别指望它:数字迷信的危险

2003 · article_academic · 原文约 6786 词
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别指望这个!

Don’t Count On It!

数字迷信之害——约翰·C·博格主题演讲

创始人兼前首席执行官,先锋集团

在普林斯顿大学经济政策研究中心“金融地雷”论坛上的演讲

新泽西州普林斯顿

2002 年 10 月 18 日

神秘莫测、看似随机的事件塑造了我们的人生,毫不夸张地说,如果我不是上了普林斯顿大学,先锋集团根本就不会存在。而如果先锋没有诞生,似乎完全有可能没有人会去发明它。我并非在说我们的存在有多重要——在人类历史的宏大画卷中,先锋连一个脚注都算不上。但我们为金融界做出的贡献——独特的共同结构、指数共同基金、三级债券基金、简单的投资哲学,以及对低成本近乎偏执的专注——确实为投资者带来了改变。而这一切,都始于大约 55 年前,我怀着忐忑不安的心情迈出学术生涯的第一步。

The Perils of Numeracy Keynote Address by John C. Bogle Founder and former CEO, The Vanguard Group Before The “Landmines in Finance” Forum of The Center for Economic Policy Studies Princeton University Princeton, NJ October 18, 2002 Mysterious, seemingly random, events shape our lives, and it is no exaggeration to say that had I not attended Princeton University, Vanguard never would have come into existence. Had it not, it seems altogether possible that no one else would have invented it. I’m not saying that our existence matters, for in the grand scheme of human events Vanguard would not even be a footnote. But our contributions to the world of finance—the unique mutual structure, the index mutual fund, the three-tier bond fund, the simple investment philosophy, and the over-weening focus on low costs—have in fact made a difference to investors. And it all began when I took the first nervous steps in my academic career some 55 years ago.

我对经济学的入门始于大二那年,当时我读到了保罗·萨缪尔森《经济学:初步分析》的第一版。一年后,作为经济学专业的学生,我正在考虑毕业论文的主题,无意中在《财富》杂志上看到一篇关于“规模虽小却争议不断”的共同基金行业的文章。这引起了我的兴趣,我当即决定将其作为论文主题。这篇论文最终帮助我以优等成绩毕业,并因此得到普林斯顿校友沃尔特·L·摩根的录用邀请——他是行业先驱,也是 1928 年威灵顿基金的创始人。如今,这只经典的平衡型基金已成为先锋集团旗下 100 多只共同基金中的一员,至今依然蓬勃成长,是全球最大的平衡型基金。

My introduction to economics came in my sophomore year when I opened the first edition of Paul Samuelson’s Economics: An Introductory Analysis. A year later, as an Economics major, I was considering a topic for my senior thesis, and stumbled upon an article in Fortune magazine on the “tiny but contentious” mutual fund industry. Intrigued, I immediately decided it would be the topic of my thesis. The thesis, in turn, proved the key to my graduation with high honors, which in turn led to a job offer from Princeton alumnus Walter L. Morgan, an industry pioneer and founder of Wellington Fund in 1928. Now one of 100-plus mutual funds under the Vanguard aegis, that classic balanced fund has continued to flourish to this day, the largest balanced fund in the world.

在那个古老年代,经济学的研究高度概念化且沿袭传统。我们的学习内容既包括经济理论的要素,也包括 18 世纪以来的世俗哲学家——亚当·斯密、约翰·斯图尔特·穆勒、约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯等等。以今天的标准来看,定量分析明显缺席。(我记得微积分甚至不是系里的必修课。)但几乎就在我开始学习经济学的那一刻,转折点来临了。以下是一位记者最近的表述¹:“经济活动可以被解释为试图实现财富最大化的理性个体,这一想法至少可追溯到 18 世纪苏格兰人亚当·斯密,而经济学家早在 1870 年代就已想到,这一切最好用数学来表达。但这种方法直到 1947 年麻省理工学院教授保罗·萨缪尔森的《经济分析基础》出版后才真正兴起,该书用牛顿微积分的语言重塑了经济学原理。随之而来的经济学数学化浪潮,席卷了一切。”

In that ancient era, the study of economics was heavily conceptual and traditional. Our study included both the elements of economic theory and the worldly philosophers from the 18th century on—Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, John Maynard Keynes, and the like. Quantitative analysis was, by today’s standards, conspicuous by its absence. (My recollection is that Calculus was not even a department prerequisite.) But it was almost at the very moment that I began my study of economics that the turning point came. Here’s how one journalist recently put it1: “The idea that economic activity can be explained as rational individuals trying to maximize their wealth goes back at least to 18th century Scotsman Adam Smith, and the thought that all this was best expressed mathematically occurred to economists as long ago as the 1870s. But the approach didn’t really take off until the 1947 publication of MIT professor Paul Samuelson’s Foundations of Economic Analyses, which recast the principles of economics in the language of Newtonian calculus. The mathematization of economics that followed swept all before it.”

当然,这种“数学化”当然需要工具来执行计算,我们很快就拥有了它们:1946 年,第一台计算机问世,笨重且重达 30 吨;接着,1970 年,第一台手持电子计算器诞生;最后,1976 年,第一台大规模生产的个人电脑出现。信息时代已经到来,它改变了我们思考事物的方式。它对研究经济和市场运作方式的影响,只是其中一个例子。数量能力主宰了我们的职业和商业生活。似乎,如果你无法量化它,它就不重要。

That “mathematization,” to be sure, required the instruments to do the counting, and we soon had them: In 1946, the first computer; cumbersome and 30 tons of heft; next, in 1970, the production of the first hand-held electronic calculator; finally, in 1976, the coming of the first mass-produced personal computer. The Information Age had arrived, and it has changed the way we think about things. Its impact on the study of how economies and markets work is just one example. Numeracy is in the saddle and rides our professional and our business lives. If you can’t count it, it seems, it doesn’t matter.

我不同意这个三段论。事实上,正如你们将在我的讲话结尾听到的一句引文所说,“认为无法衡量的事物就不重要,这是一种盲目。”但在讨论衡量的陷阱之前——更不用说试图衡量那些不可衡量的东西,比如人性品格、道德价值观,以及在所有经济活动中都扮演深刻角色的心灵与灵魂——我将先谈谈我们使用的一些衡量标准本身存在的谬误,以及它们为经济学家、金融家和投资者设下的陷阱。

I disagree with that syllogism. Indeed, as you’ll hear again in a quotation I’ll cite at the conclusion of my remarks, “to presume that what cannot be measured is not very important is blindness.” But before I get to the pitfalls of measurement, to say nothing of trying to measure the immeasurable—things like human character, ethical values, and the heart and soul that play a profound role in all economic activity—I will talk about the fallacies of some of the measurements we use, and, the pitfalls they create for economists, financiers, and investors.

“市场是否理性?”,贾斯汀·福克斯,《财富》杂志,2002 年 12 月 3 日。

“Is the Market Rational?,” Justin Fox, FORTUNE, December 3, 2002.

我的论点是:今天,在我们的社会、经济学和金融领域,我们对数字的信任过度了。数字并非现实。充其量,它们只是对现实的苍白反映。最糟糕时,它们则是对我们试图衡量的真相的严重扭曲。因此,首先,我要说明我们过分依赖历史经济和市场数据。其次,我将讨论我们乐观的偏见如何导致我们曲解数据,并赋予它们很少配得上的可信度。第三,更糟糕的是,我们如何崇拜硬数字,将股价暂时的精确性——而非企业内在价值的永恒模糊性——视为投资现实的护身符(或者说一度如此!)。第四,由于未能避开这些数字经济的陷阱,我们实际上已经损害了实体经济。最后,我的结论是:我们抵御数字确定性幻觉的最佳武器,正是那些不可测量、却弥足珍贵的品质——视野、经验、常识和判断力。

My thesis is that today, in our society, in economics, and in finance, we place too much trust in numbers. Numbers are not reality. At best, they’re a pale reflection of reality. At worst, they’re a gross distortion of the truths we seek to measure. So first, I’ll show that we rely too heavily on historic economic and market data. Second, I’ll discuss how our optimistic bias leads us to misinterpret the data and give them credence that they rarely merit. Third, to make matters worse, how we worship hard numbers and accept (or did accept!) as the talisman of investment reality the momentary precision of stock prices rather than the eternal vagueness of intrinsic corporate value. Fourth, by failing to avoid these pitfalls of the numeric economy, how we have in fact undermined the real economy. Finally, I conclude that our best defenses against numerical illusions of certainty are the immeasurable, but nonetheless invaluable, qualities of perspective, experience, common sense, and judgment.

