当今共同基金行业:“冲突,无处不在的冲突”
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如今的共同基金行业:从一个小型行业长成庞然大物“冲突,无处不在的冲突”*
2015 年 3 月
约翰·C·博格尔
股票型
债券型
9.9 万亿美元
3.7 万亿美元
货币市场型
美国证券交易委员会
资产管理部
2.5 万亿美元
平衡型
总计
7400 亿美元
16.9 万亿美元
总资产
1951 年 12 月
股票型
24.5 亿美元
平衡型
6.8 亿美元
总计
31.3 亿美元
2015 年 4 月 28 日
1951-2015 年年化增长率:15%
*朱莉·里维(Julie Riewe)演讲标题,时任美国证券交易委员会执法部资产管理组联席主管
注:我在本次演讲及随附图表中所表达的观点仅代表我个人,不一定反映先锋集团现任管理层的观点。
The Mutual Fund Industry Today: A Tiny Industry Grows into a Behemoth “Conflicts, Conflicts Everywhere”* $ 10,000 TOTAL ASSETS March 2015 John C. Bogle Equity Bond $9.9T 3.7T 1,000 2.5T Money Market United States Securities Balanced TOTAL 740B $16.9T And Exchange Commission 100 TOTAL ASSETS Asset Management Unit Equity December 1951 $2.45B 10 Balanced 680M TOTAL $3.13B April 28, 2015 1 Annual Growth Rate 1951-2015: 15% *Title of a speech by Julie Riewe, Co-Chief of Asset Management Unit, Division of Enforcement NOTE: The views I express in this speech and the visuals that follow are my own and do not necessarily reflect 1951 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2015 the views of Vanguard’s present management.
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共同基金行业龙头:基金数量的巨大增长——当年与现在
| 1951 年 | 2015 年 | |||||
| 排名 | 基金名称 | 资产(百万美元) | 管理人名称 | 资产(十亿美元) | ||
| 1 | M.I.T. | 472 | 先锋集团 | 2,988 | ||
| 2 | 投资者互助基金 | 365 | 富达投资 | 1,615 | ||
| 3 | 基石基金 | 213 | 贝莱德 | 1,230 | ||
| 4 | 泛大陆基金 | 209 | 美国基金 | 1,216 | ||
| 5 | 附属基金 | 209 | 摩根大通基金 | 519 | ||
| 6 | 惠灵顿基金 | 194 | 道富集团 | 497 | ||
| 7 | 股息股基金 | 186 | 普信集团 | 493 | ||
| 8 | 基本面投资者基金 | 179 | 富兰克林坦伯顿 | 480 | ||
| 9 | 道富投资 | 106 | PIMCO | 375 | ||
| 10 | 波士顿基金 | 106 | 联博基金 | 272 | ||
| 合计 | 2,239 | 合计 | 9,686 | |||
| 占行业百分比 | 72% | 占行业百分比 | 57% | |||
| 行业总资产:31 亿美元 | 行业总资产:16.9 万亿美元 |
*包含关联基金。
Mutual Fund Industry Leaders: Huge Growth in the Number of Funds Then and Now Total Total 9,001 1951 Assets* 2015 Assets 10,000 Rank Fund Name (Millions) Manage r Name (Billions) 3,824 1 M.I.T. $472 Vanguard $2,988 2 Investors Mutual 365 Fidelity 1,615 3 Keystone Funds 213 BlackRock 1,230 4 Tri-Continental 209 American Funds 1,216 1,000 5 Affiliated Funds 209 JPMorgan Funds 519 6 Wellington Fund 194 State Street 497 7 Dividend Shares 186 T Rowe Price 493 103 8 Fundamental Investors 179 Franklin Templeton 480 9 State Street Investment 106 PIMCO 375 10 Boston Fund 106 Federated 272 Total $2,239 Total $9,686 Percentage of Industry 72% Percentage of Industry 57% Total industry assets: $3.1 billion. Total industry assets: $16.9 trillion *Includes associated funds.
原件此处是表格,PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失,下面只剩按列读出的数字,行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。
1951 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2015 7.5% 年增长率 1951-2015 5. 6.
1951 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2015 7.5% annual growth rate 1951-2015 5. 6.
共同基金费用率与基金数量——1951 年与今天(1951 年与 2015 年)
| 1951 年 | 2015 年 | 变化 | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 主要共同基金集团——传统行业模式 | 1951 年 | 2014 年 | ||||
| MIT/MFS(综合企业) | 0.42% | 1.29% | +208% | |||
| 基金总数 | 当前基金总数 | 资产 | ||||
| 原始名称(百万美元) | 管理数量 | 当前名称(十亿美元) | 管理数量 | |||
| Investors Mutual/Columbia(综合企业) | 0.56 | 1.15 | 105 | |||
| M.I.T. | $472 | 2 | MFS | $180 | 78 | |
| 伊顿霍华德/亿廷繁世(股东公众) | 0.64 | 1.27 | 99 | |||
| Investors Mutual | 365 | 3 | Columbia | 165 | 116 | |
| 普特南(综合企业) | 0.66 | 1.31 | 98 | |||
| Affiliated | 209 | 3 | Lord Abbett | 108 | 37 | |
| 富达(私人) | 0.63 | 1.06 | 68 | |||
| Wellington | 194 | 1 | Vanguard | 2,988 | 140 | |
| T. Rowe Price(股东公众) | 0.50 | 0.84 | 68 | |||
| 伊顿霍华德 | 90 | 2 | 亿廷繁世 | 101 | 130 | |
| Affiliated/Lord Abbett(私人) | 0.75 | 1.12 | 49 | |||
| 富达 | 64 | 1 | 富达 | 1,615 | 321 | |
| 美国基金(私人) | 0.84 | 0.99 | 17 | |||
| 普特南 | 52 | 1 | 普特南 | 81 | 77 | |
| 平均值 | 0.62% | 1.13% | +80% | |||
| 美国基金 | 27 | 2 | 美国基金 | 1216 | 35 | |
| 新模式 | T. Rowe Price | 1 | 1 | T. Rowe Price | 493 | 116 |
| Wellington/Vanguard(共同化) | 0.55% | 0.17% | -69% | |||
| 德雷福斯 | 0.8 | 1 | 德雷福斯 | 248 | 151 | |
| 美元总额/平均值 | $1,475 | 1.7 | 美元总额/平均值 | $7,195 | 120 | |
| 传统模式 | $7.1M | $41.1B | 5.8 倍 |
注意:今日 20 家最大公司中有 12 家(包括贝莱德、PIMCO、道富环球和摩根大通)在 1951 年并不存在(或未管理共同基金)。
新模式 | $1.1M | $5.1B | 4.6 倍
所有权类型:(C) 综合企业,(SH) 公众股东,(P) 私人,(M) 共同化。
