个人股东的惊人消失

2005 · oped · 原文约 1535 词
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8/10/22, 9:34 PM The Bogle eBlog » Blog Archive » The Amazing Disappearance of the Individual Stockholder The Wayback Machine - https://web.archive.org/web/20160808040621/http://johncbogle.com:80/wordpress/200… 个人股东的惊人消失 JCB - 2006 年 3 月 15 日 《华尔街日报》 – 2005 年 10 月 3 日 个人股东作为美国股市支柱的惊人消失,是过去半个世纪中最不被察觉、但影响最为深远的趋势之一。如下表所示,美国家庭直接持股的比例已从 1950 年的 91% 下降到今天的仅 32%。

8/10/22, 9:34 PM The Bogle eBlog » Blog Archive » The Amazing Disappearance of the Individual Stockholder The Wayback Machine - https://web.archive.org/web/20160808040621/http://johncbogle.com:80/wordpress/200… THE AMAZING DISAPPEARANCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STOCKHOLDER JCB - Mar 15, 2006 The Wall Street Journal – October 3, 2005 The amazing disappearance of the individual stockholder as the backbone of the U.S. stock market has been one of the least recognized but most profound trends of the last half-century. As shown in the chart nearby, direct ownership of stocks by American households has declined from 91% in 1950 to just 32% today.

1950 年金融机构持有 9% 的股份,到了 1983 年突破了 50% 的门槛,如今则占到全部股票的 68%。很难想象我们早期由个人持股主导的那个社会还能重新回来。

The 9% ownership stake held by financial institutions in 1950 crossed the 50% mark in 1983, and now totals 68% of all stocks. It is hard to imagine that our earlier society dominated by individual stock ownership will ever return.

当然,个人投资者依然是股市的重要参与者,但现在他们主要是通过共同基金、公共及私人养老金计划来参与。但这种参与方式缺乏传统的所有权特征,比如选择个股、参与公司治理过程。

Of course individual investors remain major participants in the stock market, but now do so largely through mutual funds and public and private pension plans. But such participation lacks the traditional attributes of ownership such as selection of individual stocks and engagement in the process of corporate governance.

但是,我们的金融机构难道不是股票的拥有者吗?并非如此。它们在名义上是所有者,但实际上只是代理人,负有代表其委托人行事的责任——这些委托人包括我们的共同基金持有人和退休计划的受益人。当今以代理为主导的投资社会,绝大多数是由这两类最终所有者构成的。

But aren’t our financial institutions owners of stocks? Not really. They are owners in name, but in fact are agents with a duty to act on behalf of their principals, including our mutual fund owners and beneficiaries of our retirement plans. Today’s agency-dominated investment society is overwhelmingly composed of those two groups of underlying owners.

起初,机构化的进程由养老金计划引领。1950 年,养老金计划持有的股票占比不到 1%,这一比例在 1980 年飙升至 19%,1989 年至 1995 年间达到 27%,随后回落至如今的 21%。相比之下,共同基金的持股比例在早期多年停滞不前——1950 年和 1980 年均为 3%,到 1990 年也仅升至 8%。但自那以后,基金持股比例一路攀升,目前达到创纪录的 28%。

At first, the march toward institutionalization was led by pension plans. Holding less than 1% of all stocks in 1950, they shot up to 19% in 1980 and 27% in 1989-95, only to ebb to today’s level of 21%. Growth in mutual-fund ownership, on the other hand, was stagnant in the early years, holding at 3% in 1950 and 1980 alike, rising to just 8% by 1990. Since then, fund ownership of stocks has risen relentlessly to a record high of 28% currently.

在养老金板块中,公共养老金计划保持稳定,而私人养老金计划则逐步萎缩。但固定收益型养老金计划的长期下滑,已被固定缴款型节俭与储蓄计划的同步增长所抵消——这类计划的主要组成部分是共同基金。因此,当前共同基金占据主导地位的股票持有模式,似乎注定会继续扩张。

Within the pension segment, public plans are holding steady while private pension plans are gradually receding. But the secular decline in defined-benefit pension plans has been matched by an offsetting rise in defined-contribution thrift and savings plans in which mutual funds are the major component. So today’s dominant stock ownership by mutual funds seems destined for continued growth.

