获奖感言
获奖感言
约翰·C·博格
2017 年 CME 集团梅拉梅德-阿迪蒂创新奖
佛罗里达州那不勒斯
2017 年 11 月 14 日
我很高兴与我的苏格兰同胞、量化投资先驱约翰“麦克”麦奎恩共同分享这个非凡的创新奖。我尤其感到荣幸,因为 CME 集团梅拉梅德-阿迪蒂创新奖的评选依据,不仅在于发明了一项“给市场、商业或贸易带来重大变革”的金融创新,还在于“该理念在改善个人、行业或国家经济福祉方面的实际应用”——亦即符合公众利益。这始终是我漫长职业生涯所追求的目标。
Acceptance Remarks John C. Bogle 2017 CME Group Melamed-Arditti Innovation Award Naples, Florida November 14, 2017 I’m delighted to share this remarkable Innovation Award with my fellow Scotsman, the quantitative investment pioneer John “Mac” McQuown. I’m especially honored because the CME Group Melamed-Arditti Innovation Award is based, not only on the invention of a financial innovation that has “created significant change to markets, commerce, or trade,” but also on “the practical application of the idea . . . in improving the economic well-being of individuals, an industry, or a nation”—in the public interest. That’s always been the goal of my long career.
第一指数投资信托基金(即今天的先锋 500 指数基金最初的名字)的设计初衷,恰恰就是要做到这一点。我至今仍有几分惊讶,竟然是我在遥远的 1975 年创立了这只开创性的指数共同基金。这一切是怎么发生的呢?不过首先,它又何以没能更早出现?
Surely First Index Investment Trust (the original name of today’s Vanguard 500 Index Fund) was designed to do exactly that. I’m still sort of amazed that it fell to me to create this pioneering index mutual fund way back in 1975. How did it happen? But first, how did it not happen?
第一指数并非复杂算法的产物,也与现代投资组合理论(MPT)或有效市场假说(EMH)无关。对我来说,市场效率的不均匀性使得有效市场假说无法成为指数化投资的可靠基础。老实说,当我决定创立我们的指数基金时,我既没有应用统计学的训练,也没有这方面的天赋,而且说起来挺难为情的,我甚至从未听说过有效市场假说。
First Index was not a product of complex algorithms, nor of Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT), nor of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH). For me, the uneven efficiency of the market makes the EMH an unreliable basis for indexing. Truth told, when I decided to start our index fund, I possessed neither the training nor the talent for applied statistics, and, embarrassingly, I had never even heard of the EMH.
第一只指数共同基金也并非芝加哥大学和富国银行量化研究的产物。事实上,当我后来读到芝加哥版指数基金起源时,我才意识到,在我创立第一指数基金时,那篇芝加哥文章中列举的星光熠熠的名字——麦克·麦考恩、吉姆·弗廷、比尔·福斯、费希尔·布莱克、哈里·马科维茨、尤金·法玛、迪恩·勒巴伦、吉姆·洛里、默顿·米勒、迈伦·舒尔斯、比尔·夏普——这些金融学术界的“名人录”,我一个都没听说过。我这个 1951 年从普林斯顿大学毕业、仅拿了个文学士学位的人,一句话,对学术界发生的事情一无所知。
Nor was the first index mutual fund a product of the quantitative work done at the University of Chicago and at Wells Fargo. Indeed, when I later read the Chicago version of the origin of the index fund, I realized that I had then never heard of a single one of those star-studded names that graced the Chicago article at the time I created First Index. Mac McQuown, Jim Vertin, Bill Fouse, Fisher Black, Harry Markowitz, Eugene Fama, Dean LeBaron, Jim Lorie, Merton Miller, Myron Scholes, and Bill Sharpe . . . surely a “who’s who” is of the biggest names in the financial academy. This 1951 graduate of Princeton University with a mere A.B. degree was, in a word, ignorant of what was going on in the academy.