Mutual Fund Expense Ratios Number of Funds—1951 & Today 1951 and 2015 1951 2015 Change Major Mutual Fund Groups Conventional Industry Model 1951 2014 MIT/MFS (C) 0.42% 1.29% +208% Total No. of Total No. of Assets Funds Current Assets Funds Investors Mutual/Columbia (C) 0.56 1.15 105 Original Name (Millions) Managed Name (Billions) Managed Eaton Howard/Eaton Vance (SH) 0.64 1.27 99 M.I.T. $472 2 MFS $180 78 Putnam (C) 0.66 1.31 98 Investors Mutual 365 3 Columbia 165 116 Fidelity (P) 0.63 1.06 68 Affiliated 209 3 Lord Abbett 108 37 T. Rowe Price (SH) 0.50 0.84 68 webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:WFzPAC40e0kJ:johncbogle.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Bogle_SEC_2015-04-28… 1/9 Wellington 194 1 Vanguard 2,988 140 Affiliated/Lord Abbett (P) 0.75 1.12 49 Eaton & Howard 90 2 Eaton Vance 101 130 Fidelity 64 1 Fidelity 1,615 321 American (P) 0.84 0.99 17 Putnam 52 1 Putnam 81 77 Average 0.62% 1.13% +80% American 27 2 American 1216 35 New Industry Model T. Rowe Price 1 1 T. Rowe Price 493 116 Wellington/Vanguard (M) 0.55% 0.17 -69% Dreyfus 0.8 1 Dreyfus 248 151 Dollars Total/Average $1,475 1.7 Total/Average $7,195 120 Conventional Model $7.1M $41.1B 5.8x Note: 12 of today’s 20 largest firms did not exist (or did not manage mutual funds) in 1951, New Model $1.1M $5.1B 4.6x including BlackRock, PIMCO, State Street Global, and JP Morgan Ownership types: (C) Conglomerate, (SH) public shareholders, (P) private, (M) mutual 7. 8.
按资产类别划分的构成变化 股票基金——可预测性降低 1945-2015 年 风险上升 100% 90% 货币市场 1981 年 相对波动率* 1951-56 年 2009-15 年** 变化 80% 77% 超过 1.11 0% 18% +18% 70% 0.95-1.11 34 53 +19 60% 货币市场 18% 0.85-0.94 30 16 -14 债券 22 50% 0.70-0.84 36 10 -24 平衡型 8 40% 指数股票 19 低于 0.70 0 4 +4 主动管理股票 33 30% 100% 20% 指数基金 2015 年 *标普 500 指数 = 1.00 19% 10% **200 只最大股票基金的样本。
Changing Composition by Asset Class Equity Funds—Less Predictability 1945-2015 More Risk 100% 90% Money Market 1981 Relative Volatility* 1951-56 2009-15** Difference 80% 77% Over 1.11 0% 18% +18% 70% 0.95-1.11 34 53 +19 60% Money Market 18% 0.85-0.94 30 16 -14 Bond 22 50% 0.70-0.84 36 10 -24 Balanced 8 40% Index Equity 19 Below 0.70 0 4 +4 Active Equity 33 30% 100% 20% Index Funds 2015 *S&P 500 = 1.00 19% 10% **Sample of the 200 largest equity funds.
0% 1945 1951 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2015 9. 10.
0% 1945 1951 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2015 9. 10.
那么,长期股东们,现在呢……?赎回率 股票型基金赎回率 美国及国际股票基金赎回及转换转出占平均净资产百分比 90% 80% 73%,1987 年 国际基金 美国基金 国际基金中的择时交易 39%,2000-2002 年 50 24% 25% 30 6% 1951 年 1960 年 1970 年 1980 年 1990 年 2000 年 2013 年 0 1985 年 1995 年 2005 年 2013 年 来源:美国投资公司协会 11. 12.
Then, Long-Term Shareholders, Now . . . ? Redemption Rates Equity Fund Redemption Rates U.S. and International Equity Funds Redemptions and Exchanges Out as a Percentage of Average Net Assets 90 % 80 % 73%, 1987 International Funds U.S. Funds Market Timing in International Funds 39%, 2000-2002 50 24% 25% 30 6% 1951 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2013 0 1985 1995 2005 2013 Source: Investment Company Institute 11. 12.
投资者在主动管理型基金中面临的问题
成本重要吗?一个有力的例证
1924–2014 年 1 美元的增长
10,000 美元 13.69 美元
1. 高成本——每年 2% 的成本 = 股票 50 年回报的 63%
1,000 美元 10.99 美元
2. 严重侵蚀(60% 以上)股息收入
Challenges Faced by Investors in Active Funds Do Costs Matter? A Powerful Example Growth of $1—1924-2014 $ 10,000 $13.69 1. High Costs—2% annual cost = 63% of the 50-year return on stocks. 1,000 $10.99 2. Critical erosion (60%+) of dividend income.
3. 规模庞大——共同基金持有美国股市 33% 的份额。年回报率 标普 500 指数 +10.3% “钱包太鼓……是超额回报的敌人。” 10 家麻省理工基金 +9.1% 4. 高换手率——130% 的资产(买入与卖出)。R² = 0.95
3. Giant Size—Mutual funds own 33% of U.S. equities. Annual Return S&P 500 +10.3% “A fat wallet … enemy of superior returns.” 10 MIT +9.1% 4. High Turnover—130% of assets (purchases and R2 = 0.95 sales).
5. 市场营销——“我们制造会卖得掉的东西。” 基金失败率 0 相对收益率:MIT / 标普 500 指数:-61% 每十年 50% 的比率。1.50 1.00 6. 投资者(以及销售人员)关注过往回报。0.39 0.50 7. 外部持有管理人股权(前 50 大中有 39 家)。0.00 结果:受托管理职责下降,销售能力上升 1924 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2014 webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:WFzPAC40e0kJ:johncbogle.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Bogle_SEC_2015-04-28… 2/9 13. 14.
