斯皮策效应
2016 年 8 月 8 日,下午 9:36 The Bogle eBlog » 博客存档 » 斯皮策效应 Wayback Machine - https://web.archive.org/web/20160808040626/http://johncbogle.com:80/wordpress/200…
斯皮策效应
JCB - 2006 年 3 月 15 日
《华尔街日报》– 2004 年 11 月 18 日
“刚刚结束的金融时代中,大多数错误和重大过失,都将归咎于未能遵守信托原则——这条如同圣经般古老的诫命:‘没有人能侍奉两个主人’……那些名义上担任受托人,却把所管理资金所有者的利益放在最后考虑的人,说明我们已经多么严重地忽视了这一原则的必要内涵。”
8/10/22, 9:36 PM The Bogle eBlog » Blog Archive » The Spitzer Effect The Wayback Machine - https://web.archive.org/web/20160808040626/http://johncbogle.com:80/wordpress/200… THE SPITZER EFFECT JCB - Mar 15, 2006 The Wall Street Journal – November 18, 2004 “Most of the mistakes and major faults of the financial era that has just drawn to a close will be ascribed to the failure to observe the fiduciary principle, the precept as old as holy writ, that `no man can serve two masters’ . . . . Those who serve nominally as trustees but consider only last the interests of those whose funds they command suggests how far we have ignored the necessary implications of the principle.”
美国最高法院大法官哈兰·菲斯克·斯通于 1934 年写下这段话。如今,纽约州那位斗志昂扬的司法部长埃利奥特·斯皮策也完全可以信手写出同样的文字。一开始几乎孤军作战,他让聚光灯照向了近年以来太多金融中介机构不道德的行为。
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Harlan Fiske Stone wrote those words in 1934. Today, they could have been as easily written by New York State’s crusading attorney general Eliot Spitzer. At first almost alone, he turned the spotlight on the unprincipled conduct of too many financial intermediaries during the recent era.
他铲除金融服务机构与客户之间利益冲突的行动,始于 2001 年针对华尔街投资银行家,2003 年扩展到共同基金经理,上个月又将保险经纪人纳入其中。虽然用这位总检察长挥舞的刷子给整个金融领域抹黑有失公允,但违规行为不仅普遍存在,而且是由每个领域中历史最悠久、规模最大、曾备受尊敬的一些公司所实施的。
His campaign to eliminate conflicts of interest between service providers and their clients began with Wall Street investment bankers in 2001, spread to mutual fund managers in 2003, and last month enveloped insurance brokers. While it would be unfair to tarnish the entire financial field with the brush wielded by the attorney general, the misconduct was not only rife, but practiced by some of the oldest, largest and once most respected firms in each of those fields.
他攻击的那些做法,在业内人士眼中早已是公开的秘密,甚至常常被视为正常的商业惯例。例如,在华尔街,分析师对自己认为毫无价值的股票,却发布称赞其“研究”报告的情况并不罕见,其目的往往是为了抬高首次公开发行(IPO)的价格,或争取投资银行客户。
The practices he attacked were open secrets to industry insiders, indeed often accepted as the normal way of doing business. On Wall Street, for example, it was hardly unusual for analysts to publish glowing “research” reports on stocks of companies that they believed were junk, often with the objective of puffing initial public offerings or winning investment-banking clients.
在共同基金行业,基金经理们通过协助和纵容基金份额的短线投机者大搞择时交易和跨时区套利,肥了自己的腰包——而每一分钱的代价都出在长期持有者身上。在保险经纪领域,串通投标和或有佣金(也就是所谓的“优先服务协议”)被用来迫使保险公司向经纪商支付回扣,以此换取获得业务的机会。
In the mutual fund industry, managers enriched their own coffers by aiding and abetting short-term speculators in fund shares to engage in widespread market-timing and time-zone trading, at the dollar-for-dollar expense of their long-term owners. In insurance brokerage, bid-rigging and contingent commissions — “preferred service agreements” — were used to force insurance companies to pay rebates to brokers as a quid pro quo for winning the business.
金融服务业中这些普遍存在的利益冲突案例,是对公众信任的背叛。受托管理他人资金的人,承担着将客户利益置于自身利益之上的受托责任,而代他人管理资金的人也不例外。“客户至上”这一在任何行业都显而易见的准则,在处理他人钱财的行业中具有全新的强制性要求。为什么?因为金融领域为客户提供的价值,主要用美元和美分来衡量。
These pervasive examples of conflicts of interest in the financial services field are violations of the public trust. Trustees who accept the responsibility for other people’s money have a fiduciary duty to place the client’s interest ahead of their own, and those who handle money for others no less so. “Put the client first,” an obvious rule for any business, takes on a whole new imperative in the profession of handling other people’s money. Why? Because the value provided to clients in the financial field is measured largely in dollars and cents.
