皇帝的新共同基金

2003 · oped · 原文约 1408 词
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8/10/22, 9:40 PM The Bogle eBlog » Blog Archive » The Emperor’s New Mutual Funds The Wayback Machine - https://web.archive.org/web/20160808041342/http://johncbogle.com:80/wordpress/200… 皇帝的新共同基金 JCB - 2006 年 3 月 15 日 《华尔街日报》 – 2003 年 7 月 8 日 国会目前正在审议一项立法,旨在强化共同基金董事会对基金管理人的独立性,并要求向共同基金投资者披露成本。这两项措施都将提高基金投资者从金融市场回报中所获得的份额。

8/10/22, 9:40 PM The Bogle eBlog » Blog Archive » The Emperor’s New Mutual Funds The Wayback Machine - https://web.archive.org/web/20160808041342/http://johncbogle.com:80/wordpress/200… THE EMPEROR’S NEW MUTUAL FUNDS JCB - Mar 15, 2006 The Wall Street Journal – July 8, 2003 Congress is now considering legislation that would strengthen the independence of mutual-fund boards of directors from fund managers and require cost disclosures to mutual-fund investors. Both measures would serve to increase the share of financial-market returns that fund investors earn.

投资者似乎大多没有意识到,股票基金、债券基金和货币市场基金与其投资的市场回报之间存在巨大差距。例如,自 1984 年以来,标普 500 指数年均上涨 12.2%,而普通股票基金的平均回报率为 9.3%,仅为股市回报率的四分之三。债券基金获得的回报仅略高于债券市场回报的一小部分。货币市场基金的收益率则不到短期投资当前收益率的一半。

Investors seem largely unaware of the substantial gap by which stock, bond and money market funds lag the returns of the markets in which they invest. While the Standard and Poor’s 500 Stock Index has risen at a 12.2% average annual rate since 1984, for example, the average equity fund has grown at a 9.3% rate, only three-quarters of the stock market’s return. Bond funds have earned only a slightly higher fraction of bond market returns. And yields of money-market funds are less than one-half of the current yield on short-term investments.

这些缺口从何而来?它们主要是由共同基金产生的成本造成的。怎么可能不是这样呢?既然专业投资人士主导着金融市场,他们作为一个群体,在扣除成本之前必须赚取市场回报(零和游戏),而在扣除成本之后,他们的回报就会低于市场,金额恰好等于他们为徒劳地试图获得优势而付出的成本(输家的游戏)。

What accounts for these shortfalls? They are largely created by the costs incurred by mutual funds. How could it possibly be otherwise? With expert professional investors dominating the financial markets, as a group they must earn the market return before costs (a zero-sum game) and fall short of the market by the amount of the same costs they incur in the futile effort to gain an edge (a loser’s game).

参与这场游戏的成本高得惊人。其中包括共同基金的费用率,去年它达到了股票基金资产 1.6% 的历史最高水平。根据保守估计,换手成本又增加了 0.8 个百分点,因为基金投资组合证券的销售额现已超过股票基金资产的 100%。加上销售费用、自付费和其他费用的影响,普通股票基金的“全部”成本每年高达 3%——毫不奇怪,这非常接近 1984 年至 2002 年间共同基金年回报率落后股市的 2.9 个百分点。

The costs of playing the game are surprisingly large. They include mutual-fund expense ratios, which reached an all-time high of 1.6% of equity-fund assets last year. Turnover costs, by conservative estimates, total another eight-tenths of 1%, as fund sales of portfolio securities now exceed 100% of equity-fund assets. Adding the impact of sales charges, out-of-pocket fees, and other expenses, “all-in” costs for the average equity fund come to as much as 3% per year — not surprisingly, very close to the 2.9 percentage points by which the annual returns of mutual funds lagged the stock market during 1984-2002.

成本至关重要。因此,政策导向于加大成本披露力度的思路显而易见。根据待审立法要求,另外两条信息将极具价值:在基金的季度报表中,披露每位股东因直接基金费用而承担的成本的年化费率及实际美元金额;以及,披露投资组合换手成本相对于基金资产的比率。更多信息应当会带来更少成本。更低成本将提高共同基金在市场回报中获得的份额。但这只是共同基金问题的一部分。原本植根于对受托责任的关注,基金行业已逐渐转而专注于推销。曾经由高度多元化的股票基金主导,这些基金的回报往往与美国股市整体走势同步,而如今,每 10 只股票基金中有 8 只将其投资局限于特定的基准指数,如大盘成长股或小盘价值股,或者局限于窄幅行业板块,如科技和电信。

Costs matter. So directing policy toward greater cost disclosure seems obvious. Two additional pieces of information, required under the pending legislation, would be invaluable: A report in fund quarterly statements showing both the annual rate and the actual dollar amount of costs that each shareholder incurs in the form of direct fund expenses; and a statement of the cost of portfolio turnover relative to the fund’s assets. More information should lead to less cost.Lower costs will increase the share of market returns that mutual funds earn. But that is only part of the mutual-fund problem. Originally rooted in a focus on stewardship, the fund industry has gradually come to focus instead on salesmanship. Once dominated by highly-diversified equity funds whose returns tended to parallel the U.S. stock market itself, today eight of every 10 equity funds limit their investments to specific benchmarks like large-cap growth stocks or small-cap value stocks — or on narrow industry groups such as technology and telecommunication.