5. Marketing—“We make what will sell.” Fund failure 0 Relative Return: MIT / S&P 500: -61% rate 50% per decade. 1.50 1.00 6. Investor (and salesman) focus on past returns. 0.39 0.50 7. Outside ownership of managers (39 of top 50). 0.00 RESULT: Stewardship descends, salesmanship ascends 1924 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2014 webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:WFzPAC40e0kJ:johncbogle.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Bogle_SEC_2015-04-28… 2/9 13. 14.
“全方位投资费用的算术” 复利奇迹:长期回报与长期成本的博弈 来自《金融分析师杂志》 假如没有复利式长期成本的侵蚀 主动管理与指数基金:10,000 美元在 50 年投资周期中的增长
主动管理基金 | 指数基金
---|---
最终价值 | 300,000 美元 | 248,890 美元
费用率 | 1.12% | 0.06%
复利成本对财富的影响:资本累积损失 75%
交易成本 | 0.50% | 0.00%
现金拖累 | 0.15% | 0.00%
销售费用/手续费 | 0.50% | 0.00%
全方位费用合计 | 2.27% | 0.06%
税收低效成本 | 0.75% | 0.30%
总成本 | 3.02% | 0.36%
假设毛回报率 | 7.00% | 7.00%
净回报率 | 3.98% | 6.64%
年回报率损失 | -2.66% | 0%
累计财富(50 年后):指数基金 248,890 美元,主动管理基金 70,387 美元 0 10 20 30 40 50 年
注:据晨星公司历史数据,投资者适得其反的行为(高买低卖)每年还会使主动基金投资者的回报额外减少 1.5 至 2.0 个百分点。
指数基金(6.64%)| 主动管理基金(3.98%)
“The Arithmetic of All-In Investment Expenses” The Miracle of Compounding Long-Term Returns Financial Analysts Journal Without the Tyranny of Compounding Long-Term Costs Actively Growth of $10,000 over a 50-year investment lifetime Managed Fund Index Fund $ 300,000 Expense Ratio 1.12% 0.06% Impact of Compounding Costs on Wealth: $248,890 Transaction Costs 0.50 0.00 Loss in Capital Accumulation: 75% Cash Drag 0.15 0.00 200,000 Sales Charges/Fees 0.50 0.00 All-In Expenses 2.27% 0.06% Tax Inefficiency 0.75 0.30 100,000 $70,387 Total Costs 3.02% 0.36% Gross Return (assumed) 7.00% 7.00% Net Return 3.98% 6.64% 0 Loss in Annual Return -2.66% 0 10 20 30 40 50 Note: Counterproductive investor behavior (buying high and selling Years low) has historically reduced returns to active fund investors by Index Fund (6.64%) Actively Managed Fund (3.98%) another 1.5-2.0% annually according to Morningstar.
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原件此处是表格,PDF 抽取时列结构已丢失,下面只剩按列读出的数字,行列对应关系无法还原。核对数据请打开来源正文。
股息收益率和费率比晨星评级体系更好?收入消耗百分比:主动管理型基金 vs. 指数基金 “投资者应将费率作为基金选择的首要检验标准。它们仍然是预测业绩最可靠的指标。”
4% 费率 29% 投资者净收益率 1.0
54%
62%
3% 2 3% 0.05 0.07 5% 0.09
1.3 2.2% 1.3 1.9% 3.5% 2.5 2.1% 2.4% 1.9%
Dividend Yields and Expense Ratios Better than the Morningstar Rating System? Percent of Income Consumed: Active Funds vs. Index Funds “Investors should make expense 4% Expense Ratio 29% Net Yield to Investors 1.0 ratios a primary test in fund 54% selection. They are still the most 62% 3% 2 3% 0.05 0.07 5% 0.09 dependable predictor of 1.3 2.2% 1.3 1.9% 3.5% 2.5 2.1% 2.4% 1.9% performance.”
1 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.1 0.8 拉塞尔·金内尔 主动型 指数型 主动型 指数型 主动型 指数型 晨星,2010 年 8 月 美国股票基金 债券基金 平衡型基金 来源:晨星。注:指数基金收益率与费用按先锋基金 Admiral 份额类别计算。
1 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.1 0.8 Russel Kinnel Active Index Active Index Active Index Morningstar, August 2010 U.S. Stock Funds Bond Funds Balanced Funds Source: Morningstar. Note: Index fund yields and expenses for Vanguard Admiral share classes.
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结果:表现不佳,业绩缺乏持续性
80% 的主动管理型基金长期跑输基准
15 年(截至 2014 年)中主动管理型基金跑赢基准的比例
按截至 2009 年的 5 年排名分组
30%
在随后 5 年中的表现
| 5 年排名 | 5 年超额收益中位数* | 基金数量 | 最高五分之一组占比 | 最低五分之一组占比 | 合并/清盘占比 | 平均:20% 跑赢 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1(最高) | 14% | 1,091 | 14% | 24% | 10% | 15 |
| 2(次高) | 12% | 1,083 | 12 | 16 | 22 | |
| 3(中间) | 15% | 1,084 | 15 | 13 | 26 | |
| 4(次低) | 14% | 1,085 | 14 | 10 | 38 | |
| 5(最低) | 14% | 1,032 | 14 | 9 | 45 | |
| 总计 | 14% | 5,375 | 14% | 14% | 28% |
*相对于基准的超额收益。
Result: Underperformance Lack of Persistence in Performance 80% of Active Funds Underperform Over the Long Term of Active Mutual Funds Percentage of Active Funds Outpeforming Their Benchmarks 15 Years through 2014 Where they ranked 30% Rankings for the 5 years ending 2009 30 % in the subsequent 5 years 5-Year Number of Highest Lowest Merged/ Average: 20% Outperform Quintile Return* Funds Quintile Quintile Closed 1 Highest 1,091 14% 24% 10% 15 14% 2 High 1,083 12 16 22 3 Medium 1,084 15 13 26 4 Low 1,085 14 10 38 d e d e n th w lu n th w lu nd th w lue 5 Lowest 1,032 14 9 45 le o a le o a o a B r V B r V r e G e p G p ll Ble ll V g r e g r a p a a ll G a Total 5,375 14% 14% 28% g a a r -C -C Sm Sm La La -C Sm La *Excess return vs. benchmark.