不是的,第一指数基金的诞生纯属偶然和直觉。用简短的版本的来讲述,这一切得从 扬·特沃多夫斯基 说起。他拥有普林斯顿大学电气工程学士学位,刚从沃顿商学院拿到 MBA,是我们这家当时崭新、名为先锋(Vanguard)的小公司最初的 28 名创始成员之一。我让扬自己来讲讲 1975 年中期发生了什么:“有一天,你突然问我能不能运作一只指数基金,我研究了两天后回答,可以……我用 APL 语言在分时系统上编写了指数的基金程序,用的是简单的市值加权算法和公开数据库。说实话,这很容易,尽管当你把这个想法推销给承销商并开始路演时,我非常紧张。真金白银就要靠我那一小套 APL 程序来管理了!”
No, the genesis of First Index was casual and intuitive. Short version, according to Jan Twardowski, Princeton B.S.E.E. degree and recently-minted Wharton M.B.A. who was one of the 28 original crew members of our tiny, shiny new firm named Vanguard. I’ll let Jan tell the story of what happened in mid-1975: “One day you surprised me by asking if I could run an index fund and after a couple days research I said yes . . . I wrote the index fund programs in APL on a time-sharing system, using simple cap-weighting algorithms and public databases. It was, frankly, easy, although I was quite nervous when you sold the idea to underwriters and the road show began. Actual money was going to be managed based on my little set of APL programs!”
当然,这个故事远不止那则简单的轶事。让我带你简要回顾一下那些事件和境况的交汇,它们几乎必然地决定了我的时机选择和 1975 年的决策——也就是我认为“不出意外”的原因:1. 1951 年 3 月。论文。我提交了普林斯顿大学的毕业论文,主题是当时规模尚小(2.5 亿美元)的共同基金行业,题目是《投资公司的经济角色》。经过一番粗略的统计分析(大部分是轶事案例),我得出结论:共同基金“无从声称自身优于市场指数”。1975 年中期,当我准备向先锋集团董事们建议创立第一只指数基金时,我回想起了那些话。
There was, of course, much more to the story than that simple anecdote.1 So let me take you through a brief time line of the confluence of events and circumstances that made my timing and my 1975 decision almost inevitable: 1. March 1951. The Thesis. I handed in my Princeton thesis focused on the then-tiny ($2 ½ billion) mutual fund industry, which was entitled “The Economic Role of the Investment Company.” After a skimpy statistical analysis, largely anecdotal, I concluded that mutual funds “could make no claim to superiority over the market indexes.” In mid-1975, as I prepared to recommend the formation of the first index fund to the Vanguard directors, I recalled those words.
2. 1960 年–1974 年 1 月。学习经历。通过在惠灵顿基金投资委员会的经历,我亲身体验到,要找到能持续脱颖而出的投资组合经理有多难。更大的教训是:1966 年那次合并为我们带来了 Ivest 基金,但该合并于 1974 年崩盘。该基金的经理们当初播下了“快进”时代的风,后来收获的却是随之而来的旋风。这些激进的年轻经理毁掉了惠灵顿基金,毁掉了他们自己的基金,也毁掉了两个机会主义的模仿品。三只基金很快都让投资者大失所望。3. 1974 年 1 月 23 日。被解雇。尽管经理们失败了,但失去惠灵顿管理公司首席执行官职位的人却是我。我的新合伙人联合起来,解雇了我。那是我职业生涯中一个不愉快的时刻。
2. 1960-January 1974. The Learning Experience. Through my experience on the Wellington Fund Investment Committee, I learned first-hand how tough it is to find portfolio managers who could consistently distinguish themselves. Even more of a lesson: the 1966 merger that brought us Ivest Fund collapsed in 1974. Its managers, who had sown the “Go-Go” era wind, reaped the subsequent whirlwind. These aggressive young managers ruined Wellington Fund, ruined their own fund, and ruined two opportunistic copies of it. All three funds quickly failed the investors. 3. January 23, 1974. The Firing. Despite the failure of the managers, it was I who lost my job as CEO of Wellington Management Company. My new partners ganged up and fired me. It was not a happy moment in my career.
