消费主义时代的受托责任

2016 · 演讲 · 原文约 2513 词
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消费主义时代的信托责任——约翰·博格尔在“投资者运动”活动上的讲话,该活动由信托标准研究所主办,于 2016 年 5 月 24 日在宾夕法尼亚州费城国家宪法中心举行。2016 年 4 月 6 日,美国劳工部(DOL)确立了一项信托责任原则——要求为持有退休计划的客户提供建议的投资顾问和经纪人将投资者的利益放在首位。近期一则关于该规则的媒体报道标题为:《约翰·博格尔的信托标准梦想终于成真》。

Fiduciary Duty in an Age of Consumerism Remarks by John C. Bogle Before the “The Campaign for Investors” Sponsored by The Institute for the Fiduciary Standard The National Constitution Center, Philadelphia, PA May 24, 2016 On April 6, 2016, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) established a fiduciary duty principle— the requirement that investment advisers and brokers who give advice to clients holding retirement plans place the interests of investors first. One of the recent press reports on the rule headlined its story: FINALLY, JOHN BOGLE’S DREAM OF A FIDUCIARY STANDARD WILL COME TRUE.

是的,新规则确实复杂,但基金行业此前的意见已使其大为可行,披露要求也变得更实际,更便于顾问和经纪人遵守。尽管如此,劳工部的受托人标准依然面临强大的反对力量。美国商会一如既往地将商业利益置于消费者利益之上,并与另外八个组织一同向联邦法院提起诉讼,试图阻止新规则的实施。

Yes, the new rule is complex, but previous comments from the fund industry have made it considerably more workable, with disclosures that are more practical and easier for advisers and brokers to follow. Nonetheless, the DOL fiduciary standard continues to face powerful adversaries. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, as usual, places business interests ahead of consumer interests and, along with eight other groups, has filed a federal lawsuit seeking to block implementation of the new rule.

但我坚决支持这一规则。可以说,从 65 年前我在普林斯顿大学写本科论文起,我就一直在为之奔走呼吁。在那篇论文中,我用了大量篇幅讨论共同基金份额在受托人和退休计划中的使用,暗示这种使用“未来注定会增加”。但更广泛地看,我写道,“共同基金的首要责任必须始终是对其股东的。”这正是我们行业的管理法规——1940 年《投资公司法》——所要求的:基金必须“以股东利益组织、运营和管理”,而不是以董事、高管、投资顾问或承销商(分销商)的利益为出发点。

But I strongly support the rule. I’ve arguably been campaigning for it ever since I wrote my senior thesis at Princeton University 65 years ago. There, I wrote at length about the use of mutual fund shares by fiduciaries and retirement plans, suggesting that such use “seems destined to increase in the future.” But far more broadly, I wrote that, “the prime responsibility [of mutual funds] must always be to their shareholders.” And that’s precisely what our industry’s governing statute, the Investment Company Act of 1940, demands: Funds must be “organized, operated, [and] managed” in the interests of their shareholders, rather than in the interests of their directors, officers, investment advisers, or underwriters (distributors).

本演讲中所表达的观点,未必代表先锋集团现任管理层的看法。

__________________ The opinions expressed in this speech do not necessarily represent the views of Vanguard’s present management.

1971 年的挑战

1971 年,我把话说得更尖锐了。在给惠灵顿管理公司合伙人的讲话中——那几年我正担任这家公司的首席执行官,从 1965 年一直干到 1974 年初——我用更加直白的语言表达了对受托责任的关注。在我那段题为“受托责任的挑战”的发言里,我说:“我们生活在一个越来越不容忍利益冲突的世界,甚至不容忍利益冲突的表象。很难争辩说这种趋势是有害的,或者会减弱。因为这不过是‘消费者主义’的一个侧面,这股潮流几乎渗透到社会的方方面面,当然不限于资产管理行业。毫无疑问,消费者主义,加上立法、监管、司法层面对我们这一行业的全方位审视,将在未来几年以一种关键的方式影响我们如何处理自己的事务。”

The 1971 Challenge In 1971, even more pointedly, speaking to the partners of Wellington Management Company— where I served as chief executive from 1965 through early 1974—I expressed my focus on fiduciary duty in much sharper terms. In a section of my remarks entitled, “The Challenge of Fiduciary Duty,” I said: “We live in a world that is increasingly intolerant, not only of conflicts of interest, but even the appearance of conflicts. It is hard to argue either that this trend is baneful or that it is likely to abate. For this is but one aspect of the “consumerism” whose impact pervades almost every aspect of our society, and certainly is not limited to the world of money management. It seems beyond question that consumerism, along with the entire thrust of the legislative, regulatory, and judicial overview of our profession will play a critical role in how we conduct our affairs in the years ahead.”

