共同基金与税收
8/10/22, 9:28 PM The Bogle eBlog » Blog Archive » Mutual Funds and Taxes The Wayback Machine - https://web.archive.org/web/20080828064952/http://johncbogle.com/wordpress/2006/0… 共同基金与税务 JCB - 2006 年 4 月 12 日 2006 年 2 月 25 日的《华尔街日报》刊登了尤金·法玛和肯·弗伦奇的一篇专栏文章(付费用户可在此处阅读)。他们的文章促使我给编辑写了一封信,但该信最终未被《华尔街日报》刊发,无论好坏。我很高兴有机会在此与各位分享这封信:致《华尔街日报》编辑:我极为尊重法玛教授和弗伦奇教授对现代投资组合理论做出的重大贡献,但我强烈反对他们的建议——修改税法,使共同基金投资者只有在卖出自己持有的份额时才为已实现的收益纳税,而不是在基金因其底层投资组合实现收益时就被征税。(《保持简单》,2006 年 2 月 25 日。)
8/10/22, 9:28 PM The Bogle eBlog » Blog Archive » Mutual Funds and Taxes The Wayback Machine - https://web.archive.org/web/20080828064952/http://johncbogle.com/wordpress/2006/0… MUTUAL FUNDS AND TAXES JCB - Apr 12, 2006 The February 25, 2006 issue of the Wall Street Journal carried an op-ed piece by Eugene Fama and and Ken French (here, for subscribers). Their article inspired me to submit a letter to the editor, which was, for better or worse, never published by the Journal. I’m pleased to have the opportunity to share it with you here: To the Editor of the Wall Street Journal: While I greatly respect the major contributions that Professors Fama and French have made to modern portfolio theory, I take strong exception to their recommendation to change the tax code so that mutual fund investors pay taxes only as gains are realized when they sell their shares, rather than be subject to taxes paid as their funds realize gains on their underlying portfolios. (“Keep it Simple,†February 25, 2006.)
首先,他们提议的系统实际上要复杂得多。目前,基金股东从他们持有的每只基金那里收到一份单一的税务报表,其中提供了报税所需的信息。在新体系下,投资者必须报告每次买入份额的金额和日期,担心洗售问题,并在报税单上列出多笔收益(或损失)。此外,从旧体系向新体系的转换还需要为每个账户中可能数百次的单笔买入和清算重建历史数据,这极其复杂。最后,依赖投资者在卖出个人持股时提供的成本信息的准确性,对美国国税局来说已经很难强制执行;在共同基金的情况下,难度会更大。
First, their proposed system is in fact far more complex. Now, fund shareholders receive from each fund they own a single tax statement providing the information required on the tax return. Under the new system, investors would have to report the amount and date of each share purchase, worry about wash sales, and post multiple gains (or losses) on their returns. What is more, the conversion from the old system to the new would require the complex recreation of prior data of perhaps hundreds of individual purchases and liquidations in each account. Finally, relying on the accuracy of cost information from investors when they sell their holdings of individual stocks has already proven difficult for the Internal Revenue Service to enforce; in the case of mutual funds, it would be even more difficult.
其次,他们的文章完全忽视了传统开放式基金可以像交易所交易基金(ETF)一样轻松地提供税收递延这一事实。到目前为止,所有(或者说几乎所有)ETF 都是指数基金,其回报与底层市场指数同步,其税收效率几乎不高于,甚至不高于普通指数基金——许多指数基金运营成本极低,同时还没有购买 ETF 所需的经纪佣金。例如,先锋集团的 500 指数基金和全市场股票指数基金自 1999 年以来就没有进行过资本利得分配,在此前五年期间,其年均分配额不到资产价值的 0.5%。
Second, their article completely ignores the fact that traditional open-end funds can easily provide the same tax deferral as do exchange-traded funds. So far, all (or virtually all) ETFs are index funds, providing returns that parallel those of the underlying market indexes, and are barely, if at all, more tax-efficient than regular index funds, many of which are operated at extremely low cost, yet free of the brokerage commissions on purchasing ETFs. Neither Vanguard’s 500 Index Fund and Total Stock Market Index Fund, for example, have paid capital gains distributions since 1999, with annual distributions averaging less than 0.5 percent of asset value during the preceding five years.
两位作者还忽视了可供应税投资者使用的税务管理型传统基金。再次以先锋集团为例,其五只税务管理型基金在累计近 50 年的运营中,从未实现过一笔资本利得分配,同时提供了优异的税前回报,以及极为出色的税后回报(在过去十年中,平均跑赢了 92% 的同业)。
The authors also ignore the availability of tax-managed traditional funds for taxable investors. Again, Vanguard’s five tax-managed funds, in nearly 50 cumulative years of operation, have yet to realize a single capital gain distribution, all the while providing superior pre-tax returns, and truly stunning after-tax returns (outpacing, on average, 92 percent of their peers over the past decade).
真正的问题不在于税法,而在于(作者们未认识到的)共同基金经理本身。他们以惊人的年均 91% 的换手率周转基金投资组合——其组合中股票的平均持有期仅为 13 个月,这反映出的交易策略更像短期投机而非长期投资。
The real problem is not with the tax code, but (unrecognized by the authors) with the mutual fund managers themselves. They turn over their fund portfolios at a stunning average rate of 91 percent per year—a holding period of barely 13-months for the average stock in their portfolios, reflecting a trading strategy that is far more akin to short-term speculation than long-term investing.