中期 中期 中期 注:失败基金数量——1499 只 来源:先锋集团、晨星公司。
Mid Mid Mid Note: Number of failed funds—1,499 Source: Vanguard, Morningstar.
webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:WFzPAC40e0kJ:johncbogle.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Bogle_SEC_2015-04-28… 3/9 19. 20.
webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:WFzPAC40e0kJ:johncbogle.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Bogle_SEC_2015-04-28… 3/9 19. 20.
难道就没有一些共同基金,不只是我一个人……法马-弗伦奇(2010),能避开这些问题吗?
Aren’t There Mutual Funds That It’s Not Just Me… Fama French, 2010 Avoid These Problems?
“3% 解决方案”确实,但并不多。
“The 3% Solution” Yes, but not very many.
“……展望未来,我们预计这些基金具备以下典型共性:低成本指数基金组合 1. 由管理者主导,而非市场人员推动。的表现,大致会与过去主动型基金中表现 2. 合理的费用比率。位居前 3% 的基金组合相当,而优于 3. 较低的组合换手率。其余主动型基金的整体表现。” 4. 严格自我约束的规模上限。 5. 期间回报可能与市场回报存在大幅偏差。
“…[G]oing forward we expect Typical characteristics these funds share: that a portfolio of low cost index 1. Managers, not marketers. funds will perform about as well 2. Reasonable expense ratios. as a portfolio of the top three 3. Low portfolio turnover. percentiles of past active 4. Self-imposed stern limits on size. winners, and better than the rest 5. Interim returns that may vary sharply of the active fund universe.” from the market’s return.
来源:“共同基金回报截面中的运气与技能”,投资专业人士拥有并运营管理公司。《金融学刊》,2010 年 10 月。
Source: “Luck versus Skill in the Cross-Section of Mutual Fund Returns,” 6. Investment professionals own and The Journal of Finance, October 2010 operate the management company.
共同基金是唯一实用的 21. 22.
Mutual Funds Are the Only Practical 21. 22.
“个人投资者的‘巨大失败’选项” “共同基金的巨大失败……源于其系统性剥削个人投资者……从投资者手中榨取巨额财富,却提供令人震惊的低劣服务。……窃贼即便披上美国证券交易委员会批准的治理外衣,依然是窃贼……强大的金融服务行业正是这样剥削弱势的个人投资者。” “绝大多数美国家庭注定终生陷入现有共同基金惩罚体系之中。但如果他们明智的话,就会选择在指数基金里‘服刑’。”
“The Colossal Failure” Option for Individual Investors “[T]he colossal failure of the mutual fund “The vast majority of American industry; resulting from [its] systematic exploitation of individual investors . . . extract[ing] families are sentenced to a lifetime enormous sums from investors in exchange for of investing in the existing mutual providing a shocking disservice. … Thievery, even fund penal system. But if they’re when dressed in the cloak of SEC-approved smart, they’ll do their time in an governance, remains thievery . . . as the powerful financial services industry exploits vulnerable index fund.” individual investors.”
大卫·斯文森,耶鲁大学约翰·博格捐赠基金管理人,于 2015 年 4 月 7 日在格兰特举办的“伟大辩论”上发言。23。24。
David Swensen, manager of Yale University’s John Bogle endowment fund Grant’s “Great Debate” April 7, 2015 23. 24.
先锋集团的策略:结构追随结构
共同基金结构║行业结构
长期结果║长期结果
策略║策略
“先锋计划实际上进一步推进了[1940 年投资公司法]的目标,确保基金董事……能更好地评估向基金提供服务的质量……改善对股东的披露……促进规模经济带来的储蓄……显著增强基金的独立性……为其提供无利益冲突的分配控制……并促进一个健康可行的基金综合体,在此综合体内每只基金都能更好地发展。”(一致决议,1981 年)
优先考虑║增加║减少║
基金管理股东║市场份额║市场份额
⬇⬇⬇⬇
定价对管理人的影响║定价对管理人的影响
所有者的成本更高║所有者的成本更低
收入更低║收入更高
且无利润║且有利润
(例如,108 个基点)
⬇⬇⬇⬇
基金焦点║对投资者的影响║更大的风险║对投资者的影响
⬇⬇⬇⬇
指数基金║利润更高║对基金║利润更低
股权 5 个基点║为基金投资者║所有者║为基金
债券 8 个基点║抵消成本║投资者
webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:WFzPAC40e0kJ:johncbogle.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Bogle_SEC_2015-04-28… 4/9 25. 26.
Enter Vanguard Strategy Follows Structure MUTUAL STRUCTURE INDUSTRY STRUCTURE Long-term result Long-term result “The Vanguard plan actually furthers the objectives [of STRATEGY STRATEGY Prioritize the Investment Company Act of 1940] by ensuring that Prioritize fund Increasing Decreasing management shareholders market share market share the Funds’ directors … are better able to evaluate the company quality of services rendered to the funds … improved Leads Leads Leads Leads to to to to disclosure to shareholders … promotes savings from Pricing Impact to manger Pricing Impact to manger economies of scale … clearly enhances the Funds’ Higher costs for independence … provides them with conflict-free control Lower costs for Lower revenue fund owners Higher revenue fund owners and no profit and profit over distribution … and promotes a healthy and viable (e.g., 108 bps) fund complex within which each fund can better Leads Leads Leads Leads prosper.” (Unanimous decision, 1981) to to to to Fund Focus Impact to investors Greater Risks Impact to investors Leads Leads Index Funds Higher profits For Fund Lower profits to to Equity 5 bps for fund Owners to for fund Bond 8 bps investors Offset Costs investors webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:WFzPAC40e0kJ:johncbogle.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Bogle_SEC_2015-04-28… 4/9 25. 26.