这令人眼花缭乱的选择范围——近 5000 只股票基金——对投资者并无益处。自 1984 年以来,普通股票基金投资者实现的回报平均每年仅为 2.7%,与普通基金 9.3% 的回报率相比,差距惊人。结果是,普通基金投资者获得的回报还不到股市年均 12.2% 回报率的四分之一。将这些年回报率在 1984 年至 2002 年期间进行复利计算,典型共同基金投资者的困境便一目了然:如附近图表所示,最初投入 1000 美元,在股市本身会产生 7910 美元的利润,在普通股票基金中会产生 4420 美元的利润,而在普通股票基金投资者手中仅能产生 660 美元的利润。

This bewildering array of choices among nearly 5,000 equity funds has ill served investors. The returns incurred by the average equity fund investor since 1984 have averaged just 2.7% per year, a shocking shortfall to the 9.3% return earned by the average fund. The result is that the average fund investor has earned less than one-quarter of the stock market’s 12.2% annual return. Compounding these annual returns over the 1984-2002 period presents a dramatic picture of the plight of the typical mutual-fund investor: As the chart nearby shows, $1,000 invested at the outset would have produced a profit of $7,910 in the stock market itself, a profit of $4,420 for the average equity fund, and a profit of just $660 for the average equity-fund investor.

8/10/22, 9:40 PM The Bogle eBlog » Blog Archive » The Emperor’s New Mutual Funds 基金行业协会——投资公司协会(Investment Company Institute)的官员们喜欢说,该行业从未发生过重大丑闻。但可以肯定的是,当普通股票基金投资者获得的回报仅为股市回报的十二分之一时,这本身就可以被视为一桩丑闻。这一惊人的缺口生动地说明了成本和糟糕选择对基金投资者回报的有害影响。尽管贪婪和恐惧驱使许多投资者做出错误选择,但基金行业却推出了利用这些情绪的新基金。随着股市泡沫膨胀,我们向投资者提供了 564 只新的科技、电信、互联网和激进增长型基金,这些基金专注于“新经济”。在 2000 年 3 月,一家主要金融杂志(恰逢市场顶峰)上,有 44 只基金为其业绩做广告,得意地宣扬过去 12 个月的平均回报率达 +85.6%。这是丑闻吗?

8/10/22, 9:40 PM The Bogle eBlog » Blog Archive » The Emperor’s New Mutual Funds Officials of the fund industry trade association, the Investment Company Institute, are fond of saying that the industry has never had a major scandal. But it is surely arguable that when the average equity-fund investor earns one-twelfth of the stock market’s return, that could itself be regarded as a scandal. The astonishing shortfall presents a striking illustration of the harmful impact that costs and poor selections have had on fund investors’ returns. While greed and fear drive many investors to make bad choices, the fund industry created new funds that played on those emotions. As the stock-market bubble inflated, we offered investors 564 new technology, telecom, Internet and aggressive growth funds that focused on the “new economy.” In the March 2000 issue of one leading financial magazine — right at the market’s peak — the 44 funds that advertised their performance were proudly hawking an average return for the previous 12 months of +85.6%. Scandal, or not?

由于未能履行良好的企业公民职责,这个行业对巨大的股市泡沫负有相当大的责任。几乎没有证据表明共同基金经理和证券分析师曾对公司治理中不断显现的缺陷表示过担忧——过高的高管薪酬、操纵利润、被管理层拉拢的会计师事务所,以及未能为所有者利益履职的董事。即使在泡沫破裂之后,基金的沉默也是出了名的。这个行业甚至反对美国证券交易委员会提出的建议,即向我们的股东披露我们在公司代理投票中如何投票他们的股份。

By our failure to act as good corporate citizens, this industry shares much of the responsibility for the great stock market bubble. There is little evidence that mutual-fund managers and security analysts were concerned about the developing flaws in corporate governance — excessive executive compensation, managed earnings, accounting firms co-opted by managements, and directors who failed to govern in the interests of owners. Even after the fall, the silence of the funds is legendary. This industry even fought the proposal by the Securities and Exchange Commission that we disclose to our own shareholders how we vote their shares in corporate proxies.

