“让你触碰的东西比你发现它们时更好”

2007 · 演讲 · 原文约 3866 词
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“让你所触碰的事物,比你发现它们时更美好”

约翰·C·博格尔的演讲

先锋集团创始人

∞ ∞ ∞

费城联盟俱乐部

宾夕法尼亚州费城

2007 年 4 月 10 日

能在费城联盟俱乐部获得这份荣誉——这座城市,天意使然,我在此度过了人生中过去的 62 年——几乎要求受奖人从俱乐部那句永恒格言开始说起:“热爱祖国,引领前行。”事实上,正是对祖国的热爱,即身为美利坚合众国公民所享有的福泽,引领我走过了人生和职业生涯的大部分时光。从小到大,我被培养成首先要做一个好公民,在来到费城之前的岁月里,始终被提醒着,嗯,家庭价值观。这些价值观,体现在我记忆中的那些箴言里,比如“上帝保佑我们的家”,那是久远年代里绣在样品枕头上的一针一线。

“Leaving the Things that You Touch Better than You Found Them” Remarks by John C. Bogle Founder, The Vanguard Group ∞ ∞ ∞ The Union League of Philadelphia Philadelphia, PA April 10, 2007 Being honored by the Union League of Philadelphia—the city in whose environs, providentially, I’ve spent the past 62 years of my life—almost demands that the honoree begins with the club’s timeless motto, Love of Country Leads. And in fact it is love of country—the blessings of citizenship in the United States of America—that has led me through much of my own life and career. I was raised to be, above all, a good citizen, constantly reminded in my pre-Philadelphia years of, well, family values. These values are exemplified by my memory of the kind of adages like “God Bless Our Home” that were cross-stitched on the sampler pillows of years long gone.

即使在今天,这些原则依然是我人生的一部分。“做正确的事,不管有多痛苦”;“积攒一分钱,就是赚到一分钱”;“游手好闲是魔鬼的工具”(我的苏格兰祖先把‘devil’读作‘divil’);“即便一个人,也能带来改变”;还有“不管怎样,坚持下去”——那是我叔叔那艘旧龙虾船的名字。(这句话总伴随着一个提醒:你不仅要艰难时坚持下去,顺遂时也要坚持下去。)

Even today, these principles remain part of my life. “Do what’s right, no matter how painful”; “a penny saved is a penny earned”; “idle hands are the tools of the divil” (the way my Scottish forebears pronounced “devil”); “even one person can make a difference”; and “press on, regardless,” the name of my uncle’s old lobster boat. (That one came always with the reminder you must press on, not only in tough times, but in easy times as well.)

我今天要讲的统一主题,是这类家族信条中的又一条:“让你触摸过的事物,比你发现它们时变得更好。”今天下午,我想讲讲,我如何尝试将这一原则应用到一生中几个主要关切领域:国家宪法中心、布莱尔学院、先锋集团,以及我们的金融市场。_______________ 注:本演讲中表达的观点,未必代表先锋集团现任管理层的看法。

My unifying theme today is yet another of these family principles: “leave the things that you touch better than you found them.” This afternoon, I’d like to tell you how I tried to apply this tenet to some of the major interests of my long life: the National Constitution Center, Blair Academy, Vanguard, and our financial markets. _______________ Note: The opinions expressed in this speech do not necessarily represent the views of Vanguard’s present management.

国家宪法中心自 1988 年成立以来,我一直在其中担任董事,但早些年我不过是那句古老家训的拙劣践行者,几乎没做出什么贡献。不过,1996 年管理层经历了一场剧变——再加上那年初我接受心脏移植手术后精力恢复——我逐渐更多地参与其中。时任市长伦德尔和 NCC 总裁约瑟夫·M·托尔塞拉让这个几乎夭折的项目重获生机,他们以极大的热忱争取到了我们在独立广场上的绝佳位置,监督建筑设计,并为大楼筹集了资金。在这些努力进行的同时,1999 年底,他们问我是否愿意接替市长担任主席一职。我答应了先干六个月,直到他们找到我所说的“真正”的主席为止。

The National Constitution Center While I’ve been a director of the National Constitution Center since its inception in 1988, in the early years I was a pretty poor example of that old family tenet, making little if any difference. But after a management upheaval in 1996—and with the return of my energy following a heart transplant earlier in the year—I became increasingly involved. Then-mayor Rendell and NCC president Joseph M. Torsella had brought this near-moribund project back to life, doing yeoman service in obtaining our splendid location on Independence Mall, supervising the architectural design, and raising the money for the building. Amid those efforts, late in 1999, they asked me if I’d be willing to succeed the mayor as chairman. I agreed to do so for six months, only until they could find what I described as a “real” chairman.

