“先生们……为挽救我们的业务于毁灭,我们必须削减开支”
“诸位先生……为了挽救我们的企业于崩溃,我们必须削减开支”——约翰·C·博格的讲话
先锋投资公司集团创始人兼高级主席
荣获全国个人财务顾问协会特别成就奖时的发言
华盛顿特区,1999 年 6 月 4 日
“Gentlemen . . . To Save Our Business from Ruin, We Must Reduce Expenses” Remarks by John C. Bogle Founder and Senior Chairman, The Vanguard Group of Investment Companies On Receiving The Special Achievement Award of the National Association of Personal Financial Advisors Washington, DC June 4, 1999 It is a signal honor to be named as the first mutual fund executive to receive this award for distinguished service to the financial services industry, all the more so since the award places me in the company of author-journalist Jane Bryant Quinn, U.S. Representative Edward Markey, and SEC Division Director Kathryn McGrath, who have also stood for serving the mutual fund shareholder in the most honest, efficient, and economical way possible. It all comes down to giving the fund investor a fair shake.
能够被授予这一为金融服务行业做出杰出贡献的特别成就奖,并成为首位获此殊荣的共同基金高管,我感到无比荣幸。尤其让我感到荣幸的是,与我一同获得此项认可的还有作家兼记者简·布莱恩特·奎因、众议员爱德华·马基,以及证券交易委员会部门主管凯瑟琳·麦格拉斯——他们都曾以最诚实、最高效、最经济的方式,为共同基金股东的利益挺身而出。归根结底,就是要给基金投资者一个公平的待遇。
I do not believe that the mutual fund industry is giving the investor a fair shake today.
我认为,今天的共同基金行业并没有给投资者一个公平的待遇。
Marketing and promotion have taken precedence over management and trusteeship, a shift dramatized by the fact that the industry’s star manager of the 1980s and early 1990s has become the industry’s star marketer during the waning years of the millennium. The traditional mutual fund watchword—“For the long term investor”—is belied by fund portfolio turnover that now approaches 100% per year, and turnover of investors’ holdings of fund shares that has risen to 30% per year. Given this activity by both fund managers and fund shareholders, a more accurate watchword would be, “For the short-term speculator.” Fund costs march ever upward. It takes no more than hornbook arithmetic to realize that investors as a group inevitably earn market returns, less the costs incurred in earning those returns. The croupiers who run the mutual fund tables take off an ever-larger share of the market returns. And there are lots of croupiers: fund marketers and distributors, fund managers and administrators, lawyers and accountants, and brokers who handle the funds’ transactions—to say nothing of the federal, state, and local governments who collect taxes, not only on fund income but on excessive distributions of realized gains born of all of that rapid portfolio turnover.
市场营销和推广已经凌驾于管理和信托责任之上,这种转变的一个鲜明例证是,行业在 20 世纪 80 年代和 90 年代初期的明星基金经理,在千禧年即将结束的几年里,已经变成了行业的明星营销者。传统共同基金的座右铭——“为长期投资者服务”——已经被基金投资组合换手率所否定,如今换手率接近每年 100%,而投资者持有基金份额的换手率也已升至每年 30%。鉴于基金经理和基金股东都如此活跃,更准确的座右铭应该是:“为短期投机者服务。”基金成本却持续攀升。只需最基本的算术就能明白,投资者作为一个群体,其回报必然等于市场回报减去赚取这些回报所承担的成本。那些经营共同基金赌桌的赌场庄家们,正从市场回报中抽走越来越大的份额。而庄家数量众多:基金营销商和分销商、基金经理和管理人、律师和会计师、处理基金交易指令的经纪商——更不用说联邦、州及地方政府了,他们不仅对基金收入征税,还对因快速投资组合换手而产生的过度已实现收益分配征税。
Revolutionary Words A change in the entire modus operandi of this industry is imperative. Yet it seems nowhere in sight. So I urge you at NAPFA to bring this much-needed change by pressing the mutual fund firms to which you entrust your clients’ assets to cut their costs. The litany of costs that I have just enumerated has added up to a serious diminution of fund returns during the long bull market. At least a quarter of the market’s annual returns—more than 4 percentage points per year—have gone to the croupiers. When market returns fall back to more normal levels—as they will—the diminution will be cataclysmic.
