贸易
季度交易信函 | 字典里最美的词语 2025 年第一季度 | 第一部分 本·英克与约翰·皮斯 | 资产配置专题 全球贸易局势眼下几乎是所有人关注的焦点。我们一直在撰写关于这一主题的研究报告,但鉴于局势瞬息万变,任何关于投资影响的确定性论断,几乎都会因现实情况的改变而迅速失去时效性。因此,我们现在先发布这份报告的第一部分,从较为理论化的层面探讨贸易与关税的经济学原理,并解释为何广泛加征关税,很可能是特朗普政府试图实现其目标的一种不必要且代价高昂的经济手段。未来几周,我们将发布配套报告,更具体地讨论政府当前正在实施或酝酿的各类关税,可能对货币、股票和信贷市场产生的影响。
TRADE QUARTERLY LETTER The Most Beautiful Word in the Dictionary 1Q 2025 | Part 1 Ben Inker and John Pease | Asset Allocation The global trade situation is at the top of almost everyone’s mind at the moment. We have been working on a write-up of our research on the topic, but given how fluid the situation is, it’s hard to state anything definitive on investment implications without being almost immediately rendered less relevant as the facts on the ground change. So for now, we are releasing the first part of the piece we have been working on, looking at the economics of trade and tariffs at a somewhat more theoretical level and explaining why broadly applied tariffs are likely to be a needlessly economically expensive way to achieve the goals the Trump administration is presumably trying to achieve. In the coming weeks we will release a companion piece talking more concretely about the likely impacts on currencies, equities, and credit from the kinds of tariffs that the administration is currently applying and/or contemplating.
导言
今天回到家后,环顾四周。你正站在一栋并非自己亲手建造的房子里。当你悄悄溜进厨房拿一片面包时,请注意,你既没有收割麦子,也没有揉面团。事实上,你甚至可能不知道如何做面包。你的孩子——如果你有的话——可能一整天都由其他与你毫无天然照看义务的成年人照料,在一家你对其时间安排和课程设置毫无发言权的幼儿园或学校里度过。
Introduction When you get home today, look around. You’re standing in a house that you did not yourself build.1 As you sneak into the kitchen to grab a slice of bread, note that you neither harvested its wheat nor kneaded its dough. In fact, you might not even know how to make bread. Your children – if you have them – probably spent the day occupied by other adults with no inherent obligation to take care of them, at a daycare center or school whose scheduling and programming you had no role in setting up.
你之所以能够不费吹灰之力地获得这些商品,而从未考虑过如何制造它们,原因很简单:贸易。社会对你的劳动价值给予了足够认可,使你得以用自己生产的东西——或者,如果你背负了债务,用你承诺未来生产的东西——去交换他人创造的商品和服务。这种交换,恰恰是现代社会的本质。当我们谈论经济增长时,真正含义是更多贸易(新产出的商品和服务)正在发生。当我们讨论通货膨胀时,实际上是在探讨跨期贸易——用当下的物品交换未来的承诺——正变得不那么有吸引力,因为未来物品的价值高于当下。
The reason you have access to these things without ever having contemplated making them is a simple one: trade. Society values your work enough that it has allowed you to exchange what you produce – or if you’ve taken out debt, what you promise to produce – for goods and services created by others. This exchange is indeed what modern society is about. When we speak of the economy growing, what we really mean is that more trade (of newly produced goods and services) is occurring. When we discuss inflation, we are discussing how intertemporal trade – the exchange of present things for promises of future things – is becoming less attractive as values in the future are higher than those of the present.
国内贸易与国际贸易在理论上并无差别——无论哪种形式,交换的都是商品、服务(或对应的承诺)。但在现实中,国际贸易向来难度更大。在不算太久远的过去,这是因为运输成本极其高昂。蒸汽机问世之前,穿越大片陆地或浩瀚水域既代价高昂又充满风险。马可·波罗、哥伦布这样的商人之所以最终致富,是因为他们的行当需要风险溢价,而他们又足够幸运,在风险中幸存下来并获得了这份溢价。
There is no theoretical difference between national and international trade; in either case, goods and services (or promises thereof) are being exchanged. But practically, international trade has always been harder. In the not-so-good old days, this was because transportation costs were extremely high. Before the steam engine, crossing a large piece of land or a large body of water was both a costly and risky endeavor. The reason merchants such as Marco Polo and Columbus ended up rich was that their line of work demanded a risk premium, and they were fortunate enough to survive the risk and end up with the premium.