4. 1974 年 1 月 24 日。封闭之门开始敞开。就在第二天,惠灵顿基金董事会——在很大程度上独立于惠灵顿管理公司——在纽约市召开了会议。(这事儿真不是编的!)我当时仍是该基金的主席兼首席执行官,并敦促董事们行使法律赋予的独立性,继续任命我为 CEO,并自行发挥作用……不,我并不是说普林斯顿的两个学士学位和沃顿商学院的 MBA 学位,就等同于斯坦福、芝加哥、哈佛和麻省理工的所有那些博士头衔……现在还不到这么说的时候!
4. January 24, 1974. The Closed Door Begins to Open. The very next day, the Board of the Wellington Funds—largely independent of Wellington Management Company—met in New York City. (You can’t make this stuff up!) I was still Chairman and CEO of the funds, and urged the directors to assert their legal independence, retain me as CEO, and perform their own No I’m not saying that two undergraduate degrees from Princeton and an M.B.A. from Wharton are equal to all those Ph.D.s from Stanford, Chicago, Harvard, and MIT . . . not saying it yet!
行政、投资管理和股份分销服务,基本终结了这些基金与威灵顿管理公司(Wellington Management)的关系。对董事会而言,这步子迈得太大了,但他们授权我提交一份可行方案的调研报告。5. 1974 年 9 月 24 日。先锋集团(Vanguard)成立。我向董事会提交的方案,从基金收购威灵顿管理公司(我的首选),到基金自行承担行政管理职责,但保留威灵顿管理公司负责投资管理和股份分销(我的末选),一应俱全。董事会投票选择了末选。但总比什么都没有强,43 年前,先锋集团——我选定的名字——成立了,成为一个真正意义上的共同基金组织,旨在服务其股东。我们的战略之一,是尽量降低支付给顾问的管理费。现在,一只指数基金将给我机会创立一只不收取任何管理费的基金。这种机遇与动机的交汇,或许正是支撑创新的最强大单股力量。6. 1974 年 10 月 10 日。“对判断力的挑战”。就在那天,我读到了保罗·萨缪尔森(Paul Samuelson)发表在《投资组合管理期刊》(Journal of Portfolio Management)创刊号上的文章。多么巧合!我感觉他仿佛是专门写给我的。萨缪尔森博士寻求“确凿证据”来证明有任何一只共同基金的管理人能持续跑赢标普 500 指数,却一无所获。他实质上是在要求,某处、某人,创立一只基于标普 500 指数的指数基金。这道晴天霹雳,让我 1951 年的那个设想踏上了通往现实之路。
administrative, investment management, and share distribution services, basically terminating the funds’ relationship with Wellington Management. That was a bridge too far for the Board, but they authorized me to provide a study of the options available to them.2 5. September 24, 1974. Vanguard Is Founded. The options that I presented to the Board ranged from the Funds’ acquisition of Wellington Management (my first choice) to having the Funds assume responsibilities for their own administration but retain Wellington Management for their investment management and share distribution (my last choice). They voted for that last choice. But it was better than nothing, and 43 years ago Vanguard—the name that I had chosen— was founded as a truly mutual mutual fund organization, designed to serve its shareholders. Part of our strategy focused on minimizing the management fees paid to our advisers. Now, an index fund would give me the opportunity to start a fund with no management fees. This confluence of opportunity and motive may well be the most powerful single force undergirding innovation. 6. October 10, 1974. “Challenge to Judgement.” That’s when I read Paul Samuelson’s article in the very first issue of the Journal of Portfolio Management. What a coincidence! I felt as if he had written it directly to me. Dr. Samuelson sought “brute evidence” that any mutual fund manager could consistently outpace the S&P 500 Index, but found none. He demanded, in effect, that someone, somewhere start an index fund based on the S&P 500. That bolt from the blue set my 1951 idea on the road to reality.
