重塑市场：现实之痛

2002 · oped · 原文约 1294 词

译文与英文原文逐段对齐可在本页展开英文，也可打开发布者原址核对上下文。

华尔街的“卖方”分析师，在吹大近期市场泡沫的大量虚言中扮演了重要角色，这一直是众人关注的焦点。为吸引新的投行业客户并留住老客户，这些所谓证券分析师们抛出了热情洋溢的推荐报告，报告里满是概念和潜力，却严重缺乏事实和数据。据一项研究显示，1999 年华尔街公司发布的 6000 条建议中，只有八条建议“卖出”。

8/10/22, 9:42 PM The Bogle eBlog » Blog Archive » Remaking the Market: Reality Bites The Wayback Machine - https://web.archive.org/web/20170612151903/http://johncbogle.com/wordpress/2006/0… REMAKING THE MARKET: REALITY BITES JCB - Mar 15, 2006 The Wall Street Journal – November 21, 2002 Considerable attention has been focused on the role of Wall Street’s “sell-side” analysts in generating so much of the hot air that inflated the late market bubble. In the desire to attract new investment banking clients and retain old ones, so-called security analysts put forth glowing recommendations that were long on concepts and potentials, but short on facts and figures. Of 6,000 recommendations made by Wall Street firms during 1999, according to one study, only eight recommended “sell.”

尽管分析师因协助投行部门而受奖赏（或因阻碍而受惩罚）时，存在明显的利益冲突，但这种冲突已存在许久，且没有明显的替代方案。但即便我们通过将投行交易的财务分析与经纪业务客户分析完全分离来消除这种冲突，提供真正客观的研究这一挑战依然存在。为什么？因为华尔街是一台销售机器——一个庞大而复杂的证券分销营销体系。

While an obvious conflict of interest exists when an analyst is rewarded for his help (or punished for hindrance) to the investment banking department, that conflict has existed for a long time, with no obvious alternative. But even if we eliminate the conflict by a complete separation of the financial analysis of investment banking deals from analysis for brokerage clients, the challenge of providing truly objective research would remain. Why? Because Wall Street is a selling machine — a giant and complex marketing system for securities distribution.

经纪公司的激励是卖出产品。如果投资者不买股票——无论是增发股还是首次公开发行（IPO）——经纪公司就没多少收入来源。所以天平是向“买入”一边倾斜的。不仅如此，大量（也许过多）的研究基于对公司高管的访谈，所以要想冒着激怒他们的风险而推荐卖出，需要些勇气。而且，一家公司的每个客户都可以执行买入建议，但只有持有某只股票的客户才能执行卖出建议。这些障碍没有明显的绕开办法。

The incentive for the brokerages is to sell a product. If investors don’t buy stocks, those of outstanding issues and IPOs alike, brokerage firms won’t have much in the way of revenues. So the balance is one-sided in favor of buys. What is more, much — perhaps too much — research is based on interviews with company officials, so it takes some courage to risk their ire and recommend sales. Further, every single one of a firm’s clients can act on a buy recommendation, but only clients holding the particular stock can act on a sell recommendation. There is no obvious way around these roadblocks.

不过，近期的规定要求投行必须公开披露其投资建议，这似乎确实纠正了原有的不平衡，尽管术语已经发生了变化。举例来说，一家大型投行报告称，今年迄今为止，32% 的投资建议是“增持”，47% 是“标配”，21% 是“减持”。但我并不确定，这种“增强型指数化”的术语是不是比它要解决的问题本身制造了更多麻烦。此外，无论是在经纪业务和投资银行业务之间建立“中国墙”，还是设立一套拜占庭式的全新体系——让华尔街大型承销商补贴独立研究机构——似乎都很难真正奏效。也许最佳的补救措施还是老办法：披露。“阳光，阳光，阳光”——照在研究资金的来源上，照在分析师的薪酬上，照在对以往建议的表现评估上。

Nonetheless, the recent requirement that firms disclose their recommendations seems to have redressed the imbalance, though the terminology has changed. One major firm, for example, reports that so far this year 32% of recommendations are to “overweight,” 47% are to “equal-weight,” and 21% are to “underweight.” I’m not at all sure, however, that this “enhanced indexing” terminology doesn’t create more problems then it resolves. Further, it seems unlikely that either building a Chinese Wall between brokerage and investment banking or setting up a Byzantine new system in which giant Wall Street underwriters would subsidize independent research firms would work with much effectiveness. Perhaps the best remedy is the traditional one: Disclosure. “Sunlight, sunlight, sunlight” on the source of funding for research, on analysts’ compensation, and on performance appraisals of prior recommendations.