但去年十月,我开始了担任主席的第八年,这也是我漫长职业生涯中最棒的经历之一。首席执行官约瑟夫·M·托尔塞拉是一位年轻的宾夕法尼亚大学毕业生(也是罗兹学者),事实证明他是一位多才多艺的人物——企业家、管理者、规划师、历史学家,更是一个非凡的人。在他的领导下,新博物馆既没有超出预算(1.85 亿美元,包括 4000 万美元的捐赠基金),也没有延误工期,于 2003 年 7 月 4 日如期开放。难怪 2004 年初,项目完成后,乔便转向寻求公职。我想不出比这更合适的致敬方式了:用伦敦圣保罗大教堂内约 1711 年对建筑大师克里斯托弗·雷恩的题词来概括他——"若想瞻仰他的纪念碑,请环顾四周。"

But last October, I began my eighth year as Chairman, enjoying one of the great experiences of my long career. Chief executive Joseph M. Torsella, a young graduate of the University of Pennsylvania (and a Rhodes scholar) proved to be a renaissance man—entrepreneur, manager, planner, historian, and extraordinary human being. Under his leadership, the new museum came into being both on budget ($185 million, including a $40-million endowment) and on time, opening on schedule on July 4, 2003. Small wonder that early in 2004, project completed, Joe moved on to seek public office. I could think of no finer tribute to him than to reiterate the dedication to master architect Christopher Wren, in London’s St. Paul’s Cathedral, circa 1711: “If you would see his monument, look around.”

现在,一位外部董事长在面对一个机构取得的成就时,理应只分得几分功劳——绝不会太多。但聘请理查德·M.(“里克”)斯滕格尔——普林斯顿大学毕业生(还是罗兹学者)——接替乔,结果被证明是一个天赐的决定。我同样竭尽全力支持里克,他也证明了自己拥有非凡的创业和领导才华。2006 年,里克被吸引回去担任《时代》杂志的总编辑,我虽然心碎,但也理解。不过,灵感突现,我迅速打电话给乔。48 小时内,他就同意回到宪法中心。看到他再次执掌那里,我深感欣喜。

Now, an outside chairman deserves only so much credit—and surely not too much—for the accomplishments of an institution. But hiring Richard M. (“Rick”) Stengel, a Princeton graduate (and a Rhodes Scholar, too) as Joe’s successor proved to be a providential decision. Again, I did my best to support Rick, who also proved to have remarkable entrepreneurial and leadership talents. In 2006, when Rick was lured back to lead TIME magazine as its managing editor, I was devastated but understanding. But in a moment of inspiration, I quickly called Joe. Within 48 hours he’d agreed to return to the Constitution Center. I revel in his continued leadership there, second time around.

2006 年晚些时候,当我决定放弃主席职务时,我把这个职位交给了前总统乔治·H·W·布什。能够接替一位后来成为州长的市长,这无疑是一份殊荣;而被一位总统接替,同样是一份殊荣!当我在宪法中心近八年的任期接近尾声时,我收到了许多赞誉,但我最大的贡献,仅仅是认识到与我共事的那两位首席执行官非凡的才能。我毫无保留地支持他们,并在他们提出请求时给予建议。任何归功于我的赞誉,仅仅反映了他们卓越的成就以及我们杰出员工的工作。但我已尽了全力,让国家宪法中心比我 1988 年最初接下那个愿景时变得更好——它确实成为一个真实、鲜活、不断发展的机构,正在将我们的宪法带回到美国生活主流中应有的地位——当年的愿景无比美好,但终究只是愿景,如今已然成为现实。

Later in 2006, when I decided to relinquish my chairmanship, I turned the job over to former President George H. W. Bush. Surely it’s no mean honor to succeed a mayor who became a governor, and a similar honor to be succeeded by a president! While I received many accolades as my near-eight year stint at the Center came to an end, my biggest contribution was the simple recognition of the extraordinary talents of the two chief executives with whom I served. I supported them unstintingly, and advised them whenever they asked. Any credit directed toward me merely reflects their signal achievements and the work of our outstanding staff. But I did my best, and left the National Constitution Center a better place—indeed a real, living, growing institution that is bringing our Constitution back into its deserved position in the mainstream of American life—than I found it in that original vision that I signed on for in 1988—then a wonderful vision, but only a vision, now become a reality.

布莱尔学院 我国年轻公民的教育是另一个让我深感关注的领域。尽管我对国家教育体系的严重缺陷深感忧虑——也完全明白这些看似棘手的问题很大程度上源于令人不安的社会问题,包括贫困、种族歧视、毒品,以及传统上由双亲共同抚养孩子的“核心家庭”逐渐侵蚀——但我很久以前就决定,将自己有限的才能聚焦于教育领域中的一个狭窄分支。

Blair Academy The education of our young citizens is another area of considerable interest to me. While I’m deeply troubled by the profound shortcomings of our nation’s schools—and fully understand that these seemingly intractable problems arise in important measure from disturbing societal issues, including poverty, racial discrimination, drugs, and the gradual erosion of the traditional, well, “nuclear family” in which children are raised by both parents—I long ago decided to focus my own limited talent on a narrow subset of the educational universe.