假设真有哪位读者是自己亲手建了房子,我们也完全可以断定:建房用的工具不是他自己造的,建房用的材料也不是他自己种植、开采或生产出来的。
18 世纪以来,运输成本和关税的大幅下降,使国内和国际贸易都变得更加顺畅,进而让世界变得远比过去富有。贸易摩擦的降低,意味着几乎所有可交易商品和服务的供应都在扩大,而扩大的供给曲线意味着——通过更强的竞争——以更低价格实现更多产出。换言之,降低贸易摩擦有助于提高全世界的生活水平。
运输成本高企,在某种程度上很可能也是关税高企的原因。商人需要在贸易路线上拥有安全的城市,而这种安全——城市卫队、武器、城墙修缮以及某种形式的司法——都必须有人买单。路途越远,中间停靠站就越多,关税也就随之而来。
In the off chance that someone reading this letter actually The extraordinary decline in transportation costs and tariffs2 since the eighteenth century has made did build their own house, we can still posit that they did not both national and international trade much easier. It has in consequence made the world much, much make the tools they used to build it, nor did they personally grow, mine, or manufacture the materials the house was richer. Lower trade frictions translate to an expanding supply of essentially any tradable good or made from. service, and an expanding supply curve means more production at lower prices (by way of greater In part, the high transportation costs were likely responsible competition). In other words, lower trade frictions help increase the world’s standard of living. for tariffs. Merchants required safe cities along their trade routes, and that safety – in the form of a city guard, weaponry, wall repairs, and some form of judiciary – needed to be paid for. Large distances required lots of intervening stops and lo, tariffs.
贸易:字典中最美好的词 | 第 2 段 各国政府并不关心全球生活水平。问题就在这里。无论是拥有庞大国内市场的发达国家,还是试图发展本国工业的发展中国家,都有动机单方面采取某种程度的保护主义政策。如今,美国似乎正打算通过实施贸易关税来践行这一动机。
Trade: The Most Beautiful Word in the Dictionary | p2 National governments are not concerned about the global standard of living, however. And therein lies the rub. Both developed countries with large domestic markets and developing countries attempting to develop their own industries have an incentive3 to unilaterally adopt some degree of protectionist policies. Today, the United States seems intent on acting upon that incentive through the enactment of trade tariffs.
关税的经济学:贸易关税其实就是针对进口商品(通常是货物)征收的一种销售税。它不可避免地要么抬高消费者的价格,要么增加生产商的成本,这样一来,就减少了贸易的总量。如果被征税的商品变得更贵,消费者要么减少购买该商品,要么花在其他东西上的钱变少。如果生产商为了消化关税而降价,他们就只能通过削减投资支出、工资支出或股东分红来补偿。无论哪种情况,结果都是贸易的损失。简而言之:贸易关税会拉低全球经济增长。
The Economics of Tariffs Trade tariffs are just a sales tax applied to imports (generally of goods). They unavoidably raise either prices for consumers or costs for producers and, in so doing, decrease the total amount of trade that occurs. If a taxed good becomes more expensive, consumers must either purchase less of it or have less money to spend on other things. If producers lower prices to accommodate the tax, they must compensate by reducing investment spending, their wage bill, or distributions to shareholders. In each case, the result is a loss in trade. Put simply: trade tariffs lower global economic growth.
进口关税的支持者至今仍然存在——甚至不限于白宫内部——他们倾向于在以下几种经济论据的组合下为关税背书:1. 贸易损失在很大程度上由被征税的国家承担。
Proponents of import tariffs still exist – even outside the White House – and they tend to support tariffs under some combination of the following economic arguments: 1. The trade loss is in large part absorbed by the taxed country.