危险一:把历史当作确定性

普通股可以视为投资工具——而非仅仅是投机工具——这一观念,可以说始于 1925 年埃德加·劳伦斯·史密斯所著的《普通股作为长期投资》。其最新体现则是 1994 年杰里米·西格尔的《股市长线法宝》。两本书都毫不掩饰地为股票唱好,可以说都为随后爆发的超级牛市添了一把火。当然,接着两者之后都出现了大熊市。两本书同样充满了数据,但西格尔的巨著——这个计算机驱动、数字密集时代的产物——所呈现的看似无穷无尽的数据,让前作相形见绌。

Peril #1. Attributing Certitude to History The notion that common stocks were acceptable as investments—rather than merely speculative instruments—can be said to have begun in 1925 with Edgar Lawrence Smith’s Common Stocks as Long-Term Investments. Its most recent incarnation came in 1994, in Jeremy Siegel’s Stocks for the Long Run. Both books unabashedly state the case for equities and both arguably helped fuel the great bull markets that ensued. Both, of course, were then followed by great bear markets. Both books, too, were replete with data, but the seemingly infinite data presented in the Siegel tome, a product of this age of computer-driven numeracy, puts its predecessor to shame.

但让我不安的,并非《股市长线法宝》中传授的那一大堆信息。谁会反对知识呢?毕竟,有句名言说得好:“知识就是力量。”我担心的是,我们太多人暗自假设股市历史会重演,而内心深处我们清楚,未来股票回报唯一确定的就是它的高度不确定性。我们根本不知道未来会怎样,而且必须接受一个不言自明的事实:历史上的股市回报,与精算表毫无共同之处。

But it’s not the panoply of information imparted in Stocks for the Long Run that troubles me. Who can be against knowledge? After all, as the quotation goes, “knowledge is power.” My concern is too many of us make the implicit assumption that stock market history repeats itself when we know, deep down, that the only certainty about the equity returns that lie ahead is their very uncertainty. We simply do not know what the future holds, and we must accept the self-evident fact that historic stock market returns have absolutely nothing in common with actuarial tables.

约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯一针见血地指出了这个陷阱:“根据过去的经验对未来运用归纳推理是危险的……” 这是坏消息。“除非你能分辨出造成过去结果的根本原因。” 而这就是好消息。因为解释股票回报的因素只有两个,而且只需要简单的加减法就能看清它们如何塑造投资经历。一个被太多人忽视的现实是,正如凯恩斯告诉我们的那样,股票回报由(1)企业本身(“预测资产在整个生命周期内的预期收益”)和(2)投机(“预测市场的心理”)共同决定。

John Maynard Keynes identified this pitfall in a way that makes it obvious: “It is dangerous to apply to the future inductive arguments based on past experience . . .”.2 That’s the bad news. “Unless one can distinguish the broad reasons for what it was.” And that’s the good news. For there are just two factors that explain equity returns, and it takes only elementary addition and subtraction to see how they shape investment experience. The too-often-ignored reality is that, just as Keynes assured us, stock returns are shaped by (1) enterprise (“forecasting the prospective yield of assets over their whole life”) and (2) speculation (“forecasting the psychology of the market”).

经济学与情绪 颇为奇特的是,在《通论》第十二章(“长期预期状态”)论述企业与投机时,凯恩斯竟然没有使用任何统计数据。但十多年来,我却擅自做了同样的事,只是稍微改换了术语。我用“经济学”而非“企业”来描述投资回报——即股票股息收益率加上随后的盈利增长。我用“情绪”来描述投机回报——即由投资者对该投资回报的估值或贴现率变化所产生的回报。这种估值只需用股票盈利收益率(或其倒数市盈率)的变化来衡量³。例如,如果股票在十年之初的股息收益率为 4%,盈利增长为 5%,那么投资回报就是 9%。如果市盈率从 15 倍上升到 20 倍,这 33% 的涨幅将转化为十年间每年约 3% 的额外投机回报。然后将这两部分回报简单相加:股票的总回报为 12%⁴。因此,当我们分析 20 世纪 80 年代和 90 年代的超级牛市经历时,会发现这二十年股票回报惊人相似,股息收益率对回报的贡献约为 4%,盈利增长约为 6%(即 10% 的投资回报),而市盈率的年均上涨则是显著且前所未有的——约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯对 1926 年埃德加·劳伦斯·史密斯著作的评论。

Economics and Emotions Curiously enough, in his Chapter 12 (“The State of Long-Term Expectation”) on enterprise and speculation in The General Theory, Keynes used not a single statistic. But for more than a decade, I’ve taken the liberty of doing exactly that, although slightly changing the terminology. To describe investment return—the dividend yield on stocks plus the subsequent earnings growth—I use the term “economics” rather than “enterprise.” To describe speculative return—the return generated by changes in the valuation or discount rate that investors place on that investment return—I use the term “emotions.” This valuation is simply measured by the change in the earnings yield on stocks (or its reciprocal, the price-earnings ratio)3. For example, if stocks begin a decade with a dividend yield of 4% and experience earnings growth of 5%, the investment return would be 9%. If the price-earnings ratio rises from 15 times to 20 times, that 33% increase would translate into an additional speculative return of about 3% annually over ten years. Then, simply add the two returns together: Total return on stocks: 12%.4 So when we analyze the experience of the Great Bull Market of the 1980s and 1990s, we discern that in each of these remarkably similar decades for stock returns, dividend yields contributed about 4% to the return, the earnings growth about 6% (for a 10% investment return), and the average annual increase in the price/earnings ratio was a remarkable and unprecedented John Maynard Keynes commenting on Edgar Lawrence Smith’s book, 1926.

《就业、利息和货币通论》第 12 章。这一章读起来,和我 1950 年作为普林斯顿大学学生第一次读到它、并在论文中引用它时一样精彩。我知道实际上应该将两者相乘(即 1.09 × 1.03 = 1.123),这显然是一个小小的差异。但在投资这个充满不确定性的世界里,这样的精确性几乎没有必要,而对于普通投资者来说,简单本身就是一种美德。

The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Chapter 12. This chapter makes as good reading today as when I first read it as a Princeton student in 1950 and quoted from it in my thesis. I recognize that one should actually multiply the two (i.e., 1.09 x 1.03 = 1.123), obviously a small difference. But such precision is hardly necessary in the uncertain world of investing, and for the lay investor, simplicity is a virtue.

7%。结果:在此期间,美股年化回报率达到 17%,这是美国股市 200 年历史中持续时间最长、回报率最高的时期。

7%. Result: Annual stock returns of 17% were at the highest levels, for the longest period, in the entire 200-year history of the U.S. stock market.

你可能会好奇,究竟谁会愚蠢到把股票的历史收益率盲目外推到未来?不仅是凯恩斯描述的那些“无知的大众”,甚至那些本该更懂行的投资专家也这样做。更糟的是,就连老练的公司财务主管及其养老金顾问也遵循同样的做法。举例来说,最近一家《财富》500 强公司的典型年报中写道:“我们的资产回报假设,源自我们的精算师和资产管理团队进行的一项详细研究,并基于长期历史回报率。”令人惊讶的是——但也是理所当然的——这种政策导致公司随着过去回报率的每次提升,而提高自己对未来的预期。例如,在 20 世纪 80 年代初牛市起步时,大公司假设养老资产未来回报率为 7%。到 2000 年底,就在大熊市来临之前,大多数公司已大幅上调其假设,有些甚至提高到 10% 或更高。由于养老投资组合在股票和债券之间保持平衡,它们实际上已将投资组合中股票的年预期回报率,暗中提升至高达 15%。别指望了!

The Pension “Experts” Who, you may wonder, would be so foolish as to blindly extrapolate the historical rate of return on stocks into the future? It is not only the “mass” of ignorant individuals that Keynes described, but even those experts in investing who ought to know better. Worse, even sophisticated corporate financial officers and their pension consultants follow the same course. A recent (and typical) corporate annual report from one Fortune 500 company for example states that “our asset return assumption is derived from a detailed study conducted by our actuaries and our asset management group, and is based on long-term historical returns.” Astonishingly, but naturally, this policy leads corporations to raise their future expectations with each increase in past returns. At the outset of the bull market in the early 1980s, for example, major corporations assumed a future return on pension assets of 7%. By the end of 2000, just before the great bear market took hold, most firms had sharply raised their assumptions, some to 10% or even more. Since pension portfolios are balanced between equities and bonds, they had implicitly raised the expected annual return on the stocks in the portfolio to as much as 15%. Don’t count on it!