我来跟你们聊聊这个决定的前因后果。从幼儿园到十年级,我一直在公立学校读书,这些学校目标不高——对学生要求很低,课程设置也有限,不过倒也遇到了一些极其优秀的老师。但我父母对他们这三个儿子寄予厚望,他们意识到我们几个孩子都有能力去迎接更高的标准。虽然家里的经济条件确实拮据得不行,好在靠着慷慨的奖学金和校内外的假期打工,我们都进入了布莱尔学院——新泽西州一所非常出色的私立寄宿学校,离特拉华水峡不远。

Let me tell you a bit about that decision. From kindergarten through tenth grade I attended public schools of moderate ambitions—making small demands on students, and with limited curricula, albeit with some superb teachers. But my parents, ambitious for their three boys, realized that we were all capable of meeting more demanding standards. While our financial resources were meager to a fault, with generous scholarships and jobs (at school and during our vacations) we were admitted to Blair Academy, a wonderful independent boarding school in New Jersey, not far from the Delaware Water Gap.

布莱尔学院改变了我的一生。在那里读完两年后,尽管我起初适应其严格得多的课程时进展缓慢,但我还是以 1947 届第二名的成绩毕业了。那里的老师个个都是教育家,也都有鲜明的个性;他们浑身散发着人格魅力;始终要求学生具备高尚品格;并且把我逼到了能力的极限。如果没有布莱尔学院,我绝不可能被普林斯顿录取。布莱尔学院为我所做的一切,让我对母校欠下了一笔巨债,也背负了一份巨大的责任。

Blair changed my life. At the end of my two years there, despite my slow start in adjusting to its far tougher academic program, I graduated second in the Class of 1947. The masters were all teachers and they were characters; they exuded character; they unfailingly demanded high character of their charges; and they pushed me to the very limits of my abilities. Without Blair, I never could have gained admission to Princeton. Given what Blair did for me, I incurred a huge debt to the Academy, as well as a huge obligation.

我的负债,可以用布莱尔给我的金钱收益精确衡量,而且我早就以美元和美分连本带利地偿还了,远超数倍。但我的亏欠却是无限的。因为我生命中所取得的一切,几乎都始于在那儿度过的几年时光——一个男孩成长为青年,为大学做好了充分准备,被推上人生这片汹涌大海的漫长航程。

My debt can be precisely measured in the financial benefits Blair offered me, and I’ve long since repaid that debt in dollars and cents, many times over. But my obligation is infinite. For virtually everything I’ve achieved in life began with my few years there, when a boy became a young man, well-prepared for college, and launched on his long voyage on the turbulent seas of life.

1970 年受邀加入布莱尔学院的董事会时,我沉浸在回报恩情的机会中。虽然在早期我对董事会事务投入较慢,但 1984 年被选为主席,并担任该职务至 1999 年。(我至今仍是一名尽职的董事。)即便在我的心脏开始衰竭、以及长期住院等待移植的日子里,我仍全身心投入帮助重建母校、制定长远规划、恢复其声誉。在那段时期,我们新增了一栋教学楼、一座艺术中心、一座图书馆、一栋女生宿舍,目前正在建设新学生中心和体育馆。与此同时,我们的捐赠基金从可怜的 90 万美元增长到了合理的(但绝非过多!)5400 万美元。

When I was invited to join Blair’s Board of Trustees in 1970, I reveled in the opportunity to repay my obligation. While in the early years I was slow in getting involved in board affairs, I was elected as its chairman in 1984, and served in that post through 1999. (I continue as a dedicated trustee to this day.) Even as my heart began to fail and during my long siege in the hospital awaiting the transplant, I threw myself into helping to rebuild my old school, to develop a long-range plan, and to restore its reputation. During that era, we’ve added a new classroom building, a new arts center, a new library, and a new girl’s dormitory, and are now building a new student center and gymnasium. At the same time, our endowment fund has risen from a pathetic $900,000 to a reasonable (but hardly excessive!) $54,000,000.

真希望这些都是我个人的成就!可惜,它们并不是。绝大部分功劳属于那位 1989 年加入我们、至今仍在领导这所学校的杰出校长。就像在宪法中心聘用乔和里克一样,聘用钱德勒(“钱恩”)·哈德威克校长及其妻子莫妮,始终是我在布莱尔最大的成就。在优秀的全体教职员工和出色的校友群体的支持下,这两位美好的人倾注毕生心血,将我热爱的这所学校打造成全美最顶尖的学府之一。如今,布莱尔学院培养着卓越的年轻公民,他们将成为美国在新世纪的领导者——与 1945 年(或者说,是它发现了我?)那个遥远的年代相比,这所学校远比当年我找到它时更加优秀。

Would that these were all my personal accomplishments! Alas, they’re not. Most of the credit goes to the remarkable headmaster who joined us in 1989 and leads the school to this day. Even as with Joe and Rick at the Constitution Center, hiring Headmaster T. Chandler (“Chan”) Hardwick and his wife Monie remains my signal achievement at Blair. With the support of a splendid faculty and staff and a fine alumni body, these two wonderful human beings have invested their lives in making the school that I love among the best in the nation. Now educating remarkable young citizens who will serve as America’s leaders in the new century, Blair Academy is a far better institution today than when I found it (or did it find me?) in 1945, all those years ago.