然后——没错,就是 45 年前——我使出了浑身解数。我演讲的下一个章节标题是,“一个人不能侍奉两个主人。”

And then—yes, 45 years ago—I pulled out all the stops. The next section of my talk was entitled, “A Man Cannot Serve Two Masters.”

“比如,听听最高法院大法官哈兰·菲斯克·斯通在 1934 年的发言:‘我斗胆断言,当这段刚结束的金融时期被载入史册时,其中多数错误和重大弊端将归咎于未能恪守信托原则——这一原则像圣经一样古老:人不能侍奉两个主人……公司结构的发展使得资源集中在少数小团体手中,而这些资源来自大量小型且不明真相的投资者,这使得我们必须重新并热忱地信奉这一原则。然而,那些名义上担任受托人,却通过巧妙的法律手段免除了保护他们声称所代表利益之义务的人……如果他们真考虑过那些资金的提供者的利益,那也是最后才考虑,甚至根本不考虑——这足以说明我们在多大程度上忽略了该原则的必要内涵。’”

“Listen, for example, to Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, speaking in 1934: ‘I venture to assert that when the history of the financial era which has just drawn to a close comes to be written, most of the mistakes and its major faults will be ascribed to the failure to observe the fiduciary principle, the precept as old as holy writ, that a man cannot serve two masters . . . the development of the corporate structure so as to vest in small groups control over the resources of great members of small and uninformed investors, make imperative a fresh and active devotion to that principle. Yet, those who serve nominally as trustees, but relieved, by clever legal devices, from the obligation to protect those who interests they purport to represent . . . consider only last, if at all, the interests of those whose funds they command, suggest how far we have ignored the necessary implications of that principle.’

我接着说:“我赞同这种观点,同时亮出我一条由来已久的偏见:综合考虑,除非能证明这家企业有大量无法通过其他途径满足的资本需求,否则专业型企业拥有公众股东是不可取的。这一约束对资金管理人的适用程度,与对医生、律师、会计师或建筑师是一样的。在他们的情况里,和我们一样,很难看出公众投资者能为企业带来什么独特贡献。一般而言,他们既不增加资本,也不增加专业能力,更不为我们客户的福祉作贡献。实际上,完全可以设想这样一种局面:公众持股对盈利和盈利增长的压力与一家专业组织的负责任运营是背道而驰的。尽管资金管理领域兼具这两方面的元素,但商业与专业之间的差异最终必须服从于客户的利益。”

I then continued: “I endorse that view, and at the same time reveal an ancient prejudice of mine: All things considered, absent a demonstration that the enterprise has substantial capital requirements that cannot be otherwise fulfilled, it is undesirable for professional enterprises to have public stockholders. This constraint is as applicable to money managers as it is to doctors, or lawyers, or accountants, or architects. In their cases, as in ours, it is hard to see what unique contribution public investors being to the enterprise. They do not, as a rule, add capital; they do not add expertise; they do not contribute to the well-being of our clients. Indeed, it is possible to envision circumstances in which the pressure for earnings and earnings growth engendered by public ownership is antithetical to the responsible operation of a professional organization. Although the field of money management has elements of both, differences between a business and a profession must, finally, be reconciled in favor of the client.

…如果我们的基金与顾问客户接受一家公众公司[当时的惠灵顿管理公司正是如此]的服务是一种负担,那么这种负担是否应该永远存在?如果我们相信,让公司由活跃的管理层持有而非公众持有,更符合基金与顾问客户的利益,那我们难道不应该以对各方都公平的方式来解决这个问题吗?到 1976 年达成这一目标,将是多么了不起的成就!