先锋集团现金流增长 先锋集团在股票与债券基金中的市场份额 先锋基金累计净现金流
20% $1,800 1974–2015 年期间 19.7% $1.6 万亿
18 此前行业领导者 14.6% 1,400
16 麻省理工学院(MIT)15%(1924–1953) 1,200 $9930 亿
14 IDS/哥伦比亚 14%(1954–1978) s r 1,000
12 富达 13%(1979–2005) 11.8% lla 800
先锋 20%(2015 年估计) 9.8% fD $5470 亿
10 so 600
n 400
6.6% 6.6% 10 亿美元 $1060 亿
6 4.1% –$2.5 亿 $80 亿 0 4
–200
2 1974 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 5 年平均值 0
–0.7% 26.2% 20.0% 15.8% 13.9% 7.3% 7.9% 7.0%
1974 1985 1995 2005 2015 年现金流/资产
先锋集团的关键策略:指数化
Vanguard Cash Flow Growth Vanguard’s Market Share of Stock and Bond Funds Cumulative Net Cash Flow into Vanguard Funds 20 % $ 1,800 19.7% $1.6T 1,600 18 Previous Industry Leaders 14.6% 1,400 16 MIT 15% (1924-1953) 1,200 $993B 14 IDS/Columbia 14% (1954-1978) s r 1,000 Fidelity 13%(1979-2005) 11.8% lla 12 o Vanguard 20% (2015e) 800 9.8% fD $547B 10 so 600 n 400 6.6% 6.6% Billio 5.9% $106B 6 4.1% -$250M $8B 0 4 -200 2 1974 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 5-Year Average 0 -0.7% 26.2% 20.0% 15.8% 13.9% 7.3% 7.9% 7.0% 1974 1985 1995 2005 2015 Annual Cash Flow/Assets Vanguard’s Key Strategy: Indexing 27. 28.
先锋领航主导行业资金流
1975 年——首只指数投资信托基金
共同基金行业净资金流
2015 年第一季度
100 美元初期
80 行业反应
先锋领航 630 亿美元
占共同基金行业 2015 年第一季度
净资金流 830 亿美元的 133%
所有其他公司
-20
-200 亿美元
*1980 年更名为先锋领航 500 指数基金。
Vanguard Dominating Industry Cash Flow 1975—First Index Investment Trust Mutual Fund Industry Net Cash Flow First Quarter 2015 100$ Initial 80 Reaction Industry Total Vanguard $63 Billion accounted for Vanguard 133% of the +$83 Billion mutual fund 20 industry’s net cash flow in 1Q 2015 All Other Firms -20 -$20 Billion *Name changed to -40 Vanguard 500 Index Fund in 1980.
29. 30.
29. 30.
2006—2014 年美国股票类基金累计净现金流 指数基金主导先锋集团资产管理规模 被动指数基金 vs 主动管理基金 资产管理规模占比 流入指数及主动共同基金与 ETF 的累计净现金流 100% 3% 10 亿美元 9% 90% 15% 指数 +9170 亿美元 23% 26% 800 80% 19% 主动 600 70% 21% 400 60% 主动 200 50% 56% 虚拟指数 40% 82% 指数 0 30% 56% -200 20% -600 10% 18% -5970 亿美元 0% -800 股票 债券 平衡 总计 2006 2010 2014 来源:Strategic Insight Simfund 注:“虚拟指数基金”——相对其最佳拟合指数的 R 方为 0.96 或更高。
U.S. Equity Fund Cumulative Net Cash Flow, 2006-2014 Index Funds Dominate Vanguard’s Assets Passive Index Funds versus Actively Managed Funds Percentage of Assets Under Management Cumulative Net Cash Flow into Index and Active Mutual Funds and ETFs 100% 3% $ 1,000 9% 90% 15% Index +$917 Billion 23% 26% 800 80% 19% Active s 600 r 70% lla 21% o 400 60% fD Active so 200 50% n 56% Virtual Index 40% 82% Index Billio 72% -200 30% 56% -400 20% -600 10% 18% -$597 Billion 0% -800 Equity Bond Balanced Total 2006 2010 2014 Source: Strategic Insight Simfund Note: “Virtual Index Fund” – R-Squared of 0.96 or higher relative to its best-fit index.
31. 32.
31. 32.
指数投资市场份额增长——股票指数基金资产 4.5 万亿美元 10,000,000 美元指数策略占美国机构股票资产总比例 6.4 万亿美元 40% 3.2 万亿美元主动管理 1,000,000 10.6 万亿美元共同基金 37% 指数 1.1 万亿美元 1.5 万亿美元养老金基金 100,000 31% 49B 美元 webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:WFzPAC40e0kJ:johncbogle.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Bogle_SEC_2015-04-28… 5/9 30 10,000 26% 10,000 100 百万级总计指数 18% 100 指数基金资产指数基金资产与市场份额 1995 年 2015 年 年增长 2004 年:24% 10 TIFs* 480 亿美元 1630 亿美元 +19% ETF 10 亿美元 1680 亿美元 +45% 2014 年:32% 总计 490 亿美元 3310 亿美元 +23% 10 1 2004 年 2009 年 2014 年 1975 年 1985 年 1995 年 2005 年 2014 年来源:Strategic Insight Simfund、Empirical Research Partners 33. 34.
Indexing Market Share Growth of Equity Index Fund Assets $4.5T $ 10,000,000 Index Strategies as a Percentage of Total U.S. Institutional Equity Assets $6.4 Trillion 40 % $3.2 Trillion Active 1,000,000 $10.6 Trillion Mutual Funds 37% Index $1.1T $1.5T Pension Funds 100,000 31% s r $49B webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:WFzPAC40e0kJ:johncbogle.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Bogle_SEC_2015-04-28… 5/9 30 lla o 10,000 26% fD so n 1,000 Millio Total Index 18% 100 Fund Assets Total Indexing Assets and Market Share 1995 2015 Annual Increase 2004: 24% 10 TIFs* $48B $1.63T +19% ETFs $1B $1.68T +45% 2014: 32% Total $49B $3.31T +23% 10 1 2004 2009 2014 1975 1985 1995 2005 2014 Source: Strategic Insight Simfund, Empirical Research Partners 33. 34.
“他们到底对我的歌做了什么,妈?”
“What Have They Done to My Song, Ma?”