我想先锋集团大概就是如此:当一家公司起初根本不存在时,“让事物比你发现它时更好”这件事做起来倒是相当容易。当然,我说的就是先锋集团,这家我多年前创立的小公司——它始于一个意外,最初只是一场实验。关于先锋集团诞生的那些传说,碰巧都是真的。没错,1974 年 1 月,我被解除了惠灵顿管理公司首席执行官一职。没错,随后我向惠灵顿管理的共同基金董事会提交了一项计划:我将继续担任这些基金的首席执行官,而基金将保留自己的运营员工。没错,经过数月的争执,董事会批准了那个初始计划,先锋集团于 1974 年 9 月 24 日正式成立。(还有,没错,那个名字是我从一本关于英国海军史的老书里挑出来的,在那本书中我第一次了解到纳尔逊勋爵在 1798 年尼罗河战役中的旗舰;它就叫 HMS 先锋号。)

Vanguard I suppose that its fairly easy to leave something better than you found it when it didn’t even exist in the first place. I’m speaking, of course, of Vanguard, the little company that I founded all those years ago, a company started by accident and begun as an experiment. The legends about Vanguard’s creation happen to be true. Yes, in January 1974, I was fired from my job as chief executive of Wellington Management Company. Yes, I then presented a plan to the directors of the Wellington-managed mutual funds under which I would remain as their chief executive, and the funds would retain their own operating staff. Yes, after months of tussling, the directors approved that initial plan, and Vanguard was incorporated on September 24, 1974. (And yes, I picked that name out of an old book of Great Britain’s naval history, where I learned for the first time of Lord Nelson’s flagship at the Battle of the Nile in 1798; it was HMS Vanguard.)

这种独一无二的新结构的诞生,带来了以下四个成果:(1) 在共同基金行业建立了一种新型治理模式——一种共同结构,其中基金投资者的利益优先于基金经理和销售商的利益,用宪法的语言来说,这是一种“属于投资者、为了投资者、由投资者治理”的治理结构。(2) 成立了全球第一只指数共同基金,一个被动投资组合,其设计目标仅仅是复制股票市场提供的回报——而这是一个长期以来极少有投资组合经理能够达到的标准。(3) 发展出一种债券基金管理的新范式,采用了短期、长期和中期投资组合的创新三层结构,这一结构迅速成为行业标准。(4) 几乎在一夜之间,放弃了一个经过验证的、以佣金为导向的、以经纪商为核心的“供给推动”销售体系,转而采用一种全新的、未经考验的、免销售费用、面向自我驱动投资者的“需求拉动”体系。

The creation of that unique new structure led to: (1) the establishment of a new form of governance in the mutual fund industry, a mutual structure in which the interests of fund investors would take precedence over the interests of fund managers and distributors, in constitutional terms, a governance “of the investor, for the investor, and by the investor.” (2) The formation of the world’s first index mutual fund, a passive portfolio designed simply to mimic the returns provided by the stock market, a standard that precious few portfolio managers have measured up to over time. (3) The development of a new paradigm for bond fund management, using innovative three-tier structure of short-term, long-term, and intermediate-term portfolios that quickly became the industry standard. And (4) the abandonment, literally overnight, of a proven broker-dealer, commission-oriented “supply-push” distribution system in favor of a new and untried no-sales-charge, “demand-pull” system for self-motivated investors.

这些变革没有一项是轻易实现的。要完成它们,需要一种不顾一切的态度;一种对风险满不在乎的漠视;一种在没有确凿证据的情况下,坚信它们会成功的深厚信念;以及实现这一切所需的纯粹精力。然而,尽管我们自认为意图高尚,我们的结构完成之初却遭到了证券交易委员会的反对,他们否决了我们的结构,并对我们的上诉拖延了数年。当委员会最终给出了一致同意的批准时,随之而来的一句赞许被证明具有先见之明:“先锋集团计划实际上推进了(1940 年投资公司)法案的目标,并促进了一个健康且可存续的集团的形成,在该集团中,每只基金都能更好地繁荣发展。”

None of these changes came easily. To accomplish them required a devil-may-care attitude; a blasé disregard for risk; a profound conviction, without hard evidence, that they would work; and the sheer energy required to get it all done. Yet despite what we regarded as our noble intentions, the completion of our structure was initially opposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission, which rejected our structure and dawdled over our appeal for years. When the Commission finally gave us its unanimous approval, it came with an endorsement that proved to be prophetic: “The Vanguard plan actually furthers the (1940 Investment Company) Act’s objectives, and promotes a healthy and viable complex in which each fund can better prosper.”