. . . If it is a burden to our fund and counsel clients to be served by a public enterprise [which Wellington Management Company then was], should this burden exist in perpetuity? And if we believe that it is in the interest of our fund and counsel clients that our firm should be owned by its active executives and not by the public, shouldn’t we work to solve this problem in a way that is equitable to all? What a great objective to be accomplished by 1976!”

Mutualization?

Mutualization?

接着,我转向了那些寻求摆脱这些负担的上市基金管理公司可用的选项:“我希望有一种简单的办法来实现我所说的目标,更不用说把它描述清楚了。但我要说的是,随着法律环境的明朗化,可能会有多种选择出现。例如,可能会出现‘互助化’,通过这种方式,基金收购管理公司。”

I then turned to the options available for a publicly-held fund manager which sought to free itself of those burdens: “I wish there were a simple way to accomplish what I am talking about, let alone to describe it. But, let me say that a variety of options may open up as the legal atmosphere clears. For example, there may be ‘mutualization’ whereby the funds acquire the management company.”

据我所知,这是我第一次使用“互惠化”这个说法。

As far as I can recall, this was my first use of the term mutualization.

然而仅仅三年之后,我在 1971 年描述的那一连串难题,便于 1974 年 9 月随着威灵顿基金及其姊妹基金的相互化而迎刃而解。先锋投资集团公司的成立,代表了一种前所未有的共同基金结构。先锋不仅是第一家,至今也仍是唯一一家真正意义上的共同基金集团。其核心理念是让我们的共同基金拥有权力和自由,将股东的利益置于首位;以“成本价”原则进行管理;并在与投资顾问完全独立的情况下运营。这一模式在实践中如何运作?经过从 1977 年持续到 1981 年的审查后,美国证券交易委员会在其对先锋计划的裁决中,这样描述了其预期效果:先锋计划符合该法案的规定、政策及宗旨。它实际上推进了该法案的目标,确保基金董事在掌握更具体的基金成本与业绩信息后,能够更好地评估这些服务的质量。

Only three years later, as it turned out, the set of challenges that I had described in 1971 was resolved in September 1974 by the mutualization of the operations of Wellington Fund and her sister funds. The incorporation of The Vanguard Group of Investment Companies represented a totally new and hitherto untried mutual fund structure. Vanguard was the first—and is still the only—mutual fund complex that is truly mutual. The whole idea was to give our mutual funds the power and freedom to put the interests of their own shareholders first; to be managed on an “at- cost,” basis; and to operate with complete independence from their investment adviser. How would that work in practice? After an examination that lasted from 1977 until 1981, here’s how the SEC expected it to work, as described in its decision on the Vanguard plan: The Vanguard plan is consistent with the provisions, policies, and purposes of the Act. It actually furthers the Act’s objectives by ensuring that the Funds’ directors, with more specific information at their disposal concerning the cost and performance of the Funds, are better able to evaluate the quality of those services.

该计划将推动对股东信息披露的改进,使他们能够对基金运作做出更知情的判断。此外,该计划明确增强了基金的独立性,允许它们根据情况变化更灵活地更换投资顾问。该计划也在合理的公平范围内使每只基金受益。

The plan will foster improved disclosure to shareholders, enabling them to make a more informed judgment as to the Funds’ operations. In addition, the plan clearly enhances the Funds’ independence, permitting them to change investment advisers more readily as conditions may dictate. The plan also benefits each fund within a reasonable range of fairness.

具体而言,先锋计划……让基金能够从顾问费减免中获得大量节约;通过规模经济推动成本节省;使基金能够对销售职能进行直接且无利益冲突的管控;(并)推动构建一个健康且可持续的互惠基金体系,让其中的每只基金都能更好地发展壮大。

Specifically, the Vanguard plan . . . enables the Funds to realize substantial savings from advisory fee reductions; promotes savings from economies of scale; provides the Funds with direct and conflict-free control over distribution functions; (and) promotes a healthy and viable mutual fund complex within which each fund can better prosper.

