《卫报》|交易员是零售银行的祸根

2012 · 文章 · 原文约 628 词
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英国银行家协会对巴克莱交易员操纵伦敦银行间同业拆借利率(Libor)一事曝光后的反应——他们声称“感到震惊”——让人想起电影《卡萨布兰卡》中的一幕:宪兵队长雷诺上尉查封了里克的地下赌场,一边收下自己的赌赢的钱,一边说:“我很震惊,震惊地发现这里居然有人在赌博!”

The reaction of the British Bankers' Association to the revelation that Barclays traders had been manipulating the Libor interest rates – they say they were "shocked" – is reminiscent of the scene in the movie Casablanca in which the gendarme Captain Renault closes down Rick's gambling joint and says "I'm shocked, shocked to find that gambling is going on in here!" while simultaneously pocketing his winnings.

如果英国银行家协会真的不知道 Libor 操纵正在发生,那它的高管们真该多出去见见世面。它的说法看起来加倍荒谬,因为它与巴克莱共用一个主席;而且,如果像很可能发生的那样,更多银行被发现参与此类行为、其他基准利率也被发现遭到操纵,它的说法将越来越不可信。

If the BBA was genuinely unaware that manipulation of Libor was going on, then its officers need to get out more. Its assertion looks doubly ridiculous given that it shares a chairman with Barclays, and will look increasingly unbelievable if, as seems likely, more banks are found to have engaged in this practice and other benchmark rates are found to have been rigged.

一位伟大的银行家、已故的布赖恩·皮特曼爵士曾说,多数银行服务好自己的员工,但很少服务好自己的客户或股东。他在这件事上是对的,就像他在大多数事情上一样。但我们应该从最近的例子中得出什么结论?

A great banker, the late Sir Brian Pitman, once said that most banks serve their employees well, but few serve their customers or shareholders. There was never any doubt that he was right about this, as he was about most things. But what conclusions should we draw from this latest example?

首先,反对分离零售银行和投资银行的理由向来薄弱,如今更是完全站不住脚。很明显,每当我们允许投资银行交易员与零售银行业务——对经济体的信贷创造和支付系统等核心功能至关重要的业务——并肩运作,交易员就会压过零售银行家,结果会损害关键的零售银行业务。我们在信贷危机起因中已看到这种情况:投资银行家设计出一大堆有毒产品——债务抵押债券(CDO)、贷款抵押债券(CLO)、CDO 平方——并把它们卖给银行的客户。我们再次看到,参与 Libor 设定的员工被交易员带坏。

First, the arguments against separating retail and investment banks were always thin. Now they are surely unanswerable. It is quite clear that whenever we allow investment bank traders to operate alongside retail bank operations which are central to the economy's essential functions of credit creation and payment systems, the traders will overwhelm the retail bankers and the results will be damaging to the vital retail banking operations. We saw this in the causes of the credit crunch when the investment bankers devised an alphabet soup of toxic products – CDOs, CLOs, CDOs-squared – and sold them to customers of the banks. We have seen it again with the staff taking part in the Libor setting suborned by their traders.

需要做什么?英美必须制定一部《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》(1933 年在大崩盘后通过的银行法,将商业银行和投资银行业务分离开来),隔离零售和投资银行业务。维克斯委员会提议的“圈护”不会奏效。正如 Libor 丑闻表明的,人们总能找到办法翻过、钻过或绕过护栏。唯一似乎反对这种分离的人是银行家。我们为什么要听他们的?在这方面政府已经失败了——它与商界的自然亲近关系,使它被投资银行家(如今经营着许多银行)的特殊游说所说服。

What needs to happen? The UK and the US must enact a Glass-Steagall Act (the 1933 banking act passed in the wake of the Great Crash, which separated commercial and investment banking) and separate retail and investment banks. Ringfencing, as proposed by the Vickers commission, will not work. As this Libor scandal illustrates, ways will be found to climb over, burrow under and go round the ringfence. The only people who seem to have lobbied against such separation are bankers. Why are we listening to them? Here the government has failed – its natural affinity to business has allowed it to be persuaded by the special pleading of the investment bankers who are now running many of our banks.

其次,我们需要废除“大爆炸”改革中允许银行、投资银行和经纪公司合并业务、既为自己的账户交易又充当客户代理人的那些方面。在这种机构里,客户总是输家。

Second, we need to repeal those aspects of Big Bang which allowed banks, investment banks and brokerage firms to combine operations in which they traded for their own account and also acted as an agent for clients. In such organisations, the client always loses.

此外,我们需要汲取一个重要教训:谁能经营银行。交易员绝不应该被允许经营银行。交易员只关注短期,他们的短视促使他们为短期利润做事,最终却可能在更长远的未来造成毁灭。在我看来,每一家让交易员掌舵的银行都有覆灭的风险。看看所罗门兄弟、贝尔斯登和雷曼兄弟的例子吧。

In addition, we need to learn an important lesson about who should be allowed to run banks. Traders should never be allowed to run banks. Traders are all about the short term and their myopia leads them to do things for short-term profit which risk ruination in the longer term. In my view, every bank that puts a trader in charge risks ruin. Take a look at the examples of Salomon Brothers, Bear Stearns and Lehman.

回顾英国银行卷入投资银行冒险并陷入麻烦之前的时代:它们的领导人出身于零售银行背景——比如苏格兰银行的布鲁斯·帕图洛和彼得·伯特、汇丰银行的威利·普维斯、渣打银行的马尔科姆·威廉森,当然还有劳埃德银行的布赖恩·皮特曼。这些人个个都是爵士,从未有人质疑需要剥夺他们的荣誉。他们是真正的银行家,这是褒义。

Look back to an era before British banks got into the problems which have followed their adventures in investment banking: their leaders were from a retail banking background – men like Bruce Pattullo and Peter Burt at Bank of Scotland, Willie Purves at HSBC, Malcolm Williamson at Standard Chartered and of course Brian Pitman at Lloyds. Knights of the realm to a man, and there's never been any question of a need to strip them of their honours. They were real bankers, and that's a compliment.

Terry Smith

Terry Smith

The Guardian

The Guardian