而我们确实繁荣发展了。1981 年,当 SEC 最终给我们亮起绿灯时,距离我们开始已经过去了漫长的七年,股市复苏已经开始,我们的资产翻了一番,从 14 亿美元增加到 30 亿美元。此后,每隔三年,资产就会以惊人的规律性一次又一次地翻番。1983 年,达到 60 亿美元;1985 年,120 亿美元;1986 年,240 亿美元;1989 年,500 亿美元;1992 年,1000 亿美元;1995 年,2000 亿美元;1998 年再次达到 4000 亿美元。非凡!尽管资产再次翻番花费了更长的时间——又过了七年——但我们在 2004 年突破了 8000 亿美元大关。如今,我们管理着 1.1 万亿美元的他人的资金。

And prosper we did. By the time the SEC finally gave us the green light in 1981, seven long years after we began, the stock market recovery had begun, and our assets had doubled, from $1.4 billion to $3 billion. Every three years thereafter, assets would double again and again with remarkable regularity. In 1983, to $6 billion; 1985, $12 billion; 1986, $24 billion; 1989, $50 billion; 1992, $100 billion; 1995, $200 billion; and again to $400 billion in 1998. Remarkable! While it took longer—seven more years—for our assets to double yet again, we crossed the $800-billion mark in 2004. Today we oversee $1.1 trillion of other people’s money.

这种增长无疑可以描述为我们公司在商业上的成功。更重要的是,先锋集团对于我们的基金股东来说,也证明是一种艺术上的成功。我们基金的回报率始终位列行业前列,最近一次被《全球投资者》评为第一名。怎么会不是这样呢?因为这是一个成本决定一切的行业。毕竟,对于作为一个群体的投资者来说,在扣除金融中介的巨大成本之前,战胜股市是一个零和游戏;而扣除这些成本之后,则变成了一个失败者的游戏。这些由谦卑算术构成的无情法则,用布兰代斯大法官的表述方式,在我们的共同结构和我们传奇般的节俭作风支持下,保证了我们会——而且正如我们现在这样,以巨大优势——成为世界上成本最低的金融服务提供商。

Surely that growth can be described as a commercial success for our firm. More importantly, Vanguard has also proved to be an artistic success for our fund shareholders. The returns earned by our funds are consistently ranked near the top of our industry, most recently as #1 by Global Investor. How could it be otherwise? For this is an industry where cost is everything. After all, for investors as a group beating the stock market is a zero-sum game before the huge costs of financial intermediation, that a loser’s game after deducting those costs. These relentless rules of humble arithmetic, using Justice Brandeis’s formulation, backed by our mutual structure and our legendary thriftiness, guaranteed that we would be—as we are, by a huge margin—the world’s lowest-cost provider of financial services.

今天的先锋集团已经成为某种 21 世纪公司的原型——一个虚拟组织;规模巨大;严重依赖流程、实时通信和计算机技术;并主要依据现代管理的当代数字标准来管理。但在我们的核心,至少在我理想主义的眼光看来,我们创立时的价值观在很大程度上仍然完好无损,它们依靠我们常识性的共同结构、我们简单的投资策略以及永恒的真谛——比如服务他人先于服务自我,尽我们所能坚持一个信念,即道德原则和伦理价值最终必须成为任何像样企业的基础——而蓬勃发展。所以,是的,我相当满足——虽然几乎谈不上客观!——相信先锋集团将保持它今天的样子,即我们最初愿景的充分实现。更重要的是,我们对行业产生了积极的影响——方向上是如此,虽然程度上还远远不够——这种影响最终将使共同基金行业成为一个比今天更好的行业。

Today’s Vanguard has become a sort of prototypical 21st century firm—a virtual organization; enormous in size; heavily reliant on process, real-time communications, and computer technology; and managed largely by the contemporary numeric standards of modern management. But at our core, at least through my idealistic eyes, our founding values remain largely intact, thriving on our commonsense mutual structure, on our simple investment strategies, and on eternal verities such as service to others before service to self, doing our best to hold high the belief that ethical principles and moral values must be, finally, the basis for any enterprise worth its salt. So yes, I’m reasonably comfortable—if hardly objective!— in my conviction that, Vanguard will remain the fully-realized manifestation of our original vision that it is today. What is more, we have made a positive impact on our industry—in direction, if hardly in magnitude—that will ultimately make the mutual fund industry a better industry than it is today.

金融市场 但是,在我创立先锋集团之前很多年,我就已经首次接触了我们的金融市场。(在那之前,鉴于我们家庭的状况,我对巨额债务和咄咄逼人的还款通知非常熟悉,但对投资一无所知——零。)但当我 1949 年 12 月偶然翻开《财富》杂志时,我第一次了解到了共同基金行业。我被这个当时“微小但充满争议”的行业的前景所吸引和启发,并以它为题写了我的普林斯顿大学论文。那篇论文又直接引领我在 1951 年夏天获得了第一份全职工作——在费城沃尔特·L·摩根的威灵顿基金——我此后在金融市场的职业生涯就此开始。

The Financial Markets But it was years before I founded Vanguard that I first engaged with our financial markets. (Until then, given our family’s circumstances, I was very familiar with large debts and threatening repayment notices, but knew nothing—zero—about investments.) But when I happened to open FORTUNE magazine in December 1949, I learned of the mutual fund industry for the first time. I was intrigued and inspired by the prospects of this then “tiny but contentious” industry, and wrote my Princeton thesis about it. The thesis, in turn, led directly to my first full-time job in the summer of 1951—with Philadelphian Walter L. Morgan’s Wellington Fund—and my career in the financial markets began.