毫不意外,由于所有这些执行成本,高换手率与低基金业绩明显相关。例如,在过去十年中,换手率最高四分位的基金(年化 165%)提供的年均税前回报仅为 9.8%,而换手率最低四分位的基金(13%)回报率为 11.5%,每年高出 1.7 个百分点——累计超额利润接近 30%。此外,高换手率四分位的基金承担的波动风险高出近 30%(标准差为 20.6% 对 16.2%)。
Unsurprisingly, because of all those execution costs, high fund turnover is clearly associated with low fund performance. During the past decade, for example, the highest-turnover quartile of funds (165 percent annually) provided an annual pre-tax return of just 9.8 percent, while the lowest-turnover quartile (13 percent) returned 11.5 percent, an advantage of 1.7 percent per year—a cumulative extra profit of nearly 30 percent. What is more, the high-turnover quartile of funds took nearly 30 percent more risk (standard deviation of 20.6 percent vs. 16.2 percent).
从风险调整后的回报来看,低换手率基金的年均收益为 11.6%,而高换手率的同类基金仅为 8.9%。结果是:十年前投入的 1 万美元,在低换手率基金中增长到 3 万美元,而在高换手率基金中仅为 2.33 万美元——即便在考虑税收之前,利润也高出 50%。考虑税收后,累计利润的增幅接近 100%,这一差异确实令人惊叹。
Looking at risk-adjusted returns, then, the low-turnover funds earned 11.6 percent per year compared to just 8.9 percent for their high-turnover cousins. Result: $10,000 invested ten years ago grew by $20,000 vs. $13,300—a 50 percent enhancement in profit even before taxes are considered. After taxes, the enhancement in cumulative profit approached 100 percent, a difference that is truly astonishing.
就像目前正积极游说修改税法的共同基金行业一样,法玛教授和弗伦奇教授完全无视了这封信中所描述的经济现实。需要改变的并不是税法,而是绝大多数共同基金经理所表现出的“短期主义”,以及共同基金股东们因天真甚至无知而拒绝维护自身经济利益的短视行为。“亲爱的布鲁图斯,错不在我们的税法,而在我们自己。” 8/10/22, 9:28 PM The Bogle eBlog » Blog Archive » Mutual Funds and Taxes 约翰·博格 评论 salevin - 2008 年 5 月 21 日 说得好。我们最近在 TigerTomes 读书小组(http://www.tigertomes.com)讨论了《资本灵魂之战》这本书,其中提到了资本利得税的问题:—————————————————————— 上世纪 90 年代末,税法进行了一次调整,奖励长期买入并持有的投资者,对持有五年或以上的新投资,最高资本利得税率降低 2 个百分点。布什的减税政策抹掉了这一激励措施,转而奖励每年 100% 的投资组合换手率。(这些变化还坑了像我这样的人——我曾利用一个选择权,通过以 20% 的税率支付当时的部分现有持仓资本利得税,将这些持仓不可撤销地重新定基到 2001 年 1 月 2 日,以便为这些相同的投资启动一个五年的持有期计时。但这一好景也不复存在。)虽然税率不应该是驱动投资决策的唯一因素,但它对机构和个人投资者都有强大的影响。如果允许布什减税政策到期失效,并用一个更强有力的五年持有期优惠取而代之,比如持有五年后税率降至 15%,比原先再降 5 个百分点,我很有信心地预测,平均投资组合换手率将降至目前惊人水平的一个较小零头。我们甚至可以走得更远,比如持有十年税率为 10%,持有二十年税率为 5%。根据当前行政当局的流行观点,这样的减税会增加政府收入,并在未来社保最需要资金时加速收入增长,同时奖励长期储蓄和稳定投资。——————————————————————– www.johncbogle.com 上呈现的观点不一定代表先锋集团当前管理层的观点。© Copyright 2006 by John C. Bogle
Like the mutual fund industry that is now vigorously campaigning to change the tax law, Professors Fama and French simply ignore the economic realities described in this letter. It is not the tax code that needs changing; it is the “shorttermism†exhibited by the vast majority of mutual fund managers, and the short-sightedness of mutual fund shareholders who refuse, out of naiveté or even ignorance, to look after their own economic interests. “The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our tax code, but in ourselves.†8/10/22, 9:28 PM The Bogle eBlog » Blog Archive » Mutual Funds and Taxes John C. Bogle COMMENTS salevin - May 21, 2008 Amen. We recently discussed The Battle for the Soul of Capitalism in the TigerTomes book group (http://www.tigertomes.com) and capital gains taxation came up in the following: —————————————————————— Back in the late ’90s, there was a modification to the tax code to reward long term buy-and-hold investors with a 2% reduction in the top capital gains tax rate for new investments held for five years or more. The Bush tax cuts wiped that incentive out, rewarding instead 100% portfolio turnover per year. (Those changes also shafted folks like me who took advantage of the option to irrevocably redate some existing holdings as of 1/2/2001 by paying capital gains at the 20% rate at that time in order to start a 5 year clock running on those same investments.) While tax rates should not be the single factor driving investment decisions, they do have a powerful sway over both institutional and individual investors. Should the Bush tax cuts be allowed to sunset and replaced by a stronger version of the 5 year break, say a 5% reduction to 15% after five years, I would confidently predict that average portfolio turnover would drop to a modest fraction of its current stratospheric level. Let’s go even further, say 10% for 10 year holdings and 5% for 20 year holdings. According to current administration vogue, such cuts would increase government revenues, and accelerate them in the out years when Social Security will most need them, while at the same time rewarding long term savings and stable investment. ——————————————————————– The opinions presented in www.johncbogle.com do not necessarily represent those of Vanguard's current management. © Copyright 2006 by John C. Bogle