROBLEMS ■ The food/energy/fertilizer problems, exacerbated by the war in Ukraine, are even worse in the emerging world (especially Africa) than the European energy problems we have heard about. Russia and Belarus account for 40% of global exports of potash, a key fertilizer, driving wheat/corn/soybean prices to records earlier this year. Increased food and energy prices are causing acute trade imbalances and civil disorder in the most vulnerable countries, as seen for example in the extremely rapid virtual collapse of the Sri Lankan economy. The energy shock is now all but guaranteed to tip Europe into recession; while the U.S. market has a long history of ignoring foreign problems and interactions, global growth is assuredly coming down.

■ 在中国——过去 30 年里全球增长的最大承担者——同时有太多事情出错了。新冠疫情持续,严重影响其经济。与此同时,作为中国经济增长关键的中国房地产综合体,正承受严重压力。这种房地产的疲软在全球范围内有所体现,以美国为例,房屋建筑量正快速下降至远低于平均水平,考虑到新抵押贷款创纪录的难以负担,或许这也是应有的调整。在那些抵押贷款通常采用浮动利率的国家,情况看起来甚至更糟。从历史上看,房地产一直是经济稳定最重要的资产类别。

■ In China, which has carried by far the biggest load of global growth for the last 30 years, too many things are going wrong at the same time. The COVID pandemic continues, massively affecting its economy. Simultaneously, the Chinese property complex – key to Chinese economic growth – is now under dire stress. This real estate weakness is mirrored around the world, with U.S. homebuilding for example now declining rapidly to well below average levels, as perhaps it should given the record unaffordability of new mortgages. The situation looks even worse in those countries where mortgages are typically floating rate. Historically, real estate has been the most important asset class for economic stability.

我们刚刚经历了史上最大规模的财政紧缩之一——随着美国及全球各国政府撤回新冠刺激措施。从历史来看,财政紧缩与后续利润率下滑之间存在强相关性(见附录)。与此同时,美国新出台的股票回购消费税,似乎预示着美国政府正开始转变其对待劳资永恒博弈的态度(过去几十年里,资本一直在这场博弈中占据上风)。这种趋势甚至可能逐步传导至新一轮反垄断行动——这对消费者而言是极大利好,但对股票投资者而言则没那么美妙。

■ We are coming off one of the greatest fiscal tightenings in history as governments withdraw COVID stimulus, both in the U.S. and globally. Historically, there has been a strong relationship between fiscal tightening and subsequent decline in margins (see Appendix). At the same time, the new U.S. excise tax on stock buybacks looks like a harbinger that the U.S. government is beginning to shift its attitude toward the eternal battle between labor and capital (which capital has been winning for many decades now). This may even flow through in time to renewed antitrust action, which would be fantastic for consumers but less fantastic for stock investors.

长期性问题 ■ 人口:劳动者开始供不应求,且在中国和发达国家,这一状况将在可预见的未来持续下去——目前没有一个国家的婴儿出生率达到更替水平¹。加之快速老龄化,这将拖累增长、推高通胀。资源:许多金属(尤其是脱碳所需的那些)正面临不可避免的紧缺,全球当前已探明的矿产储量仅为所需量的 5%-20%²,而资本开支严重不足。这根本说不通,也清楚表明:若要让我们的生存状态勉强过得去,就必须依赖我们在替代、回收和新技术方面持续取得成功。另一个关键资源短缺是化肥。钾肥和磷肥,两者目前均为开采所得且为一切生命所必需,但:a)储量有限;b)分布极不均衡:摩洛哥控制着全球 75% 的最优质磷矿,俄罗斯和白俄罗斯开采了当前 45% 的钾肥,加拿大开采的比这还多。粮食:在土壤退化与侵蚀、淡水短缺以及害虫抗药性日益增强的背景下,即便非洲的人口增长盖过了其他地区的放缓,粮食生产率仍在下降。联合国全球食品指数近期创下历史新高。

¹ 以色列除外。

² 《该醒醒了——当前已知的全球矿产储量不足以供应计划中的非化石燃料工业体系所需金属》| 芬兰地质调查局 (GTK) 《进入超级泡沫的终局》第 5 页。

LONGER-TERM PROBLEMS ■ Population: workers are beginning to be in short supply and will stay that way for the indefinite future in China and the developed world, where no single country is producing babies at replacement rate.5 Together with rapid ageing, this will 5 be a drag on growth and a push on inflation. Resources: many metals, especially Except Israel. those required for decarbonizing, are in an unavoidable squeeze, lacking sufficient It’s Time to Wake Up - The Currently Known Global Mineral reserves – which currently are a mere 5-20% of what is needed6 – and capex is Reserves Will Not Be Sufficient to Supply Enough Metals woefully low. It simply does not compute, and it makes clear that our existence to Manufacture the Planned Non-fossil Fuel Industrial in any faintly satisfactory condition will depend on our sustained success with Systems | GTK Entering the Superbubble’s Final Act | p5 replacement, recycling, and new technologies. A second critical resource shortage is fertilizer. Potash and phosphate, both currently mined and both necessary for all life, are: a) finite; and b) very unevenly distributed: Morocco controls 75% of the world's best phosphate, and Russia and Belarus mine 45% of current potash with even more than that mined in Canada. Food: with deteriorated and eroded soil, freshwater shortages, and increasingly resistant pests, food productivity is slowing down even as African population growth outweighs the slowdown elsewhere. The UN global food index was recently at an all-time high.

