公平对待还是敲诈?

2004 · oped · 原文约 1209 词
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8/10/22, 9:37 PM 博格 eBlog » 博客存档 » 公平对待还是敲竹杠?

8/10/22, 9:37 PM The Bogle eBlog » Blog Archive » Fair Shake or Shakedown?

互联网档案(Wayback Machine)- https://web.archive.org/web/20160808040025/http://johncbogle.com:80/wordpress/200… 公平对待还是敲竹杠?

The Wayback Machine - https://web.archive.org/web/20160808040025/http://johncbogle.com:80/wordpress/200… FAIR SHAKE OR SHAKEDOWN?

JCB - 2006 年 3 月 15 日 《华尔街日报》– 2004 年 7 月 8 日 近日本报称之为“1940 年颁布的一部奇怪法律”的《投资公司法》,是现代共同基金行业的基石。该法要求基金必须“以基金股东的利益为出发点进行组织、运营和管理”,而不是以其管理人和销售商的利益为核心。

JCB - Mar 15, 2006 The Wall Street Journal – July 8, 2004 Recently described on these pages as “a strange law enacted in 1940,” the Investment Company Act is the foundation of the modern mutual-fund industry. It requires that funds be “organized, operated, and managed” in the interests of fund shareholders, rather than in the interests of their managers and distributors.

然而,这部法律的“奇怪”之处,并不在于它有效确认了 1940 年前的标准,即明确将基金公司与其聘用的管理公司分离开来——后者为基金提供其生存所需的行政、投资咨询和销售服务。相反,奇怪之处在于,该法未能建立起一种有助于实现其崇高目标的结构:把基金投资者放在首位。

What is “strange” about the law, however, is not that it effectively ratified the pre-1940 Act standard that clearly separated the fund corporation from the management corporation that it employs to provide it with the administrative, investment advisory and distribution services it requires to exist. Rather, what is strange is that the Act failed to establish a structure that would facilitate the realization of its noble purpose: Put the fund investor first.

上个月,美国证券交易委员会(SEC)勇敢地迈出了实现这一目标的第一步,通过了一项规则,要求基金董事会主席必须与管理公司无关联——实质上就是独立于管理公司。

Last month, a courageous Securities and Exchange Commission took the first major step in accomplishing that goal, adopting a rule that requires the chairman of a fund’s board of directors to be unaffiliated with — essentially, independent of — the management company.

基金投资者需要时间来从这一要求中受益。但仅凭这一点,并不足以纠正现有的结构,在这种结构中,管理公司控制着基金,决定了它为基金提供其生存所需所有服务的合同条款。基金治理还需要进一步的重组。

It will take time for fund investors to benefit from that requirement. But standing alone, it is not enough to redress the existing structure in which the manager controls the fund, dictating the contractual terms under which it provides all of the services the fund requires in order to exist. It will also take further restructuring in fund governance.

一个理想的治理结构首先要求独立董事拥有更大的代表权,而 SEC 的新规则要求董事会中至少 75% 必须是独立董事,这是又一个前进步伐。其次,由于单个基金董事通常同时监督同一集团中多达 100 至 300 只不同的共同基金,基金董事需要一个独立的员工团队,为董事会提供不带偏见的信息,包括对集团内每只基金的投资回报、风险、管理费、费用比率和资金流动的分析。(新规则授权但不强制要求设立这样的员工团队。)

An ideal governance structure requires, first, a far heavier representation of independent directors, and the new SEC rule requires that at least 75% of a board be independent, another forward step. Second, since individual fund directors often simultaneously oversee as many as 100 to 300 separate mutual funds in a given group, fund directors need an independent staff to provide to the board unbiased information that includes analysis of the investment returns, risks, management fees, expense ratios and capital flows for each of the funds in the complex. (The new rule authorizes, but does not require, such a staff.)

第三,这一结构必须辅以在 1940 年法案中增加的受托责任法定标准,要求董事确保基金确实是“以所有者的利益为出发点进行组织、运营和管理”。这样的标准还应提供指导方针,帮助董事履行其受托人职责。

Third, this structure must be buttressed by a statutory standard of fiduciary duty added to the 1940 Act requiring directors to assure that funds are, yes, “organized, operated, and managed” in the interests of their owners. Such a standard should also provide guidelines for aiding directors in carrying out their trusteeship responsibilities.