让我们思考一下,在 2000 年 1 月 1 日这个新十年开启之际,依赖历史数据外推与依赖理性预期这两种方式,会对市场前景的判断产生多大的差异。如果我们被历史说服,认为当时股票长期年化 11.2% 的回报率将会持续,那么股市一切安好。但如果我们转而从经济与人性的角度思考,那么有两件事将显而易见:第一,股息率已跌至 1%,即便早年 6% 的盈利增长率能够延续(这本身已是极大的挑战!),其后十年的投资回报也不会是 10%,而将是 7%。第二,投机回报不可能永远上涨。(他总算告诉我们了!)而如果当时已达 31 倍的市盈率,只是遵循其看似普遍存在的均值回归规律,回到 15 倍的水平,那么未来十年的总投资回报每年将被削减 7 个百分点。因此,在 2000 年年初之际,合理预期暗示,未来十年股市年回报可能恰好为零。

Consider what a difference in the market outlook would have arisen between relying on extrapolation and on rational expectations as the new decade began on January 1, 2000. If we had been persuaded by history that the then-long-term annual return on stocks of 11.2% would continue, all would be well in the stock market. But if we had thought instead about economics and emotions, two things would have been obvious: First, with dividend yields having tumbled to 1%, even if that earlier 6% earnings growth were to continue (no mean challenge!), the investment return in the subsequent ten years would be not 10%, but 7%. Second, speculative returns cannot rise forever. (Now he tells us!) And if price-earnings ratios, then at 31 times, had simply followed their seemingly universal pattern of reversion to the mean of 15 times, the total investment return over the coming decade would be reduced by seven percentage points per year. As the year 2000 began, then, reasonable expectations suggested that annual stock returns might just be zero over the coming decade.

所以,倘若我们听从凯恩斯的建议,仅仅思考股票先前回报背后的广义原因——投资 vs. 投机——我们就能大致知道将要发生什么:由所有那些情绪——乐观、狂热、贪婪,全部包裹在千年之交的兴奋之中,包裹在信息时代和新经济的奇幻承诺之中——所制造的泡沫,必然破灭。然而,虽然理性预期能告诉我们将会发生什么,却永远无法告诉我们何时发生。但清算之日还是在三个月内来临了,2000 年 3 月下旬,熊市拉开帷幕。显然,投资者若能基于当前状况来设定对未来回报的预期,而非落入用股市总回报的历史数据来指导方向的陷阱,将是明智之举。依赖股市在未来提供与过去相同的回报,这明智吗,甚至合理吗?别指望了!

So, if we listened to Keynes and simply thought about the broad reasons behind those prior returns on stock—investment vs. speculation—we pretty much knew what was going to happen: The bubble created by all of those emotions—optimism, exuberance, greed, all wrapped in the excitement of the turn of the millennium, the fantastic promise of the Information Age, and the “New Economy”—had to burst. While rational expectations can tell us what will happen, however, they can never tell us when. But the day of reckoning came within three months, and in late March 2000 the bear market began. Clearly, investors would have been wise to set their expectations for future returns on the basis of current conditions, rather than fall into the trap of looking to the history of total stock market returns to set their course. Is it wise, or even reasonable, to rely on the stock market to deliver in the future the returns it has delivered in the past? Don’t count on it!

危险之二:乐观主义倾向。依赖股市历史而非当前环境来制定投资政策决策,这一危险代价高昂。但这远非唯一的问题。同样有害的是我们的乐观主义倾向。事实是,我刚才呈现的那些股市回报本身就是一种幻觉。无论投资者是在评估过去还是展望未来,他们都戴着玫瑰色的眼镜。因为,通过关注理论上的市场回报而非投资者的实际回报,我们严重夸大了股权投资所能提供的回报。

Peril #2. A Bias Toward Optimism The peril of relying on stock market history rather than current circumstances to make investment policy decisions is apt to be costly. But that is hardly the only problem. Equally harmful is our bias toward optimism. The fact is that the stock market returns I’ve just presented are themselves an illusion. Whether investors are appraising the past or looking to the future, they are wearing rose-colored glasses. For by focusing on theoretical market returns rather than actual investor returns, we grossly overstate the returns that equity investing can provide.

首先,当然,我们通常以名义美元而非实际美元来计算——这种差异经过时间复利,会造成惊人的鸿沟。过去 50 年间,股票年均回报率为 11.3%,因此初始投资股票的 1000 美元如今价值 21.2 万美元。但该时期 4.2% 的通胀率将回报率压至 7.1%,实际价值仅为 3.1 万美元——这真是一个惊人的缩减。然后,我们实际上又假定,在某个地方以某种方式,作为一个群体的投资者确实赚取了股市所提供的回报,这加剧了问题。这与事实相去甚远。他们没有赚到,因为他们赚不到。现实必然落后于幻觉。是的,如果股市年回报率为 10%,作为一个群体的投资者享受了 10% 的总回报。但他们的净回报会被我们的金融中介体系的成本——经纪佣金、管理费、行政开支——所侵蚀,对大多数投资者而言,还要加上所得税和资本利得税。

First, of course, we usually do our counting in nominal dollars rather than real dollars—a difference that, compounded over time, creates a staggering dichotomy. Over the past 50 years, the return on stocks has averaged 11.3% per year, so $1,000 dollars invested in stocks at the outset would today have a value of $212,000. But the 4.2% inflation rate for that era reduced the return to 7.1% and the value to just $31,000 in real terms—truly a staggering reduction. Then we compound the problem by in effect assuming that somewhere, somehow, investors as a group actually earn the returns the stock market provides. Nothing could be further from the truth. They don’t because they can’t. The reality inevitably falls short of the illusion. Yes, if the stock market annual return is 10%, investors as a group enjoy a gross return of 10%. But their net return is reduced by the costs of our system of financial intermediation—brokerage commissions, management fees, administrative expenses—and, for most investors, by the taxes on income and capital gains.

一个合理的假设是,中介成本每年至少为 2%。对于应税投资账户,税收可能轻易再占 2%。结果:在一个 10% 回报率的市场中,投资者的税前净回报不超过 8%,税后仅为 6%。现实:这些成本将消耗市场名义回报的 40%。但这还没完。成本和税收每年以名义美元扣除,但最终价值体现的是实际的、可花费的美元。在年通胀率 3% 的环境下,10% 的名义股票回报将降至仅 7% 的实际回报。当扣除 4% 的中介成本和税收后,投资者的实际年回报骤降至 3%。成本和税收消耗的,不是 40%,而是市场实际回报的 57%。

A reasonable assumption is that intermediation costs come to at least 2% per year. For taxable investment accounts, taxes could easily take another 2%. Result: In a 10% market, the net return of investors would be no more than 8% before taxes, and 6% after taxes. Reality: Such costs would consume 40% of the market’s nominal return. But there’s more. Costs and taxes are taken out each year in nominal dollars, but final values reflect real, spendable dollars. In an environment of 3% annual inflation, a nominal stock return of 10% would be reduced to a real return of just 7%. When intermediation costs and taxes of 4% are deducted, the investor’s real return tumbles to 3% per year. Costs and taxes have consumed, not 40%, but 57% of the market’s real return.

长期来看,这种乐观主义倾向——呈现远高于现实世界中可获得的、理论上的回报——造成了惊人的差异。还记得那笔 1000 美元投资 50 年后的名义回报 21.2 万美元吗?好吧,当我们扣除通胀成本后,它骤降至实际价值的 3.1 万美元。但再扣除估计 2% 的投资费用,价值降至 1.16 万美元。最后,假设应税账户的税收仅为 2%,那笔初始的 1000 美元投资,实际价值仅值 4300 美元。我们原以为会拥有的财富的约 98% 已化为乌有。如果说那 21.2 万美元展示了复利回报的惊人力量,那么这 4300 美元则展示了复利成本的惊人力量。你能赚取股市的全部回报吗?别指望了!