■ 气候问题今年已呈现出失控螺旋的危险态势。前所未有的大规模干旱、危险的高温与火灾同时席卷中国、印度、欧洲和北美。其严重程度足以拖累全球 GDP:承载德国近 20% 重型货运的莱茵河因干旱断航;法国核电站因河水温度过高无法用于冷却而被迫减产;中国水力发电(占全国发电量的 18%)减半,加拿大、挪威、印度等地的水电同样因水位下降而减少;印度、亚洲及非洲部分地区的气温骤然升高,已对无空调人群及户外工作者(尤其是农民)的健康构成威胁。恶劣农耕天气的叠加效应正开始在全球范围内施加成本,并可能在不久的将来使越来越多的穷国陷入动荡。这一切的发生速度,比 10 年前任何人的预期都要快得多。

■ Climate can be seen this year as in danger of spiraling out of control. Never before have major droughts, and dangerously high temperatures and fires, beset China, India, Europe, and North America at the same time. This is severe enough to act as a drag on global GDP: the Rhine, which moves nearly 20% of German heavy traffic, is closed by drought; French nuclear power stations have had to reduce production because rivers are too hot to be used for cooling; China has had to halve its hydropower (18% of its electricity), which has also been reduced in Canada, Norway, India, and elsewhere by low water levels; rising temperatures in India, Asia, and parts of Africa are suddenly high enough to pose health problems for those without air conditioning and outdoor workers, especially farmers. The collective impact of difficult farming weather is beginning to impose its own global costs and may destabilize a growing number of poorer countries in the near future. It is all happening so much faster than anyone expected 10 years ago.

■ 所有这些都说明:多年来我始终记在脑后的长期负面问题——气候、人类生育能力、粮食及其他资源——如今正变成相关的短期问题,对通胀(向上)和增长(向下)都有影响。事实上,这些问题在整体上对我们的长期生存能力构成了潜在风险。

■ All that is to say: these long-term negative issues that I have kept at the back of my mind (and hopefully yours) for years – climate, human fertility, food, and other resources – are now becoming relevant short-term issues that bear on both inflation (upwards) and growth (downwards). Indeed, collectively, they pose a potential risk to our long-term viability.

为史诗般的终场做好准备。此前的超级泡沫如果同时涉及多个资产类别,其后经济前景都会显著恶化:例如 1989 年的日本或 2006 年的全球市场,住房与股市双双泡沫化;或者像 1973 年美国及其他地区那样,通胀飙升与利率冲击叠加股市泡沫。当前的超级泡沫集齐了现代史上最危险的组合因素:去年年底,所有三大资产类别——住房、股票和债券——均处于历史上严重高估的状态。如今我们又像 1970 年代初期一样,正经历通胀飙升与利率冲击。更糟的是,我们还面临大宗商品与能源价格飙升(正如 1972 年和 2007 年所痛苦见证的),而这类大宗商品冲击向来会投下长期抑制增长的阴影。

Prepare for an Epic Finale Previous superbubbles saw a much worse subsequent economic outlook if they combined multiple asset classes: housing and stocks, as in Japan in 1989 or globally in 2006; or if they combined an inflation surge and rate shock with a stock bubble, as in 1973 in the U.S. and elsewhere. The current superbubble features the most dangerous mix of these factors in modern times: all three major asset classes – housing, stocks, and bonds – were critically historically overvalued at the end of last year. Now we are seeing an inflation surge and rate shock as in the early 1970s as well. And to make matters worse, we have a commodity and energy surge (as painfully seen in 1972 and in 2007) and these commodity shocks have always cast a long growth-suppressing shadow.

鉴于所有这些负面因素,消费者和企业信心指数正在测试历史低点,这丝毫不令人意外。而在作为美国(及全球)经济前沿的科技行业,招聘正在放缓,裁员正在增加,首席执行官们越来越为经济衰退做准备。最近,我们看到了一轮熊市反弹。迄今为止,其演变过程恰好与三个历史先例一致——即标志着超级泡沫通货紧缩中段的熊市反弹。如果熊市已经结束,那么它与美国另外三次超级泡沫的相似之处——迄今为止仍惊人地保持一致——将被完全打破。这种可能性始终存在。每个周期都不同,每个政府的应对措施都不可预测。但这少数几次史诗级事件似乎遵循着它们自己非常独特的规律,上演着一出似乎刚刚在第三幕即最终幕之间暂停了的剧目。如果历史重演,那么这出戏将再次是:2000 年程度较轻,1972 年程度较大,而 1929 年,自然是灾难性的。

Given all these negative factors, it is unsurprising that consumer and business confidence measures are testing historic lows. And in the tech sector, the leading edge of the U.S. (and global) economy, hiring is slowing, layoffs are rising, and CEOs are increasingly bracing for recession. Recently, we have seen a bear market rally. It has so far played out exactly in line with its three historical precedents, the bear market rallies that marked the middle phase of deflating superbubbles. If the bear market has already ended, the parallels with the three other U.S. superbubbles – so far so strangely in line – would be completely broken. This is always possible. Each cycle is different, and each government response is unpredictable. But these few epic events seem to act according to their very own rules, in their own play, which has apparently just paused between the third and final act. If history repeats, the play will once again be a 2000 was minor, 1972 major, and 1929, of course, horrific.