机构投资如今大体上已是巨头的游戏。仅美国规模最大的 100 家资产管理公司,就持有全部股票的 58%。当这样一个相对小众的专业经理人群体,大规模取代了分散的数千万零散个人投资者时,人们或许会期望这些经理人更积极地主张其股东权利,并要求公司治理更开明地聚焦于股东利益。然而,除了少数值得注意的例外(部分州及地方养老金计划、工会以及 TIAA-CREF),我们的机构投资者一直避免积极参与公司事务。

Institutional investing is now largely the business of giants. America’s 100 largest money managers alone now hold 58% of all stocks. When such a relative handful of professional managers substantially displaces a diffuse group of tens of millions of inchoate individual investors, one might have expected the managers to more aggressively assert their rights of stock ownership and demand more enlightened corporate governance focused 8/10/22, 9:34 PM The Bogle eBlog » Blog Archive » The Amazing Disappearance of the Individual Stockholder on shareholder interests. With few notable exceptions, however (some state and local pension plans, unions, and TIAA-CREF), our institutional investors have refrained from active participation in corporate affairs.

是什么原因导致这些事实上掌控着美国企业界的机构如此被动?首先,太多的金融代理人要为自己的利益服务,这些利益往往与其投资委托人(principal)的利益相冲突。一个不争的事实是:委托人照看自己钱财的细心程度,远超他们作为他人代理人时照看受托资产的用心程度。当需要服务于多位主人时,那位付给仆人报酬的主人,其利益最有可能被摆在首位。

What explains the passivity of these institutions that in fact hold effective control over corporate America? First, too many of our financial agents have their own interests to serve, often conflicting with the interests of their investor-principals. It is a truism that principals are likely to watch over their own money with far more care than they take in watching over the assets entrusted to them as the agents of others. When there are many masters to serve, it is the master who pays the servant whose interests are most likely placed front and center.

例如,公司养老金计划由那些薪酬取决于其向股东报告的利润的高管掌控。在 1990 年代,他们随意提高了对未来养老金计划回报的预期,从而提升了经营利润,以满足“指引”目标,即便此时利率不断下降,预期回报也在持续缩水。

Corporate pension plans, for example, are controlled by the same executives whose compensation is based on the earnings they report to shareholders. During the 1990s, they arbitrarily raised their projections of future pension plan returns, enhancing operating earnings to meet “guidance” targets, even as interest rates tumbled and prospective returns eroded.

同样地,共同基金经理的薪酬来自另一家追求自身资本回报最大化的公司(即增进其自身的财富),这与他们应尽的职责——为基金股东托付的资本实现最大回报——形成了直接冲突。过去二十年,为换取券商销售支持而支付的过高顾问费、运营开支、沉重的销售佣金以及证券组合交易的高额手续费,吞掉了基金组合实际收益的大约 45%。

Similarly, mutual fund managers are compensated by separate corporations seeking to maximize the return on their own capital (i.e., to enhance their own wealth), in direct conflict with their duty to maximize the returns on the capital entrusted to them by their fund shareholders. The excessive advisory fees, expenses, hefty sales loads, and huge commissions on portfolio transactions paid to brokers in return for their sales support consumed something like 45% of the real returns earned on fund portfolios during the past two decades.