Taken over the long-term, this bias toward optimism—presenting theoretical returns that are far higher than those available in the real world—creates staggering differences. Remember that $212,000 50-year nominal return on a $1,000 investment? Well, when we took out the cost of inflation, it tumbled to $31,000 in real terms. But then deduct estimated investment expenses of 2%, and the value drops to $11,600. Finally, assume as little as 2% for taxes for taxable accounts, and that initial $1,000 investment is worth just $4,300 in real terms. Some 98% of what we thought we would have has vanished into thin air. If that $212,000 illustrates the amazing power of compounding returns, so that $4,300 illustrates the amazing power of compounding costs. Will you earn the stock market’s full return? Don’t count on it!

逃避成本与税收。毋庸置疑,很少有华尔街股票经纪人、财务顾问或共同基金呈现这种现实世界的比较。平心而论,《长期股票投资》确实展示了历史和名义基础上的回报,尽管它在很大程度上忽略了成本和税收。我们不仅迎合,而且强化了投资者的乐观偏见。然而,虽然通胀无法逃避,但将投资成本和税收降至几乎可以忽略的程度,却是轻而易举的事。只要有这样的意愿,股票投资者就可以指望(几乎)复制市场的总回报:通过一只低成本、低换手率的指数基金来拥有整个股市——这是赚取市场名义年回报近 100% 而非 60% 的终极策略。你可以指望它!

Escaping Costs and Taxes It goes without saying that few Wall Street stockbrokers, financial advisers, or mutual funds present this kind of real-world comparison. (In fairness, Stocks for the Long Run does show historic returns on both a real and nominal basis, although it largely ignores costs and taxes.) We not only pander to, but reinforce, the optimistic bias of investors. Yet while there’s no escaping inflation, it is easily possible to reduce both investment costs and taxes almost to the vanishing point. With only the will to do so, equity investors can count on (virtually) matching the market’s gross return: Owning the stock market through a low-cost, low-turnover index fund—the ultimate strategy for earning nearly 100% rather than 60% of the market’s nominal annual return. You can count on it!

乐观主义倾向也渗透到了商业世界。商人一贯对其公司的增长前景展现最乐观的面貌……并且通常被证明是错误的。凭借所覆盖公司的盈利指引,华尔街的证券分析师在过去二十年中,定期估计未来五年的平均盈利增长率。平均而言,预测的年增长率为 11.5%。但作为一个群体,这些公司在随后的 20 个五年期中,仅有三个期间达到了盈利目标——每七次中有六次过于乐观!而这些公司的实际盈利增长平均仅为预测均值的一半多一点——只有 6%。

The bias toward optimism also permeates the world of commerce. Businessmen consistently place the most optimistic possible face on their firms’ prospects for growth . . . and are usually proven wrong. With the earnings guidance from the corporations they cover, Wall Street security analysts have, over that past two decades, regularly estimated average future five- year earnings growth. On average, the projections were for growth at an annual rate of 11½%. But as a group, these firms met their earnings targets in only three of the 20 five-year periods that followed—overly optimistic six out of every seven times! And the actual earnings growth of these corporations has averaged only slightly more than one-half of the average projection—just 6%.

对于这种指引与结果之间的差距,我们怎能感到惊讶?事实是,我们企业整体的利润与经济增长紧密相连,几乎是亦步亦趋。企业税后利润占美国国内生产总值的比例低于 4.5% 的年份很少见,也从未超过 7% 太多。实际上,自 1929 年以来,税后利润以年均 5.6% 的速度增长,实际上落后于 GDP 6.6% 的增长率。在一个竞争激烈且基本不受约束、消费者至上——在这个信息时代更是如此——的残酷资本主义经济中,美国企业的长期利润怎么可能比我们的 GDP 增长得更快呢?别指望了!

How could we be surprised by this gap between guidance and delivery? The fact is that the aggregate profits of our corporations are closely linked, indeed almost in lock step, with the growth of our economy. It’s been a rare year when after-tax corporate profits accounted for less than 4½% of U.S. gross domestic product, and they have yet to account for much more than 7%. Indeed since 1929, after-tax profits have grown at 5.6% annually, actually lagging the 6.6% growth rate of the GDP. In a dog-eat-dog capitalistic economy where the competition is vigorous and largely unfettered and where the consumer is king—more than ever in this age of information —how could the long-term profits of corporate America possibly grow faster than our GDP? Don’t count on it!

盈利:报告利润、营业利润、备考利润或重述利润。我们的乐观偏见还导致了另一个严重弱点。在一个未能引起足够重视的趋势中,我们改变了盈利本身的定义。尽管报告利润自标准化普尔早年首次开始收集数据以来一直是标准,但近年来,标准已转变为营业利润。营业利润,本质上,是剔除了所有那些诸如资本冲销等混乱费用后的报告利润,这些费用通常是早年不明智的投资和并购的结果。它们被认为是“非经常性的”,尽管对于作为一个群体的企业而言,它们以惊人的一致性反复出现。

Earnings: Reported, Operating, Pro Forma, or Restated Our optimistic bias has also led to another serious weakness. In a trend that has attracted too little notice, we’ve changed the very definition of earnings. While reported earnings had been the, well, standard since Standard & Poor’s first began to collect the data all those years ago, in recent years the standard has changed to operating earnings. Operating earnings, essentially, are reported earnings bereft of all those messy charges like capital write-offs, often the result of unwise investments and mergers of earlier years. They’re considered “non-recurring,” though for corporations as a group they recur with remarkable consistency.

在过去二十年中,标普 500 指数成分公司的营业利润总计为 567 美元。很大程度上由于该时期巨额“非经常性”冲销的结果,累计报告利润仅为 507 美元。因此,在支付了 229 美元的股息后,本应有 338 美元留存用于再投资,但实际上仅有 278 美元可用于投资——减少了 20%——这主要是由于那些糟糕的商业决策。报告利润,而非营业利润,才反映了企业成就的最终长期现实。

During the past twenty years, operating earnings of the companies in the S&P 500 Index totaled $567. Largely a result of the huge “non-recurring” write-offs of the era, cumulative reported earnings came to just $507. So after paying $229 in dividends, instead of having $338 remaining to reinvest in the business, there was in fact just $278 to invest—20% less—mostly because of those bad business decisions. Reported earnings, not operating earnings, reflect the ultimate long-term reality of corporate achievement.

备考利润——那种可怕的公式,使一个曾经受人尊敬的术语有了新的用法(或滥用),报告的是剔除不愉快事件后的公司业绩——这不过是朝着错误方向迈出的又一步。更有甚者,即便是经审计师认证的利润也受到质疑,因为公司盈利重述的数量激增。仅在过去四年中,就有 632 家公司重述了其盈利,几乎是十年前同期 139 家重述数量的五倍。你相信企业财务报告是严谨的吗?别指望了!

Pro forma earnings—that ghastly formulation that makes new use (or abuse) of a once-respectable term—that report corporate results net of unpleasant developments, is simply a further step in the wrong direction. What is more, even auditor-certified earnings have come under doubt, as the number of corporate earnings restatements has soared. During the past four years alone 632 corporations have restated their earnings, nearly five times the 139 restatements in the comparable period a decade earlier. Do you believe that corporate financial reporting is punctilious? Don’t count on it!

“创造性”会计。宽松的会计准则使得凭空创造出被称为盈利的东西成为可能。一种流行的方法是进行收购,然后计提巨额费用,称之为“非经常性”,待到日后需要提振疲软经营业绩时,再予以转回。但我们的会计准则的崩溃远不止于此:轻率地将大项归类为“不重要”;夸大养老金计划假设的未来回报;将销售给借款(从卖方)购买的客户之交易计入销售额;在季末做特殊交易以挤出额外销售;等等。如果你无法通过并购来满足数据要求,那么实际上,只需更改数据即可。但我们粗略地称之为“创造性会计”的做法,距离不诚实会计仅一步之遥。一家公司能永远玩这个把戏吗?别指望了!

“Creative” Accounting Loose accounting standards have made it possible to create, out of thin air, what passes for earnings. One popular method is making an acquisition and then taking giant charges described as “non-recurring,” only to be reversed in later years when needed to bolster sagging operating results. But the breakdown in our accounting standards goes far beyond that: Cavalierly classifying large items as “immaterial”; hyping the assumed future returns of pension plans; counting as sales those made to customers who, in order to make their purchases, borrowed the money from the seller; making special deals to force out extra sales at quarter’s end; and so on. If you can’t merge your way into meeting the numbers, in effect, just change the numbers. But what we loosely describe as creative accounting is only a small step removed from dishonest accounting. Can a company make it work forever? Don’t count on it!