悲剧。我们只能希望这次是一场轻微的特大地震。

Tragedy. We must hope this time for a minor 7 one.

进入超级泡沫的终章 | 附录第 6 页 杰里米·格兰瑟姆 格兰瑟姆先生于 1977 年联合创立了 GMO,目前是 GMO 资产配置团队的成员,担任该公司的长期投资策略师。他是 GMO 董事会的成员,并曾在多家非营利组织的投资委员会任职。

基础会计学——卡莱茨基方程——表明,政府赤字与公司利润处于一个总和为零的账目的两端。从历史上看,政府赤字的变化与随后的利润率变化之间存在着强大的统计关系:大幅增加赤字会导致未来几年利润率上升,而大幅减少赤字则会导致利润率下降。我们刚刚经历了政府赤字最大幅度的削减之一,这导致了利润率的下降。

Entering the Superbubble’s Final Act | p6 APPENDIX Jeremy Grantham Mr. Grantham co-founded GMO in 1977 and is a member of Basic accounting – the Kalecki equation – shows that government deficits and corporate GMO’s Asset Allocation profits are on opposite sides of a ledger that sums to zero. Historically, there’s been team, serving as the a powerful statistical relationship between changes in the government deficit and firm’s long-term investment strategist. He subsequent changes in profits margins: major increases in deficits have led to rising is a member of the GMO Board of Directors profit margins over the next few years, and major decreases in deficits have led to and has also served on the investment falling profit margins. We have just seen one of the biggest decreases in the government boards of several non-profit organizations.

在 GMO 成立之前,格兰瑟姆先生在历史方面存在不足。随后利润很可能会出现相应的下降。他曾是 Batterymarch Financial Management 的联合创始人,该公司成立于 1969 年,他在 1971 年推荐了商业指数化策略,这是他声称自己是先行者之一的多个证据之一。自 1960 年以来,联邦预算余额的 1 年变动幅度超过 GDP 2% 的所有情况。他的投资生涯始于荷皇壳牌集团(Royal Dutch Shell)的经济学家。格兰瑟姆先生在英国谢菲尔德大学获得学士学位,并在哈佛商学院获得工商管理硕士学位。他是美国艺术与科学院院士,持有英国授予的 CBE 勋衔,并因慈善事业获得卡内基奖章。

免责声明

此处表达的观点是杰里米·格兰瑟姆截至 2022 年 8 月 31 日期间的观点,并可能根据市场及其他条件随时发生变化。这并非任何证券的购买或销售要约或招揽,也不应被如此解读。

联邦预算余额变动占 GDP 百分比随后 1 年企业利润变动占 GDP 百分比
1968-2.6%-0.5%
19693.1%-1.1%
1975-2.4%1.2%
1983-2.9%0.6%
2002-2.2%1.1%
2008-4.4%1.2%
20132.3%-0.4%
2020-11.0%0.9%
202211.5%??

截至 2022 年 6 月 30 日 | 来源:美国经济分析局,GMO

Prior to GMO’s founding, Mr. Grantham deficit in history. It is very likely to be matched by a subsequent drop in profits. was co-founder of Batterymarch Financial Management in 1969 where he recommended commercial indexing in 1971, one of several ALL OCCASIONS SINCE 1960 THAT THE 1-YEAR CHANGE claims to being first. He began his investment All occasions since 1960 that the 1-year change in the federal budget balance has career as an economist with Royal Dutch IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET BALANCE HAS BEEN GREATER been greater than 2% of GDP Shell. Mr. Grantham earned his undergraduate THAN 2% OF GDP degree from the University of Sheffield 1-year change in federal budget Subsequent 1-year change in (UK) and an M.B.A. from Harvard Business balance as % of GDP corporate profits as % of GDP School. He is a member of the Academy of Arts and Sciences, holds a CBE from the UK 1968 -2.6% -0.5% and is a recipient of the Carnegie Medal for 1969 3.1% -1.1% Philanthropy. 1975 -2.4% 1.2% 1983 -2.9% 0.6% 2002 -2.2% 1.1% Disclaimer 2008 -4.4% 1.2% The views expressed are the views of Jeremy Grantham through the period ending 2013 2.3% -0.4% August 31, 2022, and are subject to change 2020 -11.0% 0.9% at any time based on market and other 2022 11.5% ?? conditions. This is not an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security As of 6/30/2022 | Source: BEA, GMO and should not be construed as such.

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