如果说我觉得我们国家的市场在我离开时比我早在 1949 年发现它时状况更好,那将是很可笑的。这么说也是错误的。因为机构投资已经从早期专注于信托专业的职业标准,进入了一个以资产汇集和推销术为特征的新时代,从管理转向营销,从长期投资的智慧转向短期投机的愚蠢,从股票的所有者转变为股票的租用者。(20 世纪 50 年代和 60 年代,股票市场的换手率大约为 25%;如今是 150%——高达六倍。)这些变化对投资者不利。

It would be, well, fatuous to think that I’ve left our nation’s markets in better shape than when I first found them way back in 1949. It would also be wrong. For institutional investing has moved from an earlier era focused on the professional standards of trusteeship to a new era of asset gathering and salesmanship, from management to marketing, from the wisdom of long-term investing to the folly of short-term speculation, and from being owners of stocks to renters. (Turnover of shares in the stock market was about 25 percent in the 1950s and 1960s; today it is 150 percent—six times as high.) These changes have ill-served investors.

所以,在我遍及全国的演讲中,尤其在我最近的两本书(《资本家的灵魂之战》和《常识性投资的小书》)中,我不知羞耻地努力倡导,让资本主义和金融市场回归到那些曾使它们在早期成为无价国家资产的价值观念上。只有让我们的经济体系回归其引以为傲的根基,并将重点放在长期投资而非短期投机上,资本主义的任务才能很好地完成。《纽约时报》周日版、《今日美国》周一版,以及今天的《华尔街日报》对《常识性投资的小书》的精彩评论给了我勇气,我受到鼓舞,看到这个信息终于开始获得关注。

So in my speeches across the land, and especially in my most recent two books (The Battle for the Soul of Capitalism, and The Little Book of Common Sense Investing), I’m shamelessly campaigning to return capitalism and the financial markets to the values that made them such priceless national assets in an earlier age. Only if we return our economic system to its proud roots, and focus on long-term investing rather than short-term speculation will the job of capitalism be well done. Emboldened by the fine reviews of The Little Book in Sunday’s New York Times, in Monday’s USA Today, and in today’s Wall Street Journal, I’m encouraged that the message is finally beginning to gain traction.

从金融市场的运作到思考我们在未来几年可能从股票中获得怎样的回报,仅需一小步。(我们的主办方要求我讨论这个问题。)虽然只有傻瓜才会试图预测股票市场短期内的走势——唉,有很多傻瓜确实在这么做——但预测长期回报在很大程度上是另一组简单的“谦卑算术的无情法则”的产物,其概念类似于在维持低投资成本与获取你在股票市场回报中公平份额之间的因果联系。

It’s only a small step from the workings of the financial markets to the consideration of what returns we might expect from stocks in the years ahead. (Our host has asked me to discuss this question.) While only a fool tries to predict what the stock market will do in the short term—there are, alas, lots of fools who do exactly that—predicting long-term returns is largely a product of another set of those simple “relentless rules of humble arithmetic,” similar in concept to the causal linkage between maintaining low investment costs and capturing your fair share of stock market returns.

为什么会这样?虽然短期内股票回报主要由情绪决定——例如乐观、悲观、希望、贪婪和恐惧——但从长期来看,它们几乎完全由经济因素决定。例如,在过去一个世纪中,普通股产生的 9.6% 的年均名义总回报率(扣除通胀前)中,整整 9.5% 来自于 4.5% 的平均股息收益率和 5.0% 的平均盈利增长——这是美国企业创造的资本投资回报。剩下的 0.1% 来自投机回报,即投资者愿意在期末比期初为每一美元的公司盈利支付略高的价格。

Why so? While in the short-run stock returns are largely shaped by emotions—such as optimism, pessimism, hope, greed, and fear—in the long run they are shaped almost entirely by economics. For example, over the past century, of the 9.6 percent average annual nominal (before inflation) Total Return generated by common stocks, fully 9.5 percent was accounted for by the average dividend yield of 4.5 percent and average earnings growth of 5.0 percent—the Investment Return on capital earned by America’s businesses, The remaining 0.1 percent came from Speculative Return, the willingness of investors to pay a slightly higher price for each dollar of corporate earnings at the end of the period than at the beginning.