革命性的言论
彻底改变这个行业的整个运作模式势在必行。然而,这种改变似乎遥遥无期。因此,我恳请你们——全国个人财务顾问协会的会员们——通过向你们所托付客户资产的共同基金公司施压,要求它们削减成本,来推动这场迫切需要的变革。我刚才列举的一系列成本,在长期牛市中已经严重侵蚀了基金回报。市场年回报中至少有四分之一——每年超过 4 个百分点——落入了庄家的口袋。当市场回报回落到更正常水平时——这一天终会到来——这种侵蚀将是灾难性的。
Gentlemen*, you must recognize (1) that companies having the smallest expense will have the ultimate advantage; (2) that companies having this advantage are the most desirous of correcting present abuses, and (3) that companies which cannot long survive the present condition of affairs are determined to nullify every effort for reform. To save our business from ruin we must at once undertake a vigorous reform. To do this, the first step must be to reduce expenses.
诸位先生*,你们必须认识到:(1)那些费用最低的公司将拥有最终的竞争优势;(2)拥有这一优势的公司最渴望纠正当前的弊端;(3)那些在当前状况下无法长久生存的公司,则决心要阻挠每一项改革努力。为了挽救我们的企业于崩溃,我们必须立即着手进行一场有力的改革。要做到这一点,第一步必须是削减开支。
That is the message I bring to you today. Those words may sound rather idealistic and fiery—even revolutionary—so I quickly confess that they are neither new, nor mine. They are the words—right down to the italics—of my great-grandfather Philander B. Armstrong, who conceived the idea of mutual insurance in the property field, and formed the Phoenix Mutual Fire Insurance Company in 1875. A decade later, he spoke those words to his fellow leaders of the insurance industry in St. Louis, Missouri. The fact that my own career in the mutual fund industry, and my own convictions as well, so closely resemble his must stand as a monument to the fact that even the apple’s apple’s apple’s apple doesn’t fall very far from the tree. __________ *Today, the quotation would properly read, “ladies and gentlemen.”
这就是我今天要向你们传达的信息。这些话听起来可能相当理想主义、相当激烈——甚至可以说是革命性的——所以我得赶紧坦白,这些话既不是新的,也不是我的原创。这些话语——包括其中的斜体部分——都出自我的曾祖父菲兰德·B·阿姆斯特朗,他在财产保险领域首创了相互保险的理念,并于 1875 年成立了凤凰互助火灾保险公司。十年后,他在密苏里州圣路易斯市向保险业的同行领袖们发表了这番讲话。我本人在共同基金行业的职业生涯,以及我自己的信念,与我的曾祖父如此惊人地相似,这本身堪称一座丰碑,证明即使是苹果的苹果的苹果的苹果,也离树不远。__________ *今天,这句引文理应为“诸位女士和先生”。
Costs Matter—Enormously The fact is that costs still matter. They matter in insurance and in mutual funds, and in all financial service industries. And they matter most where they are at once very large, compounded over time, and easily measurable relative to the value of the services provided. The confluence of those three factors is vividly etched in the investment record of the mutual fund industry.
成本至关重要——极其重要
事实是,成本依然至关重要。成本在保险业、共同基金业以及所有金融服务行业都至关重要。当成本规模庞大、随时间复利增长,并且相对于所提供的服务价值而言易于衡量时,其重要性最为显著。这三个因素的共同作用,在共同基金行业的投资记录中得到了生动的体现。
During the past 15 years, for example, the return of the average equity mutual fund lagged the return of the total stock market by 2.75% per year (before taxes). Industry costs— fund operating expenses, marketing expenses, and advisory fees; sales charges and portfolio turnover costs—amounted to about 2½% per year. Assuming a continuation of that cost level and a normalized market return of, say, 10% per year, a $10,000 initial investment, simply invested in the stock market and compounded over a time period of 40 years—many of today’s investors will own fund shares over a far longer period—would grow to $452,600. Invested in an equity fund, however, it would grow to but $180,400.