第二,与 20 世纪 50 年代和 60 年代的前辈不同,当今的金融机构专注于现代投资策略,强调对转瞬即逝的股价进行短期投机,而非基于持久的内在公司价值的传统长期投资。例如,从 1950 年到 1965 年,股票型共同基金的投资组合年均换手率为 17%;而在 1990 年至 2005 年,这一换手率平均达到 91%。老式的“持有股票”行业几乎无法理所当然地期望公司治理能有效维护股东利益;而新式的“租用股票”行业则对此几乎漠不关心。

Second, unlike their predecessors in the 1950s and 1960s, today’s financial institutions are now focused on modern investment strategies that emphasize short-term speculation in evanescent stock prices, rather than traditional long-term investing based on durable intrinsic corporate values. From 1950 to 1965, for example, equity mutual funds turned over their portfolios at an average rate of 17% per year; in 1990-2005, the turnover rate averaged 91% per year. The old own-a-stock industry could hardly afford to take for granted effective corporate governance in the interest of shareholders; the new rent-a-stock industry has little reason to care.

让问题更加复杂的是,如今典型的巨型私营金融机构——既管理养老金计划又管理共同基金——在行使所有权权利和履行所有权责任时,面临着严重的利益冲突。当一项代理投票提案遭到某个企业客户管理层的反对时,这家资金管理公司不太可能投赞成票。因此,大型私营资金管理公司中的治理活动人士之所以引人注目,不仅是因为他们人数稀少,更是因为他们根本不存在,这毫不奇怪。

To further complicate matters, today’s typical giant private financial institution—managing both pension plans and mutual funds—faces serious conflicts in its exercise of the rights and responsibilities of ownership. When a proxy proposal is opposed by the management of a corporate client, the money manager is unlikely to vote in its favor. It is not surprising, then, that, governance activists among large private money managers are conspicuous not merely by their scarcity, but by their absence.

更糟糕的是,如今已经很难把所有者与被所有者区分开来。通过固定收益养老金计划,企业持有全部股票的 12%,并通过固定缴款储蓄计划控制另外 11%。不仅如此,我们大多数大型资产管理公司本身现在也由大型金融集团拥有。可以说,这种所有权上的循环让美国企业实现了自我控制。

And it gets worse. Today, it is difficult to separate the owners from the owned. Through its defined-benefit pension plans, corporations own 12% of all stocks, and dominate another 11% through defined-contribution savings plans. What is more, most of our largest money managers are themselves now owned by giant financial conglomerates. Arguably, this circularity of ownership allows corporate America to control itself.

这种新型且充满利益冲突的金融中介世界所引发的问题,绝不是什么小事。养老金计划回报预期过高,正是造成目前私营养老金计划负债超过资产 6000 亿美元缺口的主要原因。公共养老金计划的缺口据估计高达 1.2 万亿美元,两者合计赤字达 1.8 万亿美元,而且还在继续扩大。

The problems created by this new and conflicted world of financial intermediation are hardly trivial. Excessive return projections for pension plans have played a major role in creating the current shortfall of $600 billion private pension plan liabilities relative to plan assets. The shortfall in public plans has been estimated at $1.2 trillion, bringing the total deficit to $1.8 trillion, and rising.

个人退休储蓄也处于危险的低水平。只有 22% 的劳动者参与了 401(k) 储蓄计划,只有 10% 参与了 IRA。(约 9% 两者都参与。)尽管在这些税收递延计划中积累资产已有超过四分之一个世纪的时间,投资者的累计余额分别只有每个参与者 33600 美元和 26900 美元,仅相当于体面退休所需资金的一个零头。

Individual retirement savings are also at dangerously low levels. Only 22% of our workers participate in 401(k) savings plans and only 10% in IRAs. (About 9% have both.) Despite having had a quarter-century-plus to build assets in these tax-sheltered plans, investors have accumulated balances of but $33,600 and $26,900 per participant respectively, a trivial fraction of what would be required for a decent retirement.

当今的机构社会将市场回报中过大的一块据为己有,个人未来退休储蓄的前景堪忧。试想,一位今天刚进入职场的年轻公民,其投资期限至少为 60 年。举例来说,如果股市每年平均获得 8% 的名义回报率,那么今天投入的 1000 美元届时将变成 101,000 美元——这就是复利回报的魔力。

With today’s agency society arrogating to itself far too large a share of market returns, the outlook for future individual retirement savings is dire. Consider that a young citizen entering the work force today has an investment horizon of at least 60 years. If, for example, the stock market were to earn an average nominal return of 8% per year, $1,000 invested today would then be worth $101,000—the magic of compounding returns.