- 1975 年 9 月 27 日,上午。友善的说服。鉴于保罗·萨缪尔森不容置疑的声望,我把他的文章列为向董事会演示材料中的“证据 A”。接下来是我自己的统计研究,展示截至 1975 年中之前的 30 年里,股票型共同基金的年均回报率与标普 500 指数的对比——这些数据是我用一台 Monroe 机械计算器算出来的。结果:标普 500 指数每年领先 1.6%。³
- 1975 年 9 月 27 日,下午。指数基金诞生。为了化解那场令人不快的政治斗争,新成立的先锋集团被其董事会禁止向我们的共同基金提供投资管理服务。那扇门对我们关上了。但指数基金让我得以打开一扇窗:“这只基金不进行主动管理,”我告诉董事会。结果:先锋董事会一致同意,成立世界上第一只指数共同基金。(再说一遍,“这种事你编都编不出来。”)
7. September 27, 1975, Morning. Friendly Persuasion. Given Paul Samuelson’s unquestioned credibility, I marked his essay “Exhibit A” in my presentation to the board. The next presentation was my own statistical study showing the average annual return of equity mutual funds compared to the S&P 500 over the previous 30 years ending in mid-1975, which I calculated on a Monroe mechanical calculator. Result: S&P 500 annual edge, 1.6%.3 8. September 27, 1975, Afternoon. The Index Fund Is Born. To resolve that unpleasant political struggle, the newly formed Vanguard was barred by its Board from providing investment management services to our mutual funds. That door was closed to us. But the index fund allowed me to open a window: “This fund is not managed,” I told the Board. Result: the unanimous approval of the Vanguard Board to form the world’s first index mutual fund. (Again, “you can’t make this stuff up.”)
董事会内部的意见高度分裂,董事们几乎毫无共识。要不是已故的查尔斯·D·鲁特二世——独立董事团体的主席——发挥领导作用,后续那些事根本就不会发生。
The Board was closely divided, and the directors were anything but aligned in their views. Were it not for the leadership of the late Charles D. Root, Jr., chairman of the independent director group, the events that followed would never have taken place.
趣闻:我为发表在《金融分析师杂志》2016 年 1/2 月刊上的论文重复了这一研究,覆盖截至 2015 年的 30 年:标普的领先幅度为 1.6%。万变不离其宗。
Factoid: I repeated the study for my paper published in the January/February 2016 issue of The Financial Analysts Journal for the 30 years ending 2015: S&P edge, 1.6%. The more things change, the more they remain the same.
9. 1976 年 8 月 31 日,首次公开募股(IPO)。第一指数基金开局糟糕——几乎致命。这次 IPO 由华尔街四大零售经纪商牵头,原计划募资 2.5 亿美元,结果只筹到 1130 万美元,惨败。当时负责该 IPO 的一位华尔街经理人最近问道:“华尔街历史上最失败的承销,怎么会成为现代金融史上最伟大的创新?”答案:“说来话长。”
9. August 31, 1976. The IPO. First Index was off to a bad—near-fatal—start. The initial public offering, led by Wall Street’s four largest retail brokers, was planned for $250 million. It produced $11.3 million, an abject failure. One of the Wall Street managers of that IPO recently asked: “How is it possible that the worst underwriting in Wall Street history became the greatest innovation in modern finance?” Answer: “It’s a long story.”