例如,在过去 15 年里,普通股票型基金的年回报率落后于整个股票市场年回报率 2.75 个百分点(税前)。行业成本——基金运营费用、营销费用和咨询费;销售费用和投资组合换手成本——每年约为 2.5%。假设这一成本水平持续下去,并且市场年回报率正常化,比如说每年 10%,那么一笔 1 万美元的初始投资,如果简单地投资于股票市场并按复利计算 40 年——许多当今的投资者持有基金份额的时间会更长——将增长至 45.26 万美元。然而,如果投资于一只股票型基金,它将仅增长至 18.04 万美元。
Starkly put, the fund investors would accumulate 38% of the capital provided by the equity market, and the suppliers of fund services would confiscate the remaining 62%. In other words, the investor puts up 100% of the initial capital, assumes 100% of the risk, and receives 38% of the return. The croupiers, having put up none of the capital and having assumed none of the risk, consume 62% of the return. To give the fund shareholder a fair shake, quoting Great Grandpa Armstrong, “the first step must be to reduce expenses.”
直白地说,基金投资者将积累股市所提供的资本的 38%,而基金服务的提供者将攫取剩余 62% 的资本。换句话说,投资者提供了 100% 的初始资本,承担了 100% 的风险,却只获得 38% 的回报。那些庄家,既没有投入任何资本,也没有承担任何风险,却消耗了 62% 的回报。为了给基金股东一个公平的待遇,引用我曾祖父阿姆斯特朗的话:“第一步必须是削减开支。”
Industry Expenses Soar Yet industry expenses are not only not being reduced, they are soaring. Since 1980 the annual expense ratio of the average equity fund has risen by more than 40%—from 1.10% to 1.57% of fund assets. It has been documented, well, everywhere. But, the industry takes the position that the cost of fund ownership is declining. Or that’s what the industry’s Investment Company Institute says. What it means is that, according to its rather tortured and convoluted methodology, the cost of purchasing equity funds has, in fact, declined, from 2.25% annually in 1980 to 1.49% in 1997. The industry reaches this conclusion by including sales charges plus expense ratios, and then weighting the results by the sales volume of each fund each year. High cost funds that don’t sell don’t count. Virtually ignored in the ICI methodology, the managers of funds that investors shun nonetheless prosper, even as their shareholders suffer.
行业费用飙升
然而,行业费用不仅没有削减,反而在飙升。自 1980 年以来,普通股票型基金的年费用率已经上升了 40% 以上——从基金资产的 1.10% 上升到 1.57%。这一情况已得到充分记载,几乎随处可见。但该行业却认为,持有基金的成本正在下降。至少,这是行业组织投资公司协会的说法。它的意思是,根据其相当牵强和复杂的方法论,购买股票基金的成本实际上已经从 1980 年的每年 2.25% 下降到 1997 年的 1.49%。该行业是通过将销售费用加上费用率,然后根据每年每只基金的销售额对结果进行加权来得出这一结论的。销售不佳的高成本基金不计入在内。在 ICI 的方法论中,几乎被忽视的是,投资者避之不及的基金的管理者们,即使他们的股东在受苦,他们自己却依然过得很好。
To the extent that the industry’s overly-generous appraisal of the data, along with its somewhat specious series of definitions, can be regarded as valid, what the data really show is that, quoting from the independent Morningstar Mutual Funds analysis, “the drop has been driven by investors, not by shareholder-friendly mutual fund companies,” and that a few fund families “deserve credit for keeping their expenses down, but one shouldn’t credit the entire industry for the virtues of a few—and for the diligence of investors in seeking them out.”
就行业对数据的过度乐观评估,以及其有些似是而非的定义系列可以被视为有效这一点而言,这些数据真正显示的是,引用独立的晨星共同基金分析报告的话说,“下降是由投资者驱动的,而不是由对股东友好的共同基金公司驱动的”,并且少数基金家族“值得称赞,因为它们控制了成本,但不应该将少数公司的美德——以及投资者寻找它们的勤奋——归功于整个行业。”
Given the dynamic combination of (a) the increasing importance of no-load funds (sold without commissions); (b) the rapid growth of low-cost market index funds; and (c) the remarkable rise in market share of the industry’s sole mutual mutual fund complex—the unique structure adopted by a firm that operates its funds on an “at cost” basis (you’ll recognize that firm as Vanguard)—the industry’s claim that the cost of purchasing, as distinct from owning, fund shares has declined may well even be valid, as far as it goes. However, it doesn’t go nearly far enough. It ignores the fact that the heavy cost of portfolio transactions is a major “cost of fund ownership” which probably—the industry is tight-lipped on this subject—adds up to a full percentage point to fund costs, raising the total annual cost to as much as 2½%—the very number I used earlier in my example of a $10,000 investment compounded over 40 years.