2. 关税收入有助于减少国内税负(或增加政府支出)。
2. The revenue from tariffs can help reduce domestic taxes (or boost government spending).
3. 当地经济受益于某一行业(重新)发展,而这些行业原本规模较小或根本不存在。
3. The local economy benefits from the (re)development of an industry that would otherwise be smaller or not exist.
这就为我们描绘了关税的最优经济情景蓝图。要使论点一成立,关税造成的无谓损失必须由外国生产商承担。这只有在这些生产商发现消化关税(通过降低向消费者收取的价格)是利润最大化的行为时才会发生。在这种情况下,本地消费者购买应税商品的数量大致不变(因为税后价格没有上涨太多),政府则看到财政收入增加,从而让论点二开始发挥作用,并足以弥补所产生的任何消费者损失。从中期来看,论点三随之而来:在本土生产应税商品的投资回报率看起来比在别处生产更优,尤其是当政府将部分新增财政收入用于补贴本土生产时。在理想情况下,这种生产利用了经济中的闲置资源(比如想工作但没工作的人),并呈现出规模报酬递增(即你生产的商品越多,每件商品的平均成本就越低)。这意味着国内生产将上升,本地消费者最终能以更低价格买到应税商品。这是三赢局面。
This gives us a blueprint for the best-case economic scenario for a tariff. For Argument #1 to hold, the deadweight loss of tariffs must be incurred by foreign producers. This will only happen if these producers find that absorbing the tariffs (by lowering the prices they charge consumers) is a profit-maximizing endeavor. Under this scenario, local consumers buy roughly the same amount of the tariffed good (because after-tax prices didn’t increase by much), and the government sees a revenue increase, allowing for Argument #2 to come into play and more than make up for any consumer loss that occurs. In the medium term, Argument #3 ensues as the ROI of producing the tariffed good locally looks better than producing it elsewhere, particularly if the government subsidizes production with part of its higher revenue. In the ideal case, this production uses spare resources in the economy (such as people who want a job but don’t have one) and exhibits increasing returns to scale (where the more goods you produce, the lower your average cost per good).4 This means that domestic production will go up, and local consumers will eventually get the tariffed good at lower prices. A win-win-win.
尽管这种保护主义的美梦在真空中或许能够成真,但在一个有重力、摩擦力和恶意存在的世界里,它通常会土崩瓦解。首先,上文描述的那一连串正面结果,依赖于对某一特定、狭窄范围的商品征税。正如经济学家兼博主诺亚·史密斯不久前所指出的,你唯一能避开关税引发汇率调整的情况,是当那些关税具有针对性时。然而,当关税被广泛适用时,货币往往会立即做出反应,使贸易平衡回归与期望资本流动相一致的轨道(第二部分将对此详述)。货币升值将有助于减轻关税对本地消费者的冲击,但必定会损害国内出口商。
Though this protectionist dream might come true in a vacuum, it generally falls apart in a world with gravity, friction, and spite. To begin with, the sequence of positive outcomes described above relies on the taxation of a specific, narrow set of goods. As the economist-cum-blogger Noah Smith observed some time ago,5 the only case in which you escape an exchange rate adjustment to tariffs is when those tariffs are targeted. When applied broadly, however, currencies tend to immediately respond to bring the trade balance back in line with the desired flow of capital (more to come on this in Part 2). A strengthening currency will help blunt the impact of tariffs on local consumers, but it will most certainly hurt domestic exporters.
论点一也依赖于消费者对价格极其敏感(即经济学所说的“需求弹性强”)。当消费者不敏感时——无论是出于进口商品对其生产过程必不可少(例如汽车制造商无法放弃钢材),还是出于其生存需要(新英格兰人需要用天然气给房屋供暖)——本地经济就会感到痛苦。在规模报酬递增的条件下,政府或许可以通过高效运用关税收入来缓解这种痛苦;而碾压外国竞争对手以打造国内垄断,其实是一种即便有干预也难以甚至不可能实现的(国内)正收益。
Argument #1 is also reliant on consumers being extremely price sensitive (or “demand elastic,” 3 in economic parlance). When they are not – whether because the imports in consideration are More of a political incentive than an economic one. necessary for their production process (car manufacturers can’t forego steel, for instance) or for Under increasing return to scale, crushing foreign their survival (New Englanders need natural gas to heat their homes) – the local economy feels the competition to create a national monopoly is in fact a pain. The government might be able to ameliorate this by deploying the tariff revenue efficiently (domestic) positive from tariffs (or quotas) that can be hard or impossible to achieve without intervention.