无论是否构成丑闻,我认为基金行业并没有充分履行其对共同基金投资者的法定受托责任。《1940 年投资公司法》序言的明确语言要求共同基金应“为了股东的利益而‘组织、运作(和)管理’”,而不是为了“董事、高管、投资顾问……承销商或经纪人”的利益。然而,由于大多数新基金的组织目的是为了吸纳资产并产生顾问费,并且在成本水平上运作到几乎排除了跑赢市场回报的可能性,因此,我们无法相信该序言中的标准得到了遵守。

Scandal or not, I believe that the fund industry has not adequately measured up to its statutory responsibilities of stewardship to mutual fund investors. The express language of the preamble to the Investment Company Act of 1940 calls for mutual funds to be “organized, operated (and) managed” in the interests of shareholders rather than in the interest of “directors, officers, investment advisers . . . underwriters or brokers.” Yet since most new funds are organized to bring in assets and generate advisory fees, and operated at cost levels that virtually preclude market-beating returns, it is impossible to believe the standards of that preamble are being honored.

通过要求将独立基金董事人数增加到董事会的三分之二,并设立独立董事担任基金主席,拟议的立法应能改善基金治理。目前的情况是,基金顾问通常由基金投资顾问公司的负责人担任,这在基金管理公司的遴选和薪酬方面构成了不可接受的利益冲突。沃伦·巴菲特说得好:“和自己谈判很少会引发酒吧斗殴。”

By calling for an increase in the number of independent fund directors to two-thirds of the board and an independent director as fund chairman, the proposed legislation should improve fund governance. The present situation, in which the fund adviser is typically the head of the fund’s investment adviser, presents an unacceptable conflict of interest in the selection and compensation of fund management companies. Warren Buffett said it well: “Negotiating with oneself seldom produces a barroom brawl.”

8/10/22, 9:40 PM The Bogle eBlog » Blog Archive » The Emperor’s New Mutual Funds 总体而言,立法中要求的费用披露和增强董事独立性,应有助于限制未来基金费用率的上涨,或许还能有助于抑制基金过度激进的营销。但我认为,还应对 1940 年法案进行修订,以明确要求所有基金董事(无论是独立董事还是关联董事)都承担一种明确的受托责任,即严格按照序言所要求的方式行事:一种将基金股东的利益置于基金经理和承销商利益之上的受托责任。

8/10/22, 9:40 PM The Bogle eBlog » Blog Archive » The Emperor’s New Mutual Funds Together, the expense disclosure and increased director independence called for in the legislation should help limit future increases in fund expense ratios and perhaps help to mute the over-zealous marketing of funds. But I believe that the 1940 act should also be amended to call for an express standard of fiduciary duty on the part of all fund directors — independent and affiliated alike — to act in precisely the manner called for by the preamble: A fiduciary duty to place the interests of fund shareholders ahead of the interests of fund managers and underwriters.

在我看来,我整个 52 年职业生涯都在其中度过的这个行业,患有一种严重的“皇帝的新衣”综合症。我们看不到那些只要睁开眼睛就能看清的事实。虽然我相信我们行业的领导者是有能力、诚实的人,但他们所掌管基金管理公司拥有的强大经济利益,似乎已经使他们对上述现实视而不见。

The industry that I have been a part of for my entire 52-year business career, it seems to me, has a severe case of the Emperor’s New Clothes syndrome. We fail to see what is obvious to all who would only open their eyes. While I’m confident that our industry’s leaders are capable, honest human beings, the powerful financial interests that they hold in the companies that manage the funds seem to have blinded them to the realities I’ve described.

从长远来看,这个行业只有让基金股东获得公平待遇,才能实现增长——不仅在成本和披露方面,还在于拥有真正将股东利益放在首位的独立董事。说实话,这个行业需要一次观念转变,我们的焦点应从优先考虑管理者的利益转向优先考虑股东的利益。国会无法强制这种观念转变,我们必须出于自身明智的自我利益来实现这一点。那么,正如 1940 年法案所追求的那样,共同基金将再次履行其使命,服务于“国家公共利益和投资者的利益”。

In the long run, this industry will grow only as fund shareholders are given a fair shake, not only in costs and disclosure, but also in having truly independent directors who place their interests first. Truth told, this industry needs a change of heart, one in which our very focus moves from placing the interests of managers first to placing the interests of shareholders first. Congress can’t mandate such a change of heart, we must do that in our own enlightened self-interest. Then, just as the 1940 act sought, mutual funds will once again honor their mission to serve “the national public interest and the interest of investors.”

1 条评论 评论 dlmrgnk - 2006 年 7 月 1 日 我的英雄!!

1 COMMENT COMMENTS dlmrgnk - Jul 01, 2006 My hero!!

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