考虑到以下三个因素的动态结合:(a)免佣基金(无需支付佣金销售)的重要性日益增加;(b)低成本市场指数基金的快速增长;(c)行业中唯一一家真正的共同基金公司——即采用“按成本价”运营其基金的特殊结构的那家公司(你们会认出那家公司就是先锋集团)——市场份额的显著上升,行业关于购买(区别于持有)基金份额的成本已经下降的说法,就其本身而言,可能确实是有效的。然而,这远远不够。它忽略了一个事实:沉重的投资组合交易成本是“持有基金成本”的一个主要组成部分,这可能——该行业对此讳莫如深——使基金总成本增加整整一个百分点,使年化总成本高达 2.5%——这正是我前面在 1 万美元初始投资复利 40 年的例子中使用的数字。
Is There Price Competition?
存在价格竞争吗?
市场上大约有 700 家共同基金管理公司。其中至少有 50 家拥有足够的规模和资源,能够在共同基金行业的各个战场上展开竞争。在资本主义市场的大多数角落,结果将是激烈的价格竞争以降低价格。但是,正如记录所显示的那样,存在着大量提高价格的竞争。降低价格的竞争却明显缺失。至少可以说,该行业不同意这个结论。ICI 的官方立场是:“请任何人不要怀疑——共同基金基于价格进行着激烈的竞争。”这是一个荒谬的——我认为是不负责任的——立场。如果存在激烈的价格竞争,该行业如何解释这个事实——它深埋在 ICI 关于基金“持有”成本的分析报告中(且未加评论)——即成本最低的 10% 的基金,其直接费用已从每年 0.71% 提高到 0.90%?——费用上涨了 27%。(这包括先锋集团,按照 ICI 的方法论,其股票基金成本自 1980 年以来已从 0.67% 降至 0.27%,下降了 60%!)如果存在价格竞争,该行业又如何可能解释,自去年 7 月以来,行业中唯一的极低成本提供商,其直接营销(免佣)股票和债券基金的现金流竟占据了令人瞠目的 80% 份额……而市场上却没有出现任何显著的竞争回应?(没错:先锋集团现金流 400 亿美元;其他直销商 90 亿美元。)在哪个其他行业,一个相对后起之秀能够获得 80% 的市场份额,却没有一个竞争对手模仿其战略?我实在无法理解,怎么能把这种景象与声称共同基金基于价格进行激烈竞争的论断等同起来。
There are perhaps 700 mutual fund managers. At least 50 of them have the scale and resources to compete on every front in the mutual fund industry wars. In most corners of the capitalistic marketplace, the result would be fierce price competition to reduce prices. But, as the record shows, there is plenty of competition to increase prices. Competition to reduce prices is conspicuous by its absence. To say the very least, the industry disagrees with that conclusion. The official position of the ICI: “Let there be no doubt in anyone’s mind—mutual funds compete vigorously, based on price.” It is an absurd—I would argue, irresponsible—position. If there is vigorous price competition, how can the industry explain the fact—buried deep (and without comment) in the Investment Company Institute analysis of the costs of fund “ownership”—that the lowest cost 10% of funds have raised their direct expenses from 0.71% to 0.90% per year? A 27% cost increase. (Including Vanguard, whose equity fund costs—using the ICI methodology—are down from 0.67% to 0.27% since 1980, a reduction of 60%!) If there is price competition, how can the industry possibly explain how the industry’s sole very low cost provider has, since last July, accounted for an eye-popping 80% of the cash flow into direct-marketed (no-load) stock and bond funds . . . without significant competitive response. (That’s right: Vanguard cash flow, $40 billion; other direct marketers $9 billion.) In what other industry could a relative upstart capture a market share of 80% and not have a single competitor imitate its strategy? How one can equate this picture with the allegation that mutual funds compete vigorously based on price is beyond my comprehension.