话虽如此,我认为基于预期的营业利润来计算股市市盈率,并无大碍。使用较高(尽管不太现实)数字的最终结果,是使市盈率看起来更合理;也就是说,让股票显得更便宜。通过这样做,目前标普 500 指数的市盈率(基于 2002 年预期)基于营业利润为 19 倍,或许令人略感欣慰,而基于报告利润则为更令人担忧的 28 倍。但我们的金融中介体系——华尔街毕竟是一台旨在销售证券的强大机器——其中嵌入了太多的乐观主义,以至于不会去宣传那个更高的市盈率数字。

That said, I suppose it does little harm to calculate the stock market’s price-earnings ratio on the basis of anticipated operating earnings. The net result of using the higher (albeit less realistic) number is to make price-earnings ratios appear more reasonable; i.e., to make stocks seem cheaper. By doing so, the present p/e ratio for the S&P 500 Index (based on 2002 estimates) comes to a perhaps mildly-reassuring 19 times based on operating earnings, rather than a far more concerning 28 times based on reported earnings. But our financial intermediation system—Wall Street is, after all, a mighty machine designed to sell securities—has far too much optimism embedded in it to promulgate the higher p/e number.

然而,若不认清一个现实——长期来看,企业价值不仅由当前经营业绩决定,更取决于其多年来所有投资决策、并购与整合的总体结果——便依赖较高的盈利数字(以及由此得出的较低市盈率),实属愚蠢。而这类整合大多并不奏效。近期《商业周刊》研究了泡沫晚期狂热中发生的总额达 4 万亿美元的并购交易,报告显示足足 61% 的交易摧毁了股东财富。是时候认清这一谬误了:那些主要为了美化数字而做出的投资决策,实际上并不能改善业务。别指望它!

Nonetheless, it is folly to rely on the higher earnings figure (and resultant lower p/e) without recognizing the reality that in the long run corporate value is determined, not only by the results of the firm’s current operations, but by the entire amalgam of investment decisions and mergers and combinations it has made over time. And they don’t usually work. Recently Business Week studied the $4 trillion of mergers that had taken place amid the mania of the late bubble and reported that fully 61% of them had destroyed shareholder wealth. It’s high time to recognize the fallacy that these investment decisions, largely driven to improve the numbers, actually improve the business. Don’t count on it!

危险之三:对硬数据的崇拜。我们的金融市场体系既是投资过程的重要组成部分,也是为国家经济增长筹集资本这一任务的关键环节。我们需要活跃且信息充分的市场,对它们的期望不多也不少——只为股票提供流动性,以换取对未来现金流的承诺。通过这种方式,股票持有人能够随时实现未来收入流的现值。但这一优势也伴随着代价:公司股价时刻都在剧烈波动。我们要求用硬数据来衡量一家企业的成就,而且我们立刻就要!市场天性如此,自然也会满足我们。

Peril #3. The Worship of Hard Numbers Our financial market system is a vital part of the process of investing, and of the task of raising the capital to fund the nation’s economic growth. We require active, informed markets and ask of them neither more nor less than to provide liquidity for stocks in return for the promise of future cash flows. In this way, stock owners are able to realize the present value of a future stream of income at any time. But in return for that advantage comes the disadvantage of the widely fluctuating moment-by-moment valuation of corporate shares. We demand hard numbers to measure an enterprise’s accomplishments. And we want them now! Markets being what they are, of course, we get them.

但后果未必是好的。凯恩斯清楚看到了这种关系,他指出,“持有上市股票所需建立的那种资本市场组织,需要比持有其他形式财富的人拥有多得多的胆量、耐心和坚韧……有些(投资者)购买不可流通的投资时会面不改色,可如果那些投资每天都有(连续)报价,他们的头发恐怕都要愁白了。”翻译过来就是:拥有交易不频繁的投资,对心理更轻松。

But the consequences are not necessarily good. Keynes saw this relationship clearly, noting that “the organization of the capital markets required for the holders of quoted equities requires much more nerve, patience, and fortitude than for the holders of wealth in other forms . . . some (investors) will buy without a tremor unmarketable investments which, if they had (continuous) quotations available, would turn their hair gray.” Translation: Owning investments that don’t often trade is easier on the psyche.

这一智慧已被反复提及。这正是本杰明·格雷厄姆警告“市场先生”每天跑来按当前价格收购你的房子时存在的风险所在。那些听从市场先生的投资者,不过是让短暂的价格波动误导自己去关注错误的东西,让当下的情绪凌驾于长期的经济规律之上。正如格雷厄姆教授所指出的:“短期内,股市是一台投票机;长期来看,它是一台称重机。”

This wisdom has been often repeated. It is what Benjamin Graham meant when he warned about the hazards when “Mr. Market” comes by every day and offers to buy your home at a current price. Investors who pay heed to Mr. Market are simply allowing transitory shifts in prices to get them thinking about the wrong things, and letting the emotions of the moment take precedence over the economics of the long term. As the Professor Graham pointed out, “in the short-run, the stock market is a voting machine; in the long-run it is a weighing machine.”

瞬间的精确 vs. 永恒的模糊

然而,作为这一代人所身处之信息时代的组成部分,它让我们相信,股票价格所反映的瞬间精确,比衡量企业内在价值时那种永恒的模糊更为重要。换句话说,投资者似乎非常乐意冒这样的风险:精确地犯错,而不是大致正确。这种表象对现实的胜利,在最近的泡沫中得到了体现——而且被放大了!我们现在正在忍受的痛苦股市下跌,不过是回归现实而已。股票价格真的是衡量企业价值的一贯可靠标尺吗?别指望它!

Momentary Precision vs. Eternal Imprecision Yet the Information Age that is part of this generation’s lot in life has led us to the belief that the momentary precision reflected in the price of a stock is more important than the eternal imprecision in measuring the intrinsic value of a corporation. Put another way, investors seem to be perfectly happy to take the risk of being precisely wrong rather than roughly right. This triumph of perception over reality was reflected—and magnified!—in the recent bubble. The painful stock market decline that we are now enduring simply represents the return to reality. Is the price of a stock truly a consistent and reliable measure of the value of the corporation? Don’t count on it!

在那些聚焦股价的群体中,最大的受益者是企业首席执行官们。他们手握巨额股票期权,不择手段——无论合法、违规,还是介于两者之间——一心想“完成指标”。一旦数据做出来,他们的股价便飙升,期权一到期就立刻抛售股票——我们现在知道,这些交易往往是通过公司提供的过桥贷款进行“无现金”操作。但与其他所有薪酬形式不同,固定价格期权的成本从未被计入公司开支。这种期权被当成了“免费午餐”——尽管事实上,为避免摊薄股权,大多数公司直接在公开市场上回购自家的股票(回购价格远高于期权行权价)来支付这笔薪酬。

Among the principal beneficiaries of the focus on stock prices were corporate chief executives. Holding huge numbers of stock options, they were eager to “make their numbers,” by fair means or foul, or something in between. As the numbers materialized, their stock prices soared, and they sold their shares at the moment their options vested—as we know now, often in “cashless” transactions with bridge loans provided by the company. But unlike all other forms of compensation, the cost of fixed-price options was not considered a corporate expense. Such options came to be considered as “free,” despite the fact that, to avoid dilution, most corporations simply bought compensatory shares of their own stock (at prices far above the option prices) in the public market.

期权制的根本缺陷,不仅仅体现在高管几乎一获得期权股票就立即抛售,也不仅仅因为这些股票既没有资本成本负担,也没有与股价水平挂钩。真正的问题在于:以推高股价而非提升公司价值为基础的薪酬制度,完全违背了常识。股票期权能把管理层的利益与长期股东的利益绑定在一起吗?别指望了!

It is not only that shares acquired through options were sold by executives almost as soon as they were exercised, nor that they were unencumbered by a capital charge nor indexed to the level of stock prices that make such options fundamentally flawed. It is that compensation based on raising the price of the stock rather than enhancing the value of the corporation flies in the face of common sense. Do stock options link the interests of management with the interests of long-term shareholders? Don’t count on it!