美国证券交易委员会的五位委员全票通过了先锋集团的结构方案。这是对一种全新基金运作模式的最终认可——这一模式最终将导致基金行业的重大格局重组。剩下的,正如人们所说,就是历史了。

The approval of Vanguard’s structure by the five commissioners of the SEC was unanimous. It was the final stamp of approval on what proved to be a new way of operating a fund complex that would ultimately lead to a major reordering of the fund industry. The rest, as they say, is history.

“千里之行” 有了那段历史作为背景,我们现在走到了哪里?在我看来,先锋集团(Vanguard)的成立及其“股东至上”的结构,标志着一道漫长弧线的起点——这道弧线正朝着信义义务(fiduciary duty)的方向弯折。正如常言所说:“千里之行,始于足下”。在很大程度上要感谢美国劳工部助理部长菲利斯·博尔齐(Phyllis Borzi)的决心,劳工部为这一信义原则提供了至关重要的支持,近期批准了一项规则,要求注册投资顾问(RIA)和股票经纪人,在服务持有退休计划的客户时,必须将客户的利益置于自身利益之上。

“A Journey of a Thousand Miles” With that history as background, where are we today? In my view, the formation of Vanguard and its “shareholder first” structure marks the beginning of a long arc that is bending toward fiduciary duty. As it is said, “a journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step.” And thanks importantly to the determination of Assistant Secretary of Labor Phyllis Borzi, the DOL has given vital support to that fiduciary principle, recently approving a rule that requires both registered investment advisers (RIAs) and stock brokers to place the interests of their clients holding retirement plans before their own.

RIA 一直受到受托责任义务的约束,但将这一标准适用于服务退休计划客户的股票经纪人,至少在理论上,会引发一些对经纪人而言棘手的问题:1)我对待有退休计划的客户,是否应该与没有退休计划的其他投资者/客户有所不同?如何不同?为什么?

RIAs have always been subject to the fiduciary duty test, but applying the test to stock brokers who serve retirement plan clients raises, at least theoretically, some challenging questions for a broker: 1) Do I serve my clients who have retirement plans differently from my other investor/clients without retirement plans? How? Why?

2) 当客户/投资者同时持有两者时,我对于他们的退休计划是否采用不同于常规账户的处理方式,并且对自己降低标准。具体怎么操作?为什么要这样做?

2) When client/investors hold both, do I handle their retirement plans any differently from their regular accounts, and hold myself to a lesser standard. How? Why?

在实际操作中,我无法想象经纪商会对非退休计划客户用比退休计划客户更低的职责与关怀标准。他们怎么可能为这种行为辩护?因此,我预计经纪体系会迅速转向对全体客户普遍适用受信标准。但如果证券交易委员会(SEC)能与劳工部(DOL)同步行动,并迅速为所有中介机构在服务全体客户时确立受信标准,问题会解决得远为妥善。

As a practical matter, I can’t imagine brokers serving their non-retirement plan clients with a lower standard of duty and care than their retirement plan clients. How could they possibly defend such actions? So, I would expect the brokerage system to move quickly to the all-encompassing application of the fiduciary standard to all of their clients. But the issue would be far better resolved if the SEC took parallel action to the DOL’s, and promptly established a fiduciary standard for all intermediaries in serving all of their clients.

但是,请相信我,制定一项严格的联邦受托人责任标准并不会止步于此。不仅是管理客户账户的理财顾问和券商必须将自己的经济利益置于所服务投资者的利益之后——这项受托人标准必须适用于每一个经手他人资金(OPM)的个人和实体,适用于投资者托付给我国金融体系的每一美元。

But, believe me, the creation of a tough federal standard of fiduciary duty will not end there. It is not only financial advisers and brokers handling client accounts who must subordinate their own financial interests to those of the investors that they serve. That fiduciary standard must be applied to every person and every entity that touches Other People’s Money (OPM), applied to every dollar entrusted by investors to our nation’s financial system.