考虑这个简单的例子。假设只有两只大型共同基金,基金 A 每年收取 2% 的费用,基金 B 每年收取 0.20%。第一年,投资者不了解成本的作用,基金 A 销售额为 1 亿美元,基金 B 则为零。第二年,投资者觉醒了。基金 A 没有销售额,基金 B 销售额为 1 亿美元。神奇的是,根据 ICI 的方法论,基金购置成本(而非持有成本)下降了 90%——从 2% 降至 0.20%。基金 A 的经理会如何回应?如果经理把费用降到 1%,他的利润会受到挤压,但一个注重成本的市场会对此视而不见。如果降到 0.50%,他的利润将消失,对市场的影响也微乎其微。而如果降到 0.20%,这位经理大概就要破产了。所以基金 A 的经理不会降低他 2% 的费用率。价格竞争的定义,并非由消费者的行为决定,而是由生产者的行动决定。
Consider this simple example. Assume there are just two large mutual funds, Fund A charging 2% per year and Fund B charging 0.20%. In the first year, investors are unaware of the role costs play, and Fund A has sales of $100 million and Fund B zero. In the next year, investors wake up. Fund A has no sales and Fund B $100 million. Miraculously, under the ICI methodology, the cost of fund acquisition (not ownership) has dropped by 90%—from 2% to 0.20%. How would Fund A’s manager respond? If the manager cut the fee to 1%, his profits would be squeezed, yet a cost-conscious marketplace would ignore it. At 0.50%, his profits would be gone, and the impact on the market would be no more than minimal. And at 0.20%, the manager would probably be bankrupt. So the manager of Fund A doesn’t reduce his 2% expense ratio. Price competition is defined, not by the behavior of consumers, but by the actions of producers.
真正的价格竞争会是什么样子?答案既简单又显而易见。既然先锋集团的成功能建立在低成本长期投资的基础之上,竞争对手就必须:(i) 降低其管理费以及所管理的股票和债券基金的投资组合换手率;(ii) 全力以赴、热情高涨地投身指数基金的竞争之中,消极被动的“入场”是行不通的。这些改变能为它们的投资者赚钱。但会大幅削减其管理公司(及其股东)的利润,因为让管理者花费金钱,才能给股东提供他们应得的公平待遇。一个简单的经济真相是:只要如今惊人水平的盈利能力仍是管理者的首要优先事项,基金股东就得为此付出代价,而行业的费率就会继续逐步攀升。
What would real price competition look like? The answer is as simple as it is obvious. Since Vanguard’s success has been based on long-term investing at low-cost, competitors would have to: (i) cut their management fees and the portfolio turnover of their managed stock and bond funds; and (ii) plunge enthusiastically into the index fund fray; a “kicking and screaming” entry won’t do the job. These changes would make money for their investors. But they would slash profits for their management companies (and their shareholders), for it costs managers money to give shareholders the fair shake they deserve. The simple economic truth is this: As long as today’s awesome level of profitability is priority number one for the managers, fund shareholders will pay the price, and industry expense ratios will continue to edge ever upward.
基金成本与理财规划顾问 大幅降低这个基金行业的成本,显然会惠及基金股东,但同样不言而喻的是,这也会惠及个人理财顾问。你理所当然地要向你提供服务的客户收费,也理应拥有充足的选择,从众多合适且定价合理的基金中挑选那些共同基金提供给你的客户。事实上,正是这个简单的事实,支撑了我在十多年前就形成的信念:凭借其低成本,先锋集团理应成为理财规划师和注册投资顾问的天然盟友,因为他们需要将客户的总成本水平保持在合理范围内。个人理财顾问齐心协力,可以比我个人理想主义的愿景拥有更强大的力量去敦促基金降低其成本。如果你们这个代表个人投资者的协会,能够与代表机构投资者的退休计划受托人联合起来,为基金投资者争取公平待遇,那么你们就能实实在在地提升客户未来获得回报的潜力。
Fund Costs and Financial Planning Advisers Sharply reduced costs in this fund industry will obviously serve fund shareholders, but it should not go without saying that it will also serve personal financial advisers. You charge, as you must, fees for the services you provide your clients, and you deserve a wide choice of suitable, fairly-priced funds from which to choose the mutual funds you offer. That simple fact, indeed, lies behind my conviction, reached more than a decade ago, that Vanguard, with its low-costs, should be the natural ally of financial planners and registered investment advisers, with their need to keep the total level of client costs at reasonable levels. Working in unison, personal financial advisers can press the funds to reduce their costs with a power far greater than my idealistic vision. If your association, representing individual investors, could somehow join with retirement plan trustees, representing institutional investors, and demand a fair shake for fund investors, you could make a real difference in enhancing the future returns earned by your clients.