与食品、电视机、汽车和香水等消费品不同——这些产品的价值既取决于内在价值,也取决于满意度和风格——金融服务的价值——经纪账户的表现、共同基金的投资回报、房主险的保障金额、人寿保险的面额——都可以用美元和美分精确衡量。而提供这些服务的成本——咨询费与运营开支、保险保费、销售佣金——同样可以用美元和美分精确衡量。
Unlike consumer products such as food, television sets, automobiles and perfume, for example, whose value is measured as much by satisfaction and style as by intrinsic worth, the value of a financial service — the performance of a brokerage account, the investment return on a mutual fund, the amount covered by a homeowner’s policy, the face amount of a life insurance policy — can be precisely measured in dollars and cents. And the cost of providing that service — the advisory fees and operating expenses, the policy premiums, the sales commissions — can be precisely measured in dollars and cents as well.
产品成本直接影响产品价值,这恰恰是金融服务公司能否良好服务客户的核心所在。成本至关重要。因此,要向客户提供实实在在、真金白银的价值,就必须以公平、合理且具有竞争力的价格来提供金融服务。如果客户希望在预算范围内做出最佳选择,从而保护自己的资产和财产,那么完全透明的定价就至关重要。
The fact that product cost directly impacts product value lies at the very heart of how well financial service firms serve their clients. Costs matter. So providing real, honest-to-God, dollars-and-cents value to our clients requires offering our financial services at fair, reasonable, and competitively determined prices. If our clients are to make the best possible choices within their budgets as they seek to protect their assets and property, fully disclosed pricing is essential.
由于成本与价值之间这种独特的关系,那些把信任托付给金融服务业机构的众多美国家庭,理应向斯皮策先生及其团队喝彩。然而,在我们这套自由市场资本主义体系中,公平开放的竞争会同时给价格和利润带来压力,因此,这些服务提供商——即便不是全部,也是多数——正在对这群意志坚定的监管者口诛笔伐。
As a result of that unique relationship between cost and value, the vast multitude of American families who have placed their trust in their financial service providers must be applauding Mr. Spitzer and his staff. But since fair and open competition in our system of free-market capitalism puts pressure on prices and profits alike, many, if not most, providers of those services are excoriating these determined regulators.
他们的批评很大程度上是基于检察长援引了纽约州多年前制定的、且初衷迥异的法律条款。对于券商和基金管理人,援引的是 1924 年的《马丁法案》——这部“蓝天”法最初旨在打击本世纪初泛滥的“赌场式经纪行”。对于保险经纪人,则援引了 1893 年的《唐纳利法案》——这部“小谢尔曼”反垄断法旨在阻止合谋与操纵价格。
Much of their criticism has been based on the attorney general’s reliance on New York statutes adopted long ago, for rather different purposes. For brokers and fund managers, it was the Martin Act of 1924, a “Blue Sky” law originally designed to prosecute the “bucket shops” that were rife in the early part of the century. For insurance brokers, it was the Donnelly Act of 1893, a “Baby Sherman” antitrust act designed to block collusion and price-fixing.
2022 年 8 月 10 日,晚上 9 点 36 分,博格尔电子博客 » 档案 » 斯皮策效应即使一条法律已 100 年未被使用,它仍然是法律。想想我们的美国宪法,在 217 年前获得批准,至今仍耸立如一座纪念碑,见证着我们对“促进公共福利”的承诺。斯皮策先生对公共利益的积极追求,在州法律下似乎完全恰当,并且也与这一国家承诺完全一致。
8/10/22, 9:36 PM The Bogle eBlog » Blog Archive » The Spitzer Effect Even if it has not been used for 100 years, however, a law is a law. Consider our United States Constitution, ratified 217 years ago and still standing today as a monument to our commitment to “protect the general welfare.” Mr. Spitzer’s aggressive pursuit of the public interest seems entirely appropriate under state law, and wholly consistent with that national commitment as well.
将州检察长描述为“有政治野心”或许没错。但毫无疑问,大多数能干的州检察长都“有当州长的野心”,就像大多数能干的记者都“有拿普利策奖的野心”,科学家都“有当诺贝尔奖得主的野心”一样。这值得称赞!而当我们形容自己的商人和企业家有雄心创建公司、创造经济价值时,通常也是一种赞誉。斯皮策先生理应受到同样的对待。
The description of the attorney general as “politically ambitious” may well be accurate. But doubtless most capable state attorneys general are “governor-ambitious,” even as most capable journalists are “Pulitzer-ambitious,” and scientists “Nobel-laureate-ambitious.” Bless them! And when we describe our businessmen and entrepreneurs as ambitious to build firms and create economic value, it’s usually meant as a compliment. Mr. Spitzer is entitled to the same treatment.