更广泛的受托人标准

最终,受托人标准还必须涵盖所有负责管理“他人钱财”的机构资金管理人的行为——迄今为止,在这场辩论中,这个群体竟被奇怪地忽略了(金融机构持有约 70% 的美国股票)。该标准还必须包括这些机构的高管、董事、受托人、雇员、托管人,甚至某些营销人员。可惜的是,在《多德-弗兰克法案》中有一个奇怪的疏漏:美国证券交易委员会被要求就受托责任问题向国会提交报告,但其研究却被禁止纳入机构资金管理人。(人们不禁要问:是哪个行业说客,通过哪位国会议员,塞进了这条规定?)政治与资金管理人在这场辩论中扮演的角色表明,全面推广受托人标准将是一场漫长的战斗。

A Broader Fiduciary Standard Ultimately, then, the fiduciary standard must also encompass the behavior of all institutional money managers responsible for investing Other People’s Money, so far a curious omission from consideration in the debate. (Financial institutions hold some 70% of all U.S. stocks.) It must also include officers, directors, trustees, employees, custodians, and even certain marketing officials of these institutions. Alas, in a curious omission from the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC is asked to report to the Congress on the subject of fiduciary duty, but it is barred from considering institutional money managers in its study. (One wonders which industry lobbyist snuck that one in, through which member of Congress?) The role of politics and money managers in this debate suggests that the full extension of the fiduciary standard will be a long battle.

如果说我自 1951 年撰写那篇论文以来就一直在打这场仗,这有点夸张(确实夸张!);但显然,我至少从 1971 年(见前述演讲)就开始致力于此,肯定从 1974 年更是如此——那一年,我创立了先锋集团,这是第一家由股东共同拥有的共同基金公司,而推动这一切的主要动力,是我在 1975 年创建的第一只、也是终极意义上的以受托人和消费者为导向的共同基金:指数共同基金。我们的第一指数投资信托基金旨在跟踪标普 500 指数。指数化策略的开端,是我们共同基金结构下逻辑必然、甚至显而易见的结果。事实上,那是我们的第一个战略举措。这只指数基金于 1976 年首次公开募股,但坦率地说,那是一次失败,仅募集到 1100 万美元——远低于承销商 1.5 亿美元的目标。但现在,它已更名为先锋 500 指数基金,资产规模超过 4500 亿美元。加上先锋集团旗下的其他指数基金,指数化策略目前在该公司 3.2 万亿美元的资产基础中,占据了约 2.4 万亿美元。

If saying that I’ve been fighting this battle since I wrote that thesis in 1951 is a push (and it is!), it is clear that I’ve been at it since at least 1971 (note that earlier speech) and surely since 1974, with the formation of Vanguard as the first mutual, shareholder-owned firm, driven ahead largely by our 1975 creation of the first and ultimate fiduciary-oriented, consumer-oriented mutual fund: the index mutual fund. Our First Index Investment Trust was designed to track the S&P 500 Index. The beginning of an indexing strategy that was the logical, even obvious, result of our mutual structure. Indeed, it was our first strategic move. That index fund began with an IPO in 1976 that was, to be blunt, a flop, raising only $11 million—far less than the underwriters’ goal of $150 million. But, now known as Vanguard 500 Index Fund, its assets exceed $450 billion. With its sister index funds at Vanguard, indexing strategies now account for some $2.4 trillion of the firm’s $3.2 trillion asset base.

我的大部分书籍都触及(甚至可以说是猛击!)同一个主题:“把投资者放在第一位。”《博格尔论共同基金》(1993 年)、《共同基金常识》(1999 年 / 2009 年)和《资本主义的灵魂之战》(2005 年)都强调了这一受托责任的信息。《文化的冲突》(2012 年)甚至大胆地提出了 15 项客观标准,投资者可据此衡量其共同基金的经理人是否达到了受托人标准,这套标准被称为“管理商数”。例如,SQ 会考虑管理费与费率、投资组合换手率、销售佣金、投资组合经理的任职年限、内部人持有的基金份额、董事会构成等等。SQ 设定了一个高标准,而太多基金公司未能达到。

Most of my books touch on (pound on?) the same theme: “Put the investor first.” Bogle on Mutual Funds (1993), Common Sense on Mutual Funds (1999/2009), and The Battle for the Soul of Capitalism (2005) all emphasize this message of fiduciary duty. The Clash of the Cultures (2012) even has the temerity to set forth 15 objective standards by which investors can measure the extent to which their mutual funds are being operated by managers who are meeting the fiduciary standards, “The Stewardship Quotient.” The SQ, for example considers management fees and expense ratios, portfolio turnover, sales loads, longevity of portfolio managers, fund share ownership by insiders, board composition, and so on. The SQ sets a high standard, one which too many fund groups fail to meet.