但如果我们今天的金融体系每年从中吞噬 2.5 个百分点——这还是对当前现实状况的保守估计——那么,这笔 1000 美元以 5.5% 的净增长率增长,最终只能变成 2.5 万美元——仅仅是通过持有股市本身就能获得的积累额的 25%。复利的魔力,在当今高昂成本的复利肆虐面前,终究不堪一击。

But if our financial system consumes 2.5 percentage points annually of that total return—a conservative estimate of today’s reality—that $1,000, growing now at 5.5% net, would be worth just $25,000—a minuscule 25% of the accumulation that could have been obtained simply by owning the stock market itself. The magic of compounding returns, it turns out, is simply overwhelmed by the tyranny of compounding costs at today’s exorbitant levels.

构成国民储蓄脊梁的退休储备金之所以出现严重亏空,一个重要原因在于:充当代理人的基金管理人,将自己利益凌驾于理应尽职服务的投资者委托人之上。我们的金融机构未能履行企业公民的权利与责任;未能足额计提养老金储备;也未能让基金股东公平分享金融市场本身所产生的回报。

The serious shortfalls in retirement reserves that represent the backbone of the nation’s savings have arisen importantly because our manager-agents have placed their own interests ahead of the interests of the investor-principals they are duty-bound to serve. Our financial institutions have failed to exercise the rights and 8/10/22, 9:34 PM The Bogle eBlog » Blog Archive » The Amazing Disappearance of the Individual Stockholder responsibilities of corporate citizenship; to adequately fund pension reserves; and to deliver to fund shareholders their fair share of the returns generated by the financial markets themselves.

为什么?主要原因在于,从由个人投资者主导的股东社会到由专业资金管理人和公司主导的中介社会这一根本转变,并未伴随建立起一种道德、监管和法律环境,要求受托人和受信人作为代理人,必须纯粹且排他地为委托人的利益行事。

Why? Largely because the radical change from an ownership society dominated by individual investors to an intermediation society dominated by professional money managers and corporations has not been accompanied by the development of an ethical, regulatory, and legal environment that requires trustees and fiduciaries, as agents, to act solely and exclusively in the interests of their principals.

此外,我们还形成了一套拼凑起来的税收递延退休计划体系——社会保障、企业和公共养老金、递延薪酬计划、401(k) 计划、403(b) 计划、个人退休账户(IRA)以及罗斯个人退休账户(Roth IRA)——目前正考虑将个人储蓄账户也纳入其中。我们需要对这一复杂且往往成本高昂的组合进行审慎评估,并努力构建一个统一的退休制度,以提升国家的储蓄水平。

In addition, we have developed a whole patchwork of tax-deferred retirement programs—Social Security, corporate and public pensions, deferred compensation plans, 401(k)s, 403(b)s, individual IRAs, and Roth IRAs—and are now considering the addition of Personal Savings Accounts to the list. We need to undertake a careful appraisal of this complex and often costly mix, and work to develop an integrated retirement system that will enhance the nation’s savings.

当前最迫切的需要,是出台一项得到明确执行的公共政策,既能尊重我们公民投资者的利益,也让他们坐上本该属于他们的驾驶席。早就该任命一个联邦特别委员会,来审视这些问题,并提出恰当的政策建议加以解决。股东所有制社会已经终结。代理(或中介)社会并未如预期般运转。我们迫切需要建立一个真正开明的受托人社会。越早越好。

The overarching need is for a clearly enforced public policy that honors the interests of our citizen-investors and puts these beneficiaries in the driver’s seat where they belong. It is high time for the appointment of a blue-ribbon federal commission to examine these issues and make appropriate policy recommendations to resolve them. The ownership society is over. The agency (or intermediation) society is not working as it should. We urgently need a truly enlightened fiduciary society. The sooner the better.

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