无知者引领专家……走入困境。多年前,凯恩斯就曾担忧,当“股票的常规估值由大量无知个体的群体心理所确立”时,社会将面临怎样的后果。他提出,这会导致价格剧烈波动,而且这一趋势还会加剧——因为那些本应凭借自身视野与判断来抵消这些莫测变化的专业精英,也会追随群体心理,试图预测公众估值的变化方向。结果,他把股市描述成“一场比试智力的游戏,目标是预测几个月后常规估值的基础,而非一项投资在未来多年内的预期收益”。

Ignorant Individuals Lead Expert Professionals . . . into Trouble Years ago, Keynes worried about the implications for our society when “the conventional valuation of stocks is established (by) the mass psychology of a large number of ignorant individuals.” The result, he suggested would lead to violent changes in prices, a trend that would be intensified as even expert professionals—who, one might have supposed, would offset these vagaries by their perspective and judgement—follow the mass psychology, and try to foresee changes in the public valuation. As a result, he described the stock market as “a battle of wits to anticipate the basis of conventional values a few months hence rather than the prospective yield of an investment over a long term of years.”

在半个世纪前我的本科论文里,我竟斗胆提出了不同看法。我写道,在一个规模大得多的共同基金行业里,投资组合经理们“将为市场提供一种稳定、老练、开明且富有分析性的证券需求,这种需求本质上基于企业的(内在)表现,而非公众对股票价值的评估,即价格。”嗯,50 年后的今天,公允地说,老于世故的凯恩斯赢了,而天真理想主义的博格尔输了。这场较量甚至谈不上势均力敌!难道机构从长期投资的智慧转向短期投机的愚蠢,就提升了它们的业绩吗?可别指望了!

In my senior thesis of a half-century ago, I had the temerity to disagree. Portfolio managers in a far larger mutual fund industry, I suggested, would “supply the market with a demand for securities that is steady, sophisticated, enlightened, and analytic, a demand that is based essentially on the (intrinsic) performance of a corporation rather than the public appraisal of the value of a share, that is, its price.” Well, 50 years later, it is fair to say that the worldly-wise Keynes has won, and that the callowly-idealistic Bogle has lost. And the contest wasn’t even close! Has the move of institutions away from the wisdom of long-term investment and toward the folly of short-term speculation enhanced their performance? Don’t count on it!

经济终于战胜了情绪——在我撰写毕业论文的那个年代,投资委员会(当时基金管理行业的主要运作方式)的基金组合年换手率约为 15%。如今,基金经理(这是当下游戏的玩法)的基金组合年换手率已超过 110%——对于普通基金中的普通股票而言,平均持有期只有 11 个月。用凯恩斯的话来说,“企业投资”(姑且称之为投资基本面)已经变成了“投机漩涡上的一个泡沫”。这是情绪对经济的胜利。

Economics Trumps Emotion—Finally In those ancient days when I wrote my thesis, investment committees (that’s how the fund management game was then largely played) turned over their fund portfolios at about 15% per year. Today, portfolio managers (that’s how the game is now played) turn over their fund portfolios at an annual rate exceeding 110%—for the average stock in the average fund, an average holding period of just eleven months. Using Keynes’ formulation, “enterprise” (call it investment fundamentals) has become “a mere bubble on a whirlpool of speculation.” It is the triumph of emotions over economics.

但有一个不争的事实:从长远来看,经济终究会战胜情绪。自 1872 年以来,股市的年均实际回报率(扣除通胀,但未扣除中介费用)为 6.5%。股息和盈利增长产生的实际投资回报率则为 6.6%。没错,在 20 世纪 70 年代,投机回报曾将投资回报腰斩不止,而在 80 年代和 90 年代,又让它翻了 3 倍(!)。但以今天衡量,在经历了今年股市的惊人下跌后,投机在这整整 130 年间提供的年均净回报为 -0.1%。总体而言,投机既没有为投资回报做出贡献,也没有实质性地拖累它。指望靠一大笔投机回报来提升未来的股票收益,这明智吗?想都别想!

But it is an irrefutable fact that in the long run it is economics that triumphs over emotions. Since 1872, the average annual real stock market return (after inflation but before intermediation costs) has been 6.5%. The real investment return generated by dividends and earnings growth has come to 6.6%. Yes, speculative return slashed investment return by more than one-half during the 1970s and then tripled(!) it during the 1980s and 1990s. But measured today, after this year’s staggering drop in stock prices, speculation provided a net negative annual return of -0.1% during the entire 130-year period. On balance, it neither contributed to, nor materially detracted from, investment return. Is it wise to rely on a healthy dollop of speculative return to enhance future returns on stocks? Don’t count on it!

事实是,当感知——即阶段性股价——与客观现实——即企业内在价值——出现巨大偏离时,这一缺口最终只能以现实为准来弥合。在短期内,根本不可能把现实拉高到感知的水平;在竞争激烈的世界中,创造企业价值是一项艰巨而苛刻的任务,这只能靠长期坚持。

The fact is that when the perception—interim stock prices—vastly departs from the reality—intrinsic corporate values—the gap can only be reconciled in favor of reality. It is simply impossible to raise reality to perception in any short timeframe; the tough and demanding task of building value in a corporation in a competitive world is a long-term proposition.

然而,在当前泡沫时期股票价格脱离公司价值时,太多市场参与者似乎指望价值很快会攀升,以证明价格的合理性。投资者学到教训——为时已晚:别指望这个!

Nonetheless, when stock prices lost touch with corporate values in the recent bubble too many market participants seemed to anticipate that values would soon rise to justify prices. Investors learned, too late, the lesson: Don’t count on it!

第四种风险:计算带来的现实恶果。当我们把历史当作确定无疑的东西,当我们在数据中持续偏向乐观的一面,当我们把一时股票价格的令人愉悦的精确性,看得比内在企业价值的凌乱不精确性更高时,后果就远远超出了不幸的数字抽象范畴。这些风险具有社会影响,而且其中大多数是负面的。

Peril #4. The Adverse Real World Consequences of Counting When we attribute certitude to history, when we constantly bias our numbers to the positive side, and when we worship the pleasing precision of momentary stock prices above the messy imprecision of intrinsic corporate values, the consequences go far beyond unfortunate numeric abstractions. These perils have societal implications, and most of them are negative.

例如,当投资者认为股市回报源自某种精算表时,他们就不会对以下风险做好准备:投资回报本身固有的不确定性,以及投机性回报更大的不确定性。结果,他们很容易在市场压力或狂热之下做出不明智的资产配置决定。养老金计划如果犯下这个错误,在现实来袭时就不得不增加资金投入。而当投资者把退休规划建立在金融市场实际给予的任何回报之上、并默默忽视中介成本和税收造成的惊人损耗时,他们储蓄的金额少得可怜,远不足以保障舒适的退休生活。尽管如此,明智的投资者完全可以避开成本这个“斯库拉”和税收这个“卡律布狄斯”——通过自我学习、听从经验丰富的专业人士的建议,或者吸纳学术界的智慧。

For example, when investors accept stock market returns as being derived from a type of actuarial table, they won’t be prepared for the risks that arise from the inevitable uncertainty of investment returns and the even greater uncertainty of speculative returns. As a result, they are apt to make unwise asset allocation decisions under the duress—or exuberance—of the moment. Pension plans that make this mistake will have to step-up their funding when reality intervenes. And when investors base their retirement planning on actually achieving whatever returns the financial markets are generous enough to give us and tacitly ignore the staggering toll taken by intermediation costs and taxes, they save a pathetically small portion of what they ought to be saving in order to assure a comfortable retirement. Nonetheless, wise investors can totally avoid both the Scylla of costs and the Charybdis of taxes by educating themselves, by heeding the counsel of experienced professionals, or by attending the wisdom of academe.