基金行业及其说客们强烈辩称,共同基金不需要这种独立的监督。“相信我们,”管理人说,“我们会做正确的事,因为我们的声誉岌岌可危。”而且,正如最近的丑闻所显示的那样,声誉风险绝不容忽视。投资者已经从那些管理人辜负了股东信任的基金中撤出了超过 1000 亿美元。但这些丑闻只是冰山一角,基金所有者的利益屈从于基金管理人利益的现象远比这严重。

The fund industry and its lobbyists vigorously argue that mutual funds need no such independent oversight. “Trust us,” say the managers, “we’ll do what’s right because our reputation is at stake.” And, as the recent scandals have shown, reputation risk is hardly to be ignored. Investors have pulled more than $100 billion out of the funds whose managers have betrayed their shareholder’s trust. But these scandals represent only the tip of the iceberg in which the interests of fund owners are subservient to those of fund managers.

在共同基金行业,仅靠市场力量已被证明是纠正不良行为的微弱手段。随着资产收集取代审慎管理成为行业的主要焦点,基金费用上升,近 500 只主要属于投机性质的“新经济”基金在近期泡沫顶峰时被组织并推向市场。基金失败率飙升,仅在过去十年里就有大约 1900 只股票基金消失,湮没在历史的尘埃中,通常被并入同一管理下的其他表现更好的基金。

In the mutual-fund industry, relying solely on market forces has proved to be a weak remedy for bad behavior. As asset-gathering replaced prudent management as the industry’s prime focus, fund expenses rose and nearly 500 new, largely speculative, “new economy” funds were organized and offered at the recent bubble’s peak. The fund failure rate soared, with some 1,900 equity funds disappearing in the last decade alone, lost in the dustbin of history, often merged with other, better performing funds, under the same management.

如果人们接受这样的观点:共同基金只是另一种消费品,而且消费者一朝被蛇咬(他们辛苦积攒的退休储蓄被摧毁)就会十年怕井绳,那么尽管现有结构几乎达不到法定目标,它也还可以接受。但如果人们相信,对他人金钱的管理责任是一种神圣的信托,那么现在正是基金行业进行结构改革的时候了。因为允许基金以管理公司的利益而非所有者的利益为出发点进行组织、运营和管理,基金行业已经违背了 1940 年法案的原则。

If one accepts the idea that mutual funds are just another consumer product, and that consumers once burned — their hard-earned retirement savings devastated — will be twice shy, the present industry structure, although it hardly meets the statutory goal, is fine. But if one believes that the stewardship responsibility for other people’s money is a sacred trust, it is high time for structural reform in the fund industry. For by allowing funds to be organized, operated and managed in the interests of their management companies rather than their owners, the fund industry has defied the principles of the 1940 Act.

很少有人费心去审视管理人们从基金投资者的回报中攫取的高额惩罚。例如,在过去十年中,尽管股票市场的平均年回报率为 11.1%,但普通股票基金仅提供了 8.6% 的回报——两者相差 2.5 个百分点,大致相当于基金承担的沉重的销售费用、管理费、运营费用以及投资组合换手成本所造成的损耗。(基金臭名昭著的税收低效率还会再吞噬几个百分点。)

Few have taken the trouble to examine the heavy penalties that managers have extracted from the returns earned by fund investors. During the past decade, for example, while the stock market has returned an average of 11.1% per year, the average equity fund has delivered just 8.6% — a 2.5 percentage-point shortfall roughly equivalent to the drain of the heavy sales charges, management fees and operating expenses, and portfolio turnover costs it incurred. (The notorious tax inefficiency of funds would extract several additional percentage points.)

8/10/22, 9:37 PM 博格 eBlog » 博客存档 » 公平对待还是敲竹杠?

8/10/22, 9:37 PM The Bogle eBlog » Blog Archive » Fair Shake or Shakedown?