虽然“斯皮策效应”直接聚焦于那个时代的丑闻,但它也提醒我们必须关注驱动这些丑闻的力量。金融服务业的结构发生了巨大变化。这个领域曾由一系列独立且主要为私有的专业公司主导,如今却被大型商业集团控制,这些集团的利益横跨多种广泛的服务——这些服务本身往往涉及利益冲突,包括商业与投资银行、股票经纪和共同基金、保险与咨询,而这仅仅是冰山一角。
While the “Spitzer effect” focuses directly on the scandals of the era, it also points to our need to attend to the forces that have driven them. Vast changes have taken place in the structure of the financial services field. Once dominated by a series of free-standing and largely privately held professional firms, it is now dominated by giant business conglomerates whose interests span a variety of wide-ranging services which themselves often entail conflicts — commercial and investment banking; stock brokerage and mutual funds; insurance and consulting, a list that only scratches the surface.
当然,这些金融巨头的管理层和董事们对本公司股东负有受托义务。但他们同时还负有另一项直接冲突的义务——为另一个主人服务:他们控制下的共同基金的持有人、保单持有者,以及经纪业务的客户。
Of course, the officers and directors of these financial titans have a fiduciary duty to serve the shareholders of their own firms. But they also have a directly conflicting duty to serve another master: the shareholders of the mutual funds they control; the holders of their insurance policies; the customers of their brokerages.
斯皮策先生揭示了这种平衡被扭曲到了何种地步。当一家全国最大银行的首席执行官宣布,希望通过“交叉销售”将该银行资产管理集团贡献的收入占比从 7% 翻倍时,他便启动了一连串几乎注定结局的事件。经理们卷起袖子,努力去实现这个目标。看看一家公司的这一系列邮件吧:“市场择时……对基金经理和基金运营造成了极大破坏。(然而)你来自销售方面的要求……我不想拒绝 1000 万到 2000 万美元……这符合我们的最佳利益(为公司增加盈利能力)。”
Mr. Spitzer has revealed how badly that balance has been distorted. When the chief executive of one of the nation’s largest banks announces his goal of doubling the 7% share of the bank’s revenues provided by the asset management group by “cross selling,” he sets into motion a chain of events whose outcome is almost foreordained. Managers roll up their sleeves and try to make it happen. Witness this series of e-mails at one firm: “Market timing . . . is very disruptive to the portfolio managers and operations of the fund. (However) your call from the sales side . . . I don’t want to turn away $10-$20 million . . . it’s in our best interests (increased profitability to the firm).”
斯皮策先生及其他州的同行,在州证券监管机构和美国证券交易委员会的配合下,采取了建设性行动来恢复这一平衡。许多背弃公众信任的“坏苹果”已被起诉、罚款并受到惩处。但这还不够。剩下的“好苹果”责任重大,必须以自己的品格为赌注,首先必须认识到,那个装着所有好苹果和坏苹果的金融服务木桶本身,亟需修补。
In taking constructive action to restore that balance, Mr. Spitzer and his counterparts in other states have been joined by state securities regulators and the Securities and Exchange Commission. Many of the “bad apples” that have betrayed the public trust have been indicted, fined and penalized. But that’s not enough. It’s the responsibility of the “good apples” that remain to put their own character on the line, beginning with the recognition that the financial services barrel that holds all those apples — good and bad alike — is badly in need of repair.
金融业领袖们早该承认近些年的错误与过失,并建立一套'最佳实践',以维护、保护和捍卫客户及委托人的利益。但不仅是为他们服务,也是为自己服务。任何金融服务公司,若不能保持其品格——以诚信经营、负责任的行为、先人后己——都无法实现长期的成功。
It’s high time that our financial leaders acknowledge the mistakes and faults of the recent era and establish “best practices” that preserve, protect, and defend the interests of their customers and clients. But not only to serve them. To serve themselves. Without maintaining its character — operating with integrity, responsible conduct, and service to others before service to self — no financial service firm can achieve long-term success.
这并非易事。正如德摩斯梯尼在两千五百年前警告我们的:“没有什么比自欺欺人更容易。因为一个人希望什么,他便也会相信什么。”承认错误需要品格;内省同样需要;改变现状同样需要;勇气同样需要。但如果那些确实拥有品格的金融服务业领袖——这样的人有很多——对已经发生的事件承担责任,我们就能开始采取必要步骤,将受托责任的高贵品质重新置于我们优先列表中的首要位置。0 条评论,www.johncbogle.com 上发表的观点并不一定代表先锋集团当前管理层的意见。© 版权所有 2006-2011 约翰·C·博格尔。
It will not be easy. As Demosthenes warned us two-and-a-half millennia ago, “Nothing is easier than self-deceit. For what each man wishes, that he also believes to be true.” Admitting mistakes requires character; so does introspection; so does changing the status quo; so does courage. But if our financial service leaders who do have character — and there are many of them — accept responsibility for what has happened, we can begin to take the necessary steps to restore the nobility of fiduciary duty to its pre-eminent place on our priority list. 0 COMMENTS The opinions presented in www.johncbogle.com do not necessarily represent those of Vanguard's current management. © Copyright 2006-2011 by John C. Bogle