一个失当的资本形成体系

然而,我们难以轻易克服对股价(易于随时衡量)而非企业价值(难以精确衡量)的关注所带来的危险。凯恩斯勋爵的担忧是对的:如果企业沦为投机漩涡中的泡沫,“(资本形成的)工作很可能失当。”在后泡沫环境中,这项工作确实失当了。虽然一些投机行为已从体系中被驱除,短线交易者因其近乎消失而引人注目,但共同基金行业仍需整合其高难度的运作,最终回归未来,让长期投资政策重新占据相对于短期投机的首要地位。

An Ill-Done System of Capital Formation But the perils of our focus on stock prices—so easy to measure by the moment—rather than corporate values—so hard to measure with precision—is less easily overcome. Lord Keynes was right to worry that if enterprise becomes a mere bubble on a whirlpool of speculation, “the job (of capital formation) is likely to be ill-done.” In the post-bubble environment, the job has been ill-done. But while some of the speculation has now been driven from the system and the day-trader is conspicuous by his near-absence, the mutual fund industry still needs to get its high-wire act together and at last go back to the future by returning long-term investment policy to its earlier primacy over short-term speculation.

我们整个社会,不仅仅是资本市场,都因为过度依赖数字表面上的确定性而深受其害。用数字来管理公司的经济后果既广泛又深远。实质上,我们的金融体系一直在迫使公司创造出不可持续、过去不曾、未来也无法维持的盈利增长。当公司无法通过硬功夫——长期而言,通过提高生产力、改良旧产品、创造新产品、以更友好、更及时、更高效的方式提供服务、激励组织成员更高效地协作(而这恰恰是我们最优秀的公司取得成功的途径)——来达到数字目标时,它们就不得不另寻他法。

It is not just our capital markets that have been corrupted by the perils of relying so heavily on the apparent certitude of numbers. It is our whole society. The economic consequences of managing corporations by the numbers are both extensive and profound. Our financial system has, in substance, challenged our corporations to produce earnings growth that has not been and cannot be sustained. When corporations fail to meet their numeric targets the hard way—over the long-term, by raising productivity, by improving old products and creating new ones, by providing services on a more friendly, more timely and more efficient basis, by challenging the people of the organization to work more effectively together (and those are the ways that our best corporations have achieved success)—they are compelled to do it in other ways.

当然,其中一种方式就是我之前提到的激进并购策略。且不说大多数并购都未能实现目标这一普遍现象,近期《纽约时报》一篇专栏文章精准地描述了遵循这类策略的公司:“这些连环收购者(其)令人眼花缭乱的交易数量,使得长期管理上的失败很容易被掩盖。”5 以泰科国际为例,在清算日到来之前,它收购了 700 家(!)公司。但正如《纽约时报》那篇文章所解释的,这种策略的最终结局几乎是注定的:“他们(靠数字)炒作出来的帝国,随时可能被市场纪律迅速瓦解。”这种策略是长期成功的秘诀吗?别指望了!

One of these ways of course, is the aggressive merger and acquisition strategy I’ve earlier noted. Even leaving aside the commonplace that most mergers fail to achieve their goals, the companies that followed these strategies were well-described in a recent New York Times op-ed essay as “serial acquirers (whose) dazzling number of deals makes an absence of long-term management success easy to hide.”5 Tyco International, for example, acquired 700(!) companies before the day of reckoning came. But the final outcome of the strategy, as the Times essay explained, was almost preordained: “Their empires of (numbers) hype can be undone very quickly by market discipline.” Are such strategies a formula for long-run success? Don’t count on it!

在这样的大背景下,如今公司回报中有多大比例是源于财务因素而非经营因素,简直令人惊叹。道琼斯工业平均指数中 30 家成分公司的养老金计划资产总计达到 4000 亿美元,与这些公司合计 7000 亿美元的账面价值相差无几。表外财务计划大量涌现(或者说曾经大量涌现!)。通过卖出看跌期权来降低回购股票的成本、避免股票期权的潜在稀释,这种做法在繁荣期帮助避免了利润受损,但在衰退期却反过来掏空了公司金库。而大公司向消费者提供贷款以助其购买自家产品的做法更是猛增。或许并不令人意外的是,这种策略在当今的经济环境下已经不那么好看了。

In this context, it’s amazing how much of companies’ returns today are based on financial factors rather than operating factors. The pension plan assets of the 30 companies in the Dow-Jones Industrial average now total $400 billion, not far from the corporations’ collective book value of $700 billion. Off-balance sheet financial schemes proliferate. (Or did!) Selling put options to reduce the cost of repurchasing shares and avoid the potential dilution of stock options helped prevent earnings penalties in the boom, but in the bust has come back to deplete corporate coffers. And lending by major corporations to enable consumers to buy their wares has skyrocketed. Perhaps unsurprisingly, that strategy isn’t looking so good in today’s economic environment.

当纸包住石头,接下来会发生什么?

When Paper Covers Rock, What Comes Next?

太多所谓的工业企业已经变成了金融企业——这些企业靠“数钱”而不是“造东西”过日子。(一个明证是,CEO 身边最得力的助手几乎总是首席财务官,而投资界通常把这位 CFO 视作幕后实权人物。)这类企业,还是引用《纽约时报》那篇文章的话说,“其战略基础并非理解自己所进入的行业,而是假定通过四处搜罗好交易,它们能够比现有金融市场更有效地配置自己的财务资源。”如今,当我们目睹这一战略带来的后果时,不无痛苦地意识到一个现实:别指望它了!

Too many so-called industrial companies, have become financial companies—companies that count rather than make. (Witness the fact that the senior aide to the CEO is almost invariably the chief financial officer, often viewed by the investment community as the eminence gris.) Such companies, again quoting the New York Times article, “base their strategies not on understanding the businesses they go into, but assume that by scavenging about for good deals, they can better allocate their financial resources than can existing financial markets.” As we now observe the consequences of this strategy, we come to a painful realization. Don’t count on it!

我们大多数人大概还记得那个儿童游戏:石头砸剪刀,剪刀剪布,布包石头。在狂热中,当价格与价值脱节时,布的确包住了石头。那些“布”公司——以数字资产见长的企业——吞并了“石头”公司——以实体制造为根基的企业,结果是一场灾难。我提到美国在线/时代华纳、奎斯特/美国西部、世通/MCI 时,不用解释哪家是布,哪家是石头。这些并购是这一现象中最令人心酸的例证之一,其后果是数十万忠诚的长期员工失去了工作,退休储蓄被无情地大幅削减。

Most of us probably still remember the children’s game in which rock breaks scissors, scissors cut paper, and paper covers rock. In manias, as prices lose touch with values, paper indeed covers rock. “Paper” companies that count have acquired “rock” companies that make, and the results have been devastating. When I mention AOL/Time Warner, Qwest/U.S. West, and WorldCom/MCI, I don’t have to explain which is paper and which is rock. These mergers are among the most poignant examples of a phenomenon in whose aftermath hundreds of thousands of loyal long-term employees have lost their jobs, their retirement savings slashed unmercifully.

《华尔街日报》一篇见解独到的专栏文章,精辟地阐述了金融狂热酿成的苦果由全社会共同承担这一现实:“股价并非抽象的符号。(它们)影响公司所采取战略的性质,进而影响其成功前景、资本成本、借款能力以及并购能力。脱离企业基本现实的估值,会吞噬投资者的积蓄,让远比高管无辜的人们丢掉工作,并削弱供应商及社区的生存能力。”6 是的,我们对数字过度依赖所引发的人力代价,如今已知其沉重程度。

That the penalties for our financial mania are borne by our society was well-stated in a perceptive op-ed piece in The Wall Street Journal: “Stock prices are not simply abstract numbers. (They) affect the nature of the strategies the firm adopts and hence its prospects for success, the company’s cost of capital, its borrowing ability, and its ability to make acquisitions. A valuation unhinged by the underlying realities of the business can rob investors of savings, cost people far more innocent than senior management their jobs, and undermine the viability of suppliers and communities.”6 Yes, the human consequences of excessive reliance on numbers, as we now know, can be remarkably harsh.

在企业层面进行量化 过度数字化的危险还不止于此。即便是那些在其它方面还算稳健的公司,也过度沉迷于可衡量的指标——市场份额、生产力、效率、产品质量、成本——并以此为内部目标去达成。然而,当衡量标准本身变成了目标,结果往往适得其反,弄巧成拙。大多数衡量指标本质上都是短视的(不妨称之为“六西格玛综合征”)。而那些更具持久力的品质,才是真正驱动企业的动力。

Counting at the Firm Level The perils of excessive numeracy don’t end there. Even otherwise sound companies dwell too heavily on what can be measured—market share, productivity, efficiency, product quality, costs—and set internal goals to achieve them. But when measures become objectives, they are often counterproductive and self-defeating. Most measurements are inherently short-term in nature. (Call it the Six-Sigma syndrome.) The far more durable qualities drive a Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, The New York Times, June 5, 2002.