在这种情况下,你们的道德准则让我印象深刻。它使用了一些美妙的措辞,而这些词在共同基金文献中几乎难得一见:“对客户的受托责任……践行公平与适当性……正直与诚实。”这些恰如其分的语言,描述了那些受托管理投资者资产的公司和个人所应秉持的价值观。如果你们能影响这个行业,不仅推广同样的标准,而且降低成本,那么我今天的话或许就将标志着共同基金行业建设性变革的开端,这种变革将造福于数千万基金股东的利益。
In this context, I was struck by your Code of Ethics. It uses wonderful words that, as it happens, rarely if ever appear in mutual fund literature: “fiduciary responsibility to clients. . . practicing fairness and suitability. . . integrity and honesty.” These are the right words to describe the values of firms and individuals entrusted with the stewardship of the assets of investors. If you can influence this industry not only to promulgate the same standards, but to reduce costs, perhaps my words today will mark the beginning of constructive change in the mutual fund industry that will advance the interests of tens of millions of its shareholder-owners.
四代人——两位作者——同一个理念 这将需要很长时间。我之所以知道这一点,仅仅是因为阿姆斯特朗曾祖父的经历,他是一位在 19 世纪 80 年代和 90 年代挑战财产保险业的内部人士。根据他的传记,“他的方法极具原创性,并且与国内几乎所有公认的承保人的做法截然对立。”或许是因为他在火险行业推广自己理念的努力受挫,到世纪之交时,他将批评的目光转向了人寿保险业。他写了一本经典但措辞相当激烈的书,名为《偷窃许可证》,副标题是“人寿保险,骗局中的骗局。我们的法律如何抢走我们自己人民数十亿美元”,出版于 1917 年。他的结语是这样的:“为什么要谈论纠正当前的弊端?病人得了癌症。病毒已经深入血液。他不仅病入膏肓,而且对社会构成危险。叫殡仪员来吧。”
Four Generations—Two Authors—One Idea It will take a long time. I know that, if only because of the experience of Great Grandpa Armstrong, an insider taking on the property insurance industry in the 1880’s and 1890’s. According to his biography, “his methods were original and diametrically opposed to almost every recognized underwriter in the country.” Perhaps frustrated by the failure of his ideas to catch hold in the fire insurance industry, by the turn of the century he had turned his critical gaze to the life insurance industry. He wrote a classic, if rather intemperate, book entitled, “A License to Steal,” subtitled “Life Insurance, The Swindle of Swindles. How Our Laws Rob Our Own People of Billions,” published in 1917. His concluding words were these: “Why talk about correcting the present evil? The patient has a cancer. The virus is in the blood. He is not only sick unto death, but he is dangerous to the community. Call in the undertaker.”
当阿姆斯特朗曾祖父写下这些文字时,他与我的新书《共同基金常识:聪明投资者的新要求》两个月前出版时的年龄相同,正是他心肝宝贝的心肝宝贝。虽然我那本关于共同基金的书比起他那本人寿保险的书要温和得多,但论证的是同一个观点:“……这个行业所奉行的做法,严重削弱了其股东成功进行长期投资的机会……共同基金应该为投资者带来最大限度的回报,同时付出最小的管理成本,(但)这种自然秩序已经被颠倒过来了。其结果不仅违背常理,而且冒犯了常识……常识要求基金应当为其所有者——即基金持有人——的利益而运作。”
When Great Grandpa Armstrong wrote those words, he was the same age as the apple of his apple’s apple when my own new book, “Common Sense on Mutual Funds: New Imperatives for the Intelligent Investor,” was published two months ago. While my book about mutual funds is rather more temperate than his about life insurance, it makes the same point: “. . . the industry has embraced practices that seriously diminish its shareholders’ chances of successful long-term investing . . . Mutual funds should provide the greatest sum of investor returns with the least management expense, (but) the natural order has been turned on its head. The result not only defies nature, it offends common sense . . . Common sense demands that funds be governed in the interests of those who own them.”
在你们的帮助下,我们可以实现这个目标。
With your help, we can accomplish that goal.