(论点二),但要相信这种抵消效应能完全实现,就需要对我们那五位中央计划者抱有坚定的信念。更有效的贸易:字典里最美妙的词 | 第 3 页那么,当然还有报复。如果你只跟一个完全依赖你的小国挑衅,也许可以避免报复。但如果你跟所有人挑衅,就会有人想起博弈论的基本结论:在重复博弈中,惩罚利己行为者是确保更广泛、长期协调的最佳方式。此外,人类还有报复心理。单边关税被普遍视为不公平,社会科学研究和整个人类文明史都表明,人们通常愿意牺牲自身福祉,来报复那些他们认为对自己不公的人。报复意味着,在贸易战中,本国的出口商以及通过他们而存在的本国生产都将遭受损失。
(Argument #2), but to believe the offset would be complete would require staunch faith in our 5 central planners. more-effective Trade: The Most Beautiful Word in the Dictionary | p3 Then, of course, there’s retaliation. If you pick a fight with a smaller country that is entirely reliant upon yours, perhaps it can be avoided. If you pick a fight with everyone, someone might recall the basic game-theoretical result that, in repeated interactions, punishing selfish actors is the best way to ensure broader, long-term coordination. Also, people are spiteful. Unilateral tariffs are universally viewed as unfair, and both social science research and indeed the broad history of civilization show that people are generally prepared to compromise their own welfare to retaliate against those they believe have treated them unfairly. Retaliation ensures that domestic exporters, and through them domestic production, suffer in a trade war.
因此,论点一和论点二都不太可能为关税的使用提供合理依据。话虽如此,对关税最普遍的热情来自论点三——即关税将通过让国际采购失去吸引力来刺激国内制造业。这并非新观点,历史上许多发展中国家都曾尝试通过进口关税和配额来推行这一策略,偶有成功(如韩国),但更常见的是令人失望的结果(例如,基本上南美洲的每个国家都是如此)。然而,发达国家很少尝试这种做法。
Arguments #1 and #2 are therefore unlikely to justify the use of tariffs. That said, the most common reason for tariff enthusiasm is Argument #3 – that tariffs will spur domestic manufacturing by making international purchases unattractive. This is not a novel idea, and it has been tried over time by many a developing country through import tariffs and quotas, with occasional success (e.g., South Korea) and rather more frequent disappointment (e.g., basically every country in South America). It has seldom been tried by a developed nation, however.
坦率地说,这种乐观有充分的理由。如果你的经济增长强劲且富有活力,知识产业的资本回报率很高,国内低技能服务业也报酬丰厚,那么没有大规模制造业似乎也并非明显缺憾。更何况,你还能通过维持巨额贸易逆差来进口国内不生产的东西,同时本币持续升值。相反地,如果外国人满足于用你今天看重的实物商品,来换取持有债券和股票的权利——这些权利赋予他们对你未来公共和私人现金流的索取权(顺便说一句,这些索取权目前相当昂贵)——那么这至少表明,相对于世界其他地区而言,你的经济正走在正确的轨道上。
And frankly, for good reason. If you have a rich, growing economy where the return on investment for your knowledge industries is high and the domestic provision of low-skilled services is well-compensated, it isn’t obvious that you’re missing out by not having a large manufacturing footprint. It is all the less obvious when you’re able to run a massive trade deficit in order to import what you don’t locally produce and your currency keeps appreciating. To the contrary, if foreigners are satisfied to give you physical stuff that you value today for the right to own bonds and equities that give them claims to your public and private cashflows in the future (claims that are currently really expensive, by the way6) the implication is that – at least relative to the rest of the world – your economy is on the right track.