约瑟夫·富勒 与 迈克尔·C·詹森,《华尔街日报》,2001 年 12 月 31 日。

Joseph Fuller and Michael C. Jensen, The Wall Street Journal, December 31, 2001.

企业的长期成功难以衡量。但品格、正直、热忱、信念与激情,对于一家公司的成功而言,与精确的度量同样至关重要。人才是执行企业战略的首要工具。如果员工充满灵感、积极进取、精诚合作、勤勉尽责且富有创造力,那么公司的股东将得到良好的回报。

corporation’s success over the long-term are not easily measured. Yet character, integrity, enthusiasm, conviction, and passion are every bit as important to a firm’s success as precise measurements. It is human beings who are the prime instrument for implementing a corporation’s strategy. If they are inspired, motivated, cooperative, diligent, and creative, the firm’s stockholders will be well served.

近年来的情况告诉我们,当雄心勃勃的首席执行官设定激进的财务目标时,他们将实现这些目标置于一切之上——甚至置于正确的会计准则和稳健的资产负债表之上,甚至置于企业的品格之上。在太多情况下,所有可用手段——无论公平还是不正当——都被用来为结果辩护。随着良币被劣币驱逐,当日的法则变成“别人都这么做,所以我也要这么做”,一种格雷欣法则开始在企业的行为标准中盛行。

Recent years have shown us that when ambitious chief executives set aggressive financial objectives, they place the achievement of those objectives above all else—even above proper accounting principles and a sound balance sheet, even above their corporate character. Far too often, all available means—fair or foul—are harnessed to justify the ends. As good practices are driven out by bad, and the rule of the day becomes “everyone else is doing it, so I will too,” a sort of Gresham’s law comes to prevail in corporate standards.

“以指标论管理”很容易走火入魔。我最近读到一位首席执行官的信,他提出要让每股收益从 2001 年的 6.15 美元,到 2005 年恰好增长到 10 美元这一整数——相当于年均增长近 15%——但对于如何实现却只字未提。我不认为这样一个精确却空洞的数字目标能为股东带来更大利益。事实上,让我担心的不是它无法实现,而是它竟然能实现。在一个充满不确定性的世界里,公司或许只有通过操纵数字,甚至更糟糕的做法——依赖削减成本、虚假的节约,以及迫使一切可变动因素(包括那些必须屈从于此目标的人)就范——才能达到目的。但代价是什么?公司越早停止激进地“业绩指引”,就越好。因为我相信,从现在起二十五年后,那些能在行业中领先的公司,将是把盈利增长视为企业业绩的必然结果,而非战略目标本身的公司。难道数字操盘手能胜过产品创造者?别指望了!

“Management by measurement” is easily taken too far. I recently read of a chief executive who called for earnings growth from $6.15 per share in 2001 to a nice round $10 per share in 2005—an earnings increase of almost 15% per year—but without a word about how it will be done. I don’t believe that the greater good of shareholders is served by such a precise yet abstract numeric goal. Indeed what worries me is not that it won’t be achieved, but that it will. In an uncertain world, the company may get there only by manipulating the numbers or even worse, relying on cutbacks and false economies, and shaping everything that moves (including the human beings who will have to bend to the task) to achieve the goal. But at what cost? The sooner companies cease their aggressive “guidance,” the better. For I believe that a quarter-century from now the companies that will be leading the way in their industries will be those that make their earnings growth, not the objective of their strategy, but the consequence of their corporate performance. Will the numbers counters outpace the product makers? Don’t count on it!

个人视角 但别误会我要否定数字的重要性。请清楚一点:我绝不是说数字无关紧要。衡量标准——如果你愿意,也可以说是计数——对于沟通财务目标和成就是必不可少的。这我明白。然而,在过去 28 年里,我一直在打造一家企业——还是一家金融机构——其根基远非追求量化目标和统计数据,而是扎扎实实地落实几条常识性的投资理念,以及一套开明的人文价值观和道德准则。先锋集团的市场份额,我已说过无数遍,必须是衡量标准,而不是目标;它必须靠赢得,而不是买来。公司市场份额在二十多年里稳步增长,这本身就很能说明问题:这样的做法未必会适得其反。

An Individual Perspective Lest I be accused of innumeracy, however, please be clear that I’m not saying that numbers don’t matter. Measurement standards—counting, if you will—are essential to the communication of financial goals and achievements. I know that. But for the past 28 years I’ve been engaged in building an enterprise—and a financial institution at that—based far more on the sound implementation of a few common sense investment ideas and an enlightened sense of human values and ethical standards than on the search for quantitative goals and statistical achievements. Vanguard’s market share, as I’ve said countless times, must be a measure, not an objective; it must be earned, not bought. The steady increase in the firm’s market share over more than two decades says much about the fact that such an approach need not be counterproductive.

我们的策略源于一种信念:最优秀的企业增长,来自于把“为客户做事”这匹马放在“盈利目标”这辆车前面。增长必须是内生的,而不是强推出来的。这一点我深信已久。事实上,请看看三十年前我作为威灵顿管理公司总裁在年度员工致辞收尾时写下的一段话,当时谈的就是对单纯数字过分迷信的危险:“第一步是衡量那些容易被衡量的东西。这一步本身没问题。第二步是忽视那些无法被衡量的东西,或者给它一个随意的主观数值。这很做作,而且具有误导性。第三步是假设无法衡量的东西其实并不重要。这是盲目。第四步是说无法衡量的东西根本不存在。这是自杀。”⁷ 因此,过度依赖数字是徒劳的,在我们这个充满不确定的世界里,试图衡量不可衡量的东西是扭曲的。当数数成为游戏的唯一名字,而把人的价值排除在外时,我们的金融市场、我们的企业、我们的社会都将付出代价。所以,别指望它!

Our strategy arose from a conviction that the best corporate growth comes from putting the horse of doing things for clients ahead of the cart of earnings targets. Growth must be organic, rather than forced. And I’ve believed it for a long time. Indeed, consider the perspective that follows about giving too much credence to mere numbers, with which, as head of Wellington Management Company, I closed my annual staff message thirty years ago: “The first step is to measure what can be easily measured. This is okay as far as it goes. The second step is to disregard that which cannot be measured, or give it an arbitrary quantitative value. This is artificial and misleading. The third step is to presume that what cannot be measured really is not very important. This is blindness. The fourth step is to say that what cannot be measured does not really exist. This is suicide.”7 There is, then, a futility in excessive reliance on numbers, and a perversity in trying to measure the immeasurable in our uncertain world. When counting becomes the name of the game to the exclusion of human values, our financial markets, our corporations and our society pay the price. So don’t count on it!

数字是必要的工具,也是至关重要的工具。但它们只是手段,而非目的。它们是衡量企业成功的必要条件,却并非充分条件。倘若认为单凭数字化衡量——而舍弃经验、判断力和品格这些无法量化的品质——就能揭示真相,那便是我们当代金融与经济体系的一大根本缺陷。

Numbers are a necessary tool and a vital one. But they are a means and not an end. They are a condition necessary to measure corporate success, but not a condition sufficient. To believe that measurements—in the absence of the immeasurable qualities of experience, judgment, and character—are all that illuminate the truth is one of the great failings of our contemporary financial and economic system.

短短半个多世纪,学术界对经济和金融市场运作方式的研究,已从往昔的世俗哲学迈入信息时代的高等数学。然而,我们的领域必须永远首先关注对真理的不懈追寻。如果说学院曾是问题的一部分,那么它也必须是解决方案的一部分。两千年前,罗马诗人贺拉斯说得恰到好处:“美好的雅典赋予我的艺术另一主题:将真实与表象剥离,在学术的园林中探寻真理。”

In little more than half a century, the academic study of how economies and financial markets work has moved from the worldly philosophies of yore to the higher mathematics of the Information Age. Yet our field must remain, above all, concerned with the eternal search for truth. If the academy has been part of the problem, it must be part of the solution. Two thousand years ago the Roman poet Horace put it perfectly: “Good Athens gave my art another theme To sort what is from what is merely seen And search for truth in groves of academe.”

在 1972 年的一次演讲中,民意调查专家丹尼尔·扬克洛维奇说道。

From a 1972 speech by pollster Daniel Yankelovich