更糟糕的是,普通股票基金投资者实际获得的回报远远低于普通基金已经低得令人无法接受的净回报。最近对 100 只最大股票基金的股东回报(按美元加权)与普通基金回报(按时间加权)进行的比较显示,那个 8.6% 的数字会降至仅 6.2%。要理解这一巨大差距的严重性,可以设想一下:10,000 美元以 11.1% 的回报率复利增长 10 年,将增加 18,650 美元;而以 6.2% 的回报率增长,仅增加 8,250 美元——积累的资本竟惊人地少了 56%。

To make matters worse, the returns earned by the average equity fund investor fell far short of that already unacceptably low net return achieved by the average fund. A recent comparison of the shareholder (dollar-weighted) returns of the 100 largest equity funds with the average fund (time-weighted) returns would have reduced that 8.6% figure to just 6.2%. To understand the enormity of that shortfall, consider that an 11.1% return on $10,000, compounded over 10 years, grows by $18,650, while a 6.2% return grows by just $8,250 — an astonishing shortfall of 56% in accumulated capital.

行业巨头富达管理公司(Fidelity Management)最近赞助了一项研究——其在维持导致这一惊人差距的现状方面拥有巨大的经济利益——该研究声称,由关联人士担任主席的基金为其所有者带来了更好的业绩,而且成本更低。但这项研究存在严重缺陷。只需重新定义类别,就会发现该项研究实际上表明,由银行和券商运营的 889 只基金提供的回报是最差的。另外 1326 只由关联人士担任主席的基金提供的回报稍好一些,但几乎与另外 89 只由独立人士担任主席的基金的结果相同。

A recent study sponsored by industry giant Fidelity Management — which has a huge economic stake in maintaining the status quo that produced that grotesque shortfall — purported to show that funds with affiliated chairmen produced better performance for their owners, and with lower costs. But the study was badly flawed. By simply redefining the categories, one discovers that the study actually showed that the 889 funds run by banks and brokers provided by far the worst returns. The 1,326 other funds with affiliated chairmen provided returns that were somewhat better, but virtually identical to the results produced by the 89 other funds with independent chairmen.

此外,在富达的榜单顶端——遥遥领先——是那 75 只不允许任何投资顾问代表进入董事会的基金。(充分披露:所有这些基金都是先锋集团(Vanguard Group)的成员,该集团由我创办,目前仍由基金自身拥有的管理公司以成本价运营和管理。)

Moreover, at the top of the Fidelity list — by a wide margin — were the 75 funds that do not allow even a single representative of their investment adviser to serve on their boards. (Full disclosure: All of these funds are members of the Vanguard Group, which I organized and which is still operated and managed on an at-cost basis by a management company owned by the funds themselves.)

迟早会有一家基金组织认识到,这种结构是回应 1940 年法案原始原则的一种明显方式——尽管人性使然、惯性使然,这无疑还需要很长时间。因此,以更独立的董事会结构为起点的新标准,绝不会就此止步。

It’s only a matter of time — although, human nature and inertia being what they are, doubtless a long time — before a second fund organization recognizes that such a structure is one obvious response to the 1940 Act’s original principles. So the developing new standards that have now begun with a more independent board structure hardly end there.

资本主义的核心应该是为那些提供资本并承担风险的人获取股权投资的收益。历史记录表明,基金管理人不可能声称他们为我们的 9100 万持有共同基金的公民实现了这一目标。现在是把他们的利益置于核心位置的时候了,而不是任由基金管理人的私利横行。这一切都关乎给股东一个公平的对待。0 条评论 www.johncbogle.com 上发表的观点不一定代表先锋集团现任管理层的立场。© 版权所有 2006-2011 约翰·C·博格

Capitalism ought to be about capturing the benefits of equity investment for those who put up the capital and take the risks. The record makes it impossible for fund managers to assert that they have achieved that goal for our 91 million citizens who own mutual funds. It is high time to put their interests front and center, rather than allowing the self-interest of fund managers to prevail. It’s all about giving the shareowner a fair shake. 0 COMMENTS The opinions presented in www.johncbogle.com do not necessarily represent those of Vanguard's current management. © Copyright 2006-2011 by John C. Bogle