现在,让我们听听亚当·斯密的见解

现在想一想这一点:我为受托人标准设定的宏大目标何时实现、甚至能否实现,可能并不重要。因为我们生活在一个消费者主权时代,消费者有权要求企业服务于他们的需求,而无法满足这些需求的企业将面临暗淡的未来。这代表了人类历史上最强大的单一经济力量。随着当今信息获取的迅速扩大,技术已经从根本上重塑了消费市场,并且仍在继续。在金融领域,这个新时代将带来大大改善的信息披露、更高的透明度、能够区分事实与虚构的投资者教育,并在收益、风险、成本和管理质量等关键问题上亮起“红灯”。当今的消费者主权时代没有任何减弱的迹象;更有可能的是,它会加速发展。

Adam Smith to the Fore Now think about this: it may not matter when and even if my expansive goals for the fiduciary standard are achieved. For we live in an Age of Consumerism in which consumers are empowered to demand that businesses serve their needs, and businesses that fail to satisfy those demands face a dim future. This represents the most powerful single economic force in all human history. With today’s rapidly expending availability of information, technology has radically reordered the consumer markets, and continues to do so. In finance, this new age will bring much improved disclosure, more transparency, investor education that separates fact from fiction, and raises “red flags” on key issues such as returns, risks, costs, and management quality. Today’s Age of Consumerism shows no sign of abating; more likely, it will accelerate.

我们几乎不能期望,即使像亚当·斯密那样拥有智慧、才智、逻辑和清晰远见的人,能够详细预见到当今商业和技术环境中商业的各种支流——实际上是条条大河。但他宏大的视野无疑预示着这个消费者时代的到来。正如亚当·斯密在 1776 年所写:消费是所有生产的唯一终点和目的;生产者的利益,只有在为促进消费者利益所必要时,才应受到关注。这条准则如此不证自明,试图去证明它将是荒谬的……消费者的利益……必须是所有工业和商业的最终目的和对象。

We could hardly expect even a man with the wisdom, intelligence, logic and clear vision of Adam Smith to have anticipated in detail the various streams—really rivers—of commerce of today’s business and technological environment. But his overarching vision was surely a harbinger of this Age of the Consumer. As Adam Smith wrote in 1776: Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production; and the interest of the producer ought to be attended to, only so far as it may be necessary for promoting that of the consumer. The maxim is so perfectly self-evident, that it would be absurd to attempt to prove it . . . [T]he interest of the consumer . . . [must be] the ultimate end and object of all industry and commence.

将斯密的洞见应用于投资行业,我坚信斯密不仅会赞同消费者的力量,也会赞同它对受托责任原则的启示。借用他那最后一句:投资者的利益必须是整个金融体系的最终目的和对象。

Applying Smith’s insight to the investment industry, I firmly believe Smith would endorse not only the power of the consumer, but it’s implications for the principle of fiduciary duty. Paraphrasing that final sentence: The interest of the investor must be the ultimate end and object of the entire financial system.

无论这些历史线索最终编织出怎样的图景,今天在座的许多人,我敢说,都可以为身处这场运动的前沿而感到自豪。今天,“受托人标准研究所”的“为投资者而战”运动正式启动。它将为美国公民投资者带来更大的金融自由,同时,用 1940 年《投资公司法》的话来说,它也将服务于“国家公共利益”。所以,战斗下去!这是值得的!“坚持到底!”“无论如何,继续前进!”我们站在历史正确的一边。

Whatever fabric the pattern of these threads of history ultimately weaves, many of you in this audience today can take pride in being, dare I say, in the vanguard of this movement. Today begins “The Campaign for Investors” of the Institute for the Fiduciary Standard. It will lead to greater financial freedom for America’s citizen/investors, and will serve, in the words of the Investment Company Act of 1940, “the national public interest” as well. So fight on! It’s worth it! “Stay the Course!” “Press on Regardless!” We are on the right side of history.