用一个演讲标题来概括一切 交易所交易基金(ETF)来了 首只指数共同基金(1974 年)——原则趋同!· 持有美国股票市场 · 将分散化做到极致 伟大的悖论:就在主动管理型基金 · 最小化交易成本 变得越来越像被动指数化投资时 · 极低费用比率——500 指数:0.05%(Admiral 级) 被动指数化投资却变得越来越像主动管理型基金 · 买入即“永久持有”(赎回率 10%) 交易所交易指数基金(1993 年)——原则 约翰·博格 · 自选指数(现已有 1100 只可用) "指数化投资的艺术"会议 · 在你选择的板块内分散投资 华盛顿特区 · 降低费用……但不能太低(0.50%) · 买入是为了交易(大型 ETF 平均年换手率:1244%) 2004 年 9 月 30 日 35. 36.
A Speech Title Sums It Up Enter the Exchange-Traded Fund (ETF) First Index Mutual Fund (1974)—Principles Convergence! • Own the U.S. stock market • Diversify to the Nth degree The Great Paradox: Just as Active Fund • Minimize transaction costs Management Becomes More and More Like • Tiny expense ratio—500 Index: 0.05% (Admiral) Passive Indexing, So Passive Indexing Becomes • Bought to be held “forever” (redemption rate 10%) More and More like Active Fund Management Exchange-Traded Index Funds (1993)—Principles John C. Bogle • Pick your own index (1,100 now available) “The Art of Indexing” Conference • Diversify within sector you chose Washington, DC • Lower expenses … but not too low (0.50%) • Bought to be traded (average annual turnover of September 30, 2004 large ETFs: 1244%) 35. 36.
ETF 换手率 ETF——投机新方式 2014 年换手额占年平均资产百分比 2724% 2014 年交易量 SPDR 标普 500 ETF iShares 核心标普 500 337% 100 只最大股票:18.6 万亿美元 iShares MSCI 欧澳远东指数 524% 资产加权 100 只最大 ETF:15.7 万亿美元 换手率,先锋整体股市 ETF 144% 20 只最大 ETF:先锋富时新兴市场 ETF 319% 1244% 2014 年换手率 100 只最大股票:179% 先锋标普 500 ETF 274% 100 只最大 ETF:1428% iShares 罗素 2000 指数 4274% SPDR 黄金信托 725% 0 200 400 800 2600 4200% 成本与指数化—— 37. 38.
ETF Turnover ETFs—The New Way to Speculate 2014 Dollar Turnover as a Percentage of Average Annual Assets 2724% 2014 Trading Volume SPDR S&P 500 ETF iShares Core S&P 500 337% 100 Largest Stocks: $18.6 Trillion iShares MSCI EAFE 524% Asset-Weighted 100 Largest ETFs: $15.7 Trillion Turnover, Vanguard Total Stock Market ETF 144% 20 Largest ETFs: Vanguard FTSE Emerging Markets ETF 319% 1244% 2014 Turnover Rate 100 Largest Stocks: 179% Vanguard S&P 500 ETF 274% 100 Largest ETFs: 1428% iShares Russell 2000 4274% SPDR Gold Shares 725% 0 200 400 800 2600 4200% Costs and Indexing— 37. 38.
对于先锋领航的竞争对手来说,他们该怎么办?
What’s a Competitor to Vanguard to Do?
当前的比赛形势比以往任何时候都更加关键。当一位赛车手发现自己处于最后 10% 的位置时,他该怎么做?
More Important than Ever What’s a race car driver to do when he’s in last 10% position?
历年 8% 回报展望 主动型 指数型 • 加快速度——即提升业绩,更多 总回报 9% 4% 4% 6% 4.5% -1 激进营销,给分销商更多佣金 2% 成本 -2 -0.05 净回报 8% 2% 3.95%(类似人寿保险) 4% • 减少摩擦——即削减费用、裁员、减少研究 webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:WFzPAC40e0kJ:johncbogle.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Bogle_SEC_2015-04-28… 6/9 2% 4.5% 5% • 跟风模仿——即更多指数化、更少 股息率 创新 0% 盈利增长 • 换辆新车——即聚焦其他业务线, -3% 投机回报 -2% 记账服务、福利计划、风险投资、 -4% 总回报 9% 总回报 4% 礼车服务等
Historical Prospective 8% Returns Active Index • Increase speed—i.e., improve performance, more Gross Return 9% 4% 4% 6% 4.5% -1 aggressive marketing, more money to distributors 2% Costs -2 -0.05 Net Return 8% 2% 3.95% (a la life insurance) 4% • Reduce friction—i.e., cut fees, cut staff, cut research webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:WFzPAC40e0kJ:johncbogle.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Bogle_SEC_2015-04-28… 6/9 2% 4.5% 5% • Copy the car in front—i.e., more indexing, less Dividend Yield innovation 0% Earnings Growth • Get a new car—i.e., focus on other lines of business, -3% Speculative Return -2% recordkeeping, benefit plans, venture capital, -4% Gross Return 9% Gross Return 4% limousine services, etc.
未来 10 年的历史趋势?
Historical Next 10 Years ?
39. 40.
39. 40.
1940 年法案的“黄金法则”:被颠倒的哥白尼革命——股东至上!
The “Golden Rule” of the ‘40 Act Copernicus Turned Upside-Down Put the Shareholder First!
共同基金集团平均净资产总额 250 亿美元“……当投资公司为了董事、高管、投资顾问……或承销商的利益……而非公司证券持有人的利益……进行组织、运营[和]管理时,国家公共利益及投资者利益将受到不利影响……” ——1940 年《投资公司法》第 1.B.2 节 为什么太阳——是地球体积的 500 倍——不位于这个宇宙的中心? 基金管理公司平均净资产总额 5000 万美元 1993 年数据,摘自《博格谈共同基金:聪明投资者的新视角》
Average Mutual Fund Group Total Net Assets $25 Billion “… the national public interest and the interest of Why isn’t the sun—500 times investors are adversely affected … when investment the size of the planet—at the companies are organized, operated [and] managed … in center of this universe? the interest of directors, officers, investment advisers … [or] underwriters … rather than in the interest of … such companies’ security holders …” Investment Company Act of 1940, Section 1.B.2. Average Fund Management Company Total Net Assets $50 Million 1993 data from Bogle on Mutual Funds: New Perspectives for the Intelligent Investor 41. 42.
