致编辑的信
2006 年 11 月 28 日
《华尔街日报》编辑：
尊敬的先生：贵报反对股东民主的社论（《董事会游戏》，2006 年 11 月 27 日）事实有误，因此结论也是错误的。
November 28, 2006 To the Editor The Wall Street Journal Dear Sir: Your editorial opposing shareholder democracy (“Board Games,” November 27, 2006) is wrong on the facts, and therefore misguided in its conclusions.
贵文称美国企业的“大型股东往往是工会控制的养老金基金”，这与事实不符：政府养老金基金仅持有美国 9% 的股票，而共同基金持有整整 30%，公司养老金和储蓄计划（不含它们通过共同基金持有的股票）持有约 20%。
The statement that the large shareholders of American business “tend to be union-dominated pension funds” belies the fact that government pension funds hold but 9 percent of U.S. equities, compared to fully 30 percent for mutual funds and some 20 percent for corporate pension and savings plans (excluding their equities held through mutual funds).
即便是最大的州退休基金（加州公共雇员退休系统），在最新调查中也仅排名第 38 位，持有 660 亿美元股票。这与私人基金管理公司——富达、巴克莱全球、道富环球、资本集团和先锋——相去甚远，后五者合计持有超过 2.5 万亿美元的美国股票。
Even the largest state retirement fund (California Public Employees Retirement System) ranks only number 38 in such holdings, $66 billion of equities in the latest survey. That is a far cry from the holdings of private money managers—Fidelity, Barclays Global, State Street Global, Capital Group, and Vanguard—which together hold more than $2.5 trillion in U.S. equities.
这些公司是其委托人的代理人，委托人是它们所管理共同基金的最终所有人，也可以说是它们所管理养老金计划的最终受益人。说这些美国企业的代理人/所有者只能通过出售股票来行使对公司事务的投票权，本质上就是将他们的选择限制在“要么喜欢，要么扔掉”，这明显违背了他们的受托责任。
These firms are agents for their principals, the underlying owners of the mutual funds they manage and, arguably, the ultimate beneficiaries of the pension plans they manage. To say that these agent/owners of U.S. corporations can exercise their vote on corporate affairs only by selling their stock basically limits their options to “like it, or dump it,” a clear breach of their fiduciary duty.
是的，有些——绝非全部——由工会控制的企业活跃分子可能爱挑事。但如果他们的声音只反映自身特殊利益，那么除非持有多数股份的股东同意，否则他们微乎其微的投票权不会对公司治理产生任何影响。只有那时——也唯有那时——一项代理提案才会获得通过。
Yes, some—but by no means all—union-dominated corporate activists may be trouble makers. But if their voice reflects only their special interests, their tiny voting power will have no impact on corporate governance, unless the holders of a majority of shares agree. Then, and only then, will a proxy resolution be approved.
正如你们所指出的，“管理层和董事会……理应协同运作，以实现业务和财务上的成功。”这话没错。但作为整体，企业股东有权也有责任要求这种成功转化为他们应得的经济回报，以回报他们承担的风险。毕竟，公司是他们的。
As you point out, “management and boards . . . are supposed to operate together to achieve business and financial success.” That is correct. But it is the right and responsibility of a corporation’s shareholders as a group to demand that such success is translated into the economic rewards they deserve in return for putting their capital at risk. After all, they own the company.
此致
约翰·C·博格
博格先生是先锋集团创始人。
Sincerely, John C. Bogle Mr. Bogle is founder of The Vanguard Group.