要让美国重新发展制造业,要么需要从经济其他部门获取劳动力和资本,要么需要让工作(和投资)对那些原本闲置的劳动力和资本产生吸引力。在第一种情况下,资源重新配置能否带来经济改善,取决于——而且只取决于——用这些资源生产的制成品,是否比当前生产的商品和服务在全球范围内被更高度认可。如果不是,那么投入制造业的工人(和资本)就会变得更穷,经济产出将低于潜在水平。鉴于一个激励利润最大化的竞争性体系往往会接近有效地配置资源,很难说广泛的政府干预有可能提升经济产出。至于闲置资源——美国不太可能拥有大量闲置劳动力(美国 25 岁以上几乎所有年龄段的就业人口比率都处于第 85 个百分位以上)。此外,远非显而易见的是,在一个竞争性资本主义体系中,那些目前能提供的岗位收入更高的劳动者,会被收入更低的制造业工作所吸引。当前贸易对美国的倾斜程度,怎么强调都不过分。美元按购买力平价计算接近历史高位,这意味着外国人用出口换来的美元,能买到的美国商品和服务,远远少于他们用同等金额本国货币在本国能买到的。因此,单凭改善经济产出的预期,很难为广泛征收贸易关税找到理由。从非经济角度出发,重新发展美国制造业或许有其合理性。
For the U.S. to redevelop its manufacturing industry, it would either need to source labor and capital from other sectors of the economy or make work (and investment) attractive to labor and capital that is otherwise idle. In the first case, the reallocation of resources would lead to an economic improvement if – and only if – manufactured goods are valued more highly by the world than the goods and services currently produced with those same resources. If they are not, the workers (and capital) deployed in manufacturing would become poorer, with economic output growing below potential. Given that a competitive system which incents profit-maximization tends to allocate resources close to efficiently, it is hard to argue that broad government intervention is likely to boost economic output. As for idle resources – it is unlikely that they are plentiful in the U.S. (the employment-to-population ratio in the U.S. is above the 85th percentile for essentially every age cohort over 25). Moreover, it is far from obvious that idle labor would be attracted by 6 jobs that can afford them less than those that are currently on offer in a competitive capitalist It is hard to overstate how skewed this trade is to America’s advantage at the moment. The U.S. dollar is trading near system. It is therefore quite hard to argue for broad trade tariffs on the expectations of improved its all-time highs on a purchasing power parity basis, economic outcomes alone. which means the U.S. dollars foreigners get in return for their exports buy far less U.S. goods and services than the Redeveloping manufacturing in the U.S. could be justified on non-economic grounds. If the currencies they traded for them do in their own economy.
至于那些外国买家——他们不仅是在买入美元,政府也关切国家安全,或者他们相信工厂就业岗位是美国的资产,美国股票目前交易价位处于历史性高位,从任何能想到的估值指标看,其对非美股都享有内在溢价,更有利于劳动者福利和社会凝聚力——那么,关税或许确实是用以实施变革的有用工具。理性的做法是利用关税来改善国家安全或美国信用,而不是买入美股,因为那些外国买家买入美国信贷而非股票时,其利差接近历史最低。当人们争先恐后地以对你极为有利的条件与你做生意时,试图阻止他们似乎有些适得其反,反而会造成经济决策的反效果。这意味着要以尽可能有限和有针对性方式征收关税。从国家安全角度考虑,恢复特定美国制造能力似乎确有必要,但全面加征关税,正如我们所说,会导致远比上述反经济决策大得多的经济损失。对墨西哥和加拿大这两个地理上最亲近的盟友加征广泛关税,尤其适得其反,因为他们能帮助(廉价)生产许多我们自己不生产的商品。
And insofar as they are not just buying U.S. dollars, but also government is concerned about national security, or if they have a belief that factory jobs are U.S. assets, U.S. stocks are currently trading at their largest inherently better for laborers’ welfare and social cohesion, then tariffs might indeed be a useful premium to non-U.S. stocks on just about any valuation metric one could name. Meanwhile those foreigners buying instrument to enact change. A rational attempt to use tariffs to improve national security or U.S. credit instead of equities are doing so at spreads that produce jobs that are in some way “superior” to those that stem from a competitive capitalist are close to all-time tights. When people are falling over system should, however, aim to do so in a manner that minimizes the economic cost of this anti-themselves to trade with you on terms that are fantastically favorable to you, it does seem a little counterproductive to economic decision. This means imposing tariffs in as limited and targeted a manner as possible. try to stop them from doing so. A broad application of tariffs would, as we have stated, lead to much larger economic losses than For national security purposes, it seems uniquely necessary to achieve a revival of specific American manufacturing capabilities.7 counterproductive to place broad tariffs on Mexico and Canada, our geographically closest allies, who can help with the (cheap) production of many goods that we do not produce ourselves.