后记 这次 CME 创新奖的海报上,贴着我和麦克·麦奎恩——我的好友,也是这项奖当之无愧的共同获得者——的照片,海报上印着本次论坛的主题:“放眼长远,永不回望”。但回望——正如我今天下午所做的那样——会提醒我们,通往一项创新的道路是多么脆弱,然而,不知怎的,在重重困难之下,它最终却能催生出指数基金,并最终掀起一场指数革命。如此曲折的成功之路——它包含了一篇大学论文、一场灾难性的合并、一次被解雇、一篇期刊文章、一种新颖的公司结构、对一份协议的偶然(甚至可以说是轻率的)解读,以及,没错,一种不可动摇的决心——无疑是这种将伟大构想变为现实、从而改变一个行业并服务投资者的极端范例。
Afterword The poster announcing this CME award for innovation shows photos of me and Mac McQuown—my friend and enormously deserving co-recipient of this award—with the title of this conference: “Taking the Long View and Never Looking Back.” But looking back, as I have done this afternoon, reminds us how fragile the path to an innovation can be, and yet somehow, against all odds, can result in an index fund, and ultimately an Index Revolution. Surely such a tortuous path to success— one that included a university thesis, a catastrophic merger, a firing, a journal article, a novel corporate structure, a fortuitous (perhaps even disingenuous) reading of an agreement, and yes, an unshakable determination—is an extreme example of what it took to turn a great idea into a reality that changed an industry and served investors.
1976 年那只首只指数共同基金,资产仅仅可怜巴巴的 1100 万美元,艰难地站稳脚跟。直到 1984 年,它才迎来第一个竞争对手(富国银行)。直到 1990 年代初期,它才开始增长,而且真就一飞冲天。如今,先锋 500 指数基金的资产总计 5810 亿美元。加上它的姐妹基金——先锋整体股票市场指数基金(其 83% 的资产投在标普 500 指数成分股上)——还有 6620 亿美元——仅先锋一家,这些传统指数基金(TIF)的投资总额就达到 1.24 万亿美元。今天,所有先锋指数基金的资产总计 3.6 万亿美元,占先锋目前 4.7 万亿美元资产基础的 74%。
That 1976 First Index mutual fund, with its pathetic $11 million in assets, struggled to gain traction. It didn’t attract its first mutual fund competitor until 1984 (Wells Fargo). It was not until the early 1990s that it started to grow, and grow it did. Today, assets of the Vanguard 500 Index funds total $581 billion. With their sister fund, Vanguard Total Stock Market Index (with 83% of its assets in S&P 500 Index stocks), another $662 billion—in all, $1.24 trillion invested in these TIFs (traditional index funds) at Vanguard alone. Today, all told, the assets of all Vanguard index funds total $3.6 trillion, 74% of Vanguard’s present asset base of $4.7 trillion.
过去的 25 年间,指数基金终于崭露头角。更广泛地看,美国所有指数共同基金的资产从 1976 年那区区 1100 万美元,增长到 1996 年的 930 亿美元,复合年增长率达到 55%——到 2017 年底,更是达到 6.1 万亿美元,年增长率依然保持在 22% 的体面水平。仅在过去十年间,美国投资者就向其所持有的美国股票指数基金净流入 2.1 万亿美元,同时从他们持有的主动管理型股票基金中撤出了超过 9000 亿美元。投资者偏好如此巨大的 3 万亿美元转向,无疑称得上是一场指数革命。
During the past quarter-century, index funds have come into their own. More broadly, assets of all U.S. index mutual funds have risen from that pathetic $11 million in 1976 to $93 billion in 1996, a 55% compound annual growth rate—to $6.1 trillion in late-2017, still a respectable 22% annual growth rate. In the past decade alone, U.S. investors have added $2.1 trillion of net cash flow to their holdings of U.S. equity index funds and withdrawn more than $900 billion from their holdings of actively managed equity funds. Such a huge $3 trillion swing in investor preferences surely represents no less than an Index Revolution.
