首只指数共同基金

1997 · 演讲 · 原文约 875 词
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1995 年 4 月,也就是仅仅两年前,先锋集团出版了一本小册子,我们大胆地将其命名为《指数化的胜利》。这本小册子收录了我为先锋集团六只指数基金 1994 年年报撰写的董事长致函,当时这些基金由 21 个独立投资组合组成——14 个投资组合涵盖美国各类股票、国际股票、高等级债券以及平衡型(股票-债券)投资,另外 7 个投资组合则专注于税收管理或生命周期策略(资产配置)目标。到那时,先锋指数基金的总资产已达到 180 亿美元,而我们 1975 年成立先锋指数信托的首个(标普 500 指数)投资组合时,资产仅为 1100 万美元,这一增长堪称非凡。

The First Index Mutual Fund Introduction In April, 1995, just two years ago, Vanguard published a booklet which we had the temerity to title, “The Triumph of Indexing.” The booklet included the Chairman’s letters I had written for the 1994 Annual Reports of Vanguard’s six index funds, then composed of 21 separate portfolios—14 portfolios of various classes of U.S. stocks, international stocks, high-grade bonds, and balanced (stock-bond) investments, and seven portfolios focused on tax-managed or life strategy (asset allocation) goals. By then, total assets of the Vanguard index funds had reached $18 billion, a remarkable growth from $11 million when we formed the first (Index 500) portfolio of Vanguard Index Trust in 1975.

在导言部分,我指出了指数投资策略在长期内的显著成功,尽管我否定了标普 500 指数在之前三年跑赢超过 85% 的主动管理权益共同基金这一表现是可以持续或重复的说法。尽管如此,我仍期待指数化投资加速增长,因为越来越多的投资者开始意识到“指数基金正是那句老话里说的‘更好的捕鼠器’……是一种在证券市场投资中非常高效且富有成效的工具……以极低的成本提供了极其广泛的分散化”。

In the introduction, I noted the remarkable success of index investment strategies over the long term, even as I disclaimed the notion that the recent performance of the Standard & Poor’s 500 Stock Index— outpacing more than 85% of all actively-managed equity mutual funds during the previous three years—was either sustainable or repeatable. Nonetheless, I looked forward to accelerating growth for indexing as growing numbers of investors came to recognize that “the index fund is the proverbial better mousetrap . . . a very efficient and productive means of investing in the securities markets . . . providing extraordinarily broad diversification at extraordinarily low cost.”

而事实也证明,加速增长果真到来了。在随后的两年里,先锋指数基金的资产增长了四倍多,达到 80 亿美元,其中包括原始指数 500 投资组合中的 40 亿美元。确实,即使单独来看,不计入先锋旗下目前管理的另外 2000 亿美元“传统”基金资产,先锋指数基金本身的规模也足以在全共同基金行业中排到第十位。更重要的是,我们最初的理念在赢得投资者如此热烈的反响之后,最终(我想也是必然地)被许多其他基金集团所模仿——只不过,它们模仿时既没什么热情,也没给投资者提供特别有吸引力的运营成本水平(除了那些终究是临时性的费用豁免之外)。无论如何,自 1975 年“博格尔的蠢行”——这个说法在 70 年代末到 90 年代初我听得太频繁了——首次面世以来,我们已经走过了漫长的道路。

And accelerating growth, as it turned out, was just what came to pass. In the subsequent two years, Vanguard Index assets have increased more than fourfold—to $80 billion, including $40 billion in the original Index 500 Portfolio. Indeed, standing alone, without counting the other $200 billion of “conventional” fund assets now managed by Vanguard, the Vanguard Index funds would rank as the tenth largest complex in the entire mutual fund industry. What is more, our original concept, having met with such a fine reception from investors, is finally (and, I suppose, inevitably) being copied by many other fund groups, albeit neither with much enthusiasm nor with particularly attractive operating cost levels (other than through fee waivers that are but temporary) for investors. Be that as it may, however, we have come a long way since “Bogle’s folly”—a phrase I heard all too often from the late 1970s through the early 1990s—first saw the light of day in 1975.