一笔小额交易改变了一个巨无霸行业,但事情原本不该是这样……交易:ISI(账面价值 30 万美元)的所有者,以 14 倍账面价值(420 万美元)将这家公司卖给其他投资者。对道富投资信托(State Street Investment Trust)总裁保罗·卡伯特(Paul Cabot)而言,基金管理人的私有产权至关重要。实际上,这对他代表一种道德律令,他曾严厉批评那些将公司卖给保险公司和其他金融机构的企业。* 1971 年,他回顾了关于《1940 年投资公司法》的谈判:“证券交易委员会(SEC)和我们委员会都认为,基金与基金管理团队之间的管理合同属于基金……因此管理团队无权出售它……也不能通过处置这份合同获利……受信人无权将自己的工作以盈利目的卖给他人。”
到了 20 世纪 60 年代中期,包括行业巨头惠灵顿(Wellington)、万斯·桑德斯(Vance Sanders)、德雷福斯(Dreyfus)、富兰克林(Franklin)和普特南(Putnam)在内的 20 多家基金管理公司上市。后来,MFS、普信集团(T. Rowe Price)、道富、美国世纪(American Century)、奥本海默(Oppenheimer)、联博(Alliance)、AIM、特拉华(Delaware)等众多公司也纷纷效仿。
*1982 年,道富管理公司(State Street Management)的私有所有者以 1 亿美元利润,将公司卖给了(颇具讽刺意味的、当时仍是相互制的)大都会人寿保险(Metropolitan Life Insurance)。
Tiny Transaction Transforms Giant Industry It Wasn’t Supposed to Be That Way… Transaction: Owners of ISI (book value $300,000) sold the For Paul Cabot, president of State Street Investment Trust, the manager to other investors for 14 times book value ($4.2 million). private ownership of fund managers was essential. Indeed it represented a moral imperative for him, and he sharply criticized SEC v. Insurance Securities, Inc., 1958 firms that would sell out to insurance companies and other financial institutions.* In 1971, he recalled the negotiations over The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that ISI could sell it’s the Investment Company Act of 1940: “Both the SEC and our fiduciary obligation to its fund shareholders, opening the industry committee agreed that the management contract floodgates to IPOs, mergers, “trafficking” in management between the fund and the management group was something that contracts, and acquisitions of fund management companies. belonged … to the fund … and therefore the management group had no right to sell it … or to make money on the disposition of By the mid-1960s, a score of fund management firms went public, this contract … the fiduciary does not have the right to sell his including industry leaders Wellington, Vance Sanders, Dreyfus, job to somebody else at a profit.” Franklin and Putnam. Later, MFS, T. Rowe Price, State Street, American Century, Oppenheimer, Alliance, AIM, Delaware, and *In 1982, the private owners of State Street Management sold many others. their company to the (ironically then-mutual) Metropolitan Life Insurance for a profit of $100 million.
43. 44.
43. 44.
50 家最大共同基金公众持股与专业组织管理公司所有权——2015 年 私募持股(10 家) 加上共同持股(1 家) 摘自 1971 年我对威灵顿管理公司合伙人的演讲:(含 3 家最大公司) 我透露一个自己根深蒂固的偏见:综合考虑……专业企业拥有公众股东是不可取的……公众持股所带来的盈利及盈利增长压力,与 综合企业公众持股 负责任地运营一个专业 28 11 组织是背道而驰的。
Ownership of 50 Largest Mutual Fund Public Ownership and Professional Organizations Management Companies—2015 Privately Owned (10) Plus Mutual (1) From my 1971 speech to the partners of 11 Wellington Management Company: (Includes 3 largest firms) I reveal an ancient prejudice of mine: All things considered ... it is undesirable for professional enterprises to have public stockholders ... The pressure for earnings and earnings growth engendered by public ownership is antithetical to Conglomerate Publicly Owned the responsible operation of a professional 28 11 organization.
注:韦林顿公司(Wellington)如今已是私有企业,但在当时仍为上市公司。
Note: Wellington, now private, was then publicly-owned.
拥有公众持股的公司总数:39 家 webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:WFzPAC40e0kJ:johncbogle.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Bogle_SEC_2015-04-28… 7/9 45. 46.
Total Firms with Public Ownership: 39 webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:WFzPAC40e0kJ:johncbogle.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Bogle_SEC_2015-04-28… 7/9 45. 46.
受托责任 一条与圣经同样古老的诫命 该怎么办?
Fiduciary Duty A Precept as Old as Holy Writ What’s To Be Done?
没有人能侍奉两个主人:1. 减少冲突——因为他不是恨这个、爱那个,就是忠于这个、轻视那个。 2. 披露冲突
No man can serve two masters: for 1. Reduce Conflicts either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold to the 2. Disclose Conflicts one, and despise the other.
Matthew 6:24 47. 48.
Matthew 6:24 47. 48.
减少利益冲突:结构性改革
阳光披露——公开利益冲突
• 基金董事会主席必须为独立董事\*
• 董事会须配备独立员工,直接向主席汇报\*
• 监管重点应从单只基金(1924-1940 年的行业模式)转向基金集团(今天的行业模式)
• 最终,实现(全面或部分)互助化
招股说明书披露改进
所有投资者应能获取以下数据:
• 赎回率——赎回及转出金额占基金平均资产的比例
• 基金费用——占投资收益的百分比
• 基金回报(时间加权) vs. 投资者回报(资产加权)
• 长期 vs. 短期资本利得分配
• 换手率——总买入加总卖出占基金平均资产的比例
• 薪酬总额——5 位收入最高的基金高管的所有薪酬(全面披露)
• 投资顾问费——费率及金额(过去 10 年的历史数据)
\*仅适用于管理 250 亿美元及以上长期资产、且运营 20 只及以上基金的经理。2015 年,最大的 50 家基金管理公司合计管理资产达 12.4 万亿美元,占行业长期资产的 86%。Jones v. Harris Associates 案。
Reducing Conflicts: Structural Changes Sunlight—Disclosing Conflicts • Funds’ board chairman must be an independent Improvements in Prospectus Disclosure director* All investors should have access to these data: • Board must have independent staff, reporting to • Redemption Rate—Redemptions + exchanges out as a percentage of average fund assets the chairman* • Fund expenses—percentage of investment income • Regulation should move its focus from individual • Fund return (time-wtd) vs. investor return (asset-wtd) funds (industry, 1924-1940) to fund complexes • Long-term vs. short-term capital gains distributions (today’s industry) • Turnover—Total purchases + total sales as a percentage of • Ultimately, mutualization (full or partial) average fund assets • All-in compensation of 5 highest-paid fund officers *Applicable only to managers supervising assets of long-term funds of (comprehensive) $25 billion or more, and operating 20 or more funds. In 2015, the 50 • Investment Advisory Fees—Rates and dollars (10-year largest fund managers have aggregate assets of $12.4 trillion, 86% of history of each) Jones v. Harris Associates the industry’s long-term assets.