如今看来很明确了:1975 年那第一只指数共同基金的创举,为指数化革命点燃了火花。同样有理由认为,我那两本聚焦于指数基金的最畅销书——《博格尔谈共同基金:聪明投资者的新视角》(1994 年)和《常识投资小书》(2007 年)——合计销售 50 万册,约 150 万读者阅读,在随后爆发的这场非凡革命中扮演了重要角色。这场革命至今仍在继续。我很自豪能被视作这场革命的主要先驱之一。
It now seems clear that the pioneering creation of that First Index mutual fund in 1975 provided the spark that ignited the index revolution. And it seems reasonable to conclude that my two best-selling books, both focused on index funds—Bogle on Mutual Funds: New Perspectives for the Intelligent Investor (1994) and The Little Book of Common Sense Investing (2007), together with a total of 500,000 sales, and read by an estimated 1.5 million readers, played a major role in fueling the extraordinary revolution that followed. It continues to this day. I’m proud to be counted as one of the principal pioneers of that revolution.
再次感谢您今天授予我的崇高荣誉,以及能与同为先驱的麦克·麦夸恩分享这份殊荣。
Thank you again for the high honor that you have bestowed upon me today, and the privilege of sharing it with fellow pioneer Mac McQuown.
- * * 个人附注:我与杰出的萨缪尔森博士的交往,始于他在《投资组合管理期刊》上发表的那篇文章,并因他在 1976 年 8 月 16 日《新闻周刊》专栏“指数基金投资”而得到加强。此后我们多次会面,结成了一种两个人的“相互仰慕协会”。1993 年,我请他为我第一本书《博格尔谈共同基金》写推荐语时,他婉言谢绝了……但他随即主动提出要撰写前言,我既惊讶又欣喜地接受了他的提议。在前言中,他称赞我“将一个基础产业引向了最优方向”。
- * * PERSONAL NOTE: My relationship with the remarkable Dr. Samuelson began with his Journal of Portfolio Management article, and was reinforced by his Newsweek column of August 16, 1976, “Index Fund Investing.” We met several times thereafter and became a “mutual admiration society” of two. When, in 1993, I asked him to endorse my first book Bogle on Mutual Funds, he graciously turned me down . . . but he quickly offered to write the foreword, and I accepted his offer with surprise and delight. In his foreword, he credited me with having “changed a basic industry in an optimal direction.”
2005 年 11 月 15 日,萨缪尔森博士在波士顿证券分析师协会的一次演讲中,用毫不含糊的话语为指数蛋糕添上了点睛一笔。他说:我把博格尔的这项发明与轮子、字母、古登堡印刷术、葡萄酒和奶酪的发明相提并论——这个共同基金从未让博格尔本人致富,却提升了基金持有人的长期回报。这是太阳底下出现的新事物。
On November 15, 2005, Dr. Samuelson would put the icing on the index cake in no uncertain terms, in an address to the Boston Security Analysts Society, he said: I rank this Bogle invention along with the invention of the wheel, the alphabet, Gutenberg printing, and wine and cheese: a mutual fund that never made of Bogle rich but elevated the long-term returns of the mutual-fund owners. Something new under the sun.
2007 年,征得他同意后,我将我的《常识投资小书》献给了他——“我的导师,我的灵感,我的指路明灯”。这个决定来得恰是时候,因为萨缪尔森博士于 2009 年 12 月 14 日去世了。消息让我心碎。
In 2007, with his consent. I dedicated my Little Book of Common Sense Investing to him, “my mentor, my inspiration, my shining light.” Not a moment too soon, for Dr. Samuelson passed on December 14, 2009. The news broke my heart.
是的,那位“20 世纪最伟大的学术经济学家”(《纽约时报》语)与这位仅有普林斯顿大学经济学学士学位的毕业生之间这种关系,在你们看来可能很奇怪。我也觉得有点奇怪。但这却是我漫长职业生涯中最美好的一段关系之一。
Yes, this relationship between that “greatest academic economist of the 20th century” (New York Times) and that Princeton graduate with a mere A.B. in Economics may seem strange to you. It seems a bit strange to me, too. But it was among the finest relationships of my long career.