贸易:字典里最美的词汇 | 第 4 页 本·因克尔的总结
归根结底,几乎任何政府政策都既有收益也有成本。当然,关税也不例外。关税带来的收入越多,它们给消费者施加的成本就越高。如果关税成功地重构了美国经济,这种重构既会降低关税带来的收入,而且很可能还会降低美国经济整体的生产能力——因为资本和劳动力被重新配置到那些相比自由贸易下效率更低的领域。一项贸易政策的目标越清晰、越具体(例如,确保美国拥有足够的钢铁和铝产能——无论是国内生产还是来自可靠友好盟国——以应对一场重大战争),我们就能越经济高效地尝试实现这些目标。但贸易一直是人类和经济进步的惊人推动力,限制贸易会带来巨大的代价。假装限制贸易的好处可以在不产生重大成本的情况下实现,是一种幻想,最终很可能让美国(以及全世界)付出高昂的代价。
Trade: The Most Beautiful Word in the Dictionary | p4 Ben Inker Conclusion Mr. Inker is Co-Head of At the end of the day, almost any government policy has costs along with its benefits. Of course, GMO’s Asset Allocation team and a portfolio manager tariffs are no exception to this. The more revenue tariffs raise, the more costs they impose on for the team’s products. Mr. consumers. If tariffs succeed in restructuring the U.S. economy, that restructuring will both reduce Inker is a member of the the amount of revenue that tariffs raise and, in all likelihood, reduce the aggregate productive GMO Board of Directors and a partner of the firm. capacity of the U.S. economy as capital and labor get redeployed to areas where they are less He joined GMO in 1992 following the completion productive than they would be given freer trade. The clearer and more specific the goals of a of his bachelor's degree in Economics from Yale trade policy are (for example, ensuring the U.S. has enough productive capacity of steel and University. In his years at GMO, Mr. Inker has served as an analyst for the Quantitative Equity aluminum either domestically or from reliably friendly allies to withstand a major war), the more and Asset Allocation teams, as a portfolio manager cost-effectively we can attempt to achieve those goals. But trade has been an amazing enabler of of several equity and asset allocation portfolios, as human and economic progress and restricting it has significant costs. Pretending that the benefits Co-Head of International Quantitative Equities, and of restricting trade can come without meaningful costs is a fantasy that will likely wind up costing as CIO of Quantitative Developed Equities. He is a America (and the world) dearly.
CFA charterholder.
CFA charterholder.
约翰·皮斯先生是 GMO 资产配置团队的成员,也是该公司的合伙人。在 2016 年全职加入 GMO 之前,他曾在资产配置团队担任实习生。皮斯先生拥有里约热内卢天主教大学的经济学理学学士学位和经济学理学硕士学位。
John Pease Mr. Pease is a member of GMO’s Asset Allocation team and a partner of the firm. Prior to joining GMO full-time in 2016, he was an intern with the Asset Allocation team. Mr. Pease earned his bachelor of science in economics and his master of science in economics from Pontificia Universidade Catolica do Rio de Janeiro.
免责声明 本文所述观点为本·英克(Ben Inker)和约翰·皮斯(John Pease)截至 2025 年 3 月期间的意见,并可能随时根据市场及其他条件发生变更。本文并非购买或出售任何证券的要约或招揽,也不应被理解为要约或招揽。文中提及的具体证券和发行人仅作说明用途,无意也不应被解释为购买或出售此类证券的建议。
Disclaimer The views expressed are the views of Ben Inker and John Pease through the period ending March 2025 and are subject to change at any time based on market and other conditions. This is not an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security and should not be construed as such. References to specific securities and issuers are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to be, and should not be interpreted as, recommendations to purchase or sell such securities.
© 2025 年版权所有,GMO 有限责任公司。
Copyright © 2025 by GMO LLC.
保留所有权利。
All rights reserved.