但现在是时候面对现实了：没有任何证据表明研究——哪怕是《机构投资者》全明星阵容的研究——能带来额外价值。学术研究不过是在印证我们都相信的事实：股票市场高度有效，股价几乎已经吸收了所有信息。我常说的那句话没错：“永远别以为你比市场懂得多。没人能做到。”

But it’s time to face reality: There is no evidence that research — even the research of the Institutional Investor all-stars — adds value. Academic studies only confirm what we all believe: The stock market is highly efficient, and that stock prices incorporate virtually all information. As I’ve often said, “Never think you know more than the market. Nobody does.”

既然如此，华尔街广泛传播的卖方研究报告——无论它是独立研究，还是投行与经纪公司的产物——即便有明确的经济价值，也微乎其微，那么它能带来的现金收入理应相当有限。事实也确实如此：这类研究的报酬目前大多以“软美元”形式支付，即用于购买研究的佣金被捆绑在执行交易和大宗交易的价格里（同样捆绑在一起的，还有共同基金营销等其他服务的费用）。当一家共同基金经理用佣金美元来购买研究报告时，他们对成本与价值之间关系的关注度，远不如这笔钱从管理公司利润里直接掏出时来得高。更有意思的问题是：研究报告的使用者——主要是机构投资界的买方分析师——当初为什么会如此看重华尔街的研究呢？

So if widely-disseminated sell-side Wall Street research — whether independent or a product of investment banking and brokerage firms — has little if any demonstrable economic value, it should command relatively small cash revenues. And that’s the case: It is currently paid for largely by “soft-dollars,” with the commissions paid for research bundled up with the price of execution and block positioning (and, for that matter, for other services such as mutual fund marketing). When a mutual fund manager buys research with commission dollars, there’s far less attention paid to the cost/value equation than would be the case were it paid for out of the management company’s profits. The more interesting issue is why users of research, largely the buy-side analysts of the institutional investing community, place much stock in street research in the first place.

卖方研究供应商和用户的共识近乎一致：如果华尔街研究报告必须用真金白银购买，那么花在这上面的金额将急剧下降。但这并不必然意味着所有研究都缺乏内在价值。一份原创、全面且富有洞见的研究报告，一旦对所有市场参与者公开，其价值即刻归零；而同一份报告若由单一机构的研究部门持有，只要信息保持专有，其价值就依然存在。

The near-universal consensus among research providers and users alike is that if Street research could be purchased only with hard (i.e., real) dollars, the amount spent on it would plummet. Yet it does not necessarily follow that all research lacks intrinsic value. While the value of an original, comprehensive, and insightful research study becomes zero at the moment it becomes available to all market participants, the value of the same study by the research department of a single institution remains as long as the information remains proprietary.

如果大众市场化的华尔街研究报告的生命周期以瞬间衡量，而机构专属研究至少具有潜在价值，那么变革方向应当显而易见。在追求更高风险调整后收益的阿尔法过程中，共同基金行业的公司应当加强自身的专属投资组合管理、证券分析和内部研究能力。

If the value of mass-marketed Street research has a half-life measured in moments, and if proprietary institutional research has at least a potential value, the direction of change should be obvious. In their search for the Alpha of higher risk-adjusted returns, the firms in the mutual fund industry should beef up their own proprietary portfolio management, security analysis, and internal research capabilities.

当然，这需要实实在在的美元，但这些钱对共同基金管理公司的收入来说不过是九牛一毛。例如，去年共同基金的管理费、销售佣金、8/10/22，晚上 9 点 42 分，Bogle eBlog » Blog Archive » Remaking the Market: Reality Bites 以及自付费用合计产生了约 710 亿美元的收入。然而，根据我的估算，其中只有约 40 亿美元（不到 6%）花在了投资监督与研究上——而这恰恰是投资者选择基金的首要理由，即所谓的“专业管理”。

Of course it would take real dollars, but they would be a drop in the bucket of revenues of mutual fund managers. Last year, for example, some $71 billion in revenues was generated by mutual fund advisory fees, sales loads, 8/10/22, 9:42 PM The Bogle eBlog » Blog Archive » Remaking the Market: Reality Bites and out-of-pocket fees. Yet, according to my estimates, only about $4 billion of that amount, less than 6%, was spent on investment supervision and research, that very service which is said to constitute the prime reason that investors select funds — “professional management.”