由于今天在座的各位大部分都不是投资专业人士,让我用几年前我就在这个大厅里使用过的、通俗的比喻来解释这个概念。那时,我发表了一篇题为“贝果面包圈和多纳圈”的、略显粗粝的演讲来解释股票市场回报。那是 2000 年 1 月 5 日,几乎正好是股市的顶峰;场合是费城周日早餐俱乐部的一次会议。在演讲中,我借用了威廉·萨菲尔在其文章“贝果面包圈 vs. 多纳圈”中启发我的一个类比。萨菲尔告诉我们,这两种烘焙食品形状相似但特性不同:贝果面包圈是“严肃的、有民族特色的、难以消化的。多纳圈是有趣的、易碎的、甜的、令人发胖的。”

Since a majority of you here today are not investment professionals, let me put this concept in the homey terms I used in this very hall just a few years ago. Then, I explained stock market returns with a, well, crusty speech entitled “The Bagel and the Doughnut.” The date was January 5, 2000, almost precisely at the stock market’s peak; the occasion, a meeting of Philadelphia’s Sunday Breakfast Club. In my remarks, I relied on an analogy inspired by William Safire in his essay, “Bagels vs. Doughnuts.” These baked goods, Safire tells us, are similar in shape but different in character: Bagels are “serious, ethnic, and hard to digest. Doughnuts are fun, crumbly, sweet, and fattening.”

我认为,投资回报是股票市场的贝果面包圈,反映了内在商业价值的现实。其基本特性是营养的、有嚼头的和务实的。投机回报是市场本身松软、诱人、甜美的多纳圈,反映了投资预期,并受瞬间股票价格的幻觉驱动,尽管它看似精确。贝果面包圈式的投资经济学在长期几乎必然有成效;多纳圈式的投资情绪则反复无常,在很大程度上无法预测——看看 20 世纪 80 年代和 90 年代的大牛市,以及它在 2000-2002 年的崩盘,几乎完全是由于投资情绪这个多纳圈从投资者无节制乐观的甜蜜柔软,变成了尖锐苦涩的悲观。

Investment return, I argued, is the bagel of the stock market, reflecting the reality of intrinsic business values. Its underlying character is nutritious, crusty and hard-boiled. Speculative return is the spongy, tempting, and sweet doughnut of the market itself, reflecting investment expectations and driven by the illusion of momentary stock prices, however precise. The bagel-like economics of investing are almost inevitably productive in the long run; the doughnut-like emotions of investing are fickle and largely unpredictable—witness the Great Bull Market of the 1980s and 1990s, and its collapse in 2000-2002, almost entirely the result of a change in the doughnut of investing from the soft sweetness of unbridled optimism on the part of investors to the acid sourness of pessimism.

在 2000 年 1 月 5 日的那次演讲中,我考虑了新千年第一个十年股市的前景。我只问了两个问题:(1) 投资基本面的贝果面包圈会像往常一样给我们提供营养吗?(2) 投机的多纳圈会比我演讲时更甜吗,还是最终会再次变酸?

In that January 5, 2000 speech, I considered the outlook for the stock market during the first decade of the new millennium. I asked just two questions: (1) Will the bagel of investment fundamentals give us its usual sustenance? And (2) Will the doughnut of speculation get even sweeter than it was when I spoke, or will it finally sour again?

关于投资回报的第一个问题,我的答案如下:由于当时的股票股息收益率处于 1% 出头的历史低点,它肯定会很少贡献于未来的投资回报。(请记住,长期均值是 4.5%。)至于盈利增长,我永远是个乐观主义者,我猜测 8% 的增长或许可能。因此,投资经济学表明投资回报为 9.2%——即 1.2% 的股息收益率加上 8% 的盈利增长。

Here’s how I answered the first question about investment return: Since the dividend yield on stocks was then at an all-time low of just over 1 percent, it was sure to contribute little to future investment returns. (Remember that the long-term norm was 4 ½ percent.) As to earnings growth, ever the optimist, I guessed that 8 percent growth might be possible. Thus, the economics of investing suggested an investment return of 9.2 percent—the 1.2 percent yield, plus 8 percent earnings growth.

关于投机回报的第二个问题,我的答案是:在 90 年代驱使股票回报攀升至天际的看涨情绪,不可能再次出现。毕竟,当时的股票以 30 倍的市盈率成交;几乎是长期均值 16 倍的两倍。(市场当时在想什么?!)我建议说,市盈率可能会下降到大约 20 倍,从而每年从预计的 9.2% 的投资回报中削减 4 个百分点,进而将 21 世纪第一个十年期间股票的总回报降低到大约 5%,仅为长期均值 9.6% 的一半左右。

My answer to question (2) about speculative return: The bullish emotions that had driven stock returns skyward during the 1990’s, could not recur. After all, stocks were then selling at 30 times earnings; almost double the long-term norm of 16 times. (What was the market thinking?!) I suggested that P/E ratio would drop to perhaps 20 times, slashing 4 percentage points per year from the projected investment return of 9.2 percent, thereby reducing the total return on stocks to about 5 percent during the first decade of the 21st century, only about one-half of the long-term norm of 9.6 percent.