49. 50.
49. 50.
这些“基点”到底是怎么回事?高收费的指数基金与受托责任——这些基金的董事们当时在想什么?
What’s All This about “Basis Points?” High-Priced Index Funds and Fiduciary Duty What were directors of these funds thinking?
琼斯诉哈里斯联合公司案——费用率 0.40% 及以上的标普 500 指数基金——约翰·C·博格尔作为法庭之友支持原告的简报
费用 基金 资产 费率
主要大型股 标普 500 指数 47 亿美元 0.74%
区分顾问已收取的高费用率(按资产百分比)与这些费用率产生的更为过分的美元总额至关重要。
Voya 美国股票指数 46 亿美元 0.66%
哥伦比亚大型股指数 37 亿美元 0.83%
正是共同基金资产的大幅增长,以及由此产生的共同基金费用金额,在 1966 年引起了美国证券交易委员会(SEC)的担忧,
MM 标普 500 指数 36 亿美元 0.68%
因为提供投资顾问服务(本质上是管理投资组合)的成本增长远慢于按资产增长百分比收取的费用。
Dreyfus 标普 500 指数 29 亿美元 0.50%
然而,法院通常顺从顾问的意愿,将任何关于费用的争论框定在百分比——而非美元——的范畴内,从而授予顾问按任何标准都站不住脚的高额收费许可。
摩根大通股权指数* 19 亿美元 1.20%
总计(87 只基金) 193 亿美元 0.85%
先锋 500 指数- Admiral 股份 1430 亿美元 0.05%
-机构 Plus 股份 850 亿美元 0.02%
*“A”系列股份费用率为 0.45%,销售佣金为 5.25%。
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Jones v. Harris Associates S&P 500 Index Funds with Expense Ratios of 0.40% or More Brief for John C. Bogle as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners Expense Fund Assets Ratio Principal Large Cap S&P 500 Index $4.7 B 0.74% It is important to distinguish between the already-high rates (as a Voya US Stock Index 4.6 B 0.66 percentage of assets) that advisers charge and the even more excessive dollar amounts that are produced by those fee rates. It Columbia Large Cap Index 3.7 B 0.83 was the huge increase in mutual fund assets and, therefore, the MM S&P 500 Index 3.6 B 0.68 amount of mutual fund fees, that concerned the SEC in 1966, since Dreyfus S&P 500 Index 2.9 B 0.50 the cost of providing advisory services (essentially, managing an JP Morgan Equity Index* 1.9 B 1.20 investment portfolio) rises far more slowly than the fees generated Total (87 Funds) $19.3 B 0.85% by taking a percentage of the increase in assets . Yet courts have generally acceded to the advisers’ desire to frame any debate about Vanguard 500 Index-Admiral Shares $143 B 0.05% fees in percentage—not dollar—terms, thereby giving advisers a -Institutional Plus Shares $85 B 0.02% license to charge fees that are unjustifiable by any standard. * “A” series shares carry an expense ratio of 0.45% and a sales load of 5.25% webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:WFzPAC40e0kJ:johncbogle.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Bogle_SEC_2015-04-28… 8/9 51. 52.
沃伦·巴菲特箴言录:企业养老金——那虚幻的 8% 企业养老基金对未来回报的假设不合理 关于共同基金“独立”董事:去风险化与高预期回报不可兼得
The Wisdom of Warren Buffett Corporate Pensions: The Elusive 8% Corporate pension funds make unreasonable assumptions about future returns About Mutual Fund “Independent” Directors: Pension de-risking and high expected returns are not compatible.
“公司要找的不是杜宾犬,——瞧瞧 IBM 的董事会就知道了;他们找的是可卡犬。然后他们还得确保这些狗的尾巴一直在摇。”
资产 需要配置 合理配置 回报假设
债券 56% 3.75% 3%
股票 25 13.6 4
其他(对冲基金、私募股权等) 19 18.5 10
“和自己谈判,很少能吵得起来。”
“Companies are not looking for Dobermans on the Example: IBM board; they are looking for cocker spaniels. Then Asset Required Reasonable they make sure their tails are wagging.” Asset Allocation Allocation Return Assumptions Bonds 56% 3.75% 3% Stocks 25 13.6 4 “Negotiating with oneself seldom produces a Others (Hedge Funds, 19 18.5 10 barroom brawl.” Private Equity, etc.)
总回报/毛回报 100% 9.0% 4.6% 减去投资成本 -1.0% -1.0% 净回报 8.0% 3.6% 沃伦·巴菲特 53. 54.
Total/Gross Return 100% 9.0% 4.6% Less Investment Costs -1.0% -1.0% Net Return 8.0% 3.6% Warren Buffett 53. 54.
通向受托责任之路:亚当·斯密的智慧
1. 价格竞争
“消费是一切生产的唯一终点和目的;生产者的利益,只有在促进消费者利益所必需的范围内,才应予以关注。这条准则极其显而易见,以至于试图证明它都是荒谬的。”
• 投资者体验
• 投资者认知
• 充分披露
2. 唤醒独立董事
• 认知
• 董事会结构
The Road to Fiduciary Duty The Wisdom of Adam Smith 1. Price Competition “Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all • Investor experience production; and the interest of the producer ought • Investor awareness to be attended to only so far as it may be • Complete disclosure necessary for promoting that of the consumer. The 2. Awaken the Independent Directors maxim is so perfectly self-evident that it would be • Awareness • Board structure absurd to attempt to prove it.”
• Mutualize?
• Mutualize?
3. 立法者/监管者 《国富论》 • 劳工部——退休计划 1776 • 美国证券交易委员会——共同基金 • 多德-弗兰克法案 请相信我——我们一定会做到!
3. Lawmakers/Regulators The Wealth of Nations • DOL—Retirement Plans 1776 • SEC—Mutual Funds • Dodd-Frank Believe me—WE WILL GET THERE!
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