在一个管理者的利润率可以超过 50% 的行业里，哪怕基金公司已经为吸纳新资金花掉了巨额营销费用，增加投资管理投入似乎也不算过分要求。而且，如果基金业绩哪怕只有温和提升，那么因更高回报而增值的资产——以及往往伴随优异业绩而来的资金流入——所带来的额外收费收入，将远远超过增加的投入成本。

In a business in which the profit margins of managers can exceed 50%, even after the huge marketing costs fund firms expend to bring in new money, increasing expenditures on investment management would hardly seem a tall order. And if fund performance improved even modestly, additional fee revenues on assets that were enhanced by higher returns — and by the cash inflows that tend to accompany superior performance — would more than repay the extra costs.

事实上，如果基金经理们愿意言行一致，转向“激励-惩罚”型收费结构，那么增加研究投入的同时，基金经理和基金所有者都能获得远为丰厚的利润。在这种情景下，大多数证券分析和研究的责任将逐渐从卖方（其当前动机冲突、结果不尽人意）转移到买方、独立方和自营方。这场结构性转变究竟会导致研究群体扩大还是缩小，只有时间能给出答案。但让研究困境——谁提供研究、成本多高、由谁承担——如此有趣的现实在于：没有买家就没有卖家，没有卖家也就没有买家。一方赢，另一方就输。

Indeed, if fund managers were willing to put their money where their mouth is and move to incentive-penalty fee schedules, the additional investment in research could be accompanied by far higher profits, for managers and fund owners. Under this scenario, the responsibility for most security analysis and research would gradually shift from the sell side — with its present conflicted motives and unsatisfactory outcomes — to the buy side, independent and proprietary. Only time will tell whether this tectonic shift would lead to a larger research community or a smaller one. But the reality that makes the dilemma of research — who provides it, how much it costs, who bears that cost — so interesting is that there can be no seller without a buyer, and no buyer without a seller. One wins, the other loses.

其结果是，对整个市场而言，研究变成了一笔沉没成本，把零和游戏变成了输家游戏。华尔街和机构管理者花费数十亿美元用于研究，无疑获取了有用的信息，刺激了交易活动，并促进了流动性，但这一成本，连同金融中介的其他——甚至更高——的费用，注定了对于整体投资者来说，战胜市场仍将是一场输家游戏。

As a result, for the market as a whole, research is a dead-weight cost that turns a zero-sum game into a loser’s game. While the billions spent by Wall Street and institutional managers on research doubtless elicits useful information, stimulates trading activity, and fosters liquidity, its costs, along with all of the other — and even higher — costs of financial intermediation, guarantee that for investors as a whole, beating the market will remain a loser’s game.

那么，这种情况对个人投资者意味着什么？我的建议是遵守以下几条原则：1）认识到研究本身的不可靠性，持怀疑甚至愤世嫉俗的态度，不要指望它能帮你获得超额回报。2）要求充分披露——华尔街机构存在利益冲突的关系和信息流向，以及你的基金经理在投资组合监管和研究服务方面的投入程度与实际成效。3）理解游戏规则的本质，并尽可能广泛地分散投资。4）如果以上都不管用，那就跳过研究，直接买入全市场指数基金。然后一直持有——持有期限就是沃伦·巴菲特最喜欢的那种：永远。

So where does this scenario leave the individual investor? My advice is to follow these rules: 1) Recognize the fallibility of research and be skeptical, even cynical, that it will enable you to earn superior returns. 2) Demand disclosure — of conflicted Street relationships and information flows, and of the amounts and effectiveness of your fund manager’s portfolio supervisory and research services. 3) Understand the nature of the game, and diversify as broadly as you can. 4) If all else fails, skip the research and buy an all-market index fund. Then hold it for Warren Buffett’s favorite holding period: Forever.