尽管我的预测当时被视为荒谬的悲观,但实际上证明是稍微乐观了一点。盈利增长几乎与我猜测的 8% 完全一致,但市盈率暴跌至 17 倍,略低于我预测的 20 倍。但就总回报而言,这个预测看起来相当不错,市场有望在截至 2009 年的十年期间产生大约每年 4% 的总回报——与我七年前预测的 5% 这个数字惊人地接近。

While my projection was then seen as absurdly pessimistic, in fact it proved to be a bit too optimistic. Earnings growth was virtually identical to my 8 percent guess-timate, but the price/earnings multiple tumbled to 17 times, somewhat below my projection of 20 times. But in terms of Total Return, the forecast looks pretty good, with the market on track to produce about a total return of 4 percent per year during the decade ending in 2009—remarkably close to the 5 percent figure that I forecast seven years ago.

于是,汲取了智慧、常识、运气,以及朴实无华的算术法则的鼓舞,让我们展望未来十年。我预计投资回报的贝果将是相当正面的,很可能在每年 8% 的区间;即,将当前较高但依然吝啬的 2% 股息收益率,加上我猜想的 6% 左右的盈利增长。(毕竟,公司盈利的增长速度与我们经济的名义增长率大致相同。这又有什么新鲜的呢?)至于投机回报,我认为投资者有点过于乐观了,因此我预期估值会略微走低——一个不那么甜蜜的甜甜圈——或许会将股票的总回报率压低至每年 7%。这个预测会和我之前的猜测一样准确吗?只有时间能给出答案,但在经验丰富的投资者中,认为我们正面临股市回报低迷时代的绝非我一人。

So, emboldened by a combination of wisdom, common sense, luck, and yes, the relentless rules of humble arithmetic, let’s look ahead to the next ten years. I expect the bagel of investment return to be nicely positive, most likely in the range of eight percent per year; i.e., adding today’s dividend yield of a higher but still stingy two percent to what I’ll guess is earnings growth in the six percent range. (After all, corporate earnings grow at about the same nominal rate as our economy. What else is new?) As to speculative return, I think investors are a bit too optimistic, and therefore I look to slightly lower valuations—a doughnut not quite so sweet—perhaps lowering the Total Return on stocks to 7 percent per year. Will that forecast be as accurate as my previous guess? Only time will tell, but I am hardly alone among experienced investors who believe we are facing an era of subdued returns in the stock market.

如果那个 7% 的预测是正确的,投资者明智的做法是尽力去抓住它。这意味着低成本、长期的投资——没错,正是指数基金所做的——这将保证你无论我们的金融市场慷慨地提供了怎样的回报,你都能获得自己应得的一份,这是完美的赢家游戏。这也意味着要认清并接受高成本、短期的投机——包含其所有的交易成本、昂贵的管理费和不必要的税费——是完美的输家游戏。尽管我们的金融体系失败了,但你完全有理由避开它的无数陷阱,并因此成为赢家。

If that 7 percent projection is correct, investors would be wise to do their best to capture it. That means low-cost, long-term investing—yes, just what an index fund does—that will guarantee you with your fair share of whatever returns our financial markets are generous enough to provide, the consummate winner’s game. And it means recognizing and accepting that high-cost, short-term speculation—with all of its trading costs, expensive management fees, and unnecessary taxes—is the consummate loser’s game. Despite the failure of our financial system, then, there is no reason you can’t avoid its myriad potholes, and by so doing be a winner.

总结

当我回顾那些我有幸参与其生命的机构时,我承认自己让一丝骄傲流露了出来——尽管我已尽力(用本杰明·富兰克林辛辣的话语来说)“尽可能地去掩饰它、打压它、抑制它、羞辱它,但骄傲仍会时不时地冒头。”因此,当我承认我可能或多或少让国家宪法中心、布莱尔学院和先锋集团变得比我发现它们时更好时,这一点也同样适用。唉,我不能说在我为让共同基金行业重拾其光荣传统、为我们的国家建立一个更好的金融体系、以及让资本主义在我们的社会中回归更富生产力的角色而进行的这场逆风之战中,我也做到了同样的事。尽管如此,我绝对坚信,我的奋斗让我站在了历史正确的一边,并且我的努力有一天将带来积极的改变。

Wrapping Up As I look back over the institutions whose lives I’ve been privileged to touch, I confess to letting a little pride peep out—much as I’ve tried (in Benjamin Franklins pungent words) to “disguise it, beat it down, stifle it, mortify it as much as one pleases, pride will nonetheless every now and then peep out.” And so it does when I concede that I’ve likely left the National Constitution Center, Blair Academy, and Vanguard, to some degree at least, better than I found them. Alas, I cannot say that I’ve done the same in my against-all-odds fight to restore the mutual fund industry to its proud heritage, to build a better financial system for our nation, and to return capitalism to a more productive role in our society. Nonetheless, I hold the absolute conviction that my crusade places me on the right side of history, and that positive change will one day result from my efforts.

而且我不会放弃。毕竟,我又怎能忽视我在开头告诉你那串家族价值观时的最后一句鼓舞人心的箴言呢:“不论如何,继续前进。”

And I’m not giving up. After all, how could I possibly ignore final inspirational saying in that litany of family values that I told you about at the outset: “Press On, Regardless.”