在理想世界中,指数共同基金增长的基础本该是对指数投资背后那条简单理论的逐步——哪怕是勉强——接受:投资者作为一个整体,无法战胜市场,因为他们就是市场本身。而从这一理论衍生出的现实是:投资者作为一个整体,必然落后于市场,因为参与成本——主要是运营费用、顾问费以及投资组合交易成本——直接从市场回报中扣除。与主动管理型基金不同,指数基金不支付顾问费,并限制投资组合换手率,从而将这些成本压至最低水平。这正是它的优势所在。从根本上说,你只需要知道这些,就能理解为何指数基金必然提供更优的长期回报。

In an ideal world, the basis for the growth of index mutual funds would have been the gradual, if grudging, acceptance of the simple theory that underlies index investing: investors as a group cannot outperform the market, because they are the market. And from that theory flows the reality: investors as a group must underperform the market, because the costs of participation—largely operating expenses, advisory fees, and portfolio transaction costs--constitute a direct deduction from the market’s return. Unlike actively-managed funds, an index fund pays no advisory fees and limits portfolio turnover, thus holding these costs to minimal levels. And therein lies its advantage. That, essentially, is all you need to know to understand why index funds must provide superior long-term returns.

这种不言自明的事实,如果经验丰富的专业资金管理人能利用新手和业余者,那当然无关紧要。但在高度有效的市场中,这种事不会发生。之所以不会发生,是因为设定价格的正是这些专业人士,而专家和新手都要按这个价格买卖。历史记录很清楚:大多数主要金融市场确实高度有效。大量证据——有人会说是铁证——表明:(a)大多数专业管理人的业绩无法超越相应的市场指数;(b)那些偶尔超越的人,其成功过去很少能在未来重现——这些证据之多,已经到了几乎无法实质反驳的程度。

This self-evident reality, of course, wouldn’t matter if experienced professional money managers were able to take advantage of tyros and amateurs. But in highly-efficient markets, that doesn’t happen. It doesn’t happen because it is the professionals who set the prices that are paid by expert and novice alike. And the record is clear that most major financial markets are indeed highly efficient. The body of evidence—some would say brute evidence—(a) that most professional managers fail to outpace appropriate market indexes; and (b) those who do so rarely repeat in the future their success in the past—is so abundant as to defy substantive rebuttal.

遗憾的是,这些令人信服的理由在指数基金近期的增长中只占很小一部分。真正的原因是,我们在 1995 年初《指数化投资的胜利》一文中曾有所保留的标普 500 指数基金的出色表现——不仅持续了下来,而且在 1995 年剩余时间、1996 年以及 1997 年迄今变得更为优异。说来遗憾,指数基金成了“热门产品”——《华尔街日报》将先锋集团 500 指数基金描述为“行业宠儿”——并且指数基金资产增长中有很大一部分似乎来自追求快速回报的短期投资者,他们是共同基金交易者,而不是那些被简单理论以及指数化投资为“坚持到底”的投资者提供的实现最佳长期回报的卓越机会所说服的长期投资者。

Alas, these compelling propositions account for but a fraction of the recent growth of index funds. Rather, the extraordinarily favorable performance of the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index funds—performance we disclaimed in “The Triumph of Indexing early in 1995—has not only continued, it has gotten even better during the remainder of 1995, in 1996, and so far in 1997. Sorry to say, index funds are “a hot product”—The Wall Street Journal described Vanguard’s Index 500 Portfolio as the “industry darling”—and a significant portion of index fund asset growth appears to be coming from short-term investors who are mutual fund traders, seeking quick returns, rather than long-term investors persuaded by the simple theory and the remarkable opportunity for the optimal long-term returns that indexing offers to investors who “stay the course.”

但正如这支首只指数基金——先锋指数信托 500(Vanguard Index Trust 500)的 500 投资组合(最初以“第一指数投资信托”之名运作)——的历史所展现的那样,最初的 23 年历经了许多起伏、诸多挑战与大量机遇。如今,指数基金正在改变投资者看待共同基金的方式——比以往任何时候都更聚焦于成本与分散化这两个关键问题。即便今天,正如可能的情形那样,是广受欢迎且业绩卓越的标普 500 指数基金在人气上达到的短暂巅峰,我依然相信,低成本指数化的根基足够坚实,能够在长期中取得优势。如我在本章结尾所指出,指数基金既然能在早期挫败中存活下来,也照样能经受住胜利的考验。

But, as this history of the first index fund—the 500 Portfolio of Vanguard Index Trust 500 (initially operating under the name First Index Investment Trust)--recounts, the first 23 years has had many ups and downs, many challenges and many opportunities. Today, index funds are changing the way investors look at mutual funds—focusing more than ever on the critical issues of cost and diversification. Even if today proves to be, as well it might, a momentary peak in popularity for the remarkably popular and successful index funds based on the Standard & Poor’s 500 Stock Index, I believe the fundamentals of low-cost indexing are so strong as to prevail over the long pull. Having survived early defeat, as I note at the end of the chapter, the index fund can also survive victory.

约翰·C·博格尔 1997 年 6 月 30 日 © 1997 年版权归约翰·C·博格尔所有

John C. Bogle June 30, 1997 © Copyright 1997 by John C. Bogle.